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Chairman: Mr. Andrés AGUILAR M. (Venezuela).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Farah (Somalia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

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Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security (continued) (A/7994)

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. JIMENEZ (Philippines): The Ambassador of Turkey spoke this morning on behalf of the Asian group of countries to express their shock and deep sorrow at the tragedy that has befallen Pakistan. As a member of that group of countries, my delegation completely shares the sentiments he has so eloquently expressed. But because of the close and friendly relations existing between the Philippines and Pakistan, we cannot but avail ourselves of this opportunity to voice our own regret and condolences. The magnitude of the occurrence truly staggers the imagination. It is said that it is the worst tragedy of the century. We feel a sense of extreme sadness and sympathize most deeply with Pakistan. In this hour of its darkest tragedy, Pakistan needs the sympathy and the help of the world.

2. In our statement of 2 November [1749th meeting], we referred to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A] as one that provided a note of encouragement at the start of the Disarmament Decade.

3. At the twenty-fourth session, when my delegation addressed itself to the first draft of the treaty, which was then before the First Committee, we said:

"We maintain that the scope and extent of the historic territorial waters of the Philippines should not be affected by the draft treaty. Ours is an archipelago of more than seven thousand islands, and the international recognition of the unique position of territorial waters of archipelagos is therefore very important to us. We are studying very carefully the impact of articles I and II of the draft treaty upon our territorial waters. Consequently, while we agree in principle to the non-emplacement of nuclear weapons

on the sea-bed and on the ocean floor as well as in the subsoil thereof, we are not disposed to accept any diminution of our territorial jurisdiction, whether directly or by implication, under any international instrument. As we have previously stated before this Committee, we shall maintain and continue to maintain our claim of national jurisdiction over our territorial waters, as clearly delineated in the records of the United Nations.” [1702nd meeting, para. 51.]

4. Despite the changes and improvements incorporated in the draft treaty now before our Committee, we have not wavered or changed our view, but rather we reiterate our reservation that we are not disposed to accept any diminution of our territorial jurisdiction, whether directly or by implication, under any international instrument. In other words, we interpret the relevant provisions of the present draft treaty contained in articles I, II, III and IV as in no way affecting Philippine national jurisdiction over its territorial waters and continental shelf.

5. In the light of what I have said, my delegation wishes to associate itself with Argentina in the position it has taken. We refer to the statement by that country’s representative on 9 November:

“Furthermore, I should like to lay special stress on the fact that, at the meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament held on 1 September 1970, in the course of which the draft that we are analysing now was introduced, in order to make its legal scope as regards the law of the sea perfectly clear, my delegation noted the statements made by the co-sponsors to the effect that: ‘... its provisions are in no way designed to, nor do they seek to, undermine, strengthen or affect the positions of States, or to prejudice or influence future decisions on those questions, or to confirm or annul existing or future obligations assumed under international instruments.’ At that time we considered these declarations of the co-Chairmen as a formal commitment and we expressed our conviction that they would not challenge our interpretation. To our satisfaction, and I believe to the satisfaction of all those who may entertain similar misgivings, this interpretation was not challenged. This means, in brief, that under this treaty no position is affected or consolidated to the detriment of others which hold different legal criteria in matters basic to international maritime law.” [1754th meeting, para. 84.]

6. Nevertheless, my delegation has listened with great interest to the in-depth analysis of the provisions of the draft treaty made by Mr. Galindo Pohl of El Salvador on 11 November [1757th meeting]. We have also taken note of the questions addressed by the representative of Mexico to the two co-Chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament on 2 November [1748th meeting] as to the meaning and scope of the second exception—“or to the sea-bed beneath its territorial waters”—appearing in paragraph 2 of article I of the draft treaty.

7. It is our hope that the Soviet Union and the United States of America, as co-sponsors of the draft treaty and as co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, can forthwith and satisfactorily meet the wishes of both the representatives of El Salvador and

Mexico. In that way, the draft treaty would gain greater support.

8. Strictly speaking, the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof is not a disarmament measure but rather a non-armament measure. However, that should not detract from its intrinsic value as a step towards disarmament, if it is considered in the context of the exclusion of the sea-bed as an area for a competitive race to accumulate nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The draft treaty has the effect of creating a zone free of such weapons in an area comprising two thirds of our planet. But more than this, article V of the draft treaty provides that:

“The Parties to this Treaty undertake to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.”

This provision, if faithfully complied with, is an important step towards the goal of general and complete disarmament. It could also bring about the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and the exploration and exploitation of its resources for the benefit of all mankind. As we are all aware, this is a question of universal importance now facing the United Nations.

9. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, my delegation would be prepared to support the adoption of the draft treaty during the current session of the General Assembly. But, at the same time, my delegation would wish it understood that the Philippines is going to continue its studies of all the provisions of the draft treaty, so as to get a more accurate and definitive judgement concerning our position before affixing our signature thereto.

10. On the question of the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, the Philippines, as a signatory to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,¹ has time and again strongly protested against the nuclear tests in the atmosphere that have recently taken place in the vicinity of our region. My delegation upholds the view that all nuclear and thermonuclear testing for military purposes in all environments must stop. We are in favour of a comprehensive test ban treaty because we believe that science and technology have progressed far enough to provide sufficient guarantees in the verification of underground nuclear tests of a determined threshold. Last year, my delegation voted in favour of resolution 2604 (XXIV), which would facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive test ban through the international exchange of seismic data. The Philippines readily responded to the request of the Secretary-General for the desired information on its seismographic stations, just as many other countries did [see A/7967/Rev.1]. My delegation is in favour of proceeding further to facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive test ban through the international exchange of seismic data. We welcome the Canadian initiative embodied in the draft

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.529 and we are prepared to support it.

11. Last year my delegation expressed its appreciation concerning the initiation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union and its hopes for the success of the talks. The third round of talks is now in progress in Helsinki after the two previous sessions in Helsinki and Vienna. It will be recalled that the General Assembly, in expressing the hope that these negotiations would bring about early and positive results which would pave the way for further efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament, appealed to the USSR and the United States of America to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapons systems [*resolution 2602 A (XXIV)*]. Almost a year has elapsed since then, but the outside world has yet to hear the reply of the two super-Powers to this appeal. The two countries have maintained official silence thus far and this behaviour on their part has naturally created an atmosphere of uneasiness among the other nations, because they know that the future of all mankind is at stake in these negotiations; yet we, who form the larger portion of this world, are left staring at a blank wall.

12. Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] is worded as follows:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

Because of this provision, it is easy to see that the credibility of the non-proliferation Treaty and its viability will depend in large measure on the results of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The non-nuclear-weapon States that have signed the non-proliferation Treaty and have accepted the obligations prohibiting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons expect in return that the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons will in due course be reversed in order to diminish tension and strengthen their security. Hence, we continue to hope for fruitful results from the talks, if only to give credence to the non-proliferation Treaty.

13. Before concluding our statement, we wish to refer once again to our proposal for the creation of an *ad hoc* committee of the General Assembly for the Disarmament Decade [*1749th meeting*]. We made this proposal for the valid and compelling reason that it would contribute to the success of the Disarmament Decade. We added our voice to the many others who had expressed hopes for real progress in disarmament, such as those heard at the Lusaka summit conference² last September, and in the General Assembly during the commemorative session, and we submitted our proposal in the honest belief that more meaning and significance could be imparted to the Disarmament Decade. We offered concrete and specific suggestions on the tasks

and responsibilities of our proposed committee. I need not repeat them now as they were clearly spelled out in our statement of 2 November.

14. My delegation has conducted wide-ranging consultations with the other delegations on this proposal. Although some quarters voiced opposition, we were heartened by the favourable reaction of others. After considerable reflection on the many statements made during the debate, my delegation is more than ever convinced that our proposal is indeed one that can amply contribute to the success of the Disarmament Decade, notwithstanding arguments we have heard to the contrary.

15. We have been listening to a constant stream of statements of dissatisfaction at the slow and tedious progress of disarmament. That there is a need for enlightening world public opinion on matters affecting disarmament has been pointed out. The inadequacy and apparent weakness in the existing machinery in the disarmament field has been commented upon. The fact that disarmament negotiations, the results of which are apt to affect us all, are becoming more exclusive has been increasingly criticized. These considerations have encouraged us to pursue our proposal, despite the charges that it is worthless and expensive but without any evidence to back those allegations. We are at a loss to understand how a committee could possibly subvert the work of the General Assembly, especially since it would be reporting on its activities to that body. It has been argued that our proposed committee would infringe on the activities of the Security Council. In the light of Article 26 of the Charter, can the same not be said of all United Nations disarmament committees and commissions created and dissolved in the past and those still existing?

16. Indeed, the consideration of our proposal has really just begun, and it is our determination to keep the question open. Like many other delegations, we wish to spare no effort to ensure the success of the Disarmament Decade. Incidentally, my delegation has sponsored a draft resolution in the Second Committee by which the link between the Disarmament Decade and the Development Decade shall be fully understood and utilized in as practical and comprehensive a manner as possible.

17. Mr. GHORRA (Lebanon): During the commemorative session, as well as at the meetings of this twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the shortcomings of the United Nations in past years have been enumerated and the hopes for the future highlighted. Both shortcomings and hopes centre around the fundamental question of peace and international security and the related problems of peace-keeping and disarmament.

18. Armaments and the arms race and their danger to mankind are abhorred by all peoples, especially by the younger generations, who are called upon to become the first acquiescent victims of armed conflicts. A revolution in the conscience of man against armaments is widespread, paralleled by an ever-increasing demand to halt the arms race and avert catastrophe, to strengthen peace and security and to divert the human and material resources released by disarmament to improve the cultural, economic and environmental well-being of man. The moral and political

² Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka in September 1970.

force generated within and without the walls of the United Nations remains today more euphoric and intangible than real and concrete. Here in the United Nations it has not been matched as yet by sufficient measures to give effect to the purposes of the Charter in order to emancipate the peoples of the world from the fear of wars, nuclear holocausts and annihilation. Perhaps one of the positive achievements of the United Nations in the past 25 years of its existence has been the steadily growing debate on disarmament and the emergence of a collective United Nations philosophy advocating ever more strongly the need for disarmament as an essential prerequisite for the maintenance of peace and security.

19. The purposes and principles of the Charter have become clearer and better defined and, as a result, a universal and more humane consciousness has evolved, shared by peoples all over the world. However, we should remember that the debate on disarmament has been proceeding in earnest for a century and that the fears generated by armament prompted the convening of The Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907, which ended in complete failure. Those Conferences prompted the League of Nations to make the reduction of national armaments a prime objective as was stipulated in article 8 of its Covenant. The Conference of Locarno of 1925 attempted to implement that article and some additional undertakings were initiated by the great Powers of that time. Nevertheless, after the Conferences of The Hague, the First World War occurred, and after the Locarno Conference, the Second World War. Both wars brought to the world vast destruction and untold suffering. The debate was not sufficient to prevent the use of arms and their horrible effects. The will to disarm was lacking then as much as it is today.

20. It might be argued that the picture is not as gloomy as it appears to be and that the United Nations has many achievements already to its credit. My delegation would be the last to deny the importance of the progress achieved in the field of disarmament. We shall refer to the positive realizations in a few moments. Yet we do believe that these realizations have only been partial and are therefore insufficient to lead the world on a speedier road to general and complete disarmament. They have not been commensurate with the minimum hopes of mankind. While a few laudable measures have been taken, the production, deployment and stockpiling of both conventional and nuclear weapons have been proceeding unchecked and on an unprecedented scale. Instead of using the atoms and other resources that might be released from disarmament to make deserts fertile, jungles habitable and frozen regions profitable, and to refashion the world in which we live for the benefit of man, we find that the sophistication of nuclear technology has progressed to such an extent as to allot to each one of us and to every other human being alive the equivalent of 15 tons of TNT for his destruction, that is, to kill him a million times over.

21. We realize that these arguments have been more eloquently elaborated by many delegations and that they have been the driving force behind all the efforts of our Organization to negotiate, approve and conclude agreements on some aspects of disarmament. However, we believe that it is our responsibility, individually and

collectively, to re-emphasize those arguments, to hammer at them until every conscience is awakened and enlisted against the arms race, until the resolve to halt it has been obtained and the will to disarm has prevailed. The struggle of man against armaments must become total, for the peril of a nuclear war has become total. It is self-evident that the super-Powers realize as well as we do that their peoples are not the only ones to inhabit the earth, that their peoples are, as a matter of fact, the minority, and that we, all the other peoples of the United Nations, form the majority, that the planet Earth is as much ours as theirs and that their national interests should not override the interests of the rest of mankind.

22. By stressing these points the Lebanese delegation is more imbued with moral and humane considerations than with legal, political or technical ones. Our desire is to participate in the stimulation of action for the future and not to discuss the failures of the past. Our Secretary-General has taken the lead in fostering the idea of making the 1970s a Disarmament Decade. This idea was incorporated in General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969. The Decade was to coincide with the Second United Nations Development Decade. These two projected Decades have been interlinked in the minds of people, because the progress of one will stimulate the progress of the other. The United Nations has a prime duty to see to it that they both end successfully and that the sad experiences of the past in both development and disarmament are not repeated.

23. Now that I have dwelt on questions of generalities and principles, allow me to touch upon some specific matters. Among them are some bright spots in the general field of disarmament.

24. Both the United States and the Soviet Union command our gratitude for their joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations,³ which was unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly in 1961. This statement has provoked since then an acceleration in the thoughts and actions of the United Nations with regard to the problems of disarmament. The agreed principles have been clarified through a long process of discussions here and in Geneva. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has emphasized in its report [A/8059-DC/233] that its members were particularly aware of the need to encourage activities directed towards systematic progress in solving the whole problem of disarmament. Paragraph 59 of the report reflects the general philosophy of delegations about general and complete disarmament. On this question we welcome the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament presented to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 27 August 1970 by the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 42], intended to give effect to the General Assembly resolution regarding the Disarmament Decade.

25. We fully support the principles and measures detailed in that document. They deal with short- and long-range objectives, which we think should direct our action in the United Nations towards the complete cessation of the

³ Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

testing of nuclear weapons, followed by limitation and finally by the reduction and elimination of all armaments, both nuclear and conventional.

26. Likewise we welcome the entry into effect on 5 March 1970 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]. However, it leaves much to be desired and is not likely to dispel all apprehensions. The Treaty must become universal to be more meaningful.

27. We share the satisfaction expressed in this Committee by many delegations with regard to the bilateral discussions going on between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. We wholeheartedly wish the negotiators every success because in that success lies the key to further effective measures for disarmament. The key to such success is that of confidence. Once mutual confidence is established and promoted between the two super-Powers, humanity can then hope for the dawning of the day of real disarmament. In fact, the partial test ban Treaty⁴ of 1963, the outer space Treaty⁵ of 1967, the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, and other international instruments, praiseworthy as they may be, have been limited and partial in scope. They have been described as instruments for non-armament rather than for disarmament. They have limited the actions of the "have-not" nations and consolidated the position of the "have" nations. But their adoption was necessary to promote the needed trust between the two super-Powers and the required atmosphere of international *détente* conducive to reaching additional agreements.

28. One of these additional agreements is the proposed draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A]. The draft was jointly introduced by the United States and the Soviet Union. Our Committee sees in this joint enterprise another good omen.

29. The new draft meets the many reservations and observations made last year in our debate as well as those made at Geneva. The various delegations that have submitted working papers to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to iron out the difficulties deserve our gratitude. We welcome in particular article IX and the role of the Mexican delegation in its formulation. That article, in our view, constitutes a most important and positive element in the draft treaty. It takes into account the desire of States parties to treaties on nuclear-free zones to keep those zones totally free of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in any way, form or place. The scope of those zones, as well as the treaties governing them such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco⁶ of 1967, is unlimited. We would have welcomed a similar scope for the present draft treaty.

⁴ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

⁵ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

⁶ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

30. In comparing the new draft with previous drafts submitted here last year and at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, we note that article III, paragraph 5, provides, among other methods of verification, for verification within the framework of the United Nations in accordance with its Charter. Such a provision is a welcome improvement. It gives our Organization a wider role in any verification system and thus enhances its authority.

31. Article V calls for further negotiations in the field of disarmament, for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof; yet it confirms the reservation made in article I, paragraph 2, regarding coastal States and the sea-bed beneath their territorial waters. Those States maintain the right to carry out exactly what the treaty intends to prohibit elsewhere, that is to say, those Powers with the capability of emplacing weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed under their territorial waters—more specifically the super-Powers—have the right to do exactly that, until further negotiations meet with alleviatory success. Thus, in essence, the treaty is more applicable to the States with no present or eventual capability of emplacing the prohibited weapons. In our view, that is a negative aspect of the proposed treaty, though realism beckons and invites us to give it our approval.

32. My delegation is somewhat hazy about the use of the word "testing" in article I, paragraph 1. If that paragraph is to be read in the light of paragraph 2, we then see a contravention of the partial test-ban Treaty prohibiting testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Perhaps a clarification of that point might be helpful.

33. So far as the comprehensive test-ban treaty is concerned, we wish to praise the efforts deployed by many delegations, but especially the Swedish delegation, during the deliberations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, to break the deadlock on the problem of verification of underground nuclear testing. We believe that this question can be brought closer to solution than it was last year if we are guided by two principal factors: first, the advance in seismological means of detection and, second, the improved atmosphere of confidence between the two super-Powers manifest in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Helsinki. A combined national and international technological means of detection could very well overcome the present difficulties.

34. My delegation is grateful to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and some of its members for their studies and analyses of the problem of the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. We need hardly emphasize the dreadful dangers of those weapons to man and his environment.

35. We are pleased that Brazil, Japan and Morocco have ratified the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,⁷ of 17 June 1925. The decision by President Nixon to refer the Protocol to the United States Senate for ratification is an added source of satisfaction. It is the hope of my delegation that the Protocol will be ratified and complied with universally.

⁷ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.

Furthermore, we believe that the anticipated comprehensive agreements on chemical and bacteriological weapons should embrace the two types of weapons—notwithstanding the difficulties which may be encountered in the adoption of means of inspection for the production of chemical weapons. National means of safeguard and inspection, coupled with international means of verification, could in a large measure deal with that question.

36. In conclusion, my delegation wishes to state here that, although we are displeased with the piecemeal and partial measures for disarmament, we nevertheless recognize the complexity of achieving general and complete disarmament in the immediate future. By granting approval to such partial measures, however, we do not mean to imply that we are satisfied with the achievements of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The dangers of the arms race and of weapons of mass destruction weigh very heavily on the minds and hearts of people everywhere. The objective of the United Nations should be the liberation of those minds and hearts from the fear of annihilation. The United Nations must ultimately provide for complete and comprehensive measures for disarmament in order that such fear may be abated and annihilation itself averted.

37. Mr. KHALID (Sudan): In many a field of United Nations activity, speakers have considered this anniversary year an occasion for taking stock of our actions and inaction, our accomplishments and failures. The field of disarmament should be no exception.

38. For the last 24 years the competent bodies of the United Nations, by virtue of a liberal reading of Articles 11, 26 and 47 of the Charter, have been engaged in considering general principles of disarmament and measures to ensure the least diversion towards armaments of the world's human and economic resources. To achieve that end, 99 resolutions have been adopted to date by the General Assembly. But those resolutions, though creating among nations accepted norms of conduct in the field of armaments, have not succeeded in achieving a breakthrough towards the world's most cherished goal of general and complete disarmament, a goal that has been proclaimed in United Nations jurisprudence since 1959, in accordance with resolution 1378 (XIV).

39. Not only is there a lack of momentous progress in the field of disarmament, but—and we were cautioned of this by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization⁸—the world has been witnessing in recent years an alarming tendency for military budgets to increase at a greater percentage rate.

40. The arms race has not been halted. It has been accelerated. Increasing amounts of the world's economic resources—nearly 7 per cent of the annual world total—are devoted to the production and development of new weaponry. The very little groundwork done in the field of disarmament was accomplished only through arduous and often frustrating effort. All this is only indicative of one reality: that the world—particularly that of the more powerful—is still suffering from the maladies of the past; that States are still not well tuned to the concept of

relations of trust and peaceful co-operation. Whether we like it or not, the world is still one of narrow national interests, of basic pride and prestige, memories of hard-won victories and humiliating defeat, irritating old wounds. It is this state of affairs that must be changed if confidence is to replace mistrust and if a new atmosphere is to be created to achieve a breakthrough in disarmament.

41. There is certainly an element of truth in the Kantian theory that armies have their own ethics and armaments have their independent dynamics, both leading ultimately to the use of force. But that is a philosophy one should not carry to an absurd extreme. Armies are not autonomous institutions, nor is armament an isolated process.

42. The political realities I have alluded to are the prime sources of it all. Those realities can be changed neither through an act of will nor through dogged determination on the part of the United Nations. It will take more than that. It will take a change of heart on the part of the great Powers and their realization that the world of the United Nations, 25 years after the enactment of the Charter, is a world to be ruled by law and not by force, by conciliation and not by intimidation, by co-operation and not by selfishness. And as long as colonialism persists in its old naked form of imperialism or behind its new, adorned garb of colonialism, as long as disregard for the human rights of all continues, as long as the propensity to transgress on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States prevails—as long as all those deviations from moral rectitude exist, the world will continue to be governed by might and might will find its expression only in armies and in armouries.

43. This is 1970, and the world is already approaching the second millennium with a whole history of calamitous wars and tragic strife behind it, a history that must have taught us one thing, if anything: that the logic of might has led all its proponents to the brink of hell, if it has not landed them beyond it.

44. But there are still those who have failed to memorize the lessons of the past. There are those who found it appropriate to tutor us—right here, in the General Assembly, on the occasion of commemorating the birth of the first universal Magna Carta—and with pride, on the concept and role of power. Historians of the Anglo-Saxon world may have recorded that the philosophy of Sir Robert Walpole died long ago, but the realities of that world today indicate that if it did die it must have died very hard. And in a world where power is no longer monopolistic but duo-polistic the scramble for armaments and the resulting consciousness of security is in fact rooted in fear and not in strength. Among the powerful it takes a lot of courage to admit, as President Kennedy did before the General Assembly at the sixteenth session, that the “risks inherent in disarmament pale in comparison to the risks inherent in an unlimited arms race”. [*1013th plenary meeting, para. 52.*]

45. If the United Nations expressed its alarm on armaments in 1946, it did so essentially because of its realization of the perils inherent in nuclear armaments. The future of a world bent on armament was envisioned by those assembled in 1946 with the same eye with which Albert

⁸ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

Einstein, one of the precursors of the father of the bomb, saw it when he said the next war would be fought with stones. And it is that vision that gave importance and urgency to the problem. It was therefore not coincidental that the first resolution adopted by the Assembly was one in which it requested its competent organs to proceed with dispatch to inquire into all phases of the use of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes. But where have we gone from there? Atomic arsenals are fatter; their lethal power is infinitely scaled up and their mode of delivery ever swifter.

46. Taking stock of the past 25 years, this is what has been achieved: with 99 General Assembly resolutions and the hundredth in the offing, the world is still in a situation the Secretary-General has chosen to describe as less and less secure with every new generation of more sophisticated weapons. The lesson of the first 25 years of the nuclear age—and here we agree with the Secretary-General—is that “security cannot be found by accumulating destructive power, but must be based on negotiated solutions to remove the common dangers”.

47. So, with an unresigned sense of realism, we believe that the few achievements of the last 25 years need not be minimized. It is in that sense that my Government views the few agreements that have been concluded—be they agreements of principle, like the Zorin-McClosky formula, or treaties of obligation, or draft treaties seeking to obligate States with certain duties and responsibilities with regard to armaments. Our views on those agreements and draft agreements are as follows.

48. First, there is the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.⁹ My Government hailed the conclusion of this agreement only as a first phase of a comprehensive and total ban on nuclear testing. Its conclusion was in itself a great landmark in the history of disarmament, for it represented the first international agreement on the voluntary banning of armaments since the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament of 1922.¹⁰ However, in its resolution 2604 (XXIV), the General Assembly requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue as a matter of urgency its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear tests and to submit a special report to the Assembly on the results of its deliberations. The report of the Conference is now available [*A/8059-DC/233*], and examination of its paragraphs 12-22, relating to that question, reveals that no real progress has so far been made regarding this issue. On the other hand, the report contains a number of invaluable suggestions from Member States in response to the request of the General Assembly. We particularly refer to the draft comprehensive programme for disarmament submitted by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 42], which we believe is a very constructive and forward-looking piece of work; given attention and consideration, it could substantially help us in our deliberations.

49. We firmly believe that a comprehensive disarmament programme can be effectively carried out if the highest

priority is given to nuclear disarmament and emphasis is placed on such questions as a comprehensive nuclear test ban, control of nuclear delivery systems and establishment of an operational seismic system based on new techniques designed to give detection and identification capabilities. In this connexion we wish to assert the importance we attach to regional denuclearization. We recall with satisfaction General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX) on the denuclearization of Africa, which was concluded in pursuance of the initiative of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, held at Cairo in 1964. It is our ardent desire that more concrete measures, along the lines of the Latin American experience, which we hail, will soon be devised.

50. Secondly, we have the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. It is indeed a good omen that the Disarmament Decade starts its first year with the coming into force on 5 March of the non-proliferation Treaty and it is gratifying to note that since the entry into force of this Treaty a special safeguard committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency has made substantial progress in preparing the ground for the negotiation of the safeguard agreements provided for in the Treaty. It is also encouraging to note that, in regard to the main operative stipulations on controls, current negotiations within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency seem to be making satisfactory headway.

51. Thirdly, in connexion with the demilitarization of the sea-bed, my Government, which is honoured to be a member of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, notes with satisfaction the draft agreement on the question of emplacement of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. The third revision of the draft treaty on the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, attached as annex A to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, is the result of two years' hard work in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in last year's General Assembly. It is encouraging to note that almost unanimous agreement can be reached on this text, which satisfies the principal national interests of all. We sincerely hope that it will be adopted by this Committee and commended by the General Assembly for the signature and adherence of Member States at an early date.

52. Fourthly, the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons is one of the most perilous areas of armament. The report of the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament on this item of disarmament is based on the Geneva Protocol of 1925¹¹ on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. My delegation shares the view expressed by the representative of Italy [*1752nd meeting*] that effective steps should be taken towards the universalization of the obligations and commitments embodied in that Protocol. However, my delegation has listened with due attention to some views put forward by other

⁹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

¹⁰ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XXV (1924), No. 609.

¹¹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

representatives requesting the separation of these two reputedly interrelated items from each other, namely, chemical and biological weapons. But we sincerely believe that the two items are two parts of one whole and that they should therefore be dealt with collectively. The representative of the United States in his statement before this Committee [1748th meeting] informed us that the Geneva Protocol had been submitted to the United States Senate for its advice and consent.

53. These are happy tidings which we welcome with appreciation. However, I wish to draw the attention of the representative of the United States to the news published in *The New York Times* of 10 November 1970, in a report by Robert M. Smith from Washington, entitled: "U.S. slow to dismantle germ-war arsenal despite Nixon stand". In that statement it was reported that:

"While specific information on biological agents is secret, Government visitors to Pine Bluff Arsenal report the existence of a ten-story tower where biological agents were produced and 273 mounds or igloos, visible from the air where the germs or toxins—toxins are the dead but poisonous products of bacteria—are kept under refrigeration. According to reliable sources, four types of agents are stockpiled at Pine Bluff. These agents produce tularemia, Q fever, anthrax and Venezuelan equine encephalitis. Some Government officials attributed the delay in destroying these stocks to the lethargy of the bureaucracy; others contend that the White House has failed to take vigorous action to make sure its decision is carried out. In any case, the Army will probably spend almost the same amount of germ warfare in this fiscal year as it spent in the last. Congress appropriated \$21.9 million then; it authorized \$21.1 million for this fiscal year."

I should like to have some clarification on this.

54. The little progress achieved would not have been possible were it not for the relative relaxation of tension in the world, the subsidence of the cold war rhetoric and manoeuvres and the conclusion of agreements closing that tragic page of world history entitled World War II. I wish to make a special reference here to the heartening agreement concluded last week between the Federal German Republic and Poland which came as a natural follow-up to the earlier one between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But while a twilight of conciliation is illuminating the horizon, the vision of the United Nations, looking east, is still blurred. There is no more appropriate occasion for bringing the People's Republic of China into our midst than this occasion. Is it not humiliating for the United Nations that the Organization, in order to ensure a world-wide and comprehensive discussion of disarmament, is ready to adopt resolutions calling for conferences outside its jurisdiction to enable the representatives of the Chinese people to participate. This is indeed humiliating.

55. China has made its view on the matter clear: a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It did this on the occasion of the explosion of its first nuclear device. It did it last year. It confirmed it only yesterday in the communiqué to President Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan of Pakistan.

56. Mentioning President Yahya Khan, I wish, in the name of my delegation, to extend to our brothers in the Pakistan delegation our heartfelt sympathies for the catastrophe that has afflicted East Pakistan.

57. I have some last words to say on some of the collateral aspects of disarmament, to use the parlance of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Having regard to the political and social context of the policy of armament, it is necessary that an additional effort should be made by the United Nations to help to change some of the socio-cultural realities. There are two things to which I should like to refer.

58. The first is education. The lunatic policy of the arms race often finds its support in the misconceptions of an ill-informed populace. The logic of power inevitably leads to self-righteous assertions of strength, beliefs in self-fulfilling visions, double standards and enemy stereotypes. The only way to fight the psychological logic of fear among people is by educating them in the concepts of universal civilization. The United Nations and its qualified specialized agencies have a role to play in this field.

59. In the words of H. G. Wells, "Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe", and in order to avert this impending catastrophe, let us educate.

60. The second question is that of war propaganda. In the same vein, a more energetic effort should be made by the United Nations to expose national efforts of war propaganda. Warmongers, particularly in major industrial complexes, play an important role in creating a war psychosis in the world. There is an important lesson to be learnt from the conclusions of the Commission of the League of Nations which inquired into the private manufacture of arms in 1921. From the conclusions of that Commission it transpired:

"1. That armament firms have been active in fomenting war-scares and in persuading their own countries to increase their armaments.

"2. That armament firms have attempted to bribe Government officials, both at home and abroad.

"3. That armament firms have disseminated false reports concerning the military and naval programmes of various countries.

"4. That armament firms have sought to influence public opinion through the control of newspapers in their own and foreign countries."

61. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): I must first of all express our shock at the horrifying natural disaster which recently struck Pakistan. We hope, as earlier speakers have said, that the various relief activities will bring some assistance to those who have suffered these grave material losses, but we recognize that for the thousands of people who have lost families and friends there is nothing we can give but sympathy. I would ask the delegation of Pakistan to be kind enough to convey this sympathy to its sorely afflicted compatriots.

62. As we near the end of our general debate I wish to take this opportunity to add a few comments on the issues before us, taking into account various observations made in the debate, as well as responding to certain questions posed by earlier speakers.

63. First, with respect to the sea-bed treaty, the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, has asked us [1748th meeting] several questions about the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A]. His first question related to the meaning of the exceptions contained in article I, paragraph 2. He indicated that he would be grateful to receive an explanation as to the significance and scope of the exception applicable to the sea-bed beneath the territorial waters of a coastal State. I should like to provide that explanation.

64. The United States delegation considers that paragraph 2 of article I does not in any way affect the sovereignty, under international law, of the coastal State over its territorial waters and its sea-bed within the zone mentioned in the same paragraph and, consequently, the provisions of this paragraph leave intact and unimpaired all rights of the coastal State derived from that sovereignty. To put the matter in an affirmative manner, this provision is designed to leave unaffected the sovereign authority and control of the coastal State within such territorial sea.

65. The intention of the provision is simply to describe the scope of the treaty's obligations. It is, of course, fully consistent with the disclaimer clause in article IV of the treaty in that it does not support or prejudice the position of any State with respect to rights or claims related to waters off its coast, including, among other things, territorial seas.

66. I should like now to turn to the second question of the representative of Mexico. In his statement he quoted a paragraph from my statement on 1 September 1970, at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, concerning the relationship of article I, paragraph 3, to nuclear-free zones. Ambassador García Robles asked whether paragraph 35 in document CCD/PV.492 represented the authorized interpretation of the United States. I am glad to inform the representative of Mexico that indeed this statement does represent the position of the Government of the United States.

67. I should like now to turn to another question which has been the subject of some discussion in connexion with the sea-bed treaty. This is the question of the meaning and significance of the procedures contained in article III of the sea-bed treaty regarding recourse to the Security Council. As I stated on 23 April at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

"The procedures provided for in article III do not, of course, prejudice or limit the right of any State to apply directly to the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations." [See CCD/PV.467, para. 33.]

This statement was made in relation to the text of the draft treaty submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union on 23 April [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 3]. After that time, a revised text was negotiated containing some modifications of article III. However, the statement which I made on 23 April remains entirely applicable to the version of the treaty submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union on 1 September. I would only add that the question of the exercise by a Member of the United Nations of its right under the Charter to apply to the Security Council is, of course, a complex question depending on a variety of legal, political and security considerations. The ability of a State to exercise its Charter right in the light of these considerations is not prejudiced by the present draft of the sea-bed treaty.

68. With respect to the detailed and technical legal analysis presented by the representative of El Salvador [1757th meeting], I would only wish to make several points. As we have found in the case of the non-proliferation Treaty and other arms limitation treaties, the process of negotiating an important agreement is indeed a process of lengthy and difficult adjustment and compromise. The language which is agreed upon to accomplish our purposes can never be language conforming exactly to the preferences of any single participant. I am convinced, having listened most carefully to the remarks of the representative of El Salvador that a treaty drafted solely by his delegation would have achieved a high standard of legal excellence. However, it has not been the privilege of any of us—not of the United States, the Soviet Union, Sweden, Nigeria, Argentina, or any other participant in the negotiations—to draft a treaty to conform to its own individual standards. This is simply an inescapable fact of international negotiations.

69. This does not mean that we believe the present text is defective. We are convinced that the drafting of the treaty is adequate for its purpose. We are further convinced that the treaty cannot be misunderstood to the detriment of any participant. Any complex set of clauses can always be construed as containing implications at variance with the clear intention of the document as a whole. But in the case of this treaty, we believe that a fair reading of its provisions can result only in a fair and practical application of its obligations. It seems to us—and here I address all the members of this Committee—that all of the delegations which have worked so hard for more than a year at the Committee on Disarmament to achieve a fair, practical and balanced result, and who now support the present draft, join with us in reaching this conclusion.

70. To add one more specific point, I should like to stress that there is simply no possibility of prejudice to any country's interests as a result of this treaty. Article IV, the disclaimer clause, was the object of particular scrutiny and gradual improvement throughout our negotiations. Although perhaps alternative formulas would have been found possible, even for this article, we believe that the present clause is now both broad enough and specific enough to provide reasonable assurance to all that this treaty cannot be misused by any State to advance positions in areas beyond the purview of the treaty. We are pleased that a number of delegations that are concerned with the question have specifically spoken to this effect in our debate.

71. With respect to the amendments submitted by Peru [*A/C.1/L.528*], it is to be noted that some of them touch upon very basic questions, which were the subject of extensive negotiations and compromise at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. For example, as we understand the Peruvian amendments, they would make the prohibitions of the treaty extend from the coastline of one State to the coastline of every other State. This is a proposal that was, in fact, considered in the early stages of negotiations in Geneva. There were other proposals as well regarding the geographic scope of the treaty. The United States proposed, in the initial stages, that the exempted sea-bed zone should be three miles, the Soviet Union proposed that it should be 12 miles, and some participants in the negotiations proposed that there should be broader defensive zones, with special rules applicable to these areas. The present provision is therefore a compromise which takes into account a complex of security, legal and political considerations.

72. We would not make progress by endeavouring to reopen compromises which have already been reached; indeed, nothing would be gained, and much would be lost, should we attempt to renegotiate the provisions arrived at with such care and effort and with the participation of all members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and many members of this Committee who contributed suggestions at last year's General Assembly.

73. In the light of these considerations, I must state to the representatives of both El Salvador and Peru that it remains our view that the most practical and constructive course of action is to proceed with the treaty in its present form.

74. Finally, I should like to restate an important point which arose during the General Assembly's consideration of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At that time, in 1968, many delegations inquired whether an affirmative vote for the resolution commending the non-proliferation Treaty would in any way bind their Governments either to sign the non-proliferation Treaty or subsequently to become a party. It was then established that an affirmative vote stood in effect for only one simple proposition; that is, the treaty should be opened promptly for signature.

75. The situation is identical with respect to the sea-bed treaty. We hope, of course, that favourable action here on the sea-bed draft resolution will encourage many Governments to make affirmative decisions to sign and become parties to that treaty. Nevertheless, we can be absolutely clear that an affirmative vote on the sea-bed draft resolution [*A/C.1/L.523*] will not commit any Government to sign or subsequently become a party to the treaty.

76. We are most appreciative of the comments made by a great many delegations expressing their support for the sea-bed treaty, which is the product of difficult and prolonged negotiations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It seems to us encouraging that many delegations in our debate have recognized the importance of this treaty, and its beneficial influence on arms control negotiations and on international relations as a whole.

77. When the draft resolution, now sponsored by 37 delegations, comes to a vote in the next few days, we hope

that as many delegations as possible will join those 37 sponsors in taking the clearly affirmative step of helping to see that this treaty is promptly opened for signature.

78. Several delegations have suggested that this Committee should take action on the comprehensive disarmament programme which was called for in resolution 2602 E (XXIV), and to which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament devoted considerable attention this past year. Specific actions suggested have ranged from referring the question to Geneva for further consideration to the adoption by this Committee of a specific programme as a guideline for further disarmament negotiations. It is indeed a difficult question—how we ought to proceed in the light of the many complex considerations that we all know are present. In an effort to advance a practical solution which we hope will be able to gain wide acceptance, I would like to outline an approach that my delegation is prepared to support.

79. We believe that a draft resolution regarding the question of a disarmament programme should state clearly the importance of making more intensive efforts to bring about a faster pace toward our disarmament goals. This, after all, was the motivation of all of us when last year the General Assembly established the 1970s as a disarmament decade and called for a programme to help in our efforts. Second, we believe due appreciation should be expressed of the important and constructive contributions which have been made by delegations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Third, we should be prepared to support a draft resolution which appropriately takes note of the documents presented by various delegations in Geneva and asks the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to take them into account in its future deliberations. I refer particularly to the documents submitted on 24 February 1970, by the Netherlands [*A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 5*]; on 19 August by Italy [*ibid., sect. 38*]; and on 25 August by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia [*ibid., sect. 42*]. Finally, we believe the draft resolution should expressly leave open the possibility of further disarmament programme suggestions.

80. If we can agree to take this action, we will have fulfilled the objective of resolution 2602 E (XXIV), in that we will have valuable and well-thought-out documents bearing on a disarmament programme which will have been considered by the General Assembly. However, at the same time that we take action with respect to these documents, we need to recognize that the entire question of a programme is not a static concept. Programmes must evolve as the international situation develops and as there is further progress in disarmament. An over-all programme should, therefore, be conceived of as a continuing process whereby useful concepts and guidelines are formulated and considered in order to assist the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in its work.

81. We need to encourage and stimulate every helpful idea on the disarmament programme that may come at any time from any delegation. In order to avoid the risk of division, when we really need consensus, we should not take action on only one of the documents presented this year at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. At the same time, we should leave open the possibility of further

constructive suggestions in the future. We believe a resolution based on these concepts would constitute a constructive, positive action by the General Assembly.

82. As I have noted above, all of us fully share the desire of the Philippine delegation to speed up progress in the disarmament field. We believe, however, that the proposal for a new committee would not be conducive to such progress. On the contrary, it could have a negative effect on negotiations, since its activities would inevitably compete with and duplicate the functions of existing bodies. At the very best, it would be a wasteful and unproductive exercise. At worst, it would be harmful to disarmament prospects.

83. Ambassador Yost has already pointed out here, in his statement of 2 November [1748th meeting], that the disappointingly slow pace at which we are registering disarmament agreements reflects a fact of international life—the fact that such agreements are inherently difficult to achieve—and this situation cannot be altered by establishing more committees. If the Philippine delegation's idea were presented for action, we would, I regret, be compelled to vote negatively.

84. My delegation is gratified to note that the Canadian initiative for a study of international seismic data exchange as a possible element in the verification of an underground test ban has attracted the interest and co-operation of a substantial number of United Nations Members. We will, of course, be prepared to support draft resolution A/C.1/L.529 on this subject, submitted by Canada and thirty-four co-sponsors.

85. Three draft resolutions have been submitted on the subject of chemical and biological weapons. One of those draft resolutions, submitted by the United Kingdom [A/C.1/L.526], would ask the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to get back to work more urgently and to take into account all of the major proposals and approaches—that is to say, the United Kingdom revised draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare, which would also include toxins in its coverage, the socialist draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, which would ban immediately all chemical and biological weapons, and the joint memorandum on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare by the non-aligned members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We believe that this is a fair draft resolution which will stimulate negotiations. And it is, after all, negotiations we need in order to make progress. The United Kingdom draft resolution does not attempt to prejudge those negotiations, but merely to stimulate them. We therefore support it.

86. However, these positive comments cannot be made about the draft resolution proposed by Poland, Hungary and Mongolia [A/C.1/L.527]. The operative paragraphs of that draft would, in effect, tell us what is to be the outcome of our negotiations: the socialist draft convention. Such a decision would be unsound. It would stimulate division rather than negotiation. Accordingly, we oppose that draft resolution.

87. A third draft resolution [A/C.1/L.533] has just been submitted by the delegations of 12 non-aligned States. We have referred that draft to our capital, where it is under study.

Mr. Aguilar M. (Venezuela) took the Chair.

88. Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): In connexion with the great disaster which has struck Pakistan, the cyclone that devastated parts of East Pakistan, killing many thousands of the country's inhabitants and causing enormous destruction and damage, the delegation of the Soviet Union would like to associate itself with the words of condolence and sympathy addressed by the Chairman to the delegation of Pakistan. Our delegation wishes to express its own heartfelt condolences and sympathy to the friendly country of Pakistan. On behalf of the delegation of the Soviet Union, I should like to ask the delegation of Pakistan to transmit our condolences on the occasion of the catastrophe which has struck its country.

89. Today we are concluding the general debate on the questions of disarmament which are before our Committee. On behalf of our delegation, I should like to observe that the discussion which has taken place in the Committee has been thorough and businesslike. A large number of delegations have explained their positions on various aspects of the complex and important problem of disarmament. What has been said during the debate will provide a useful basis for further negotiations on disarmament and will be carefully studied by the participants in the Committee on Disarmament.

90. Many delegations have expressed constructive ideas on a number of vital aspects of disarmament. In particular, this was reflected in the Committee's consideration of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, which was submitted to the General Assembly by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/233, annex A]. Much has been said here about the significance of the conclusion of this Treaty as a means of preventing the extension of the race in nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to the sea-bed. In our statement today we do not wish to repeat the important and convincing arguments put forward on the subject during the Committee's general debate. An indication of the importance attached to the draft treaty on the sea-bed is the fact that 37 delegations have joined in sponsoring the draft resolution of the General Assembly which urges that the Treaty should be adopted and opened for signature [A/C.1/L.523]. We hope that the General Assembly will adopt the resolution and that this will prove to be an important step towards taking the first specification to ensure the demilitarization of the sea-bed.

91. At the Committee's 1748th meeting on 2 November this year the distinguished representative of Mexico, Mr. García Robles, asked two questions in connexion with the draft treaty on the sea-bed which we intend to answer in our statement today.

92. As representatives are aware, the first question relates to the content of article I, paragraph 2, of the draft Treaty,

which provides that the undertakings of paragraph 1 of that article "shall not apply either to the coastal State or to the sea-bed beneath its territorial waters". The question of the Mexican delegation was, in effect, a request for information concerning our understanding of this provision.

93. In regard to that question, we should like to note that no interpretation of article I, paragraph 2, could in any way prejudice, in our view, the sovereignty of a coastal State in connexion with its territorial waters and the sea-bed beneath those waters within the 12-mile zone mentioned in that paragraph. Therefore that provision must be interpreted as embodying the intangible rights of all coastal States arising from such sovereignty under international law. Furthermore, one must be mindful of the fact, in our view, that article IV of the draft treaty on the sea-bed specifically states that the treaty in no way prejudices the rights or claims of the coastal States in matters of territorial waters. As has already been stated, the treaty relates only to problems concerning the matter of the demilitarization of the sea-bed.

94. The second question of the Mexican delegation related to the scope provided for in paragraph 3 of article I, in connexion with the nuclear-free zones referred to in article IX. The Mexican delegation in the course of the meetings of the First Committee again put forward the proposal it had made at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under which the article on nuclear-free zones would contain an undertaking by States parties to the treaty not to contribute to the commission in the zone referred to in article I of acts involving a violation of the obligations undertaken by those parties under an agreement on nuclear-free zones. In regard to that proposal, the Mexican delegation asked us whether the clarification offered by the Soviet delegation at the 492nd meeting of the Committee on Disarmament remained valid. In that statement, the Soviet delegation, in reference to the aforementioned Mexican proposal, referred to paragraph 3 of article I, which contains an obligation not to induce other States to carry out activities prohibited by the treaty. We said that we interpreted that paragraph in such a way that it fully covered the Mexican proposal and did not allow the activities mentioned in the proposal. In answer to the question of the Mexican delegation, we wish to confirm that the clarification given by us at that meeting of the Committee on Disarmament remains fully valid and is the official position of the Soviet Union.

95. In preparing the draft treaty on the sea-bed, the members of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva did a great deal of complicated work, as has been noted here by many representatives, and, taking into account the results of that work, which has been approved by the majority of those taking part in the current debate, may conclude that the Committee has made a considerable effort to carry out the task entrusted to it by the previous session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Soviet Union sees the treaty prohibiting the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor only as a first step towards the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed. We intend to take a most serious approach to the fulfilment of the undertaking provided for in article V of the treaty to continue negotiations in good faith concerning measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of

an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. We therefore attach great importance to the proposal made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Polish People's Republic that the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed should remain on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament [see CCD/PV.471].

96. One of the main questions discussed in this Committee during the current session of the General Assembly has been that of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We should like once again to draw the attention of all delegations to the special importance of this international problem from the point of view of strengthening peace and the security of peoples and to the important initiative taken by nine socialist countries as reflected in the revised draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons submitted to the current session of the United Nations General Assembly [A/8136]. During the general debate here in the Committee on questions relating to disarmament, our colleagues the representatives of Poland, Hungary, Mongolia and other socialist countries gave detailed explanations of the amendments made by the sponsors in preparing the revised text of the draft Convention. These amendments relate to important questions of international co-operation in the fields of chemistry and biology, implementation of the convention and, finally, the convention's scope. The submission by the socialist countries of their revised draft convention on chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare is proof of their businesslike and practical approach to consideration of this important and pressing international problem, which still awaits solution.

97. This approach is likewise reflected in the fact that the socialist countries have continued in our Committee to insist on the need for a combined solution of the problem of prohibiting both chemical and bacteriological weapons simultaneously and completely, without any exceptions. The Soviet Union is deeply convinced that only such a solution of the problem can ensure the full prohibition of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare and the elimination of such methods of warfare from the military arsenals of States.

98. The statements of many delegations here in the First Committee in favour of the complete prohibition of all chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare have convinced us once again of the correctness of the approach which the socialist countries have suggested for solving the problem of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We believe that, in considering this question, we must also bear in mind the necessity of continuing the effort begun with the conclusion of the Geneva Protocol of 1925¹² for the prohibition of the use in war of such weapons. The convention we are discussing should be built on the firm foundation of that Protocol. If we depart from this principle and agree, as suggested by the Western delegations, to prohibit only biological weapons, we shall be undermining the Geneva Protocol, weakening its effect and thus paving the way for the wider use of chemical weapons in war. This would have far-reaching and extremely dangerous consequences.

12 *Idem*.

99. The twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly also devoted a great deal of attention to the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons. That discussion resulted in the adoption of a procedural resolution under which all the documents submitted to the General Assembly and the ideas expressed at its meeting were to be transmitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for consideration by that body [*see resolution 2603 B (XXIV)*]. Our delegation, like the delegations of many other States, thinks that this year we must move forward in this matter and adopt a resolution which would give the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament a more substantive recommendation, indicating the lines along which the efforts of members of the Committee should proceed in the future. In our opinion, this idea has been fully reflected in the draft resolution which Poland, Hungary, and Mongolia have submitted for consideration by the members of the Committee.

100. Turning to the question of general and complete disarmament, we should like to express satisfaction that this problem has received considerable attention from delegations at the General Assembly. The representatives of many countries who have spoken during the debate on questions of disarmament have expressed concern at the lack of progress in solving this important problem and have insisted on the need to make greater efforts to achieve tangible results with respect to disarmament. A number of delegations have spoken in favour of the elaboration of a broad programme of disarmament. In this connexion, we should like to reaffirm our position, which we explained in our statement of 2 November this year in this Committee [*1748th meeting*]. The Soviet Union does not object in principle to the elaboration of a broad programme of disarmament aimed at halting the arms race and achieving agreement on urgent measures in this field. At the same time, it must be recognized that the elaboration of such a programme would be a large and complex undertaking which would require considerable effort and comprehensive consultations if the programme was to be a sound realistic document serving the interests of both the security of individual States and international security as a whole.

101. During the sessions which the Committee on Disarmament held this year, many of its members advanced various proposals concerning the content of such a programme. These proposals and comments have been enumerated in the report of the Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly [*A/8059-DC/233*] and we therefore do not intend to mention all the proposals which were put forward in the Committee on Disarmament concerning the matter.

102. The members of the First Committee have devoted a great deal of attention, in particular, to the document prepared by the delegations of Mexico, Yugoslavia and Sweden, which was submitted to the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva at the concluding stage of its summer session. That document was entitled "Draft comprehensive programme of disarmament" [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 42]. In their statements, several delegations spoke of the possibility of adopting that document as a programme for further negotiations on disarmament.

103. In this connexion, we feel we must explain our delegation's position on the matter. We greatly appreciate

the initiative taken and the efforts made by the authors of the draft in preparing that text and their desire to contribute to the elaboration of a programme of disarmament. We feel, however, that it would be highly inappropriate to adopt at this time a decision whereby one or another specific document, including the three-Power draft, would be taken as the only basis, already agreed upon between States, for a programme of negotiations on disarmament.

104. As we have already emphasized, the preparation of a broad programme of disarmament requires a great deal of effort. Work on this question must be approached carefully and will entail consideration of a wide range of proposals, different draft programmes of disarmament and the measures that have already been taken in this field. It will also require a thorough and profound analysis of individual and general programmes of disarmament as they relate to the task of ensuring international security and a detailed indication of the various stages of such a programme. A programme of disarmament can have real significance only if it is based on comprehensive consultations with a wide range of States, indeed with all the main groups of States participating in the work of the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament. Failure to meet this requirement could turn any programme of disarmament into an ineffective document.

105. The Soviet Union is in favour of the elaboration of a programme of general and complete disarmament. In the course of negotiations on disarmament and consideration of the question of a programme of disarmament, we would be prepared to pay due attention to the views advanced in the document of the three States, but we cannot treat it as a fully prepared basis, acceptable to all States, for negotiations on disarmament, a comprehensive programme for such negotiations or a guideline for such negotiations, since this document does not meet the requirements, deemed by us to be of vital importance, which we mentioned above and since it contains a number of provisions which are clearly unacceptable to one group of States or another.

106. During the debate here in the First Committee on questions of disarmament, representatives have devoted much attention in their statements to the question of prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests. We should like to make it clear that the Soviet Union is whole-heartedly in favour of a positive solution of this important and urgent problem.

107. The Soviet Union has often stated its views on this problem; in brief, our position is that an underground test ban can be achieved on the basis of the use of national means of detection to verify the implementation by the Parties of their obligations. The demand that on-site inspections should be carried out for the purposes of such verification only blocks the achievement of agreement on questions relating to the prohibition of underground tests.

108. The Soviet Union declares that it is prepared to contribute to the quickest possible achievement of agreement on an underground nuclear weapon test ban. At the same time, we do not consider it appropriate that the solution of the problem of prohibiting underground nuclear weapon tests should be deferred while all sorts of studies

and investigations in the field of seismology are carried out. If agreement is reached to halt tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection, the Soviet Union, as we have often stated, will be prepared to participate in the broadest possible international exchange of seismic data. Even now it is actively participating in such an exchange. In order to reach agreement on such a test ban, it will be necessary first of all to adopt the appropriate political decision, as we have very forcefully indicated in the Committee on Disarmament and at a number of General Assembly sessions.

109. Such are our views on several matters which have been raised in the course of the discussion in this Committee of questions relating to disarmament. We shall explain our position on a number of other questions during the debate on separate draft resolutions proposed in connexion with various agenda items relating to the problem of disarmament.

110. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): With the statement we have just heard from the representative of the Soviet Union, we have concluded the list of speakers and the Committee has thus ended its general debate on the disarmament items on its agenda. According to the decision adopted by the Committee, the Committee at its next meeting tomorrow, will have to take up the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. This document is included in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We will also have to consider

the draft resolutions on this matter contained in document A/C.1/L.523, and we will have to take up the amendment which appears in document A/C.1/L.528. After hearing delegations which may wish to address themselves to the draft resolution I have just mentioned or the amendments thereto, the Committee will then vote on the drafts.

111. At tomorrow's meeting, which will be held at 10.30 a.m., I shall consult the Committee on the order of priority to be attached to the other draft resolutions submitted on this and other disarmament items. I intend also to consult the Committee at our next meeting on whether it feels that it might be appropriate to decide upon some deadline for the submission of draft resolutions on these disarmament questions. I am not asking the Committee to take a decision on this matter now, but I would appreciate your considering the possibility of setting some final date for the submission of such draft resolutions or amendments thereto.

112. Before adjourning this meeting I call on the representative of Pakistan who wishes to make a short statement.

113. Mr. MEHDI (Pakistan): I merely wish to thank most sincerely the representatives of the Philippines, Sudan, the United States and the USSR for the expressions of sorrow and sympathy that they have voiced for the victims of the cyclone in East Pakistan. I should like to assure them that their sentiments will be duly conveyed to the Government and people of Pakistan.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.