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Chairman: Mr. Milko TARABANOV (Bulgaria).

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General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8328, A/8337, A/8457)

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Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security: report of the Secretary-General (A/8469 and Add.1)

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace
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GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. TANAKA (Japan): This is the second year of the Disarmament Decade. Recalling the main advances made during the past year one might mention, among those advances, the sea-bed arms control Treaty,¹ the submission of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex A] and, furthermore, the achievement of agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union both on measures to reduce the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war and on measures to improve the direct communications link between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. My delegation welcomes those two agreements, which were signed by the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union on 30 September 1971, and came into effect on the same date. Although those agreements are collateral from the point of view of disarmament, we should fully appreciate the contribution that they may make to the security of the world, in reducing the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war.

2. My delegation earnestly hopes that, in addition to the agreements to which I have referred, more substantial agreements on the limitation of strategic armaments will soon be worked out in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

3. The present state of affairs relating to disarmament may not yet fully meet the expectations of a majority of States Members of the United Nations but it could be taken as a bright sign for the further development of future disarmament talks. It is important that we take this opportunity to renew our determination and make further efforts in order to realize basic and substantial disarmament measures befitting the second year of the Disarmament Decade.

4. I should now like to express the views of my country on the draft convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons.

¹ Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (resolution 2660 (XXV), annex).

5. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year concentrated its efforts on the early realization of the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, pursuant to the request of General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV) of the previous year, but failed to achieve agreement among members of the Committee with regard to the means of verification in connexion with the prohibition of chemical weapons. Accordingly, the majority opinion of the Committee on Disarmament leaned towards working out the draft convention as a first step towards the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons. As a result, the draft convention supported by 12 members of the Committee is submitted to the General Assembly for consideration.

6. My delegation considers that the most realistic approach to the over-all objectives of disarmament is to achieve agreement on various specific measures of disarmament, step by step, as they become susceptible of solution. Therefore, Japan is prepared to become one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.579, commending the draft convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons. I hope sincerely that the draft convention will be widely supported in the General Assembly.

7. At the same time, my delegation feels strongly that the prohibition of chemical weapons, as weapons of mass destruction, is urgently necessary. In view of the provisions of article IX of the draft convention now before us on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons, which stipulates in effect that each State party to the convention undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of chemical weapons, my delegation considers that we should concentrate continued efforts on the early realization of the prohibition on chemical weapons.

8. As we all know, the greatest factor retarding the achievement of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons lies in the difficulties involved in solving the verification problem. It is necessary to ensure international means of adequate verification. To that end, we must study many intricate technical problems; this has already become clear in the process of past negotiations. Therefore, my country has maintained the position that we should continue to deliberate on the verification problem, taking into consideration the views of experts in this field. In this context, it is desirable to have the active co-operation and contribution of the socialist countries for our common task.

9. The crux of today's disarmament problem is nuclear disarmament. The first step towards realizing nuclear disarmament must be the prevention of so-called horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. As for the prevention of horizontal nuclear proliferation, namely, freezing the present number of nuclear weapon States, we do not see for the moment any indication of the appearance of a new nuclear weapon State. Also, the pressure of world opinion plays an effective role in preventing the appearance of a new nuclear weapon State.

10. For our part, the Government of Japan has made it clear in a series of official statements that Japan will not arm itself with nuclear weapons and this policy is supported by our people.

11. On the other hand, world public opinion attaches the greatest importance to the prevention of vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons as the starting point for further measures of nuclear disarmament. Today, there are two major nuclear weapon States—the United States and the Soviet Union—which possess advanced nuclear forces, both in quality and quantity, and there are the other nuclear weapon States. Although there is much difference in the strength of nuclear forces between these two categories of nuclear weapon States, the best possible approach to nuclear disarmament would be to find a way to freeze and then to reduce the present level of nuclear forces. I believe that, in compliance with this approach, the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess advanced nuclear forces, should take an active initiative to this end.

12. The major nuclear-weapon States have been engaged in a severe nuclear arms race up to date, but they are now endeavouring to curb that race, as is symbolized by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

13. We welcome the joint United States-USSR statement, issued by both Governments on 20 May 1971, that the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit those systems, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons. My delegation earnestly hopes that the objectives indicated by the joint United States-USSR statement will be faithfully carried out in the sixth round of their negotiations.

14. Among several items of possible nuclear disarmament measures, the halting of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons and the diversion to peaceful purposes of existing weapon-grade material would be a quite effective means for the realization of nuclear disarmament, in company with the limitation of nuclear weapon delivery means and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. I hope that these matters will be actively taken up in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and also in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

15. It is nuclear weapon tests that symbolize the nuclear arms race and those tests have raised a serious problem of environmental pollution. It is a matter of great regret for us to see that the major nuclear weapon States are continuing nuclear testing, on a frequent basis as well as on a large scale, such as the recent example of Amchitka, and also that other nuclear weapon States are still conducting their testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere.

16. World public opinion against nuclear tests has intensified and we believe that the time is ripe to realize the total prohibition of all nuclear testing. At the same time, we are aware that there are different views among States concerned on the question of whether or not seismic methods are effective enough as a means of verification for the implementation of a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests. In comparison with the position taken by nuclear weapon States regarding the question of verification for the prevention of horizontal proliferation of nuclear

weapon tests, it is not theoretically well balanced for certain nuclear weapon States to take the position that verification for the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests should be limited solely to national means. It is, however, an encouraging phenomenon that seismic methods have shown remarkable progress and that many States, including nuclear weapon States, have been making efforts to improve seismic methods.

17. It will be recalled that at its twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth sessions, the General Assembly voted with overwhelming support for resolutions 2604 (XXIV) and 2663 (XXV) concerning the establishment of an international exchange system of seismic data in order to achieve the banning of underground nuclear tests. We hope that all nuclear weapon States will co-operate positively for the establishment of an international verification system based on the exchange of seismic data as the minimum requirement for solution of the question of verification. In my view, the present session of the General Assembly and the next session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should strive energetically to solve the problem of banning underground nuclear weapon tests and of elaborating the necessary verification means.

18. In the view of my delegation, since the prohibition of underground tests is a matter of urgency, all nuclear weapon States, particularly the major ones, should, as soon as possible, and without waiting for agreement on the question of verification, reduce drastically the number and scale of nuclear tests now being conducted, either through unilateral action or through bilateral or multilateral agreement. We believe that this is the way for the nuclear weapon States to respond to the overwhelming aspirations of world opinion.

19. I should now like to touch upon the relationship between the participation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Although the Conference has proved to be a useful forum for disarmament negotiations it is nevertheless a fact that not all nuclear weapon States are represented on that Committee. Japan has repeatedly pointed out the importance of securing the participation of all nuclear weapon States in disarmament negotiations. Bearing in mind that nuclear disarmament is such an urgent problem, we believe that the time has now come to consider how to achieve effective results in realizing the purposes of disarmament. We believe, therefore, that close consultations should be held so that all nuclear weapon States may come to participate in the Conference in a manner satisfactory to the States concerned.

20. In my statement today, I have emphasized that the problem of disarmament is one of great urgency and I believe that the overwhelming majority of the United Nations shares this feeling. On the other hand, it seems to me that the possession of nuclear weapons tends to be regarded as a basis for a special voice in international affairs, and that there is also some tendency to accept such a concept. I am afraid that this will be an obstructive factor in future progress in disarmament negotiations. I am convinced that, facing squarely such a contradiction in international politics, we should renew and intensify our joint, co-operative efforts to achieve the purposes of disarmament.

21. Lord LOTHIAN (United Kingdom): May I, before turning to my statement, cordially welcome our colleagues from the People's Republic of China. It is specially fitting that the representatives of the People's Republic are taking their seats in the General Assembly and in the First Committee when both these bodies are debating disarmament questions. We have long felt it necessary that the People's Republic of China should take part in such deliberations. We welcome them and look forward to working with them.

22. Last year, in my statement to the First Committee [*1750th meeting*] I started with some general observations on arms limitation and disarmament and then proceeded to deal with some more particular points concluding with a rather detailed exposition of the British point of view on the prohibition of biological weapons.

23. This year I should like to reverse this procedure by starting from the particular and ending up with some more general observations. Part of my reason for this is that the British views on biological weapons put forward in my statement to the Committee at the twenty-fifth session have now very largely been accepted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

24. During the past year the Committee has worked out a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [*A/8457, annex A*]. Such an approach is fully in accordance with resolution 2662 (XXV) which we adopted last year.

25. It is gratifying that so many Member States have now come to recognize the soundness of our approach, which is that while biological weapons remain largely undeveloped and undeployed weapons, they are easier to ban than if we allow time for further research to perfect them. We believe that this weapon of mass destruction, which is so potentially deadly and so largely uncontrollable, especially in its incalculable effect on innocent civilians who would be its chief victims, is one upon which we should rightly concentrate our attention. Finally, because of the nature of the weapon, verification of biological weapons prohibition—using verification in the usual rather narrow sense of the word—is uniquely different. For practical reasons, verification can be replaced by adequate provisions for handling complaints, together with assistance procedures which are both designed to deter any State party which might be tempted to violate its undertakings under the convention. This affords us an opportunity to reach agreement on the subject, without encountering the conflict of views which has unhappily caused so much delay in reaching agreement on other prohibitions.

26. In previous debates here in New York, as in Geneva, fears have been voiced that the Geneva Protocol of 1925² might be weakened by what we were proposing on biological weapons.

27. We ourselves were not convinced by these arguments; indeed, our intention was to strengthen the Geneva

² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

Protocol, to which the United Kingdom attaches very great importance. But we recognize the strongly and sincerely held views of other delegations. To meet their concern that an existing international instrument of proven effectiveness might be called in question, the United Kingdom has been prepared to accept a convention marginally different from the one we would ideally have wished to see negotiated. We acknowledge with appreciation that the same spirit of compromise has been shown by other delegations; and I think that the very explicit terms of the resulting draft convention will have taken care of any doubts that might have remained. Accordingly, and while my delegation reserves the right at a later date to set forth its views on some of the particular points dealt with in the draft convention, I have no hesitation in assuring the Committee that my delegation, which was one of the sponsors of the draft convention in Geneva, now regards the present draft as the best available compromise in the circumstances and a sound and realistic basis for agreement. My delegation is a sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.579 that has been submitted today, and we hope that the General Assembly will commend the draft convention and request its opening for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date.

28. It is, I think, no secret that the British delegation has been disappointed that it has taken so long to negotiate a draft biological weapons convention since the moment when a complete draft was put forward by the United Kingdom in Geneva in July 1969.³ Our intention was to prepare the way so that the problems of chemical weapons could be seen clearly and unobscured by the very different considerations attached to biological weapons. From the start we made it clear that we should not seek to sidestep the difficulties of a prohibition of chemical weapons. This remains our position. Under the terms of the new draft convention before us, we shall undertake a treaty commitment to this effect. We look forward to positive and fruitful discussion in the Committee on Disarmament next year on this subject. We are, accordingly, among the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.580 which has been submitted today. It is our hope that real progress may be achieved in the next year. Fortunately, during the past years the Committee on Disarmament has done much of the basic work on chemical weapons and we now know a great deal more of the techniques and ideas available to us. We shall undoubtedly need to discuss these further and probably evolve some new techniques and enlist some new ideas; but it gives me satisfaction to record that so much of the basic groundwork has already been done.

29. The real progress we have recorded on a convention on biological weapons over the past year has not been paralleled by progress on the equally important subject of a comprehensive test ban. Many ideas, some new, some old, some variants of old ideas, were put forward this year in Geneva. It was disappointing that nearly all these seemed to be rejected in very uncompromising terms by the representative of the Soviet Union in a statement he made there on 7 September [see COD/PV.536]. These ideas, which were put forward by non-aligned delegations as well as by

Western delegations, and particularly with great skill and force by the Canadian delegation, involved a considerable number of proposals designed to help and hasten the progress towards a comprehensive test ban. Those proposals would not have delayed it and were certainly worthy of examination. It is disappointing that they were so flatly rejected.

30. This subject is of course additionally complicated by the fact that not all the nuclear weapon States that conduct nuclear tests have taken part in the deliberations in Geneva. We must hope that a way will be found to integrate all of them in our discussions and negotiations. We have made some progress without them, and I think there is no doubt that we could continue to do so but it is increasingly unrealistic to believe that far-reaching measures of disarmament can be concluded without them.

31. I turn now to the technical aspects of verifying a ban on underground testing. There is, I think, no dispute that we shall have need of modern scientific methods of detection and identification when the ban is eventually agreed. It is good to be able to record that the Soviet Union has again acknowledged its preparedness to partake in exchanges of seismic data. It is disappointing that hitherto the Soviet terms for such exchanges have not included any guarantee of the unimpeded flow of such data and have insisted that national means of verification of a comprehensive test ban would suffice. It is our hope that as our negotiations proceed the Soviet Union will feel able, as part of the negotiating procedure, to state with more precision the lines along which it envisages the details of seismic co-operation to verify a treaty banning underground tests. If the Soviet Union were now to make clear that it will join with the vast majority of countries in co-operation in the international exchange of seismic data, and make seismic data relating to nuclear test explosions available on a guaranteed basis, then we should have surmounted one obstacle in the path of the comprehensive test ban negotiations. I say "one" obstacle because I do not wish to imply that the international exchange of seismic data on a basis of guaranteed availability will alone suffice to solve the verification problem. My Government believes that such means of verification should be provided for a comprehensive test ban treaty as are appropriate, practicable and—more particularly—sufficient. The international exchange of seismic data would, we can be confident, be necessary to the successful verification of a treaty; but we cannot in present circumstances say that it would be sufficient. For one thing, there is, in our view, a need for improvements in the seismic network itself in order to exploit to the full the potentialities of seismology as a tool of verification.

32. More encouraging have been the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. We believe that these talks, a further session of which has just opened in Vienna, offer the best hope in present circumstances of limiting the nuclear arms race and of opening the way for further progress in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament. It was encouraging that on 20 May 1971 the United States and Soviet Governments announced their agreement on a framework for continued negotiation whose main feature was concentration on working out an agreement for the limitation

³ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232, annex C, sect. 19.

of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems. They also agreed to seek to conclude certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons. The first formal results of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were seen with the signature in Washington on 30 September 1971 of agreements on an improved "hot line" and on measures to prevent the accidental outbreak of nuclear war. We continue to hope for progress on the more substantive goals of the programme of 20 May.

33. The prospect of progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is, I believe, of the greatest importance. It is also significant in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. It would represent the early redemption of the pledge that, if the non-nuclear-weapon States bound themselves in the non-proliferation Treaty, the nuclear weapon States for their part would limit and control their own nuclear armoury.

34. Those gloomy prophets who doubted the effectiveness of the non-proliferation Treaty have also been confounded by the way in which the Safeguards Committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was able, in less than a year of strenuous negotiation, to draw up detailed guidelines for the agreements which non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty are required to conclude with IAEA; and also to settle how non-proliferation Treaty safeguards should be financed. We believe that this achievement, to which nearly 60 States contributed, was an outstanding one.

35. Several States have already concluded agreements with IAEA, and others are being negotiated. There are, however, a large number still incomplete. I very much hope that all non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the Treaty, whether they have peaceful nuclear programmes or not, will make contact with IAEA and put in hand the necessary arrangements for a safeguards agreement. On 20 September the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community approved a mandate for the negotiation of a verification agreement with IAEA. Negotiations between IAEA, the European Commission and the five European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) non-nuclear-weapon States are already under way. Japan too has indicated its intention to begin talks on the non-proliferation Treaty agreement with the Agency. Such negotiations are of crucial importance to the future of the Treaty. Their successful conclusion will not only open the way to ratification of the Treaty by a very important group of countries; it will also encourage wider acceptance of the Treaty by States that still have doubts about it.

36. The United Kingdom recognizes the importance that many States attach to our offer, made during the negotiation of the Treaty, to afford an opportunity for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom, subject to national security exclusions. We have already had two rounds of discussions with IAEA. However, in practice, when Britain becomes a member of the European Communities, our offer is likely in fact to be implemented by means of the procedures agreed in the EURATOM/IAEA verification agreement.

37. What is now very important for the security of the world is that the non-proliferation Treaty should be more

widely accepted, and that States parties to it should comply with their obligations in respect of safeguards negotiations with IAEA. The Treaty is now a proved measure of arms control. Let those who call for other more far-reaching measures of disarmament make sure first that those agreements we have are comprehensive and thus fully effective.

38. It is heartening to be able to record that IAEA has also had under active discussion this year the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. I am glad to note too that Soviet-American talks on this subject have also continued. The close relationship between peaceful nuclear explosions and test explosions of nuclear weapons makes this a most sensitive and important subject which we do well to keep at the forefront of our minds. Expert assessment of the potentialities and problems of peaceful nuclear explosions of the sort that IAEA is promoting is the most useful contribution in present circumstances, and IAEA is the right body to undertake such consideration.

39. Last year, first in this Committee and later in the Assembly, we adopted resolutions commending the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [*resolution 2660 (XXV), annex*]. This Treaty was opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington on 11 February 1971 and to date has been signed by more than 80 States. We also have a considerable number of ratifications and it is my hope that the Treaty will come into force in the near future. The United Kingdom for its part has prepared and is ready to deposit its instrument of ratification.

40. Regional measures of arms limitation and disarmament have received new impetus this year. The guiding star in this respect is the Treaty of Tlatelolco.⁴ We have welcomed the fact that British ratification of its Protocol II, which binds nuclear weapon States, has been matched by United States ratification. It is our hope that the other nuclear weapon States will soon follow this example. We also welcome the ratification of Protocol I by the Netherlands. It is also our hope that those Latin American States which have not yet done so will sign and ratify the Treaty with the appropriate waiver in accordance with the provisions of article 28, paragraph 2. The value of the Treaty as an effective measure increases in direct proportion to the widening of the zone in which it has come into force.

41. A new item on our agenda this year is the regional proposal put forward by the representatives of Ceylon and the United Republic of Tanzania [*see A/8492 and Add.1*] concerning the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. This subject was discussed fruitfully at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in Singapore in January this year. Since then it has been the subject of detailed bilateral and multilateral discussions between both the littoral States in the area and the external States principally involved. For so sweeping and challenging a proposal this seems to me the right way to proceed until we all have a clearer idea of the many problems this very broad proposal presents. It would hardly be right to try to adopt

⁴ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

now a set of detailed and specific injunctions. That would amount to attempting to anticipate forthwith the results of intricate and difficult negotiations.

42. I am glad to congratulate the Secretary-General on the report [A/8469] that has been produced by his Group of Consultant Experts on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race. This is, I think, the fourth report in the field of disarmament that has been produced under the auspices of the Secretary-General and, as on the previous occasions, the British Government has given the fullest measure of support to the experts' work. I cannot attempt to do justice to the report in a few sentences. It challenges us all to face up to the staggering burden that armaments place upon the world and to the cost of the arms race in terms of effort and opportunities lost. I would point particularly to the second conclusion of the report: that it is the responsibility of all countries, regardless of their size and wealth—and, I might add, of their ideology—to consider what steps they can take to promote the sympathy, trust and understanding that will permit us to achieve practical measures of arms control and disarmament. This is surely right.

43. I am far less happy about the suggestion that we should ask the Secretary-General to revise the report periodically. The British Government's contribution to the preparation of the report itself was a very substantial one—I am bound to point out, with regret, that many countries apparently did not send any reply at all to the Group of Experts' questionnaire [see A/8469/Add.1]—and I do not think that the cause of disarmament would be materially promoted by asking Governments and the Secretariat to go through this laborious exercise too frequently; nor do I believe that the returns would justify the expense involved. What we have to do is to carry on with negotiations in a helpful and practical spirit. I would not want our attention to be diverted too much to background studies which serve to remind us of the need for disarmament but which do not actually point to any particular measure by which it may be achieved.

44. There is much work to be done in many fields relating to arms limitation and disarmament. We have some solid beginnings; now we must build on them. But this has not been a year altogether without hope. In Europe, in particular, there is now a better possibility of a settlement of some of the problems that have bedevilled our continent for so long. In the disarmament field the proposals relating to mutual and balanced force reductions are significant. At last there has been a response to the frequent calls by NATO for meaningful negotiations on this subject. Just what can be achieved and how it will be achieved are still matters for discovery, and the appointment of Mr. Brosio, NATO's former Secretary-General, to probe intentions further may reveal some of the answers. I think we all realize that there will be no dramatic overnight results; but let us hope that it will be possible to enter into serious negotiations with a genuine possibility of results.

45. The year may have brought encouragement, but what counts in the end is results. One cannot say too often how important it is to remember that what we are talking about is the national security and defence of us all. National security can of course be furthered by carefully negotiated

measures of arms control and disarmament. This is in the interests of all of us individually and collectively. But so in their right places are collective security and self-defence, as is recognized in the Charter. What we must do is identify where our individual and national interests in disarmament coincide, and then create trustworthy instruments to give them legally binding form. No country can impose its wish on others, still less can it force disarmament upon them. What we can do is to help to create the right conditions for a meeting and a merging of interests. This year I believe we have a particularly good chance of broadening and hastening the disarmament negotiations. It is certainly most satisfying that with agreement on a biological weapons convention we shall have started on a process involving real disarmament and shall have completely eliminated the possibility of one of the weapons of mass destruction ever being used.

46. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): Before calling on the representative of Finland, the last speaker on my list for this morning, I should like to address an urgent appeal to the delegations which intend to take part in the general debate on the disarmament items to do so as soon as possible. I think that we could still hear one or two statements this morning. I should also like to inform the members of the Committee that I intend to close the list of speakers on Friday, 19 November, at the end of the afternoon. I invite those delegations which intend to speak several times in the debate to inscribe their names on the list of speakers as soon as possible. As I hear no objection to the proposal I have just made I take it that the Committee agrees that the list of speakers should be closed on Friday, 19 November, at the end of the afternoon.

It was so decided.

47. Mr. HYVÄRINEN (Finland): May I first, on behalf of the delegation of Finland, extend our warmest wishes of welcome to the representatives of the People's Republic of China attending the meeting of the First Committee.

48. All in all, the year 1971—the second of the Disarmament Decade—has been good for disarmament, progress and promise of progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); a draft convention outlawing biological weapons by the Committee on Disarmament [A/8457, annex A]; some progress at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament bringing a comprehensive test-ban treaty into sharper focus; completion of a model IAEA safeguards agreement in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]; preparation of the Secretary-General's report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race [A/8469 and Add.1]; prospects for a world disarmament conference; initiatives aimed at negotiations on regional disarmament in Europe, and the whole political development in Europe. All these are encouraging signs. Taken together with the series of limited, yet important arms control measures of recent years, they maintain and carry forward the momentum of negotiation and agreement.

49. At the same time, the general political framework within which disarmament negotiations have to evolve is undergoing a rapid and profound change. It is to be hoped that the People's Republic of China and France may now

join disarmament negotiations. The continuing series of meetings between the leading statesmen of the world's most powerful countries hold promise of a normalization of relations, a reduction of tensions and the strengthening of *détente*.

50. Nowhere is the improvement of the political climate more evident than in Europe. It is obvious that for a neutral European country like Finland, the development of the political and military situation of our own continent is of crucial importance. It follows that on the basis of scrupulous observance of its recognized policy of neutrality, Finland desires to do whatever it can in order to contribute to the lessening of tension and the strengthening of security in Europe. The efforts of the Finnish Government on behalf of a conference on European security are well known. The same desire to contribute to a continuing process of *détente* in Europe, and at the same time to enhance our own security in neutrality, has also motivated our initiative to seek in treaty form a comprehensive negotiated solution to our relations with the two German States.

51. In this perspective it is natural that Finland welcomes the initiatives of the NATO countries and the Soviet Union designed to lead to negotiations on force reductions in Europe. My Government hopes that henceforth rapid progress may be made towards a conference on European security, co-operation and negotiations on force reductions. In substance at least, these issues are closely interrelated, representing as they do both a result of and a further contribution to the encouraging process of *détente* in Europe.

52. The situation in Europe is, indeed, qualitatively different from that in the middle of the 1950s and in the early 1960s, when the first substantive initiatives for regional arms control and disarmament measures were made. The plans then advanced did not lead to serious considerations, let alone to substantive negotiations. Then the world—and more particularly Europe—was still living in the grip of the cold war. Mutual distrust and suspicion doomed initiatives as soon as they were presented. At present, different alternatives for regional arms control and crisis management are considered and explored in order to find realistic ways to a more stable peace in Europe. New approaches are needed, but earlier ideas should also be given renewed consideration in the light of the new situation, as suggested by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, during the disarmament negotiations at Geneva.

53. In this connexion, I should like to refer to the idea presented by the President of Finland, Mr. Kekkonen, in 1963. Pointing out that none of the Nordic countries had nuclear weapons on its soil, President Kekkonen expressed the conviction that if a nuclear-free zone consisting of Nordic countries were to be established, this would confirm the existing situation without impairing the security of the Nordic countries or the balance of power generally. According to his idea, the denuclearization of this region would disengage the Nordic countries from strategic speculations of rivaling military blocs and would thus contribute to peace and security in Europe.

54. The years which have gone by have not diminished the relevance of this idea. The accession of all the Nordic countries to the non-proliferation Treaty has been a step towards the complete denuclearization of this area. My delegation expresses the hope that both the substance of President Kekkonen's idea and the regional approach reflected by it would be taken into account in efforts to strengthen security and to reduce tension in Europe.

55. The Secretary-General's report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race graphically illustrates the immensity of the task with which the international community is still faced. In exposing in convincing terms not only the evils and the dangers of the arms race but also the senseless waste of human and material resources which it entails, the report will serve to enlighten public opinion everywhere and to make a significant contribution to the debate on disarmament. In so doing, it should help—in the words of the Secretary-General—towards reordering both national and international priorities in the decade ahead. The Finnish delegation wishes to pay tribute to the Secretary-General and the consultant experts on whose assistance he has relied for this outstanding report, as well as to the Government of Romania which took the initiative for the preparation of the report at the last session of the General Assembly.

56. From the beginning of the SALT talks, my delegation has held the view that this continuing strategic dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States constitutes in itself an arms control measure of vital importance, and that in addition to their intrinsic political value, the SALT talks are a crucial factor in the progress towards a more stable strategic environment in the nuclear field and thus strengthen the hope for the preservation of peace. My delegation is reassured in this view by the recent signing of the treaties against the danger of war through nuclear accidents and on the improvement of the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow.

57. These agreements, although mainly technical in character, serve the purpose of limiting the threat posed by the very existence of nuclear arsenals and of improving methods of crisis management in the nuclear age. But even more important is the fact that their achievement demonstrates the willingness of both sides to make progress at SALT. This, coupled with the joint announcement of the two Governments of 20 May 1971, leads us to hope that now when the SALT negotiators have reconvened in Vienna they will make rapid progress towards the first substantive agreement in this field.

58. Finland has continued to follow closely the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by dispatching special observers to Geneva. The main tangible result of the work of the Committee on Disarmament at this session is the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction.

59. I have been instructed by the Finnish Government to indicate its full support for the draft convention in its present form, and the Finnish delegation is happy to join other delegations in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/

L.579 commending the draft convention for the approval of the General Assembly and for subsequent signature and ratification by States.

60. The arguments which have led my Government to support the draft convention on bacteriological weapons in its present form can be broadly summarized as follows.

61. First, the draft convention would do away with a particularly odious weapon of mass destruction—a weapon which by its very character would have innocent civilian population as its prime target.

62. Secondly, the draft convention would be the first disarmament measure to contain an element of genuine disarmament not only by prohibiting the development and manufacture of these weapons but also by providing for the destruction of existing weapons stocks.

63. Thirdly, the draft convention would facilitate the achievement of a corresponding ban on chemical weapons. Of particular relevance in this respect is the pledge given in article IX of the draft convention to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures to prohibit chemical weapons.

64. In this context, it is also important to keep in mind the successful efforts of the non-aligned members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to broaden the scope and to extend the application of the draft convention to the extent where it can be said to be not only a convention on bacteriological weapons but simultaneously a first agreement and a step on the way to a complete prohibition of all chemical and biological weapons, as explicitly provided for in the eighth paragraph of the preamble.

65. This legal link is further strengthened by a material link in that the prohibition in the draft convention on bacteriological weapons also comprises toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, which are generally considered to belong to the category of chemical warfare agents.

66. Fourthly, the draft convention would add a new and significant disarmament measure to the series of collateral arms control measures already achieved. In so doing it would maintain and carry forward the momentum of negotiation and agreement necessary for further progress in disarmament.

67. This overwhelmingly positive assessment with which the Finnish delegation approaches the draft convention on bacteriological weapons must, however, be tempered by some more critical observations.

68. The first of these refers to the over-all framework of the treaty which we are requested to approve. As is well known, it has been the practically unanimous wish of the General Assembly to achieve a more comprehensive treaty covering chemical as well as biological weapons. This has not been achieved. It is clear, therefore, that in terms of the expectations of the General Assembly the draft convention on biological weapons will remain a half-measure unless and until it is followed—within a reasonable span of time—by another convention also prohibiting chemical weapons. The

joint memorandum of the non-aligned members of the Committee on Disarmament [*A/8457, annex C, sect. 33*] may, in the view of my delegation, prove a helpful point of departure for future negotiations on this subject.

69. Another principal aspect of the draft convention on bacteriological weapons which has generated a fair amount of discussion in the Committee on Disarmament concerns the question whether the prohibition of the draft convention on bacteriological weapons should be extended to include a prohibition of the use of these weapons, although this is already covered by the Geneva Protocol of 1925.⁵ A clear majority in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament seems to have concluded that an explicit repetition of the prohibition of the use in the draft convention would tend to weaken the Protocol. Such an effect would, of course, be in contradiction with the aims which the draft convention is seeking. My delegation for one has not become totally convinced of the force of this argument, but it is ready to comply with the will of the majority on this question. In doing so we particularly take into account the ninth and tenth preambular paragraphs of the draft convention which contain language going some way in this direction.

70. There is a general aspect of the question of verification and complaint procedure which I should like to comment on briefly. This concerns the role of the Security Council as the supervisor of the observance of various arms control agreements and as the guarantor of the compliance with these treaties. The draft convention on bacteriological weapons suggests as one of the modalities of verification a complaints procedure to the Security Council. In pursuance of this, the delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland have submitted a draft Security Council resolution [*ibid.*, *sect. 21*] by which the Council would confirm its preparedness to consider and to act on possible complaints. It is interesting to note that this is now becoming standard procedure in all arms control and disarmament agreements. The sea-bed Treaty⁶ included a similar provision and this is also a feature of the Swedish draft treaty on a comprehensive test ban [*ibid.*, *sect. 30*]. In a wider context, these stipulations giving the Security Council specific functions in the enforcement of arms control measures serve to underline the organic link which exists between disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security for which the Security Council bears a primary responsibility according to the Charter. This accords fully with the original purposes of the Charter which in its Article 26 envisages a disarmament role for the Security Council.

71. My Government does not underestimate the difficulties connected with the work on an agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The primary responsibility remains with the great Powers. It is evident, however, that the participation in the efforts towards the common goals should take place on as broad a basis as possible. Contrary to the

⁵ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

⁶ Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (resolution 2660 (XXV), annex).

situation in the case in nuclear weapons, the technical and scientific realities do not drastically limit the number of countries which may have an active interest in chemical weapons. This fact should make the early achievement of common understanding even more urgent, and my Government joins the appeals to all Governments, as outlined, for instance, by the representative of Poland in this Committee at the 1828th meeting and expressed in draft resolution A/C.1/L.580, to take all steps to contribute to a successful outcome of negotiations.

72. It has been stated repeatedly during the disarmament discussions that the question of the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons is a problem of political will rather than of technical capabilities. In the opinion of my Government that is true. At the same time, the efforts made in good faith to study and solve the complex technical problems connected with the issue are also of great importance. If it were possible to solve specific technical problems concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons, that would promote an atmosphere of mutual trust and thus provide conditions for the emergence of a political consensus, necessary for the conclusion of an international agreement. A positive feed-back from technology to politics might thus be created. Therefore the technical aspects of the problem of disarmament as regards chemical weapons should be studied and solved, as far as possible, in parallel with the political problems.

73. There are considerable gaps in our knowledge of technical problems connected with disarmament as regards chemical weapons. While the available information about the types and effects of the weapons already deployed has remained only fragmentary, the development of those weapons continues. The situation is thus becoming even more difficult. As far as the verification of chemical agents and the control of the prohibition of their development, production and use is concerned, two kinds of problems apparently arise. The technique of verification and control can at present be foreseen only summarily, and the role of the verification and control aspects in the future convention concerning chemical weapons is unknown so far. The substance of the second problem will, of course, be dependent wholly on the political solution which can be attained.

74. In the opinion of the Finnish Government, the chances of success in the negotiations on chemical weapons would be improved by paying special attention, already at this phase of negotiations, to the following issues:

75. First, by international co-operation, methods which would make available to all interested Governments expert information on verification and control of chemical agents and chemical weapons should be studied and developed. The valuable research work conducted by some international research institutes, especially by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), already serves that purpose. This kind of activity should be continued and made more effective. This is a task of which the Committee on Disarmament might find it appropriate to take charge.

76. Secondly, technical capacity should be developed and the facilities should be acquired on the national level for

verification of chemical agents and control of their prohibition, having in mind the eventuality that this kind of practical capacity would be needed for international use.

77. As far as the second question is concerned, the Government of Finland emphasizes its position that the possible international use of the verification and control capacity of chemical weapons will naturally depend on a common understanding on the political level regarding the provisions of the future convention on chemical weapons. However, this kind of technical capacity and appropriately trained expert reserves should, in the opinion of my Government, be supplied and be ready in advance for the tasks arising from the application of the convention on chemical weapons.

78. My delegation has instructions to announce that the Government of Finland, for its part, has begun to study how to establish, on a national basis and within the resources available in Finland, a verification and control capacity for chemical weapons, as described earlier, for possible international use.

79. While working out a draft convention on biological weapons the Committee on Disarmament has devoted, in almost equal measure, its time and attention to the problem of prohibiting underground nuclear tests, in the form of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The main results which the Committee on Disarmament can show for that include a substantive special report on the subject [A/8457, part III], a joint memorandum of nine non-aligned countries [A/8457, annex C, sect. 34], a revised draft treaty on a comprehensive test ban presented by Sweden [*ibid.*, sect. 30], proposals made by Canada for transitional measures [*ibid.*, sect. 9] and a host of valuable working papers, mainly on the technical aspects of verification by seismic methods. In this connexion my delegation would like to pay a special tribute to the representatives of Sweden and Canada for their energetic and untiring efforts to keep the attention of the Committee on Disarmament focused on the problem of prohibiting underground nuclear tests and to accelerate progress towards achieving its solution.

80. It is the impression of the Finnish delegation that the revived interest in a comprehensive test ban reflects not only a sense of frustration caused by the fact that the pledge given eight years ago in the Moscow Treaty⁷ is still unfulfilled but also a more optimistic evaluation of the situation, indicating that the achievement of a comprehensive test ban might not be quite as hopeless a task as it seemed to be a few years ago. The main elements behind that evaluation seem to be the strengthening of the process of political *détente*, the progress expected of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and, more narrowly, the diminishing returns of nuclear testing and the advances made in detection and identification capabilities.

81. For years, the apparent contradiction between the positions of the two major testing Powers on the question of verification has been said to be blocking the way to a comprehensive test ban. Various proposals have been made

⁷ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

to circumvent this difficulty: the idea of a threshold treaty, verification by invitation, "black boxes", transitional measures and, finally, seismic methods of detection.

82. At least in the technical sense, the efforts in the field of seismology have been the most successful and it is encouraging to note that further progress has been made in the field during this year. In fact, scientific progress in the field of seismology has successively lowered the thresholds at which seismic events can be detected, located and identified. New and more sensitive instruments, as well as the refining of the methods of discriminating between the signals emanating from earthquakes and from underground explosions, hold out prospects for further progress in this respect. It is true that there are still divergent views in the scientific world and elsewhere about the exact capabilities of seismic identification in terms of event magnitude. Likewise there are divergent views about the potential capabilities of detecting and identifying very weak events; and there are also the problems of underground nuclear explosions in dry alluvium, of decoupling and of masking of tests.

83. What remains, however—and this is clearly demonstrated in the proceedings of the Committee on Disarmament—is the almost unanimous conclusion that for all practical purposes the question of the verification of a comprehensive test ban by seismic and other remote control methods has been solved: in other words, that seismology is now, or will be in the very near future, capable of detecting and identifying all underground tests with the possible exception of the very weakest ones.

84. Since a 100 per cent foolproof system of verification is impossible in any case—the argument continues—all that we can reasonably strive to achieve is a system of verification which is sufficiently stringent to deter a prospective violator from violating the treaty. At least the technical prerequisites would therefore seem to exist for the achievement of a comprehensive test ban under conditions of what has been called "acceptable relative risks", that is, that the risks of some evasion by undetected testing must be weighed against the risks—political and otherwise—which continued, unrestrained underground testing involves. The Finnish Government, which has all along given its support to the efforts to help to solve the verification problem by developing seismic methods of detection and international co-operation in this field, fully shares this conclusion.

85. The Finnish delegation is also in substantial agreement with the so-called "two-pronged approach" to the problem of underground nuclear testing which has been advocated in the Committee on Disarmament, particularly by the delegation of Canada. It seems both useful and practical to propose transitional and interim measures which, while curtailing the number and size of underground nuclear tests, would help towards the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. At least they would not suffer from the inherent weaknesses in the concept of a threshold treaty, an idea which the Committee on Disarmament has wisely discarded. At the same time, focusing on transitional measures should not make us lose sight of our main objective: the comprehensive test ban treaty. In these circumstances, the best way to proceed might well be to

take the Swedish draft treaty as a point of departure. With its new elements—the three protocols of which one proposes a phasing out period—the Swedish draft, in fact, envisages transitional measures, but puts them firmly within the comprehensive framework of a treaty banning all underground nuclear testing.

86. The Finnish delegation believes that a distinct opportunity to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty now exists. This opportunity should be seized. It may have presented itself in 1963 when the Moscow Treaty was negotiated. A third opportunity may not come. It follows that, in our view, the Committee on Disarmament should at its next session concentrate all its efforts on obtaining the comprehensive test ban treaty. In this perspective it would be of crucial importance if the Powers which are conducting underground nuclear tests and which simultaneously at SALT have declared their willingness to negotiate restraints on nuclear arms, would pledge themselves to concentrate in 1972 on working out a treaty banning all underground nuclear weapons tests, as proposed by the Secretary-General in the Introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization.⁸ Cessation of all nuclear weapon tests would be the single most effective measure to halt nuclear proliferation, to maintain the viability of the non-proliferation Treaty, and to honour the pledges given eight years ago in Moscow. We believe that the time to act has now come.

87. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): Since there are no further speakers who wish to take part in the general debate at this time, I shall now call on the representative of Pakistan, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

88. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): First of all let me say how happy the Pakistan delegation feels to see the true representatives of China seated in this Committee, after having been unjustly excluded from it for 22 years.

89. With respect to the observations made by the Foreign Minister of Denmark in this Committee at the 1829th meeting on the events in East Pakistan since March this year, I should like first of all to pay tribute to the deep humanitarian motivations of his country in any situation which involves human suffering. These are evidenced by the material assistance that Denmark is always prepared to offer in such situations.

90. I should also like again to acknowledge the great efforts made by our dedicated Secretary-General to the cause of peace and humanitarian relief in East Pakistan. My Government's acceptance of every proposal made by the Secretary-General since the inception of the crisis is a matter of public record. My delegation has had the opportunity during this Assembly session to recount the several proposals of the Secretary-General that have been accepted by my Government. I do not, therefore, think it necessary to repeat what we have said on previous occasions.

91. With reference to the observations of U Thant in the introduction to his annual report on the Work of the

⁸ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 49.

Organization, let me assure this Committee that my Government is making every effort to bring about a political solution of our internal crisis based on respect for humanitarian principles and a peaceful transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. It is, however, tragic that an armed insurgency to bring about the dismemberment of Pakistan, aided and abetted by foreign armed incursions into East Pakistan in flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter, should leave no option to my Government but to take security measures for the preservation of our territorial integrity. No Member State faced with a similar threat would forego or default in its paramount duty to its people to defend its national existence.

92. Violence in East Pakistan can be brought to an end if the secessionists are not encouraged by a foreign Power to persist in their destructive course.

93. As far as the freely expressed will of the people is concerned, the people of East Pakistan did not vote for national disintegration and anarchy. They voted for autonomy within the framework of Pakistan as a single and indivisible State. It is to this will of theirs that respect will be shown.

94. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Denmark, who has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

95. Mr. MELLBIN (Denmark): I have listened carefully to the statement just made by the representative of Pakistan,

and I understood him not to take issue with anything that my Foreign Minister said in this Committee at the 1829th meeting. Still I wish very briefly to clarify whatever misunderstandings might prevail.

96. The remarks of my Foreign Minister with respect to events in East Pakistan could not be interpreted as an attempt to intervene in any way in the internal affairs of Pakistan; they were made in the context of observations already made by the Secretary-General and several other responsible authorities.

97. I was therefore satisfied to hear Mr. Shahi make such positive comments on the pronouncements made by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report and on the initiative of the Secretary-General.

98. Finally, with respect to the remarks made by my Foreign Minister on moderation, restraint and the need for a political settlement based on the freely expressed will of the people, those remarks signified that we feel such standards should apply to the solution of problems in any situation similar to that resulting from events in East Pakistan since March 1971.

99. Last, but not least, let me confirm that my Foreign Minister, in stating his views, was strongly motivated by his concern for the widespread human misery resulting from those events in East Pakistan.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.