

United Nations  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 1834th  
MEETING

Tuesday, 23 November 1971,  
at 10.30 a.m.

NEW YORK

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GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My statement today, like the one I made last week, will be confined to one of the disarmament items listed in our agenda. At the 1829th meeting, I dealt with the question of chemical and microbiological weapons. Today, I shall deal with the item appearing in the agenda of the General Assembly under the heading "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament".

2. May I begin by saying that in my delegation's view consideration of this item is practically exhausted and that it is extremely difficult, not to say impossible, to add anything new to the subject. We therefore believe that it might be best to engage in some recapitulation and selection, highlighting the essential aspects of the item, among which the following warrant mention.

3. First, in the third preambular paragraph of the Moscow Treaty<sup>1</sup> that was opened for signature on 5 August 1963—that is to say, over eight years ago—the three original parties thereto expressed their determination to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", and to "continue negotiations to this end".

4. Secondly, in spite of that solemn commitment freely contracted, not only have underground explosions not been stopped, but the average number of annual nuclear weapon tests in all environments, the majority underground, which have taken place since 1963, has been almost twice that of the explosions between that year and 1945, when the first experimental explosion occurred. In fact, the average rose from 27.9 to 45.5.

5. Thirdly, the stalemate in which we find ourselves is basically the same as when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, at the beginning of its work in 1963, established a sub-committee composed of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and specifically instructed it to consider the question of the suspension of nuclear weapon tests.

<sup>1</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

6. Fourthly, the prolonged stalemate is due, in the final analysis, to the fact that neither the position of the United States that on-the-site inspections are necessary, nor that of the Soviet Union which contends that the use of national means of detection suffices, has in any way been significantly altered.

7. Fifthly, the rigid and unchanging positions of the nuclear super-Powers have given rise to profound suspicion and concern in world public opinion regarding the true motives for their stands, since their apparently irreconcilable differences regarding acceptable procedures simply mean in the end that they retain the advantage of possessing the monopoly on underground tests.

8. Sixthly, the situation thus created has also led to an alarming race to increase the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, which U Thant quite justifiably termed the “arms schizophrenia”.

9. Seventhly, the multiplication and magnitude of underground tests have served as an excuse for the nuclear Powers which have not yet adhered to the Moscow Treaty to continue to contaminate both the atmosphere and the sea with their tests in both those environments.

10. Eighthly, that situation, if not speedily corrected, might in the near future wreck the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], which was so carefully elaborated.

11. Bearing in mind the above conclusions which must inexorably be drawn from any objective examination of both the distant and the immediate background of this matter, my delegation, in concert with the other 11 States members of the group of 12 non-aligned countries members of the Committee on Disarmament and with the valuable co-operation of all concerned, prepared draft resolution A/C.1/L.584.

12. The draft resolution is, we believe, one of those about which we can safely say that it is self-explanatory. Therefore I shall limit myself to making a few remarks regarding the last preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 2.

13. The inclusion of that preambular paragraph is due to two main reasons. The first resides in the fact that, despite the commitments contracted in the Moscow Treaty and despite the many constructive proposals which have been constantly submitted by many members of the Committee on Disarmament in order to solve the problem of verification, the statements of the two super-Powers on the question very often sound like a “dialogue of the deaf”. Thus, in 1968, the eight States that then comprised the non-aligned group, in a memorandum of 26 August 1968, expressed their deep disquiet over—and I shall quote from the memorandum itself: “the fact that no serious negotiations have taken place on these proposals. These proposals should be studied further without delay.”<sup>2</sup>

14. The second reason for the inclusion of that preambular paragraph is even more important. It is that whatever

the differences between the two super-Powers over the question of verification, the situation in 1971 is totally different from that which prevailed 10 years ago; this applies both to the enormous progress achieved on the scientific level and to the considerable degree of increased knowledge and less mutual distrust achieved by the two super-Powers. This leads us to believe that we are justified in stating in the last preambular paragraph that “there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban” on nuclear weapons.

15. My delegation—and I believe that our views are probably shared by many other delegations—would see no objection if, in the treaty to prohibit underground testing, provision were to be made for the possibility of allowing a reasonable minimum of on-site inspections. We believe that if the procedure to be followed were to be surrounded by adequate guarantees to avoid any vitiation of the objective, there would be no danger of its being abused for other purposes than to strengthen confidence and to make verification more accurate.

16. Furthermore, with equal frankness, we must state that—and again I think I am speaking on behalf of a number of delegations which share our views—bearing in mind the astonishing progress achieved both in the field of detection and identification of underground nuclear tests and in the field of satellite photography, we do not believe that agreement on a treaty based exclusively on national means of detection could spell any danger whatever that any of the nuclear Powers might be in a position to carry out clandestine tests of any magnitude which might affect the strategic balance.

17. Among other reasons for our opinion we have drawn information from a number of statements made by American experts, and I would cite that made at the beginning of 1971 by Mr. William C. Foster, a statement which acquires special value and significance for any of us who noted his experience, his objectivity and his very carefully considered judgements during the years when he acted as head of the delegation of his country to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We are therefore deeply convinced that all that is needed to break the vicious circle in which we have floundered so long is the will to do so.

18. I turn now to operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution. The comment that I would like to add to a very clear paragraph is that the final date on which all nuclear weapon tests are to cease has been left blank. That was done to allow the date to be decided upon in the light of the preferences expressed by the majority of delegations in the course of our debates. As far as my delegation is concerned, we believe that an appropriate date might well be that of 5 August 1973. That date will mark the tenth anniversary of the signing of the partial test ban Treaty.

19. We have full confidence that the draft resolution we have submitted may well become one of the most important resolutions of the present session of the General Assembly. I am very happy to stress that it already enjoys the support of the majority of the members of the group of 12 of the Disarmament Committee—the other members are still awaiting instructions from their Governments, but in

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 10.

the light of their traditional stand on this matter we believe such instructions will be positive. World public opinion will doubtless see in this resolution, in which we reiterate solemnly and most emphatically the unreserved condemnation of all nuclear weapon tests of 1962, a much-needed response to the failure to implement the many previous resolutions. Once again this resolution will help to carry out one of the most important of the functions of the General Assembly, namely, to act as the voice of the conscience of mankind.

20. Mr. KHATTABI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): The restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, which has made it possible for the delegation of this great nation to take a seat in our midst, conferred upon this session of the General Assembly a particular significance, particularly with regard to the discussion in the General Assembly and the First Committee of questions relating to disarmament. We would like to hope that this important event in the life of the Organization will give new impetus to the work and negotiations with a view to solving the many problems of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament.

21. While the absence of positive measures to curb the arms race, to reduce armaments and to bring about nuclear disarmament is being felt more and more by the international community, it is none the less true that the multilateral and bilateral conversations already begun, as well as the diplomatic steps taken this year, particularly among European leaders, give ground to hope for encouraging results at the very least.

22. Negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have produced this year a draft convention on the total prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins [A/8457, annex A]. This draft convention which has now been submitted to the General Assembly for approval may be considered an achievement of the Disarmament Decade. It is indeed the result of the efforts and contributions of all members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament because it reflects to a large extent the ideas and suggestions put forward by the different delegations.

23. It may obviously be argued that this draft convention does not provide for the elimination of chemical weapons which are as dangerous and destructive as biological weapons. This is true. Nevertheless my delegation, which from the very beginning has vigorously defended the idea of simultaneously banning both types of weapons, considers that article IX is one of the important provisions of this draft convention. Indeed, the continuing of negotiations with a view to bringing about rapidly an agreement eliminating chemical weapons is the subject of a formal commitment and the principle of this prohibition is recognized in the provisions of the article I have mentioned.

24. Furthermore, permit me to draw your attention particularly to the terms of articles IV, V, VI, VII and X of this convention providing for a series of national and international measures designed to secure compliance with the obligations flowing from the convention while seeking to strengthen international co-operation in the fields of mutual assistance, research and exchanges with regard to biological agents.

25. My delegation regrets the fact that the principle that a proportion of the savings effected as a result of measures taken in the field of disarmament should serve to promote economic and social development has not been included in the preamble of the draft convention. However, we consider that this text is, on the whole, acceptable and deserves the approval of the General Assembly.

26. It is widely recognized that the essential and supreme objective of the negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is gradually to bring about general and complete disarmament. I say "gradually" in order to underline the fact that we are perfectly well aware of the complexity of this task at a time when science and technology are constantly providing their valuable and highly sophisticated services for the production and deployment of weapons, to the point indeed where weapons which generally were called "conventional" have been gradually acquiring all the characteristics of weapons of mass destruction.

27. The Committee on Disarmament still has before it two draft treaties [A/C.1/867<sup>3</sup> and ENDC/30 and Add.1-3<sup>4</sup>] which can serve as a useful basis of discussion although they should be revised and brought up to date. However, this work has not made any progress at all, and these texts which, in 1962, revived the hope that States would pool their views in order to bring about balanced and effectively controlled disarmament have now been shelved and the deliberations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the principal item of its agenda have not proceeded beyond the stage of sporadic statements on general principles. It should be recalled in this regard that the Soviet-American joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations of 20 September 1961, which the General Assembly welcomed [resolution 1722 (XVI)], recommended *inter alia* the implementation of a programme of "gradual" disarmament, "phased" disarmament, in order to ensure that such disarmament would be general and complete and that it should be accompanied by the adoption of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

28. Need we recall that instead of the implementation of this promising programme of disarmament, the arms race in all its forms has since then maintained its tempo, and each year has attained disturbing dimensions.

29. Conversations on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT) show that the efforts of the two major nuclear Powers are converging towards the preparation of an agreement on the limitation of the installation of anti-ballistic missile systems and thereafter to lead to an agreement on certain measures with regard to the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. Of course, the very fact that talks were begun and these conversations continued is proof of the will of the Soviet Union and the United States to set

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 90.

<sup>4</sup> For document ENDC/30, see *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex I, sect. F; for documents ENDC/30/Add.1 and 2, see *ibid.*, document DC/205, annex I, sect. E and F; for document ENDC/30/Add.3, see *ibid.*, *Supplement for January to December 1963*, document DC/208, annex I, sect. H.

a limit to the terrifying and extremely costly nuclear arms race. But, it should be pointed out, the international community must express its reservation as to the scope and purport of certain attempts whose only purpose is to limit the means of mass destruction with a view to establishing a balance of power which will be less costly but safer, which is far from bringing about balanced, gradual and general disarmament.

30. Before turning to another subject, permit me to quote on this point a comment by a distinguished British statesman, Lord Chalfont, who in an article on the SALT talks published in a British diplomatic magazine wrote:

“In Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Russians and the Americans are, in fact, trying not to change the balance but to maintain it at a safer and less expensive level.”<sup>5</sup>

31. The question of the limitation of conventional armaments has been raised in Geneva and here in the First Committee by a number of delegations.

32. While it is true that the present situation in Europe does lend itself to the opening of dialogue on the question of conventional weapons, as well as “on mutual and balanced reduction of forces on the continent” to use the expression of the representative of Belgium in his statement at the 1829th meeting on 16 November, the situation elsewhere, particularly in certain areas of Africa and Asia, remains, unfortunately, typified by tension and uncertainty because of the persistence of hotbeds of armed conflict, colonialism and *apartheid*. The threat of armed aggression, the maintenance of military occupation of the territory of others, raises the extremely thorny problem of the security of a large proportion of the people of these two continents and makes difficult at present any regional attempts at reducing conventional armaments.

33. Morocco, for its part, has always worked towards the cessation of the arms race in its own region; this would make it possible for us to lay down in peace and understanding the foundations of stability and of political, economic, and cultural co-operation between the countries of North Africa which all have the same desire. The military expenditure of Morocco has declined within the period of four years by 32.8 per cent, to the benefit of our economic and social development.

34. More generally speaking, we still consider that the solution to the problem of conventional weapons should be found within the framework of world-wide efforts to bring about general and complete disarmament. Furthermore, we should not lose sight of the links between the solution of this problem and questions relating to the production, improvement and profitable trade in conventional armaments.

35. The Moroccan delegation believes that it is high time to achieve an understanding on the banning of the use of nuclear arms and to give serious attention to the question of atomic disarmament beginning with a total ban on tests. The particular responsibility of the Powers possessing these weapons has been stressed by most representatives who have spoken in this Committee.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in English by the speaker.

36. While it is comforting to remember the relative importance of the agreements concluded in the field of the prohibition of nuclear arms, nevertheless it is equally true that the value of these measures is very often reduced, either by delay in furthering the negotiations called for in these agreements in order to bring about other more substantial measures, or by the hesitation or refusal of certain countries to become parties to these multilateral instruments. The example of the Moscow Treaty of 1963<sup>6</sup> and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], is only too obvious. No measure had been taken since the signing of the Moscow Treaty to cease underground nuclear explosions for all time. Furthermore, and in spite of this Treaty, nuclear arms tests in the atmosphere and under water are continuing and increasing with all their harmful consequences to the environment and to the depths of the sea which have been declared by the United Nations as the heritage of mankind. This regrettable situation could inevitably lead to a weakening of the Treaties already concluded, which would consequently lose their value and effectiveness.

37. That is why we believe that the early achievement of an understanding on the complete prohibition of nuclear arms tests is dictated by the very nature of things. All the nuclear Powers should associate themselves with such an important and urgent task.

38. The delegation of Morocco favours the preparation of a treaty banning underground tests while increasing the number of signatories of the Moscow Treaty of 1963. Any partial agreement based on a gradual reduction of underground testing or based on what is known as the “threshold method” can, in our view, only entail further technical and political complications, thus unnecessarily delaying a final solution to this problem.

39. However, the idea of the adoption of some interim measures to create a climate of confidence and to lay the groundwork as it were, pending a total prohibition of underground testing, seems to us worthy of interest. A proposal along these lines has been formulated by the delegation of Canada in working document CCD/336 [*see A/8457, annex C*].

40. With regard to the problem of verification, the idea of compulsory on-the-spot inspections seems in principle unacceptable for two reasons: first, the techniques and methods of detection, location and identification of underground tests have become so perfected that it is possible, in the view of certain experts, to verify by national means the application of a potential agreement, and secondly, the desire to avoid anything which might be considered intervention in the internal affairs of States.

41. It has now become quite clear that the solution of this important problem depends upon political will rather than on technical difficulties. The framework of the negotiations remains, of course, to be defined. While the role of the Committee on Disarmament in this area has to some extent been challenged, particularly as regards its

<sup>6</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

present membership and methods of work, and the prolonged absence of China and France, this Organization, in our view, still remains the proper framework for negotiations on disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. The idea of negotiations between the five nuclear Powers does not enjoy the unanimous support of the parties principally concerned; moreover it should be borne in mind that a meeting of the five could not be fully effective without the participation of at least a certain number of countries which have acquired considerable experience and advanced knowledge in the field of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, as well as techniques of detection, because the question of control and verification is, as we all know, as important as the banning of the tests themselves.

42. The world conference advocated by the Soviet Union, and also by the People's Republic of China—with a difference of approach with regard to the level of representation and the essential role of such a conference—might appear to be a sound framework for bringing about nuclear disarmament, on the condition that the conference would be preceded by scrupulous preparation and serious and active consultation, aimed, on the one hand, at creating the appropriate political conditions for the holding of such a conference, and, on the other, at preparing the texts of the agreements which would be discussed and approved by the conference.

43. I should like to take this opportunity to point out that Morocco has already had occasion to speak in favour of the convening of a world disarmament conference. We would like to express our pleasure at the initiative of the Soviet Union with regard to the convening of such a conference and, at the same time, to hope that the problem of countries which, for one reason or another, are not yet Members of the United Nations may be resolved and that the principle of universality essential to the success of such an important and difficult enterprise may be finally confirmed by the United Nations before the meeting of the conference, thus making it possible to give the Charter its full significance.

44. I would also remind the Committee that the preparation of a detailed programme of disarmament has lost nothing of its urgency and importance. We should therefore give all due attention to this question, bearing in mind the proposals already made in this regard. I am thinking particularly of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) and 2661 C (XXV).

45. Before concluding I should like to express the gratitude of my delegation to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as to the consultant experts who assisted him in the drafting of his report on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race [A/8469]. This objective and remarkable piece of work will, we are sure, arouse the interest of world public opinion and, through the shocking facts which it relates and by its carefully considered conclusions, provide food for thought to the leaders of the world.

46. We also take pleasure in the initiative of the delegation of Ceylon in submitting for the agenda of this session an item entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace" [A/8492 and Add.1]. It is true that now, more than

ever, "the countries of the Indian Ocean need a climate of peace and tranquillity to transform and modernize their economies and their societies". Countries of other regions, such as the Mediterranean, also need the same climate of peace and tranquillity. For that reason the Government of Morocco will, I am sure, consider the proposal of Ceylon with attention and sympathy.

47. In conclusion my delegation would like to express once again its admiration for the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.<sup>7</sup> Of course, the Powers possessing nuclear weapons have their share of responsibility with regard to that important instrument. Their full co-operation is therefore necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The signing and ratification of Additional Protocol II is clearly the best proof of that co-operation.

48. Mr. SPÁČIL (Czechoslovakia) (*translation from Russian*): The peoples of the world rightly see in disarmament the key to ensuring their security and durable peace throughout the world and the key to a significantly accelerated rate of general economic and social development. Consequently the consideration of disarmament questions in the United Nations has traditionally occupied a leading place on the agenda of the General Assembly.

49. Yet, despite the efforts of a number of States to resolve the problems of disarmament, the arms race still continues.

50. In view of this one can justifiably ask what is the real reason for today's ever-growing level of armaments.

51. The responsibility for this situation does not lie with the socialist countries. War and the armaments associated with them are phenomena inherent in imperialism. They spring from the very essence of imperialism, and so it would be very wrong to place the imperialist and socialist States on the same footing in the matter of the feverish acquisition of armaments.

52. This point is further borne out by general developments since the Second World War. The Soviet Union, with the support of other socialist countries, has, since the very inception of the United Nations, made great efforts in the sphere of disarmament and above all in the matter of total elimination of nuclear weapons. This basic fact, typical of the peaceful foreign policy of the socialist countries, should not be forgotten. Nor should one overlook the fact that all-important proposals for disarmament have from the start been put forward by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Their Governments have been ceaselessly seeking new prospects with regard to areas for agreement and approaches to the solution of particular disarmament questions.

53. We still remember well the important Soviet proposal on general and complete disarmament,<sup>8</sup> which had our full support. Unfortunately, during its consideration the socialist States met with an insuperable obstacle—the unwilling-

<sup>7</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

<sup>8</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 90, document A/C.1/867.

ness of the Western countries as a matter of principle to engage in general and complete disarmament—and discussion of the matter reached an impasse. In the circumstances it was necessary to choose one of two alternatives: either to accept that further discussion was blocked, or to seek other ways of making progress on the basis of partial, gradual steps. With the agreement of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, the discussion was directed along the second path, which we believe to be the correct one, although it has only been in the past few years that the first concrete results have been achieved in the Organization. The partial measures adopted, while covering only a few aspects of the general problem of disarmament, are of great significance, even though the essence of the problem of general and complete disarmament, which we continue to view as the main goal of our efforts, still awaits solution.

54. The Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the spring of this year formulated an important programme of Soviet foreign policy in respect of disarmament, setting out concrete proposals on such matters as the modalities of future negotiations in this sphere.

55. The programme takes as its starting point the fact that disarmament is a problem of concern to all, and it accordingly sets forth an extremely important plan for convening a world disarmament conference. Another important measure along this same line is the Soviet proposal to convene a conference of the five nuclear Powers. The Czechoslovak Government has expressed its full support for both these proposals. In view of the importance of the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference, it is being discussed directly by the General Assembly in its plenary meetings, where the Czechoslovak delegation has already made a detailed statement of its views on this Soviet initiative [1987th plenary meeting].

56. The holding of a world disarmament conference or a conference of the five nuclear Powers should not lead to a disruption of the activities of existing organs dealing with disarmament questions, and particularly those organs which through their activity have demonstrated their usefulness and produced concrete results. I have in mind first and foremost the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which in the past few years has played a decisive role in preparing a number of international agreements on partial arms limitation measures that have won support throughout the world and the acceptance of the General Assembly.

57. The latest contribution of the Conference along these lines has been the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex A]. Consideration of this draft convention is on the agenda of our Committee.

58. Czechoslovakia views the draft convention as a first step towards the total prohibition and elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

59. I should like to recall in this regard that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, together with other social-

ist countries, has been of the view from the very beginning of the discussion of this matter that it is necessary and possible to secure total prohibition of both chemical and bacteriological weapons. Our feeling in this matter is based, among other things, on the fact that the two kinds of weapons are of the same character, that the same kinds of delivery means are needed for them and that the same specialized military units are trained for their use. This position of the socialist countries has been in keeping with the view of the overwhelming majority of States, as is shown by the voting on General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV).

60. The Czechoslovak delegation along with the delegations of other socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament did its utmost to obtain this sort of comprehensive solution.

61. The position taken in the matter by the various groups of States or by individual countries is of course no secret to anyone.

62. The delegations pressing for a general ban on chemical and bacteriological weapons were those of the socialist and non-aligned countries. They met with the disinclination and unwillingness of the Western States, mainly the United States and the United Kingdom, to undertake immediate prohibition of chemical weapons. Because of the intransigence of these States, the deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament reached an impasse, placing in serious jeopardy the fulfilment of the task assigned to the Committee by the General Assembly. Thus a situation was created in the Committee where the possibility of an agreement banning both these types of weapons was excluded. In an effort to salvage the talks, the socialist countries in late March 1971 submitted their draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 8]. The main reason why the draft convention does not also cover chemical weapons lies solely in the fact that the Western States are not yet willing to eliminate these weapons from their military arsenals.

63. Yet the draft convention was so worded that, although it resolves only the problems of bacteriological and toxin weapons, it creates an obligation to continue negotiations towards the prohibition of chemical weapons. Thanks to the submission of this further draft convention by the socialist countries, the Committee's deliberations received a fresh impetus.

64. On the basis of the Soviet draft and with all States members of the Committee actively participating, the Committee worked out the text of a new draft convention banning bacteriological weapons which it submitted to the General Assembly in its report. The draft takes very full account of the views and comments of the various delegations and is truly the result of the concerted efforts of the entire Committee.

65. We accordingly trust that the draft convention will receive very broad support from the Members of the United Nations and will be approved by the General Assembly. We also express the hope that the Assembly will adopt the



draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.579, of which the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is a sponsor.

66. Adoption of the proposed convention would be an important step in that it would remove the threat of warfare with bacteriological and toxin weapons and would contribute to the further improvement of the international situation. It will constitute what amounts to the first real disarmament measure, as it will bring about the destruction of existing stocks of one type of weapon of mass destruction.

67. In this connexion I should like to reiterate that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has not retreated from its initial positions and views. We shall continue to exert our maximum efforts for the early attainment of the prohibition of chemical weapons. We regard the convention banning bacteriological weapons as a first step which will be helpful in achieving that goal. From this standpoint we consider it very important that the Assembly adopt draft resolution A/C.1/L.580, of which we are also a sponsor.

68. Along with the basic political aim, which is to remove the threat of nuclear war, the need to resolve disarmament problems is all the more important and urgent in the light of the steadily increasing financial, human and other material and spiritual resources which armaments are consuming at the expense of activities in the peaceful sector all over the world.

69. As indicated in the Secretary-General's report on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race [*A/8469 and Add.1*], in the preparation of which a Czechoslovak expert took part, since 1967 the military sector has been absorbing on a world scale the astronomical sum of \$U.S.200,000 million per annum; the work, talent and skills of nearly 25 million young people of the most highly productive age serving in armed forces; and about 50 million working people, among them leading scientists, technicians, specialists and other workers who are engaged directly or indirectly for military purposes.

70. The mind boggles at the thought that by 1980 annual expenditure on armaments will reach an estimated level of \$300,000-350,000 million (at 1970 prices), if we do not succeed in fundamentally changing, indeed reversing, world developments in the arms field.

71. These are additional major factors which should induce all Governments to redouble their efforts to reach agreement on truly effective disarmament measures.

72. As is clear from the report of the Committee on Disarmament, that body also directed considerable effort towards achieving a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests. It failed, however, to obtain any concrete results in the matter of drafting a treaty banning such tests. The reason why the talks bogged down lies in the United States position with respect to verification. In a situation where growing numbers of States share the view that appropriate and effective verification of a ban on underground tests does not require on-site inspection, the United States persists in its unfounded demand for such inspection.

73. In so doing the United States is disregarding the opinion of many United States scientists active in this field

and of a number of more realistically-minded United States politicians that the United States, as well as other countries, has the technical ability adequately to verify compliance with an underground nuclear test ban without on-site inspections. For progress to be made in this matter the United States must take into account the real state of affairs in the world and the views of all countries with regard to the practical possibilities of ensuring effective and adequate verification of compliance through national means of control.

74. In order to enhance such control, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as well as other socialist countries, is prepared, on condition that an agreement banning underground nuclear weapon tests is reached, to take part in international co-operation in the area of seismological data exchange on a voluntary basis and evaluation of selected data by individual countries.

75. With regard to discussions on the demilitarization of the sea-bed, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has from the very beginning taken the view that the sea-bed and the ocean floor should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has striven to ensure that this environment is entirely excluded from this sphere of military applications. Last year the Committee on Disarmament prepared a draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, which was approved by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session [*resolution 2660 (XXV)*]. In February of this year the Treaty was opened for signature by all States.

76. The growing number of signatures and ratifications attests to the fact that the Treaty demilitarizing the sea-bed is meeting with wide support throughout the world. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic signed the Treaty on the day it was opened for signature, and on 8 October of this year the Federal Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic approved the action and recommended ratification to the President of the Republic.

77. The Treaty will prevent expansion of the arms race in nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in an extensive area covering two thirds of the earth. In our view it should also stand as a first and decisive step towards the full demilitarization of that environment, namely, by excluding from it all types of weapons and war *matériel* of whatever nature.

78. We accordingly think it imperative that the Committee on Disarmament should continue discussions on further measures to attain the full demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

79. The talks in the Geneva Committee also touched upon the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], which, according to a statement by the distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant on the occasion of the entry into force of the Treaty,<sup>9</sup> "has been widely acclaimed as the

<sup>9</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970, document DC/233, annex C, sect. II.*

most important international agreement in the field of disarmament since the nuclear age began".<sup>10</sup>

80. However, for the Treaty to become fully universal it must be acceded to by other States, and first and foremost those which are important from the economic and military standpoint. The need for early implementation of the control measures prescribed in the Treaty has recently grown considerably in importance. In the case of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the first round of talks towards the conclusion of a safeguards agreement under the non-proliferation Treaty took place between the delegates of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 September of this year. Preparations are now being made for the next round of talks, which we should like to hold at the end of this month. We believe that the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency will be signed before the second special session of the IAEA Board of Governors which is to open on 8 January 1972 at Vienna.

81. These are our comments on several of the disarmament items on the agenda of this session of the General Assembly. As regards the other questions relating to disarmament, the Czechoslovak delegation reserves its right to address itself to them in the course of our further discussions, and to speak on the draft resolutions which have been submitted so far.

82. The current session of the General Assembly should promote the attainment of substantial progress in the efforts to resolve disarmament problems. We trust, therefore, that it will set in motion practical preparations for a world disarmament conference, that it will underscore the responsibility of the nuclear Powers for the implementation of effective measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, that it will approve the draft convention banning bacteriological weapons and that it will instruct the Committee on Disarmament to conduct further talks on other important disarmament measures.

83. The Czechoslovak delegation, as at previous sessions, stands ready to provide its assistance towards the attainment of these ends.

84. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has now completed its tenth year of work in Geneva and is presenting its tenth report [A/8457] to the United Nations General Assembly. An evaluation of the results is not very encouraging. While in the real world armaments are sky-rocketing, negotiations on disarmament crawl at a snail's pace.

85. A few days ago, when I spoke in the General Assembly [1989th plenary meeting] on the question of a world conference on disarmament, I had the opportunity of evaluating the situation in general terms and of stating my Government's positive interest in turning a fresh and more promising page in the history of disarmament efforts.

86. Today, I want to comment in greater detail on some points on which we hold that immediate attention should

be directed in order to bring to completion some specific collateral measures of disarmament, because preparations for them are already in quite an advanced state.

87. Before turning to them, however, I want to say that in the generally sombre picture we seem to discern some rays of light. One of them relates to the progress which has been signalled to be under way in the recently resumed bilateral United States-Soviet Union negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms. We share the view expressed by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization<sup>11</sup> this year that what was needed was a halt in both the quantitative accumulation and the qualitative sophistication of nuclear weapons and missiles, proceeding further to a reduction of their present numbers and then to their eventual elimination.

88. That, of course, is a responsibility of the nuclear weapon Powers, and most specifically of the two super-Powers that have an enormous overkill capacity which they can, without any detriment to their national security, begin to scale down. To agree to a lowering of the guard while retaining balanced postures would be particularly timely at this juncture, when it is generally recognized that the risk of an all-out war between the two super-Powers has diminished and when it is acutely important to dissuade other great Powers from trying to take part in an arms race with the super-Powers. For these specific reasons, we hope that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) will really become the gateway to a new course towards serious disarmament.

89. Proceeding from these bilateral disarmament negotiations, the next logical step is to ask what prospects may lie in regional approaches to disarmament. Here also the link to political realities must be kept in mind. In this case, the diagnosis cannot be so optimistic. The risks of war which most acutely worry the world today are obviously those of so-called local wars. Nations all over the world should in their own best interest be eager to find agreed ways of reducing the arsenals, or at least refraining from constantly adding to them. Our Organization has hitherto been reluctant to make pronouncements as to disarmament measures in this regional category. Such measures must rely on mutual agreements between nations in a region which will understandably be interested in the maintenance of a certain balance.

90. I want to recall that in regard to conventional armaments and the continued, costly building up of such arsenals everywhere, the General Assembly has recurrently been presented with certain proposals, although these have mostly been concerned with reduction of arms sales and of military subsidies rather than with limitation of arms production. It has been the position of my Government that initiatives in these fields are most likely to succeed if they are taken up for regional consideration by the countries directly concerned. This does not preclude, however, that some measures in regard to conventional armaments could usefully be discussed multinationally in connexion with other "global" disarmament negotiations, in order to get a general picture of the possibilities and problems lining our path to "general and complete disarmament".

<sup>10</sup> Quoted in English by the speaker.

<sup>11</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A.



91. Certain regional negotiations are being opened up. In Europe there are hopeful signs that events are moving towards a relaxation of tensions, which may also have consequences for reducing military postures. A settlement of the German problem seems to be within reach, and this should create favourable conditions for a regional security conference in Europe. There are also indications of other contacts between NATO and Warsaw Pact Governments as regards possible mutual reductions of forces in Europe. The discussions will in all likelihood have to deal with the deployment of both nuclear and conventional weapons, massed in such great magnitude as they are in Europe.

92. Earlier discussions have rather centred on proposals for nuclear-free zones in Europe. It is encouraging to note that, for instance, Northern Europe already *de facto* constitutes such a zone. I want in this context to refer to the statement made at the 1830th meeting of this Committee by the representative of Finland, when he mentioned the so-called Kekkonen Plan of denuclearization of the Nordic region. The accession of more European countries to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] might pave the way for a similar denuclearization of larger parts of our continent.

93. I should also like to recall the plea for a nuclear-free zone in Africa, and inquire particularly what the prospects are for implementing General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961—that is 10 years ago tomorrow—in which Member States were called upon to refrain from testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons in Africa and to respect that continent as a denuclearized zone.

94. To my mind, the Treaty of Tlatelolco<sup>12</sup> is an excellent model of what could also be achieved by other regions. It was proposed and negotiated on the exclusive responsibility of the Latin American States themselves. This Treaty even succeeded in establishing as one of its salient features a Protocol II, according to which commitments have begun to be obtained from nuclear weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American parties to the Treaty.

95. The road to similar initiatives for keeping out nuclear weapons, or even mass destruction weapons in general, including biological and chemical weapons, lies invitingly open to other regions of the world.

96. I have wanted to underline that progress in bilateral and regional disarmament endeavours would be highly welcome as signs of making disarmament a realistic issue. If, simultaneously, some world disarmament conference is being prepared, we should have the right to hope that, finally, a more systematic and serious approach would be taken for stopping the senseless wasting of resources on war machinery.

97. In the meantime, however, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has some unfinished business to conclude. Let me therefore turn now to the most urgent

of those, namely, the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. How urgent it is today, 12 years after it was first included in the agenda of the General Assembly, has just been blatantly illustrated. The groundswell of criticism by public opinion and mass media of the Cannikin test on Amchitka Island creates a political background for a decision to be made now to proceed with a complete cessation of all tests—not however primarily on account of the ecological risks involved in them, but on account of their function to escalate the armaments race.

98. The fact has to be stressed that the many resolutions adopted during the years by the General Assembly, as well as all the pledges in international treaties, have gone unheeded. Each year the Conference has also been requested by the General Assembly to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. Each year the Conference has failed to achieve such a measure and has only been able to report that it has devoted attention to these questions.

99. The report of the Conference this year contains a special reference to the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. It bears witness to the serious concern expressed by most members of the Committee regarding the continued nuclear testing. Several possible approaches towards a comprehensive prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons have been presented but no progress has been achieved.

100. Two months ago my own delegation submitted a working paper to the Geneva Committee [A/8457, annex C, sect. 30], containing suggestions for possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. This is a revised version of the draft treaty text which Sweden presented in April 1969.<sup>13</sup> Again, we hope that such a proposal can contribute to more detailed, concrete negotiations on this vital subject.

101. Our draft treaty text serves particularly to illustrate how the control question could be solved, a question that has been highlighted as the main, or even the only, obstacle to agreement. To satisfy the political requirements of control we have outlined a gradual procedure. National means of observation, strengthened by international co-operation for the exchange of seismic data, should primarily be relied upon for detection of possible treaty violations. If they show a need of clarification, there would follow a series of increasingly more intensive queries. The procedure has sometimes been called verification by challenge or verification by invitation. It does not exclude on-site inspections, by invitation or by mutual agreement, as a last resort.

102. It is clearer than ever that the decisive obstacles are military-political, even if technical arguments are relied upon for refusing the cessation of tests. What are these technical arguments worth? The techniques for seismological monitoring of nuclear explosions have advanced so far over the years that one can now correctly identify such a large proportion of explosions that in fact an effective deterrent against attempts at clandestine testing can be

<sup>12</sup> Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

<sup>13</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232, annex C, sect. 6.

obtained. With investments which are modest in relation to the issue and which, therefore, depend only on political will, it would be possible to improve the present network of observatories so that they would be generally satisfactory for both detection and identification of all but very weak explosions.

103. Thus the importance once attached to the question of on-site inspection is now greatly reduced. The technical argument for a verification procedure based on on-site inspections could really apply only to the smallest explosions. Some such residual, impossible to detect by seismic means, will always remain; but it is highly doubtful whether even on-site inspection would improve the possibilities to detect and identify these small and presumably also militarily less important tests.

104. For the main range of test explosions we are confident that sufficiently satisfactory ways exist of achieving the desired deterrent effect, both through seismic and non-seismic means of monitoring and information, for instance, satellite observations. A comprehensive test ban treaty could be concluded today on the basis of knowledge that we possess. The world is impatiently waiting for this. A comprehensive test ban would be a major achievement in the disarmament field. It would have strategic importance as a two-pronged measure: on the one hand, it would save mankind from the continued race between the nuclear weapon Powers towards newer and more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction; on the other hand, it would serve as a barrier against the acquiring of such weapons by more countries.

105. It is in order to stress once more the urgency of bringing to a halt all nuclear weapon testing and to reach a comprehensive test ban without delay that my delegation has joined with other delegations in submitting today in this Committee draft resolution A/C.1/L.585 on this subject. Later the draft resolution will be formally introduced by the representative of Canada, but I want to underline now that it is a resolution to which we attach special importance. At the same time I want to state that the Swedish delegation will also vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.584 introduced today by Mexico, which we find to be complementary to our own.

106. Let me turn now to the chapter on chemical and biological weapons, where action is likewise urgent. It was with somewhat mixed feelings that my Government participated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament when it elaborated a treaty banning production only of biological and toxin weapons, as we did not feel that this measure ranked highest in priority. We have been, and still are, of the opinion that a ban on the production of chemical weapons is of much greater practical, that is, military, urgency. We also hold that it remains vitally important to attain universal, unambiguous and unqualified adherence to the Geneva Protocol.<sup>14</sup>

107. In this latter respect I feel constrained to make some comments of a more specific nature, lest silence on my part

be construed as acquiescence in unilateral attempts to reduce the scope of the rules embodied in the Geneva Protocol. What I have in mind is that, while the vast majority of States have gone on record as interpreting the ban against use of biological and chemical means of warfare as covering them all comprehensively, a few States have attempted to make qualifications which, if they were maintained and insisted upon, might result in a pattern of unequal obligations and an erosion of the Protocol.

108. Therefore my delegation ardently hopes that the United States Government will soon see its way to a ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and interpret it as the vast majority of States do, that is, as covering also tear gases and herbicides. My delegation further hopes that the United Kingdom Government will retract the recently voiced view, which is as surprising as it is unacceptable, that the Geneva Protocol did not cover CS gas, because "smoke" was not covered by the Protocol.

109. As a party to the 1925 Protocol, my Government categorically rejects any unilateral attempts to curtail obligations which for 45 years have been considered mutually binding on all parties in an equal, non-discriminatory way. We view them as dangerous attempts to erode the ban. They are the more dangerous if they are not openly communicated to the Government of France and circulated by that depository Government to the parties to the Protocol, giving these parties an opportunity to react officially.

110. In this context, I welcome the decision of the Canadian Government—as communicated to us at the 1829th meeting by the representative of Canada—to commit itself in a clear-cut way to non-use for warfare purposes of all chemicals whether intended for use against persons, animals or plants.

111. This concern on our part is not motivated only by the desire to maintain the integrity of international agreements. There is, as I have had occasion to state in greater detail in Geneva, a real risk, if the taboos are broken down, that in so-called local wars a use of herbicides for crop destruction could amount to massive food denial for whole populations, that is, waging war for victory through starvation. In the more global context the greatest scare is related to the nerve gases. An agreement first on a moratorium on the production of this category of nerve gases which are unusable for any other purpose than killing, such as indicated in the Mexican amendment [A/C.1/L.578], would be strongly supported by my delegation if it were a separate resolution dealing with chemical weapons. To make a start with these highly lethal gases has seemed to us, as well as to some other delegations, to be the most urgent and the most pragmatic way of proceeding to a ban on the production, stockpiling and so on of chemical weapons.

112. Now I should, however, turn to the recommendation [A/C.1/L.579] before us for a convention restricted to a ban on production, stockpiling and so on of biological and toxin weapons [see A/8457, annex A]. I have already given our reasons for not having considered such an agreement to be of extreme urgency, it being widely admitted that biological weapons are of low military significance. But, of

<sup>14</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

course, the purpose of outlawing their production is a very worthwhile one *per se*, particularly since the clause in the draft convention about destruction of existing stocks of biological weapons would make it into a true disarmament measure, really the first one that could rightly be so labelled.

113. I should like to express satisfaction also that so many changes have been introduced in the draft convention as the result of detailed consultations in the Committee on Disarmament, including delegations outside the group of sponsors. In the opinion of my Government this has considerably improved the text.

114. However, there are still some important questions of principle which have to be raised in relation to the terms of the convention.

115. My delegation is concerned about the procedures which the draft convention provides for ensuring compliance. We think that it would be wise for States which questioned the full compliance of another State first to make use of the obligation of parties to co-operate under article V of the draft convention to clear up the question. During that stage the use of the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations would seem to be one of the "appropriate international procedures", to use the words of the convention. So far there is perhaps no great problem.

116. We must, however, seek clarification and reassurance regarding the exact import of article VI of the convention.

117. We have assumed that the obligations of the biological weapons convention are to be entered into by States on the basis of equality and that all parties which undertake the obligation not to "develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain" biological and toxin weapons accept the same measure of obligation to co-operate in an investigation, should a complaint about a treaty violation be lodged. It is in this connexion that we have become concerned about the construction of article VI of the convention. Similar queries have been expressed in this Committee by the representatives of Ghana [1829th meeting], Australia and Brazil [1831st meeting].

118. Let me try to explain our worries. We should like to be reassured—by explicit statements from the permanent members of the Security Council—that the practical result of this article is not that a permanent member by veto could prevent an investigation were a complaint lodged against it—or against one of its allies—while an ordinary member invariably would be obliged to submit to an investigation which was decided upon by the majority of the Council, including the permanent members.

119. We should be much reassured to hear from the permanent members that an unequal obligation is not intended and that such a result will be avoided because they hold that the initiation of an investigation provided for under article VI of the draft convention will be decided upon by the Council in the manner prescribed for procedural matters. Another method which does not, however, give equally broad reassurance might be to have it declared that, whatever the State against which a complaint was

lodged—a great Power or not—that State would be obliged under Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter as a party to a dispute to refrain from voting on a proposal for investigation of the complaint and to co-operate in carrying out the investigation. If the answers to our questions are positive, it would seem easy to draft some amendment either to the draft convention or to the proposed Security Council resolution to spell out the situation.

120. Surely, what we all seek to achieve is a non-discriminatory convention, one that holds all parties bound to the same rules on compliance and on control. This question of course has important implications for all future rules about control of disarmament measures.

121. Some may ask why we have not raised this question at earlier sessions of the General Assembly, for instance, when similar language was introduced in relation to last year's Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [resolution 2660 (XXV)]. But there is a categorical difference between nuclear and other weapons. The nuclear weapon Powers are restricted in number to those which are also the permanent members of the Security Council. The prohibitory clauses in that Treaty could *de facto* refer only to them, and control measures can *eo ipso* envisage only action against them. Chemical and biological weapons, on the other hand, are not in a monopoly category. They are, at least potentially, available to all nations. Consequently, rules about their prohibition, against violation of such prohibition and about fact-finding investigations in suspected cases should be the same for all nations.

122. This question about the equality of the States under the biological weapons convention and the non-applicability of the veto as regard investigations under article VI must now be clarified.

123. My statement today has referred to some remarks which my delegation wished to bring to the attention of the Committee at a relatively early stage. We reserve our right to speak later on specific issues raised in various draft resolutions.

124. Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (*interpretation from French*): We would like to believe that discussion of the disarmament question at this twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations has some chances of taking place in a favourable atmosphere conducive to a comprehensive and sincere discussion of the many aspects of the question.

125. The situation in Europe is evolving in a manner which raises very great hopes with, first of all, the prospects of holding a conference to establish a system of European security. The peace programme launched by the Soviet Government at present is represented by promising initiatives and signs of progress. The proposals to hold a conference of the five nuclear Powers and a world disarmament conference also open up new horizons. The resumption in Vienna of the negotiations on strategic arms limitation a few days ago also confirms the importance that the two nuclear Powers attach to the questions of the

limitation of strategic arms, and allows us to foresee results that the world awaits.

126. Furthermore, the encouraging progress achieved thus far and the experience of the United Nations in the field of disarmament also offer a wider basis and a more advanced starting point along the road that we have been following for so long. The documents available to us—such as the introduction to the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization,<sup>15</sup> the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8457] and the report of the Secretary-General on the consequences of the armaments race [A/8469 and Add.1] and certain documents of the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, particularly the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [resolution 2734 (XXV)] are also sources of enlightenment to all of us in dealing with the problems that confront us.

127. We are also convinced that the decision of the General Assembly that has already been a highlight of the present session—and I speak of the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in all organs of the United Nations—is highly significant particularly in the field of disarmament. May I take this opportunity on behalf of the Bulgarian delegation to welcome the delegation of the People's Republic of China to this Committee and to express our conviction that that delegation will contribute to solving the problems that we have on our agenda.

128. We believe that it would be sufficient to consider the place occupied by disarmament problems in the intense international political activity that is a feature of today's world, as well as the concern of public opinion, to gauge the urgency of mobilizing and concerting all efforts to achieve a solution to a problem whose importance needs no further proof. Because today, as in the past, and whenever the disarmament question appears in the United Nations, we are forced to recognize that, despite efforts made thus far, the results obtained are far from being those expected. This meagreness has created a threatening situation in the world which becomes aggravated with alarming trends. The Secretary-General himself noted on this matter that "this situation not only poses a continual threat to international peace, but also has a deep unsettling effect on human society".

129. On this point may I recall certain events of a different nature which also very significantly illustrate the deeply disturbing effect of which the Secretary-General spoke. And I am thinking of the monetary and financial crisis that for some months has upset economic relations among the Western Powers and seriously threatens the economies of many nations. Might I ask if there is not between the arms race and the financial difficulties of the world today a tie, a very close cause and effect relationship whose consequences should dictate a new approach to the problems of disarmament?

130. Furthermore, this relationship is established and very clearly proved in the outstanding report on the consequences of the armaments race that the Secretary-General, assisted by a group of experts, submitted in accordance

with resolution 2667 (XXV). We believe that that is a highly edifying document and one of the greatest value for all those who are truly concerned over the most troubling aspects of what we usually term the arms race. We have no doubt that the members of this Committee have already attached great attention and importance to that document.

131. As far as the Bulgarian delegation is concerned, with the consent of my colleagues I would like to stress certain conclusions of the report which seem to us of the greatest importance. But, of course, I do not feel that I am going to exhaust all the resources of this document in so doing.

132. The picture of the negative effects of the arms race as outlined by the experts is extremely striking. I shall not mention the figures that are so well known. The squandering of enormous financial and material resources mentioned in the report, while hundreds of millions of human beings are the victims of the most squalid wretchedness, has raised the same feelings of indignation in my delegation as those expressed by many other delegations. But I would like to stress the other different, but no less nefarious consequences, namely, the deterioration of the national and international climate, the growing insecurity, the political impact, the moral and psychological effects of this true scourge which is the arms race of today.

133. The economic consequences of the arms race and military expenditures can to a certain extent be examined quantitatively. But the same cannot be done with the social aspects. The incidence of these matters on the national level, as the report points out, is terrifying. Might I just cite paragraph 87, which says:

"The arms race also tends to change traditional relationships between the civilian and military sectors of the economy. The military sector means more than the military forces themselves. It includes the firms and industries which serve them, the scientific institutions where their research is done, and the political establishments and ministries that owe their power to the arms race . . ."

And further on in paragraph 88, when mentioning the existence of what has been termed the "military-industrial complex", the report shows the machinery of the arms race and the influence of the military establishment that tries to create for itself a political image in the world, but which calls for a high state of military preparedness.

134. The report goes on to say: "Yet another is the threat to democratic processes which can arise." And then it draws the categorical conclusion that: "The spirit of militarism is opposed to the spirit of democracy and peaceful progress in the world." I do not think we need look very far to find examples that prove these conclusions. Suffice it to recall certain revelations regarding the role played by this militarist spirit in the preparation of the aggression in Viet-Nam.

135. And now I come to those aspects of the report that describe the effects of the arms race on international life. Here the danger is even greater since it threatens peace in the world. The arms race by definition, the report stresses in paragraph 90, possesses an international justification and

<sup>15</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly. Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A.*

an international character. Periods of international tension are usually associated with an acceleration in the arms race and in turn a speeding-up of the race exacerbates international tension. This, as stated in paragraph 93, "inevitably undermines the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations". The armaments race creates mistrust and fear by one nation of another and not only envenoms political relations, but also threatens economic and social welfare by hampering exchanges among peoples and by slowing down exchanges of techniques and scientific know-how among countries. When countries devote much of their resources to prepare for war, the suspicion and tension which result tend to take over the handling of relations and this situation paralyses any possibility of co-operation.

136. The arms race aggravates international tensions to which it is linked. Political divergencies are exacerbated by fear and mistrust engendered by the accumulation of armaments. Military expenditures cause grave imbalances in international payments and cultural exchanges are hindered. So, armaments which were supposed to create security and dissipate tensions have, on the contrary, heightened political divergencies. The powerful interests that in capitalist countries hold the levers of command tend to perpetuate this state of affairs from which they sprang and, the report points out, only a political decision can finally break this vicious circle.

137. I shall now touch on the problems referred to in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Following the lead of many other delegations, I should like to express the satisfaction of the Bulgarian delegation at the good work done this year by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

138. As others have pointed out, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has attached great importance to two items on its agenda, chemical and biological weapons and underground nuclear tests. Devoting most of its work to the first of these problems it has achieved concrete results on a draft convention on the prohibition of the manufacture, stockpiling and production of chemical, biological weapons and toxins and on their destruction, which is annexed to the report. Having taken an active part in the preparation of this draft in the Committee on Disarmament, we are very gratified with the positive reception given to the document. The provisions of the draft treaty taken as a whole meet the unanimous desire to eliminate once and for all one of the most dangerous of weapons, and thus one of the first disarmament measures is about to be agreed to.

139. The Bulgarian delegation understands full well certain reservations and also the disillusionment expressed in the course of this debate, particularly when voiced by the majority of member States, that a simultaneous solution could not be found to the chemical and bacteriological questions in accordance with the terms of resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970. However, we are also convinced that the majority will take into account the circumstances in which the negotiations have to take place. I am sure that all remember that the socialist countries submitted a draft to that effect<sup>16</sup> along the lines of the

resolutions I have just mentioned and that it was only the intransigent attitude of certain Western Powers in the Committee on Disarmament that made a global solution unobtainable. It was only because of the impossibility of achieving a solution and having weighed all the risks of a stalemate that the socialist delegations submitted their new compromise draft on 30 March 1971 [A/8457, annex C, sect. 8].

140. We should also recall that it was after lengthy and very bitter debates that we were able to include in this draft certain substantive provisions, particularly concerning the links which should be preserved between the draft convention and the Geneva Protocol,<sup>17</sup> and between the convention and the prohibition of chemical weapons. This understanding makes us optimistic regarding the way in which the General Assembly and this Committee will deal with the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. It is for these reasons and because of this confidence that my delegation is a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.579, which urges the depository Governments to open the convention for signature and ratification as soon as possible.

141. The Bulgarian delegation shares the view that two questions have now acquired maximum importance and will be studied with priority at the Geneva Conference: that of chemical weapons and that of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

142. My delegation hopes that the discussion of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons will benefit from the comprehensive examination of all its aspects that was carried out at previous meetings of the Committee. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.580, of which my country is a sponsor, will doubtless give a new impetus to negotiations on that important matter.

143. When dealing with the question of the prohibition of underground tests I should like at the outset to state that my delegation is ready to join those delegations which consider that nuclear disarmament is a crucial aspect of disarmament problems as a whole and the prohibition of underground tests must be the first, urgent and necessary, step to be taken. These tests are intended to perfect new nuclear weapons and to continue the qualitative nuclear arms race, which is the most dangerous race. They constitute a constant threat of a breach of the very fragile balance on which we are told peace rests today. They keep alive tension among States, increasing suspicion and mistrust, and sap reliance on certain treaties and above all on the good faith of the signatory parties.

144. To justify the continuation of nuclear tests, the interests of national security are always invoked. This was true for the latest underground nuclear test on Amchitka Island. The Secretary-General's report, which I cited earlier, has devoted many paragraphs to proving the fallacious nature of these arguments and it concludes that the arms

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 and 94, document A/8136.

<sup>17</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

race, far from increasing security, creates the greatest threat and is the single greatest peril confronting the world today. The logic of the arms race stretches that threat to the limits, for if an explosion of five megatons is necessary to increase national security, why not admit that a 10-megaton explosion would doubly increase so-called national security, and so on and so forth?

145. It is this sinister game that must be ended. Verification, which thus far has been cited as the main obstacle to a solution, is today not an insoluble question. This is felt by the greatest experts. Detection, localization and identification of seismic phenomena today can all be carried out with modern techniques. A number of suggestions made in the course of the latest meetings of the Committee on Disarmament open prospects of real progress in the matter. The Soviet Union, as Ambassador Roschin stated in the First Committee on 11 November, is prepared to sign an agreement prohibiting underground nuclear tests based on the use of national means of detection. [*1827th meeting, para. 43.*]

146. We are very gratified at the general singleness of view that we have found in the Committee relating to the need to give priority to negotiations on these two problems in future. We are convinced that the Committee on Disarmament will devote most of its time and efforts to these questions. My country, a member of the Committee on Disarmament, will contribute to the maximum of its possibilities to that end.

147. The Conference, in which arduous and difficult negotiations took place, has now gone through the test period and possesses enormous experience and inexhaustible resources of perseverance and desire for work. If the results thus far have been modest, we must take into account certain circumstances and the too often negative positions of certain countries that have not always made its work easy. We are happy to note that the majority of delegations have expressed their confidence in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which I am sure will stimulate its future work.

148. Having said this, I wish to note that a number of other problems are still included in the agenda of the Conference thus, for example, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the total demilitarization of the sea-bed, the creation of nuclear-free zones, the liquidation of foreign military bases, etc.

149. Before concluding, may I note that even if, as we hope, the Conference were able to deal with all these problems thoroughly or at least with some of them—even if it managed to solve the problem of the prohibition of the use of chemical and underground tests—it would still have many other important things to do. There would remain the problem of disarmament, true and veritable disarmament, that is, the complete elimination of the nuclear danger, the destruction of the enormous stockpiles of all types of weapons in all arsenals: in one word, general and complete disarmament. That was the target that the United Nations assumed in accordance with the Charter, and in accordance with the unanimously adopted resolutions of the General Assembly in session after session. That is a task whose complexity does not have to be stressed and it is a

task that must be performed by all States Members of the international community as a whole.

150. The Bulgarian delegation feels that after 10 years of efforts and trials, the moment is ripe for us to leave the beaten track and seek a new approach along the lines of the proposals of the Government of the Soviet Union calling for a conference of the five nuclear Powers and the convening of a world disarmament conference.

151. Whether we want it or not, reality is such that the problems of nuclear disarmament—the crux of general disarmament—cannot be solved without the agreement of all five nuclear Powers. We therefore do not understand why such a conference should become or might be turned into an attack on the non-nuclear Powers. We cannot believe that the non-nuclear Powers should be happier today, in the present state of affairs, with the arms race in full swing, nor can we grasp what they would have to lose if the arms race were stopped.

152. Furthermore, the world conference—with, of course, the participation of all militarily strong countries—would give them all a chance to contribute to planning the road leading to the main goal, which is general and complete disarmament. We are convinced that a world conference, as proposed by the Soviet Union and supported by a great majority of the Members of the United Nations, would be a decisive milestone in international life and in our efforts to solve the problems of disarmament in general.

153. Mr. AMERASINGHE (Ceylon): Ten years have passed since a joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations was presented to the United Nations by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States.<sup>18</sup> That statement made clear what the goal of disarmament negotiations as conceived by these two major Powers should be. The programme of general and complete disarmament as defined in that joint statement was one which would ensure that States had at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as were necessary to maintain internal order and security, that it would seek the disbandment of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, including bases, the cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses, the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, the cessation of the production of such weapons, and the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction. These were the main features of that programme.

154. The overriding principle of disarmament, as expressed in that joint statement, was that all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage would any State or group of States enjoy a military advantage and that security would be ensured equally for all. As a principle this was unexceptionable. As an objective it was as precise as could be expected since the concepts of balance and equality of security do not lend themselves to material or physical assessment or measurement.

<sup>18</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.*



155. The partial test ban Treaty<sup>19</sup> of 1963, the Tlateloleo Treaty<sup>20</sup> of 1967 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] represent a steady though stumbling advance in the direction of general and complete disarmament. The Treaty adopted at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [*resolution 2660 (XXV), annex*] was yet another development of great importance, but it does not preclude the use of nuclear weapons from the marine environment. It eliminates one possibility but permits a no less efficient and deadly alternative—the operation of nuclear-powered submarines from the marine environment.

156. The United Nations, characteristically, provided another institutional or rather psychological framework for its efforts towards general and complete disarmament when it endorsed the Secretary-General's proposal that the 1970s be declared a Disarmament Decade. Elaborate programmes of disarmament have been presented in response to General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV), among them the comprehensive programme of disarmament presented on 2 December 1970 by Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia.<sup>21</sup>

157. This year the General Assembly has received a further instalment from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament towards the general and complete disarmament account. We welcome the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [*A/8457, annex A*].

158. The authors of this draft convention may not like their hard-won agreement to be jeopardized by suggestions for amendment, but we strongly favour the amendment proposed by Mexico in document A/C.1/L.578 of 12 November 1971 for the insertion of a new article in the draft convention which would call for a moratorium on the development, production or stockpiling of chemical agents. If those who are capable of producing these agents are resolved to negotiate in good faith to reach early agreement on the banning of chemical weapons, they could give us no better earnest of their good intention than the acceptance of the moratorium proposed by Mexico.

159. We would also support the suggestion made by Ghana [*1829th meeting*] and Australia [*1831st meeting*] in regard to the provision for lodging complaints of breach of obligation. Article VI (1) should be amended to provide that such complaints should be lodged not with the Security Council but with the Secretary-General. That suggestion does not imply any confidence in the Security Council, nor is it founded on the maxim *Quis custodiet custodes?* The repository for complaints should as a matter

of principle be a totally impartial authority who is not a potential offender himself.

160. We were among those who desired that action should be taken simultaneously on the prohibition of both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, but, like others, we are content to accept the realities of the situation. We have, therefore, joined with others in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.581, requesting the Conference to proceed with the task of negotiating, as a high priority item, agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States. If biological weapons are insidious and indiscriminate in their choice of victims, chemical weapons are pervasive and deliberate.

161. We appreciate the argument that what is easier to ban should be banned first, lest time overtake us, but we would wish that the same argument were applied to all other proposals and not employed as an excuse for inaction. I shall return to that point at a later stage.

162. Despite the progress on the question of general and complete disarmament that has been achieved, the final objective seems with every passing year to recede further and further. As the Secretary-General has stated, the emphasis must shift from arms limitation to arms reduction and disarmament. The arms race has not abated one whit. On the other hand, new tracks are being opened up or discovered where the main contenders can engage in further trials of stamina, strength and ingenuity.

163. The sum total of our achievements to date has been to confine the testing of nuclear weapons to one area alone; to limit the spread of nuclear weapons; to establish zones where such weapons will not be produced, deployed or used; and, through the draft convention on bacteriological (biological) weapons, to mitigate in one respect the horrors of war. The combined effectiveness of all those measures can be put to a simple test, and the result is clear: they fail the test. The partial test ban Treaty has done nothing to stop the production and further refinement of nuclear weapons. It seems in fact to have had exactly the opposite effect of enabling nuclear Powers to confine their tests to one area and to proceed with frenzied concentration on the production of even more sophisticated nuclear weapons. The imagination is dwarfed by the capacity for annihilation that the present nuclear armoury commands.

164. So much for the technological implications of the various measures that have been taken. If we apply the financial test, the facts are even more startling. In the first year of the Disarmament Decade, military expenditures have, according to the Secretary-General's reports, increased from \$120,000 million to \$200,000 million, an increase of more than 66 percent. The claim that we have achieved any success in disarmament cannot be taken seriously if within the first year of the 10-year period in which we were committed to intensify our efforts, the armouries, and especially the nuclear armouries, of the world should have expanded to such fantastic proportions as the increase in expenditure clearly shows.

165. There is a tendency on the part of many of us to lament this expenditure as a senseless waste of resources that could be put to better use for promoting economic and

<sup>19</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

<sup>20</sup> Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (*ibid.*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

<sup>21</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 and 94, document A/8191.

social development, particularly in the developing countries. I hope that the two major Powers which have the largest share of this \$200,000 million expenditure on armaments will not conclude that our main interest in disarmament is prompted by the desire to get some of their money to finance our economic development. There is no need to stress time and time again the needs of the developing countries. That is not the heart of the matter. We want general and complete disarmament to save posterity from the scourge of war. We do not need to affirm the principle that savings from disarmament should be diverted to economic and social development. Even the wealthiest societies have social and economic inequalities which need to be redressed. Schools, hospitals and the care of the aged and the underprivileged, even in those wealthier countries, could claim resources that are now absorbed by nuclear warships, intercontinental ballistic missiles, MIRVs and ABM systems.

166. What we must ask with one voice is that a new approach be found to the reduction of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments. Regret is expressed that progress cannot be made in regard to nuclear disarmament because certain countries are not parties to the test ban Treaty. If it is the principle that disarmament must ensure a proper balance, so that one party will not be at an advantage over the other, the application of that principle to nuclear armaments would require that those who enjoy a tremendous advantage over the others should in the first instance stop further growth of their nuclear arsenals and agree to a phased reduction of their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It would also be not unreasonable to expect that further testing on the part of those Powers that enjoy this advantage should cease, as they are already so far ahead of the rest of the field that they have no need to engage in continued sophistication of their nuclear weapons and the continued expansion of their arsenals. If they were willing to adopt that measure of self-discipline, an immediate agreement on a comprehensive test ban might be more easily and more speedily attainable.

167. The two most formidable nuclear Powers in the world are today competing with each other. There is no competition between those Powers, on the one hand, and the rest of the world, even the other nuclear Powers, on the other. They command an overwhelming superiority that can never be seriously challenged by others. They have no one to fear except each other and a drastic reduction in their nuclear arsenals would not expose them to any threat from others. We appreciate that this is the aim of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), but it is difficult to reconcile the avowed purpose of those talks with the unchecked and unprecedented growth in nuclear development for warlike purposes.

168. My delegation's principal interest in the subject of disarmament today centres on the proposal which, along with the delegation of Tanzania, we submitted for inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly this year [A/8492 and Add.1], namely, the "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace". I must first of all refer to the concern expressed by the representatives of Argentina and Australia in regard to an observation in our memorandum of 1 October 1971 submitting the proposal. In that memoran-

dum we referred to the Antarctic Treaty<sup>22</sup> as an example of the recent trend in development of international law and practice towards the principle that areas not assimilated to national jurisdiction constitute an international domain that should be subject to international regulation and international responsibility. At the 1827th meeting, the representative of Argentina categorically disagreed with the statement that Antarctica was an area not assimilated to national jurisdiction and asserted that his country exercises sovereignty over a vast region of Antarctica and is, at the same time, a party to that Treaty. The representative of Australia raised a similar objection at the 1831st meeting. I must express my regret that our observation was so worded as to create the impression that we were challenging any claims to national sovereignty over Antarctica. On a subsequent occasion we did stress that we recognized that Antarctica was potentially under national sovereignty. I had hoped that this would be sufficient amends for our apparent encroachment on national sovereignty.

169. We do not wish to challenge any country's claims to any part of Antarctica. We are glad, however, that the objection has been raised by Argentina and Australia because it even improves on and strengthens our observation in our memorandum of 1 October 1971. It shows that there is a noticeable trend in international law and practice towards acceptance of the principle of bringing under international regulation not only areas that are not assimilated to national jurisdiction, but even areas that are claimed to be within national jurisdiction. We congratulate those countries like Argentina and Australia which exercise sovereignty over such areas on their willingness to refrain from asserting claims to national sovereignty to the point where they would interfere with so laudable an international purpose as that of seeking to treat such areas along with areas beyond national jurisdiction as denuclearized and demilitarized zones.

170. In our statement at the 1815th meeting of this Committee with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Peace and Security we indicated that the physical reduction of the volume of armaments was of little significance as long as quantitative reduction was more than offset by qualitative refinement. The material approach to disarmament is totally inadequate. There must be a moral approach as well. What we need is the creation of a climate and atmosphere of peace. What we need is the conscious and deliberate adoption of a philosophy of peace combined with an honest effort to translate that philosophy into practice. This practical expression would be fully met by the policy of non-alignment with its cardinal principle of avoiding all alliances or understandings with major Powers that would assume a military character. If there are two Power blocs that, through their fear of each other, engage in military competition and vie with each other in an arms race into infinity, a third element is needed to interpose itself between the two contending parties, without commitment to either but pledged only to the principles of the Charter. The existence of this third element would, with every new adherent to it, exercise a restraining influence on both blocs and make their competition and rivalry increasingly futile. To support either bloc is to get drawn into the vortex of hostile competition.

<sup>22</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series* vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

171. Wherever it is possible to reduce the scale of this competition between the rival Power blocs or to prevent it from developing, it is our duty to take measures to that end. If there are regions of the world where the arms race has not yet assumed menacing proportions and where there is still even a remote possibility of preventing its intrusion, the countries in that region could best serve the cause of peace and their own interests by making a concerted effort to arrest and reverse such developments or forestall them altogether in their region. There is one area of the world that is both historically conditioned to adopt such a policy and where actual circumstances are peculiarly favourable for the adoption of the policy: that is the Indian Ocean area.

172. With very few exceptions, all the people of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean have had a colonial past. With very few exceptions, all the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian ocean are developing countries with severely limited resources which cannot meet the demands of economic and social development even if they were to be reserved exclusively for that purpose. These States cannot afford to divert even a fraction of their resources to military expenditures, although circumstances compel them to do so. It rests with them to free themselves from those circumstances lest they forfeit all moral right to seek assistance from abroad for the peaceful task of economic growth.

173. There is no question that our proposal would, by the common consent of the littoral States, create the conditions in which great Power rivalries would be excluded from the area and ultimately enable the elimination of all military bases from the area. Even the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations<sup>23</sup> to which the Soviet Union and the United States subscribed in 1961 seeks the dismantling of military establishments, including bases. If this can be achieved in one region, we should not shrink from doing so. Peace cannot be established merely by the outlawing of nuclear weapons from a region. Where conditions permit, we should also outlaw conventional weapons from the region and thus hasten our advance, within the region, to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament which, again as expressed in the joint statement of the Soviet Union and the United States, would leave at the disposal of States only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, supply facilities and establishments as would be necessary to maintain internal order and security.

174. In my statement in this Committee on the implementation of the Declaration on International Peace and Security at the 1815th meeting, I gave elaborate details of our proposal for the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. I stated that our proposal had a new element which went further than any other measures hitherto taken in the field of disarmament. It would apply to one of the major oceans of the world the principle of the reservation of an area exclusively for peaceful purposes and would seek to give effect to that principle by the exclusion not merely of nuclear weapons, but even of conventional weapons from that area. We chose the Indian Ocean as the area for the inauguration of this new departure in strengthening

international peace and security through an essentially regional measure because it offered the best prospects. The lessons of history provided a psychological impetus. Contemporary events sounded the warning. The moment was also opportune.

175. Only two great Powers are present in force in the Indian Ocean, but their military and naval strength has not yet assumed such proportions as could complicate or frustrate the task of demilitarization and denuclearization of the area provided an accommodation could be reached between these two Powers, and others would respect the new status of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

176. None of the great Powers nor any of the intermediate Powers are contiguous States. The major maritime nations are geographically remote from the Indian Ocean area. The economic interests of the great Powers are not involved to any appreciable degree in that area to warrant the maintenance of formidable military and naval establishments in the Indian Ocean for the protection of those interests. Our proposal would not interfere in the least with the peaceful use of the sea lanes lying across the Indian Ocean. It would offer no obstacle to the movement of trade and commerce between East and West across the Ocean, or interrupt the flow of essential supplies in either direction. The only objection to it could be that the presence of the two Power blocs in the area is necessary either in the interests of the littoral States or for the furtherance of the global strategy of the Power blocs themselves.

177. In my statement, I set out the ultimate limits of our proposal, which would be the exclusion from the peace zone of all military bases, military installations, fortifications, logistical supply facilities, weapons testing, the conduct of manoeuvres, and the use, deployment, installation or storage of weapons or warlike devices of any kind, whether offensive, defensive or detective. The rights of coastal States in special areas of jurisdiction recognized under international law and any rights incidental thereto were to be preserved. We also had in mind that between the adoption of a declaration of this nature and the conclusion of an international agreement to give effect to it, all States would refrain from any activity incompatible with the terms of the declaration and also take effective measures for the early removal of any military bases, military installations, fortifications, logistical supply facilities and weapons lying within the zone.

178. In the course of our consultations it became apparent that the members of the Committee were not ready for such a comprehensive scheme for the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean; but we did also experience certain objections on technical and legal grounds. Our proposals and our approach to the idea have, therefore, undergone a radical change in deference to the reservations expressed by our critics.

179. We have thought fit at this stage to limit the scope of our proposal and to change its form. We would ask the General Assembly to declare that the Indian Ocean, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, within limits to be determined, be designed for all time as a zone of peace. In conformity with this declaration, we would ask the General Assembly to call

<sup>23</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.*

upon the major Powers to enter into immediate consultations with the coastal States of the Indian Ocean to halt the further expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and to take reciprocal action to eliminate from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, and to exclude from the area all nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence conceived in the context of great Power rivalry. This is the essence of the Lusaka Declaration of September 1970<sup>24</sup> and it is on this foundation that we seek to erect an edifice of peace and security for the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean.

180. We would also ask the General Assembly, in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances in the Indian Ocean, and in order to strengthen international security through regional and other co-operation, to call upon the coastal and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultations with a view to such action as may be necessary to ensure that: warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any purpose associated with the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any coastal State; subject to that provision, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by vessels of all nations is guaranteed; and that appropriate arrangements are made to give effect to any international agreement ultimately reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

181. Finally, we would request the Secretary-General to report to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly on the progress that has been made with regard to the implementation of this declaration.

182. The essence of the declaration is that it calls upon certain parties to enter into immediate consultations for a declared purpose: the creation of a zone of peace comprising an extensive ocean area bordered by States together representing about a third of the world's population. This purpose is fully consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with every single declaration, formal or otherwise, in the United Nations or outside it, whose objective is the promotion and attainment of peace and security.

183. We must not lose sight of the fact that in paragraph 11 of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [*resolution 2734 (XXV)*], the General Assembly recommended "that all States contribute to the efforts to ensure peace and security for all nations and to establish, in accordance with the Charter, an effective system of universal collective security without military alliances".

<sup>24</sup> Declaration adopted at the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries held in Lusaka from 8 to 10 September 1970.

Lest that commitment become a dead letter, let us start with the Indian Ocean area.

184. If it could have been said of our earlier formulation that it placed certain Powers at an advantage over others and, therefore, upset some sort of balance, such an objection would not be valid in regard to the present proposal. The consultations would give everyone the opportunity of accepting, modifying or rejecting any proposal. But one thing must be made clear. If there is any area of the world where such a concept or declaration has a reasonable prospect of successful application, it is incumbent on us to seize that opportunity and not to discard it merely on the ground that other areas of the world are not ready to entertain it. The fact that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are not ready to be declared and treated as zones of peace is no excuse for denying that status and that treatment to the Indian Ocean area.

185. Within the next few days the delegation of Ceylon will be in a position to present a draft resolution on the question. A critical examination of our proposal in its revised form, but bearing in mind what our ultimate objective is, should be directed towards the following issues if we wish to be constructive and practical and not merely captious and academic.

186. Does it threaten the vital interests and security of the littoral States? Does it interfere with any plans of theirs consistent with the principles of the Charter or with the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States? Does it forestall or prejudice any likely developments in relation to the law of the sea and thereby encroach on the functions and responsibilities of any other organ or subsidiary body of the United Nations? Does it upset or endanger the delicate equilibrium of forces which is necessary, in the absence of general and complete disarmament, to preserve international peace and security? Does it place either of the Power blocs at an advantage over the other and thereby prejudice its security or global interests? Does it differ materially from other international instruments in its aim at securing a limited surrender of the right of individual action by a State in the exercise of its sovereignty for the greater good of a greater number? Does it impair the effectiveness of any existing deterrent to war or to breaches of international peace? Does it hold out the hope or possibility of arresting the arms race in the Indian Ocean? Would it make a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security?

187. It is the answers to these questions that should determine our verdict on the proposal. It is on the littoral and hinterland States that the main responsibility devolves. It is their wish alone that can command the actions of others. They should not let it be said of them that they regarded war with indifference and peace with consternation.

*The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.*