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Chairman: Mr. Milko TARABANOV (Bulgaria).

*Tribute to the memory of Mr. Wasfi Al-Tal,
Prime Minister of Jordan*

1. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): I am sure that I am speaking for all members of the Committee when I express our consternation at the tragic death of His Excellency Mr. Wasfi Al-Tal, Prime Minister of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, who was the victim of an attack that has moved us all deeply.

2. The Chairman of the Asian group, the representative of Kuwait, expressed his fear this morning of the possible consequences of this incident. I should like to request the representative of Jordan in this Committee to be so good as to convey to his Government our condolences and to say how deeply we share its grief.

3. I should like now to request the members of the Committee to rise and observe one minute of silence in tribute to the memory of Mr. Wasfi Al-Tal.

The members of the Committee observed a minute of silence.

AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 AND 98
(continued)

General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8328, A/8337, A/8457, A/C.1018)

Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8457, A/C.1/L.578 to 582)

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8457, A/C.1/L.583 to 585)

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Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/8336/Rev.1, A/8346, A/8435)

Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security: report of the Secretary-General (A/8469 and Add.1)

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace
(A/8492 and Add.1)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

4. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Today I shall deal with item 31 of our agenda, the purpose of which is to consider to what extent resolution 2666 (XXV) has been implemented with respect to the signing and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,¹ also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

5. It seems to me that perhaps it would not be superfluous to recall, by way of introduction, certain basic elements and aspects of the Treaty which it is useful never to lose sight of in order to have a proper perspective for viewing that important multilateral legal instrument.

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

6. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is the culmination of a noble and bold Latin American enterprise. It is the result of the spontaneous exercise of the joint will of the States of that region. That is why the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, in the message which, on 12 February 1967 when the Treaty was unanimously adopted, he addressed to the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America that had drafted it, stated:

“The nations of Latin America can, with ample justification, take pride in what they have wrought by their own initiative and through their own efforts.”

7. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first—and to this day remains the only—treaty through which it has been possible to establish a régime of complete absence of nuclear weapons, applied to densely populated areas and not to inter-stellar space, to the depths of the oceans, or to inhospitable plains under a mantle of perpetual snow.

8. Following the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the number of parties to the Treaty rose to 19, with the deposit by Panama of its instrument of ratification on 11 June 1971. As regards Additional Protocol I—whereby, as we know, States that are internationally responsible for territories within the area of application of the Treaty undertake to apply to said territories the statute of denuclearization for war purposes as defined in that Protocol—the ratification by the United Kingdom, which was already a fact, was supplemented, on 26 July 1971, by ratification by the Netherlands.

9. The area of Latin America free from nuclear weapons—which, when it includes all the territories within the area of application of the Treaty, will cover somewhat more than 20 million square kilometres in which, at the present level of population density, 280 million human beings will live—today already includes an area of nearly 7 million square kilometres with a population of about 120 million people.

10. There is therefore nothing surprising in the fact that the exceptional significance of the Treaty for peace and disarmament has been recognized throughout the world in the loftiest international forums and especially the most representative organ of the international community, the General Assembly of the United Nations, and by the highest officer of the Organization, the Secretary-General.

11. As regards the General Assembly, it will suffice to recall that when, at the twenty-second session, the Treaty was placed before the First Committee for the first time, the debates devoted to it took up 12 meetings which were held between 23 October and 28 November 1967. At those meetings the Treaty was the subject of the greatest praise by the representatives of 46 States from the most varied geographical areas, political ideologies and economic systems. The General Assembly crowned those debates by proclaiming in its resolution 2286 (XXII) that the Tlatelolco Treaty, “constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security”.

12. Regarding the Secretary-General, so as not to read too many quotations I shall limit myself to mentioning the

ideas expressed by U Thant on 2 September 1969 at the inaugural ceremony of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), when he said:

“In a world which too often looks dark and foreboding, the Treaty of Tlatelolco will shine as a beacon light. It is a practical demonstration to all mankind of what can be achieved if sufficient dedication and the necessary political will exist.”

13. The many references to the Treaty of Tlatelolco which, as in years past, have been made now in our debates, emphasizing its beneficial influence as an example and an encouragement for the creation of other nuclear free areas on inhabited lands, once more bear out the importance quite rightly attributed to the Treaty, and to its beneficial influence for disarmament.

14. There is, therefore, nothing surprising in the fact that the General Assembly, doubtless being convinced that the full co-operation of the nuclear Powers was necessary for the greater effectiveness of what was initially called “denuclearization of Latin America”, since its first resolution on the subject, resolution 1911 (XVIII), which was adopted in 1963, referred expressly to this aspect of the question, one with which the Assembly itself has dealt, after completing and opening for signature the Treaty and its two Additional Protocols. The Assembly has dealt with three successive resolutions: 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 2456 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, and 2666 (XXV) on 7 December 1970, in which it has constantly appealed to the nuclear Powers to sign and ratify additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as early as possible. In the last of those resolutions, it urged them to “sign and ratify Additional Protocol II... as soon as possible”. It is precisely to examine the implementation by the nuclear Powers of the resolution I have just mentioned that agenda item 31 was included in the agenda for the twenty-sixth session.

15. The fundamental point regarding this question is no doubt the one that was emphasized in 1968 by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and which the General Assembly reiterated last year by stressing that the co-operation of the nuclear Powers for any treaty which establishes a nuclear-free zone should “take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol”.

16. Furthermore, this procedure seems to be the only one that is in accord with the basic principle of the sovereign equality of States, since it would be contradictory to that principle if procedures such as unilateral declarations which are deemed to be insufficient in the case of States which do not possess nuclear weapons were to be accepted as satisfactory in the case of nuclear Powers.

17. I should also like to say a few words about the commitments which Additional Protocol II entails for the nuclear Powers which sign and ratify it. In brief, these commitments are the following: first, to respect, “in all its express aims and provisions”, the “statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes,

as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty”; secondly, “not to contribute in any way to . . . acts” being performed on the territories to which the Treaty is applicable which entail “a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty”; and thirdly “not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty”.

18. An analysis of these three obligations which additional Protocol II represents for the nuclear Powers parties to it leads to the conclusion that they are far from signifying anything burdensome for those Powers because, as the Assembly affirmed in its resolution 2666 (XXV), “. . . these objections are entirely in conformity with the general obligations assumed under the Charter of the United Nations which every Member of the Organization has solemnly undertaken to fulfil in good faith, as set forth in Article 2 of the Charter.”

19. I shall now go on to consider what is the present status of Additional Protocol II in so far as signatures and ratifications are concerned, and what progress has been achieved since the Assembly adopted its last resolution on the matter. At the same time, I shall give a brief recapitulation of some relevant background information.

20. After 7 December 1970, when resolution 2666 (XXV) was adopted, the United States, on 12 May 1971, became the second State Party to Additional Protocol II. The first, as will be recalled, was the United Kingdom, which ratified the Protocol on 11 December 1969.

21. Therefore, three of the five nuclear Powers have yet to sign and ratify the instrument. They are, in alphabetical order: China, France and the Soviet Union.

22. I believe that it might be of interest to review some of the main statements made by the representatives of those three Powers in regard to the question about which I am talking, and the rest of my statement will be devoted to this. This will enable us to assess the respective positions and determine what can reasonably be expected in the future.

23. As regards the People's Republic of China, the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, which, as I have said, was given the task of negotiating the Treaty of Tlatelolco, decided in 1966 to request its Negotiating Committee, in the manner and following the procedures which it deemed appropriate, to explore informally whether the Government of that country would be prepared to undertake the commitment of respecting the legal status of the denuclearization of Latin America. The Committee carried out the negotiations requested of it, through the Mexican Ambassador to Cairo, Mr. Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto, who established contact with his Chinese colleague in the same city. As a happy coincidence, at that time it was Mr. Huang Hua, who, as we all know, has just been designated Permanent Representative of his country to the United Nations.

24. The main points of the reply of the Government of China which Mr. Huang Hua transmitted orally on 8 August 1966 to his Mexican colleague, who, in turn, submitted it to the Negotiating Committee of the Preparatory Commission, are summarized in the second report of that Commit-

tee, which is published in document COPREDAL/CN/2 of 29 August of the same year. It reads as follows:

“The Government of the People's Republic of China, even though it views with positive sympathy the efforts of the Latin American countries to denuclearize their zone, notes, of course, that all the activities carried out to this end are closely linked to a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations which was adopted at its eighteenth session.

“Since the United Nations has ignored all the rights of the People's Republic in the world Organization, China cannot have anything to do with its activities and is therefore not in a position to support the Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America.”

25. An analysis of that statement would seem to warrant reaching a positive conclusion now for what we hope will be the not too distant future—perhaps it is even imminent—since from those statements one might logically infer that, now that the question of the representation of China in the United Nations has been resolved, all obstacles have disappeared, so that the Government of the People's Republic of China may become a party to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

26. The conclusion is further confirmed if one reflects on some of the emphatic statements made in the plenary meeting of the Assembly on Wednesday of last week by the Chairman of the delegation of China, Deputy Minister Chiao, who, it will be recalled, made clear the following among other things:

“First and foremost, the countries possessing nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other, and particularly, should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or nuclear-free zones. It should not be difficult to undertake such obligations if one truly has the desire to avert a nuclear war and move towards the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Many countries are now demanding the establishment of nuclear-free zones or peace zones. These are just demands, which China supports.” [*1995th plenary meeting, para. 45*].

27. What is also particularly encouraging is the emphasis placed by the delegation of China, both in the statement I have just quoted and in the reply we heard in the Assembly on Friday, 26 November [*1996th plenary meeting*], on the importance which its Government justly attaches to having words always confirmed by deeds.

28. As regards France, there are two very significant pronouncements which should be recalled: in the first place, the one made by the French Ambassador in Mexico, which is the headquarters of the Preparatory Commission, who, as an observer of his Government accredited to the Commission, addressed to its Chairman on 26 July 1966—when the Commission had not yet completed the drafting of the Treaty—a note in which *inter alia* he indicated the following:

“The Government of France, which follows with sympathy, of which you are aware, the efforts of the

Latin American countries, has carefully studied the texts transmitted to it through me. Nevertheless, since we are not a party to the negotiations, we cannot pronounce ourselves with a complete knowledge of the treaty until the members of the Committee have successfully completed their work.

"You can nevertheless be sure that France does not thereby welcome less favourably any effort to limit the dissemination of nuclear weapons when it proceeds from the will of the peoples concerned themselves . . ."

29. Secondly, in the statement made to the First Committee on 27 October 1967, the Permanent Representative of France, participating in the debates concerning the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had been opened for signature in February of the same year, expressed himself as follows:

"I would be loath to prolong the Committee's discussions, which are proceeding so satisfactorily, and I shall confine myself to a few words; my Government merely wishes to stress the importance and sympathy with which it views the matter we are discussing today.

"...

"Today, when those efforts have borne fruit and the Tlatelolco Treaty is a reality, the French Government expresses its satisfaction at witnessing the realization of the hopes with which it was associated very early on, and reiterates its sympathetic attitude towards the Latin American States that have succeeded in their undertaking . . .

"My delegation wishes to state that the French Government is studying with the greatest attention the political and legal implications of the texts submitted to it for signature. It is too soon, perhaps, to forecast the outcome of that study, but I am authorized to state that the message which France sent last year to the Mexican representative who was kind enough to recall its contents recently and to describe them as positive in character, will continue to govern France's attitude." [1510th meeting, paras. 76, 79 and 80.]

30. I would be failing in truthfulness were I not to place on record the fact that it has been a matter of profound disappointment for the Latin American countries to observe that the sympathy and the good intentions that were so fully expressed in the two statements from which I have quoted have so far remained on paper. For those of us who are aware of the political and legal genius of France and the abundance of its talent, it is truly incomprehensible that after almost five years it has not yet been possible to complete the study of a Treaty which in substance does not differ from many other treaties and which, of course, has nothing mysterious or esoteric about it. I should like to add that unfortunately we have found nothing to alter our reaction, which we believe to be the reaction of all Latin America, in the statement that was made here this morning by the representative of France.

31. With respect to the original attitude of the Soviet Union, its Ambassador to Mexico, in a note addressed to

the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission 20 January 1967, defined it as follows:

"The Soviet Union is in favour of establishing denuclearized zones in the various areas of the world, considering that this will lead to an effective limitation of the installation and use of nuclear weapons. The establishment of denuclearized zones is likewise of great importance in eliminating the threat of a nuclear war and in limiting the arms race.

"The Government of the Soviet Union believes that, in the interest of strengthening peace and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the responsibility for creating denuclearized zones can be assumed not only by groups of States which cover entire continents or vast geographical areas, but also by limited groups of States and even by individual countries. For its part, the Soviet Government is prepared to contract the obligation of respecting the status of all the denuclearized zones which are established in the future, if other nuclear Powers undertake a like obligation."

32. This attitude, so openly favourable to nuclear-free zones set forth in the two paragraphs which I have just quoted, has since been reiterated *ad infinitum* by the Soviet Union in various international forums. It can therefore be considered to be a position which, at least in theory, continues to be valid.

33. It would therefore seem logical that the Soviet Union would already have at least signed the Protocol. Unfortunately that has not been so, and to explain its failure to comply with the appeals of the General Assembly, it has elaborated a rather complicated theory, an excellent example of which can be found in document A/8336/Rev.1, of 6 July 1971, on the item we are now considering. An analysis of that theory inevitably leads to the conclusion that, if its validity were accepted, one would automatically accept the theory which seems to constitute the implicit premise of the Soviet position, the two essential elements of which could be stated as follows: first, it is not the United Nations but the Soviet Union which has exclusive authority to decide whether or not a nuclear-free zone exists in any part of the world, even though the zone has been established by a multilateral treaty which contains the most complete international system of inspection and control and which, as in the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has received the repeated praise of the General Assembly and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as the praise of the vast majority of the members of the international community; secondly, in such cases in which the Soviet Union would agree that the territory of one or several countries constitutes militarily denuclearized zones, the State or States concerned could only aspire to receive from the Soviet Union, and even this after certain conditions and reservations, a unilateral promise conceived in the terms which it deems suitable, and in no case a commitment contracted in what is known in the law of treaties as a solemn international instrument, such as Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

34. Such a theory would render null and void the objectives pursued by Additional Protocol II and, furthermore, is in flagrant contradiction with all the resolutions on

the subject adopted by the General Assembly and by the Conference of Non-Nuclear States, as may be perceived in my delegation's memorandum of 22 July [see A/8346].

35. Accordingly, we venture to hope that a more thorough analysis of all the factors involved in this question will enable the nuclear Power I am referring to finally to heed the urgent appeals of the United Nations, which will surely be reiterated by the Assembly during this session, by adopting the draft resolution which 17 Latin American delegations—Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela—have submitted and which appears in document A/C.1/L.587.

36. Since all representatives already have this document and, on the other hand, its contents are such as not to need any explanation, particularly in the light of the considerations I have advanced in this statement I shall, in conclusion, limit myself to recalling once again what, by virtue of the adoption of resolution 2286 (XXII), in regard to which I had the privilege of being the spokesman for the sponsors in the First Committee, I had the opportunity to affirm in the plenary meeting of the Assembly on 5 December 1967, and which I consider continues to be completely relevant:

"We are convinced that all those who care for history's judgement of them should take very seriously the duties laid on them by this United Nations resolution. There was a stage at which expression of encouragement and goodwill could be very useful for the preparatory work. But the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, designed to ensure the complete and everlasting absence of nuclear weapons from the sub-continent with its more than 250 million inhabitants, has brought that stage to an end. We no longer need high-sounding words, but deeds.

"There is one episode in Cervantes' immortal work in which one of the characters, Master Pedro, tells the Knight of La Mancha '*Operibus credite et non verbis*', which corresponds to the traditional Spanish version of the proverb 'Actions speak louder than words'. We are sure that this will be the criterion by which to judge the conduct of the States referred to in the Assembly resolution, the peoples directly or indirectly concerned with the future of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, whom we believe without exaggeration to include in one way or another all the peoples of the world." [1620th plenary meeting, paras. 94 and 95.]

37. Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia): I should like to begin my statement by concurring in the view that the year 1971 has witnessed developments which give rise to a certain cautious hope for meaningful talks on the vital problems of disarmament. The most important of these developments is surely the beginning of *détente* in Europe which, if carried on as is hoped, is likely to bring about a new turn in the relations of the countries of that continent and thus contribute to a relaxation in the over-all world situation.

38. The restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations has dealt a decisive blow to the hostile and discriminatory policy pursued by

the United States and certain other Western Powers against each and every country that they consider to be revolutionary or anti-imperialistic. I humbly submit, in passing, that the enthusiastic welcome accorded in the United Nations to the representatives of the People's Republic of China has stemmed from the fervent hope and expectation of the overwhelming majority here that that great country will display a far-sighted and constructive approach to the vital problems, including that of disarmament, which plague the world community.

39. Among the developments of immediate bearing, I may mention the conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [resolution 2660 (XXV), annex], which has already been signed by more than 80 States. Further, in the opinion of my delegation, the conclusion by the Soviet Union and the United States of an agreement aimed at reducing the danger of an accidental outbreak of nuclear war is in keeping with the desire of the people of the world to do everything possible to stave off such a world-wide catastrophe.

40. I believe the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex A] now before this Committee represents yet another asset in the disarmament efforts. The concluding of this convention would represent a tangible supplement to the five major international instruments in the field of the limitation of the arms race agreed upon since 1963.

41. On the other hand, however, with a deep sense of regret we have to admit that the unabated arms race—especially the nuclear arms race—still overshadows the limited progress achieved as a result of long and untiring efforts on the part of the socialist countries and of all peace-loving States. Indeed the picture is more than gloomy. A number of speakers have already cited disquieting figures from the telling and valuable report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security [A/8469 and Add.1], prepared pursuant to the initiative of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania. I would not tax the patience of the Committee by referring to them again at this late hour.

42. The main reason for the spiralling arms race lies in the policies of those forces which are conducting a neo-colonialist war against the peoples of Indo-China, committing aggression in the Middle East, Southern Africa and elsewhere to try to strangle the national liberation, democratic and revolutionary movements of the peoples. The evil imposed on the peoples by the military-industrial complexes of leading imperialist Powers has indeed brought the world to the brink of an abyss.

43. On the other hand, the dangerously precarious world situation obtaining now has invigorated as never before the determination of the peoples to prevent a nuclear holocaust, to seek all means and ways that would facilitate progress in the field of disarmament. It is amply clear that

all nations, big or small, developed or developing, should support everything positive which reflects the urgent desire of the world community.

44. In this connexion, I should like to note in passing a regrettable fact that some people, or many of us for that matter, confronted with difficult problems such as those of disarmament, often tend to take refuge behind such fallacious concepts as power politics, interests of super-Powers or super-Power rivalry. Many may be doing it without realizing that in this way they are putting in the same boat the forces that fight imperialism, colonialism, racism and war together with those of reaction and aggression. But it is even worse when some deliberately exploit those concepts in order to mislead public opinion, to slander the peaceful policy of socialism and, at the same time, to whitewash and justify the imperialist policy of war and enslavement.

45. I humbly believe that the world situation compels us not to be content with only pointing out shortcomings, failures and other adverse factors, but to exert every effort to meet the challenge of the growing danger of the arms race, especially that of the development and perfection of weapons of mass destruction.

46. Our disarmament effort must embrace both implementary and complementary fields. The implementation of the measures already agreed upon, regardless of whatever limited nature they may have, is of major importance for moving towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. We fully share and support the view that the agreements already concluded should become universally binding rules of international law. In this connexion, my delegation wishes to stress once again that the compliance by all militarily important States, primarily those possessing nuclear weapons, with measures that have been agreed upon earlier will greatly enhance the effectiveness of various agreements in the field of disarmament. As is well known, non-participation and non-observance by certain Powers of the provisions of important agreements have seriously undermined their value as effective international legal instruments. The securing of universal adherence to and compliance with the previous agreements aimed at curbing the nuclear arms race should remain one of the main concerns of the United Nations.

47. The significance of the implementation is not limited only by the question of compliance. The agreements concluded so far also help us maintain and carry forward the momentum of disarmament negotiations. Almost all of them bind all parties with the obligation to carry on negotiations with a view to reaching agreements in the specific fields of arresting the arms race and achieving disarmament.

48. Allow me to make some observations on the questions connected with the limitation and ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapons, which rerepresent the crux of the disarmament problem of today.

49. The Mongolian People's Republic, like many other States, insists on the immediate cessation of all nuclear tests, including ~~underground~~ tests, by all countries. We consider that a comprehensive test ban, provided that it is

strictly observed and implemented, would constitute in itself an important breakthrough towards nuclear disarmament.

50. Although the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has devoted considerable time and effort to the solution of this problem, the situation remains unchanged. The responsibility for the lack of progress in this field rests fully with those who have taken the stand to insist on the so-called on-site inspection. In this connexion, I should like to refer to a press report which, in our opinion, reveals the true reason behind the United States insistence on international on-site inspection. The *International Herald Tribune* of 26 July 1971 carried the following dispatch:

"The Defence Department is now contending that nuclear testing must be continued to assure the reliability of the United States atomic arsenal."

The report went on:

"The Defence Department appears more opposed than ever to abandoning underground tests, the only available method it has for developing and 'proof-testing' atomic weapons."

I assume that in the light of this report which appeared after the hearings by the Sub-Committee on Disarmament of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, one is only strengthened in the conviction that what is clearly lacking is the political will on the part of the United States to stop underground nuclear tests.

51. It has become a very widely accepted view that seismic methods of detection and identification through national means are adequate for the verification of an underground test ban. To give more assurance, the national seismic detection method can usefully be supplemented by the international exchange of seismic data for this specific purpose. My delegation considers that the question of ensuring a comprehensive test ban by all nuclear-weapon States should be given one of the highest priorities in the future disarmament talks. We fully sympathize with the idea of achieving a moratorium on underground nuclear tests pending an appropriate agreement.

(52) The Mongolian delegation deems it appropriate to give serious consideration to the important proposal advanced by the Soviet delegation at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, namely, conclusion of a convention under which the States parties shall assume the obligation not to use nuclear weapons, not to threaten their use and not to induce other States to use such weapons.² We proceed from the premise that the time has come to undertake concerted efforts to have embodied in a binding international instrument the principles of the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons adopted at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly [*resolution 1653 (XVI)*]. I believe that the practical solution to this question is less attended by the alleged difficulties of a technical nature such as the verification issue. The conclusion of such an agreement, on

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 96, document A/6834.

the other hand, would considerably reduce the risk of nuclear war and would pave the way for the ultimate destruction of nuclear weapons.

53. The proposal of the Soviet Union on convening a conference of the five nuclear Powers [A/8328] deserves the firm support of all peace-loving peoples. We wish to share the hope that the negative stand of certain nuclear-weapon Powers on this proposal is not the expression of their final position. Nuclear-weapon States are in duty bound to take an active initiative in nuclear disarmament.

54. Here I fully subscribe to what Mr. Kosciusko-Morizet of France said at a meeting of the General Assembly. He stated:

“Our objective, far from attempting to condone a monopoly, is the opposite, since it consists in obliging the nuclear Powers to meet to come to an understanding and to set an example for disarmament.” [1989th plenary meeting, para. 28.]

Indeed, the nuclear Powers bear a special responsibility before mankind because they are *inter alia* the most competent to solve and implement the very complex problems of nuclear disarmament. The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, like many others, considers that far-reaching measures of disarmament cannot be attained without the participation of all nuclear weapon States.

55. My Government equally attaches great significance to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States. We associate ourselves with those who have urged the two Powers to exert concerted efforts to bring to fruition their joint statement in which they held out the hope of a possible agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, both defensive and offensive.

56. My delegation further would like to reiterate its full support of the Soviet proposal on a world disarmament conference. Since my delegation spoke on this subject at greater length at the 1987th plenary meeting on 17 November 1971 I shall not restate our positions on the different matters involved.

57. The Mongolian People's Republic, like the other socialist countries and many other peace-loving States, attaches great importance to the elimination of the other types of weapons of mass destruction, namely, chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. It is therefore with great satisfaction that the Mongolian delegation, as one of the sponsors of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction, commends it for approval by the General Assembly. Since the other sponsors who have spoken before me have eloquently explained the merits of the draft convention I shall limit myself to a few observations underscoring its importance.

58. First of all, the outstanding feature of the draft convention is that it represents the first authentic disarmament measure. Secondly, the draft bases itself firmly on the

principle of there being a close relationship between chemical and bacteriological weapons. Thirdly, it recognizes the urgency of the elimination of chemical weapons and contains an explicit undertaking by the parties to continue negotiations in good faith to achieve that goal. Fourthly, it also recognizes the important significance of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925.³ We, as one of the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.579, which commends the draft convention for the approval of the General Assembly, express our hope that it will find unanimous support in this Committee and in the General Assembly.

59. My delegation, like the overwhelming majority in this Committee, has taken the position from the very beginning that chemical and bacteriological weapons should be dealt with together and prohibited simultaneously. However, regrettably this did not happen. The record of how the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament came to the partial agreement falling short of the widely accepted approach to this vital problem has been alluded to at greater length by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary and other socialist countries. Agreeing to the conclusion of a convention banning only bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons first, my delegation proceeded from the firm belief that this should *inter alia* constitute an initial step towards an early ban on chemical weapons.

60. The urgent need to outlaw these horrible weapons is dramatically underscored by the fact that they are being used to date by the United States in Viet-Nam and by Portugal in the Territories under its domination. In this connexion I should like to quote from the statement by the International Commission of Enquiry into United States crimes in Indo-China to which Ambassador Alarcon of Cuba alluded in an extensive and eloquent manner this morning. In its statement issued on 24 June 1971 in Oslo the Commission declared *inter alia* that:

“Chemical warfare remains one of the most serious features of the United States warfare”, meaning in Indo-China. “It causes damage primarily to the civil population, especially to its weaker members such as children, women, the aged and the sick. Evidence also revealed that poison gas is being used against the civilian population, frequently with lethal results.”

This statement is contained in the document entitled “Record of 30 months of war crimes by the Nixon administration in Viet-Nam” and circulated on 17 November 1971 to States Members of the United Nations at the request of the representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. I fully support the suggestion of the representative of Cuba that this session of the General Assembly should call upon the United States Government to desist immediately from the use of chemical substances in its genocidal war against the people of Viet-Nam. In view of the pressing urgency of the prohibition of chemical weapons, we express our hope that the General Assembly will adopt the draft resolution contained in document

³ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

A/C.1/L.580 and will instruct the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to accord the highest priority to the question of the elimination of chemical weapons.

61. We also hope that pending the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, States will refrain from the development and production of the most toxic chemical agents having no direct peaceful use. We are of the view that such voluntary acts of States will greatly facilitate an early agreement on this vital issue.

62. Apart from the problems of nuclear disarmament and the elimination of the other types of weapons of mass destruction, there are many important disarmament problems whose positive solutions are closely connected with such vital issues of our times as the strengthening of international security, enhancing the economic advancement and social progress of peoples. As a developing country Mongolia is fully aware of the tremendous benefits that may be gained in terms of resources for economic development of all countries, in particular developing ones, as the result of major disarmament measures. We fully understand the concern of the representatives who lay special stress on the close concatenation of disarmament problems with those of development and social progress.

63. In this connexion, we are appreciative of the conclusions reached by the consultant experts in their report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race. Since I have mentioned this report I would submit that if such studies were to be made on a periodic basis more attention should be given to the different political as well as social factors that contribute to the arms race.

64. The position of the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic on such collateral measures as the reduction of military expenditures, dismantling of military bases on foreign soil, creation of nuclear-free zones and other regional disarmament measures is well known to this Committee. I have no intention of reiterating them here. Further progress in any of the above fields will strengthen mutual confidence among nations and promote the achievement of more substantial and far-reaching results in disarmament efforts.

65. I should like to conclude by referring to a conclusion reached by the above-mentioned consultant experts which states that regardless of their size or their stage of development, all countries share the responsibility of taking steps which will help achieve the goal of disarmament. That is also the conviction of my Government because in the long run general and complete disarmament will provide the only material guarantee for eliminating war from the life of human society.

66. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): I should like to remind the members of the Committee that at the 1835th meeting on 24 November, we decided in principle that draft resolutions on the various points on disarmament could be submitted until 29 November, that is to say, until this afternoon. However, some representatives have indicated that consultations—fortunately the last ones—are to be held very early tomorrow morning and will lead to decisions which could make it possible to present further draft resolutions. I would therefore request delegations which intend to submit draft resolutions on these items to do so by 6 o'clock tomorrow afternoon, so that we may conclude our work as speedily as possible. I take it that this will be satisfactory to the delegations which have clearly expressed a desire to be given an opportunity to submit a final draft resolution on certain questions.

67. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. Chairman, I wish to express to you the gratitude of my delegation for the suggestion or decision which you have just announced.

68. My delegation, like several others, is still in the process of consultation, particularly in the group of 12 non-aligned countries, with regard to one or two draft resolutions and this postponement until tomorrow will be extremely useful.

69. I should also like to add that my delegation interprets what the Chairman has just said as being the general rule which I shall be very happy to adhere to; but like every rule, if the occasion calls for it, some exception may be made to it. The only exception which I can foresee at present would be a possible change in the composition of the Committee on Disarmament.

70. During the discussion of the item on the world disarmament conference, I took the liberty of referring to this aspect of the matter in my statement at the 1992nd plenary meeting. I shall accordingly not repeat what I said on that occasion. I simply wish to place on record this interpretation which my delegation gives to the general rule which you, Mr. Chairman, have so wisely and prudently just established.

71. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): I hope that all draft resolutions will be submitted in conformity with my interpretation of the statement of the representative of Mexico. Of course, if there are exceptional circumstances, there are also exceptional decisions. But in the present case I think tomorrow evening must be set as the time-limit for the submission of draft resolutions.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.