

United Nations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 1756th
MEETING

Wednesday, 11 November 1970,
at 10.30 a.m.

NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. Andrés AGUILAR M. (Venezuela).

AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 93 AND 94

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7958, A/7960 and Corr.1, A/7961, A/8059-DC/233, A/C.1/1001 and 1010, A/C.1/L.523 and 528)

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Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2456 B (XXIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (*continued*) (A/7993 and Add.1 and 2, A/8076, A/C.1/L.522)

Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security (*continued*) (A/7994)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before I call on the first speaker on my list, I should like to ask the Committee to take note that the delegation of Somalia has joined the list of sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.523.

2. I give the floor to the representative of Romania.

3. Mr. DIACONESCU (Romania) (*interpretation from French*): The Romanian delegation attaches all due importance to the present debate on disarmament, the first on this subject since the adoption during the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations of the important Declaration in which all Governments are called upon "to renew their determination to make concrete progress towards the elimination of the arms race and the achievement of the final goal—general and complete disarmament under effective international control" [resolution 2627 (XXV)].

4. Among the problems now under discussion in this Committee, we should like to devote our statement today to the question of the "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security", an item included in the agenda of the present session on the proposal of Romania [A/7994].

5. That approach is based on the conviction, also expressed in the explanatory memorandum submitted by my country, that thorough consideration—with the wide participation of States—of all aspects of the complex phenomenon of the armaments race, as well as of all its implications can facilitate a better understanding and comprehensive evaluation of the harmful effects of the armaments spiral at all levels and of the great dangers with which it is fraught, and can help us draw conclusions with a view to practical measures to slow down and halt this utterly senseless competition without further delay.

6. In the constructive spirit that marks Romania's participation in the international disarmament effort, we regard the debate on this item as a means of encouraging a serious, concrete and responsible analysis of the present stage and the dynamics of the arms race and, through comparison, of the results achieved during the disarmament negotiations, in order to highlight the urgent tasks in this field facing the United Nations, the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and all States and, above all, to decide what practical measures must be negotiated without delay. Once identified, these measures will have to be applied and made a reality through the persevering efforts of all States.

7. We note with satisfaction that the same spirit is to be observed in the statements made by a considerable number of delegations at this session of the General Assembly. Further contributions in this regard will undoubtedly be forthcoming from many representatives who intend to speak in the debates of our Committee.

8. If we look back over the years which have elapsed since the last world war, we notice one fact which has often been pointed out elsewhere in this body, namely, that, whereas negotiations on disarmament have led to partial agreements, with which we are all familiar and which we fully appreciate, the arms race has nevertheless continued to grow, presenting today the image of a world in which weapons of all kinds—nuclear, chemical-bacteriological and conventional—have been accumulated in gigantic stockpiles whose destructive capacity exceeds by several times the force required for the complete annihilation of mankind. And yet, the military competition continues to intensify, with far-reaching adverse effects on the economic and social life of the peoples, on their peace and security.

9. Referring to the effects of armaments, the President of the Council of State of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, stated recently during the commemorative session of the General Assembly:

“The arms race has assumed huge proportions. Military expenditure has exceeded \$200,000 million annually, producing a deeply harmful effect on the economic and social progress and on the levels of living of many peoples. Nuclear weapons are a serious danger to the very future of mankind. Under the circumstances, we believe that it is both imperative and urgent for the United Nations and all States to take most resolute action to achieve general disarmament and, first and foremost, nuclear disarmament.

“The United Nations, the leaders of all States and all statesmen bear a very heavy responsibility towards mankind, towards the future of human civilization, to free the world from the burden of armaments and the nightmare of an atomic war.” [1872nd plenary meeting, paras. 101 and 102.]

10. In the economic and social field, the arms race constantly exercises deeply harmful effects, seriously jeopardizing the efforts made towards the progress and well-being of all nations, great or small, developing or developed, rich or poor. Absorbing a considerable part of mankind's wealth, of its material and human resources, which it needs so badly, the arms race is one of the heaviest burdens on the whole of mankind.

11. According to statistics, \$4 million million was squandered on military purposes from the beginning of this century up to the end of the last decade. If this enormous sum had been spent for peaceful ends, it would have been sufficient to meet the food needs of the whole population of the world over the same period. What strikes us as particularly disquieting is the fact that in recent years there has been a massive increase in military expenditure, as regards both the annual amount spent and the annual rate of growth. This is eloquently illustrated by the comparative analysis of the increase in military expenditure, undertaken by the Agency for the Control of Armaments and Disarmament, as well as by other agencies doing similar research in various States. The figures show that military allocations rose from \$139,000 million in 1964 to \$200,000 million in 1969, and it is estimated that this sum will be exceeded in 1970. This means that, in a period of six years, more than a million million dollars has been spent for arms and armed forces. According to the same sources, the sum mentioned represents the equivalent of the income for two years of ninety-three developing countries with populations of more than 2,500 million. The upward trend of military budgets during the period referred to followed closely the annual rate of growth of the world product. For example, while the annual increase in military expenditure over the period under review averaged about 7 per cent, the value of the world product increased by an average of about 9 per cent.

12. The ratio between world military expenditures and the sums allocated for international assistance on behalf of the developing countries reveals a completely anomalous situation.

13. Thus, the aid recently granted to the developing countries has been estimated at about \$8,000 million per year. This sum represents less than 0.5 per cent of the gross national product of the developed countries and about 6 per cent of their military budgets. *Per capita* economic assistance furnished by the industrialized countries is about \$8, while the military expenditures are twenty-one times higher, or \$170 per inhabitant.

14. On another level, the sums allocated by Governments for armaments are equivalent to or even greater than the funds allocated to such important fields as education and medical assistance.

15. Thus, the world military budget has swallowed up as much money in the last six years as all Governments have spent on all forms of public education and medical care. One example seems to us to be eloquent in this regard. States now spend an average of \$100 on the education of one of the approximately 1,000 million young people of school age, while the average cost of a young man in military uniform is about \$7,800, or 78 times as much.

16. The conclusions drawn by experts from an analysis of the figures concerning the level of armaments are revealing. They show that the diversion of resources to military purposes has increased at a rate which is close to that of the increase in world production capacity; a considerable part of the world's national revenue over the past six years has been squandered on massive military expenditure—hence, unproductive expenditure—which is thus diverted away from the urgent needs of peaceful development; *per capita*

the burden of military expenditure has increased still further over the past six years.

17. Long-term scientific forecasts warn that unless energetic steps are taken without delay to halt the arms race and to achieve disarmament, there is the danger that military expenditure will swallow another \$2,500,000 million in the course of the 1970s, proclaimed by the United Nations as the Disarmament Decade.

18. In the age in which we live, marked by a vigorous affirmation of the right of nations to a life of freedom and dignity, the multilateral economic and social advancement of all peoples is an imperative of progress and an essential requirement of world peace. The efforts to attain this major objective, which requires the mobilization of all energies and resources throughout the world, are nevertheless denied a considerable part of the wealth of mankind that the arms race diverts from the sphere of peaceful applications and from the pressing needs of development, and wastes on the production and improvement of means of destruction.

19. In addition to the enormous waste of material resources, armaments and preparations for war absorb a tremendous and invaluable human potential. Vast intellectual resources diverted from the constructive sphere, tens of thousands of scientists and research workers, specialists and highly qualified technicians who, systematically drawn into the military machinery, are prevented from putting their intelligence and skills to the service of the material and spiritual progress of society and its well-being.

20. All this is going on at a time when many peoples in different latitudes and different parts of the world are suffering poverty and malnutrition, when whole areas of the planet are in a state of economic, social and cultural underdevelopment, denied the benefits of civilization in a century which has seen the conquest of outer space and the harnessing of the oceans.

21. Great gulfs separate peoples whose coexistence in the same age is chronological only.

22. The fact that large quantities of goods and treasure continue to be diverted for military purposes is having a more and more adverse effect on the economic and social life of all States, doubly damaging to the developing countries where the shortage of trained personnel and material and financial resources is most keenly felt.

23. Many of these States are obliged in present international circumstances to increase their national efforts in the military sphere; at the same time, the increase in the military budgets of the industrialized States reduces the international assistance granted to the developing countries.

24. What could be more revealing than the fact that while truly astronomical sums are spent on arms and armies, the modest objectives of the First United Nations Development Decade have not been attained?

25. The freezing and reduction of States' military budgets, a proposal put forward this year by Romania in the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament a halt to the arms race and the gradual progress towards disarmament

would surely help to make considerable material, financial and human resources available which could serve the interests of the various peoples and help the developing countries to undertake effective development efforts. This problem arises with particular urgency in the context of the development strategy adopted by the United Nations for the Second United Nations Development Decade [*resolution 2626 (XXV)*].

26. Considered in the light of its social effects, the present-day arms race is disastrous. It may be stated without fear of error that there is almost no area of social life on which military rivalry has not left a deep mark. It hampers the peaceful application of the achievements of science and technology, interferes with education and culture, and prevents broad access to the results of scientific and technological research.

27. The maintenance of war psychosis by imperialist circles and by arms programmes, with everything that means in terms of material and intellectual tribute, as well as the perpetual insecurity created by the grave dangers inherent in the accumulation of ever greater means of destruction, particularly weapons of mass destruction, directly affect not only the welfare of peoples but also their tranquillity and security, thus preventing them from devoting their full creative energies to the attainment of their legitimate aspirations to peace and progress. The arms race has a direct influence on the young generation, which is inspired by the desire to build a world in which men, delivered from the spectre of war, may be able to enjoy fully the fruits of modern civilization.

28. In the present circumstances, where the achievements of science and technology not only act as a powerful incentive to economic and social progress, but also make possible the improvement of existing arsenals and the development of new types of weapons, the modern arms race must be analysed with particular attention to this factor too, for it is the only way we can grasp the real dimensions of its negative consequences in the long term and see which disarmament measures should be given priority.

29. The arms race today is a qualitative competition *par excellence*, and will be even more so tomorrow unless energetic steps are taken to stop it.

30. As the history of recent decades attests, every new scientific discovery, from the fission and fusion of the atom to progress in chemistry, biology and radiology or the development of lasers, has been or is about to be used for the production of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological devices, the military use of lasers and so on.

31. Further spectacular developments, the scientists warn, are to be expected in the decades ahead; urged on by research and development, aided by the revolution in materials and production technology, armaments are likely to reach growth rates and proportions still difficult for the imagination to grasp.

32. The effective remedy is to tackle without delay, in a determined effort to reach lasting agreements, the problems

posed by the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race now and in the future, so as to put an end to this competition in its present phase and to erect a solid barrier which can prevent further military developments which contain the seeds of possible global conflagrations with unforeseeable consequences.

33. The acceleration of the disarmament negotiations and the increase of their effectiveness until they overtake the arms race itself is the best alternative in this regard.

34. A similar approach is required for conventional weapons, the manufacture and significant improvement of which account for over half the total world military expenditures while at the same time serving as tools in many local conflicts, involving the danger of wider wars.

35. The extremely harmful effect of the arms race on the peace and security of the world is another facet of the problems submitted by Romania, for debate at this session, and it should be considered with the same attention as the economic and social effects.

36. Paradoxical as it may seem, the arms race, although absorbing a considerable part of the wealth of mankind, does nothing to increase its security, nor does it strengthen world peace. The accumulation of armaments has never solved the problems of national or international security, and least of all can it do so in present conditions. On the contrary, it represents a factor of tension and mistrust in inter-State relations, giving rise in turn to measures of armament on the part of other States and to counter measures which in the final analysis lead to a chain reaction, to the ever-rising spiral of armaments.

37. Similarly, and for symmetrical reasons, the arms race cannot strengthen peace, since the accumulation and improvement of ever bigger military arsenals themselves offer the necessary instruments for breaching the peace. It is a broadly recognized truth that comprehensive security and lasting peace cannot be based on force and the instruments used to apply it, namely, weapons, but rather on the prohibition of the threat or use of force, on a halt to the arms race and on disarmament, on the establishment of a system of international relations resting not upon the precarious balance of force but on the rules of international law, and first and foremost on strict respect, by all States and towards all States, for national independence and sovereignty, equality of rights, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual advantage.

38. The struggle to put an end to the arms race and to achieve disarmament is an integral part of the struggle waged by peoples for independence and sovereignty, to ensure respect for their right freely to decide their own destiny, for peace and security, for economic and social progress.

39. The adoption of measures to stop the arms race and effective steps towards disarmament and the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources and energies spent on armaments, are therefore measures which are fully in keeping with the fundamental interests of all nations of the world jointly and severally.

40. Before concluding this statement, my delegation would like to express the conviction that favourable conditions do exist, following a thorough debate on the effects of the arms race, and with the broad participation of States, for the General Assembly to recommend certain practical actions to help mobilize the support of States and world opinion in favour of effective measures to put an end to the arms race and to achieve concrete steps towards general disarmament and, in the first instance, nuclear disarmament.

41. In our opinion, it seems necessary that the decision to be adopted by the General Assembly should clearly indicate the directions in which the efforts of Governments and of the United Nations should be channelled in order to attain those objectives.

42. The preparation by an international group of highly competent experts, under the aegis of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of a thorough study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of the vast military expenditures on the world scale would be particularly useful.

43. In this regard we should like to recall the proposal and the useful ideas put forward in the introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization:

“Finally, in order that the Governments and peoples of the world may be more fully informed and may better understand the issues and problems related to the continuing arms race, I would propose that a comprehensive international expert study be undertaken of the economic and social consequences of the arms race and massive military expenditures. Such a study, which would complement a similar study carried out in 1962, could delineate the implications and evaluate the effects on nations and on economies of the growing stockpiles of armaments and the increasing volume of resources being diverted from peaceful to military purposes. It would help towards a better understanding of the needs and the possibilities for reordering both national and international priorities in the decade ahead.

“On the threshold of the Disarmament Decade and of the second quarter-century of the United Nations, I appeal to the Member States and to the peoples of the world to rededicate themselves to the Charter objectives of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with ‘the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources’. It is my firm belief that the nations of the world cannot move away from the abyss of self-destruction and fulfil the urgent social tasks facing the rich and poor countries alike, unless they put an early end to the malignancy of the arms race, both nuclear and conventional.

“If significant progress towards disarmament is to be made, Governments must put aside suspicion and mistrust and approach this subject in a new spirit. The Disarmament Decade offers opportunities to speed up the momentum of the agreements achieved during the 1960s and to utilize human creativity and economic resources so that science and technology will become a universal boon

and not a bane. If the nations of the world resolve to move ahead in planning specific steps towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, they can succeed in creating a secure and better world for all mankind.”¹

44. The thorough consideration, correlation and synthesis of considerations, suggestions and proposals of delegations taking part in the present debate, and thorough study of the consequences of the arms race on the economic and social levels, and on the peace and security of the world, we believe, constitute a positive premise in that regard.

45. The recommended study, which would be submitted to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, would bring the grave and far-reaching consequences of the arms race to the attention of States Members of the Organization, with a view to the adoption of concerted measures to lighten the burden and reduce the danger to mankind of the arms race.

46. For its part, my delegation is consulting with the delegations of other interested States with a view to submitting a joint draft resolution on the question. We express the hope that the idea of this study, which has been supported by other delegations in the debate, will enjoy broad support from Member States.

47. Mr. LEGNANI (Uruguay) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation’s statement on the question of disarmament, which is now before the First Committee for its consideration, is, apart from certain general considerations, intended to offer brief comments on the application of General Assembly resolution 2456 B (XXIII) on the signing and ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and on the draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

48. On previous occasions we have drawn attention to the fact that the birth of this eminent Organization, the United Nations, coincided with the dawn of the nuclear age. This allowed us to draw a parallel between the force of law and the law of force, and created the illusion that just as science had succeeded in dominating the anarchic unleashing of the atom, the United Nations Charter would have to confine within a universal legal order the anarchic chain reaction of human aggressiveness unleashed for various reasons in war.

49. The lack of any institutional machinery such as a mandatory court of law, the failure to achieve such an essential objective as disarmament and, in addition, the failure even to comply with the purposes, principles and codes of behaviour laid down in the United Nations Charter deprive us of that security it was thought had been achieved and plunges us into the worst of uncertainties concerning the destiny of mankind, particularly since any possible outbreaks of aggression may now entail the use of nuclear energy, and we have not succeeded in working out adequate machinery for keeping tempers in check, which would prevent and avoid outbursts of aggression leading to war.

50. While disarmament has occupied a prominent place among the constant concerns of international life we should

nevertheless recognize that it has failed to achieve the same prominence—far from it—in terms of practical achievement.

51. Though it has been zealously pursued in various forms—and long before the United Nations came into existence—the demilitarization of territories, treaties on the limitation of arms and so on—disarmament has achieved only a number of successes which have inevitably been modest in terms of human aspiration based on the sure conviction that disarmament is the indispensable prerequisite for peace.

52. On the other hand, in head-on contradiction with those aspirations, armaments have steadily increased. Vast sums of money required for the development of countries to satisfy the growing needs of peoples are used in steadily escalating expenditures for military purposes and highly refined techniques of mass killing, not to mention the increase in the production and stockpiling of so-called conventional weapons.

53. Those facts explain why, in their Declaration on peace and disarmament [*see A/C.1/1001*], the Nobel Peace Prize Laureates said

“It is only too easy to understand why a decline of general interest, sometimes a sense of cynicism, and even a feeling of despair, have begun to cloud the efforts of nations to bring meaning to disarmament.”

54. None the less, well known facts of the utmost importance clearly indicate the course that should be followed, which is and should be none other than to persist in advancing towards the goal of general and complete disarmament as called for in 1959 by a unanimous decision of the General Assembly.

55. Indeed, it is well known that the perfection of the means for killing has brought mankind to the verge of extinction. Therefore, the arms race and a new world war now would serve no purpose other than the death of the human race. It is equally well known that military expenditures represent a heavy burden for the wealthy countries and an exhausting one for the less developed countries.

56. On the other hand, as was stated in the report of the Secretary-General on the *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament*,² “It is thus generally agreed that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now absorbed by military expenditures can—and should—be of benefit to all countries, and lead to improvements in the social and economic conditions of all mankind.”

57. Lastly, no one can ignore the fact, equally well known, that some progress has been made towards disarmament, as was recalled in the Declaration by the Nobel Peace Prize Laureates in the following terms:

“The 1960s witnessed the achievement of a number of treaties which show that progress towards disarmament can be made. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Treaty establishing a nuclear-free zone in Latin America of 1967, the Non-

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A, paras. 29-31.

² United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.IX.2.

Proliferation Treaty of 1968, are all witness to this fact. Each step which is taken provides a pointer to others which have still to be taken.”

58. Among the immediate first steps which, in my delegation's view, should be taken without further delay is to expand the beneficial influence of the steps already taken, by strengthening and consolidating the positions that have been achieved in disarmament. In that sense, it seems obvious that we should draw attention to the importance of the support given by all States possessing nuclear weapons to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).³

59. As was stated by the General Conference of organizations created by that Treaty in its resolution of 5 September 1969, which is reproduced in document A/7993, “the Treaty of Tlatelolco is the only international instrument in force designed to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in an inhabited area of the earth, and . . . it is also the only treaty dealing with disarmament measures that establishes an effective system of international control under its own permanent supervisory organ”.

60. My delegation believes that these simple and undeniable *de facto* considerations are more than sufficient to convince us to decide, in accordance with resolution B of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,⁴ that States possessing such weapons but that are also devoted to peace should co-operate with this undertaking, in resolute fashion in order to ensure the utmost effectiveness of the Treaty, by signing it and ratifying its Additional Protocol II.

61. The greatest step forward towards general and complete disarmament would be to tackle the problem of converting or transferring present investments in the production of armaments and in military expenditures into investments and jobs for peaceful purposes designed to promote and increase human well-being.

62. When we call to mind the facts set forth in the memorandum issued by the Romanian delegation [*see A/7994*], which reports that from the beginning of the century up to the end of the last decade, the world has spent more than \$4 million million on armaments, that in the last six years alone, \$1 million million was spent, and that at present military expenditures are in excess of \$200,000 million per annum, it will be understood and admitted, without any reservations whatsoever, that the world is wasting vast resources that could be used to supply the many, many needs stemming from the poverty of nations.

63. The transition stage during which we would effect the process of absorbing the human and material resources, which are at present devoted to war expenditures and industries, in industries and activities that would enhance the economic and social well-being of peoples, would, without question, be an immense and arduous undertaking. But the lessons of history teach us that human beings have already successfully tackled equally arduous and compli-

cated tasks. And in connexion with that process of transfer carried out on a world-wide scale, man can count on two fundamental incentives: that of his own survival, and the urge to step up the economic and social development of countries to bring about living conditions in respect of food, housing, health, education, and the like, that will enable men to live on this planet under conditions that meet the minimum requirements of the human condition.

64. As broader and more effective measures leading to general and complete disarmament are proposed and discussed, naturally my delegation, in accordance with the traditional peaceful and humanitarian policy of our country and on the basis of specific instructions from our Government, will support any measure designed to halt the ruinous arms race, to suspend the underground testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, to eliminate the use for purposes of warfare of chemical and biological agents, and to restrict or limit all types of armaments in general.

65. My delegation believes that the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, which appears in annex A of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*A/8059-DC/233*], reflects a considerable amount of effort, on the part of delegations which make up the Conference, to prevent the arms race from expanding into the vast areas of the earth covered by seas and oceans.

66. These efforts merit the express thanks of my delegation; and we also wish to thank the Latin American delegations members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for the improvements that they proposed and that were introduced into the original versions of the draft treaty, improvements without which we surely could not hope to gain the approval of the proposed text.

67. In fact Uruguay, which did not ratify the 1958 Geneva Conventions and which extended its sovereignty to an area of the territorial sea measuring 200 nautical miles and to the soil and sub-soil of this sea and to the continental shelf, defining its position in the declarations of the conferences on the law of the sea convened this year in Montevideo in May and Lima in August, would have not been able to accept the restrictive rule laid down in article II, which establishes as the outer limit of the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof, to which reference is made in article I, the limit of twelve miles mentioned in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.

68. However, we shall be able to support the draft, because of the fact that, in accordance with the interpretative rule contained in article IV, this would be only an apparent restriction, because, to quote the terms of the article, “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or favouring the position of any State Party with respect to existing international conventions, including the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.”

69. In the light of the same provision concerning the interpretation of the treaty and in accordance with article IX, the draft treaty in no way affects the full application of

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, agenda item 96, document A/7277.

the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which excludes nuclear weapons from all the national territory, including the territorial waters, the floor and sub-soil thereof and the adjacent continental shelf, of the Latin American countries that have ratified it.

70. Without forgetting that further improvements may still be made to the draft treaty and without prejudice to the clarifications that we have made and others that may be made during this debate with the object of dispelling any doubts concerning its interpretation, my delegation is inclined in principle to support it.

71. The Disarmament Decade proclaimed by the United Nations has already witnessed the entry into force on 5 March 1970 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*].

72. The signing and ratification by all nuclear-weapon States of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and the approval of this draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and ocean floor and in the sub-soil thereof could constitute two further immediate successes for the current Disarmament Decade.

73. We hope that successes leading to the goal of general and complete disarmament will follow without interruption, and this is tantamount to expressing hope for the peace and security of all peoples, in the words of the Charter, preserving future generations from the scourge of war.

74. Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): The current session of the General Assembly has been marked not only by an evaluation of the activities of our Organization in the past 25 years but also by the determining of its main tasks for the near and more distant future. One of the paramount tasks already set for us in the Charter is the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, an objective that has since been enlarged by General Assembly resolutions to encompass world-wide disarmament. Consequently it is entirely natural that a great majority of the speakers in the general debate and at the commemorative session should have made references to both positive and negative aspects of the preceding disarmament talks. It has been noted that much remains to be done before we can be fully satisfied with the attainments of the talks.

75. In the past 25 years arms production has gone on at an ever higher speed, and funds allotted to armaments have been constantly rising. Thus, in the period since the end of the Second World War, mankind has suffered, as a consequence of armament and local conflicts, material losses such as might have been sustained in another world war. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, together with the other socialist countries, has constantly drawn attention to this unfavourable development. We have stressed that it is imperative that in disarmament talks nations should not only have good intentions but should do their utmost to attain the objectives so often solemnly declared.

76. In this connexion, we realize that to reach agreement in disarmament talks is an extremely delicate matter, for

the question at stake is now to ensure the security of nations. Mere plans will not suffice; the still existing dangers of nuclear war should imbue nations with the goodwill truly to implement such plans.

77. In past years the socialist countries have submitted a number of proposals concerning both partial measures and general and complete disarmament. We are ready to continue our efforts to shape a system of international security founded on genuine and complete disarmament. We can note with gratification that in these efforts of ours we are not alone, that the desire for frank and purposeful disarmament talks has been growing in recent years.

78. As in previous years, in commencing our disarmament talks we have before us the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva [*A/8059-DC/233*].

79. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which has met continuously since 1962, is, in our opinion, potentially the most effective instrument for the preparation of complicated disarmament agreements, the bringing to life of which is dependent upon wider participation by the international community. In some situations, of course, other forums may be more convenient—for example, in the case of problems confronting in practice only a few parties. Thus, in regard to the question of limiting missile weapons, bilateral talks such as the current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are no doubt suitable. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has shown several times that it is capable of constructive work. We may have reservations inasmuch as it has not succeeded in attaining what it has striven for and what should be the paramount objective of its work, but, in our view, that has not been due to its composition or the organization of its work. In talks concerning all disarmament measures the Conference is bound and delimited by the positions of Governments of the individual countries and their political decisions, upon which the attainment of agreement concerning the individual measures depends. The Conference itself could not take any decision of principle, even if it worked at its best. The situation has been the same in other organs. Therefore we are convinced that nothing would be achieved by activating other machinery or even by establishing other organs to deal with disarmament.

80. In the preceding debate we heard some new proposals concerning certain measures of an organizational character within the framework of the Disarmament Decade. Some proposals of this kind were made here on 2 November by the representative of the Philippines [*1749th meeting*]. In this connexion, we wish to emphasize that we fully understand the strivings for positive attainments in this field. However, in our opinion, organizational measures alone do not usually serve true progress in substantive talks. The General Assembly of the United Nations should not, and does not, only passively register what has been prepared elsewhere. Several times in the past, it has demonstrated that it is capable of taking concrete positions and of making useful recommendations concerning the solution of important questions in such a manner that the agreements prepared in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament correspond to the views of a greatest possible number of States.

81. In the general debate a number of delegations expressed their appreciation of another concrete draft treaty, which was submitted, elaborated and agreed upon in the Conference in a form accepted by practically all its members. I have in mind the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A]. We appreciate the fact that the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, the two co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, who jointly submitted the draft treaty, reacted very sensitively to all the suggestions made at the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session, as well as at the session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year. We may say that the present draft reflects all the fundamental and sensible elements that members of the Committee and other Members of the United Nations wanted it to contain. At present, an expeditious adoption of the draft treaty by the General Assembly should follow, so that the treaty may be open to signature and enter into force as soon as possible.

82. If we speak about past attainments in the field of disarmament, we cannot but mention the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex], which entered into force in March this year, when it was ratified by a due number of States. However, we should bear in mind that if that Treaty is to fulfil its mission, it is indispensable that all States become parties thereto. As far as the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is concerned, we consider accession to the Treaty by the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries of the European Atomic Energy Community of paramount importance.

83. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was among the first States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, up to the present, has been actively striving to bring about a safeguards system emanating from article III of the Treaty. Therefore, on 3 June 1970 we officially informed the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency that we were ready to start negotiations on a safeguards agreement as soon as possible. We believe that the talks in the Agency's Special Committee on Safeguards should proceed in such a manner that the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons may be able to fulfil, within the determined period of time, the obligations arising for them from article III of the Treaty.

84. As a consequence of the Treaty, nuclear armament is reduced at least by the limited number of possessors of nuclear weapons. We hope, however, that limitations as to kind, quality and quantity will follow, also that stockpiles will be gradually destroyed, and that nuclear weapons will be completely eliminated from world arsenals.

85. Our wish is not limited to nuclear weapons alone. Not only the prohibition of use, but also the complete liquidation of stockpiles and the cessation of development and production, should apply to all weapons of mass destruction—that is, to chemical and bacteriological weapons as well. We have in mind the fact that the Geneva

Protocol of 1925,⁵ concerning the prohibition of the use of those weapons, not only is in force, but new States are becoming parties thereto.

86. From the preceding course of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and liquidation of stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological weapons, we have received the impression that some countries have so far not been willing to surrender all chemical weapons as part of their military armaments. We should be glad to know we were mistaken. However, the position of some delegations during the consideration of this problem at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva seems to corroborate the correctness of our assertion. Constant reiteration of arguments to the effect that it is possible to eliminate bacteriological weapons without special pre-conditions, while chemical ones can be eliminated only when a number of requirements and wishes—as yet only hinted at but not specified—are fulfilled, no doubt creates justified concern among all those who would wish to have all weapons of mass destruction eliminated from the world.

87. We believe that the General Assembly should once again voice its unequivocal protest against every attempt directed at such a solution, which would in fact only deceive world public opinion and achieve, *de facto*, very little. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva should be instructed to continue its search for a solution that would not separate bacteriological weapons from chemical ones. This position was expressed by a number of representatives in the general debate, as well as at the commemorative session.

88. In this connexion, we should like to join those preceding speakers in the current debate who drew attention to the fact that the joint memorandum [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 39], submitted by a group of delegations of non-aligned States in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 25 August this year expresses, in its paragraph 6, an identical position.

89. The delegations of socialist States had already, during the session of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, drawn attention to the harmful and dangerous nature of the attempts of some Western States to separate the problems of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

90. It seems to us that those delegations which are delaying talks on chemical weapons by their insistence upon separate negotiations on bacteriological weapons are guilty of several inconsistencies. At the current session we heard from them that bacteriological weapons were almost more dangerous than chemical ones. In spite of that, however, they emphasized that they could not conclude any agreement on chemical weapons without some all-round and foolproof safeguards, which they did not require in the case of biological weapons. At the same time, they speak about those all-round and foolproof safeguards of

⁵ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

chemical weapons only vaguely. It is hard to believe that we should insist on negotiations concerning weapons whose use is still theoretical and, at the same time, postpone agreement on weapons that are really used.

91. In its working document [*ibid.*, sect. 28] submitted at the session of the Geneva Conference, the Czechoslovak delegation drew attention to the interdependence—and interrelation—of the two kinds of weapons, from which it follows that the problem would not be solved by the prohibition of one category of weapons, because a system consisting of both categories of weapons would remain untouched.

92. We consider it necessary to point out that an effective and generally acceptable solution of individual disarmament questions is not possible in the present situation, where the positions of some States are determined by their military and strategic interests and considerations, as we have witnessed in the case of the positions of some Western States in negotiations on a complete ban of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

93. It is of course obvious that, if we want to achieve success in negotiations on chemical and bacteriological weapons, we must proceed flexibly and effectively. We cannot, however, surrender our fundamental requirement that the two types of weapons be considered jointly. The proposal submitted by the socialist countries last year concerning the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons proceeded therefrom.

94. We have listened attentively to constructive suggestions made in connexion with that proposal of the socialist countries, both in this organ at last year's session and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. All the proposals and suggestions submitted were thoroughly studied. On their basis the draft convention was amended so that a text, substantially revised in comparison with last year's version, could be submitted at the current session in document A/8136. The Czechoslovak delegation is of the opinion that the solution suggested in that document is realistic and in full conformity with the prevailing situation. We continue, of course, to be ready to listen to and take into consideration any constructive recommendations.

95. When we evaluate our past work in the field of disarmament, we cannot but mention the fundamental task of all disarmament talks: general and complete disarmament. Negotiations concerning general and complete disarmament were included in the agenda of the General Assembly on the initiative of the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union. As early as 1960, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, together with the other socialist countries, in the then Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva and later on many other occasions, emphasized that general and complete disarmament should be dealt with in such a way as to be in conformity with decisions taken by the United Nations General Assembly. Today we continue to be of the opinion that the achievement of general and complete disarmament should be and has to be the main objective of disarmament talks. Those socialist countries which are not Members of the United Nations have also adopted a positive attitude to the problems of

general and complete disarmament, for example in the statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic contained in document A/C.1/1010.

96. However, we have noted several times, both in this forum and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, that it would not be in the interest of the solution of concrete disarmament problems or, in the end, in the interest of the achievement of general and complete disarmament, if we allowed the disarmament talks to assume a purely theoretical character and did not take advantage of all the possibilities of reaching agreement on partial measures which, while not answering all questions, at least would bring us closer to an ultimate solution. In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva it was noted that a great number of measures included in the individual plans for general and complete disarmament were discussed in the course of disarmament talks, concrete proposals in that respect were made and some of them were included in the negotiations on so-called collateral measures. We could hardly expect more in the present situation.

97. This year the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva dealt with the question of general and complete disarmament in more detail than in past years. Paragraph 59 of its report contains the views of members of the Conference on problems that have to be solved, if talks on general and complete disarmament are to be successful. In our view, it should be particularly emphasized that the participation of all nuclear Powers is indispensable for the success of talks on general and complete disarmament. There are, however, many other problems which must be taken into consideration and which were discussed at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

98. During our current debate numerous speakers have expressed themselves in favour of discussing and adopting a programme of further disarmament measures. During previous disarmament talks, the socialist countries submitted several proposals in connexion with similar programmes. Let us recall, for example, the memorandum submitted by the delegation of the USSR in 1968.⁶ Our position concerning the elaboration of such a programme is still a positive one. We realize its significance for the course of future disarmament negotiations; that, however, is why we have to approach the task with great attention and sensitiveness.

99. Concrete proposals in that respect were submitted at the summer session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. In this connexion, we have heard here several references to the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament, submitted at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 27 August by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia [*ibid.*, sect. 42]. We consider it necessary to draw attention to the fact that the Conference did not have sufficient time to consider and study the programme thoroughly. Prior to the adoption of any programme which would be binding on all the participants in the negotiations, it will be necessary to have thorough consultations and a confrontation of views. Before the

⁶ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Annexes, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96, document A/7134.

submission of any concrete proposals, not only our Committee but also the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should have the opportunity to evaluate and discuss them in detail. The destinies of disarmament talks in succeeding years may depend upon the prudence of our proceedings. We should not forget either that the programme includes the problem of priorities, which is often even more complicated than the adoption of the programme itself.

100. In our opinion, measures relating to nuclear disarmament must take an important place in such a programme. The agreement on the procedure of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, adopted in August 1968, included the sphere of nuclear disarmament; and even if no priorities were adopted, that stemmed, in our view, from the fact that nuclear disarmament stands in the forefront of the tasks confronting us. Here we should, of course, take into consideration the fact that the most important talks in the field of nuclear disarmament are at present held in the form of bilateral talks on the limitation of strategic arms.

101. Those talks between the Soviet Union and the United States of America have been mentioned many times during this and previous sessions of the General Assembly, not only in statements concerning disarmament but also in the general debate in plenary. That is natural, because the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) represent, as a result of their political significance, a principal international political event and their results may have some impact both on further proceedings of disarmament talks and on the general international situation. The talks will also, no doubt, greatly influence further considerations as to what measures should be included in the agenda of future disarmament talks in the field of nuclear disarmament. That does not mean that we should remove from the agenda the question of nuclear disarmament and wait only for what the talks will bring us. For example, the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, in connexion with which a number of concrete proposals were made in the course of the preceding disarmament negotiations, deserves to be given our permanent attention.

102. In the field of non-nuclear disarmament, special attention must be paid to means of mass destruction—that is, to chemical and bacteriological weapons. Likewise, we should not forget that the proposed treaty on the denuclearization of the sea-bed and ocean floor will not solve the entire problem of the potential military abuse of this sphere and that we must continue negotiations aimed at attaining its full demilitarization. Only thus will it be possible to ensure its full utilization for peaceful purposes. We hear in this connexion about preparations of plans for the establishment of an underwater missile system by the United States and other similar plans for the use—or perhaps misuse—of the seas and oceans for military purposes.

103. In conclusion, we should like to point out that the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has always devoted great attention to disarmament questions. Representatives of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have been working incessantly in various disarmament organs as representatives or experts since 1958. The Czechoslovak representatives, at this session, in the Confer-

ence of the Committee on Disarmament, and in all other competent organs are ready to continue their work as intensively as possible in order that we may not only show our good intentions but that we should truly attain our objectives.

104. U SOE TIN (Burma): Mr. Chairman, before proceeding to speak in this Committee for the first time during the present session, may I, on behalf of the delegation of Burma, and of myself personally, extend to you, to the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Farah of Somalia, and to the Rapporteur, Mr. Cerník of Czechoslovakia, our sincere congratulations on your unanimous election. The delegation of Burma is confident that your knowledge, experience and skill, ably supported by the officers of this Committee, will make a major contribution in guiding the work of this Committee to fruitful accomplishment.

105. In the view of my delegation, the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly will, in a sense, assume a new phase for a possible future direction of disarmament negotiations in the context of the Disarmament Decade that has this year been declared for the 1970s. To judge from this perspective and its coincidence with the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) now taking place between the major nuclear Powers, this year may also prove to be a watershed of sorts in the history of arms control, since a breakthrough at the talks is widely regarded as holding out the prospect of a significant beginning to more tangible measures of disarmament. It is against this background that my delegation considers it both timely and necessary to review its attitude to this task. In this connexion my delegation will focus upon three aspects: first, my Government's general approach to disarmament negotiations; second, the position it takes on specific questions of disarmament measures currently under consideration; and third, some reflections on the subject of a comprehensive programme for disarmament.

106. While having no illusions about the limited role that a non-armed country like Burma can play, my Government maintains a consistent interest in the question of disarmament and is accordingly participating in the deliberations within the United Nations and in the Geneva meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in order to assist and to facilitate—however humble our contribution may be—the search for practicable agreements intended to lead progressively towards general and complete disarmament.

107. At this point my delegation would like to stress that proposals for international disarmament, while necessarily of interest to Burma as a peace-loving nation, must be intended primarily for those nations the intensive nature of whose armaments is properly the target of all disarmament proposals. It must be recognized that the fundamental quest for general and complete disarmament is a complex and technically intricate process which can only be achieved as part of a broad political agreement encompassing all the world's nuclear Powers. The long-term stability of any arms control agreement requires the complete involvement of all the nuclear Powers; and Burma hopes that it will not be long before it is possible for the Republic of France and the People's Republic of China to be parties to all disarmament negotiations, since any agreement without them would have an air of unreality.

108. Prompted by its own understanding of developments in the field of disarmament and its own experience in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Burma maintains the view that in all matters of disarmament it is necessary to balance what is desirable and what is practicable. Given the facts of a world situation, with its deep residue of distrust and long-standing military traditions, immediate substantial disarmament would be at the present time of an impractical nature. Our position is that a practicable formula for effective general and complete disarmament would appear to be that all the major armed Powers, assisted to the fullest possible extent by the non-armed nations, should seek phased and proportional agreements and proceed by an aggregation of limited gains to totality of achievement. This would encompass a broad and integrated approach involving unilateral, bilateral and multilateral arms control activities towards the achievement of world stability.

109. Twenty-five years have passed since the world's first nuclear bomb explosion of July 1945 ushered in a new era in the history of arms development, evolving into what has culminated in the present intense and wide-ranging arms race between the major nuclear Powers.

110. Correspondingly, the same event marked a new era of ceaseless negotiations in problems of disarmament and arms control, based on the consensus of the same nuclear Powers that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important concern confronting the world today. With the nuclear genesis of the arms race and the annihilative power which it portends, the control of nuclear weapons remains the highest priority concern in disarmament negotiations. Yet no specific progress has been achieved so far in substantive steps to reduce nuclear armaments, although the major nuclear Powers came close to agreement on the components of a disarmament plan at the beginning of the past decade. The adverse effects of the 1960s have been the phenomena of mounting military budgets and a full-fledged technological arms race. Today, the two major nuclear Powers possess in their arsenals a tremendous over-kill capacity.

111. No internationally concerned nation can regard the present situation with equanimity or fail to recognize the frightful consequences of a nuclear war which might get out of control.

112. It is clear from this that the fundamental problem of arms control for immediate purposes is the achievement and stabilization of the strategic balance between the two major nuclear Powers, because this could lead to the end of the arms race in numbers and preparedness of strategic forces. The delegation of Burma welcomes the continuing series of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and anxiously awaits their early successful outcome.

113. A desirable concomitant to the talks is the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. While both the Soviet Union and the United States are unanimous in their expression of support for the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests, the issue has been hampered by their failure to agree on the methods for monitoring the ban. In so far as my delegation is concerned, we believe that the time is now opportune for the nuclear Powers to make

a special political effort for an advance on the question. It is evident from the cumulative data of scientific and technological knowledge that has been progressively gained in the field of seismology and the encouraging nature of the replies to the Canadian initiative for the creation of a world-wide exchange of seismological data, that a basis is at least apparent for a start forward on the prohibition of tests above a certain threshold. It cannot be over-emphasized that the most vital step for an effective cessation of the nuclear arms race is the conclusion of a ban on underground tests to complement the 1963 partial test-ban treaty.⁷ It is in this context that my delegation views the Swedish draft⁸ of April 1969, as a gratifying approach projected on the right framework. A particular point of appeal to us in the Swedish draft is that it leaves the question of the regulation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to be the subject of a specially negotiated separate international agreement, which could cover nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike, under a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This we feel could most appropriately be negotiated within the forum of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

114. The delegation of Burma regrets to state that, despite the provisions of resolution 2604 B (XXIV) of last year requiring the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament "to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests . . . and to submit a special report to the Assembly on the result of its deliberations", an attempt by Sweden to persuade the Conference to proceed with urgent preparatory work in anticipation of some concrete agreements emerging from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [CCD/PV.487] met only with a swift response, if not a polite rebuff, from the two super-Powers—the United States reiterating its position on the need for on-site inspection and the USSR stressing the sufficiency of national means of control. In the circumstances, the so-called special report on the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests contained in paragraphs 12 to 22 of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/233] fell far short of the expectations of the General Assembly resolution. The entire question remains as solidly deadlocked as before. In respect of other matters in the nuclear field, the unusually voluminous report of the Conference we have before us, apart from a mention of statements made by heads of Governments on the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex], is mainly significant for its silence on these issues.

115. With regard to the eligibility of access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions, my delegation stands on its position that the question is as much an economic proposition as it is a disarmament aspect, and that it is necessary to ensure that the guarantee of equitable treatment under the provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute should not be vitiated or jeopardized by restrictive or discriminatory pre-conditions.

⁷ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

⁸ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232, annex C, sect. 6.

116. I now turn to the text of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, the fourth version of which [A/8059-DC/233, *annex A*] is before the Assembly. When the initial draft was placed before the General Assembly last year, it was largely the work of the two co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The present version is a composite product of the concerted efforts made in this First Committee, as well as of the delegations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. This augurs well for a stronger spirit of co-operation and understanding between the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon Powers in future disarmament negotiations. We note with satisfaction that two of our chief concerns, which seemed to us crucial omissions in previous drafts, have been met to a certain extent in the present text. With the reference to international procedures in the verification article and a separate article concerning further negotiations towards a more comprehensive prohibition, the omission has been set right and we believe that the treaty now presented to this Committee can, as a whole, achieve wide general acceptance. The delegation of Burma has, accordingly, decided to co-sponsor the draft resolution on the subject contained in document A/C.1/L.523.

117. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year devoted a considerable part of its time to the question of chemical and biological weapons. Discussions were characterized by a large number of statements devoted exclusively to the problem and the tabling of an unending stream of papers. Nonetheless, the Conference finds itself no nearer to an agreement. The divergence of opinion remains wide and unresolved owing to basic differences in underlying assumptions. Disagreement continues to be sharp over whether chemical or biological weapons should be banned together or separately. The question remains completely deadlocked. From the records of the debate on verification procedures it is evident that there is no easy solution to the problem. We are inclined to think that an appropriate initial first step should be political—at the same time anticipating firmer agreements on control. Burma favours a comprehensive approach to the question of chemical and biological weapons and believes that interim stability on the problem should be achieved by national legislative and administrative means to control these weapons pending mutually acceptable agreements on international verification procedures.

118. Burma is of the view that the prohibition of the use of chemical and biological weapons will not be effective unless concerted efforts are made by all Member States to stop the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons in accordance with the recommendation made by the Secretary-General in his report entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*.⁹

119. Preliminary proposals for a comprehensive disarmament programme have been put forward in formal statements and working papers at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. However, nothing resembling a broad consensus has emerged. This is only to

be expected as indeed general and complete disarmament covers a field wide enough to embrace the universe itself and therefore raises a multitude of complex issues, which strike at the very heart of the security of nations large and small. A comprehensive disarmament programme is not a “programme” in the ordinary sense, but is a grave political document having far-reaching political and security implications, and carrying short, medium and long-term commitments. One could and must accept the idea of a comprehensive disarmament programme, but when we go beyond that point and start to draw up a concrete programme with priorities, stages, balances, and so on, we immediately come face to face with all the problems and conflicts under the sun, which make the world the sorry place it is.

120. The draft programme tabled by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia [*ibid.*, *annex C, sect. 42*] is a commendable initiative to lend the discussions a sense of direction. Few of the principles and elements embodied in the draft would seem objectionable or call for serious misgivings. But every single principle and element must be seen and weighed in the context of particular conditions and situations prevailing in different parts of the world. Our preliminary thinking is that the draft programme might perhaps seem to impose on a global basis solutions and measures suited to the strategic situation in Europe.

121. Under measures for regional disarmament, the creation of nuclear-free zones is a prominent concern. My delegation cannot help but be impressed with the Latin American record in this sphere. Three years have elapsed since the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America¹⁰ and its Protocols were opened for signature in February 1967. The Treaty has been in operation since June 1969 and its international agency (OPANAL) was formally established in September 1969. But the viability of any nuclear-weapon-free zone would be less than credible without formal nuclear-Power commitment to respect and guarantee the zone. For this reason, the plea of the delegation of Burma is for the nuclear Powers not to delay their contribution in signing and ratifying Additional Protocol II.

122. And now for some last words. It is beyond question that there is a universal popular desire for some break in the intensity of the current arms race. The tasks before us are clearly numerous, difficult and complex in nature. Nevertheless, the delegation of Burma notes with satisfaction that the climate of disarmament negotiations has, in a sense, improved in recent years, in correspondence with the wider international move towards *détente*. We are therefore not without hope that some desired agreements are not beyond reach, provided the major nuclear Powers rise to the required heights of statesmanship.

123. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Burma for the very kind words of congratulation which he addressed to the officers of the Committee.

124. Princess ASHRAF PAHLAVI (Iran) (*interpretation from French*): Since this is the first time that I have taken the floor in this Committee, I should like to say how happy

⁹ United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.L.24.

¹⁰ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

I am to see you occupying the Chairmanship. Not only do our countries maintain excellent relations, but I cannot forget our close collaboration both at the Teheran Conference on Human Rights and in the Commission on Human Rights, where you have always made a most useful and noteworthy contribution.

125. I should also like to extend my congratulations to the Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur.

126. Mr. Chairman, if I welcome your election to this high office, I am unfortunately unable to say the same about the question now before us. As the Secretary-General and preceding speakers have pointed out, very little progress has been made and, where there has been progress, the results achieved are scarcely commensurate with the needs.

127. The question of disarmament was on the agenda of our planet well before the birth of the United Nations, and the hopes that our Organization aroused in this area have been dangerously eroded. As the representative of Sweden put it the other day [*1750th meeting*], despite some progress, things are taking a turn for the worse, since the military arsenals have not ceased to expand. The figures quoted by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report¹¹ and the information that many representatives have given us are appalling. The calculations of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) seem to me to be eloquent. According to SIPRI, the destructive power of nuclear explosives now existing in the world, evaluated in tons of TNT, would suffice to provide more than fifteen tons for each inhabitant of our happy globe. I might add that other experts have undertaken some rather different calculations which demonstrate that it is now impossible to provide every human being with more than fifteen kilos of wheat or rice a year! The very matter-of-factness of these figures provides an astonishingly succinct comment on the state of our world.

128. In the circumstances, we must admit that the efforts of the United Nations during its first quarter century have failed in the field of disarmament, in relation both to intentions and to the needs. The breakdown of this period into three parts, as indicated last week by the representative of Italy [*1752nd meeting*], seems to me to be realistic, and I agree with him when he says that the present session provides an excellent opportunity for reflection on the meagre results achieved.

129. Nevertheless, I shall refrain from lapsing into pessimism, because despite the negative elements we should pay attention to the positive achievements, and they do exist.

130. Thus, in the field of nuclear disarmament four Treaties have been concluded since the 1960s and the most recent, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] has quite rightly raised great hopes. More than one hundred countries have signed it. Fifty have already ratified it and its entry into force last month will undoubtedly mark a historic milestone on the road to general disarmament.

131. Again, the spirit of co-operation which animated the negotiations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament when drafting the treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor as well as on the subsoil thereof, was a positive element. The draft which is annexed to the report of the Conference [*A/8059-DC/233*], we believe represents an improved version of the text which the General Assembly had before it at its last session.

132. In this regard, it should be emphasized that the changes made in the initial text improved the draft, which now contains, in particular, a practical verification procedure and a precise geographical definition. If the treaty marks one further step towards a limitation of the arms race, it must nevertheless not be forgotten that it will not serve to demilitarize the sea-bed. That is why article V, which stipulates that the parties must continue their negotiations with a view to the attainment of further agreements, is of great importance.

133. Another encouraging development is the progress made by the International Atomic Energy Agency towards the peaceful utilization of atomic energy and of nuclear explosives. In response to General Assembly resolution 2605 B (XXIV) Iran has made known its agreement to the creation within the Agency of an international service for the peaceful application of nuclear explosives. We hope that substantial progress will be made in the course of next year.

134. It is also reassuring to note the resumption of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). It is to be hoped that these negotiations will finally result in a permanent limitation of strategic nuclear weapons systems, thus responding to the expectations of the whole world. It is generally recognized that the objective of the talks is connected with the question of the prohibition of all forms of nuclear tests. It is one more reason to hope that the negotiations will produce rapid results. We are, of course, aware of the difficulties revealed by the slow pace of the negotiations, and we must not underestimate them. But our Committee should in any event follow closely the progress of the talks.

135. Recent developments concerning chemical and bacteriological weapons constitute another encouraging element. We associate ourselves with other delegations in calling for unreserved ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.¹² It is of vital importance to mankind that the threat of these weapons be eliminated. We support the idea of the prohibition applying not only to the use but also to the manufacture and stockpiling of these weapons. The prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol should cover all biological and chemical methods of warfare and the separation of biological and chemical weapons should be avoided.

136. Those are some of the elements we believe give reason at least for a certain measure of hope. I say "measure of hope" because, apart from the draft treaty

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A.*

¹² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed, it seems to us that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has made very little progress and has advanced only very slowly.

137. As the Secretary-General has emphasized in the introduction to his annual report, the Disarmament Decade, which we enthusiastically welcomed last year, will assume its full significance and its real meaning if a comprehensive disarmament programme can be elaborated. I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia for the excellent document they have placed before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in that regard [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 42]. We think that document can be useful in the discussions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to elaborating a disarmament programme.

138. The General Assembly asked the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to consider a disarmament programme. It studied the question but was unable to reach agreement. That is regrettable, to say the least.

139. After all, the world looks anxiously to the United Nations in this its twenty-fifth anniversary year, and the problem of disarmament is for the public a kind of touchstone. Continually disappointed hope could still further destroy the Organization's reputation. That is why it is urgent for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to reach agreement on a disarmament programme.

140. Of course we all know, as the representative of Brazil reminded us the other day [1751st meeting], that disarmament cannot be considered in the absolute, separate from political realities. So long as the security of States is threatened no real progress can be made. But the links between the two phenomena must not be allowed to become a vicious circle. The Organization must accordingly strive at the same time to ensure and strengthen international security while reaffirming its role in the peaceful solution of international disputes. The Organization must also help to bridge the scandalous gap between the wealthy and the developing countries.

141. I refer once again to the statement of the representative of Brazil, who told us that armament expenditure in the world represents 1,000 times the United Nations budget for development. I might add to that the calculations of certain experts who a few years ago worked out some equivalents of this kind: one intercontinental missile base, according to them, is equivalent to a hydroelectric dam with a capacity of 1.7 million kilowatts; the cost of a new prototype bomber represents the annual salary of 250,000 teachers; fourteen jet bombers, they said, represent a year's food supply for 14 million children.

142. I shall not continue to read the list; everyone knows it. But those few examples lead me to speak of the proposal of the Romanian delegation, which is, in fact, similar to the idea of a study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race contained in the introduction to the Secretary-General's annual report. It also reflects the purposes of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV).

143. My delegation can only approve the preparation of such a study, which would in fact be a follow-up to discussions on a similar subject in the Second Committee. Such a study would have the merit of informing world opinion, and could certainly give new impetus to the idea of general and controlled disarmament.

144. In the present world situation, no stone should be left unturned in pursuing the essential objective of disarmament.

145. Against that background, we are grateful to those delegations who have given us the Nobel Peace Prize Laureates Declaration on peace and disarmament [see A/C.1/1001]. That text is, in fact, an appeal on behalf of the Disarmament Decade. We cannot but endorse their statement that if we are to spare civilization a set-back from which it might never recover, and if we wish man to survive on our planet, it is absolutely essential that the Disarmament Decade not belie its name.

146. That the beginning of the Disarmament Decade should coincide with that of the Second United Nations Development Decade is in itself remarkable, for those two questions are today the hinge on which the United Nations turns, and the great challenge that confronts mankind in this field, as in others, comes down to the following question: does man have sufficient sense to point his destiny in the right direction, that is to say to make intelligent use of his new possibilities, or will he be foolish enough to use them to destroy himself?

147. The other day I was reading an account of a speech delivered by a great biologist who, at the opening of a scientific congress held here, said that we were in a state of full transition, and he predicted the advent of an age of co-operation and interdependence within the space of three generations. Speaking of himself, he said he was a long-term optimist. For my part, I am an optimist pure and simple, and I share the hopes of the Secretary-General that the question of disarmament will make substantial progress in the decade of the 1970s. It is for us to renew and strengthen our efforts so that the advent of the age of co-operation may be more rapid. For the rest, we can only trust in the words of the Prophet: "God is with those who are patient".

148. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank Her Royal Highness Princess Ashraf Pahlavi for her very kind words of congratulation to the officers of the Committee, at the beginning of her statement. I should like to assure Her Highness that I consider it an honour and a privilege to have been able to participate in the International Conference on Human Rights at Teheran and in the last session of the Commission of Human Rights, both of which she presided over with such dignity and wisdom.

149. Mr. SCOTT (New Zealand): Disarmament is and will remain for some time to come a fundamental task of the United Nations. The first resolution adopted by the Organization 25 years ago dealt with this question, which has been the subject of countless resolutions since. No one would disagree that general and complete disarmament must be the crowning point of the United Nations ultimate goal, the principal purpose set forth in the Charter and a

fundamental objective of the Organization: the attainment of international peace and security. Yet in many respects, after 25 years, the world is as far distant from the attainment of general and complete disarmament as it has ever been.

150. All of us in this Organization have the best of intentions in regard to the need to put an end to the arms race. None of us is unaware of the threat to human existence represented by an almost geometrical progression in the growth of the world's capacity for self-destruction that advancing technology has brought in its wake during the past quarter of a century. But good intentions are no substitute for action and words alone cannot provide salvation. Here is a problem, above all, where leadership and direction from the super-Powers, with their immeasurable capacity for over-kill, is essential.

151. The growth of confidence springing from negotiation and action by the great Powers could have infectious and beneficial results for progress by all nations. Since disarmament is a matter of universal concern, however, the small nations have a legitimate and perhaps a more pressing political and economic interest than the nuclear-balanced great Powers in demanding that urgency be given to disarmament negotiations. What we still lack is the collective will necessary to ensure that the worthy sentiments we express are translated into positive measures.

152. The picture is not, of course, entirely black. We can point to some progress, painfully slow though this may have been. In the field of arms limitation; in particular, we have managed to close some doors on future developments which would further intensify the threat of self-annihilation which looms over us all. The Antarctic Treaty,¹³ the Treaty on outer space,¹⁴ the partial test-ban Treaty,¹⁵ the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex], the Treaty of Tlatelolco,¹⁶ and the draft treaty on the prohibition on the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A] are not inconsiderable achievements, and in them we can all take some satisfaction. But our satisfaction must be tempered by our recognition that these instruments, valuable though they may be, do no more than deal with the outer limits of the problem. The whirlpool of the arms race continues at an ever-increasing pace; newer and more frightening weapons of mass destruction are being developed; there has been a sharp increase in the purchase and stockpiling of conventional arms; and the huge human and material resources that are expended on armaments of all kinds are being diverted from the more urgent and crucial needs of a major part of the world's population.

153. In these circumstances, my delegation must confess to some disappointment on studying the latest report on

¹³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

¹⁴ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

¹⁵ Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

¹⁶ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (*ibid.*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

the activities of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/233]. As an expression of substantive progress in the field of disarmament it can only be described as a somewhat meagre document. The fact that it records agreement on the treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor is, of course, to be welcomed. We have also been pleased to note the increased attention the Conference has devoted to the important question of the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. Similarly, we have observed the progress that has apparently been made on the proposed establishment of an international system of seismic data exchange, first advanced by Canada and further developed by the United Kingdom. This undoubtedly brings closer the prospect of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which New Zealand has long urged should be the logical next step from the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. This being said, however, and despite the great amount of effort and study that has gone into the individual proposals and working papers submitted, the Conference as a whole appears rather to have been marking time over the past year. We would not wish to underestimate the difficulty of the problem of which the Committee is seized but, like a number of other delegations, we would have hoped for some greater indication of forward progress than is in fact offered in this year's report.

154. New Zealand has always considered that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is the most appropriate and best qualified body to deal with disarmament questions. Over the years it has undoubtedly developed a considerable scientific and diplomatic expertise in this field. But there is a real danger that lack of progress on its part could lead to a decline in confidence in the Conference's ability to carry out its mandate and to an increase in the feeling—already being voiced—that its responsibilities should be shifted elsewhere. In the view of the New Zealand delegation, this would be a most regrettable development.

155. The chief outcome of the Conference's deliberations over the past year is, of course, the text of the treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. As I indicated earlier, New Zealand welcomes the agreement that has been reached on this text and is a sponsor of the draft resolution commending the treaty and requesting that it be opened for signature at the earliest possible date [A/C.1/L.523]. In the view of the New Zealand delegation, the manner in which the treaty was finally negotiated is of almost as much importance as its substance, since it represents a significant example of what can be achieved in the disarmament field, given a readiness on the part of all those involved, directly or indirectly, to show a true spirit of co-operation and a determination to move forward. The result of this collaboration has been a much-improved text from the one we had last year.

156. The treaty is, admittedly, a measure of non-armament and not of disarmament. In this it parallels most of the other international agreements in the field of what is broadly described as disarmament that have been obtained so far. In common with other delegations, New Zealand would have liked to see a treaty which was broader in scope

than the one now before us, and we would question whether it is desirable or practical to distinguish quite so sharply between the problems of the sea-bed and the remainder of the deep-ocean area as does the present draft. We are, however, pleased to note that there is provision in the treaty directed towards future negotiations on additional sea-bed disarmament measures. We would hope that this might eventually lead to further effective agreements in fulfilment of the principle that the sea-bed and ocean floor should be used solely for peaceful purposes.

157. Another major issue to which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has devoted considerable attention over the past year is the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. Its report performs a valuable service in setting out and clarifying some of the more complex problems involved.

158. New Zealand was an early party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol¹⁷ and firmly believes that all States should become parties to it as soon as possible. We have been gratified to note that a number of States have acceded to the Protocol over the last twelve months and others have indicated that they intend to do so in the near future.

159. At the same time, we fully recognize that technological developments affecting the ability of countries to produce chemical and biological weapons now make desirable the negotiation of some new agreement to supplement the 1925 Protocol. In particular, the fact that the Protocol prohibits only the use of such weapons in war and says nothing about their development or manufacture, is an obvious imperfection. Another drawback is the somewhat outmoded language of the Protocol in relation to current technological and scientific terminology. We would wish to emphasize, however, that these inadequacies are not sufficient to justify changes in the Protocol itself or, necessarily, its replacement by some new, all-embracing agreement. What is required, in our view, is some supplementary international instrument which will expand and update the provisions of the Protocol.

160. In this respect we do not share the view expressed by certain delegations that it is essential that both chemical and biological weapons be studied together and that the prohibition on their use, production, and stockpiling be set in one single international instrument. It is helpful and sensible that the two subjects of chemical and biological warfare be discussed in a joint context within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, but the difficulties that arise in the case of the proper treatment of one type of weapon should not be allowed to delay progress in securing agreement on the handling of the other.

161. As the report of the Conference reveals, there is general agreement on the importance of prohibiting biological weapons and agents and some unanimity of view on the means which might be adopted to achieve such a prohibition. In the case of chemical weapons the problems involved are clearly much greater. The fundamental dis-

agreement that exists over the permissibility of the use of tear gases, "smokes" and chemical defoliants, together with the considerable number of chemicals which are in common production and commercial use, and the verification problems which ensue, would suggest that considerable difficulties lie in the way of early international agreement on this question. Certainly we cannot accept that these difficulties are in any way met by the Soviet draft convention [A/8136], which seeks to ban both types of weapon but makes no provision for safeguards, enforcement procedures or verification.

162. In these circumstances we believe that, as a matter of practical common sense, the first step should be towards a suitable supplementary treaty to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which would cover the production and possession of biological agents for possible hostile purposes. The revised draft of the convention proposed by the United Kingdom [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 2] represents, to our mind, a conscientious attempt to solve the problems involved, and New Zealand would in fact be prepared to support it as it stands. We have, nevertheless, noted the views expressed by Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Sweden and others to the effect that further study of the technical aspects of biological warfare could well reveal more secure methods of verification and control. New Zealand has always held the view that reasonably effective verification procedures are an essential part of disarmament agreements. This applies as much to a prohibition on biological warfare as it does to other disarmament measures, and if there is a possibility that further study might lead to a more efficient and meaningful treaty, then this possibility should not be ignored. Such study might usefully be carried out both within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and by qualified international experts on biological agents.

163. It is clear from the draft resolution that has been submitted by the United Kingdom [A/C.1/L.526] that it too shares the belief of a number of other members in the value of further examination by the Committee on Disarmament of the problems of both biological and chemical warfare. New Zealand strongly supports that resolution. It is a well-balanced draft which, contrary to the draft resolution proposed by Hungary, Mongolia, and Poland [A/C.1/L.527], gives equal weight to all the views expressed in the course of the deliberations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Therefore we would urge its adoption by this Committee and we hope that it will also be adopted by the General Assembly.

164. One highly important issue on which, to my delegation's regret, the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament touches but lightly is that of a comprehensive test ban treaty. A number of previous speakers have already referred to the absence of any really substantive comment in the report on this problem. It is almost exactly seven years since the partial test ban Treaty entered into force. Since that date there has been a slow but steady increase in the underground testing of nuclear devices, and two States, neither of them parties to the Treaty, have continued to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. The atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons has been thoroughly condemned by the world community, and in continuing to carry them out the countries involved

¹⁷ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

are acting in total disregard of international opinion. In addition to the risk, the psychological damage and the defiance of world opinion involved, there is the cumulative poisoning and pollution of the environment, of food resources and of human and animal life, with as yet incalculable results flowing from continued nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere. These are all crucial aspects of the over-all environmental problem, of which in recent years we have become suddenly, and belatedly, conscious. It is our most earnest hope that the countries concerned will accept their international obligations in this matter and discontinue these activities.

165. The increasing frequency of underground testing and the rapid development of further nuclear-weapon systems intensify the urgent need for a ban on such testing, which will supplement the partial test ban and so result in a total prohibition of the testing of all nuclear weapons. We have been pleased to note in this connexion the growth of interest in, and further development of, the proposal, originally put forward by Canada, concerning an international exchange of seismic data. New Zealand has already offered its support for this proposal, which, in its view, provides the necessary foundation on which an adequately verifiable ban on underground testing can be built. It now seems possible, provided that the political will to do so exists among the nuclear Powers, for more definite progress to be made towards an all-embracing ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. It is our hope that, in its forthcoming deliberations, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, having disposed of the sea-bed disarmament treaty, will now be in a position to give high priority to drawing up such a comprehensive treaty.

166. A number of speakers have commented on the disturbing growth in the trade and stockpiling of conventional arms. This question is not mentioned in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, but we believe—in line with the views expressed by the representative of Italy [1752nd meeting]—that it would be both timely and appropriate if, with due regard for its other priorities, the Committee were to begin to undertake studies directed towards the problem of the reduction of conventional armaments. The incredible amounts involved in the purchase of conventional arms, often by the countries which can least afford them, represent a wasteful diversion of resources which could, and should, be put to more productive use.

167. The year 1970 represents the first year of the Disarmament Decade. In a resolution adopted by the General Assembly last year the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was requested to work out a comprehensive programme dealing with the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations. In response to that request Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia have drawn up a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 42] and Italy has submitted a working paper [*ibid.*, sect. 38] on the same subject. The New Zealand delegation has studied those two proposals with some care and, while it believes that both could provide a basis for further discussion, it has certain reservations about the approach

adopted and some of the proposals advanced. This is particularly so in regard to the three-Power draft.

168. In the main our reservations centre on the relationships between the proposed programme put forward by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia and the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations,¹⁸ entered into by the United States and the Soviet Union on 20 September 1961 and recognized by the General Assembly in resolution 1722 (XVI). The New Zealand delegation considers that that statement should continue to provide the basis for any future comprehensive disarmament programme. It was envisaged in paragraph 4 of the statement that the disarmament programme:

“... should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified ...”.

169. The three-Power proposal admittedly does contemplate proceeding by a series of “packages”, each dealing with one particular aspect of the problem and put into effect when agreement is reached on it. To our mind, however, this is rather different from the procedure laid down in paragraph 4 of the agreed principles. Similarly, it seems to us that the three-Power draft makes insufficient reference to the key principle of balance laid down in paragraph 5 of the joint statement, which reads in part as follows:

“All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage ... could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.”

In my delegation's view, the reference in the three-Power draft to the fact that the principle of balance should simply be “kept in mind” is thoroughly inadequate, given the overriding importance of that principle.

170. In short, the New Zealand delegation believes that if there is to be an attempt to set out a comprehensive disarmament programme, then that programme should be founded on the joint statement of principles of 1961 and should seek to formulate a stage-by-stage procedure for the implementation of paragraphs 3 and 4 of that statement. This was, of course, the intent of the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1962 to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It seems to the New Zealand delegation, therefore, that a revision and updating of those treaties—the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, put forward by the Soviet Union,¹⁹ and the outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a

¹⁸ Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

¹⁹ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. C.

peaceful world, submitted by the United States²⁰—might in itself constitute a useful and reasonable approach to the establishment of guidelines for future discussion and negotiation. We have noted the comments offered by the representative of Mexico [1753rd meeting] about the

status of the agreed principles and the connexion between them and the three-power draft. We would welcome any further observations that its co-sponsors or other members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament may have on the point of view we have expressed.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, sect. F.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.