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Chairman: Mr. Andrés AGUILAR M. (Venezuela).

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Farah (Somalia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 AND 94

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7958, A/7960 and Corr.1, A/7961, A/8059-DC/233, A/C.1/1001 and 1010, A/C.1/L.523 and 528)

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Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security (*continued*) (A/7994)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN: Before continuing the general debate on the disarmament items, I should like to inform the Committee that Burma has become a sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.523.

2. Mr. KHATRI (Nepal): If the twenty-fifth anniversary of our Organization is time for some serious stocktaking, it is also time for some blunt talk. It appears to be a fact that at no time since the Cuban missile crisis have relations between the United States and the Soviet Union been more uncertain than now and consequently prospects for disarmament more bleak.

3. The revival of tension between the super-Powers is especially distressing when we find that Europe, which was one of the main reasons for previous tensions between the two, is now enjoying a period of *détente* and relaxation of tensions unprecedented since the Second World War.

4. We are concerned that worsening super-Power relations might result in the continued disregard on their part of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. It might also retard progress at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Prudence would therefore dictate that we should not place too much hope on the outcome of those talks. Unfortunately, the initiation of the talks seems to have had the effect of diluting the urgency of disarmament efforts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other forums. Measures which should normally have been dealt with by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have been set aside pending outcome of the talks. If disarmament efforts in all other forums come to a standstill because of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and if the talks keep

dragging on without producing any significant and comprehensive agreement, as appears likely, the world will indeed be a lot worse off than if the talks had not started at all. Moreover, it should be understood that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are not a disarmament forum and what is being discussed there is certainly not disarmament. The talks are primarily aimed at a mutual adjustment of the strategic posture of the two sides in view of developments that have made past strategic concepts and weapons obsolete and at ensuring that the balance of terror between the two Powers is not upset. Any gains chalked up to the cause of disarmament at the talks will come largely as a result of accidental spin-off from whatever agreements are reached there. For example, if the two sides were to agree at the talks to liquidate their fixed land-based missiles in favour of increased reliance upon the more invulnerable blue water strategy, it would merely signify a recognition on their part that the advent of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) has made land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) obsolete as a weapon of deterrence. Consequently, the phasing out of the Minuteman and its Soviet counterpart would amount to an unintentional spin-off resulting from a shift in the deterrence posture of the two sides rather than a calculated act of disarmament. But even such spin-offs would be of questionable value if the only outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were to freeze the balance of mutual deterrence at a higher threshold than now. The talks would then become just a forum for strategic "horse trading" between the super-Powers and totally inconsequential as far as disarmament is concerned. The only way to make them meaningful for disarmament is for the two sides to agree on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive weapon systems as called for by the General Assembly. First and foremost, the moratorium should include a halt in the further deployment of MIRVs and also of ABMs, which constitute the main rationalization for deployment of the former. It should also include a halt in the development of anti-submarine warfare capabilities and in the deployment of large active sonar systems capable of detecting missile-launching submarines.

5. These are some of the restraints the super-Powers must exercise if the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are to make a contribution to disarmament. Whether they will adopt such restraints is, of course, a totally different question. We should therefore guard against over-estimating the significance of the talks as far as they relate to disarmament. If our assessment of the talks seems more pessimistic than reality, then it would be desirable for the two sides to furnish us with a report on the progress so far made and its relevance to general and complete disarmament. Since it also seems unlikely that the talks can produce agreements that could be construed as relevant to article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, the super-Powers should make serious efforts to live up to their obligations under article VI independently of the talks if they genuinely desire the Treaty to become universal. It is clear that as long as article VI of the Treaty remains a dead letter the Treaty is not going to attract the key non-nuclear Powers whose adherence is not only vital but the only rationale for the Treaty. We had hoped that by the time the Treaty had entered into force the super-Powers would have concluded an agreement banning nuclear weapon tests above a certain threshold, as also an agreement on the cessation of the production of

fissile materials. That that has not come about is unfortunate, the more so because those two measures are the very minimum considered acceptable by the international community to balance the obligations of the non-nuclear Powers under the treaty.

6. *Quid pro quo* is an expression despised by the super-Powers, but we are afraid that is what the non-proliferation Treaty question has boiled down to. And the minimum *quid pro quo* is a cut-off and a threshold treaty. As long as the super-Powers continue to avoid the conclusion of those two measures in the name of political realism, then realism will also demand that the near-nuclear Powers continue to eschew the Treaty. It is as simple as that.

7. There is no doubt that quantitatively the non-proliferation Treaty has proved to be a tremendous success. Over 100 States have so far been prevailed upon to accede to the Treaty and give up their option to stalk the world with their menacing nuclear presence. So what if a handful of countries continue to ignore the Treaty and negate its very rationale? As realists we ought to be able to do without them, just as we can do without any progress on article VI of the Treaty. Or can we?

8. It should be fairly evident by now that the attempts to achieve disarmament through partial measures have failed. We would, therefore, urge the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament not to mark time or entertain peripheral or irrelevant issues pending the outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, but to make serious and vigorous efforts towards what they were primarily constituted to do, namely, work out a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

9. Nine years have elapsed since the Zorin-McCloy joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations<sup>1</sup> and since the General Assembly gave its blessing to what was then the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We are no closer to our goal. The two Co-Chairmen, after duly presenting their respective draft treaties in 1962,<sup>2</sup> led us to believe that, given the political realities, progress on general and complete disarmament could be made only through partial and confidence-building measures. Thus the task of negotiating a treaty on general and complete disarmament was promptly set aside and pride of place on the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee agenda was usurped by confidence-building measures that have failed to build confidence and partial measures that have remained partial. While reiterating our belief that it is futile to hope to contain the arms race through partial measures, we would also like to emphasize that it is of the utmost importance that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament make a serious effort towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament to the exclusion of all issues that are peripheral, irrelevant and immaterial to general and complete disarmament. We also wish to renew the General Assembly's call to the Conference of the

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

<sup>2</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex 1, sects. C and F.

Committee on Disarmament contained in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) to prepare a comprehensive programme "dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament".

10. Such a programme should ideally begin with a critical review by the United States and the Soviet Union of the Zorin-McCloy agreed principles and revision of their respective draft treaties on general and complete disarmament in light of the changes that have taken place since then. But since political realism decrees that we have no business telling the two Co-Chairmen what to do, we would urge the non-aligned members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to take that initiative themselves. They should prepare a memorandum that would serve as a basis for a comprehensive disarmament programme. That memorandum should include a review of the entire general and complete disarmament picture and should suggest new modalities for negotiations on general and complete disarmament in this new decade, taking into account the developments that have supervened since 1961. The memorandum should also review the agreed principles and the United States and Soviet Union draft treaties on general and complete disarmament and indicate how they should be revised in light of new developments. In doing so, they should in particular take into account that a new *détente* has settled on Europe, that the Soviet Union has at last succeeded in achieving a rough nuclear parity with the United States and that the two sides have in recent years taken spectacular strides towards devising a foolproof inspection system employing national means of verification.

11. Particularly noteworthy are gains made in the science of satellite reconnaissance, which should help narrow down the divergence in the two draft treaties on general and complete disarmament. For example, one issue on which the two draft treaties are very far apart is the Soviet proposal to curtail the overkill capacity of the two sides to a bare minimum in the first stage, while permitting them to retain a nuclear umbrella to assure adequate deterrence until the final stage of general and complete disarmament.

12. The Gromyko proposal, as the formula is called, is a very workable one, since deterrence, which is, after all, a relative concept, will continue to function even when the forces of the two sides are greatly reduced. The proposal, which has so far foundered on the rocks of verification, is now, in our opinion, a viable one, given the immense improvement in the technique of verification, particularly that involving satellite reconnaissance.

13. This is but one example of how the respective draft treaties can be brought closer together to reflect the realities of the 1970s. And it is this task which the non-aligned members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should concern themselves with. We are not unaware that the two Co-Chairmen will not look too kindly on the procedure. However, in the past, that did not deter the non-aligned nations from presenting highly incisive, cogent and valuable memoranda on the issues of test-ban, non-proliferation and collateral measures. We earnestly hope and have faith that they will come up with an equally illuminating memorandum on general and complete disarmament, which will serve as a basis for the disarmament programme of the Disarmament Decade. A

comprehensive disarmament programme should not be merely a cataloguing of disarmament problems, as is the provisional agenda of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament<sup>3</sup> drawn up by the two Co-Chairmen in August 1968. It should be a strategy involving a series of coherent measures relevant to the achievement of general and complete disarmament, but without assigning strict priorities. In this connexion, we would like to express our deep appreciation to the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia for their initiative at the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We support the intent and the spirit of their efforts, and I am sure that in preparing their memorandum the non-aligned Powers in the Conference will draw heavily upon the three-Power initiative.

14. However, in the final analysis, no programme of disarmament can be complete unless it reflects the aspirations of all mankind. Would not, therefore, a disarmament programme shaped by the entire membership of the United Nations be more fulfilling than one presented as a fait accompli? We certainly think so. And this again leads us to repeat our weary call for the convening of the Disarmament Commission. We have been clamouring for a meeting of that body for the past five years, and at no time would such a meeting have been more opportune. The Commission has much to discuss, so we should seriously consider a meeting of the Commission sometime in April of next year, by which time, we hope, the memorandum of the non-aligned nations that we have asked for will be ready for the Commission's consideration. The Commission will wish further to elaborate on that memorandum and provide additional guidelines, and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would then negotiate and explore implementation of those guidelines. The Commission would also wish to take into consideration the programme of the Nobel Laureates. The convening of the Disarmament Commission will also give the super-Powers an opportunity to relate their disarmament programme to the growing aspirations and expectations of the developing nations. I have in mind the proposal to set aside, for the betterment of developing countries, a certain percentage of the resources now committed to the arms race. We wish to make it clear that the Disarmament Commission cannot be a substitute for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or our deliberations in the General Assembly or the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. However, it is essential to review and co-ordinate the efforts of those forums, and the Commission will perform exactly that function. The convening of the Commission would also go a long way towards compensating for the embarrassingly meagre time allotted to the General Assembly for the consideration of the disarmament items in depth. Since the guidelines will already have been formulated by the Disarmament Commission, the few days normally allocated to disarmament items in the Assembly will not prove to be as inadequate as has been the case so far.

15. We are heartened that the Co-Chairmen have completed the revision of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/231, para. 17.

the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A]. We urge its adoption, if only because we would not like the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to devote any more time to it. As I said earlier, the Conference should concern itself with measures more immediately relevant to general and complete disarmament.

16. On the question of banning chemical and bacteriological weapons, we reiterate our opposition to a separate convention relating to the latter. To argue that bacteriological weapons are strategic and chemical weapons are tactical and that they should be dealt with separately is not convincing. Should one, therefore, argue that on the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons we should first deal with strategic nuclear weapons and leave tactical nuclear weapons alone? Moreover, it is a fact that tactical weapons can have hundreds of strategic applications. For example, when chemical weapons are used against an agricultural country to defoliate its forests and destroy its crops, it is not any comfort to the victim to know that the weapons employed to devastate its economy were tactical weapons. We also believe that a separate convention banning bacteriological weapons could undermine the Geneva Protocol.<sup>4</sup> We therefore suggest the conclusion of an agreement banning bacteriological weapons, along the lines proposed by the United Kingdom [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 2] but coupled with a moratorium on the production and use of chemical weapons and providing for verification by challenge. We make this proposal because, in our opinion, existing techniques for monitoring the production and field-testing of chemical weapons constitute adequate verification consistent with the low risk involved for the aggrieved party in any possible violation of the moratorium. Furthermore, the risk of being caught and the attendant international censure would far outweigh the negligible advantage to be gained by the violators. But ultimately, and as in the case of a comprehensive test ban, the decision is mainly a political one. Unfortunately, we have seen how technical monkey-wrenches have been employed in the past to prevent a political decision. While on the subject, we would like to appeal to those parties to the Geneva Protocol who have placed certain reservations to the Protocol, to withdraw them. I also appeal to those States which have not already done so to ratify or accede to the Protocol.

17. Those were the observations I wished to make at this stage with respect to some of the important disarmament items.

18. Mr. ANAS (Afghanistan): The magnitude of the scope of the items we are discussing in the First Committee under the heading of "disarmament" would give comfort to a fictitious visitor to our planet interested in our genuine concern regarding friendship, peace and security. We are trying to persuade *homo sapiens* not to fight on the sea-bed or in the subsoil thereof, not to fight underground, not to fight in outer space. This would seem to presume that we have already attained conventional peace and friendship on the land, at home, in the streets, within each country, between nations and among regions of the world.

<sup>4</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

19. Suppose this extra-terrestrial outsider were to attend our Committee as an observer. How should we face him? How should we answer his queries? With a big question mark? Perhaps we would remain silent, having no justification, no explanation of our attitude to offer him. The outsider would observe that the whole world is preparing for its own annihilation. The equivalent of 30 tons of TNT per inhabitant of this planet is stored in the nuclear stockpiles of the two super-Powers. If we take into account conventional arms and also include the military might of other nations, then our *per capita* investment in explosives will reach about 80 tons of TNT per person. The armaments race is being conducted at such a pace that even the explosive increase in world population is not reducing the ratio. There is another direct ratio between overpopulation and the armaments race; as both armament expenditure and overpopulation increase, poverty, misery and political tensions all over the world intensify.

20. Eighty tons of TNT per person! Do we think that we have to kill each person over and over again? Who knows? Perhaps that could be done in the case of our fictitious space visitor, but mere mortals can be killed only once. Moreover, we can commit suicide only once in a lifetime—no more. So what is the use of this warfare machinery and such a huge stock of means of mass destruction? We cannot use all of it; we shall perish before it is used up. The outsider will find for himself that the war industry diverts income from the wage-earners and makes them poor, hungry, sick and miserable. The vast expenditure on weapons of mass destruction, even before their utilization in warfare, crushes the economic backbone of a society, enhances misery, creates tensions, blocks development and encourages cold war. This internal tension sporadically erupts here and there like a volcano on the surface of the earth and produces lava which further inflames the world's hotbeds.

21. Monetary resources equivalent to the income of the poorer half of the world's population are being wasted, not invested, in armaments, in the erroneous conviction that they will maintain peace and security. Fear, hate and suspicion are the factors which motivate highly developed countries to involve themselves in a neurotic armaments race. To quote Bertrand Russell:

"The present trouble is caused by vast mass emotion of fear, hate and suspicion, which each feels towards the other. If both sides were capable of thinking rationally about the danger, they would minimize the ground of conflict and open the way towards sincere negotiation on disarmament. If both parties were at least persuaded that the safety of each demands successful negotiations, many things would quickly become possible."

22. The United Nations Charter has the objective of saving humanity from the scourge of future war. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) endeavours to trace the origin of war in the mind of man, trying to purify, not brain-wash, his mind. Both the United Nations and UNESCO strive to create such an international moral atmosphere as will dissolve dark clouds of suspicion, fear and hatred in the minds and hearts of the people of the world. If only more emphasis could be given to heart and spirit—the ultimate remedies—to prevent

and cure all these troubles, for there can be no remedies without mutual understanding and goodwill between the parties involved!

23. The experience of the past 25 years has proved that the solution of disarmament problems relies more on the psychological and human elements than on scientific and technological processes of control and limitation. Wisdom and sanity should be our principal guidelines if we genuinely want to achieve general and complete disarmament. During every step of our negotiations we should keep in mind and listen to the voices of wisdom and sanity. Only then will it be possible to conclude meaningful agreements and treaties and respect them.

24. Concurrently with the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, we observe the first year of the Disarmament Decade—a time to be conscious of our failures and the limitations of our achievements in disarmament during the past 25 years. The “Disarmament Decade” does not mean that the United Nations was not responsible for disarmament during the 25 years of its existence. On the contrary, it was highly and basically responsible, but Member nations failed to restrain themselves from involvement in the armament situation.

25. Thus far no effective action on general and complete disarmament has been taken; no international treaty has been signed in this regard. If we did not succeed in general disarmament, we should at least have taken action on the reduction of armaments. However, no result has been obtained. Only recently have the United Nations and its agencies succeeded in concluding certain international agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear armaments. This is neither complete disarmament nor reduction of existing armaments but a limitation of one kind, although a very important kind, of armament. Conventional armaments, with which people are currently fighting, have not received much attention.

26. This state of affairs shows us how difficult it is to achieve consensus and understanding among nations or groups of nations that are technically so highly developed as to invent these sophisticated weapons. It proves also that intricate technological questions, complex as they are, are easier to resolve than social and psychological problems. It is indeed very difficult to ease political tensions and reduce hostilities to create an atmosphere of negotiation.

27. The progress of science and technology gains ever-increasing momentum; new discoveries create new social, economic, and political situations. It is vitally important that the United Nations should take practical measures towards concluding treaties on non-armament. The absence of such treaties could jeopardize the safety of the world on a much larger scale than would appear at first glance.

28. Nuclear science and space research, chemical and biological discoveries, have created such destructive potentialities that, if not properly harnessed, they may extend militarization to the sea, space, and micro-organisms. As in any hazardous situation, the emphasis should be on prevention—a much more logical approach than remedy and rectification. In this respect, the results achieved during the last decade have been encouraging: the treaty on the

denuclearization of Antarctica<sup>5</sup> in 1959; the partial test-ban Treaty<sup>6</sup> in 1963; the Latin American nuclear-free-zone Treaty;<sup>7</sup> the outer-space Treaty of 1967;<sup>8</sup> the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] in 1969—all are good examples of precautionary and preventive measures of non-armament. And this year the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has negotiated a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*A/8059-DC/233, annex A*].

29. These treaties have contributed to the expanding system of international agreements to control proliferation of new weapons or the introduction of weapons into new environments. They will gain much greater importance in the future.

30. The year 1970, the first year of the Disarmament Decade, has already been distinguished by resumption of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Since the talks are vital to the future maintenance of world peace, my delegation fervently hopes that concrete results will be achieved in the negotiations, and that they will serve as an example for all other disarmament negotiations.

31. International co-operation in seismology, and advances in seismological analysis in the detection of underground tests beyond 10 kilotons, have persuaded some Nobel Prize-winning scientists firmly to advocate the general nuclear test ban, without jeopardizing the security of any concerned party [*see A/C.1/1001*]. Other kinds of scientific control and verification should be devised to ensure that verification and supervision are foolproof, and to help dissolve suspicion—the main stumbling block in the way of disarmament. Development of impartial and objective supervision, verification, and, eventually inspection are considered a prerequisite to the achievement of a balanced and equitable disarmament. These actions can be conducted only by the United Nations—the Organization deserving the confidence of the super-Powers. That is one of the major tasks of this Organization, especially in the Disarmament Decade.

32. Technological and scientific progress opens new vistas to a happy future. If we could succeed in achieving general disarmament and releasing the tremendous amount of money, personnel and labour engaged in the armaments race, and if we could channel those resources from destructive to constructive fields, then we could bring about the real happiness of mankind. Under-development would be eliminated; poverty, disease and ignorance would be uprooted; scientific discoveries, strictly applied towards peaceful purposes, would contribute largely to raising the

<sup>5</sup> The Antarctic Treaty (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778).

<sup>6</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (*ibid.*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

<sup>7</sup> Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (*ibid.*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

<sup>8</sup> Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

standard of living, thinking, and feeling of mankind; radioactive pollution hazards such as fall-out would be eliminated; and science and culture, working hand-in-hand with nature's virginity, would cosmetically transform the face of our planet into one most agreeable in a universal contest of cosmic beauty.

33. All these dreams can be realized if—and only if—the progress of science goes hand-in-hand with sanity. The voice of wisdom and sanity should impregnate the actions of the world's leaders and politicians in their negotiations and drafting of treaties on disarmament. Every punctuation mark—each comma, semi-colon, and full stop—should reinforce in the drafters' minds this motto: science and sanity. Humanity cannot afford any mistake in this vital venture.

34. Arms reduction, general and complete disarmament, non-armament—this happy perspective is no false Utopia. It may be difficult to achieve, but it is not impossible. Nothing is impossible with goodwill, understanding and a common goal; and man's common goal, at the outset of this Disarmament Decade, is man's salvation.

35. Mr. GALINDO POHL (El Salvador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): As part of the seven items relating to disarmament, I should like to refer to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A] which is contained in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

36. Before speaking in this debate on a well-defined topic, I have ascertained that, in accordance with the interpretation of the Chair, it is possible at this stage not only to discuss the problems of disarmament generally, but also to deal specifically with one or more of the seven items that are being considered jointly.

37. I shall therefore proceed forthwith to review those sections of the draft treaty to which I have referred, which have prompted my delegation, after careful consideration, to formulate certain observations.

38. In referring to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,<sup>9</sup> signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958, the aforesaid draft treaty states that the outer limit of the denuclearized zone shall be coterminous with the outer limit of the 12 mile zone mentioned in part II of the Convention. On the basis of that reference, however, it cannot be assumed that we are thereby accepting, directly or indirectly, any of the formulas, terms, definitions or obligations of the Convention.

39. The reference to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone must have been designed to achieve, not an indirect or surreptitious acceptance of its clauses, but, more probably, to provide a shorter draft that would take advantage of the vast and detailed rules of measurement in part I, section II, of the aforesaid Convention through an all-encompassing reference to them. Its specific purpose could be none other than the adoption of the rules of measurement of the 12 mile zone which are laid

down in that Convention. Accordingly, if the draft treaty were approved in the language in which it is now proposed, the reference to the coterminous nature of the two zones would be designed solely to ensure the adoption of specific criteria for the delimitation of the denuclearized zone and no interpretation could assume that the concept of a contiguous zone which is established in the Convention had indirectly been adopted. With respect to the clauses of that Convention, a State would commit itself only through an express, categorical, clear and direct decision through the process of ratification or adherence.

40. To say the denuclearized zone of the sea-bed will be coterminous with the outer limit of 12 miles of the zone mentioned in part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone is to say in other words that it would coincide with the so-called contiguous zone. According to article 24, paragraph 2, of the aforesaid Convention, the contiguous zone cannot extend beyond 12 miles from the coast. The reference to the zone mentioned in part II of the Convention introduces into the draft treaty, by a tangential approach, the concept of a contiguous zone which, for the specific purposes of the draft treaty, is irrelevant; for it would be sufficient to indicate the outer limit of the denuclearized zone as beginning 12 miles from the coast and adopt *in extenso* the rules of measurement which make it possible to define that outer limit.

41. To avoid misunderstanding, and again in the interests of brevity, it would be possible to adopt the rules of measurement which are included in such detail in the aforementioned Convention, by using simple and direct language, if article II were to say, for example, that "for the purposes of the present treaty the outer limit of the zone of the sea-bed referred to in article I will be measured in accordance with the provisions of part I, section II, of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958". We would thus eliminate the reference to the coterminous nature of the two zones which, for the purposes of the rules of measurement, is a tautology. In addition, we could delete the words "and in accordance with international law", because the rules of measurement of the Convention are exhaustive and they leave nothing to general international law. If they did leave something to that law, however, it would be problems of interpretation which would be solved by the common and well-known methods of interpretation of treaties. It is not easy to see which rules of international law would coincide with the rules of section 2, part I, of the Geneva Convention in the delimitation of the outer limit of the denuclearized zone of the sea-bed.

42. Another alternative—which, of course, would not result in a saving of words but a superabundance instead—would be to include *in extenso* the rules of measurement in part I, section II, of the Convention, without mentioning the source, and thus we would be making use of those rules for what they are worth in and of themselves. My Government favours the latter solution, for we would be prepared to accept the amendment of article II of the draft treaty along these lines or, as a last resort, the alternate draft first mentioned by my delegation.

43. I shall proceed now to examine the problems concerning the coterminous nature of the outer limits of the

<sup>9</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477.



denuclearized zone and the zone mentioned in part II of the Geneva Convention.

44. Article II of the draft treaty states that "the outer limit of the sea-bed zone referred to in Article I shall be coterminous with the 12 mile outer limit of the zone referred to in part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone". But the Geneva Convention does not define the limit of the contiguous zone, which in the draft treaty is called, by a turn of phrase, "the zone referred to in part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone".

45. If that Convention stated that the contiguous zone measured 12 miles, we could talk about a coterminous relationship between the outer limit of the contiguous zone—or, to use the euphemism of the draft treaty "of the zone referred to in part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea"—and the outer limit of the denuclearized zone of the sea-bed. But no treaty states that the contiguous zone extends 12 miles from the coast. The Geneva Convention says something very different, namely, that the contiguous zone "may not extend beyond 12 miles". Accordingly, the breadth of the contiguous zone is not defined, and it can be less than 12 miles; in other words, it is defined only in its maximum limit.

46. How can we state that a specific zone such as the denuclearized zone of the sea-bed and the ocean floor is coterminous with a zone that is not defined and for which only the maximum width has been mentioned? This shows that the reference to the alleged coterminous relationship of the outer limits of the two zones, in addition to being informal for the purposes of the draft treaty, is in conflict with the rules which define the legal objectives of the Geneva Convention. The legal consistency of the clause concerning the coterminous status of the zones—article II of the draft treaty—is marred by the proposed text, and article II would have to be readjusted if this consistency is to be preserved intact.

47. On the assumption, without accepting the hypothesis, that part II of the Convention were to establish with certainty a zone the outer limit of which was 12 miles, in that case the coterminous relationship of the outer limits of the two zones would have to be established through a link which is not mentioned in the draft treaty. This missing link is the perpendicular plane that would extend from the 12 miles measured over the surface to its intersection with the sea-bed. The contiguous zone is a concept of surface, while the denuclearized zone of the sea-bed and the ocean floor reflects another concept. The horizontal plane of the contiguous zone and the inclined plane of the sea-bed do not directly coincide. The denuclearized zone does not coincide, physically speaking, with the contiguous zone, but rather with a boundary of that zone resulting from the intersection of a vertical plane drawn along the length of the horizontal limit of 12 miles. Normally, no matter how gentle the slope of the sea-bed in the areas adjacent to the coast, the distance from this line of intersection, in relation to the coast, must be more than 12 miles, and the steeper the incline of the sea-bed, the more it will exceed 12 miles. This is a very simple and well-known truth based on the geometry of triangles.

48. I turn now to the point that the prohibition established would be subject to an exception concerning the territorial sea.

49. Article I, paragraph 2, of the draft treaty provides that in a certain area of the sea-bed the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons shall not apply either to the coastal State or to the sea-bed beneath its territorial waters. The words "or to the sea-bed beneath its territorial waters" are misleading, since it is well known and recognized that there is no international rule governing the breadth of the territorial sea. The fact that this is a problem that is still pending and is recognized as such by the United Nations as demonstrated by the fact that we have added to the agenda of the General Assembly, as item 25 (d), the "Question of the breadth of the territorial sea and related matters", a question which has been allocated to the First Committee.

50. The inclusion in a treaty of such a controversial concept, which the parties would construe differently, is not consistent with the precision required in international obligations. From its very inception, the treaty would carry with it a misleading element and we would all know that it existed.

51. Moreover, I do not see the need of this reference for the purposes of denuclearization, because it would be sufficient to say that the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons shall not apply to the zone which extends 12 miles from the coast.

52. The reference to which I have alluded, however, might be a reflection of the purpose discernible in some clauses of the draft treaty since it came to the General Assembly accompanied by the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1969,<sup>10</sup> namely, to bring in other international conventions. In the reference that I have been commenting on we might once again discern the subtle, indirect, discreet and clever introduction of the concepts used in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. As a matter of fact, the clauses of that convention with respect to the territorial sea amply correspond to and fit in with the text of the draft treaty.

53. To say that the absolute commitment concerning the emplacement of nuclear weapons applies to the zone of the sea-bed beyond 12 miles of the coast, and to make an exception with respect to the territorial sea, is to presuppose, if the clauses are to be consistent with themselves, that the territorial sea cannot be wider than twelve miles.

54. For the purposes of the treaty, I do not see that it is necessary to touch on the problem of territorial waters, because it would be sufficient merely to state that the obligations contracted in accordance with article I, paragraph 1—the prohibition of the emplacement of atomic weapons—would not be applicable to the coastal zone of 12 miles. The States parties to the Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone would have no problem whatever with this language, which serves discreetly to favour their contractual rights and obligations.

<sup>10</sup> 10 *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232, annex A.

But the States which consider that a great part of maritime law still remains to be written would like to have the treaty on the denuclearization of the sea-bed and ocean floor confined to simple, plain, clear and categorical compliance with its objectives.

55. It should be observed that last year, in article I, paragraph 2, the draft treaty established the exception solely for the coastal States and said nothing about territorial waters. The question of the reasons which might have led to the inclusion of this reference to territorial waters is something that does not appear in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and, therefore, it is left open to conjecture.

56. I turn now to the question of the freedom of action of the coastal State with respect to the emplacement of nuclear weapons in an area adjacent to its coast.

57. Article I, paragraph 2, was conceived so that the coastal States could freely emplace nuclear weapons within an area 12 miles from their coasts. At least this becomes clear from the evolution of the draft treaty, if one studies the 1969 report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In the course of the negotiations on the draft treaty, it was thought that this freedom could be exercised by the coastal State or by another State with which the coastal State might reach an understanding. This appears in the records of the debates held at Geneva.

58. None the less, the text of article I, paragraph 2, of the draft treaty is open to misunderstanding. For since it follows upon an absolutely binding commitment—that is to say, the obligation contained in article I, paragraph 1—it should be understood as a strictly legal interpretation and therefore as making a single and exclusive exception in favour of the coastal State, and not of other States which might reach an understanding with the coastal State. In other words, the coastal State, and only the coastal State, could emplace nuclear weapons in the 12 mile coastal strip. Thus, licences, leases, concessions or any other type of agreement on this point would be ruled out.

59. Apparently this has not been the intention of the drafters of this article. To avoid misunderstanding, however, article I, paragraph 2, should be drafted more clearly, and to this end it would be sufficient to state that the prohibition in article I, paragraph 1, would not apply to a specific coastal strip—that is to say, the 12 mile zone. Of course, if what we want is that the coastal State alone, and no other State that may come to an understanding with it, can use the coastal strip for the emplacement of atomic devices, even then the proposed text should be clarified.

60. The draft treaty establishes two different systems governing the same zone. Setting aside national positions for the moment, there are still difficulties in the draft treaty that cannot be ignored, even if they are looked at favourably in view of our understanding of the important objectives of this draft.

61. The more one studies the draft treaty the more doubts crop up. Some of its clauses do not seem very easy to understand, or perhaps they draw on a peculiar lexicon which has not been made available to delegations. One of

its provisions at least does not really say what it probably was intended to say. Article I, paragraph 1, refers to the zone of the sea-bed that would be denuclearized and only that denuclearized zone is referred to and nothing else.

62. I confess that I have read this clause over and over again. I have mentally rearranged the order of its parts and I have always come to the conclusion that it refers solely and exclusively to the zone of the sea-bed which would be denuclearized. Well then, if paragraph 2 of this same article I is to have any meaning and relevance it cannot refer to the same zone mentioned in paragraph 1, but rather it must regulate the zone which extends 12 miles from the coast.

63. None the less, article I, paragraph 2, states that “The undertakings of paragraph 1 of this Article”—that is, the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons—“shall also apply to the sea-bed zone referred to in the same paragraph,”—and I repeat, “in the same paragraph”; of course we understand they are referring to paragraph 1—“except that within such sea-bed zone, they shall not apply either to the coastal State or to the sea-bed beneath its territorial waters”. Consequently, paragraph 2 is referring to the same zone as that to which paragraph 1 refers, and yet the legal consequences established in each of these two paragraphs are different, for the first creates the absolute prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and in the second an exception is made to that prohibition in favour of the coastal State.

64. In point of fact, in the zone situated more than 12 miles from the coast that would be denuclearized, no State could install nuclear weapons or any other type of weapons of mass destruction or any structures, launching installations, or other installations intended specifically for the stockpiling, installing or utilization of such weapons. In that way an absolute, total and unconditional prohibition, without any exceptions whatsoever, would be established.

65. If article I, paragraph 2, is to have any meaning as to the legal consequences it establishes—and I am referring to the exception made with respect to the coastal State and the territorial waters—it cannot refer to the same zone as discussed in paragraph 1, but rather to some different zone. And to this end I would venture the thought that perhaps the text was trying to say that the coastal zone of 12 miles should not be subject to the absolute prohibition of paragraph 1 but rather that the coastal State concerned would be allowed to use this strip for its own nuclear installations. That is a hypothesis, because that is not what the draft treaty says.

66. Article I, paragraphs 1 and 2, therefore, should not refer to the same zone, because if so, they would subject the same area to two different régimes and, therefore, would infringe the principles governing contradiction. But the texts under review state that the zone situated beyond the 12 miles of the coast would be subject to the absolute prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons—article I, paragraph 1—and subject to that prohibition, with the exception of the case of the coastal State and its territorial waters which is taken up in article I, paragraph 2. Consequently, the same zone located beyond 12 miles from the coast would be subject on the one hand to a system of



total prohibition—article I, paragraph 1—and on the other hand subject in the very next line to a régime of prohibition which would make an exception of the coastal State and its territorial waters. It could certainly not have been the intention of the draft treaty to grant to the coastal State the right to emplace atomic weapons on the sea-bed which some other State would consider subject to its national jurisdiction.

67. We must therefore take into account the hypothesis that article I, paragraph 2, must have been meant to refer not to the same zone referred to in paragraph 1, but rather to a different zone. Indeed, the internal logic of the draft treaty requires that article I, paragraphs 1 and 2, should refer to different zones, one zone being subject to absolute prohibition and the other subject to relative prohibition and not that they should refer to the same zone, as stated in the text on which I am commenting.

68. However, as the draft has been drawn up, not only in article I, paragraphs 1 and 2, is there reference to the same zone, but article II also states expressly that in article I they are talking of one single zone. For article II contains the following statement: "For the purpose of this Treaty the outer limit of the sea-bed zone referred to in Article I shall be coterminous", and article I has three paragraphs, the first two of which create the problem that I have mentioned. In article II we are being told that in article I reference is made to one zone because the text mentions: "the outer limit of the sea-bed zone referred to in Article I".

69. Article III of the draft treaty restates the idea that article I refers only to one zone and accordingly presses the point that paragraphs 1 and 2, which are constituent parts of article I, deal with the same object. Article III, paragraph 1, talks of the same "zone referred to in Article I"—the same "zone" in the singular. Therefore, throughout the structure of the draft treaty we continue to find the same object subject to two different régimes. The whole draft treaty is affected by this subjection of the same zone to different régimes.

70. Within the structure of the draft treaty I cannot ascertain how or why the same zone is subject, according to one provision to an absolute prohibition, and in the language of another clause, to a relative prohibition. Which of the two régimes with different legal consequences shall prevail—since they deal with the same subject, the denuclearization zone of the sea-bed—is something that I would not venture to suggest at this time.

71. I turn now to the lack of definition of the zones where the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and the right of verification would apply.

72. Article I, paragraph 1, prohibits the installation of nuclear weapons "beyond the outer limit of a sea-bed zone as defined in article II". Article II states that the outer limit of the sea-bed zone referred to in article I shall be coterminous with the 12 mile outer limit of the zone referred to in part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.

73. The prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons should not be carried out "beyond a sea-bed zone as

defined in article II" as is stated in the draft, but rather in the zone of the sea-bed as defined in article II. To say that this prohibition affects the area beyond the zone defined in article II is to allege that it is beyond that zone when, on the contrary, what we are talking about is that it should apply to what would normally be understood to be the denuclearized zone, beyond the limits of 12 miles from the shore.

74. Article III, paragraph 1, which establishes the right of verification, presses the point of defining the space in which this right shall be exercised as "beyond the zone referred to in article I". The zone to which reference is made in article I and its two sub-paragraphs is the same as that referred to in article II. Here again we would have to delete the word "beyond" and refer to the corresponding zone.

75. The misunderstanding comes to light again, because, in the way in which article III is drafted, the zone in which the right of verification would have effect is located "beyond the zone referred to in article I" and since the zone mentioned in article I is the denuclearized zone, what lies beyond that area is the coastal strip of 12 miles. Is it a question of allowing the right of verification to apply in the 12 mile zone? I raise the question.

76. Article II contains mention of two zones: the denuclearized zone and the 12 mile strip, and it is said that the outer limits of both are coterminous. When reference is made in article III to the zone mentioned in article I, we must bear in mind that article I refers in turn to article II and therefore, in article III, reference is made to the denuclearized zone. The subject of this sentence in article II is the denuclearized zone, and the 12 mile strip appears as a complement. What article II deals with, therefore, is the denuclearized zone. To say in article III that the right of verification shall be exercised beyond the zone mentioned in article I which in turn refers to article II or, in other words, beyond the denuclearized zone, is tantamount to saying that it would be exercised outside that denuclearized zone. This conclusion is not altered by the reference that article I makes to article II because in the latter article the subject of the sentence, what the drafters are talking about, is the denuclearized zone, and the 12 mile zone mentioned in part II of the Geneva Convention stands as a complement. By such phraseology, therefore, the right of verification, could be established in the long run for a zone which is not precisely the denuclearized zone.

77. But apparently the right of verification would have to be exercised outside the 12 mile strip, because otherwise one could not explain why article III, paragraph 6, states that this right shall be exercised with due regard, *inter alia*, for freedom of the high seas, and that other States of the region, as well as the coastal State, can participate in the verification activities.

78. The repeated use of the word "beyond" in various articles of the draft treaty means that the obligations contracted in the long run refer to any zone except the one that we wish to exclude from the possible emplacement of nuclear weapons. The objectives subjected to different legal consequences therefore appear elusive, fleeting, and no matter how much one tries, it is not possible to grasp them.

Thus the hypothesis still stands that what the proposed text says is probably not what it was intended to say.

79. I turn now to the general approach of the draft treaty.

80. In the case of this draft treaty, what is happening is what has happened with other conventions. It should be limited to its purpose and not try to take advantage of the situation to solve other controversial matters which will be studied, debated and solved in due course. Therefore we may well deplore the fact that a draft treaty of such importance as the one that I am discussing has gone beyond its objectives and creates problems for certain States so that, from its inception, by virtue of the expansionist concept that prevails, it jeopardizes the universality which is its very essence.

81. The safeguard clause contained in article VII of the draft treaty is very well drafted, but it is insufficient to cover the positions mentioned in respect of maritime law. This safeguard clause does not alter the implications of the draft treaty concerning certain controversial questions such as the contiguous zone and territorial sea in the Geneva Convention and, of course, it has no effect on the various ambiguities that have been mentioned.

82. My Government fully supports the denuclearization of the sea-bed, but, as I had occasion to state in this Committee at the twenty-fourth session in 1969 [*1698th meeting*], when this draft treaty was first discussed, it does not appear to us to be appropriate, useful or necessary to bring into the problem of denuclearization controversial matters concerning the law of the sea, nor is it wise through indirect references to allow formulas of conventions that have received minority support in the international community to filter through into the text. Through such indirect references we could go on piling up minor antecedents which if repeated would increase the political advantages of certain theories of maritime law.

83. The criticisms levelled at the draft treaty do not alter my Government's attitude of full participation in the attainment of its proposed objectives. But although my country supports the policy of the great sea Powers in matters of the sea, a good many of the observations I have made could not have been left unsaid, because of the interest aroused by the draft treaty to which I have referred.

84. It is in the interests of all contracting parties that the obligations undertaken should be precise and clear; we cannot faithfully discharge our responsibilities on the basis of ambiguity or obscurity and even less on the basis of contradiction.

85. My delegation regrets that it has been compelled to speak in dissident terms, after the praise and tributes paid to the draft treaty. Some of our observations reflect our well defined national policy with respect to the law of the sea; others, however, are not linked to our national position.

86. The draft treaty does not appropriately define the two zones of the sea-bed, one of which would under the treaty be submitted to total denuclearization while the other, the

coastal zone, would be made an exception to this prohibition with respect to coastal States. That defect pervades the entire structure of the treaty, which pivots on this confusion between the legal objectives and its provisions because it refers to a single zone subject to two régimes, one of total prohibition and the other of relative prohibition. Where reference should have been made to the denuclearized zone with respect to the right of verification, mention is made of what lies beyond that zone, that is to say the coastal strip, which remains totally under national jurisdiction.

87. Accordingly, for the reasons I have outlined, my delegation cannot support draft resolution A/C.1/L.523 of 6 November 1970, which is now sponsored by 36 states.

88. The following, in summary, is my delegation's appraisal of the draft treaty.

89. It represents a magnificent goal, dealt with by inappropriate means.

90. It is an example of an exceedingly noble effort to unify the wishes of the international community, an effort which bears within it the germs of dissidence and the seeds of the division of this community.

91. It pursues an objective shared by all Members of the United Nations without exception, but it goes beyond that objective and tries to settle tangentially or by implication other problems of law of the sea.

92. It is a very fine draft, but some of its parts suffer as a result of ambiguity.

93. Finally, it is an infant that deserves to be nurtured and it should therefore be saved and made viable through a common effort of understanding and collaboration.

94. Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): At the conclusion of the disarmament debate last year the General Assembly declared the 1970s the Disarmament Decade [*resolution 2602 E (XXIV)*]. That declaration should, I believe, be understood as an expression of confidence on the part of the Member States of this Organization in the prospects of making real and substantial progress in the field of disarmament and arms control in the years to come. Nor is that confidence misplaced. The past decade, the 1960s, has seen limited yet important achievements in the form of multilateral arms control agreements. Although there is no reason for complacency, it would, in our view, be equally wrong to belittle the importance of the results already achieved or to despair of the possibilities of future progress. Frustration and recrimination will not advance our common cause. A modicum of optimism coupled with a realistic assessment of the possibilities and limits of those possibilities is much more likely to do so.

95. It is to state the obvious to say that the ambitious goals set for the Disarmament Decade can only be translated into reality by the concerted and determined efforts of all Governments concerned. We all have an equal interest in disarmament. Weapons of mass destruction are a threat to everyone. They pose a threat to the strong as well as to the weak, to the allied as well as to the neutral, to

developing and developed alike. At the beginning of the last decade the destructive power of the tens of thousands of megatons in the arsenals of nuclear Powers was said to constitute a danger beyond imagination. Since then the stockpiles of nuclear weapons have multiplied both in quantity and in quality. Another round of the nuclear arms race, if not halted in time, would increase even further the threat posed by nuclear weapons. And that is not all. We also have to take into account the dangers inherent in the development of other types of weapons of mass destruction, notably the chemical and bacteriological weapons.

96. It is right, therefore, that in declaring the 1970s the Disarmament Decade the General Assembly should have paid special attention to the need to work out a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In that context, my delegation wishes to express its appreciation for the efforts of the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia, which have resulted in a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 42]. As we understand it, the purpose of that draft is to provide a basis for future discussion and negotiation.

97. The beginning of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the two leading nuclear Powers provides an auspicious start for the Disarmament Decade. Finland is proud once again to offer its neutral ground as a site for those important negotiations, which entered their third phase last week in Helsinki.

98. Until now disarmament negotiations have resulted in a number of collateral arms control measures designed to limit the political and security risks caused by the continuing nuclear arms race. Each of those measures has its value as a practical step towards making the world more secure from the devastation of nuclear war. Yet none of the measures so far agreed upon has touched the core of the threat posed by nuclear armaments. That is now being done for the first time in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

99. By pursuing their talks on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons systems the two leading nuclear Powers are in fact fulfilling the pledge given in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date". The continuation of the talks in itself constitutes an arms control measure of vital importance to the preservation of peace. The strategic dialogue now initiated between the United States and the Soviet Union promises to become a continuous process of exchanging views and information and of building mutual confidence. That confidence, in turn, is a necessary prerequisite for any future progress in disarmament and arms control.

100. Measured in political terms, the intrinsic value of the talks on the limitation of strategic armaments is obvious. It is no exaggeration to say that the outcome of the talks will largely determine not only the prospect of further progress in the field of disarmament and arms control, but also the future trend of international relations as a whole. There are now indications that the parties have made some progress in their efforts to reach substantive agreement, and this

encourages us to believe that the hopes with which the whole world follows these talks will not be disappointed.

101. Another important event in the field of nuclear arms control is the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty. My delegation continues to be convinced of the fundamental importance of that Treaty as a corner-stone, as it were, of a vast and complex system which is beginning to evolve for the purpose of keeping nuclear arms under control. It is, furthermore, an encouraging demonstration that practical results can be achieved in the field of disarmament and arms control by persistent effort and patient negotiation. We should not forget, however, that the edifice of the non-proliferation Treaty is as yet far from complete. A number of countries whose nuclear potentialities make them key countries in the context of the non-proliferation Treaty remain outside the Treaty, while others have so far only signed but not yet ratified it. The building of a network of safeguard agreements under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency is still at its initial stages. While it is natural that, after the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty, our interest would focus on new arms-control projects, the efforts on behalf of the non-proliferation Treaty—particularly in the way of widening its field of application and of putting its provisions into practical effect—should not be neglected. In this context, it is a source of some satisfaction to my delegation to mention that Finland is the first country which, after the completion of the necessary preparatory work, has now initiated formal negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to concluding a safeguard agreement in accordance with article III of the non-proliferation Treaty.

102. My country has continued to follow closely the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by dispatching special observers to Geneva. The main operative result of the work of the Conference at its last session is the new draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A]. It is the opinion of my delegation that the new draft presented jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union represents a considerable improvement over the earlier version which the Assembly considered last year.<sup>11</sup> The main improvements consist of the new verification provisions, particularly in the fact that henceforth verification also will be possible through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Another significant improvement is the new article V of the draft, where the parties undertake to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. My delegation welcomes these improvements and notes with satisfaction that the new draft treaty enjoys the practically unanimous support of the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It should now be the task of the General Assembly to convert the draft into an international instrument and to open it for signature and ratification. The Finnish delegation has joined with other delegations in sponsoring a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.523] to that effect.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

103. Although the sea-bed treaty avowedly is a limited step, it is another step in the right direction. It is our view that its main importance lies in carrying forward, as it does, the momentum of negotiation and agreement which we hope will continue in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The completion of the new sea-bed treaty also goes to show that the enlargement of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has not had any adverse effect on its work. On the contrary, the Conference seems to have gained by the change. It is now more representative than before and can therefore be expected better to fulfil its function as a main forum for international disarmament efforts.

104. Another question to which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has continued to devote considerable attention concerns the testing of nuclear weapons. My delegation continues to believe that this question occupies a key position in the whole complex problem of nuclear arms. While we recognize that this question is intimately linked with the issues discussed in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Helsinki, this should not prevent the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament from continuing its work on the subject so that it can act quickly whenever the political conditions for its solution are at hand. In this respect, I have in mind particularly the technical aspect of the problem, which concerns the verification of compliance with an eventual comprehensive test-ban treaty. Considerable progress has in fact been made in recent years in the search for international co-operation in the development of adequate seismological methods for the detection and identification of underground nuclear events. My delegation has noted with satisfaction the encouraging response that has been forthcoming from the great number of Governments [see A/7967/Rev.1] in the context of the Secretary-General's questionnaire requesting information in connexion with the creation of a world-wide exchange of seismological data. We particularly welcome the efforts of the Canadian delegation in this matter. As last year, my delegation will be happy to join the Canadian delegation in sponsoring a draft resolution which seeks to carry this work further.

105. The question of chemical and biological weapons has rightly been an item of priority on the agenda of the Conference Committee on Disarmament at its last session. In this respect, the work done in Geneva has greatly enhanced our knowledge of certain key technical questions related to these weapons. My delegation would also like to pay tribute to the work carried out on these problems by private research institutes, notably the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

106. One of the most important and basic documents in this field is the Geneva Protocol of 1925.<sup>12</sup> In view of the universal acceptance of its continued validity, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the provisions of the Geneva Protocol have become part of customary international law also with respect to those States which, for one reason or another, have not yet adhered to it. As to the

problems connected with the scope of the rules and prohibitions of the Protocol, the Finnish delegation would like to suggest that the most natural way to deal with this might well be to consider the possibility of requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, the supreme authority on international law and the main judicial organ of this Organization, particularly since interpretation of treaties is one of the principal tasks given to the International Court of Justice in its Statute.

107. In view of the complexity of the problems connected with chemical and bacteriological weapons, particularly those relating to control and verification, much more information than now available is still needed before effective and practical action can be taken. We have therefore been pleased to note the declaration of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in paragraph 35 of its report [A/8059-DC/233], to the effect that the Committee intends to continue intensive work in this field with the aim of reaching an agreement on the subject. It is our impression that during the discussions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament a number of ideas have already emerged, which, if properly developed, could be combined into elements on which an acceptable compromise could be based. An early agreement on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons is, in the view of the Finnish delegation, imperative, not only because of the threat posed by those weapons, but also as a necessary link in the continuing process of disarmament and for the positive impact such an agreement would have on the international situation in general.

108. Mr. SHEVEL (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): This session of the General Assembly has convincingly demonstrated the need to resolve the principal political problems, above all, the problem of strengthening international peace and security. It is universally recognized that one effective and reliable means to that end is disarmament, the freeing of mankind from the arms race, which imposes a heavy burden on nations and which, in our time, is fraught with the dangers of thermonuclear war.

109. We should like to point out that, in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General gives a prominent place to this problem and draws our attention to the following very significant fact:

“While at the present time the military expenditures of the industrial countries for both nuclear and conventional armaments represent more than 85 per cent of the total world military expenditure, there has been a regrettable tendency in recent years for the military budgets of the developing countries to increase at a greater percentage rate than that of the world total, which now exceeds \$200,000 million a year.”<sup>13</sup>

110. The Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations [resolution 2627 (XXV)] sums up, as it were, this general concern and calls upon “all Governments to renew their determination

<sup>12</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

<sup>13</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 20.

to make concrete progress towards the elimination of the arms race and the achievement of the final goal—general and complete disarmament under effective international control”.

111. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has favoured and continues to favour active negotiations on general and complete disarmament. We do so because we believe that in solving this problem, the most important thing is to avert the threat of a nuclear war. That, in our view, is the most important and effective criterion in disarmament matters.

112. The implementation of partial measures in the limitation of nuclear armaments is gratifying in this respect. I refer to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,<sup>14</sup> the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [*resolution 2222 (XXI), annex*], which prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit around the Earth, on the moon or on other celestial bodies, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*].

113. Now we can note with satisfaction that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, whose report [*A/8059-DC/233*] we have carefully studied, has prepared and submitted a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*ibid., annex A*].

114. The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic fully approves and supports the draft treaty in question, which, after its entry into force, will become one of the most important international instruments promoting the interests of all peoples.

115. This draft treaty is a tangible result of many years of effort on the part of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and other peace-loving States to ensure that the sea-bed and ocean floor are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

116. The revised draft treaty submitted for consideration at this session of the General Assembly was prepared in the course of lengthy negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly, with the participation of virtually all States Members of the United Nations. The draft treaty reflects the views and the proposals of many States which have been carefully studied and considered from every angle. Therefore it may be stated with full assurance that the draft treaty embodies the positions and views of a wide range of States.

117. At the same time, it should be emphasized that, although any international instrument is worked out on the basis of compromise and mutual concessions, it is impossible for each such instrument, including this draft treaty, to include all the amendments proposed and conform fully to the views of all the participants in the negotiations.

118. We would therefore appeal to those delegations wishing to submit amendments to the text of the draft treaty to take note that the draft treaty is a balanced document reflecting an acceptable balance between the interests of various States.

119. The importance of the treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor consists primarily in the fact that when it enters into force it will initiate the utilization of two thirds of the earth's surface for exclusively peaceful purposes. Hence the paramount importance of article V of the draft treaty, which refers to the obligation of parties to this international instrument “to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof”.

120. We also completely agree with the proposal submitted by the Polish delegation on 18 June 1970 in the Committee on Disarmament that that body should keep on its agenda the question of the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed [*see CCD/PV.471*].

121. The merit of this revised draft treaty, apart from everything else, lies in the fact that it provides for a flexible and at the same time reliable system of verifying the fulfilment by States Parties of the obligations they have assumed. Article III, in its revised form, contains provisions relating to the observation of the activities of other States Parties to the treaty, notification of States Parties of any doubts which may arise concerning compliance with the treaty, co-operation and consultation between Parties, including any coastal State, notification of the results of verification and, lastly, inspection. In addition, the draft treaty provides that States shall have the right to appeal directly to the Security Council, which may take action in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

122. Guided by these considerations, the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic fully supports the draft treaty submitted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.523. We invite other delegations to support this document, so that the treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof may be approved by the General Assembly at this session and open for signature at the earliest possible date.

123. The problem of prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons occupies an important place in disarmament matters. Some of the possible consequences of the use of such weapons are described convincingly enough in the well-known report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on this question.<sup>15</sup>

124. Even if these weapons of mass destruction are not used but simply kept in military stockpiles while research continues into new types of chemical and bacteriological

<sup>15</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

<sup>14</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

means of inflicting disease, the threat to the security of mankind remains, generating distrust in relations between States and causing a deterioration in the international atmosphere. That is one of the points to which attention is drawn by the authors of a recently published report by a group of WHO consultants, which states:

“As long as chemical and biological research directed specifically to military use is continued, it will be considered necessary by some countries to continue research towards detection of and protection against such agents. This research could in itself point to agents more destructive than those now existing. In view of the power of existing agents in conditions favourable to their use and the possibility of developing new and even more dangerous weapons, it is imperative to find ways of abolishing any presumed need for this militarily orientated research as soon as possible.”<sup>16</sup>

125. Thus the problem of a complete ban on chemical and bacteriological weapons has become extremely urgent.

126. Discussion in the General Assembly, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in other international forums and the many statements made by scientists, statesmen and politicians, convincingly demonstrate that there is now a general demand among broad social strata in all countries of the world for the complete exclusion of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare from the life of human society.

127. Today, in contrast to the past, the problem of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons has passed from the stage of general discussion to the stage of preparing and agreeing on a specific draft agreement concerning such a prohibition. A year ago, at the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the delegations of nine socialist countries, including the Ukrainian SSR, submitted a draft international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons.<sup>17</sup> A revised draft convention has now been submitted [A/8136], which was convincingly introduced in this Committee a few days ago by the distinguished representative of Poland [1748th meeting].

128. We believe that this draft convention opens the way to a solution of the problem of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

129. The far-ranging discussion of this problem, both in the United Nations General Assembly and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, has clearly determined the positions of States and has revealed both the points of agreement and the points on which there are differences of opinion.

130. The main difficulty continues to lie in the approach to a solution of the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

<sup>16</sup> *Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons* (World Health Organization, Geneva 1970), section 9.

<sup>17</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 104, document A/7655.

131. Common sense, logic and many objective factors suggest that there is only one correct approach: that it is essential to solve the problem of prohibiting simultaneously and completely the development, production and stockpiling of both chemical and bacteriological weapons. That is the approach on which the draft convention of the nine socialist countries is based.

132. The sponsors of the draft convention have repeatedly expounded the arguments in favour of a simultaneous approach to a solution of this problem. These arguments may be summarized as follows.

133. Such an approach is justified from the scientific standpoint, since, although there are certain differences between these types of weapons, it is nevertheless very often difficult to draw any clear distinction between them. It is no accident that the world-famous scientists who took part in preparing the well-known report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use considered these two types of weapons as a single problem. The same approach was also adopted by another group of prominent scientists which took part in preparing the report of a World Health Organization group of consultants.

134. From the military standpoint, too, there is no essential difference between these types of weapons, since they act exclusively on living tissue and can be used for both tactical and strategic purposes. The ways in which both types of weapons can be used and the methods of delivery for both are very similar.

135. On the political level, chemical and bacteriological weapons have also been considered together. Suffice it to refer to the Geneva Protocol of 1925,<sup>18</sup> whose provisions are simultaneously applicable to both chemical and bacteriological weapons. The resolutions of the General Assembly on the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons are also based on a simultaneous approach to the prohibition of these methods of warfare.

136. The delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and a few other countries insist that the prohibition of biological weapons should be dealt with now in a separate agreement, but that the prohibition of chemical weapons should be postponed for an indefinite period.

137. We cannot possibly agree to that approach and we consider that, at a time when chemical weapons are not only being produced and stockpiled in military arsenals but are also being widely used in the military operations being conducted in various parts of the world, it is of the utmost importance that we should not postpone a decision on the prohibition of these dreadful weapons but that we should prohibit them, simultaneously and fully, along with biological weapons.

138. In trying to find a compromise solution and to overcome the existing disagreements on an approach to a solution of this problem, some delegations have put

<sup>18</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).



forward the idea of working out two or more parallel agreements. However, that course is no less fraught with danger. Nobody can deny that some countries, for one reason or another, may wish to accede to only one of the agreements—let us say, to the one prohibiting bacteriological weapons. If that happens, then such a State would not consider chemical weapons as being prohibited and it would continue as in the past to produce and stockpile that type of weapon. Thus the problem of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons would remain unsolved.

139. The second difference of principle which has emerged in the course of the discussions in the General Assembly and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is bound up with the problem of ensuring compliance with the agreement on the prohibition of the production of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare.

140. In solving this problem we must, first of all, bear in mind that one feature of chemical and bacteriological weapons is that their production is closely and specifically connected with the peaceful production of chemical substances and bacteriological products. Verification through the establishment of control posts or inspection groups is, therefore, neither possible nor practical. The revised draft convention of the socialist countries provides for a combination of national and international means and procedures. Article V gives States Parties an opportunity to abide strictly by the terms of the Convention through various legislative and administrative measures. Article VI provides for international co-operation in solving problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of the Convention. Article VII provides that States Parties shall be entitled to lodge a complaint with the Security Council if the actions of any other State Party constitute a breach of the obligations assumed under the Convention and that the Security Council shall undertake an investigation of such complaints and States Parties shall undertake to co-operate in carrying out any such investigations.

141. The very fact of establishing such a procedure for the consideration of complaints, over and above its direct purpose, is important also because it will have a restraining influence on possible breaches of the agreement.

142. The Ukrainian delegation believes that this session of the General Assembly should be marked by an important decision on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The resolution which must be adopted should not only refer the existing proposals and documents to the Committee on Disarmament; it should be a clear political mandate, directing the activities of the Committee towards the urgent and simultaneous solution of the problem of prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling and the destruction of both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

143. This is the spirit in which draft resolution A/C.1/L.527 submitted by the delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland and has been prepared. Our delegation fully supports this draft resolution and invites other delegations to do the same.

144. In the course of the debates, many speakers have paid considerable attention to the problem of general and complete disarmament and have noted with concern the unsatisfactory state of affairs in that regard. We cannot, it is true, endorse the pessimistic view that the whole history of the consideration of the question of disarmament in the United Nations is one of failure and complete despair.

145. The achievement of an understanding on a number of questions, which has been reflected in the conclusion of the agreements limiting the nuclear arms race, to which I have already referred, demonstrates that it is possible to solve the problem of disarmament and is at the same time an incentive to further progress.

146. The enormous importance of the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks now going on between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States has already been referred to here. We are convinced that the fact that questions of nuclear disarmament are now coming to the forefront is dictated by life itself.

147. Both in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the course of this current debate, important documents and proposals on disarmament have been put forward, including proposals for a 10-year disarmament programme. We support the idea of working out such a programme, which should comprise effective proposals aimed at halting the arms race and at reaching agreement on urgent disarmament measures. All this should be the result of persistent joint efforts by States, mutual negotiations and concerted action. We believe that the task of working out a disarmament programme should be entrusted to the body which is best fitted for it, that is to say, the Committee on Disarmament. Past experience in the preparation of existing agreements shows the usefulness of such an approach.

148. This is why we cannot agree to the idea of setting up any new bodies, in particular, to the proposal by the Philippines delegation that a General Assembly Committee on the Disarmament Decade should be established. We think that such machinery would be artificial and would introduce unnecessary duplication and confusion into the work on disarmament. In our view, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is the best body for this purpose, and it has already demonstrated its effectiveness. Our delegation believes that the task of drafting a disarmament programme could best be carried out by that body.

149. In this statement we have dwelt on some important aspects of disarmament. We reserve the right to express our views on the draft resolutions that have already been submitted or that will be submitted in the future.

150. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): The United Nations has, to date, proved extremely incompetent in dealing with the urgent and dangerous question of disarmament, which has brought the survival of the human race into question. Even the solemn Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations [*resolution 2627(XXV)*] was extremely disappointing when viewed from the standpoint of disarmament. It failed to establish a solid link between the so-called Disarmament Decade—which the 1970s is supposed to

be—and the Second United Nations Development Decade—which is to coincide with the same period. More regrettably, the document adopted a rather resigned attitude towards the failure of the United Nations in the matter. In this field we are not only confronted with failure but with the utmost despair.

151. In my delegation's view, such an attitude is very serious and foreboding, because what we are actually doing is refusing to come to grips with the basic problem: that of the survival of the human race. That problem is more than political; it is one of fundamental importance. It is not a problem to be dealt with by polemics, but a human problem to be solved by the utmost imagination and determination of man himself, who created the problem in the first place.

152. We have now embarked again on a discussion of the disarmament items. Once again at this session, as at so many previous ones, we shall no doubt stress the importance, the relevance and the crucial nature of the items under consideration; and at the end we shall adopt resolutions which show clearly how important these discussions have been. However, there are grounds for fearing that these will prove to be mere empty words, while the deeds that are necessary for ensuring that the disarmament problem ceases to be one will be lacking. We may re-emphasize that disarmament is essential, but nevertheless the world—and especially the super-Powers—may go on building arsenals of doom and despair; for this ritual has been repeated year after year, since the first resolution was adopted by the General Assembly, a resolution which tried to deal with the problems of disarmament.

153. We are prepared to accept that the problem of disarmament is not one that can easily be dealt with. We are prepared to be patient, but this patience which many of us have exercised over the years has now become a convenient disguise and justification for any nation not willing to disarm. At present, the prospects for disarmament are bleaker and gloomier than they were in 1961, when my country joined this Organization. And the very word "disarmament" has lost its original meaning; today it really stands for non-armament or arms limitation. The fact is that we are gradually sliding closer to the brink of nuclear warfare with its catastrophic consequences.

154. These may seem to be harsh or pessimistic words. But do they not give a fair appraisal of the actual situation that has prevailed so far? When the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water<sup>19</sup>—the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty—was signed, we were told it was a step towards the cessation of all nuclear tests. It was followed by a voluntary moratorium on testing; but that was short-lived and States soon resumed their dangerous competition in the experimental development of more sophisticated nuclear weapons. The present position is that more nuclear weapons are tested annually than before the Moscow treaty.

155. When the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] was being discussed, promises were made that the adoption of the Treaty

would go a long way towards achieving disarmament, but the fact is that the Treaty merely anticipates a period of 25 years, which may be extended for another 25 years, before all nuclear weapons are eliminated. Thus the Treaty condemns nuclear disarmament to virtual oblivion, with the underlying theory that the danger which faces humanity does not lie in the weapons themselves but in their holders and possessors. The Treaty contains a limitation on the sovereignty of some States and does not contain the necessary limitations of nuclear weapons. In the Treaty, nuclear weapons are treated as of value for the human race provided they remain in the possession of powerful, "adult and responsible" nations.

156. Vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons has accelerated rather than slowed down since the appearance of the non-proliferation Treaty and the arms race has assumed an even more grotesque aspect with the new generation of missiles with multiple nuclear warheads.

157. It cannot be argued that the Treaty has not gone a long way towards achieving the stabilization of power in the case of the so-called super-Powers. Yet article VI of the Treaty has for all practical purposes remained a non-existent article.

158. In the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States are still awaiting implementation. From all indications, only token consideration may be given to this subject during this session of the General Assembly and it will reappear on next year's agenda still unfinished.

159. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America<sup>20</sup> was hailed by this Assembly as an example to be followed in the creation of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. Yet, almost four years since its signature, only one of the nuclear-weapon Powers has ratified the Additional Protocol which would guarantee the necessary co-operation for the effectiveness of the Treaty. The negative attitude of the other nuclear-weapon Powers—with the exception in this regard of the People's Republic of China—is consistent with their refusal to give any undertaking not to use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

160. A curious obsession seems to prevail that the greater danger now lies in the armaments, nuclear or otherwise, of smaller nations, rather than in the ever-growing arsenals of the super-Powers. It is now argued that, contrary to historical evidence, power brings moderation, restraint and responsibility. People prefer to speak of reduction of conventional armaments and registration of the sale and transfer of conventional weapons, while negotiations in the field of nuclear disarmament or nuclear arms control remain deadlocked. As in the case of the non-proliferation Treaty, all efforts are now directed towards disarming nations which are already disarmed.

161. Thus it is clear that, at present, power has become sacred and untouchable; that never has power been revered as it is today. This can be seen now when nations are

<sup>19</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

divided into categories from the least to the most powerful and when only the great Powers control the respect and admiration of others; this was established in the non-proliferation Treaty, where power was used as the only and supreme yardstick. There was a clear understanding that the powerful would become more powerful and the defenceless even more defenceless. This is a phenomenon that has its parallel in the economic field, where the richer nations become richer and the poorer nations poorer. A concurrence of these phenomena contributes to the stability and perpetuation of the *status quo*.

162. The true perspective from which this matter should be viewed was indicated as long as 22 years ago when the General Assembly adopted resolution 192 (III). The considered view was then expressed by the Assembly

“that the aim of the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces can only be attained in an atmosphere of real and lasting improvement in international relations, which implies in particular the application of control of atomic energy involving the prohibition of the atomic weapon”.

163. The proceedings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the last few years have shown clearly that no serious efforts have been made to achieve general and complete disarmament. It is true that the Conference has made progress towards a few goals in the field of non-armament and in a few problems of arms control or the limitation of armaments. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union, which started in Vienna and have now resumed in Helsinki, appear to aim only at the elimination of redundant nuclear weapons; that is, those which are not needed for the destruction of the world 10 times over. We have stressed the fact that at present peace is being downgraded to a *détente* or relaxation of tensions. Disarmament is now viewed as non-armament or arms control.

164. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/233] now before us contains a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Co-sponsored by the two Chairmen of the Committee, this draft treaty was the subject of careful study by the other members of the Conference last year and again this year, in the light of the comments of many delegations during the debates on disarmament in this Committee last year. The result is a text of a draft treaty which is quasi-unanimously supported by the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

165. It would be childish to spurn or belittle a draft treaty which was the subject of such careful consideration and such eminent sponsorship. But close examination of the text of the draft treaty discloses it to be narrow in its scope and not free from vagueness in certain respects. As to its scope, it appears from article I that the draft treaty would limit its prohibition to fixed installations of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor as well as fixed structures for storing or launching such weapons. Mobile installations of weapons of mass destruction are not prohibited, but

apparently “crawling” installations and structures for storing or launching are.

166. As to the area covered, according to article II “the outer limit of the sea-bed zone . . . shall be coterminous with the 12 mile outer limit of the zone referred to in part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,<sup>21</sup> signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958”. It is perhaps unfortunate that the draft treaty contains a reference to a Convention which may itself shortly be replaced by one more precise and more widely acceptable.

167. The most serious shortcoming of the draft treaty is the fact that it covers weapons that are of little strategic interest. Hence the criticism that it picks on one part of the ocean environment—the sea-bed only—and outlaws installations that are not attractive militarily. The draft treaty does not cover the most dangerous present form of ocean weaponry, namely, submarines armed with nuclear missiles. Nor does it cover those most likely to menace non-nuclear-weapon States; that is, non-nuclear military installations just outside their territorial seas but on their continental shelves.

168. The cynical conclusion might almost be that, once again, peace-loving mankind has begged for a loaf and has been given a crumb. However, my delegation prefers to recognize the positive aspects of the draft treaty, small though they may be. We note that in article V, the parties would pledge “to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof”. This is a far cry from the positive provisions that the sea-bed and the ocean floor should be used for peaceful purposes, but we live in hope and faith that these crumbs of disarmament are a foretaste of an eventual full loaf.

169. I shall speak only briefly on the subject of chemical and bacteriological weapons, because so far no agreement has been reached on these matters in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Last year the General Assembly had before it two draft conventions pertaining to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The first was a draft convention submitted by nine socialist countries on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons.<sup>22</sup> The other draft convention was submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on the prohibition of biological methods of warfare.<sup>23</sup> It will be recalled that the General Assembly referred the two draft conventions to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for consideration, with a view to submitting this year a report on all aspects of the problem and the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

170. On going through the records of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament one can see that there were

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477.

<sup>22</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 104, document A/7655.

<sup>23</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232, annex C, sect. 19.

still a number of obstacles to reaching an agreement on the elimination of these two types of weapons. The first obstacle was whether negotiations should be held to deal with both types of weapons simultaneously or whether the negotiations should be undertaken so as to deal first with biological weapons. The second problem was whether any agreements on the elimination of this weapon should be embodied in a single document or in more than one document. A third problem was that of verification, and in particular, with regard to chemical weapons, whether verification could be accomplished without sophisticated monitoring and inspection methods.

171. My delegation is convinced that the two types of weapons form a whole and they have been considered as such not only in the 1925 Geneva Protocol,<sup>24</sup> but also in the special studies undertaken by the United Nations Secretary-General, the World Health Organization and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. We therefore contend that negotiations on the elimination of the two types of weapons should be carried out simultaneously. It is no secret that a great deal of the reluctance to support a ban on chemical weapons stems from the advantage which certain great Powers believe they derive from the indefensible practice of mass destruction of lives and food-stuffs of peasants by the use of napalm and other chemical agents. If any one type of weapon was to be given priority, negotiations on the banning of chemical weapons—which have greater military value—should be embarked upon immediately.

172. Regarding the question of whether a ban on the two types of weapons should be embodied in a single legal document or not, that, in the view of my delegation, is a procedural matter, which should await a decision that can only be reached after the framework of an agreement to ban the two types of weapons has been successfully negotiated. It is only then that we can wisely discuss the legal form such an agreement should take.

173. The question of verification with regard to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons is very important but it is also important to stress that a political will to subscribe to a disarmament measure cannot be dissociated from the acceptability of the control system. That was appreciated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which my delegation notes has devoted a long time to discussing this question of verification.

174. We believe that a compromise between the two extreme positions represented in the discussions of the Disarmament Conference can be found in the joint memorandum sponsored by 12 non-aligned States at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. That memorandum recommends that:

“... Verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system which would ensure

effective implementation of the prohibition.” [*Ibid.*, annex C, sect. 39, para. 7.]

175. My delegation hopes that the General Assembly will lend its support to the recommendations contained in the joint memorandum so that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at its next session may be able to construct the precise form of the combined measures that will result from these discussions.

176. Before concluding, I wish to touch upon the item entitled “Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security”. That item was included in the agenda of the General Assembly on the initiative of the delegation of Romania [A/7994]. It takes into account the inter-relationship that exists between economic development, disarmament and international security.

177. My delegation believes that there exists an inter-relationship that exists between economic development, international security and economic development, while we are failing miserably in the field of disarmament. The channelling of enormous resources and finance, now estimated at over \$200,000 million annually, to the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a serious setback for the cause of economic development. From this it follows that without such development international security cannot be achieved. All this wealth, all these resources, are being wasted, for it is clear that they will—as we hope—never be used; but in case they are ever used, there will be no one left to regret it. On the other hand, to argue that this wasteful expenditure is justified and warranted by existing circumstances is to admit that we are facing an inevitable nuclear holocaust.

178. We sincerely hope that our debate this year on this item will prove useful and will permit the adoption of constructive and significant measures. If the nations of the world, and especially the super-Powers and the more developed nations, would be willing to dedicate just one per cent of what they spend in armaments and other military expenditure to the development programme of the United Nations, that would be equivalent to increasing this programme 10 times beyond its present limits. I do not have to reiterate that the dangers of the arms race have increased at almost the same pace as the problems of underdevelopment. Thus it will be a mistake on our part if we are less than determined to make sure that the day is not far distant when these proposals will be successful.

179. This Committee—and in fact the General Assembly and the United Nations itself—has to face realistically the problem of achieving complete disarmament. Now is the time to reach a decision as to whether the United Nations will be successful in its quest to reach this elusive goal, or whether we shall all, by passivity or obstinacy, make self-destruction our inevitable end.

180. Mr. KUFUOR (Ghana): The happy coincidence of the launching of the Disarmament Decade and the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations provides, in the view of my delegation, an excellent opportunity to review the progress of the United Nations on the important question of disarmament, and to carefully

<sup>24</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

analyse our successes and failures in this field, in the hope that such analysis will serve as guidelines for future United Nations action. Several delegations that have spoken before me have cited the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963,<sup>25</sup> the Latin American nuclear-free-zone Treaty,<sup>26</sup> the outer space Treaty of 1967<sup>27</sup> and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] of 1969, as important achievements over the past 25 years in the field of disarmament. My delegation, while agreeing that these are important milestones, also shares the view, which has been widely expressed, that progress on disarmament has been disappointingly slow. Indeed, delegations, including mine, have often expressed in this and other forums our grave concern at the mounting and spiralling costs of the arms race, which has now reached an astronomical figure of \$200,000 million a year. Our disappointment is even greater when we consider that of all the events cited as landmarks in the field of disarmament, not one is, in the strict sense of the word, a true disarmament measure—they are in fact non-armament measures. As the representative of Sweden rightly pointed out in her statement of 4 November 1970 [1750th meeting], during the past 25 years only one item of true disarmament involving any elimination of weapons from arsenals has been initiated, namely, President Nixon's decision last year to dismantle the United States resources for biological warfare, a decision yet to be fully implemented. That is also, incidentally, the only decision involving any measure of military sacrifice on the part of a super-Power. For the many years of persistent United Nations efforts in the field of disarmament, this state of affairs is indeed very disappointing.

181. In their statements to the General Assembly during the commemorative session of the United Nations twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations, the majority of Heads of State or Government or their special representatives expressed serious concern at the spiralling arms race, and the correspondingly slow pace of disarmament negotiations, and urged the need for expeditious action. The concern of my own country, Ghana, and the importance that we attach to disarmament, was reflected in the following statement made by the Prime Minister, Dr. K. A. Busia, in his address to the General Assembly during the commemorative session:

“... the policies of nations, big and small, appear to have been based through many generations on the conviction that the best way to secure peace is to prepare for war. The nations of this Organization, it seems, have also sought to secure peace along that traditional line. A reflection on the long history of man as well as on what is happening around us today will give ample evidence that this policy, far from ensuring peace, has invariably led to war.

“On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations I wish the distinguished leaders of the nations gathered

here to consider whether the time has not come for us to give some concrete expression to our desire for peace and to our determination to build a world without war. Should not ‘If you wish for peace, prepare for war’ be replaced by ‘If you wish for peace, renounce war’? Has the time not come for nations to renounce violence as an instrument of peace?

“I know that long hours have been given by Committees of this Organization to the questions of disarmament, and yet the nations have gone on progressively increasing their expenditures on arms. This is not an expression of faith in the future . . .

“I would respectfully ask that on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations we give a sincere expression of our determination to build a world without war by doing something that the ordinary man can understand. What about beginning a progressive reduction of arms instead of talking about disarmament? What about making sure that, by the fiftieth anniversary of this Organization, not only the fear of war but even the threat of war will have been wiped out?

“We could achieve this in 25 years, if we took this year as the base for action in the cause of peace . . .” [1876th plenary meeting, paras. 137-141].

182. This was the advice of Prime Minister Busia to the United Nations and it is in the light of this concern for progressive disarmament that I shall proceed to comment on the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as presented in its report [A/8059-DC/233], which is now before us.

183. My delegation welcomes the revised draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, contained in annex A of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The revised draft treaty in our view constitutes the major achievement of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in its session just ended, and my delegation would like to express its gratitude and appreciation to all members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, through whose hard work and spirit of compromise and accommodation the successful negotiation of the draft treaty became possible.

184. It will be recalled that last year, in this Committee [1702nd meeting], my delegation was among those which expressed reservations and dissatisfaction with several aspects of the draft treaty, particularly the “verification by observation” procedure in article III, and also with the fact that the draft treaty did not include a ban on the emplacement of conventional weapons on the sea-bed and ocean floor. With regard to the latter, we stated that the Ghana delegation would not be in a position to consider the draft treaty until a specific additional paragraph, as proposed by the Swedish representative, was included in an eventual draft, which would clearly impose, particularly on the super-Powers, the obligation further to negotiate a comprehensive demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor in the near future.

<sup>25</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

<sup>26</sup> Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (*ibid.*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

<sup>27</sup> Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

185. We are indeed happy to note that our position, as well as the views of several other delegations, have been taken into account in the new draft. Although the new draft still falls short of our initial hopes for a treaty that would prohibit the arms race, both nuclear and conventional, from the sea-bed, it nevertheless represents a synthesis of the various views expressed by several delegations and even includes a provision for future revision.

186. My delegation considers successful negotiation of the revised draft treaty significant for two reasons: first, it will constitute a first step towards preventing the arms race on the sea-bed; which represents a substantial portion of the surface of the earth, and second, the fact that so many divergent views expressed in this Committee have been taken into account in the new draft is a very healthy and encouraging sign. It is indeed an excellent example of how an important multilateral treaty can be negotiated with the help and participation of many countries, developed or developing, nuclear or non-nuclear.

187. This should augur well for future disarmament negotiations. We consider the new draft, though not perfect, a balanced draft treaty worthy of support.

188. As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Ghana welcomes its coming into force on 5 March 1970. The coming into force of this Treaty, in spite of its imperfections, symbolizes the hope and expectation of all mankind for peace and security. My delegation considers it important that certain provisions in the non-proliferation Treaty, particularly article VI, should not be lost sight of. Those provisions make it incumbent upon States signatories to the Treaty, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to continue negotiations on further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Indeed it is the hope of my delegation that the nuclear Powers will follow up the coming into force of this Treaty—which is again essentially a non-armament Treaty—with real measures of nuclear disarmament.

189. In connexion with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), my delegation welcomes the reconvening in Helsinki of those bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is a pity that no concrete disarmament measures have as yet emerged from them, but we continue to hope that the present talks will lead to positive results which would reverse the strategic arms race and open new avenues for other measures of nuclear disarmament that have hitherto led nowhere.

190. While my delegation welcomes the progress made by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and notes with satisfaction the other hopeful initiatives being taken in the areas I have already mentioned, we very much regret to note from its report that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has made little or no progress in negotiating a treaty to ban underground nuclear tests. The greatest stumbling block to concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty remains the question of verification. In spite of many proposals submitted both within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly to press for a speedy solution, this problem

remains insurmountable. My delegation would tend to agree with those delegations which feel that the present deadlock is not so much due to a lack of proposals and suggestions as to the lack of political will on the part of the nuclear Powers to consider favourably the proposals so far advanced.

191. My delegation believes, however, that while this political will is still not forthcoming we should not give up hope, but should rather continue to explore other avenues. That is why my delegation was happy to support the Canadian initiative last year for a world-wide exchange of seismological data as a means of solving the hitherto intractable problem of on-site verification, as a result of which resolution 2604 (XXIV) was adopted last year by the General Assembly. Ghana was among the first to send replies to the Secretary-General's questionnaire in compliance with this resolution and we were pleased to see such an encouraging world-wide response [see A/7967/Rev.1] to the questionnaire. We are grateful to the Canadian delegation again this year for the enlightening progress report [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 34] they have given us on this matter. My delegation is happy to be a sponsor of the Canadian draft resolution, which we understand is about to be introduced into this Committee, and we hope it will receive unanimous support. We hope that through this proposed exchange of seismological data a widely acceptable system can be evolved which will expedite the conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty.

192. On the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons, it is regrettable that despite the continuing efforts of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the Committee was unable to report any substantial progress. It will be recalled that last year the General Assembly directed that the two draft conventions submitted—one by the United Kingdom, for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare,<sup>28</sup> the other by nine socialist countries, on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons<sup>29</sup>—be referred to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for consideration with a view to its submitting this year a report on all aspects of the problem of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons. From the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament it would appear that the problems with which the Committee was faced revolved around three points: first, whether the negotiations should cover the two weapons simultaneously or serially, dealing first with biological weapons, as proposed by the United Kingdom; secondly, whether the agreement on the weapons should be embodied in a single document or more; and, thirdly, how the problems of verification, particularly with regard to chemical weapons, should be solved.

193. Last year, in this Committee, my delegation expressed the view that, in order to arrive at a successful conclusion, the basic action for all States to take was first

<sup>28</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232, annex C, sect. 19.

<sup>29</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 104, document A/7655.



to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol<sup>30</sup> without any reservations. With regard to separating the two kinds of weapon, we stated that in our view the traditional practice of combining the problems of chemical and bacteriological weapons so characteristic of both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Secretary-General's report<sup>31</sup> should be maintained.

194. My delegation stands by those views, which are in line with the following opinion, expressed by the representative of Ethiopia in this Committee on 6 November 1970:

“... in order to strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Committee should, first of all, proceed to seek universal adherence to the Protocol in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIX), investigate ways and means of removing all reservations of States signatories to the Protocol, and agree upon a broad definition of the scope of the weapons in question. Once this is done, the question of dealing with a single or combined approach will be greatly simplified.” [1752nd meeting, para. 15.]

195. In our intervention last year in this Committee during the debate on disarmament, my delegation stated its firm conviction that unless and until we had a real master strategy for general and complete disarmament, seen from an over-all point of view, reflecting the universal will and purpose of mankind, spread over an identifiable period of time and involving commitments on the part of all concerned—both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers—regarding nuclear and conventional weapons, we should be indulging in organized deception and for that people throughout the world would never forgive our generation. It was because of that firm conviction that my delegation firmly supported General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV), which, while declaring the 1970s a Disarmament Decade, requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to work out “a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control”.

196. My delegation is disappointed that this matter was not given appropriate consideration during the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. However, we welcome the initiative taken by the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia in presenting a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 42]. We consider it to be a serious and constructive document, presenting basic thoughts that could constitute a coherent and broad-based programme for disarmament. We therefore hope it will receive the most thorough and serious attention of this Committee.

197. We must, however, express our disappointment that, despite the request of the General Assembly at its last

session for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to work out a comprehensive programme for the Disarmament Decade, no positive recommendations have as yet actually been submitted by that body at this session. As a result, neither this Committee nor the General Assembly is in a position to consider any proposals with a view to taking a decision on the principles, targets and phases that should guide the Disarmament Decade.

198. In our view, this unfortunate result stems from constitutional and organizational defects inherent in the present system of considering disarmament proposals. It is doubtful whether this task could actually be undertaken by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which is a negotiating body dominated by the super-Powers—and, as we all know, some of the super-Powers claim to be somewhat independent of the General Assembly. If a disarmament plan is to be evolved for the Disarmament Decade, in our view a more consultative deliberative and representative body should undertake the task. The Ghana delegation believes that that role can best be played by the Disarmament Commission, which has unfortunately been allowed to remain inactive for reasons well known to members of this Committee. We believe that the early reconvening of the Disarmament Commission is necessary for the above-mentioned purpose. However, if that is not found generally acceptable, we would favour the creation of a special committee of the General Assembly to map out a strategy for the Disarmament Decade somewhat along the lines of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade [resolution 2626 (XXV)] that has now blazed the path for the inauguration of the Second Development Decade.

199. Unless international public opinion is in this way enlisted for the task, and specific goals, objectives and stages of disarmament are clearly mapped out, we shall continue to project the present depressing picture of immobility in the disarmament field, compounded by the annual ritual of affirming a desire for disarmament unsupported by convincing action. On this twenty-fifth anniversary celebration of the United Nations, the least the Organization can do in this most important field is to take concrete action to push mankind nearer to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

200. In this intervention I have, like other delegations who have spoken before me, confined my remarks to the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as described in the report of the Conference. My delegation reserves the right to intervene again on these and other aspects of the disarmament question as and when they come up for discussion.

201. Mr. BOUKHRIS (Libya): The problem of disarmament has been and remains the predominant concern of man, distressed by the prospect of his own destruction. To live in peace, safe from the threat of wars and mass destruction, is the unanimous desire of people all over the world. I should like to stress that international peace and security are not the exclusive concern of the great Powers but are the responsibility of the whole international community.

202. We, the small defenceless developing nations, are always suffering the consequences of struggles and rivalry

<sup>30</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

<sup>31</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

among the great Powers. We must raise our voice, the voice of all mankind, in this prominent international body in order to urge those responsible for peace and war to find ways and means of stopping the insane arms race and thus preserving succeeding generations and human civilization from mass destruction.

203. We do not underestimate the complexity of the problems of disarmament, or its effect on the balance of armaments between the nuclear Powers. In the years when the question of disarmament has been discussed, this Committee has always felt the need for the two super-Powers to undertake bilateral negotiations, because the preliminary agreement of the two super-Powers would emphasize any eventual measure being taken in the field of disarmament.

204. In this connexion, my delegation wishes to welcome the resumption in Helsinki of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States. We would like to say how much we appreciate the resumption of those talks, and we should also like to associate ourselves with all previous speakers in expressing the hope that those talks will lead to a real limitation of strategic arms and to a total elimination of all nuclear weapons. The conclusion of an agreement between the two super-Powers will eventually lead to the promotion of prospects for the adoption of further arms-control measures. The outcome of these talks is obvious. They may constitute a historic landmark on the difficult road to disarmament and may open the way to a *détente*, thereby creating a better climate of confidence between the two super-Powers.

205. We wish to welcome with satisfaction the news reports that, despite the slow pace that has marked the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks since their preliminary phase a year ago, both the American and the Soviet side continue to express optimism about the chances for concrete results.

206. One of the major achievements and favourable events of this year in the field of disarmament was the entry into force on 5 March 1970 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]. The entry into force of that Treaty will undoubtedly have a positive influence on the international scene and will help to limit and contain the threat of nuclear war. We consider that Treaty as a most significant international agreement and as a great constructive step along the difficult road to general and complete disarmament. Its purpose is to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons among countries that do not possess them, and to establish a safeguard system for the purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Treaty. My delegation would like once again to express the hope that all countries, especially those with the technological capability of producing nuclear weapons, will accede to the Treaty in order to realize its universality.

207. We note that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament spent a considerable amount of time discussing the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A].

208. In our opinion, the new text of the treaty before us is a great improvement over the previous draft that was under the consideration of the First Committee during its last session. My delegation wishes to take this opportunity to express its appreciation to the Co-Chairmen for the consideration they have given to the constructive views and the suggestions that were made by various delegations. Despite the fact that the draft treaty falls short of our hopes for an international instrument that would prohibit the nuclear arms race in an area that constitutes two thirds of our planet, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.523, commending the treaty.

209. We have read with great interest the Secretary-General's introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization,<sup>32</sup> and we note that he did not attempt to conceal his concern at the lack of progress in disarmament. He states that little progress has been made in recent years towards achieving a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. The progress achieved over the last 15 years in the field of nuclear disarmament, comprising the partial test-ban Treaty,<sup>33</sup> the Antarctic Treaty,<sup>34</sup> the outer space Treaty<sup>35</sup> the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America<sup>36</sup> and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has not penetrated to the very core of the nuclear threat. Underground testing is still going on, and so far we have not been able to reach an agreement on stopping the production and improvement on nuclear weapons. The existing stockpiles could easily annihilate the human race.

210. According to the yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,<sup>37</sup> recently published, the world's nuclear stockpile amounts to about 50,000 megatons which would represent about 15 tons of TNT per person on earth. The yearbook further states that between 1969 and June of this year, a total of 73 nuclear devices were tested, some of which released radioactive material into the atmosphere.

211. This frantic race can contribute neither to the security of those engaged in it nor to world peace and security. The race leads to a senseless waste of financial and technical resources, which the world in general, and the developing countries in particular, so desperately need.

212. These enormous military expenditures, which are estimated at more than \$200,000 million, are used for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, for preparation for war and for domination, at a time when two thirds of the world's population is under-nourished and in need of medical care and education.

<sup>32</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1 A.

<sup>33</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

<sup>34</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

<sup>35</sup> Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

<sup>36</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

<sup>37</sup> SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1969/70 (Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1970).

213. My delegation wishes to associate itself with the opinion expressed by the Secretary-General, that "in order to achieve agreement on far-reaching measures of disarmament, it is indispensable that all militarily significant Powers, and in particular all nuclear Powers, including France and the People's Republic of China, should participate in the negotiations".

214. My delegation considers that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and the destruction of such weapons, is one of the most important and urgent questions under discussion in this Committee.

215. There is today an increasing awareness among the peoples of the world of the great danger inherent in the waging of war with the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. They are also aware of the stockpiles, which are capable of causing incalculable harm to the world's population and to animal and vegetable life on our planet. In this regard, I wish to inform the members of the Committee that the Revolutionary Government of Libya has decided to accede without reservation to the Geneva

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.<sup>38</sup> By its accession, Libya wishes to give concrete proof of the importance it attaches to the need for banning the development, production and stockpiling of these appalling weapons of mass destruction.

216. In conclusion, I should like to say that it is surely in the interest of all countries, and of world security as well, to spare no effort to find a solution to the problems of disarmament as a whole. However, to achieve that noble purpose, it is not sufficient to concentrate fundamentally on the questions involved in disarmament, for along with this it is necessary to remove the sources of tension in the world, where force is being used for the purpose of imposing solutions in the field of international relations and as a means for territorial domination and expansion. World peace cannot be achieved unless it is based on justice and respect for the fundamental principles of the Charter.

*The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.*

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<sup>38</sup> League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.