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CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 98 (<i>continued</i>):	
General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	
Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	
Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	
Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	
Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General	
Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security: report of the Secretary-General	
Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace	
General debate (<i>continued</i>)	1

Chairman: Mr. Milko TARABANOV (Bulgaria).

**AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 AND 98
(*continued*)**

General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8328, A/8337, A/8457, A/C.1/1018, A/C.1/L.588)

Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8457, A/C.1/L.578 to 582)

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8457, A/C.1/L.583 to 585)

Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/8336/Rev.1, A/8346, A/8435, A/C.1/L.587)

Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security: report of the Secretary-General (A/8469 and Add.1)

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace
(A/8492 and Add.1)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. GHORRA (Lebanon): When we were dealing with the question of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, we expressed the commonly shared view that the greatest threat to international security was the arms race. To speak of the catastrophic dangers of thermonuclear war is to speak about the obvious. However, it is our duty to bring out this fact as often as we can in a constant endeavour to arouse the concern of the international public and to enlist its aid in a common struggle for disarmament as the best means of ensuring international peace and security.

2. The nuclear weapons currently deployed on land and at sea have an explosive power of over 350,000 megatons—enough to kill every human being 70 times over, to obliterate life on earth and to transform the earth into a wasteland. This is equivalent in destructive power to 15 tons of TNT for each person on earth, or to over 60 tons *per capita* for the inhabitants of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries. The financial resources devoted to military purposes passed the \$200,000 million mark in 1970—a trend which is continuing upwards. It is estimated that, if unchecked, this amount will reach \$300,000 million before the end of the present decade. Thus, nearly \$60 is spent *per capita* in the world for destructive means, while the average annual income of an individual in many of the least developed countries is almost the same amount—an amount hardly sufficient for human survival.

3. Even the most developed and industrialized nation, the United States of America, is gripped by many social and financial problems. We read nowadays about the \$1,500 million deficit in the New York State budget—a deficit which will have ill effects on the problems of environment, health, education, housing, transportation and social disorder. This problem is not peculiar to New York State or to New York City, but to many states and cities in this country where over \$7,000 million are being spent annually for research only in the field of military technology to develop more sophisticated weapons. I wish to add that the Soviet Union and many other major Powers are not lagging behind in these matters.

4. The most terrifying aspect of arms technology is the limitless possibility that such technology has opened up for

future weaponry. Most of the weapons we have today will have become obsolete in a few years, since the rate of acceleration of such technology is overwhelming. At the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, Frederick Engels believed that the weapons used in that war had been perfected to such a degree that no further progress was possible. We see today how wrong Engels was. Technocrats, scientists and we diplomats can no longer be short-sighted with regard to future developments along these lines. We cannot delude ourselves with the belief that the ultimate objectives and capabilities of arms technology have been attained.

5. It is claimed that scientists are able to predict much of what the future holds in store for the human race in the field of weaponry. For the non-experts like myself it is sufficient only to read the news that is disseminated daily about the advances made in arms technology in order to realize how foreboding the oncoming years are. The future potentialities of nuclear weapons are likely to increase the present level of overkill at least a thousand times *per capita*. What an absurd waste of resources and energies; what a lunatic depreciation of human life. Scientists are and will continue to be preoccupied with the development and application of many innovations in military technology: lasers, hypersonic aircraft, rocket belts for infantrymen—the flying infantrymen—desintegrator rays, and so forth. These are ominous prospects for mankind. Even if a war does not occur for man to use all these military possibilities, the fact remains that if he proceeds along such a technological path unchecked, he may well have to surrender to the slavery of the machines and the techniques he has invented. He may then find himself devoid of all his freedoms and exposed to spiritual, moral and economic decay. Indeed, this would be a bleak future for the human race.

6. The outcry here at the United Nations and on the world scene is for the reduction of resources devoted to arms research, production and stockpiling, and for the diversion of such resources towards productive and peaceful purposes. We realize that the dream of humanity to attain a state of general and complete disarmament is far-reaching. However, concrete steps must constantly be taken to achieve such a goal. The activities of the United Nations must be quickened and sustained. Many partial, marginal and collateral agreements about the various aspects of disarmament have been realized or are soon to be realized. However laudable they may be, they must usher us into a new era—an era during which our work must be directed towards the fundamental problems of disarmament.

7. Recently, a world conference for disarmament was proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union. We supported this proposal in principle in the General Assembly. We believe that the conference should be held within the framework of the United Nations, that the necessary consultations and preparations must be made within that framework, and that the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament must continue to play a principal role in its conduct. They must define the guidelines of the conference, prepare its proposals and conventions in order to enable it to take decisive actions, and set time limits in order to prevent it from becoming another permanent organ, preoccupied with

useless and unproductive deliberations. Until such a conference is convened, however, and more comprehensive agreements reached, we can enlarge upon what the United Nations has already achieved within the possibilities offered us.

8. One of the major guarantees against the dangers of nuclear war is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] of 1968. We can understand the value of the argument that this Treaty consolidates the position of the nuclear super-Powers while preventing other nations from having access to nuclear armament. It is equally understandable that nuclear deterrence is not a sure guarantee against nuclear war or catastrophe. But we cannot agree to the premise that because of these factors more and more nations should enjoy the privilege of acquiring nuclear war capability for extended periods of time. To allow this process to continue is to increase the risks of nuclear war. In fact, it has become possible for scores of nations with modest technological and industrial bases to produce nuclear weapons in the next decade or two. Such a course is not a logical alternative to the non-proliferation Treaty. The better alternative would be for all nations to adhere to it, thus making it truly universal. Undoubtedly, the super-Powers would be left alone, glorified with the possession of nuclear weapons. The task, then, of all peoples would be to create a momentum for disarmament and to continue to work towards achievement of this objective by putting enough moral and political pressure upon the military Powers, by encouraging them, and by urging them first to halt the arms race and subsequently to reduce and finally destroy the nuclear stockpiles, sites and means of delivery. A wider coalition of non-nuclear Powers to impress the need for nuclear disarmament upon the nuclear Powers is by far more effective than a growing club of nuclear nations. The coalition has a better chance of succeeding than has the club. A smaller membership in the club—no matter how powerful it may be—will have to assume greater responsibility towards the coalition and towards mankind, or it will have to forfeit its ambitions of world leadership.

9. Furthermore, the accession of more Powers to the non-proliferation Treaty will be an added guarantee for denuclearized peace zones. Universal recognition of this Treaty, on the one hand, and respect for the denuclearized zones such as those of Latin America, Africa, and the Nordic States on the part of the major Powers, on the other hand, will enhance the prospects for peace. The more denuclearized zones and zones of peace that are created the greater will be the benefit. In this context, Ceylon's proposal to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace [*A/8492 and Add.1*] is a welcome one. Such zones, multiplied and widened, should ultimately be knitted together to produce one global zone for peace—the planet Earth.

10. The test ban Treaty of 1963¹ is also considered a major breakthrough. To give it its full significance and to prevent the dangers of nuclear testing, it must become comprehensive, and all tests must be banned at all times

¹ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

and everywhere. The reasons which have prevented the Treaty from encompassing all tests are yielding steadily to technological progress. Political and military considerations remain the main obstacles to agreement. Yet it is already considered feasible to distinguish with certainty some types of underground nuclear tests from natural earth tremors. These tests could be verified by a world-wide network of seismographic instruments. Their prohibition could become the subject of a protocol to be appended to the test ban Treaty. An additional protocol might be attached at a later stage for the remainder of the underground tests on which there has not yet been any accord, once a full agreement has been reached about acceptable means for their control and verification.

11. It follows that if a total ban cannot be initiated quickly, as is generally desired, the nuclear powers and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament could intensify their consultations and work to put into effect what the Secretary-General described as transitional measures. In paragraph 194 of the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization,² he stated the following:

"It was felt that if, against all hope, there was any further delay in achieving an immediate comprehensive test ban, a number of temporary transitional measures could be undertaken immediately to limit and reduce the magnitude and number of underground nuclear tests, and to phase them out, pending the achievement of a comprehensive agreement. Such transitional measures can certainly help to reduce the dangers and risks inherent in continued testing, while negotiations proceed urgently for the complete cessation of all tests except those that are permitted for peaceful purposes."

12. In the light of these considerations, the Lebanese delegation supports the joint memorandum on a comprehensive test-ban treaty [A/8457, annex C, sect. 34], presented to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by nine non-aligned members of the Committee and will also view favourably, at the time of voting, the draft resolutions submitted by the delegations of Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Sweden, Canada, and others, contained in documents A/C.1/L.583, 584 and 585.

13. The greatest threat to world peace has occurred in Europe, where a massive accumulation of nuclear and conventional arms has occurred, and where complex problems growing out of the Second World War have eluded a final settlement for 26 years. Some positive signs, however, are changing the European scene. There has been a relaxation of tensions and a general rapprochement between East and West. The Berlin Agreement, the prospects of solutions to German problems, and projected negotiations for a mutual balanced reduction of arms between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) under way between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the proposed conference on European security, are all conducive to improving the climate of peace and co-operation in Europe and to reducing the risks of confrontation between the

major super-Powers. Such healthy developments, if maintained and intensified, might well lead to more bilateral and multinational negotiations for significant reductions in arms and in the deployment of armies, and might consequently enhance the prospects of disarmament.

14. An additional sign of encouragement is the fact that the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed, the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, approved by the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly [resolution 2660 (XXV), annex], was open for signature on 11 February 1971 and that by mid-July last, it had already been signed by 81 States.

15. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for this year, contained in document A/8457, dated 6 October 1971, includes a very important draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. This draft convention responded partially to resolution 2662 (XXV)—to operative paragraph 6—adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 1970. The Lebanese delegation wishes to record its appreciation towards the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for this significant achievement which ended the long stalemate in the negotiations on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons. The spirit of compromise shown by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union made this achievement possible, and the contributions made by the non-aligned members improved the original text submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

16. As we stated last year in this Committee, we would have preferred the draft convention to deal with the prohibition of both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. We view with satisfaction, however, the provision contained in article IX of the draft convention, which affirms that the signatory Powers will "continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition" of chemical weapons. Thus, the draft convention is considered as a "first possible step" and a link is maintained between the two types of weapons. The need to negotiate in good faith for an early prohibition of the chemical weapons is sufficiently stressed.

17. Other commendable principles in the draft convention deal with first, the total prohibition, contained in article I: this article forbids the development, production, stockpiling, and retaining of weapons under any circumstances; secondly, the duration of the Convention: according to article XIII, the convention shall be of unlimited duration; thirdly, the reaffirmation in article VIII of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare³ of 17 June 1925. We are gratified that, as stated by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report, many States are adhering to this Protocol.

18. For those considerations and others, the Lebanese delegation was happy to join in sponsoring the draft

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

³ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/L.579 and 580. We believe that these two drafts commend themselves to unanimous adoption by the Committee. Even with this new achievement, we are still far from our main objective: general and complete disarmament. Yet, this is a positive step, one that is certainly in the right direction.

19. At its twenty-fifth commemorative session last year, the General Assembly launched simultaneously the Second United Nations Development Decade and the Disarmament Decade and also adopted the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. To our minds, the three decisions are linked together. Progress in one will enhance the prospects of progress in the others. There is recognition, as there never was before, that international peace and security can be achieved by the cessation of the production of arms, the reduction and destruction of arms stockpiles, and the diversion of human, financial, and economic resources thus released to the field of development on both the national and international planes. In our quest for peace, it is primordial to free ourselves from the science of war and apply our capabilities in a constant, imaginative, positive and dynamic fashion to the science of peace.

20. Human progress and civilization have reached such a degree of alertness and awareness concerning the futility of the arms race that it can now better appreciate the words of a former British statesman, Lord Grey, who once stated: "If civilization cannot destroy armaments, armaments will destroy civilization."

21. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translation from Russian*): The discussion at the current session of the United Nations General Assembly of matters relating to disarmament shows how serious is the attention paid by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations to disarmament, one of the most important problems of our day.

22. The continuation of the arms race into the nuclear and space age represents a serious threat, and its negative influence on the life of society is today far more harmful than at any time in the past. We spoke of this in detail at the 1995th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, when we supported the proposal of the Soviet Union for the convening of a world disarmament conference. Here we wish merely to emphasize that the negative political, economic and social consequences of the arms race are leading to ever more numerous demands from peoples for its cessation and reversal in order to strengthen international security and universal peace and to divert the human and material resources liberated as a result of disarmament to enhancing the economic and cultural well-being of mankind.

23. From the first days of its existence the Soviet State has consistently and unflinchingly struggled for a just peace, against the arms race, for the reduction of tension, for disarmament and for peaceful coexistence.

24. The struggle for an end to the arms race and for disarmament, to the extent of general and complete disarmament, is one of the most important aspects of the foreign policy of the Soviet peoples. In the spring of this year, the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party

of the Soviet Union drew up a programme for foreign policy in the field of disarmament. The aims of this programme are: to achieve the conclusion of treaties banning nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons; to work for nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapon States; to strive for the cessation, everywhere and by everyone, of all nuclear weapon tests; to promote the creation of nuclear-free zones; to struggle for the removal of foreign military bases and for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in areas where military confrontations are particularly dangerous, and above all in central Europe; to evolve measures to reduce the probability of the accidental development or deliberate instigation of armed conflicts and to reach agreement on the limitation of military expenditure, in the first instance on the part of large States.

25. The programme contains a proposal for a conference of the five nuclear Powers to seek ways to achieve nuclear disarmament. On 23 June the Soviet Government, following up this initiative, made a special statement to all the nuclear Powers in which it was suggested that they should begin through diplomatic channels an exchange of views on matters connected with the timing of the conference, the place where it might be held, its agenda and order of work [A/8328]. The Byelorussian delegation is firmly convinced of the importance and timeliness of this Soviet proposal and sincerely regrets that this point of view is not shared by all the nuclear Powers.

26. Recently the General Assembly concluded its general debate on the proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the convening of a world disarmament conference to discuss the whole range of disarmament questions and if the majority of participants in the conference so desire, the questions of the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. It was proposed that all questions relating to disarmament should be discussed by all the world States, before the eyes of all humanity and bearing in mind the interests of all countries and peoples. To our surprise, this proposal, which has received such wide support, has met with additional opposition on the part of certain delegations.

27. Our approach to the discussion of disarmament questions is based on the belief that they can be successfully solved if all participants in the negotiations adopt a constructive position, are prepared to consider each other's proposals and do not make preconditions before talks have even begun. In our opinion, the tactic of making preconditions is employed in cases where there is no political willingness to hold constructive discussions. For its part, the Byelorussian SSR welcomes whole-heartedly any type of discussion which might lead to progress in disarmament. We also welcome any partial agreement which is intended to slow down the arms race, to prevent the further development of weapons technology, to prohibit the militarization of new fields and branches and to reduce international tension.

28. The first significant success gained by all the peace-loving forces in the struggle to curb the nuclear arms race was the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,⁴ signed at

⁴ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

Moscow in 1963. This was then followed by the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [*resolution 2222 (XXI), annex*]; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], barring the spread of nuclear weapons, which would endanger peace; the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [*resolution 2660 (XXV), annex*].

29. These treaties were concluded on the initiative of the Soviet Union and were drawn up as a result of the collective efforts of the international community. They have been signed by an overwhelming majority of world States, showing that those countries recognize the importance, practical advantage and value of the measures to limit and restrain the nuclear arms race contained in the treaties. In addition, the United Nations General Assembly constantly adopts resolutions calling upon States to become parties to those treaties.

30. Unfortunately, however, we sometimes, even in the First Committee, hear sceptical statements and denigration of the progress so far achieved with regard to disarmament. Those who criticize the treaties which have been concluded overlook the fact that these agreements represent steps on the road towards disarmament and they fail to bear in mind that the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament have before them proposals for other treaties and agreements, including a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

31. The Byelorussian SSR, together with many other parties to the treaties which have been signed and are now in force, considers that those treaties must be strengthened and new agreements reached to overcome the resistance of those who oppose them. In this connexion we consider that one valid test of the genuineness of the desire of any country to achieve disarmament and to strive to reach an understanding on this question is its attitude to treaties already adopted to restrain and limit the arms race.

32. At present the Committee has before it a number of draft resolutions concerning the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. Their merit lies in the fact that they are born of the need to end all nuclear tests in all places and by all nations. At the same time, these proposals, like the statements of certain representatives, demonstrate that the road chosen to reach that goal is not the most direct, and sometimes not even the most correct.

33. It is widely known that the current level of development of science and technology and the range of seismic services make it possible to monitor underground nuclear tests using national means of detection and, on this basis, to reach agreement on and implement a ban on all nuclear tests. All that is required is the goodwill of those who still continue to set off nuclear explosions despite the Moscow Treaty, and also a political decision by all the nuclear Powers to refrain from underground testing. This should be provided for as a matter of priority in the Assembly's decisions. In line with this, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR considers that there is no advantage to be

gained from needless preoccupation with the technical aspects of the problem of banning underground nuclear tests, from blanket condemnation of all the nuclear Powers for any nuclear explosions, whether they are prohibited by the Moscow Treaty or have not yet been banned by an international agreement, or from a different approach in appeals concerning underground nuclear tests to countries which are parties to the Moscow Treaty and to those which are unwilling to accede to it. If we desire a complete ban on nuclear tests, we must strive to achieve universal compliance with the existing treaty and to reach an understanding on the banning of underground tests on the basis of national monitoring of such a ban.

34. As early as the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, the delegations of the Byelorussian SSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons.⁵ At the twenty-fifth session, these socialist countries, taking into account the comments and wishes of other countries, introduced a revised draft convention.⁶ As a result of this, the problem of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons, which had long been neglected, has been the subject in recent years of active and practical discussions. The socialist States, together with a large group of non-aligned countries, supported the urgent and simultaneous banning of both types of weapon. However, the discussions on this question came to an impasse in view of the position of the Western countries. In an attempt to break the deadlock, the socialist countries displayed flexibility and a constructive approach, and on 30 March this year introduced a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [*A/8457, annex C, sect. 8*]. The Byelorussian SSR was also a sponsor of that draft convention. We fully support the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [*ibid., annex A*] submitted for the approval of the General Assembly in the form in which it has been prepared by the Committee on Disarmament. We consider that agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons is the first possible step towards achieving agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

35. As is known, the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons was at one time settled in the form of a treaty in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.⁷ That international instrument has stood the test of time, and has shown itself to be a viable and important agreement. However, some States have not yet acceded to

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 104, document A/7655.*

⁶ *Ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 and 94, document A/8136.*

⁷ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

it, and among them we must mention above all the United States, which two years ago announced its intention to ratify it but has still not done so, solely because that country itself isolates the provisions of the Geneva Protocol.

36. It is known that certain kinds of poisonous chemical substances are being used on a large scale by the United States against the patriotic forces and the civilian population of South Viet-Nam, and also by the Portuguese colonialists against the national freedom fighters. The United Nations General Assembly has more than once condemned those who violate the Geneva Protocol. At the suggestion of the non-aligned countries and with the support of the socialist States, the United Nations adopted a resolution to the effect that the Geneva Protocol prohibits the use in international armed conflicts of any chemical and biological agents of warfare.

37. In this connexion we consider it important that the draft convention on bacteriological and toxin weapons recognizes the important significance of the Geneva Protocol, reaffirms adherence to the principles and objectives set out therein and calls upon all States to comply strictly with them.

38. Our position on the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons from the military arsenals of all States is well known. In accordance with that position, the Byelorussian SSR is also a sponsor of the corresponding draft resolutions, A/C.1/L.579 and 580, which, we believe, will be adopted by an overwhelming majority.

39. I should like to say a few words in connexion with the proposal by Ceylon to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace [A/8492 and Add.1]. The Byelorussian SSR is interested in seeing all continents, islands, oceans and seas become a total zone of peace. However, we appreciate that it is difficult to achieve everything at the same time and we therefore consider that the question of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean should be the subject of consideration and of a decision by the appropriate States on the basis of equality.

40. In our opinion, the approach to the solution of this problem should be based on a certain logic and on respect for the existing rules of international law. If it is intended to declare any area to be a zone of peace, provision must be made for the removal of any foreign military bases in that area and for an appeal to all remaining States to agree not to establish new bases there. This must be a fundamental provision of any international instrument which declares a region to be a zone of peace. It is necessary in such matters to proceed from the existing universally recognized rules of international law laid down in the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the law of the sea, which provide for freedom of navigation on the high seas and establish the right for all vessels, including warships, to carry out scientific investigations in that area. Subject to that provision, we are in favour of a study being made by those bodies which are holding talks on disarmament, namely, the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament, together with all the nuclear Powers, of the question of declaring the Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace.

41. The strengthening of international security and disarmament are in the front rank of the major international problems which have a considerable influence on general international trends and prospects. Being aware of this, the socialist countries are constantly seeking ways to settle those problems and introducing new proposals. Unfortunately, their initiatives are frequently met by intentionally unacceptable conditions or stipulations, by the lumping together of questions of a differing nature or, on the other hand, by the separation of interconnected questions.

42. On matters of disarmament the socialist countries adopt a constructive position and will accept reasonable compromises if they further the cause of disarmament. However, it has happened that when the socialist countries agreed to accept proposals by the other side, the sponsors of such proposals have gone back on them. The socialist countries are prepared to accept both partial and the most complete and most far-reaching disarmament measures without seeking any unilateral advantages for themselves, but striving to consider equally the interests of the security of all States and peoples. Our proposals are aimed at achieving an effective solution to the problems. For us disarmament is not a propaganda slogan but a programme of action.

43. Following the general debate, the First Committee will have to adopt a number of decisions on various aspects of the problem of disarmament. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR reserves the right to speak on some of them.

44. Mr. SHARIF (Indonesia): Before I proceed may I be permitted, on behalf of my delegation, to extend my heartfelt condolences and sympathy to the delegation of Jordan and our Arab friends upon the tragic death of Prime Minister Wasfi Al-Tal of Jordan. For the deceased I offer my sincere prayers of *Al-Fatiha*.

45. In the first part of its statement, at the 1835th meeting on 24 November 1971, my delegation emphasized the urgency of accelerating the work and improving the mechanism of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and our common task under the Charter on the establishment of a system to regulate armaments and disarmament. On the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8457] my delegation has expressed its views in support of an early prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and their destruction, including its comments on the draft of such a convention for bacteriological weapons; the urgency of the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and other effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, including a request for a consideration of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States before a nuclear attack takes place; and a confirmation in the form of a formal declaration of the nuclear-weapon States or a resolution of the Security Council on immediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

46. In this second part, my delegation will present its views and comments on three more subjects: the question

of conventional arms, social and economic consequences of the arms race, and the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

47. My delegation does appreciate the growing attention of the Committee on Disarmament to the question of conventional arms, and is most grateful to the representative of the United States—as reported in paragraph 63 of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament's report—for proposing that the Conference, while continuing work on measures pertaining to weapons of mass destruction, also devote intensified discussions to the question of conventional weapons. It cannot but express its disappointment, however, that what the Conference ultimately decided on that proposal was not reported, and that during its 50 formal sessions from 23 February to 30 September 1971 it had nothing further to report in paragraph 63, the only paragraph on conventional weapons, other than that the representatives of Argentina, Italy, Sweden, Romania and Czechoslovakia have spoken on the issue. Neither are there any working papers on conventional weapons or proposals attached to the present report.

48. As my delegation has had occasion to state each year, for developing nations, which now constitute more than two thirds of the membership of the United Nations, the question of conventional weapons is of direct importance and only second to the question of nuclear disarmament and denuclearization.

49. A study of the political upheavals and military take-overs within newly independent countries, and other areas of conflict among these countries, leads one easily to the conclusion that the crux at issue is indeed the supply or procurement of conventional weapons.

50. Indonesia had its own experiences, when it was faced with aggression by the former colonial rulers during its struggle for independence, and had to subdue upheavals and rebellions in its infant years of independence. We have noted also similar rebellions and unrest within many newly-independent, small, medium-sized and developing nations. Some have even been the victim of aggression from outside.

51. Independence brings with it also many responsibilities, including self-government, but first and foremost also the responsibility to defend one's hard-won independence. Since, as in my country, even under colonial rule the colonial government was not in a position to defend the territory itself, and since they were overpowered by other foreign intruders, we realized only too well that after independence the entire question of the security and defence of the nation is in our own hands.

52. No nation at this stage of world political developments could permit itself to remain unarmed and defenceless. Weapons are needed to maintain law and order and to preserve the national unity and territorial integrity or internal security which is a prerequisite for a stable situation and economic development of the country. In view of political developments in the international scene, each country should also have arms in order to defend itself against aggression from outside. Experiences of the Second World War, the suppression of freedom fighters for indepen-

dence in colonized territories, espionage and interference in the internal affairs of other States have taught us that many forces still exist in this world of today whose aim is to dominate other nations and peoples for their own economic and other interests.

53. It is true that the danger of the cold war confrontation of the major nuclear Powers has been reduced, but that cannot be said for the small nations. This situation was noted in the Declaration by the 53 heads of State or Government in their Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lusaka, in September 1970, in which it was stated *inter alia*:

“The immediate danger of a conflict between the super-Powers has lessened because their tendency to negotiate for the improvement of their mutual relations is strengthening. However, it has not yet contributed to the security of the small, medium-sized and developing countries, or prevented the danger of local wars.

“The practice of interfering in the internal affairs of other States, and the recourse to political and economic pressure, threats of force and subversion are acquiring alarming proportions and dangerous frequency.”

In similar language, this evaluation is further confirmed by the Ministerial Meeting of 54 Non-Aligned Countries held in New York in September 1971.

54. Nations should indeed not live on the basis of suspicion. As is stated in Article I of the Charter, they are “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”. When however *si vis pacem, para bellum* seems still to be the generally accepted principle and peace seems to be possible only on the basis of strength, we cannot but base our policy on prevailing realities.

55. Newly independent nations have, generally speaking, no weapon industries of their own. However important they may be, they need first and foremost those industries which assist the economic uplift of the standard of living of their peoples.

56. Thus, for many years to come, they will depend for their armaments and their supplies—if not all, at least for the greater part—on imports from abroad, for which they are compelled to use a large portion of their meagre foreign exchange reserves. To meet these difficulties, we are familiar further with practices by which grants, easy payments and other facilities are extended in exchange for a regular supply of conventional weapons, which are so vitally needed to bring or maintain law and order, and preserve national integrity or internal security, which is the prerequisite for a stable political situation, conducive to economic development.

57. When at the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Nations held in 1955 the struggle against colonialism was the binding force among newly independent nations—of Africa and Asia in particular, in the face of the many colonies still existing and the adamant attitude of the

colonial Powers—my delegation believes that now, with the independence of many of those former colonies and our experiences in the past 10 to 15 years, the common denominator for joint struggle for those newly independent nations seems to be how to preserve that hard-won independence and protect the country from foreign aggression or disintegration. In the considered view of my delegation, thorough discussions of the regulation of conventional arms to developing nations to enable them to defend themselves against rebellions from within or aggression from without may well bring us to a more practical solution of many of those political questions in many parts of the world. We request the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament kindly to devote some time to intensified discussions on this question.

58. The weapons trade is indeed an important part of world trade, and on the part of the developing nations it consumes a significant portion of their foreign exchange earnings. As they did last year, several delegations have drawn our attention to the extraordinary increases in the expenditures of trade in conventional arms in the past year. Figures on defence expenditures quoted from such sources as the International Institute of Strategic Studies indicated *inter alia* 8.6 per cent of the gross national product for the United States and 8.5 per cent for the Soviet Union in 1969. While averages for the remaining countries were quoted as 3.7 per cent for the NATO countries and 4.2 per cent for the Warsaw Pact countries, many countries outside the two alliances were reported to spend a much higher percentage, from between 10 and 25.1 per cent of the gross national product.

59. The report on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race [A/8469], prepared by the 14 experts duly appointed by the Secretary-General under resolution 2667 (XXV), indicated a decrease for military expenditures in 1970, from \$U.S. 209.6 thousand million in 1969 to \$U.S. 202.6 thousand million in 1970, or from 6.8 per cent in 1969 to 6.3 per cent in 1970 as a percentage of the gross national product being \$U.S. 3,096 thousand million in 1969 and \$U.S. 3,204.1 thousand million in 1970. In paragraph 9 we noted that out of the estimated \$U.S. 1,870 thousand million for the period of 1961-1970 for armaments expenses, about \$U.S. 600 thousand million—that is almost one third—was devoted to the purchase of equipment. By far the larger portion of this sum was spent on conventional arms—guns and ammunition, transport vehicles and tanks, communication and surveillance equipment, aircraft and ships.

60. We are aware of the explanation given by several European countries to justify their sales of arms to external sources as a means of keeping their industries alive, and preventing therewith economic and social crises in their own countries. However, we have also noted the fact that arms aid is very often used as an important adjunct to over-all foreign policies.

61. Whatever it be, in the opinion of my delegation, some form of regulation—as opposed to “control”—of trade in conventional weapons would allow developing nations to redirect their precious reserves of foreign exchange into the more urgent task of development. Such regulation must take into account the security needs, the level of develop-

ment and the national independence of countries in need of arms. Basic studies along these lines would be a valuable start.

62. Having explained at some length the basic question of the need of conventional arms and its relation to political stability and economic development in the developing countries in general, I believe that I need not comment in detail on the question of the economic and social consequences and the extremely harmful effects of the arms race as outlined in the report.

63. As has been stated by many speakers before me, there is no doubt that the huge sums for military expenditures, amounting to the astronomical figure of \$U.S. 200 thousand million each year, would be of more benefit to mankind if they were used to finance the countless development projects in all parts of the world. The findings of the experts on this specific point, as set out in their report, speak for themselves. My delegation is grateful indeed for their concise studies which, with their concluding paragraph 120, have also strengthened my delegation's belief that, to minimize the extremely harmful effects of the armaments race: first, we should bring about as soon as possible a substantial reduction in the military expenditures of all countries, and second, all countries, regardless of their size and their stage of development, should share the responsibility for taking steps which will help achieve this goal.

64. A halt in the arms race and significant reduction in military expenditures will help the economic and social development of all countries and will increase the possibilities of providing aid to developing countries.

65. Numerous discussions have been held and resolutions passed to direct the use of funds which would have been released through essential reduction in the military expenses, for the financing of the economic and technical assistance programmes of the developing nations. The International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade is already directed towards that goal, and my delegation hopes that, for that purpose, some kind of co-ordination could also be achieved between the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Economic and Social Council or its Committee for Review and Appraisal. Other resolutions dated back as early as December 1953, when we adopted resolution 724 A (VIII) on the declaration on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament, and in 1969 in connexion with resolution 2526 (XXIV) on “A day for peace”, suggestions were made to devote the costs of one day of war to the funds for economic development. It is to be regretted, indeed, that no further action was taken for the implementation of those resolutions, and that none of these funds has been obtained thus far.

66. Renewed efforts should be jointly planned, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other forums, in order to make a success of our first Disarmament Decade, which we have agreed should coincide with the Second United Nations Development Decade.

67. As an archipelago State lying where the Indian Ocean ends and the Pacific Ocean begins, and with a coastline of

more than 6,000 miles of Sumatra, Java, Bali, the Lesser Sunda islands and hundreds of other islands in the Indian Ocean, my country is directly involved in any declaration on the Indian Ocean.

68. In our joint efforts towards strengthening peace, consolidating independence, promoting development and bringing about greater co-operation on the basis of equality of all States, and in the spirit of our own independent and active foreign policy, my Government whole-heartedly supported at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Lusaka in September 1970, resolution 12, paragraph 8, sub-paragraph (6), stating:

“A Declaration should be adopted calling upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition, either army, navy or air force bases, are excluded. The area should also be free of nuclear weapons.”

69. As a participant also in the Ministerial Meeting of 54 Non-Aligned Countries held in New York in September 1971, my delegation confirmed this position. It is in that context also that my delegation welcomes the initiative of the Governments of Ceylon and the United Republic of Tanzania to inscribe on the agenda of this session of the Assembly an item on the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace [A/8492 and Add.1]. My delegation has from the very outset also given its full co-operation to the delegation of Ceylon in the informal consultations, both with the littoral and immediate hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and with the non-aligned group of States.

70. Politically, my delegation is in support of the high ideals aimed at in the second paragraph of the working paper of the delegation of Ceylon to bring a halt to further expansion of military presence in the Indian Ocean, in the context of our objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances in accordance with paragraph 11 of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, resolution 2734 (XXV) that we adopted last year, and to eliminate from the Indian Ocean all bases, and dispose of all nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great-Power military presence in the area conceived in the context of great-Power rivalries.

71. We have some doubts, however, whether for its realization a conference or consultations between the major Powers, on the one side, and the coastal States around the Indian Ocean, on the other side, could ever be held on an agenda to bring a halt to the further expansion of the military presence of major Powers in the area, and to take reciprocal action to eliminate from the area any manifestation of great-Power rivalry, as proposed.

72. A further proposal for its implementation calls for consultations by coastal and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean with the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to discuss traffic navigation and use of the area. Aside from the feasibility also of such a conference, it is beyond any

doubt clear by now that, for both conferences and consultations, involving practically all branches of national life—from fisheries and economic development and trade, to the all-important issue of national defence and security of the nation, and co-operation with neighbours and relations with other States—careful preparations are necessary.

73. Many Governments, including my own, have not had sufficient time to examine the matter thoroughly. The item has been inscribed only as an additional item on our agenda in the course of our session. Furthermore, time is also needed to allow consultations among Governments, as my delegation believes that any such declaration should be acceptable to at least all the littoral States in and around the Indian Ocean, and by no means—for its practical implementation such as verification and the like—opposed by the major Powers.

74. Because of the limited time at our disposal, my delegation, after consultations with many other delegations, believes that we have to limit also our maximum objectives in this session, and prefers therefore to follow the procedure that has been followed for such similar cases as the declaration on the denuclearization of Latin America and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, or the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa. We are aware of the differences of the situation. We can, however, benefit from their experiences.

75. We would propose as the first stage to achieve our goal to work at this session for a declaration by the Assembly in general terms, stating that the Indian Ocean is a zone of peace and is an area free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, followed by some other provisions, such as a request to all States to respect this declaration, and a request to littoral and immediate hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultations for the preparation of an agreement on measures to implement the declaration.

76. At a later stage, as a concrete follow-up of the declaration, the littoral and immediate hinterland States of the Indian Ocean will hold a conference to prepare an agreement for the implementation of the declaration, followed by another conference with the major Powers to seek their co-operation in the verification and successful implementation of the declaration.

77. Summarizing the issue, my delegation would like to emphasize that the Indonesian Government welcomes an early declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and politically, supports fully the high aims in the proposal of Ceylon and the United Republic of Tanzania to preserve the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace free from major Power rivalries and military presence in the context of such competition.

78. It is indeed this same spirit that inspired my Government also to sign with the four other States members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations the Kuala Lumpur Declaration at the conclusion of the Ministerial meeting of that Association on 27 November 1971, stating, *inter alia*, that:

“Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary

efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, South-East Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers.”

A Committee of senior officials of the five countries has already been appointed to study and consider what further necessary steps should be taken to bring about the realization of the objectives of the declaration.

79. With my comments on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, my delegation has concluded its observations on all the items relating to disarmament.

80. We will study the draft resolutions which have been or will be submitted on the different subjects under discussion and will decide our position in the light of these observations.

81. Mr. BAYÜLKEN (Turkey): In the history of international relations no question has been the subject of such extensive discussions and negotiations as disarmament. No extended negotiations have achieved so little progress, and no negotiations have persisted despite so little progress.

82. Indeed our achievements in the past 25 years, however important they may be, have been quite modest, when compared to the efforts expended and to the magnitude of the problem. Most of our achievements have been in the field of non-armament rather than disarmament and consequently they did not produce any concrete results in halting the ever-increasing arms race. On the contrary, the figures in the report prepared by the Secretary-General on social and economic consequences of the arms race [*A/8469 and Add.1*] illustrate dramatically the enormous resources absorbed by the arms race. We should be thankful to the Secretary-General and his experts for submitting such a well-prepared report and we hope it will help to focus our attention more extensively on the question of general and complete disarmament.

83. In the plenary meeting my delegation had the occasion to speak about the general aspects of disarmament. As I said then, we, however modestly, believe that the developments in 1970 and 1971 are of a nature to inspire us with fresh hopes and, we think, new horizons are being opened in the disarmament field. Among these, I should particularly like to mention the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [*A/8457, annex A*] which is the first true disarmament measure and which we hope will set a precedent in carrying our future endeavours from an era of non-armament to an era of disarmament. Another encouraging development is the prospect of initiating negotiations on mutual and balanced forced reductions in Europe which may constitute an effective measure of arms control as well as a further contribution to *détente* in Europe. On the other hand, the importance of the SALT talks, which entered another new round, need hardly to be stressed. We hope the talks will achieve the best concrete results to end the nuclear arms race between the two Powers.

84. Our expectations in the disarmament field have been heightened by the participation of the People's Republic of

China in the work of the General Assembly. We hope their presence will give a new impetus to our efforts in the disarmament field.

85. My delegation welcomes the draft convention and is one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.579. We consider this draft convention as a significant step to elimination of one of the weapons of mass destruction and we hope that it will pave the way to the elimination of all the other weapons of mass destruction. Especially, we hope that article IX of the draft convention will facilitate efforts to achieve a ban on chemical weapons. It is indeed the fruit of long and arduous negotiations but, as with every compromise text, it is far from being perfect.

86. I should like to take this opportunity to make some observations on the draft convention. The loop-holes in the draft render many of its provisions into provisions of a voluntary character and leave much room for the goodwill of the parties in implementing them. For example, article I, paragraph 1 of the convention allows the parties to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents or toxins for defence purposes. This provision not only constitutes an exception to the provision prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons, but also because of the difficulty of discriminating defensive purposes from other purposes, it may create an atmosphere of distrust and of no confidence among the parties to the convention which consequently may impair the effectiveness of the convention.

87. In this respect we were pleased to hear yesterday the assurance provided by the representative of the United States of America, who stated:

“...I wish to state unequivocally that the terms ‘prophylactic’ and ‘protective’ are not intended to convey any broader meaning that would in any way permit possession of biological agents or toxins for weapons purposes...” [*1838th meeting, para. 126.*]

This unilateral statement, although it does not remove our concern completely, constitutes a step forward in ensuring that article I will not be diverted from its purposes.

88. Parallel considerations are also true with reference to verification. In the draft convention, no verification whatsoever is mentioned. As a result, verification of the destruction of stocks or of their diversion to peaceful purposes will largely depend on national means and on the unilateral declaration of the parties.

89. The enforcement of obligations of the parties under the draft convention are envisaged in two separate articles. Article V of the draft mentions consultations and co-operation to solve any problems arising from the convention. These consultations may take place among the parties or within the framework of the United Nations. We hope that the vague phraseology of “through appropriate international procedures” will be interpreted in such a way as to comprise the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

90. As to article VI of the draft convention, which contains measures against the breach of obligations deriving

from the convention, my delegation shares the views expressed by several delegations, particularly by the representative of Sweden, in a very explicit manner. We believe that it is the common desire of all representatives present to see that the obligations are equally valid for all the parties to the convention. To this end we hope that adequate assurances will be provided to ensure that the provisions of the draft convention regarding complaints to the Security Council and investigation initiated by the Council will not be interpreted in such a way as to enable the permanent members of the Security Council to enjoy discriminatory protection.

91. Had it been found acceptable in the negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation would have been in favour of the proposal in the British draft of August 1970,⁸ which envisaged that in case of violation complaints would be submitted to the Secretary-General, who would then initiate investigations. Acceptance of such a provision would have ensured non-discriminatory treatment to all parties to the convention. However, the negotiations have proved that the inclusion of such a proposal would further block an agreement. At this stage it would be appropriate to try to eliminate any grounds of concern about unequal treatment under the convention, which would increase the effectiveness of the convention and thus ensure a wider adherence to it.

92. Since the draft convention does not contain any provisions on the prohibition on the use of biological and toxin weapons, we are pleased to see the references made in the second, third and fourth preambular paragraphs, and also in article VIII, to the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare⁹ of 17 June 1925. We are of the view that the draft convention should not in any way weaken the Geneva Protocol of 1925, but should rather complement it. In fact, if the purposes of the draft convention are achieved, it may even reinforce the Geneva Protocol. Indeed, in the draft convention the validity of the Geneva Protocol is confirmed and all States are called upon to comply strictly with its principles and objectives. Moreover, since the draft convention aims at eliminating biological and toxin weapons, once it enters into force the reservations made in the Geneva Protocol against retaliation will have no purpose. We hope that the draft convention will pave the way for universal and unreserved adherence to the Geneva Protocol.

93. Let me now turn to the question of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The fact that since the conclusion of the Moscow partial test ban Treaty,¹⁰ tests are still continuing, should induce us to renew our efforts for a complete test ban. A comprehensive test ban treaty is essential to ceasing the vertical arms race without which all the other nuclear disarmament measures will be incomplete. On the basis of these views, we believe that a comprehensive test ban treaty requires prior and careful consideration by the Conference

of the Committee on Disarmament. This is why we welcome the announcement made by the Soviet Union and the United States of America that they will concentrate in 1972 on working out a treaty banning all underground nuclear weapon tests.

94. At present, as in the past, the main obstacle to reaching an agreement on the prohibition of underground tests seems to be the verification problem. The importance of adequate measures of verification for such a treaty is self-evident. However, we are witnessing technological developments which give rise to new possibilities of agreement. The progress made in seismic verification methods has lowered thresholds of both detecting a seismic event and identifying whether it is a nuclear explosion or an earthquake, as well as narrowing the gap between the two thresholds. Although detection and identification thresholds may be further lowered after the installation of special seismic instruments, it is also true that a certain threshold will always remain below which nuclear explosions cannot be detected or identified.

95. When the progress achieved in seismological methods, together with non-seismic means of monitoring, are taken into account, it will not be a wrong diagnosis to say that the issue of a comprehensive test ban has now become more a political problem than a technical one. This view brings us to the conclusion that the realization of a comprehensive test ban treaty requires the creation of a favourable international atmosphere of mutual confidence which will initiate the necessary political will. With this consideration in mind, we think interim measures proposed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament may be useful to the creation of such an atmosphere. The measures mentioned in the report of the Committee [A/8457], proposals such as that of a threshold treaty and a transitional period of descending quotas of tests and other proposals are all constructive ideas which deserve careful consideration.

96. On the other hand, we believe that the international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data facilitates the realization of a comprehensive test ban by enhancing progress in the identification methods and by creating a favourable climate. In this respect we studied with great interest the working paper submitted by the delegation of Canada to the Committee on Disarmament (*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 18), which recommends that consideration should be given to measures to help to develop seismological identification techniques and facilities.

97. Since we can neither stop nor reverse technological advances, which through their use or misuse brought the arms race into the present sophisticated and dangerous stage, the success of our endeavours in the disarmament field will depend on our ability in halting and reversing the arms race as well as in diverting the nuclear technology into peaceful purposes.

98. In the latter aspect, the International Atomic Energy Agency has a significant role to play and it deserves tribute for the valuable work which it has conducted, particularly in ensuring the access of non-nuclear States to the benefits of nuclear energy. In this connexion, I should like to stress the importance of transferring the benefits of peaceful

⁸ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 2.

⁹ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

¹⁰ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

nuclear explosions to the non-nuclear States, especially to the developing countries. My delegation supports the establishment within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under the control of the Agency. In this respect, we believe that further studies should be carried out on the questions arising from the peaceful explosions, with due regard to the aspects of international liability, health and economics of nuclear explosions. In establishing such an international service within the Agency, care should be taken not to place an additional burden on the developing countries.

99. As mankind cannot risk another world war, the choice before us is to establish a peace with or without general and complete disarmament. The past 25 years have demonstrated that peace without general and complete disarmament is too fragile and is far from being a secure and lasting one. In fact, it is a peace short of a world war. Past experience should teach us at least one capital lesson, if not more, namely, that in order to have lasting peace and security and to ensure the survival of mankind, we have no other alternative but to strive for general and complete disarmament.

100. Mr. HASSAN (Sudan): Mr. Chairman, I shall not let this occasion of my first address to this Committee pass without stating how impressed and content I am with the way you have guided and are still guiding the deliberations of the Committee. I am further convinced that the ability and experience of the other officers of the Committee will add immensely to the fruitful conclusion of the work of this Committee.

101. I dare not disagree with the representatives who spoke on the subject in their description of our world as one replete with armaments of astronomically overkilling capacities and as a world over the skies of which looms the imminent threat of its extinction and withering. However, be that as it may, we should not lose sight of the fact that the United Nations and its Charter have survived the last 26 years of turmoil and stand to this day as the most prodigious achievement of man to preserve his own species. It is now the second year of the Disarmament Decade and never has the world stage been so favourably set, as in the years we are now witnessing, to conclude disarmament agreements and finally bring peace and tranquillity to the world.

102. The last decade witnessed the successful conclusion of several agreements related to nuclear disarmament, namely, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is being satisfactorily conducted and is steadily gaining momentum. The declaration of Africa and Latin American as nuclear-free zones is symbolic of the deep concern of the world over international peace and security. With the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China finally restored in the United Nations and its active participation in this

Committee, a giant step has been taken towards the universality of this Organization.

103. My delegation is fully aware of the fact that for general and complete disarmament to be fully attained we need to take far more concrete and decisive measures than those which I have cited. The nuclear Powers must bear in mind the stern reality that to stockpile and accumulate these lethal weapons and feverishly to embark upon the improvement of their means of delivery will in no way contribute to sparing their peoples from nuclear catastrophes of apocalyptic magnitude.

104. My delegation is of the view that the existence during these years of a compromising and conciliatory mood by the great Powers in their approach to international peace and security must be exploited to the fullest extent. Unswerving and persistent efforts must be made by the nuclear Powers to bring general and complete disarmament into being. When the cold war was in full gear the mere contemplation of considering issues which are now being negotiated and discussed by the super-Powers in full pursuit of a final settlement would have been dismissed as wishful thinking. Advances in science and technology, and especially in the field of seismic detection, with goodwill and the spirit of compromise, can, it is hoped, bring about the happy conclusion of an agreement to ban completely nuclear testing in any sphere. I find myself reiterating the words of the representative of Canada, who said in this Committee on 16 November:

"It is surely for these Powers then to decide whether mutual deterrence has now reached the point where efforts to upset the current strategic balance of an unrestrained testing situation might not involve greater dangers of destabilization than the consequences of a few undetected low-yield evasions of any underground test ban." [1829th meeting, para. 48.]

105. Biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction are no less repugnant than are nuclear weapons, and the suffering and harm that they inflict upon humanity should in no way be mitigated or underestimated. The draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex A] represents, in our opinion, a commendable and praiseworthy effort of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. However, this draft convention does not cover chemical weapons, a field which represented the hard core and backbone of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.¹¹ My delegation considers it extremely important that these fields should be dealt with jointly. Although the draft convention suffers from this drastic limitation, we note with relief that it makes provision for the destruction of these weapons, since it is an established fact that adequate methods now exist for the destruction of the stocks of those weapons. Reference is made here to the provisional report of the symposium on the subject matter by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute held in Stockholm in September this year.

¹¹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

106. Nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are, in my delegation's view, a field which must come under the strict and tight control of a body such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The vast nuclear energy wasted in meaningless nuclear tests may well be engaged in innumerable peaceful activities on behalf of the human race. I find myself in complete agreement with the representative of Kenya, when he said in this Committee on 25 November that:

"there is a lot of information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy that can be beneficial to developing countries. We therefore appeal to the nuclear States and to the International Atomic Energy Agency to share, to an even greater extent, nuclear technology with the developing countries so as to enable them to achieve faster rates of development and industrialization."
[1836th meeting, para. 123.]

107. The control and surveillance which we envisage over these explosions for peaceful purposes should only serve to spare our world more radio-active pollutants. Unplanned and uncontrolled haste are apt to defeat the very purposes for which those explosions are conducted. My delegation strongly adheres to the fact that any nuclear explosion, no matter how it contributes to welfare and economic progress, is utterly unjustifiable if it adds, whether directly or in the long term, to the pollution of our environment, however infinitesimally small that pollution may be. The article in the magazine section of *The New York Times* of 31 October 1971 by Dr. H. Peter Metzger, President of the Colorado Committee for Environmental Information, titled "Dear Sir: Your House is Built on Radioactive Uranium", serves to support this argument. Dr. Metzger in his article pinpointed the case where large tailing piles, which are radio-active wastes of uranium mining, dismissed at the time as being harmless and overlooked by the authorities, were used in the construction of some 5,000 houses. It was established that the lungs of the occupants in 10 per cent of these houses were known to have been exposed to the equivalent of more than 553 chest X-rays per year. One but shudders.

108. The initiative by the delegations of Ceylon and Tanzania to declare the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace [A/8492 and Add.1] is viewed with pleasure by my delegation. It is in the spirit of non-alignment and concern for peace and security that we welcome that declaration.

109. This Committee witnessed the unanimity of members in expressing their condemnation of the armaments race as a prime factor in the retardation of the economic and social progress of all nations. Its bearing on world peace and security is that of agitation and tension. My delegation's view in this respect is in complete alignment with the views expressed by other representatives in this Committee. The squandering of these vast resources on the acquisition and stockpiling of weaponry, be they of mass destruction or

conventional, instead of diverting them to the welfare and development of man, is utterly absurd.

110. The absurdity of this is further exposed by the Secretary-General's report to the Fifth Committee in which he declared the United Nations to be on the verge of bankruptcy, especially when it is known that the expenditure on armaments amounted to more than \$200,000 million this year.

111. On the other hand, many developing countries are directing badly needed sizable sums of their incomes to purchase of arms. Their natural resources are left unexploited, their people's basic requirements are unattended to, and their development and progress are thus arrested. This situation, though regrettable, is in many cases necessitated by sheer survival instincts and in defence of their inalienable rights of self-determination and prevalence of peace and justice.

112. How could Egypt, Syria, Jordan and all the Arab nations attend to their economic and social progress when their Palestinian brethren are, by armed might, turned into refugees and their territories remain occupied by armed force. Israel, with the full support of the United States of America, chose to defy Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in an arrogance amounting to contempt of this Organization and world opinion.

113. Frontiers of independent States in Africa, such as Zambia and Guinea, and many other States, are overtly violated by colonial and racist régimes. Mercenaries, employed by these régimes and the forces behind them, roam about the African continent harassing these African States intent upon achieving economic and social progress for their peoples.

114. In South-East Asia, a vicious war is being waged by the United States of America against the Viet-Nameese people. This viral war has even extended to the neighbouring countries of Laos and Cambodia, thus arresting any form of economic and social progress in the whole region.

115. In concluding my statement, let me reiterate the very words of the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Sudan, Dr. Mansour Khalid, when, in his statement last year to this Committee, he said that:

"As long as colonialism persists in its old naked form of imperialism or behind its new, adorned garb of colonialism, as long as disregard for the human rights of all continues, as long as the propensity to transgress on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states prevails—as long as all those deviations from moral rectitude exist, the world will continue to be governed by might and might will find its expression only in armies and in armouries." [1762nd meeting, para. 42.]

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.