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Chairman: Mr. Milko TARABANOV (Bulgaria).

**AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 AND 98
(*continued*)**

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Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8457, A/C.1/L.578 to 582)

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Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security: report of the Secretary-General (A/8469 and Add.1)

**Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace
(A/8492 and Add.1)**

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. BELLIZZI (Malta): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first time I am addressing this Committee, allow me to express to you my personal congratulations, and those of my delegation, on your election to the office of Chairman of the First Committee. Our felicitations go also to Mr. Ramphul of Mauritius and to Mr. Migliuolo of Italy for their election as Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur respectively. If our congratulations are summarily expressed, they are nonetheless sincere.

2. I should also like to take this opportunity to associate myself and my delegation with the warm sentiments of welcome extended by other speakers before me to the representatives of the People's Republic of China on this Committee. I am convinced that their constructive contribution will play a significant part in facilitating progress in the tasks facing this Committee.

3. Disarmament has been likened to motherhood, in that both are highly commendable states of affairs which are essential for the continued propagation of the human species. It has also been said that unfortunately the analogy cannot be pushed further for, unlike motherhood, disarmament is not likely to come about in the normal course of events unless suitable precautions are taken. And yet, to judge from the progress—or lack of it—achieved in all these years, as a result of discussions in this forum and elsewhere, the casual observer must surely be forgiven for thinking that the nations of the world do not appear to be taking this matter as seriously as it deserves—or at best, that they do not match their words and declarations with the necessary action. As has repeatedly been stated, disarmament is the most important step that the world community can and must take for the strengthening of international peace and security. We have also repeatedly been told that the continuing arms race does not purchase more security—not even for the nations with the most powerful arsenals. Everybody accepts this conclusion, as is evidenced by the fact that the two greatest military Powers have for some time been engaged in bilateral talks to limit strategic arms. Their efforts are naturally directed towards finding a less expensive plateau upon which to rest the existing military balance as well as to avoid engaging in fresh upward spirals of the arms race which, while imposing tremendous economic burdens, do not really add anything to the

security of either side. If anything, it has now come to be recognized that every escalation of the arms race, whether it is in conventional or nuclear weapons, produces less, not more, of that elusive commodity—security.

4. If we consider carefully this aspect of the arms race the conclusion would be inevitable that military expenditures, apart from their social and economic costs, also carry a clear cost in terms of international security. At a time when the subject of strengthening international security looms large in our minds, when considerable debate has already been devoted to this subject and will—quite rightly—continue to be given to it in the future, my delegation feels it opportune to raise a question concerning the connexion between excessive military expenditure and the maintenance of international security. The question is this: if it is universally accepted that heavy expenditure on military procurement reduces international security—that is, the security of all nations—is it not reasonable to suggest that those nations who so contribute to such a lessening of security should recognize their responsibility for making some amends to the international community?

5. Peace is indivisible. So is international security. Any action which diminishes international security is an action directly against the interests of all States, as well as against the professed goal of this Organization. Heavy expenditure on armaments is such an action, and it calls for compensatory action on the part of its authors. Until such compensatory action can take the form of real and significant disarmament measures, the interests of the international community would seem to demand at least some kind of monetary compensation, which should be directed towards international economic development. It may sound too idealistic, but is certainly not illogical, to expect that some day the Members of this Organization may assemble in what could be described as an annual disarmament pledging conference at which they would announce voluntary pledges either—and preferably—in the form of disbanding or dismantling selected parts of their military establishments or, failing that, in the form of monetary contributions to co-operative development efforts which would bear some relation to their total military expenditure beyond their strictly internal security requirements. We have pledging conferences for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and a variety of other worthy causes. Is it not possible to visualize a pledging conference for the vital cause of disarmament?

6. Unfortunately, that prospect would appear to be somewhat remote. The willingness of States to acknowledge any responsibility for reducing international security through their military procurement activities is highly doubtful at present. Their attitude towards contributing to international economic development activities is likewise not yet sufficiently progressive and forward-looking. This can easily be gauged from the fact that the world's spending on military armaments of over \$200,000 million per year, or approximately 6.5 per cent of the world's gross national product, is nearly 900 times the present level of assistance provided under the United Nations Development Programme.

7. And if support for UNDP has been less than satisfactory, the situation of other co-operative development efforts gives no cause for complacency. For instance, under article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], there is a specific commitment, on the part especially of nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, to contribute "... to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world". This is a legal commitment, not merely a moral one. All are familiar with what is after all recent history and there is no need to recall the blandishments and pressures applied by some nuclear-weapon States to secure acceptance by the General Assembly of the joint non-proliferation Treaty originally presented by the USA and the USSR. Suffice it to mention the repeated assurances that the Treaty would not only enhance the security of all States, but would also enable all States, particularly the developing nations, to share in the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It was said that these benefits outweigh whatever disadvantages could result from the renunciation of nuclear weapons. It was likewise announced that the undertakings in article IV of the Treaty constituted—in the words of the Canadian representative—a "... charter of rights in the sphere of nuclear science and technology for developing countries ...".¹

8. Let me sketch briefly the developments in this field during and after the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in 1968. As representatives will be aware, that Conference adopted seven resolutions on the subject of co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.² The most important of those resolutions, from the point of view of direct, practical impact, recommended, *inter alia*, increases in the funds available for technical assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency; the establishment of a "Special Nuclear Fund" for the purpose of making available grants and low-interest loans for financing nuclear projects in non-nuclear-weapon States; and the establishment of nuclear technology research and development programmes within the United Nations Development Programme and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), both programmes to be chiefly financed by nuclear-weapon States.

9. Over three years have passed since the adoption of those resolutions and it is pertinent today to take stock of the situation. Let me emphasize that the calls made upon the nuclear-weapon States for fresh and substantial financial contributions were no more than what the obligation laid upon States by article IV of the non-proliferation Treaty demands. They are no more than what the principle of "balanced contributions", so often heard in the debates leading to the Treaty, would seem to require. If the contribution of non-nuclear-weapon States in renouncing nuclear weapons and accepting international safeguards is to be adequately balanced by the nuclear-weapon States, the latter must not only make visible progress towards

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, First Committee, 1557th meeting, para. 19.*

² *Ibid., Twenty-third Session, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 17.*

nuclear disarmament but they must also live up to the obligations contained in article IV of the Treaty. It is disheartening to have to record that on neither count has there been much tangible progress so far.

10. The resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States were submitted to the General Assembly in 1968. What has happened since may be summed up, in statistical terms, as follows: in 1968, two resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly seeking fresh reports; in 1969, three reports were presented by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and two resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly; in 1970, another report was presented by the Secretary-General and two other resolutions were adopted by the Assembly.

11. The outcome of all this has been, first, the laudable creation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of a fund of special fissionable material; second, the launching of the International Nuclear Information Service; and third, a modest increase in the Agency's target for technical assistance under its Regular Programme from \$2 million to \$2.5 million for 1971. Apart from the fact that in no year so far has the target set ever been achieved, it would surely be ludicrous to suggest that the marginal increase of half a million dollars—incidentally, the first increase since 1962—can be regarded as in any way meeting the needs of the Agency to respond to all the requests for technical assistance made upon it, still less to meet the real—if sometimes as yet unexpressed—requirements of developing countries. The contribution of the UNDP and of other international sources of finance, valuable though it is, does little more than scratch the surface of the vast problem represented by the gap between declared needs in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and currently available resources.

12. According to the report by the Administrator on the activities of the UNDP in 1970,³ expenditure under both Special Fund and Technical Assistance Projects undertaken through the International Atomic Energy Agency totalled, for each of the past three years, \$2.1 million in 1968, \$1.2 million in 1969 and \$1.7 million in 1970. These figures, which incidentally include overhead costs, must be judged against the total amount of UNDP assistance, which in 1970 reached \$231.7 million. The total UNDP programme is itself judged to be far from adequate to meet the needs of the developing countries. In fact, concern has been expressed at the fact that the level of pledges for 1971 was less than 6 per cent over the pledges for 1970. This is below the annual growth rate realized over the past several years. More important, the increase fell short of the 9.6 per cent minimum growth set by the UNDP Governing Council and is far short of the 15 per cent annual growth target set by the Secretary-General as needed to double the UNDP's resources by 1975. If the UNDP programme is itself inadequate, the tiny part of it—0.7 per cent in 1970—devoted to nuclear energy projects can only be described as irrelevant. Moreover, this infinitesimal expenditure covers activities across the entire field of the application of nuclear technology to development. According to the Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon

States,⁴ estimates of the amount of foreign capital that will be required over the next 15 years by developing countries to install nuclear power plants—that is, excluding other applications of nuclear technology—range from \$7,000 million to \$9,000 million. And this, according to the same document, will merely provide the developing countries collectively with no more than seven or eight per cent of the total installed nuclear megawattage capacity in the world by 1985.

13. As has been rightly pointed out by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in his statement to the General Assembly [*1979th plenary meeting*] on 8 November 1971, "The implementation of article IV of the non-proliferation Treaty is tied up with the problem of increasing aid to the developing countries." But whereas the obligation to provide development aid in general is no more than a moral obligation on the part of developed countries, the obligation to implement article IV of the non-proliferation Treaty is a legal obligation binding on all States Parties. The accent so far has been on exploring the possibilities of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to the virtual exclusion of other peaceful applications of atomic energy. This may have been, in part, the result of General Assembly resolution 2605 B (XXIV) which focused on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. However, I should like to remind this Committee that the question of such explosions for peaceful purposes is a distinct obligation laid on States Parties by article V of the Treaty. Article IV, on the other hand, provides for a separate and much wider set of responsibilities—those related to all the potential peaceful applications of nuclear energy, including the fields of medicine, agriculture, pest control, water resources development, generation of electricity, etc. It has to be emphasized that while some progress has been made in the direction of meeting the obligation in article V, little or nothing has been done to translate into action the high-sounding principles enunciated in article IV. Unfortunately, the provisions of this article are still to be honoured in their observance. In the view of my delegation the only way for this to be done is through the creation of a special fund, largely subscribed by the nuclear Powers, within which the Regular Programme of Technical Assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency would be integrated, to cater for the entire gamut of needs of Member States for international assistance in the field of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Such a suggestion was made by my delegation in 1969, but unfortunately there was no response. I am glad that the representative of Argentina, in his statement before this Committee at the 1827th meeting, has referred to this question before me. I should also like to declare the readiness of my delegation to join efforts with others who might share our feelings.

14. Before turning my attention to other aspects of disarmament, I should like to express the appreciation of my delegation for the illuminating report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.⁵

15. I must, however, express disappointment over paragraphs 121 and 122 of that report, which deal with General

⁴ Documents A/8079 and Add.1.

⁵ International Atomic Energy Agency, *Annual Report, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971* (Vienna, July 1971).

Assembly resolution 2261 B (XXV). That resolution called upon the Agency to pay attention to the safeguards required with respect to new techniques for uranium enrichment. While it is gratifying to learn from the report that the IAEA secretariat is continuing its studies of the possible implications of new techniques for uranium enrichment with a view to determining the effect they might have on the application of safeguards in practice, it is somewhat disconcerting to say the least that this problem should not have engaged the Agency's serious attention before now. This is evident from the Agency's own admission in paragraph 122 of the report that: "The structure and content of agreements recommended by the" (Safeguards) "Committee were formulated on the basis of experience in applying safeguards to nuclear material in facilities other than enrichment plants" and that: "Until now Agency safeguards have not been applied in uranium enrichment plants."

16. When one considers, as the Agency itself predicts, that facilities for enriching uranium will expand greatly during this decade and that new techniques for enriching uranium will have a large part to play in this process, the urgent necessity for developing safeguards procedures to ensure that none of the enriched uranium is diverted from peaceful purposes becomes obvious. Such diversion could occur not necessarily as a deliberate act by Governments but as a result of criminal or underworld activity which is bound to be attracted to such lucrative possibilities. In this connexion one would perhaps have expected some more positive action from the Agency than the mere hope contained in paragraph 122 (d) of its report, namely, that: "In due course . . . it is expected that Agency safeguards will be applied to nuclear material in all types of peaceful nuclear activities."

17. The two brief paragraphs devoted by the Agency to the resolution adopted last year by the Assembly have not really shed much light on the problem of ensuring that the vastly more plentiful and relatively cheaper supplies of enriched uranium which new enrichment techniques will make available are subjected to effective safeguards procedures so as to eliminate the risks of their diversion to weapons purposes. As my delegation pointed out last year, the development of new methods of uranium enrichment has produced a fresh threat to the viability of the non-proliferation Treaty. We also expressed our strong belief that the General Assembly, which had commended the Treaty to Member States, is at least entitled to be informed of the manner in which it is proposed to adapt to the advance of technology the safeguards system established under the non-proliferation Treaty. I reiterate that belief, and I regret to say that in the view of my delegation the report of the IAEA does not meet this fundamental right of the General Assembly. For this reason my delegation proposes to introduce a fresh draft resolution which would call upon the IAEA to accord priority to devising effective safeguards applicable to new techniques of uranium enrichment, and to keep the Assembly informed of developments.

18. The task of disarmament is an immensely complex one. For this reason, my delegation views with favour any proposal that could be of assistance in helping to provide some of the pieces necessary to construct this laborious

edifice. It is in this light that we view the proposal of the USSR for a world disarmament conference. We recognize the importance of increasing the focus of public attention on all the issues surrounding disarmament, as well as of providing additional forums where fruitful debate and exchange of ideas can take place. In our view, such a conference must not be viewed as doing away with the need of other forums, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which has been doing such useful work for so many years. The subject of disarmament is so vast and complex that no single body can possibly devote as much attention to every possible aspect of the problem as the urgency of the situation would warrant. This can perhaps be seen from the comparative lack of attention devoted in recent years to the question of general and complete disarmament.

19. It is well known that, despite the routine genuflections in the direction of general and complete disarmament which are repeated regularly in every forum dealing with disarmament questions and indeed despite the fact that general and complete disarmament has repeatedly been declared to be the principal goal of disarmament negotiations, the fact remains that little or no progress has been made towards this all-important goal. Such steps as have been taken, while admittedly helpful in building up trust and confidence, can hardly qualify to be described as disarmament measures. Again, while the proclaimed intention during the disarmament debate of the past decade has been to proceed with such collateral measures as become possible without losing sight of the over-all objective of general and complete disarmament—to which indeed first importance was to continue to be accorded—we find that more and more time has been devoted to partial and collateral measures of non-armament than to the main question itself.

20. On page 137 of that excellent handbook *The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1970*,⁶ there is the following statement:

"In fact, in the course of its meetings between 1962 and 1970, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament devoted a larger part of its efforts to partial and confidence-building—or collateral measures of disarmament, as they are usually called—than to general and complete disarmament."

21. It is not my intention to offer any criticism of the excellent work performed by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and its successor, the present Committee on Disarmament, over the years. My delegation is grateful to the countries represented in that body for their increasing efforts, as shown both by the verbatim records of the Conference and by the perceptive working papers submitted to it by various delegations. It is no criticism to draw attention to the declared goals of the Conference and to compare them, not so much with the results that have been achieved, but with the extent to which such goals have in practice been receiving the time and attention of the Committee. As the Secretary-General pointed out in paragraph 192 of the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization: "The designation of the 1970s as the

⁶ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.70.IX.1.

Disarmament Decade serves to underline the fact that general and complete disarmament remains the goal of all discussions and negotiations.”⁷ Fresh impetus must therefore be given towards this goal and the convening of a world disarmament conference during this Disarmament Decade would seem to be a step in the right direction.

22. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been unable to devote as much attention to general and complete disarmament as one might wish—and here I would again refer to the Secretary-General’s words in the same paragraph of the report:

“The General Assembly last year requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to give specific consideration to a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the time available to it, however, the Committee’s efforts were devoted mainly to the problems of chemical and biological weapons and to the comprehensive test ban.”

It seems to my delegation that one of the first tasks to be undertaken by the proposed world disarmament conference could well be detailed consideration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Only thus, it would appear, to quote from the same source, could “simultaneous consideration . . . be given to more than one or two disarmament measures at a time”. None the less, my delegation would like to emphasize that the mere creation of more forums for discussing disarmament, however painstaking the preparations may be, will not of themselves solve the problem. What is needed above all is a fresh approach, a change in outworn concepts, on the part of all States.

23. The draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex A], ironed out within the Conference this year, is broadly supported by my delegation. We would naturally have welcomed some more positive and parallel action towards the banning of chemical weapons as well, but we recognize that in the existing circumstances it is better to agree on a treaty limited to biological weapons than to have no treaty at all. We must, however, express our strong hopes that the authors of the draft treaty will still find it possible to include in the preamble a reference to the principle that part of the savings derived from disarmament measures should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries. This would be highly appropriate in view of the link between the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade, through which we are passing. It would also be a fitting recognition of the important report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race [A/8469 and Add.1] which, in one of its main conclusions, confirmed the view that a halt in the arms race would help the social and economic development of all countries.

24. Another suggestion which my delegation wholeheartedly supports is that advanced by Mexico [A/C.1/L.578], which would declare a moratorium on the further

development, production or stockpiling of those chemical agents for weapons purposes which because of their degree of toxicity have the highest lethal effects. This is not an unreasonable request to make, and we make a strong appeal to the Powers concerned to accept such a moratorium, of which the psychological impact on further disarmament measures would be out of all proportion to its direct significance on their military capabilities.

25. I should now like to refer briefly to the question of a comprehensive test ban treaty. My delegation shares the deep sense of disappointment which other delegates before me have already expressed, that notwithstanding the numerous resolutions passed by this Assembly and despite all the hard work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the prospects of achieving an early breakthrough in the deadlock which has characterized negotiations for a comprehensive test ban over the past several years remain bleak. This continuing impasse—ostensibly over the question of on-site inspections—has recently been confirmed by the respective statements of the representatives of the United States and the USSR. My delegation fervently hopes that as a result of the significant improvement in test detection techniques and devices it might be possible to break this deadlock. Whether this progress in seismic and other means of detection is viewed as reducing considerably the need for on-site inspections or as eliminating them altogether—and in this connexion I would draw attention to the conclusion of the highly informative research report issued by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute last month under the title “The Test Ban”—it certainly provides the possibility of moving forward through compromise. Such a compromise could take the form of an acceptance in principle of on-site inspection by its current opponents, subject to a specific limit of two or three inspections a year. This was in fact the position of the USSR in 1963, and from the point of view of principle there should be nothing to stand in the way of its adopting the same position today. On the other hand, although less satisfactorily, compromise could also lie in the direction indicated by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization following some useful suggestions advanced this year in the Conference, whereby as a means to prevent further delay in achieving progress towards a comprehensive test ban, a number of temporary transitional measures might be taken immediately to limit and reduce the magnitude and number of underground nuclear tests and to phase them out, pending the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. This approach, which is not entirely new, may be the only one that could resolve the prevailing stalemate. Such an approach would bear comparison with the not unsuccessful attitude adopted towards the question of banning chemical and biological weapons, where an initial partial measure was finally seen to be better than none.

26. Before concluding, I should like to refer to the continuing bilateral talks between the United States and the USSR on the limitation of strategic armaments. In common with all other countries, large or small, Malta is well aware that on the outcome of these talks much indeed will depend of crucial importance for the future peace and security of the entire world. With such vital interests at stake, I hope that my remarks will not be considered presumptuous.

⁷ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

27. We were heartened last May when, nearly two years after the talks began, an agreement was announced to concentrate on the limitation of antiballistic missiles, together with some understanding on the limitation of offensive strategic weapons. This agreement was followed in September by a further agreement to reduce the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war and to improve the direct communications link between Washington and Moscow.

28. Whilst hailing these agreements and the improving climate which they denote, my delegation cannot refrain from sounding a note of caution. Although it may appear churlish to do so, it must be pointed out that the May agreement is in itself no more than an agreement to attempt to negotiate a rather limited agreement—limited both in scope and impact. If, as it appears from press reports, the prospective agreement is merely intended to put a numerical ceiling on certain categories of armaments, it will not significantly reverse or even retard the arms race. It will merely divert efforts into an accelerated race for qualitatively superior weaponry, posing fresh dangers for the strategic equilibrium without adding anything to the national security of the contestants. Moreover, since the hypothetical agreement, even if it takes in offensive weapons, would appear to be limited only to land-based missiles, the cynical may well conclude that such an agreement could well be prompted by recognition of the creeping obsolescence facing land-based missiles. I refer to technological advances expected in three main sectors, namely, the enhanced dependability and efficiency of missiles; their increased accuracy to within insignificantly small margins; and the expanded deployment of genuine, multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles. Such technological developments can be expected to lead to the capability, actual or merely feared by the other side, of delivering a deadly first strike which could annihilate the opponent's land-based missiles. Consequently, the prospects are that in order to maintain a credible second strike potential, increasing reliance will have to be placed on submarine-launched missiles which are much harder to pinpoint and, hence, to destroy at one blow. Unless, therefore, limitations are to be placed on these missiles as well, we shall be following the pattern established by other disarmament, or non-armament, measures agreed upon so far, whereby agreement is only reached with respect to those areas which are of dwindling military significance.

29. Many attitudes must change before the threat and scourge of war is effectively removed from the face of the earth. A radically new approach to sources of international friction must be allowed to develop in all States. For this to come about it is not enough for States to meet together regularly and discuss the same questions on the same old basis of outmoded concepts of national interest, narrowly conceived. Trust must be built up, and for this to be done there must be a parallel movement on as broad a front as possible embracing the political and military, scientific and technical, economic and commercial, social, legal and humanitarian fields. There must be a conscious decision on the part of all States to give adequate consideration to the rights of others and to refrain from seeking unilateral advantage. If this is judged unrealistic, I would ask whether it is a more realistic picture to envisage this small planet of ours, "Spaceship Earth" as it is now being called, increasingly torn apart by tensions and friction amongst its

passengers. As has been said on countless occasions, the rapid advance of technology will add greatly to the sources of friction. Unless significant steps are taken now to build up an increasing fund of trust and mutual confidence, it will become virtually impossible to resolve peacefully all the multifarious problems which the future will force on the attention of mankind. In an age where technology is forcing humanity to draw closer together in order to derive maximum benefit from the prospects opening before us, it is folly to persist in old, worn-out concepts of traditional self-interest. A change of heart is necessary, and the time for it is now.

30. Mrs. PADILLA (Costa Rica) (*interpretation from Spanish*): First of all I should like to express the deep conviction of my delegation that the participation of the People's Republic of China in the deliberations of this Committee will help in our search for solutions to the grave problems confronting us and to the fulfilment of our hope that the contribution of the representatives of the People's Republic of China to the achievement of a final solution of those problems will be a determining factor in attaining the goal that we have set ourselves, namely, the establishment of a just and stable peace in the world which will turn this planet into a fertile field for the growth of progress and welfare for all mankind.

31. May I, on behalf of my country, speak with pride of the intangible power of ideas, a power stronger than any of the armed forces of the world. There are no frontiers strong enough to contain the expansion of the human spirit or mind, since that is the divine spark in man and is safe from the reach of perishable matter. Since man lost Eden he has embarked on a frenetic race towards ephemeral mirages, seeking a happiness that in the course of centuries has assumed different and deceptive guises. Man seems to have forgotten that he has a destiny to fulfil, that he is part of a brotherhood being in a world that gyrates around its own axis, travelling in an orbit that was set by forces beyond his control. Forlorn creatures are we, dreaming of Utopian realms of power, paying in blood for a dream of greatness. *Vanitas vanitatis!* Man will always be mortal, though he cover himself with shields and wield modern weapons with threatening gestures.

32. History shows us that the most aggressive of peoples have flashed for a fleeting instant across the sky of the world and then fallen victims to their own dreams; but those peoples that paid tribute to ideas and made empires of culture still possess their altars in the hearts of mankind.

33. Mine is a small country and dreams of no territorial expansion. We cherish a profound respect for the noble traditions of peace and compliance with the rights of others that we inherited from various generations of free and cultured men. In the idiosyncrasies of our people, freedom reigns as our original virtue, and our repudiation of brute force is present as an integral part of our mind and soul: a small nation possessing neither arms nor army, devoted to planting the soil, knowing that our best weapon is the plough and that our best defence is the reading book where we teach children to read and give consistency to their ideas. In every settlement there is a school where the children discover their future, in every school a brigade of teachers building a democracy that will be exemplary in

America, an army of teachers with the weapons of wisdom in their books.

34. We want war, yes, but war against misery, against disease, against injustice, against all that may sap and diminish the dignity of man. For that war we want weapons; for that war we want help. But to destroy one another mutually, to destroy the world that we must leave to future generations: no, my country will stint no effort to avoid that and we will support the hope expressed that those weapons, which even in friendly hands might be a constant threat to peace and solidarity of peoples, should be prohibited. My country needs no armies. We claim the same privilege for all the sister peoples of the world. Over the dubious strength of power and weapons we base our survival on respect for ideas and our tribute to freedom.

35. My country cannot be silent when, according to the report of the Secretary-General, in today's world \$200,000 million are squandered yearly on defence expenditures. It is sad for us to know this when we try so desperately to find new markets for our surplus coffee, on which the Costa Rican economy rests, when very often we have sought a review for the prices set for our agricultural production, when we have asked for an increase in the quotas that will give encouragement to the Costa Rican families devoted to the soil, hoping for better markets for their harvests.

36. The Secretary-General also states that the armed forces of the entire world include approximately 20 million men. Paradoxically, in my own country the main reason for a high infant mortality rate is malnutrition. Our peasant children die of hunger because agriculture is not a sure source of income, when weapons are considered an article of necessity for 20 million men in the world.

37. Perhaps it might be very easy for Costa Rica to barter its coffee surplus, its meat, its sugar and its bananas for murderous weapons; but we do not know how to handle them, nor do we want to learn that art; nor will they give us the milk for our children, nor the cement to build homes worthy of them, nor the tar to build our roads. These we would obtain were it possible for a very small portion of those \$200,000 million to be injected into our economy, saving us from the anguish in which we live, not given as gracious charity but as loans, with better terms and at better rates.

38. We are part of America, and as Americans we dream of a destiny of progress and common welfare for all peoples of this continent. From dawn to dusk our Costa Rican worker goes out to the fields, bowed over the furrow, wresting from the entrails of the earth the fruits of his labour. Let him not raise his head to see the nuclear explosions that will blind him. The Costa Rican worker works for America; the Costa Rican teacher works for America, so that succeeding generations will find the field ready to be sown and their happiness before them. Let them work in peace.

39. We know nothing of bacteriological, chemical or toxic weapons. And since we do not want to be taught about them we want them to be prohibited forthwith so that later we shall not have to deplore a painful and precocious acquisition of knowledge.

40. We have listened to everything that has been said in this Committee. We are very gratified to see that there is a general consensus on the latent danger confronting mankind in the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated weapons. We have great faith in the goodwill of the great Powers to solve the grave problems that have arisen. We do not forget that together with our own security lies the security of their people too, since there are no atmospheric frontiers to bar the destructive advance of emanations and fall-out produced by the abuse of nuclear, bacteriological, chemical or toxic weapons.

41. Aware as we are of our puny physical might, we know that in the world arena ours is but a small voice; but, acquiring new impetus from the very heart of our historical tradition as a free country, respectful of all, we venture to ask that appropriate measures be taken to ensure to all peoples of the world the right to work in peace, to achieve new goals whereby the earth will be a welcoming place for succeeding generations, and that those measures be speedily taken before the trumpets of death are raised from the bowels of hell through a nuclear explosion.

42. We would venture to hope that the great Powers will come to a satisfactory agreement, particularly on general and complete disarmament, bearing in mind the primary interest of the survival of mankind, thus alleviating the dangerous tensions which have beset the world, and allowing a fresh approach to world problems under a new light of trust and reason.

43. Let us recall the words of Napoleon Bonaparte: "There are two powers in the world, the sword and reason, and with the passage of time it has always been the sword that has been vanquished by reason."

44. Mr. BOGDAN (Romania): We should like, from the outset of our participation in the debates on disarmament in this Committee, to reaffirm the Romanian Government's firm conviction of both the urgency and the timeliness of fresh, intensified efforts on the part of the community of nations, in order to put an end to the arms race and to achieve general disarmament. We are, of course, aware of the hitherto poor record of the negotiations on disarmament, but still we feel that there is no time or room for slackening our efforts.

45. The great strides of the peoples' fight for peace, national independence and progress, the expanding process of normalization and the strengthening of relations between States, the results achieved in the negotiations on certain pending issues and the continuous advance of political realism favour and at the same time require a new impetus in the efforts for genuine disarmament.

46. The restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations—an act of historic significance—decisively enhances the capacity of our Organization to reaffirm its role in the solution of disarmament problems in conformity with the letter and the spirit of the Charter.

47. We are also encouraged by the more marked orientation towards action which is becoming manifest in the debates of the current session.

48. The process of devising the most urgent and appropriate measures from the vast area of disarmament issues and the implementation of those measures without delay should start, in our view, from the prevailing situation in the field of armaments, and in the first place in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their impact on economic and social life and on peace and security. In that spirit the priorities should be determined by the contribution of any given measures to the reduction or liquidation of the real and present dangers engendered by the arms race. That is why we are devoting our remarks today to the item entitled “Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security”. We reserve our right to present before the Committee the considerations we might have regarding other issues related to the present debate on disarmament.

49. In its explanatory memorandum requesting the inclusion of this item in the agenda of the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the Romanian Government stated:

“Thorough consideration, in all its aspects, of the complex phenomenon of the current armaments race would facilitate a better understanding and a comprehensive evaluation of its negative consequences at all levels and of the great dangers with which it is fraught, and would make it possible to draw certain conclusions on the basis of which practical measures could be devised to slow down and halt this senseless competition.”⁸

50. The same conviction prompted resolution 2667 (XXV), initiated by 26 countries, including Romania, and unanimously adopted, which, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General “to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, a report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures”. We have also endeavoured to contribute our share, together with many other Member States, with the United Nations Secretariat and with all those who contributed to the drafting of the report [A/8469 and Add.1]. We share the view expressed by many delegations which have preceded us that we now have before the General Assembly a valuable document, deserving thorough attention.

51. We should like at this point to express our high appreciation for the Secretary-General, the 14 experts and the members of the Secretariat who, through their hard work, recognized competence and spirit of co-operation, have succeeded in drafting a report which, in our opinion, reflects the spirit and the provisions of the resolution to which I have referred.

52. The Romanian delegation shares the conclusions in the report of the Secretary-General and is of the opinion that they can serve as a useful guide for our future efforts in the field of disarmament. We shall be more specific about that but at this stage, we should like to present a few considerations of a more general nature.

53. First, it is undoubtedly true that the main danger resulting from the arms race is the threat of the ultimate

annihilation of mankind as a consequence of the character of the weapons of mass destruction; however, one should not underestimate the perils for world peace and security resulting from the economic, political and social burden of the arms race. For how long will mankind, after all, be able to sustain or be ready to accept the huge and increasing waste of material and human resources required by the arms race, especially at a time when the scientific and technological revolution is creating the real material possibilities for all nations to fulfil their highest aspirations towards peace, freedom and prosperity?

54. At present the level of military expenditures—\$1,900 thousand million in the last decade, equalling the total expenditures on military purposes between 1900 and 1960—constitutes a major roadblock in the liquidation of underdevelopment. The group of consultant experts who drafted the report before us warn that if effective measures are not implemented we shall face the risk of spending \$1,000 million a day on armaments towards the end of the 1970s.

55. It is clear to us that a further continuation of the arms race might lead to a situation in which a majority of mankind will find itself condemned to permanent backwardness, a situation which obviously will not be accepted quietly by the peoples concerned. The arms race also distorts the normal political development of nations. It has as permanent fixtures the use of the force of arms by the imperialist circles against independent States and the establishment of military bases and troops on foreign territories, the negative impact of which on national sovereignty and international security is well known.

56. It is obvious, under these circumstances, that the arms race is incompatible with normal economic, political and social development, which requires not only an urgent stop to the arms race but also its winding-down and eventual liquidation.

57. Obviously, any freezing of the arms race, as an end in itself, which does not provide for further steps aimed at abolishing arms altogether, will not eliminate the source of the grave dangers to the normal development of all nations already created by the present level of material and human resources being devoted to weapons and to military purposes.

58. Secondly, the qualitative aspects of the arms race are particularly disquieting. While we may still entertain hopes for some quantitative limitations on military expenditures, no measures for stopping, much less for curtailing, the continuous efforts to increase the destructiveness of weapons are even being contemplated.

59. There is better illustration of the dangers the arms race represents for international peace and security and of the incompatibility between the arms race and the principles of the Charter, than the senseless and mounting sophistication of the weapons of mass destruction.

60. We believe that two main conclusions are emerging as a result of this particularly dangerous feature of the present phase of the arms race.

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 and 94, document A/7994.

61. First, of course, when we speak about the qualitative aspects of the arms race we have in mind nuclear weapons, the main qualitative, motivating factor in the armaments race. Consequently, the interests of disarmament require, first and foremost, that the qualitative aspects of the arms race be curtailed or stopped, which obviously means absolute priority for nuclear disarmament. In practical terms, as was pointed out in the reply of the Romanian Government [see A/8469/Add.1] to the note of the Secretary-General of 1 March 1971, the requires, in the first place, the immediate prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production, and the reduction and, eventually, destruction of these types of weapons. There can be no more urgent task, and no effort could be considered too great when the objective is nuclear disarmament.

62. Secondly, the fact, so eloquently revealed in the report, that many of the improvements in modern weaponry are not determined by a clearly-defined threat but by an imaginary one, fostered by suspicion or, even worse, by an automatic reaction of the weapon-designer to improve on his own creations, points to the immense waste of resources involved in the arms race, even from the viewpoint of those who argue its necessity or unavailability. We hope that the recent improvements in the international atmosphere will help to reduce suspicion in interstate relations. This is why we believe that one of the most timely and realistic steps that could be taken right now, independently of any other measure of disarmament, would be the freezing and gradual reduction of military budgets. Such a step should greatly benefit the developing nations and the whole world community, not to mention the countries directly involved.

63. Finally, the data furnished by the report on the places occupied by various countries or categories of countries in the whole context of the arms race are particularly revealing.

64. From the standpoint of expenditures, six countries account for four fifths of the total sums involved. On the other hand, from the standpoint of the consequences, the most seriously affected are the small and middle-sized countries, particularly the developing nations. This is one more confirmation both of the inalienable right and of the duty of all nations, big or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, to participate on an equal footing in disarmament negotiations.

65. We believe that the report of the Secretary-General and the debates that have taken place so far in the General Assembly confirm the correctness of the decisions made by the Assembly to examine, within the Organization, the complex effects of the arms race, and that they underline the advisability of maintaining this matter among its concerns.

66. We therefore support the conclusion of the report that "In order to draw the attention of the Governments and peoples of the world to the direction the arms race is taking, the Secretary-General should keep the facts under periodic review" [A/8469, para. 120].

67. May we recall, at this stage, that in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization the Secretary-General wrote:

"... I would recommend that a study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures be undertaken, with the assistance of consultant experts, every three years. Such periodic studies could provide current information and a study of the trends, and help to bring about a fuller understanding of the harmful effects of the arms race and the need, and perhaps also of the modalities, of converting the arms race into a peace race."⁹

We hope that the recommendation of the Secretary-General will receive the attention it deserves.

68. The Romanian delegation would also hope that the General Assembly, commending the Secretary-General and the consultant experts, as well as all those who contributed to the drafting of this document, will endorse the conclusions of the report.

69. It also falls to the Assembly to recommend the full utilization of this report by bringing it widely to the attention of world public opinion and by submitting it for consideration to the competent international organs in the field of disarmament. An appeal, addressed to all States and to international bodies having responsibilities related to disarmament, to greatly increase their efforts with a view to a rapid cessation of the arms race and to achieving effective progress on the way to general disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament, would well respond to present preoccupations for a new start for all disarmament efforts.

70. We are now consulting other delegations with a view to working out a joint draft resolution, embodying the ideas outlined above, which, we hope, will be widely supported by Member States.

71. Allow me, in conclusion, to express the confidence of my delegation that the debates and the actions of the United Nations with respect to the item "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security" will continue to be—and increasingly so—a useful contribution of this Organization to the cause of disarmament.

72. Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): The report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race [A/8469 and Add.1], to which my delegation will refer in particular during the further deliberations in our Committee, has once again warned the international community very convincingly against more rapid intensification of the arms race and against its growing danger to peace, security and the development—even the existence—of States and nations. The data presented and the conclusions of experts, together with the observations of the Secretary-General, unequivocally demonstrate that, as stated in paragraph 2 of the foreword: "The need to halt and reverse the arms race before it reaches the point of no return is, therefore, a matter of grave concern to the international community."

⁹ *Ibid.*, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 50.

73. In the opinion of my delegation, the most recent developments in international relations offer somewhat more favourable conditions for attaining more meaningful results in the field of disarmament. It has been clearly demonstrated that the threat or use of armed force for aggressive purposes cannot lead to the solution of particular international problems. The trend towards overcoming cold-war tensions, initiating negotiations and finding agreed solutions to certain questions which have for years burdened international relations increases the prospects for intensified activity and the achievement of concrete results in the field of disarmament.

74. Perhaps it would not be superfluous to recall that in the past it was frequently pointed out in this auditorium that it was possible to initiate the disarmament process only in conditions of greater mutual confidence between States and an improved political atmosphere in the world. Today, when we see some encouraging signs and indications of positive changes in international relations, any delay in the field of disarmament could not only retard the continuation of these trends but compromise that which has already been achieved. And conversely, every success in disarmament would give new impetus to favourable trends in world relations.

75. In reviewing the circumstances which give rise to the conviction that we are on the threshold of an era in which protracted and arduous disarmament efforts will yield more substantial results than in the past, we wish to express our gratification that the People's Republic of China has joined our common endeavours and responsibilities in the United Nations. The Yugoslav Government has always held the view that the unjustified absence of the People's Republic of China and other States from the United Nations was one of the major obstacles to a more rapid advancement towards disarmament. We are confident that the participation of the People's Republic of China will open new possibilities for intensified efforts in the field of disarmament.

76. The adoption of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security by the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly [*resolution 2734 (XXV)*] represents an important encouragement for more intensive examination of disarmament questions. The discussion at the present session of the General Assembly of the implementation of that Declaration has once again accentuated the link between international security and disarmament.

77. The pressing problems of economic and social development in all parts of the world also constitute one of those factors regarding which concrete action in the field of disarmament is urgently required. The developing countries rightly expect that the halting of the arms race and more resolute progress towards general and complete disarmament could substantially contribute to the process of their economic and general emancipation, provided that a large portion of the savings thus derived were used for economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries. Those requests and expectations are formulated in many documents of the United Nations and other international forums. Only recently such an unequivocal statement was formulated in the Declaration and Principles of the Action Programme adopted at Lima on 7 November

1971 by the Group of Seventy-seven Developing Countries, during the Second Ministerial Meeting.¹⁰ That demand, which was voiced by the great majority of humanity, should not remain unheeded at this session of the General Assembly.

78. The recent favourable trends in Europe strengthen the conviction that in the field of disarmament it is possible to achieve concrete results in this region as well. It is important to bear in mind the fact that within a relatively small European area enormous military, nuclear and conventional weapons are concentrated. The reduction of armed forces in Europe would strengthen mutual confidence and co-operation on that continent, as well as its security, and would have a positive impact upon international relations as a whole.

79. There is a growing conviction that in the contemporary world, which is becoming more integrated and at the same time more vulnerable in the face of the destructive capacities of sophisticated weapons, a solution to disarmament should be sought within broader political, geographic and technological realms.

80. Without underestimating the significance of partial measures, we feel that it is urgent and possible, in the ensuing period, to examine disarmament problems in their entirety. A broad disarmament approach has already been initiated by many proposals and activities, such as the convening of a world disarmament conference, the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, the reduction of fleets on the high seas, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the preparations for negotiations on the reduction of armaments and armed forces in Europe, the solution of the complex of chemical and bacteriological weapons, etc.

81. The General Assembly, by designating the 1970s as the Disarmament Decade [*resolution 2602 E (XXIV)*], reaffirmed at its twenty-fourth session that general and complete disarmament constitutes the top priority problem facing mankind today. Important guidelines for an over-all approach to disarmament are contained in the comprehensive programme of disarmament which was proposed by Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia,¹¹ and recommended by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session [*resolution 2661 C (XXV)*]. In this context, the plans for general and complete disarmament dating back to the beginning of the 1960s—which should now be re-examined and adapted to the present circumstances—and the agreed basic principles on disarmament negotiations could serve a useful purpose in the exploration of new avenues for solution of the crucial disarmament issue.

82. We are now faced with an important matter: the establishment of the most suitable mechanism for integrating all these initiatives and activities and for encouraging a more rapid formulation of generally acceptable solutions. The convening of a world disarmament conference, the

¹⁰ See A/C.2/270 and Corr.1.

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 and 94, document A/8191.*

re-activation of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the adaptation of present bodies and channels for negotiations to new circumstances, constitute basic elements of a concept which would, on the one hand, secure the active participation of all States in the reappraisal of this highly topical question and guarantee respect for their interests and, on the other, facilitate effective progress in the direction of the final adoption of decisions which are inadmissibly being delayed.

83. As far as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is concerned, we hold the view that that negotiating body could justify its existence in the future as well, provided that its composition, procedures, content and method of work are adapted to new conditions, as was so clearly manifested during the current General Assembly session and about which many preceding speakers have put forward such forceful arguments.

84. For years now our Organization has been dealing extensively with the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons. World public opinion is unanimous in condemning these weapons of mass destruction and in demanding their complete prohibition and elimination from the war arsenals of all States. This rationale has been reflected in many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the last few years. This question was also given priority in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, especially this year. The result of these efforts is the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex A], which is now before us.

85. In restating the belief of the Yugoslav delegation that the adoption of this draft convention would mark the first step towards disarmament, I should like to recall some activities preceding the formulation of the draft convention which could serve as guidelines for further efforts aimed at reaching the complete prohibition of chemical weapons as well.

86. Twelve States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, attaching high importance to the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and desirous of contributing to a more rapid solution of this problem, have formulated their positions and proposals in a memorandum submitted to the Conference on 25 August 1970.¹² The memorandum stressed the importance and urgency of achieving agreement on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, demanded a simultaneous consideration of both types of weapons and indicated the possibilities for developing an effective verification system based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures. This basic position embodied in the memorandum of the group of 12 met with broad support during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly. In fact, it served as a framework for resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970.

87. Faced, however, with the insistence that in the present stage it is only possible to elaborate a convention on the

prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and then to proceed with endeavours towards reaching early agreement on chemical weapons, the group of 12 has made its contribution to the formulation of the proposed draft convention. However, the main efforts of the group of 12 were aimed at introducing into the draft convention provisions confirming the necessity and urgency of prohibiting chemical weapons and demands for reaching early agreement to this end. The Yugoslav delegation believes that the preambular part and article IX of the draft convention clearly and precisely stipulate the obligations and determination to proceed, without any further delay, with the elaboration of an agreement on the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

88. However, we note with great concern that the draft convention does not contain the proposal of the group of 12 countries reaffirming the recognized principles that: "a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries". [A/C.1/L.582.]

89. For this reason Yugoslavia is one of the sponsors of the proposal contained in document A/C.1/L.582 which is intended to amend the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.579.

90. Pursuing its activities over the years in the field of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and being consistent in its basic approach to find a simultaneous solution to the problem of these weapons, the group of 12 countries looks upon the draft convention on bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons as the first possible step within an inseparable whole. Important elements are contained in the joint memorandum submitted by the group of 12 countries to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 28 September 1971 [A/8457, annex C, sect. 33] for working out an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

91. Guided by these considerations, 28 countries submitted a draft resolution on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, which is contained in document A/C.1/L.581 and which I am honoured now to introduce on behalf of the sponsors. The text of this draft resolution is self-explanatory. It reaffirms in the second preambular paragraph the already agreed approach, endorsed by General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV), that the prohibition of both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons be dealt with simultaneously. Since the work on the elaboration of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction is entering the final phase, the third and fourth preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution correctly stress that this represents only a first possible step towards the achieving of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons also and underline the immense importance and urgency of acting resolutely towards this end.

92. In paragraph 2, therefore, the General Assembly requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

¹² Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 39.

to proceed with the task of negotiating, as a high priority item, agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States. In paragraph 3 it also requests the Conference to be guided in these negotiations by the elements contained in the memorandum of the group of 12 and also to take into account the views and suggestions put forward in the Conference and in the First Committee relating to the question of chemical weapons. Proceeding from the determination and the firmly expressed commitment in paragraph 1 (a) to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, in paragraph 4 the General Assembly urges all States to take all necessary measures which could facilitate this task. Finally, the General Assembly in paragraph 5 calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol¹³ inviting those States that have not already done so to accede to or ratify that Protocol.

93. We are confident that this draft resolution will meet with broad support and acceptance in our Committee.

94. With the adoption of an agreement on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons a major threat to mankind would be removed, a threat which, regrettably, has not always been only hypothetical. A substantial step would thus be taken in the direction of general and complete disarmament.

95. We note with satisfaction that the demand for agreement on chemical weapons has met with the broad response and support of the international community and that many States have already advanced sound suggestions and feasible recommendations for also finding an acceptable solution to all controversial questions, including verification. We feel confident that this approach will facilitate the attainment of the goal which has been set in the near future.

96. From the days of its inception, the United Nations has given prominent consideration to the problem of nuclear weapons. Actually, resolution 1 (I) adopted by the General Assembly deals with this problem. Nevertheless, the nuclear arms race has not been checked, but intensified. This is clearly proved by the nuclear weapon tests whose frequency and power-range are constantly increasing.

97. For over a decade the General Assembly has been passing resolutions insisting on early agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. The nuclear Powers, signatories of the 1963 Moscow Treaty,¹⁴ have assumed an obligation to work towards the banning of all nuclear tests. Unfortunately, results were not forthcoming. Hopes that this could be achieved were aroused anew by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]; however, these expectations once

again proved to be in vain. The international community, aware of the dangers inherent in the continuation of the nuclear weapons race, is fully justified in demanding that within an immediate, realistically defined, period of time all nuclear weapon tests be banned and discontinued.

98. The argument that it is necessary to take into account the realities of the present-day world cannot invalidate the justification, the necessity and the urgency of such a demand. Contemporary realities are too well known to us. The attempts of the nuclear Powers to avoid a mutual military confrontation and to prevent an outbreak of a nuclear war are, no doubt, in the interest of the international community as a whole. However, we firmly believe that stable peace and international security cannot rest on a nuclear equilibrium maintained by the upward spiral of the arms race, nor can conflicting interests of individual nuclear Powers be protected through a mounting nuclear competition. A solution should be sought, and we are confident that it can be found, within a broader context including, above all, renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, discontinuation of the manufacturing of fissionable materials, prohibition of the development and production of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the gradual conversion of existing nuclear capacities for peaceful purposes, a decisive orientation towards general and complete disarmament and the further strengthening of the system of international security in the interest of all States. A common denominator could be found for all the specific interests of nuclear and non-nuclear States alike. The halting of the nuclear arms race rests on such a broadly-based approach.

99. In a sufficiently broad approach to the problem of nuclear disarmament it would not be difficult to find a solution also for the problem of verification, which, at this stage, represents the only obstacle to the attainment of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. There are elements for a rather reliable verification system of such tests in many documents submitted to the Conference. Possible loopholes in such a system should not be used as a pretext for denying the validity of the system as a whole. The risks thus incurred would undoubtedly be much smaller than the risks to which mankind is exposed by the continuation of the test explosions of nuclear weapons.

100. Yugoslavia, together with eight other members of the Conference, has sponsored a joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty [*A/8457, annex C, sect. 34*]. The memorandum refers to the need and possibility of achieving the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests and notes that the continuation of such tests threatens "the existence of all treaties concluded so far in the nuclear disarmament field, as well as the continued disarmament negotiations".

101. In our opinion, this should serve as a serious warning of the real danger facing the international community unless resolute action is taken towards nuclear disarmament. Also deserving of attention, in our opinion, is the request addressed to the nuclear weapons Powers to submit their own proposals urgently so that purposeful negotiations can be undertaken immediately.

102. Once again reiterating its demand on the need and urgency for banning all test explosions of nuclear weapons,

¹³ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

¹⁴ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

the Yugoslav delegation associates itself with various other temporary transitional measures aimed at reducing and limiting all test explosions of nuclear weapons, as suggested by Canada, Sweden and some other States, as well as the measures recommended by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization.¹⁵ However, we must admit that the lack of sufficient knowledge regarding the test explosions of nuclear weapons gives rise to many uncertainties concerning the limitation of their number and magnitude. If it is correct that every reduction in the number and size of nuclear weapons test explosions has decreased their harmful and dangerous consequences for human health and the human environment—and we believe that it is—then this in itself would justify the demand for limitation of the number and magnitude of nuclear explosions, as a clearly temporary measure pending their total banning at the earliest possible date.

103. My delegation is paying great attention to the proposal of Ceylon to establish the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace [A/8492 and Add.1]. Non-aligned Yugoslavia, as a littoral country—in whose proximity for decades foreign fleets have cruised demonstrating specific interests, not infrequently contrary to the vital interests of peace and security of the Mediterranean countries—has great understanding for the preoccupation of non-aligned Ceylon and its efforts to save the Indian Ocean from becoming an area of confrontation of foreign Powers and hence, in turn, a hotbed of new international crises and conflicts.

104. We are confident that adoption of the proposal made by Ceylon would be of vital interest not only to countries of that region, but to the interests of peace and security in the world. This important proposal by Ceylon constitutes yet another initiative in a series of activities by the non-aligned countries in the field of disarmament. It is known that the non-aligned countries not only have made pronouncements at their conferences, but have acted in their over-all international activities as determined champions for a more rapid halting of the arms race and for the initiation of the disarmament process. It is through such activity that the non-aligned countries have become factors which can no longer be bypassed in the search for solutions to questions of vital interest to all countries.

105. Before concluding my statement I should like to single out a more specific aspect which is giving rise to greater concern. I have in mind the fulfilment of commitments and obligations assumed under existing treaties on the limitation of the arms race. We cannot accept the practice of major Powers to insist upon the fulfilment of specific obligations on the part of other countries, while they are delaying indefinitely the fulfilment of their own contractual obligations. In each treaty the obligations assumed constitute an integral and balanced whole. We feel that a detailed analysis of this problem would make it possible not only to identify existing problems in this area, but to evolve and to project new possibilities for the further strengthening and affirmation of these treaties.

106. Mr. MANDI (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): The consideration of disarmament problems is one of the

essential tasks of our Committee. Indeed, the debate on this important matter affords us the opportunity of assessing progress achieved towards weapons control and disarmament in general.

107. My delegation has followed with great interest and attention the previous statements made by eminent speakers, because we not only recognize the importance of this problem, but we are also convinced that in view of the level reached by the arms race, a serious effort must be made and sacrifices must be realized by the international community if we truly wish to strengthen international peace and security.

108. My delegation wishes to express its concern at the pace of the arms race. Many countries, despite the large amounts of weapons which they already possess, continue to manufacture other weapons. These are ever more terrifying, with their capacity for destruction and annihilation. This proliferation of weapons aggravates international tension and dangerously threatens the chances of reaching if not a final, then at least a partial settlement of the disarmament problem.

109. My Government is greatly appreciative of the efforts of the United Nations towards general and complete disarmament and unreservedly supports the repeated appeals of the Secretary-General in this field.

110. My delegation has taken note of the report published by the Secretary-General concerning the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8457]. We wish to pay tribute to the Conference for the intensive and exhaustive work done by it. In examining the conclusions of the Conference, we note that several concrete suggestions have been made, and we should like to express the wish that they will be adequately studied at the next meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

111. In the view of my delegation, to reach a positive result in such a complex field as disarmament, mutual trust and especially the will to achieve genuine co-operation are elements which should guide all the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

112. Therefore, my delegation fully supports the proposal of the Secretary-General when he advocates the formula of three co-chairmen,¹⁶ which seems quite appropriate to us since it ensures better representation for the three groups at the Conference.

113. My country, Zaire, is located in the very heart of Africa; it is the hinge between independent Africa and that part of the continent still under colonial subjugation; it justly values international peace and security. The fact that our continent, through a decision of the Heads of State and Government of Africa, has been proclaimed a nuclear-free zone is a guarantee for the future of Africa and the succeeding generations on our continent. My Government is fully alive to the disastrous consequences of a possible confrontation among the nuclear Powers, and this is why we support the idea of nuclear-free zones such as those that

¹⁵ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

already exist, for we consider that these measures are premises of hope towards the control of armaments.

114. Concerning chemical and bacteriological weapons, my Government is of the view that an agreement on the text of a convention relating to this category of weapons should be reached as speedily as possible. In our opinion, the progress of science and technology should rather help to free man from the servitude to which he is subjected than serve goals of domination and conquest. In this connexion, my delegation wishes to praise the efforts of the group of 12 non-aligned countries members of the Conference in its search for a solution to this thorny problem.

115. The draft convention on biological weapons [*ibid.*, annex A] is in our view an effective means and an appropriate instrument to protect mankind from the dangers inherent in the possible use of these weapons. Therefore, we should like to express the wish that this draft convention will be supported by all delegations present here.

116. Many speakers have stigmatized the danger represented by nuclear weapons. Proliferation of these weapons worries all States and, in the eyes of my delegation, their reduction must be one of the fundamental objectives of our Organization. With reference to the 1963 Treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests,¹⁷ my Government considers that this instrument is an interim measure which should make it possible to engage in decisive negotiations to put an end once and for all to all nuclear tests.

117. We share the growing concern of many delegations at the continuing arms race, especially in the field of nuclear arms. In fact, the quantitative and qualitative accumulation of weapons of mass destruction is not likely to create a climate of mutual trust, which is the prelude to any fundamental negotiation in the field of general and complete disarmament.

118. Concerning underground nuclear tests, the Committee should redouble its efforts to reach an agreement prohibiting such tests. Everybody knows that underground nuclear tests, as well as nuclear tests in the atmosphere, have again been held, despite the disapproval of the majority of world public opinion. In our view, the total prohibition of nuclear weapons tests must apply to all environments; such a decision is the only possible solution to general and complete disarmament. It is obvious that it cannot be effective if it is not accompanied by specific measures for control and verification. That is why we support any proposal relating to international co-operation in the field of the exchanges of seismological data.

119. We are fiercely opposed to nuclear weapons; but we think that some nuclear explosions, limited to peaceful purposes, should be continued since no one can remain indifferent to the tremendous possibilities offered by the conquest of the atom by the scientist.

120. Many delegations before mine have expressed their viewpoint on the report of the Secretary-General, drafted

with the assistance of experts and relating to the economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security [*A/8469 and Add.1*]. This document is truly valuable because of the impact it could have on our work at this session. We have never ceased condemning, here and elsewhere, the obvious danger to mankind of the accumulation of weapons. This is why we greatly regret to note that the military budgets of many countries have reached disquieting proportions. This headlong armaments race hampers the economic development of the countries of the third world because, instead of devoting considerable resources to the economic development of young nations, the rich countries continue to spend their resources in endeavours towards self-destruction. Paradoxical as this attitude of the "have" countries may be, the efforts made to help the young nations have remained timid. We are also entitled to ask whether international peace and security—the essential objective of our Organization—can be attained when three quarters of mankind still live in conditions of famine, disease and misery. The scope of military expenditures clearly runs counter to the wish of peoples to live in peace and to work for the well-being of mankind.

121. The decade from which we are just emerging is characterized, as stressed in the Secretary-General's report, by the proliferation and technical improvement of weapons. This qualitative aspect of the arms race has had a nefarious effect on the development of the young nations. That period corresponded to the launching of the First United Nations Development Decade, which did not yield the expected results.

122. There is one fact that can be ascertained, which is as follows. As the nuclear Powers multiply their inventions in the field of weapons of mass destruction, the gap between the rich and the poor is deepening further. Technical achievements in the field of armaments were not followed by any significant progress in the struggle against underdevelopment. On the contrary, the complaints of young nations have given rise to a hardening of positions among the richer nations, which have adopted an even more parsimonious attitude.

123. It goes without saying that the desire for further improvement of weapons has given rise to increased expenditures by countries wishing to possess these weapons, dangerous not only to those not possessing them, but also to themselves, because when the knell of a possible nuclear war will have tolled, no country will be spared whether it possesses nuclear weapons or not.

124. For our part, we consider that expenditures for armaments would be better used to assuage the suffering which mankind still experiences today in the fight against disease, ignorance and unemployment.

125. In his report, the Secretary-General notes with concern that there was increasing military expenditure in the developing countries. Despite the fact that the proportion of this increase is rather small, the countries of the third world should devote the greater part of their resources to carrying out the tasks required by their development. My country is aware of this idea, and that is why it devotes the greater part of its national budget to education and

¹⁷ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

economic and social progress. It is obvious that as long as States continue to produce weapons of mass destruction, the feeling of insecurity will increase. We consider that the resources used for military expenditures for the improvement of existing weapons must be released and used for peaceful purposes in the interest of the whole of mankind. Public health, education and development are, in our view, the sectors which should benefit first from the resources released in this manner.

126. Once again, the arms race is a matter of concern for all of us. No matter what draft resolutions our Committee will approve in this connexion, only the political will of States and the sincere desire to achieve effectively controlled disarmament are likely to ensure security and peace in the world.

127. It is greatly to be desired that one day we could see mankind freed once and for all from the danger that lies in wait. Indeed, the arms race hampers all efforts at development, and the threat of a nuclear war hangs over all countries. That is why, increasingly aware of the incalculable disaster which would result from a nuclear or thermonuclear war, my delegation, during this session, will join the efforts of other delegations in order to reduce international tensions created and maintained by the stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

128. We are convinced that the developing countries stand to gain enormously from the end of the arms race. If up to now States have succeeded in avoiding the worst, international peace and security are not, however, ensured. It is, therefore, important that all States should redouble their efforts to reduce military expenditures in the interests of peaceful endeavours, and we believe that our Organization offers the appropriate framework in which to take appropriate measures in this connexion. The end of the arms race, decided by all States together, will undoubtedly enable mankind to work more assiduously for the strengthening of international security.

129. In concluding my statement, I should like to address a more urgent appeal to States possessing nuclear weapons and to ask them to redouble their efforts to reach agreement in order to accelerate the disarmament process. Peace and the fate of mankind are in their hands. We hope that this appeal will be heeded and that all States will work together for a better and more peaceful world, freed from the nuclear nightmare.

130. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): I should like to announce that the delegation of Madagascar has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.580 on the question of chemical and biological weapons. I wish also to state that among the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.579 we now have the delegations of Jamaica and Madagascar.

131. The representative of Saudi Arabia has asked to speak in order to submit draft resolution A/C.1/L.583.

132. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Some of the conventional weapons used during the Second World War and in subsequent conflicts were of such potency that they brought about mass destruction in many regions of the

world. Coventry and Dresden were levelled with what came to be known as "block-busters" in the Second World War. Two relatively and, I may say, primitive atom bombs not only levelled Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, but generated world-wide fear that it would become within the power of men to bring about the end of the human species.

133. This world-wide fear has not been abated by the declarations of nuclear Powers that none of them would be the first to use nuclear and similar weapons of mass destruction. If we take such declarations at their face value we still have no assurance that a critical situation will not develop when one of the nuclear Powers, finding itself on the verge of defeat, may in desperation resort to the deployment of such weapons. We cannot afford to feel smug about the fact that man, individually and collectively, can accustom himself to live in fear. Man is an adaptive animal and he has been able to live throughout history under great stress and strain. By the same token, we also do know that imminent fear, even though it may be submerged in the subconscious of the individual by his psychological mechanism of self-preservation, nevertheless conditions the daily behaviour of man and often subjects him to a state of frustration. Such frustration may become very dangerous when it grips communities or nations. The abnormal psychology of the masses is the best example of the cumulative effect of frustration rooted in fear. To put it succinctly, the peoples of the world have been subjected to fear and frustration ever since nuclear weapons came into being. Need I draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that collective frustration has been known to find expression in rebellion and violence. It is that constant fear seething in the hearts and minds of peoples of the world that has been preoccupying us all, I am sure. The United Nations will lose the confidence of peoples everywhere in the world if we do not give them hope that we are taking resolute action in order to mitigate, if not dissipate, fears and frustrations.

134. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.583 which I shall present is, I hope, a modest step towards that end. It will be noted that the word "urgent" is the first word of the item before us: "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests". We do not merely say: "The need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" but, "The urgent need".

135. For how many years have such weapons been tested? Since 1945 or even I would say since 1943. Almost 30 years have elapsed since tests were first carried out. Fortunately for the world, there was no monopoly of nuclear weapons. Russia developed its own nuclear weaponry and so did Britain, France and the People's Republic of China. No doubt there are efforts on the part of many other countries which are secretly developing their knowledge and technique of new devices of mass destruction. This is why it will be found that the emphasis in my draft resolution is on fear. The first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution reads as follows:

"Noting that one of the first steps for the strengthening of international security is to dissipate world-wide fears that nuclear, thermonuclear and other weapons of mass destruction may be used by miscalculation in what could appear a desperate situation".

136. We have heard time and again declarations by the nuclear Powers to the effect that they will not be the first to use such weapons. We are not talking here of powers in the abstract. Powers are headed by leaders and leaders are men. And who can vouch for the perfect sanity of any man, whether he is in power or is a man of the street? We have our frailties, we have our foibles, and under stress we are apt to behave quite abnormally. Therefore, when they—the United States, or the People's Republic of China, or Britain, or France for that matter—say that their Governments will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, what do they mean? Do they mean the people of France, the people of the United Kingdom, the people of the People's Republic of China, the people of the United States of America who have been demonstrating against such diabolical weapons? No, they are referring to the military hierarchy, to the leaders who after all are human, and they are not immune from error and blunders, as we have noted in two world wars. And I am the contemporary of two world wars.

137. In retrospect we know what Lloyd George and Clemenceau did at Versailles. In retrospect we know what the victors did in Nuremburg and Tokyo when their enemies surrendered to them. They hanged them. Emotions run high in leaders as they do in the common man or the man in the street. This is why we cannot take at face value declarations that the leaders will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is a sort of sweeping statement, if I may say so.

138. The second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution reads:

“Considering that for the last few years the United Nations have been preoccupied with finding ways and means for diminishing the pollution of the earth's atmosphere”.

This paragraph is self-explanatory. We are now bedevilled by the industrial pollution of the atmosphere; and added to it would be the fall-out from such nuclear weapons. As I said in my last statement, most of us here are laymen. We are not scientists or physicists. Some of us have heard time and again that some nuclear weapons are clean. Look at the semantics. Is there any such thing as a clean weapon which destroys people by explosion? But they mean that these weapons have no fall-out. Suppose others cannot produce a “clean” atomic or thermonuclear bomb. What then? Would those who have the dirty bomb not use it in revenge if the others used the clean bomb? Where is our intelligence? It is an insult to our intelligence to talk about clean and dirty atomic bombs here.

139. The third preambular paragraph states:

“Noting that scientists have been unanimous on the conclusion that the fall-out from nuclear tests is injurious to human and animal life and that such fall-out may poison the earth's atmosphere for many decades to come”.

This is an incontestible conclusion of the scientists. If one is subjected to many X-rays, they say one may develop cancer. The medical profession is very wary about taking excessive X-rays of their patients. They are not used unless

those X-rays are imperative for surgery or for advanced cancer. Here the scientists tell us that the cumulative fall-out may poison the whole atmosphere and that those who go through the destruction of the explosion may develop all kinds of illnesses, and undergo not bacterial but cellular transformation in their bodies.

140. The following paragraph states:

“Taking into account that underground nuclear and thermonuclear tests may not only create serious health hazards but may also cause as yet undetermined injury to humans and animals of the region where such tests are conducted”.

Do you recall what happened to so many sheep in one of the States of the host country where nuclear tests were carried out? And in another context, do we not recall—and this had nothing to do with nuclear explosions—that cans of tuna fish had to be withdrawn from supermarkets and grocery stores because the fish was polluted by industrial mercury dumped into the sea and rivers? How can the leaders of the nuclear Powers assure us that we may not be subjected to diseases due to fall-out from the tests—leaving aside their being forced to engage in a nuclear conflict?

141. The next paragraph reads:

“Recognizing that there already exist sufficient nuclear, thermonuclear and other lethal weapons of mass destruction in the arsenals of certain Powers to decimate the world's population and possibly render the earth uninhabitable”.

This paragraph is self-explanatory.

142. Now I come to three modest—modest, I say—operative paragraphs. The first reads:

“Appeals to the nuclear Powers to desist from carrying out further nuclear and thermonuclear tests, whether underground, under water or in the earth's atmosphere”.

We cannot urge them. I did not use the word “urge”, I did not use the word “request”, because we do not want to be rebuffed as a majority if we vote in favour of such a draft resolution as I am submitting today, or a similar draft resolution for that matter. I say “appeals”, not “urges”. We are reasoning with them. We are trying to find a path to their hearts, if not to their minds. The other day my colleague from the People's Republic of China did not understand me. He thought I was criticizing his country, but I was not. I was referring to all tests whether they are by the United States of America or any other nuclear Power for that matter, and he was not here when I addressed myself to the test that subsequently took place in the Aleutians. So for heaven's sake, you representatives of nuclear Powers, bear with us. We are speaking on behalf of the peoples of the world, as proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, and not on behalf of Governments.

143. Operative paragraph 2 reads:

“Urges the nuclear Powers to reach an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests without

delay and in any case before the proposed World Disarmament Conference”.

This paragraph is consonant with the statement I made in the General Assembly a few days ago [1985th plenary meeting] when I referred to the proposed convening of a world disarmament conference. What is the use of having a world disarmament conference two years from now if an agreement on testing is not reached amongst the major nuclear Powers within six months or so? They will squabble and quarrel in the world disarmament conference and we small nations—and even the big nations if they are big in numbers and small in power, however you label us—we shall be like false witnesses. They will probably come and ask us to be clients of one Power or the other, which we should refuse. We should all be unanimous about this use of nuclear testing as of now, if we want to succeed in the proposed world disarmament conference.

144. The last operative paragraph reads:

“Reassures the peoples of the world”—I did not say “the Governments of the world” although we are the representatives of Governments—“that the United Nations will continue to raise its voice against nuclear and thermonuclear tests of any kind and earnestly requests the nuclear Powers not to deploy such weapons of mass destruction.”

145. A few last words: most of us in this Committee are middle-aged men, representing a generation governed by elderly leaders many of whom—with all due respect to their personal wisdom—have lived their lives and are approaching

the threshold from which, sooner or later, they will make their exit from this world. We, the elderly—and the middle-aged, but you and I, Sir, are elderly—are in the twilight of our lives and we should leave the world in a better state than we found it. Like other generations that preceded us, we have made many mistakes, for, after all, we are human. Some of us have witnessed the ravages of two world wars and seem to have learned very little from history. No wonder that the youth of the world are seething with unrest. Are there any young people in the public gallery? I am heartened; there are some young people there.

146. The nuclear Powers are holding the proverbial sword of Damocles over their heads. Youth want to build a new world, a world untrammelled by antiquated patterns of balance of power and power politics. Youth are demonstrating, and once in a while youth erupt into violence because of fear and frustration brought about by antiquated policies predicated on serving the narrow national interests of States, big and small. You, my good friend, Mr. Chairman, will recall how angry many of the youth were during the World Youth Congress held in the spring of last year in the General Assembly hall. But all of them wanted to build a peaceful world community. In a few years we shall have to abdicate our powers, since youth are the heirs of this world. We should give them hope that in the meantime the nuclear race will stop and that we shall turn for them a clean page, on which they can write their own history.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.