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**GENERAL DEBATE**

1. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): The consideration of the disarmament items on our agenda that we are beginning today is one of the most important functions of this body and, in our view, one of the most important functions of the United Nations. The General Assembly's annual review and assessment of the challenges we face and the accomplishments we have achieved in the arms control and disarmament field, together with the over-all guidance set forth in its resolutions, has provided a major stimulus towards progress in this area.

2. Last year in this Committee there was extensive discussion regarding the question of possible prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons. That debate culminated in the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2662 (XXV), which took note of the various proposals that had been made for progress in this area, commended the basic approach set forth in the joint memorandum of the group of 12 non-aligned countries members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament<sup>1</sup>, and requested the Conference to continue its consideration of the problem of chemical and biological methods of warfare with a view to prohibiting urgently the development, production and stockpiling of those weapons.

3. I believe that all Members of the United Nations can take satisfaction in the work accomplished by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during the past year towards the realization of that objective. The draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, *annex A*] is a solid achievement; it is an achievement that can eliminate the threat of the use of disease as a method of warfare. It is an agreement that is in the interests of all Governments; it is in the interests of all mankind.

4. I would like to make a number of comments on this draft convention, on the contributions which it embodies,

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 39.*

on some of its specific provisions and on its general significance.

5. This draft convention is the first concrete result of some three years of international discussion and negotiation on the question of chemical and biological weapons. Incorporated in its provisions is a wide range of ideas, suggestions and compromises reflecting the views of the many delegations that participated in its preparation.

6. A proposal for a concrete agreement dealing with biological methods of warfare was first put forward by the United Kingdom in 1968. Important provisions in the present draft convention are derived from the draft that was submitted by the United Kingdom at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1969,<sup>2</sup> and again, in revised form, in 1970.<sup>3</sup> Other provisions are based on the draft presented early this year by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 8]. The prohibition on the production and stockpiling of toxins, which are among the most lethal means that could be used for warfare, was suggested by the United States Government—by my country. The broad definition of toxins which appears in article I was included at the suggestion of Sweden.

7. In the course of the negotiations at Geneva this year, the representatives of Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia presented a working paper [*ibid.*, sect. 23] containing a number of concrete suggestions which are reflected in the present text. Those concerned, in particular, changes in the preamble designed to emphasize the link between the prohibitions of chemical and biological weapons and a strengthening of the undertaking of further negotiations regarding chemical weapons. Other proposals reflected in the language of the draft and in the statements that were made regarding its interpretation were put forward by the delegations of Argentina, Canada, Egypt, Italy, Morocco, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

8. This brief summary is by no means a complete account of all the contributions that have been made to the formulation of this draft convention. It does illustrate, however, that this important multilateral instrument has been forged with the significant help and through the significant participation of many, many countries. It is the result of hard work, of compromise and accommodation among many points of view, and of thoughtful and painstaking negotiations.

9. The provisions of this draft convention and a number of statements made at Geneva regarding its interpretation had been summarized in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly [A/8457]. At this time I would like to highlight just a few points of particular importance.

10. As noted in the report, it was the desire of all participants in those negotiations that nothing should be

done in formulating a new agreement which might in any way cast doubt on the validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.<sup>4</sup> That Protocol is, in fact, fully safeguarded by the provisions and by the nature of the prohibitions of the present draft. Article VIII specifically provides that nothing in the draft convention should be interpreted as limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States under the Geneva Protocol. The preamble contains clauses whereby the parties not only note the important significance of the Geneva Protocol but also reaffirm their adherence to, call on all States to comply strictly with, and recall that the General Assembly has condemned actions contrary to, the Protocol's principles and objectives. Moreover, as a practical matter, the elimination of biological agents and toxins from the arsenals of States will exclude completely the possibility of their being used as weapons.

11. Another matter of the highest importance to Committee members was that this convention should ensure that work was continued on an urgent basis on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Accordingly, article IX of the draft convention reaffirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and sets forth a firm undertaking regarding continued negotiations in this area. The importance and urgency of eliminating weapons using chemical or biological agents and the fact that this agreement represents the first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on chemical weapons are recognized in the preamble. In our view the present draft convention thus fully complies with the approach recommended by the General Assembly in resolution 2662 (XXV) which it adopted last year.

12. In February 1971, President Nixon indicated in a letter to the Conference that an agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins would enhance the security of all countries and international security as well. He stated:

"Because of the rapid transmission of contagious diseases, particularly with modern means of communications, any use of biological weapons—by any State in any conflict anywhere in the world—could endanger the people of every country. Additional restraints on biological weapons would thus contribute to the security of all peoples. A prohibition against the possession of biological weapons could also have far-reaching benefits of another character. It could encourage international co-operation in the peaceful application of biological research, a field which may lead to immeasurable advances in the health and well-being of peoples everywhere." [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 2]

It is thus a matter of particular satisfaction to the United States that article X of the present draft convention sets forth in some detail provisions designed to facilitate international co-operation regarding peaceful application in the field of bacteriology and biology.

13. In accordance with his decisions regarding United States programmes in this field, and in accordance with the

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232, annex C, sect. 20.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1970, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

spirit of the draft convention now before us, President Nixon announced on 18 October 1971 that the former Army Biological Defense Research Center at Fort Detrick, Maryland, is being converted into a leading centre for cancer research. I should like to quote from the President's statement on that occasion:

"This facility, which once was so top secret, which was closed not only to Americans, but, of course, to anybody from foreign lands, now is open to all people in the world. Wherever scientists or doctors may be, whether in Europe, Latin America, Africa or Asia, they can come here. They are welcome to come here to see what we have done, just as we hope they will welcome us, so that we can see what they have done."

14. This draft convention, which provides for the elimination from the arsenals of States of an entire class of weapons, is a true measure of disarmament. I believe that a broad measure of consensus in favour of this agreement already exists. I would therefore urge the Committee to encourage prompt and widespread support for the draft convention and to request that it be opened for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date.

15. I should like to turn now, if I may, to consideration of the challenging task that remains before us and to the important work that has already been accomplished with respect to further prohibitions regarding chemical weapons. At the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year considerable attention was devoted to this issue, as all present know. Many delegations contributed through working papers and through the participation of their leading experts on this subject, in an informal meeting in July, to a better understanding of the central problems of the workability of a chemical weapons verification system. We believe that during the past two years a serious start has been made on exploration of possible approaches to this problem. The task still before us, as we see it, is to sort out and to examine those elements of verification that might be amenable to development as effective tools for ensuring compliance with prohibitions on chemical weapons. Further progress will require study of all promising suggestions. In this regard I should like to note that a memorandum proposing elements as a basis for negotiation was indeed presented to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by a group of 12 delegations [*ibid.*, sect. 33]. We hope that that document will contribute to continued efforts to achieve sound and reliable arms control measures in this field. For our part, we are determined to pursue this task. We will listen with care to suggestions during the debate in this Committee, which will, we hope, request that the Conference continue its work on this important issue.

16. In accordance with resolution 2663 (XXV), adopted by the General Assembly last year, the Conference also continued its work on the question of a ban of nuclear weapon tests. As requested in that resolution, a special report on this issue was prepared and has been included as part III of the report of the Conference to the General Assembly. The proposals and views of Committee members regarding the nature of a possible comprehensive test ban agreement on the concept of a threshold agreement for partial measures and on interim measures or restraints were set forth in considerable detail in the report. Suggestions

were also included regarding verification of a prohibition on underground nuclear weapon tests and regarding international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data, the improvement of world-wide seismological capabilities and further study of detection and identification of underground nuclear tests. I am sure that all members of this body will wish to give this report their very careful study and consideration. I can assure them that my own Government will continue to examine all serious possibilities for effective controls over a prohibition of underground testing. As many delegations are aware, the United States has devoted considerable effort to the study of the seismic detection, location and identification of earthquakes and underground explosions. We have made our findings broadly available to other countries in the hope that this will contribute to a better understanding of the verification issues. The United States continues to support an adequately verified comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. In order to be effective, we believe that verification of such a measure should include on-site inspections.

17. Turning now to another aspect of the arms race—and, indeed, in terms of total expenditures on armaments by far the most important aspect—I should like to comment briefly on the need to explore possible restraints on conventional weapons. As the United States delegation pointed out at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this summer, the intensive discussion of ways to control weapons of mass destruction during the past 25 years has not only resulted in a number of concrete agreements but has also helped to forge the tools for meaningful discussion on this problem. A body of common objectives and concepts, and a shared vocabulary, have been developed. As yet, we have no comparable tools for dealing with the subject of conventional-arms control. We therefore urge that the international community begin now to try to reach a better understanding of which steps in this field might be possible and sensible and which might not be. Of course, in making this suggestion we need not, and should not, derogate from the priority of other issues. An effort to come to grips with the problem of conventional weapons should proceed concurrently with work in these other important fields.

18. I would emphasize that a discussion would in no way bind any of the participants to one particular approach. It would, however, initiate the process through which we must pass if we are to ascertain how restraints on conventional weapons can contribute to the security of all countries. We make this suggestion with the full realization that the question of possible limitations on conventional weapons is not a popular topic. We are aware that there is a widespread reluctance even to consider this matter. We are firmly convinced, however, that if the effectiveness of our work in the arms control field is to match the solemnity of our declarations, we must come to grips with the question of possible restraints on those armaments to which such a major portion of expenditure on weapons is devoted.

19. In this regard, my delegation welcomes the publication of the Secretary-General's study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures [A/8469], which has been prepared, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV) adopted on this subject

last year, by a number of distinguished international experts. We are studying that document with great attention.

20. In the introduction to his report to the General Assembly this year on the work of the Organization,<sup>5</sup> the Secretary-General pointed out, in paragraph 202, that

“During the Disarmament Decade, it is not only important that intensive and uninterrupted work proceed in the field of disarmament; it is also important that all existing treaties should be strengthened.”

The Secretary-General added that

“The strengthening of these treaties and their becoming accepted standards of international law will not only ensure that they will be observed and have continuing validity, but will also serve to make additional agreements more readily attainable and acceptable.”

The United States is in firm agreement with this view, and we are pleased that during the past year significant progress has been made in this area.

21. The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, which was commended by the United Nations General Assembly last year [*resolution 2660 (XXV), annex*], was opened for signature in February. It has already been signed by some 80 countries. My own Government has submitted this Treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. We hope that it will enter into force at a very early date.

22. The dedicated efforts of representatives of many countries have brought us closer to a realization of the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. Significant progress has been made during the past year by the International Atomic Energy Agency in elaborating a safeguard system in accordance with article III of that Treaty.

23. Last year the General Assembly adopted resolution 2665 (XXV) dealing with the establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control. The Agency has achieved significant progress in this field, as reflected in paragraph 94 and 95 of the Agency's annual report.<sup>6</sup> We continue to support further study of this matter within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which we believe should be the body responsible for international activities in this regard.

24. The United States is deeply conscious of its responsibilities under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. We have sought to meet those responsibilities through a variety of efforts in the arms control field and, in particular,

through our negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding limitations on strategic armaments. These negotiations have been pursued with determination and with steadfastness. While much hard work and intensive negotiation remain before us, the past year has witnessed important and promising developments.

25. In May, a joint United States-Soviet Union statement announced that the two Governments concerned had agreed “to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems”, and that they had also agreed that “together with concluding an agreement to limit anti-ballistic missile systems, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons”. It was announced that the two sides were taking this course in the conviction that it would create more favourable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms, and that those negotiations would be very actively pursued.

26. In September, agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union were signed on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and on measures to improve the United States-Soviet Union direct-communications link. Secretary Rogers stated at the signing ceremony in Washington that these agreements represented “realistic and concrete steps forward, taken in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, which declares the determination of its Members ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’”. He emphasized as well that “these agreements are in the interests of all nations”, and that they “are proof of the advantages of a sober and realistic approach in dealing with arms control”.

27. During the past year specific steps have also been taken toward negotiations on regional arms control issues. The task of achieving a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe is now being given the most serious consideration. Exploratory talks to that end were proposed in the NATO Declaration in 1968 and again in Rome in 1970. Indications of readiness on the part of the Soviet Union to consider the reductions in armed forces and armaments in Central Europe were welcomed in June in the NATO communiqué issued at Lisbon.

28. In another part of the world, the United States is gratified with the further progress that has been made with respect to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.<sup>7</sup>

29. Sound and durable restraints on armaments are possible only when all participants perceive that such limitations are in their own interests. This mutuality of interest can be reached only through a reconciliation of divergent views, through compromise, and through some practical accommodation. I would hope that our important debate on these issues this year will help to promote a much better understanding of our common interests in moving through negotiation toward arms limitations that will provide greater security for all than can be achieved by arms alone.

30. Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Today the First Committee

<sup>5</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

<sup>6</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency, *Annual Report, 1 July 1970–30 June 1971* (Vienna, July 1971).

<sup>7</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

is beginning its consideration of the items on disarmament on the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The approach of the Soviet Union to these items is based on its view that the unceasing arms race launched by imperialist circles is one factor in contemporary international life which prevents a normalization of the world situation. The arms race has a direct effect on the present international situation, which, more than a quarter of a century after the end of the Second World War, is characterized by tension and the growth of militarism. The particular danger of the arms race in our time is qualitatively intensifying and increasing as a result of the existence of missiles armed with nuclear warheads, whose power of destruction and annihilation constitutes an extreme threat for mankind as a whole. At the same time, the increasing arms race is consuming vast material resources and human efforts and thus placing a heavy burden on the shoulders of the peoples of most countries in the world and preventing an increase in their standard of living and even the satisfaction of man's most basic needs for food, clothing and housing.

31. In present conditions, the most important task in order to prevent war, strengthen peace and security and raise the standard of living of the peoples of the world is to concentrate the efforts of all on putting an end to the constant growth of armaments and reversing the arms race. The future world situation depends to a large extent on how that task is accomplished: shall we see a reduction in international tension and an end to the enormous growth in armaments or, on the contrary, will preparations for war continue at an even faster rate and the threat of a new world war increase? For that reason, the problem of disarmament should occupy a central place in international life. It is important because of the danger linked with the arms race, which constitutes a threat to mankind.

32. Since it attaches great importance to the problem of disarmament, the Soviet Union is conducting an active and untiring struggle to remove the threat of war, to put an end to the arms race and, first of all, to suspend and eliminate all weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical and bacteriological. The struggle for disarmament is an important and integral part of our country's policy. In the United Nations and in other international forums, the Soviet Union is putting forward extensive programmes for nuclear and for general and complete disarmament and, at the same time, is seeking to achieve the implementation of separate or partial measures in the field of disarmament and arms limitation.

33. Disarmament questions occupied an important place in the work of the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in spring of this year. The Congress approved an extensive programme relating to disarmament problems. This programme set as its objectives nuclear disarmament by all States possessing such weapons, the cessation by all countries everywhere of all nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, and the promotion of the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various areas of the world. The programme calls for an intensified struggle to put an end to the arms race in weapons of all kinds.

34. In accordance with the constructive disarmament programme approved by the Congress of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union advocates a practical settlement of that problem through co-operation among a wide circle of States. The Soviet Union's efforts to achieve a positive settlement of the problem of disarmament are dictated by its concern for the maintenance of peace and international security and its desire to prevent a world nuclear conflict which threatens all mankind with catastrophic consequences. This is also the aim of the Soviet Union's proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference.

35. In the view of the Soviet Union, all States, irrespective of their economic or military potential, should make a contribution towards attaining the goal of disarmament. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. A. A. Gromyko, said in his statement during the general debate at the current session of the General Assembly [1942nd plenary meeting], the socialist countries do not claim and do not seek a monopoly in peace policies. The Soviet Union is prepared to join with all other States in the struggle to limit the arms race and to attain disarmament.

36. Some positive results have been obtained in recent years in the field of limiting the arms race: international agreements on the implementation of a number of important measures in this field have been concluded and ratified. They include treaties banning nuclear weapon tests in three environments—the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,<sup>8</sup> the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII) annex] and the treaties prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons in outer space<sup>9</sup> and on the sea-bed and the ocean floor.<sup>10</sup> All these agreements which have been reached on limiting the arms race are only the first steps towards disarmament. It is, unfortunately, true that no radical step has so far been taken towards controlling the dangerous process of stockpiling and perfecting armaments, that the arms race as a whole has not been halted or reversed, that armaments and military budgets continue to increase and that such important and urgent disarmament measures as the prohibition and elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons, have yet to be applied.

37. All this makes it essential to intensify consideration of and talks on disarmament questions, using all channels and forums, both multilateral and bilateral. In view of this goal, the Soviet Union is participating actively in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva and endeavouring to get the Committee to prepare concrete agreements on slowing down the arms race and on disarmament questions. In addition to participating in multilateral international forums on disarmament, the Soviet Union is engaging in exchanges of views on the problems on disarmament on a bilateral basis. Recently, Soviet leaders have had meetings and talks with the leaders of France, India, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco,

<sup>8</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

<sup>9</sup> Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI) annex).

<sup>10</sup> Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (resolution 2660 (XXV), annex).

Canada, Cuba, and other States, during which much attention was paid to disarmament problems. The Soviet Government, as is well known, is also conducting bilateral talks with the Government of the United States of America on strategic arms limitation. In May of this year, the Soviet Union and the United States of America achieved agreement on which questions should receive priority in the talks. These questions are the preparation of an agreement limiting the deployment of anti-missile defence systems and, at the same time as the conclusion of an agreement on that question, agreement on certain measures in the field of strategic offensive weapons. Those talks have had certain positive results. On 30 September agreements were signed in Washington on measures to reduce the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, and on improving the direct line of communications between Moscow and Washington in order to eliminate any dangerous situations. The Soviet Union believes that the agreements which have been signed are positive steps in the direction of reducing international tension and the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

38. During talks on disarmament questions, the Soviet Union has laid special stress on the necessity for the complete prohibition and removal of all weapons of mass destruction, and especially on the settlement of the problem of nuclear disarmament. In an effort to make a practical start in the consideration and settlement of this cardinal problem in the field of disarmament, the Soviet Government proposed to all nuclear Powers in June this year that they should meet to consider nuclear disarmament.

39. For a number of years the Soviet Union has been making efforts to get all States which now possess nuclear arsenals to make joint efforts to eliminate those arsenals. As early as 1 July 1968, the date on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed, the Soviet Government proposed that all nuclear Powers should immediately begin talks on halting the production of nuclear weapons, on reducing stocks of such weapons, and on the subsequent complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control.<sup>11</sup>

40. The proposal for the convening of a meeting of the five nuclear Powers [A/8328] is a further development of the Soviet Union's initiative, the purpose of which is to persuade States which possess nuclear weapons to come to an agreement on the prohibition and elimination of such weapons. The attitude of the Soviet Union is fully and realistically based on the particular responsibility which the Governments of countries possessing nuclear armaments bear towards humanity. A radical settlement of the problem of nuclear disarmament depends in the final analysis on the readiness of States possessing nuclear arms to prohibit and eliminate such weapons. We hope that in the end the Governments of those States will show a proper sense of responsibility to the peoples of the world and, heeding the increasingly insistent demands of the peace-loving community, will sit down at the negotiating table

with a view to establishing conditions in which the danger of the outbreak of a war involving nuclear weapons will be removed for ever.

41. As one of the highly essential measures of nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union advocates an immediate settlement of the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, by all countries everywhere.

42. The prohibition of underground nuclear tests is an essential part of the problem of nuclear disarmament. A settlement of that problem would be of great political and economic significance. It would be of political significance in the sense that it would considerably improve the present world situation and promote the implementation of other disarmament measures. Its economic significance would consist partly in the fact that banning underground nuclear tests would facilitate the transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful uses, including underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The problem of underground nuclear explosions was discussed in detail in the Committee on Disarmament this year. The discussion in the Committee on that problem showed that many countries attach great significance to it. Agreement on the question, however, has still not been achieved.

43. The Soviet Union, as we have already stated many times, is prepared to sign an agreement prohibiting underground nuclear tests based on the use of national means of detection of underground nuclear explosions. Modern science and technology have developed to a stage which makes it possible to ensure control with the use of national means of detection, which will provide all States with an assurance that an agreement banning underground nuclear tests is being conscientiously implemented by all.

44. In order to ensure the most reliable guarantees that the parties to such an agreement are strictly observing the obligations they have undertaken, we consider it possible to make use of international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data. The Soviet Union supports such co-operation within the framework of an agreement banning underground nuclear tests, on the understanding that control of its observance will be effected without any kind of international inspection. At one time Sweden put forward a proposal for a so-called "detection club", based on co-operation in the exchange of seismic data. The Soviet Union stated that it regarded that proposal favourably on the understanding that States should not be obliged, on the strength of their participation in the "detection club", to assume obligations with regard to international inspection and supervision on their own territory. The provision of seismic data by such States can be effected only on a voluntary basis, and the evaluation of selected data carried out not by some international body, but by each State individually.

45. We note with satisfaction that an increasing number of States are tending to agree with the view that national means of detection are adequate. The representatives of a number of countries made statements to that effect in the Committee on Disarmament. Unfortunately, a different position is held by the United States, which is responsible for the majority of nuclear tests throughout the world.

<sup>11</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Annexes*, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96, document A/7134.



With regard to underground nuclear tests, the United States puts forward a demand for obligatory on-site inspection in order to supervise observance of the treaty. Although it has been widely recognized that it is possible to effect control of the cessation of underground nuclear tests by national means, we still see no change in the position of the United States concerning the banning of such tests. The reason is a political one—the fact that the United States of America is not prepared to come to an agreement on banning them. The demand for obligatory on-site inspection is in fact an obstacle to settlement of this urgent disarmament problem.

46. The banning of other types of weapons of mass destruction—chemical and bacteriological weapons—would be of great importance in limiting and halting the arms race. The Soviet Union persistently seeks to achieve the complete prohibition and elimination of all such weapons, and insists on the need for urgent practical steps towards eliminating them to be taken now. The socialist countries have repeatedly drawn the attention of States to the fact that the continuing production, improvement and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons constitutes a serious threat to mankind. Urgent measures to eliminate arsenals of such weapons would contribute to the strengthening of peace and security. The achievement of an international agreement on this matter would establish a favourable atmosphere for progress in other areas of disarmament. In view of that goal, the goal of achieving the complete prohibition of those types of weapons of mass destruction, at the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly the Soviet Union and other socialist countries introduced draft conventions on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons.<sup>12</sup>

47. A positive result of that initiative by the socialist countries was that it revealed the great interest of States in banning those types of weapons of mass destruction and in strengthening the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in war of chemical weapons and bacteriological agents;<sup>13</sup> the number of signatories to that important international agreement has increased. The General Assembly has adopted important decisions stressing the role of the Geneva Protocol prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons and the necessity for drawing up measures to ban such weapons completely. In an atmosphere of general condemnation of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare, a number of States which had previously rejected the proposal that such types of weapons should be prohibited declared their readiness to agree to prohibit the production of bacteriological and toxin weapons and remove them from their stocks of armaments.

48. The basic position of the socialist countries, which consists in recognizing the possibility of a combined prohibition of both chemical and bacteriological weapons, is shared by many States. However, certain Western

States—including the United States and the United Kingdom—have declared their readiness to agree only to the prohibition of bacteriological methods of warfare, justifying their obstructive approach to the banning of chemical weapons by alleged difficulties in ensuring implementation of the agreement.

49. As a result, talks on the simultaneous prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons reached a deadlock, and the achievement of an agreement on the full scope of the problem appeared impossible. The deadlock in attempts to achieve an agreement on the prohibition of those types of weapons seriously impeded constructive consideration and settlement of other disarmament problems, gave rise to a mood of pessimism and, in fact, undermined efforts directed towards achieving positive results in disarmament talks.

50. In an attempt to remove the deadlock in the solution of this problem, the socialist countries, as a first step towards settling it, declared their readiness to come to an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin methods of warfare alone. For this purpose, the socialist countries which were members of the Committee on Disarmament—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the USSR—submitted to the Committee on Disarmament on 30 March 1971, on behalf of nine socialist countries, including the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction [A/8457, annex C, sect. 8]. On the basis of that draft, talks were conducted in the Committee, as a result of which the Committee submitted to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly a revised draft convention on the matter. [*ibid.*, annex A]. The aim of this convention is to eliminate completely the possibility that bacteriological and toxin weapons might be used in war.

51. The draft convention which has been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration is the result of the joint efforts of all the members of the Committee on Disarmament. It contains proposals, views, amendments, observations and additions by many States which are members of the Committee on Disarmament, which examined it thoroughly and in detail during the Committee's meetings in 1971. The draft convention contains an undertaking by States never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain bacteriological weapons and toxins, as well as the corresponding means of delivery of such weapons (article I of the draft convention). The draft also provides that the prohibited types of weapons must be destroyed or diverted to peaceful purposes as soon as possible (article II of the draft convention). These important and vital provisions of the convention on the prohibition and elimination of bacteriological methods of warfare are significant in that their implementation would lead to the removal of one of the most dangerous kinds of weapon of mass destruction from the arsenals of States. During the general debate at the Assembly's current session, many delegations correctly stressed that the conclusion and implementation of a convention on bacteriological weapons would constitute an initial step towards true disarmament.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 94, document A/7655; and Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 and 94, document A/8136.

<sup>13</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929. No. 2138).

52. In connexion with the submission of the draft convention on bacteriological weapons for the consideration of the General Assembly, the USSR delegation deems it necessary to provide some clarification and to express certain views on its individual provisions.

53. When the Committee on Disarmament was considering the draft convention on bacteriological weapons, much attention was paid to the question of the connexion between that convention and the prohibition of chemical weapons. That reflects the concern felt by many States over the danger resulting from the concentration in the arsenals of States of such weapons of mass destruction as chemical methods of warfare. The draft convention submitted to the Assembly lays the basis for further talks and for the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. The basic provision relating to this question is contained in article IX of the convention. That article provides for an undertaking by States parties to the convention to continue negotiations concerning chemical weapons in good faith, and lays down the concrete goal of those negotiations, namely, the effective prohibition of chemical weapons by means of an agreement on the matter. It is stressed that such agreement should be achieved at an early date.

54. The content of article IX, taken together with the preambular provisions and certain other articles of the draft, sets out the necessary conditions for progress in settling the question of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

55. Those provisions of the draft which relate to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons are very important. Article VIII of the draft lays down that nothing in the convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol. In addition, the preamble recognizes the important significance of the Protocol and reaffirms the adherence of States parties to the principles and objectives of the Protocol and calls upon all States to comply strictly with them. On the whole, the draft convention fulfils the task of strengthening the Geneva Protocol.

56. Article I of the convention lays down that the parties to it undertake "never in any circumstances" to resort to such actions as the convention prohibits. We should like to state in this connexion that the phrase "never in any circumstances" emphasizes that the prohibitions laid down in the convention remain valid both in time of war and in time of peace. Nothing in the convention allows for any other interpretation.

57. We should also like to state that that phrase in article I of the convention—"never in any circumstances"—covers the question of the withdrawal, with reference to bacteriological weapons, of the reservation made by many States when signing the Geneva Protocol in respect of exceptions to the ban on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

58. Article I of the draft convention also contains a provision to the effect that the prohibition does not cover agents of types and in quantities designed for protective

purposes. In that connexion we should like to note that the inclusion of the word "protective" is based on the authoritative explanations of experts to the effect that a limited quantity of such agents is essential for developing and testing ways and means of protecting individuals and whole populations from biological agents. There is, of course, no foundation for seeking in that formulation a loophole to allow the convention to be violated, since the wording refers to the use of agents exclusively for peaceful purposes, while the reference to prophylactic and protective purposes is a concrete formulation of that provision.

59. During the consideration in the Committee on Disarmament of the draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons, the wish was expressed that States parties to the convention should give notice of the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of stocks of bacteriological and toxin weapons in accordance with article II. In that connexion, we should like to state that the Soviet Union will be prepared to give such notice on the understanding that other States parties to the convention will do likewise. Our approach is based on the fact that article XIV (5) of the convention provides that the depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States, *inter alia*, of the receipt of other notices. Notices relating to the implementation of article II, that is to say, to the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of existing stocks of bacteriological and toxin weapons, may be transmitted through the depositary Governments, which shall so inform all parties to the convention.

60. Article VII was included in the draft convention on bacteriological weapons on the proposal of a number of States. This article concerns assistance to any party to the convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the convention.

61. We should like to state that the "assistance" referred to in article VII is intended to cover medical or life-saving measures. Within the meaning of that article, the assistance referred to is medical or other humanitarian assistance. At the same time, other measures may also be undertaken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to ensure the security of the party which has been subjected to attack, or to maintain peace, as laid down in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It should also be pointed out that article VII of the convention does not, of course, exclude the provision of assistance on the basis of other agreements or obligations, in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

62. Those are the observations and comments which the Soviet delegation wishes to make with regard to the draft convention on bacteriological weapons.

63. In speaking of the conclusion of this convention, we should like to stress that its entry into force would prevent the possibility of the outbreak of a war involving the use of such agents, which would be in accordance with the interests of all peoples of the world. By imposing on States an obligation to prohibit and eliminate that category of weapon of mass destruction, the convention would become an agreement relating to the implementation of genuine disarmament measures and would undoubtedly facilitate



progress in reaching agreement on other disarmament measures and in achieving general and complete disarmament.

64. In submitting to the United Nations General Assembly the draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons, the socialist countries proceed from the assumption that the conclusion of such a convention would permit those participating in disarmament negotiations to give more attention to the drawing up of an agreement banning chemical weapons. While there have been attempts, during discussions on biological weapons, to evade negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, after the conclusion of the convention which we have proposed on the prohibition of bacteriological methods of warfare there would be no pretext for evading such negotiations.

65. The Soviet delegation urges the General Assembly to approve the draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological methods of warfare, and to appeal to States to conclude this important international agreement as soon as possible. At the same time, we believe that the Assembly should give strict instructions to the Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue negotiations which would lead to the elaboration of an agreement banning chemical weapons.

66. With reference to other disarmament measures, one of the practical results achieved in that field, as we have already pointed out, has been the conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. This Treaty was occasioned by the fact that, as a result of the rapid scientific and technological progress of recent years, mankind has come very close to mastering a new environment—the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof—and by the fact that the possibility has arisen that such areas might be widely used for military as well as peaceful purposes.

67. On the question of the peaceful utilization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, the Soviet Union advocates their complete demilitarization. However, no agreement has been reached on a radical solution of this problem, as proposed by the Soviet Union. Certain Western countries have adopted an obstructive attitude towards this proposal, inasmuch as they have already implemented a number of measures of military significance on the sea-bed, and are drawing up plans for the further expansion of military activities in that environment.

68. In present conditions, a possible solution to that problem would be agreement on banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. Now that that partial solution of the problem has been found, efforts must be made to achieve agreement on broader measures banning military activities in that environment. An approach to that question must also be based on the fact that, in article V of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, States have undertaken "to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof".

69. There are at the moment a number of factors favouring further steps in the demilitarization of the sea-bed. As a result of the preparation of the Treaty, principles and, later, concrete provisions have been agreed upon and established concerning the definition of the area to which the Treaty applies, a system of control and a number of other questions related to the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes. These principles and provisions, which were approved by the General Assembly and have been recognized by a wide range of States parties to the Treaty on the sea-bed, may be of use in drawing up a treaty concerning further steps to demilitarize the sea-bed and the ocean floor. In addition, a basis for determining the scope and nature of the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes can be found in the draft treaty on the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed which was submitted by the Soviet Union to the Committee on Disarmament in March 1969<sup>14</sup> and which has received the support of a large number of States.

70. The General Assembly and the First Committee also have to consider a number of other problems relating to disarmament, including the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, the reduction of military budgets, the elimination of military bases on foreign territory, and so on. While giving due attention to partial disarmament measures, we should not allow a solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament to become of secondary importance. Discussions on disarmament questions at sessions of the General Assembly and in other forums have shown that a wide cross-section of States are concerned about finding a solution to important problems in that field, including general and complete disarmament.

71. The agenda of the current session of the General Assembly includes other items related to the problem of disarmament. The Soviet delegation intends to express its views on those questions when the relevant agenda items and proposals on those items are considered.

72. It is important that all States should participate on the basis of full equality in the consideration of the whole range of disarmament problems, relating to both nuclear and conventional weapons. For this purpose, the Soviet Union proposes that a world disarmament conference should be convened in which all countries would participate. Such a conference could become a forum where all countries could jointly discuss the problems of disarmament in all their ramifications and attempt to find feasible and generally acceptable means of solving those problems. The true universality of such a conference would be an important guarantee of its success. Our delegation introduced the Soviet proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference in a detailed and thorough manner at the 1978th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 3 November 1971. As we stressed in that statement, the holding of such a conference should in no way detract from the importance of other channels for disarmament negotiations which are already in existence, such as the Committee on Disarmament.

<sup>14</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232, annex C, sect. 4.*

73. The convening of a world disarmament conference is directly linked with the task of strengthening international peace and security. Bearing in mind the importance of implementing this measure, we are convinced that the Soviet Union's proposal for the convening of such a conference will be given a proper place in the work of the current session of the General Assembly.

74. In conclusion, allow me to express the hope that consideration of disarmament questions at the present session of the General Assembly will promote a positive solution of those problems and will constitute a new step towards solving the problems of arms limitation and disarmament for the benefit of all peoples.

75. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The discussions in the First Committee on the disarmament items this year are beginning in totally different circumstances from those of previous sessions. This difference arises from a new political event which is of special importance to the Organization and is at the same time an extremely positive element in the evolution of negotiations on the delicate problems we are considering, because of their close relationship with national security and the maintenance of international peace.

76. That fact, it is almost redundant to stress, is the presence of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. Perhaps it might not come amiss if I recall here the importance that my Government has attached to the participation of China in the disarmament deliberations. In fact, on 16 March this year, the Argentine representative at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament referred specifically to this problem and said:

"The People's Republic of China has an undeniable conventional military capacity together with a nuclear force whose existence and development is a latent factor in the deliberations of this Committee." [CCD/PV.501, para. 49.]

Further on in his statement he added:

"...if we really wish to consider the problem of general and complete disarmament in an international political setting, we must accept certain realities as minimal conditions, otherwise our efforts to achieve disarmament will not make sustained progress." [*Ibid.*]

He also pointed out, when he recalled the absence of France and the People's Republic of China from the Committee on Disarmament, that

"On this, as on other subjects calling for political action, we are slowly and steadily arriving at what I would call the 'limit of alternatives'. As time passes the possibility fades of seeking understanding in fields of disarmament where the participation of those two Powers is essential if the measures that can be agreed upon are to be politically viable and acceptable to all. The doors of this Committee are open to France. We would add that it is now necessary to open them to all nuclear weapon Powers." [*Ibid.*, para. 50.]

77. We note with satisfaction that the participation of the People's Republic of China in this forum will give us a

unique opportunity of stemming this process of gradual deterioration of alternatives open to the international community in the field of disarmament and even perhaps of turning it back, thus facilitating the development of new approaches that will allow us to tackle the disarmament problem from a wider angle than that adopted in the past.

78. If the presence of the People's Republic of China in the negotiations on disarmament was essential before its representatives took their rightful seat in the United Nations, now it is urgent to set up adequate procedures to ensure its participation also in the body dealing with these questions, namely, the Geneva Committee. This can be done either by perfecting its functioning or, if it were deemed necessary, by creating new machinery to conduct the negotiations. Whether one or the other solution be adopted, it appears obvious that the co-chairmanships of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will not be able to function in the future as in the past.

79. The five Powers possessing nuclear weapons are now represented in the United Nations. Since my own country joined the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament we have stressed the importance of the presence of France, whose contribution is also basic to the deliberations on disarmament. Now we must make sure that the wide representative nature which characterizes the Organization is reproduced in other competent bodies.

80. We believe that with these measures a qualitative change in the approach to the great disarmament problems can be secured. It is a known fact—which Argentina itself has repeatedly stressed—that negotiations on disarmament have concentrated on the adoption of so-called "non-arms" measures. This was because a prior condition for more ambitious progress such as the acceptance of the principle of universality was lacking. It is not only a question of applying it when negotiations have been concluded and the instruments have been agreed upon and are opened for signature by all States. The essential point is to ensure that that principle be likewise respected in the earlier stages. This second condition can and should now be complied with, and this will ensure that the deliberations on disarmament will advance towards more positive targets and allow serious consideration of the possibility of adopting true measures of reduction of armaments, particularly of the complex systems of the strategic arms possessed by the super-Powers. Thus further opportunities are offered us and new perspectives opened up which fully justify our right to hope for more productive efforts and more encouraging results in the negotiations.

81. In these circumstances, I should like to point out, it will also be more feasible not only to analyse other disarmament measures but also again to redefine the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, including the due priority to be given nuclear disarmament, a subject which seems almost to have been overlooked by the General Assembly as well as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, despite the insistence of a group of countries, including my own, that the subject be given the attention it deserves. Therefore, the time is ripe for a thorough review of the subject, especially if we recall that General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), adopted 10 years ago, placed upon the

Disarmament Committee the responsibility of undertaking negotiations as a matter of utmost urgency, "with a view to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

82. Both Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee Disarmament previously referred to this subject linking it to the participation of all nuclear weapon Powers. This condition has now been met in our deliberations, and thus we believe that the reasons for delay in the consideration of a problem of such great interest to the international community are no longer valid.

83. We have previously criticized the approach to the question of disarmament being limited to the adoption of "non-armament" measures. In the United Nations, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the general assembly of the Organization of American States we have constantly stressed the fact that this trend, if followed, might give rise to an unacceptable international situation by promoting what we then termed "the disarmament of the disarmed". We are happy to note that other delegations have shared this concern and attached its true significance to the phrase as a principle of great political importance in the negotiations on disarmament and arms control. In one word, it is a question of maintaining an acceptable balance of responsibility and obligations between nuclear weapon States and all other States. It is this balance that will guarantee the security of all and strengthen the possibility of ending the arms race.

84. On 11 February, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [*resolution 2660 (XXV), annex*] was opened for signature. If followed by other disarmament measures, it will be one step towards ultimate general and complete disarmament under effective international control and a contribution to world peace.

85. But as we stated previously, the way in which the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty were tackled should serve as an example for future deliberations in the field. In fact, contrary to what occurred with other agreements on the subject, when this instrument was being elaborated the authors showed the conciliatory spirit that is indispensable in order to arrive at balanced and acceptable formulae. This can be seen in articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, to which the Argentine suggestions were added. This process and the results thereof made it possible for my Government, on 3 September, to sign it.

86. After a long delay, the General Assembly this year has before it the task of considering the first true disarmament measure. I refer to the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction, which appears as annex A to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*A/8457*]. Argentina stressed the advantages of this initiative when the first version of the document was submitted to that body. At that time the Argentine representative stated:

"The Argentine delegation has studied with the closest attention document CCD/325, which was submitted at

our meeting on 30 March by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, on behalf of his country and of Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Ukraine, and also the subsequent revised version (CCD/325/Rev.1). On this question my delegation regards that document as a very positive step towards the solution of the problem of bacteriological (biological) weapons, since it represents a laudable effort by the socialist countries to arrive at an agreement on the subject now that negotiations appear to have reached a deadlock." [*CCD/PV.512, para. 48*]

87. Imbued with a spirit of co-operation, my country, in the course of the negotiations on the draft convention in question that took place in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, made some suggestions, the substantive aspects of which were ultimately included in the text that has now been placed before us. My delegation considers that that draft contains an acceptable agreement, although we believe it should be further improved by inclusion of the initiative referred to in paragraph 8 of document CCD/341 [*A/8457, annex C, sect. 23*]. That is to add a new preambular paragraph to the draft convention which would affirm the principle "that a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries". We trust that this valuable proposal will be considered by this Committee and endorsed. It would fill a very important gap, which we pointed out in the Disarmament Committee.

88. We have stated that the compromise efforts made in no way imply that the important question of chemical weapons has been set aside. On the contrary, we believe that the adoption of this measure constitutes encouragement to proceed with the negotiations on that type of weapon, although we recognize the difficulties inherent in the complex problem of verification.

89. I need not stress the perils inherent in those weapons, or the need to achieve effective means of prohibiting their use. It is for this reason that Argentina in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was one of the sponsors of the joint memorandum [*ibid., sect. 33*] on the approach to and the elements that might serve as the basis for prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapon and their destruction. That document represents an important contribution which should be seriously considered by this Committee when discussing that specific subject. We also believe that it would serve as a useful guide to the negotiations to be held in the near future.

90. I should like now to refer to the question of the application of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States held in 1968. My delegation feels that we should actively encourage co-operation among the industrialized countries and international organizations in programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the developing countries.

91. In the light of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency and also of the work carried out by different bodies, we note that little progress has been made

with regard to resolutions adopted at that Conference, except in matters related to technical assistance and greater co-ordination among those organizations themselves.

92. On the contrary, in the field of the financing of great nuclear undertakings, particularly in the case of reactors themselves, progress has been meagre, and no satisfactory response has been received from the financing bodies.

93. As previously, my delegation is ready to continue to co-operate with others that share our concern so that at the present session a resolution may be adopted that will allow us to correct the defects noted and thus effectively promote achievement of the targets set by the Conference.

94. The General Assembly must in the course of the present session also consider the question of establishing, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an international service for peaceful nuclear explosions under adequate international control. This is a subject that has been on the agenda of the General Assembly for some time, and the Argentine delegation has in the past given its views upon it. At this time, therefore, I shall sketch our position very briefly.

95. We reiterate that the competent organ to exercise the functions of an international service is the International Atomic Energy Agency itself because of the categorical provisions of its statute. We consider it neither convenient nor appropriate to create new machinery when the Vienna Agency has already proved its efficiency in the field of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and has unchallenged competence in these matters. It is, furthermore, obvious that according to the statute of the Agency all member States have the right to benefit from such a service without any discrimination.

96. However, these principles were not adequately reflected in General Assembly resolution 2665 (XXV), which was why my delegation abstained in the vote. It is particularly lamentable that that resolution should have referred to a specific "non-armament" measure without even mentioning the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. May I at this point clarify that we do not object to that reference in itself, although we are not signatories of the instrument mentioned in the document; but we do not believe it can be accepted if at the same time no express and identical mention is made of the provisions of the statute. The service cannot be linked only to a "non-armament" treaty, particularly when the competence of the Vienna Agency to act as the executing organ for such service allows of no ambiguity. I trust that these observations will be borne in mind by those delegations that have shown special interest in this subject.

97. In conclusion, I should like to touch upon agenda item 98, "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace". My delegation has taken note with interest of the inclusion of this item on the agenda. Our position on the inappropriateness of preceding general disarmament and arms control measures by those of a regional nature is well known. That was our position at the first session of the general assembly of the Organization of American States, when a "non-armament" initiative for application to Latin America was submitted.

98. However, we recognize that conditions justifying the proposal being examined by the Committee are not the same as those which arise in our own regional framework. But we do believe it essential that local understandings on questions of disarmament or arms control meet with the agreement and participation of all the States of the region concerned.

99. Apart from these general comments, we have noted with concern the fact that in document A/8492, which contains the explanatory memorandum on the subject, mention is made of the Antarctic Treaty as an illustration of the principle that "areas not assimilated to national jurisdiction constitute an international domain that should be subject to international regulation and international responsibility". We are sorry, but we must categorically disagree with that interpretation. My country exercises sovereignty over a vast region of Antarctica and is at the same time a party to that Treaty.

100. On this point I would specifically refer representatives to article IV, paragraph 1, of the Antarctic Treaty<sup>15</sup>, which reads as follows:

"Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:

"(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights or of claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;

"(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;

"(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other State's right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica."

I think that quotation clarifies the matter entirely, and therefore we consider it necessary to point out here and now that we shall be obliged to vote against any draft resolution that directly or indirectly refers to Antarctica as under international dominion.

101. Those are the preliminary comments of the Argentine delegation on some of the disarmament items of our agenda.

#### AGENDA ITEM 34 (continued)\*

Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security: report of the Secretary-General (A/8431 and Add.1-5; A/C.1/1015, A/C.1/L.566, 567, 573 and 577)

102. Mr. FRAZÃO (Brazil) (*interpretation from Spanish*): On behalf of the delegations of Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican

<sup>15</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

\* Resumed from the 1818th meeting.

Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela, to which have just been added the delegations of Haiti and Peru, I have the honour of presenting to the First Committee draft resolution A/C.1/L.573, on the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security.

103. The Latin American delegations I have just listed have followed very closely the debates that have taken place in the First Committee on agenda item 34 and have endeavoured to draw from them the general views. The guidelines that we venture to suggest at present for the implementation of the Declaration are, to a large extent, consistent with the draft resolution submitted by 23 Latin American delegations during the negotiations at the last session, the main points of which were incorporated in the Declaration ultimately approved. The present draft is once again an example of the constructive action that can and should be taken by the medium-sized and small Powers of all continents in the consideration of the question of international peace and security.

104. In operative paragraph 1, the draft solemnly reaffirms that all provisions of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security must be fully respected and implemented by all Member States. This is to indicate that the Declaration is an organic whole that must not be fragmented arbitrarily in order to meet immediate or circumstantial interests, and that its application must be in keeping with full respect for the preamble and the purposes and principles of the Charter. It is our understanding, therefore, that no Member State, under any circumstance or for any reason whatsoever, can elude its legal obligation to respect the Charter of the United Nations, which is a formal treaty within the framework of international law. In accordance with the provisions of Article 103, the obligations assumed under the Charter must prevail over all others. Consequently, there can be no room for any pretext of a political nature, or for any allegation of "special responsibility", as an escape clause with respect to those provisions of the Charter that apply to the international conduct of all Member States, bar none.

105. The Declaration is not a mere repetition, however, of the provisions of the Charter; on the contrary, it rests upon the philosophy of the Charter and develops its juridical and political doctrines, thus seeking to ensure its coherent and progressive development. The strengthening of international security is a continuing process that presupposes an interaction of international measures, on both multilateral and bilateral levels, and its implementation does not end with measures adopted individually by States. As we conceive of peace and security to be world responsibilities, so its achievement depends, in the final analysis, on the collective measures adopted by the competent organs of the United Nations.

106. In operative paragraph 2, the draft resolution states that appropriate measures must be adopted for the establishment of a system of collective economic security that will promote the sustained development and expansion of national economies. We are thus trying, thereby, to render explicit the connexion between peace, security, disarmament and development. By recognizing that conditioning

relationship in the Declaration we adopted last year, we tried to focus the great international problems of our day through the lens of the institutional strengthening of our Organization, so as to endow it with increasingly favourable conditions for resolving existing or potentially critical situations.

107. We would hope that the Powers that are so greatly interested in maintaining the international *status quo* will not fail to tackle contemporary problems from that global standpoint. Perhaps the present situation can be attributed to the fact that some Powers endeavour to maintain a topical perspective while others act as if there were nothing left to discuss, as if the destinies of the world had already been finally set. The sponsors of the draft resolution do not consider it acceptable for us mechanically and uncritically to exclude from debate such matters as the channelling into development of a substantial part of the resources saved through disarmament measures, or the revision of the United Nations Charter, including the proposal to equip the Organization with machinery to further the elimination of insecurity in international economic relations and, in that field, to avoid the confrontations that are so harmful to the expansion of already industrialized economies and, above all, so damaging to the development of the underdeveloped countries. Thus what is involved is a recognition of the impossibility of achieving peace and security *stricto sensu*, unless economic relations among States are such as to avoid conflict and confrontation. It would be equally impossible for us to accept the static theory that the medium-sized and small countries—the majority of which are developing countries—can only conform to the present situation of political insecurity, of growing nuclear threats and of unjustifiable economic and financial disorder.

108. The Latin American countries sponsoring this draft are convinced of the necessity of constant and systematic activity in furtherance of respect for and implementation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of man, and in implementation of resolution 1514 (XV)—the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples—as well as strict application of resolution 2131 (XX)—the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty. The latter declared that no State has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Hence, in operative paragraph 3 of the draft it is declared that the strengthening of international security requires universal respect for such rights and freedoms, and the elimination of all forms and manifestations of colonialism.

109. But this enunciation of general principles is not enough, and that is why the draft goes on to mention the operational measures we consider essential for the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security and, therefore, for the full effectiveness of our Organization in the field of peace and security. In operative paragraph 4, it is decided to undertake a broad review of all aspects of the question of peace-keeping operations, the importance of which for the reinforcement of international security and for the very *raison d'être* of our Organization seems to us beyond dispute. It is well known that all discussion on this matter, both in the

Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations and in the Special Political Committee, is now at a standstill, which is why it is imperative that we agree to give a new political impetus to this matter to show that we are keeping up with the times, and stating our readiness to endow the Organization with the instruments necessary to enable it to perform one of its fundamental functions. At this time, priority should be given to the task of formulating a generally acceptable definition of such operations; to the establishment of machinery able to maintain or restore peace in those cases where it is troubled by the use of force or the threat to use force; and to the adoption of guidelines for the functioning of such machinery. In other words, what should be created is the possibility of making use of peace-keeping operations in a flexible and effective fashion to avoid the use of force or to put an end to such use.

110. Then, in operative paragraph 5, the Security Council is invited to give priority to consideration of the appropriate means and procedures for ensuring the strict and complete implementation of its resolutions, thus ensuring the effective discharge of its very own functions relating to peace and security as envisaged in the Charter, and upholding, as well, its dignity and prestige in the international community. We have drafted this paragraph very carefully to put it into conformity with the letter and spirit of Article 24 of the Charter, which invests the Security Council, as a body, with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

111. Operative paragraph 6 invites all Member States and, in particular, the more developed countries, to adopt all appropriate measures to meet the grave financial situation of the Organization. Once its finances are in order, the United Nations will be in a position effectively to carry out its functions and fulfil its programmes, particularly those related to the implementation of the Declaration.

112. In operative paragraph 7 the Secretary-General is requested to submit a report to the next session of the General Assembly, taking into account certain criteria defined in the paragraph, which, without doubt, will lead to the elaboration of a more specific and objective document than the present one, thus allowing the debate next year to be more thorough and the better to examine the changing international situation and to seek areas of negotiation and agreement, contributing thereby to improving the prospects of international peace and security.

113. Finally, operative paragraph 8 calls for the inclusion of the item that we are dealing with in the provisional agenda of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly. The sponsors do not foresee opposition to such a request, in view of the obvious usefulness of the debates that have been held during the last three sessions on the question of the strengthening of international security.

114. These are the preliminary comments that I wanted to make in submitting draft resolution A/C.1/L.573. We trust that this draft will be acceptable to the great majority, if not to all the members of the First Committee. Thus, we will progress towards implementation and we will avoid reducing the Declaration to a simple and momentary manifestation of false hopes or a document intended for the historical museum of the United Nations. We, the

sponsors, continue to believe in the political importance of that Declaration and in the need to follow through with efforts for its implementation.

115. Mr. SURYADHAY (Laos) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. Chairman, at the close of the general debate on this question, you said that delegations wishing to speak on the draft resolutions, or to make general statements, would have an opportunity of doing so when we came back to the study of the question. I should like to ask your leave to make a general statement at this time, since I was not able to do so before.

116. Mr. Chairman, seeing you preside with so much authority, tact and wisdom over our Committee, I should like to associate my delegation with others in congratulating and thanking you. Around you, you have very capable men whose contribution to our work has been made evident, and we should like to thank them also.

117. Coming for the first time to this most prestigious building, I should like to greet all representatives here who try in all conscience to put into practice the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [*resolution 2734 (XXV)*]. All are agreed in stating, on behalf of their respective Governments, that this Declaration represents a great if not the last achievement of human genius to ensure the survival of mankind in equality, freedom, social justice and brotherly co-operation. It has given renewed vigour and vitality to the immutable principles of the United Nations Charter. It indicates that there is a direct link between the strengthening of international security, disarmament, economic development and the elimination of colonialism as well as all forms of racial and social discrimination. It lays down duties and obligations for all the Members individually and collectively, as well as for every organ of the United Nations responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.

118. The introduction to the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Declaration [*see A/8431*] is clear and unambiguous; and our debate is so enlightening that hearing it is enough to understand the extraordinary importance of that document whose implementation is required by human conscience.

119. I think that if there were any false notes in our debate about the ways and means to achieve our objectives, they only show the legitimate and urgent interest we have in the strengthening of international security, upon which the life and happiness of all countries, States, nations and peoples depend on our planet. This is what I should like to conclude from our impassioned, important, useful and agreeable debate where a strict legal spirit has accompanied the utilitarian and pragmatic, where humour, rhetoric, wisdom and maturity give a meaning to life in our long struggle to liberate peoples from the social evils of an obsolete past.

120. Before speaking about the practical ways and means mentioned in the various draft resolutions presented to us, I would like, on behalf of the Royal Government of Laos and with all the force of the calm voice of a small and peaceful people, to reaffirm our unreserved support of and to express our devotion to the principles of the United Nations Charter and resolution 2734 (XXV).



121. As was said by the Secretary-General in paragraph 7 of the introduction to his report:

“One of the main prerequisites for the strengthening of international security is that all States shall live up to the principles of the Charter and shall constantly rededicate themselves to the standards of international morality and behaviour set out in the Charter.”

122. In view of the situation now existing in the Kingdom of Laos, this rededication, this proclamation can be viewed as an urgent appeal to the conscience of the international community to remedy the dreadful injustice which was committed 20 years ago against our people. All representatives here know very well the state of affairs in Indo-China, which is one of the points on our globe that threaten international peace and security. The Prime Minister of my country fully depicted this in the general debate at the twenty-fifth session, on 19 October 1970, when, from the rostrum of the General Assembly of the United Nations, he declared:

“We should like to see a United Nations decade for world peace. We have perhaps 10 years in which to solve the greatest problem, that of collective security. That is our wish so far as we are concerned because, more unjustly perhaps than any other country, our small Kingdom, peace-loving and tolerant, has paid its heavy tribute to colonialism, imperialism and aggression, condemned here for 25 years but still alive, still active, ever reborn.” [1873rd plenary meeting, para. 143.]

123. Some representatives here, among them the head of the delegation of Mauritius, Mr. Ramphul, our Vice-Chairman, suggested a stronger role for the United Nations in the restoration of peace in Indo-China, and I quote his statement:

“To strengthen international security the United Nations should so act that peace can finally prevail in Indo-China and the Middle East. In the first case, while encouraging bilateral or multilateral negotiations between the parties concerned, the United Nations should be ready to assume a more active and direct role in peace-keeping operations.” [1816th meeting, para. 64.]

124. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization,<sup>16</sup> speaking of the conflict in Indo-China, said: “This conflict constitutes a direct challenge to the principles and authority of our Organization.”

125. Therefore the United Nations is in duty bound to play a role in that critical part of the world. In this connexion, in his letter of 28 April 1971 addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Prime Minister wrote that

“The United Nations should reawaken its interest in peace and justice, as has been requested by the people of Laos for almost 20 years. It may be that if there were a mass expression of will on the part of its Members,

especially the small countries, without any selfishness, legal quibblings, ideologies or self-seeking, the world would ensure not only with words a real and fraternal peace in our country in conformity with the spirit of the Charter and the hopes of the men of goodwill who drafted it 25 years ago.”

126. One must draw the necessary conclusions from these various statements. In the view of the Secretary-General, the implementation of the provisions of the Declaration in that dangerous part of the world would help to eliminate many serious threats to international peace and security, and I would like to repeat the important provisions of the Declaration which in my view must apply to the situation in Indo-China. I quote the Secretary-General:

“Of considerable importance are those provisions of the Declaration which reaffirm that it is the duty of every State to refrain from the threat or use of force, that the territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention to the Charter, and that the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible.” [A/8431, para. 7.]

127. Paragraph 5 of the Declaration should also be stressed:

“Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State.”

Paragraph 4 of the Declaration should be stressed:

“States must fully respect the sovereignty of other States and the right of peoples to determine their own destinies, free of external intervention, coercion or constraint, especially involving the threat or use of force, overt or covert, and refrain from any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country.”

128. May I add, parenthetically, that these provisions remind one very much of the undertakings of the signatories to the Geneva Agreements of 1962, recognizing and ensuring respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of my country. But these Agreements have remained a dead letter for reasons well known to all the representatives in this room, and which have been spelled out each year in the white books of the Royal Government which have been distributed to you. Paragraphs 37 and 38 of the introduction to the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization should make it possible to assess the situation in Laos as it really is. There are in fact aggression and violations of international agreements signed in good faith.

129. Coming back to the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, my delegation, as I said, considers that it must be applied in a specific and dangerous area of the world. I fully share the views of the head of the delegation of the Khmer Republic, who on 27 October 1971 said in this Committee:

“Now that the People’s Republic of China, one of the signatories of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indo-

<sup>16</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 31.

China, has become a Member of the Organization with a preponderant role as a permanent member of the Security Council, it is to be hoped that the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security will be put into practice in the specific case of the Khmer Republic, with particular reference to the regional framework and the honouring of treaty commitments.” [1807th meeting, para. 122]

130. This is the view of my delegation on the implementation of the Declaration: that it be applied in an area of the world that has been declared dangerous—in this case Indo-China—where the conflict is a direct challenge to the principles of the United Nations and its authority, to paraphrase the statement of our Secretary-General, and then through collective action, as suggested by the head of the delegation of Mauritius, to contribute to restoring a lasting peace.

131. As to the way in which we should conclude our debate, most delegations agree that resolutions should be adopted, but they oppose a proliferation of resolutions. One resolution per subject of debate would seem wise. But that resolution must not breach the integrity and unity of the Declaration, which constitutes a compact whole. It must try to help the United Nations to play its part, that of maintaining and strengthening international security. The collective action of the United Nations is one of the essential factors of international security. We agree with the head of the French delegation when he said: “We support any measures that may improve this action and make it more effective. The primary responsibility in this field, of course, in accordance with the Charter, falls to the Security Council.” [1814th meeting, para. 25.] But that resolution must also be acceptable to the entire Committee. Those are the main features of the resolution to be adopted.

132. The Laotian delegation is a sponsor of the draft resolution presented by the group of non-aligned countries [A/C.1/L.577]. In our times collective action by the United Nations cannot be envisaged since not everything has yet been settled in the field of peace-keeping opera-

tions. Therefore the draft resolution urgently appeals to all States to take effective measures to implement the Declaration in all its parts and—more important for us—calls upon all States to contribute towards the resolving of the existing crises in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, United Nations resolutions, and the Declaration. We are convinced that the main threat to international peace and security lies in the violation of the provisions of the Charter, the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Declaration. We consider that the draft resolution, being non-aligned and taking account of the concrete realities of the present-day international situation, can be unanimously approved.

133. We are also ready to consider other draft resolutions in a spirit of co-operation and justice.

134. At a time when the world is witnessing signs of *détente* even in the hottest spots of the world, at a time when we have restored the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, at a time when we ready ourselves to welcome its representatives among us, we wish to express from the bottom of our hearts the wish that the 1970s will be a decade when all the peoples of the United Nations will join their efforts to ensure that peace and understanding will finally prevail. As far as we are concerned we hope that the United Nations, once it has the necessary machinery for peace-keeping operations, will be able to play a more active and direct role in the settlement of the problems of Indo-China.

135. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): Before adjourning the meeting, I wish to draw the attention of the Committee to another draft resolution which has just been circulated and which was mentioned by the representative of Laos. It is in a document presented by 35 nations and circulated as A/C.1/L.577. I also wish to inform you that Cameroon, Jordan, Trinidad and Tobago, and Yemen have indicated their desire to be included among the sponsors of that draft resolution.

*The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.*