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GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. RONAN (Ireland): The present year at the United Nations is one of commemoration and stocktaking. In the disarmament context, it marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the end of the last world war and of the establishment of the Charter machinery for the maintenance of international peace and security and for disarmament discussions. But it is also the twenty-fifth anniversary of the birth of the nuclear age. In the period, five different nations have become nuclear military Powers. Mankind has had to live with the prospect of nuclear war and the danger of global destruction.

2. The advent of the nuclear age opened up great opportunities for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but at the same time confronted States with the most difficult security problem ever faced by the human race. In achieving a strategic balance based on mutual deterrence, the two super-Powers developed massive nuclear arsenals and means of delivery and have multiplied their capacity to overkill to an incredible pitch. With the pace and pattern of technological progress, the problem of halting and reversing the nuclear and the conventional arms races has become one of the greatest urgency and priority. To attain the goals of a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, a universal collective security system must be envisaged. Meanwhile, every effort must be made to accelerate the slow pace of arms control negotiations and to move on to real disarmament measures.

3. In speaking of the Second United Nations Development Decade, the Secretary-General has said that the Members of the United Nations have perhaps 10 years left in which to launch a global partnership in order, *inter alia*, to curb the arms race, or the problem will be beyond our capacity to control. This is a warning which must be taken very seriously if international anarchy is to be avoided and peace, justice and progress are to be advanced. Although the advent of the nuclear age produced an arms race of mathematical progression, there was, nevertheless, a response by the international community to the growing

Chairman: Mr. Andrés AGUILAR M. (Venezuela).

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Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (continued) (A/8080)

dangers of confrontation. In a spirit of *détente* a number of important achievements were made in the disarmament field in the decade of the 1960s. The United States-Soviet Union joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament¹ was recommended by the General Assembly in 1961 as a basis for negotiations on general and complete disarmament, and five important treaties—the Antarctic Treaty,² the Partial Test-Ban Treaty,³ the Outer Space Treaty,⁴ the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)⁵ and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), *annex*]⁶—were concluded and have entered into force. It was therefore timely in an effort to promote further progress that the General Assembly, on the initiative of the Italian delegation, in resolution 2602 E (XXIV), adopting a proposal of the Secretary-General, declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade. In that same resolution, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva was requested, while continuing intensive negotiations on collateral measures, to work out a comprehensive programme which would provide a guideline to chart the course of its further work and negotiations.

4. It is to be noted from its report to the General Assembly [A/8059-DC/233] that in the past year the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has devoted close attention to the possibility of preparing a generally acceptable programme and received a number of important working papers on the subject from members. In particular, the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia made an important contribution in the draft comprehensive programme on disarmament [*ibid.*, *annex C, sect. 42*]. That paper sets out in clear and logical order the objective of the programme and the underlying principles that should govern it. It also contains the elements and phases of a balanced programme without any rigidities of time element which could be meaningless in the context of disarmament negotiations. The interrelationship between disarmament, international security, peace-making and peace-keeping and a climate of confidence are stressed. All depend on international organization for the achievement of real progress. The United Nations and its related bodies must therefore provide the means and the necessary machinery through which the ends in question are to be achieved. The declaration of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade requires the adoption of a comprehensive programme if the concept is to have cohesion and success. The three-Power working paper is, in my delegation's view, an important starting point and offers the basis for a comprehensive programme on disarmament that would be worthy of adoption by the General Assembly for the first year of the new decade.

5. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization⁶ the Secretary-General stressed that pro-

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

³ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

⁴ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), *annex*).

⁵ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A*.

gress during the Disarmament Decade will to a large extent depend on two developments: first, the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty to halt the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and, secondly, the making of substantial headway in limiting strategic missile systems—that is, in halting the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unless success is achieved in both those fields it is difficult to conceive of much real progress in other significant arms control or disarmament measures. This analysis pinpoints the principal danger areas in nuclear weapon proliferation requiring priority attention.

6. My delegation has previously stressed in this Committee the vital importance my Government attaches to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks that have been initiated and are continuing between the Soviet Union and the United States. Progress in technology has begun to threaten the balance of nuclear deterrent, and common sense and prudence have indicated the necessity of calling a halt to further astronomical expenditure in building up what could be ineffectual strategic missile systems. The super-Powers each find themselves faced with a nuclear power paralysis and have moved from positions of rigid postulation to negotiation with a view to checking the prospect of further futile momentum in the nuclear arms race, which would pose the most serious threat ever to human survival.

7. While the issues involved in the talks are difficult and complex, there is every prospect that agreements in this area could be achieved without adversely affecting the vital security interests of either of the parties. In the achievement of success in the talks the stakes are very high both for the super-Powers and for their peoples and the rest of mankind. The advantages involve enhanced security, improved international relations and the release of resources for economic and social purposes. Above all, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks represent an indispensable beginning towards halting the nuclear arms race and the exploration of the possibilities of nuclear disarmament. Allowing for the need for an atmosphere of confidence in conducting the talks, the desirability of providing suitable progress reports or briefings should be borne in mind. The General Assembly has an interest in being kept abreast of developments—indeed it has some claim in the matter. A dramatic earnest of good intentions could be achieved by an early announcement by the parties in response to the appeal of the General Assembly in resolution 2602 A (XXIV) for a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems.

8. It has been encouraging that the concept of the Disarmament Decade should have coincided with the coming into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, potentially the most far-reaching international arms control measure adopted since the United Nations was established. It would be wise and realistic to regard the Treaty as a possible starting point for general nuclear disarmament. The timeliness of the coming into effect of the Treaty when large amounts of fissionable materials can shortly be expected to be available in many countries cannot be overstressed. A little over a decade ago less than 20 nuclear power reactors existed in Member States, and all of those were in the nuclear-weapon States. Today there are over 100 such reactors in some 14 Member States and, according to estimates made by the Interna-

tional Atomic Energy Agency, in a mere six years the present number of power reactors will have almost trebled and the number of States possessing them will have almost doubled. Moreover, the size and sophistication of those reactors is in a constant state of advancement.

9. Already an increasing number of developed countries as well as some developing countries are showing interest in the potential utilization of the fast-breeder type reactor in the context of low-cost nuclear energy production on a large scale. In the long term we are faced with the prospect of a rapidly advancing nuclear technology with revolutionary new discoveries and applications. Already, for instance, important experimental work is in progress in controlled fusion research and its potential for the generation of power. The need to make available the vast benefits of nuclear energy for the prosperity of mankind while at the same time preventing their abuse for destructive purposes makes the non-proliferation Treaty an indispensable instrument of peace for present and future generations.

10. The entry into force of the Treaty on 5 March 1970 was undoubtedly of fundamental importance and a fitting prologue to the Disarmament Decade. There is still, however, a long way to go before we can be certain that the Treaty in fact will prove to be a workable instrument and that its aims can be fully realized. My Government has constantly urged as a first step the widest possible adherence to the Treaty itself and it is a matter of considerable satisfaction that to date it has been signed by almost 100 States and ratified by over 60. We sincerely hope that all States that have not done so will accede to the Treaty at an early date. As was pointed out in the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons. "The solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them."⁷

11. During the last year, my Government welcomed the setting-up by the International Atomic Energy Agency of the Safeguards Committee, which is still in session, for the purpose of working out the structure and content of the agreements to be negotiated under article III of the non-proliferation Treaty. My delegation is confident that a safeguards system which strikes a balance between a scheme which is so comprehensive as to be unnecessarily burdensome and one so loose as to be ineffective can in fact be achieved. We would also hope that a system of financing of safeguards can be agreed on, so that adequate account is taken in particular of the different status under the Treaty of the nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and of the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other. We trust that a final consensus in the Safeguards Committee will soon be reached on the important outstanding technical, legal and financial clauses, so as to allow detailed negotiations to begin at an early date between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. We would also hope that such a consensus

will permit a number of important States which have not yet become full parties to the Treaty to do so without undue hesitation.

12. As regards the dissemination of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with articles IV and V of the non-proliferation Treaty, my delegation welcomes the progress being made by the International Atomic Energy Agency as summarized in its reports [*A/8079 and Add.1 and A/8080*], which we have before us. While we are fully aware that the technology of peaceful nuclear explosions is still at a very early stage, we appreciate the work being done by the IAEA in regard to studying the implications of an international service and will look forward with interest to the conclusions of the panel of experts who are meeting this month to advise the Director-General of the IAEA on the question of international observation of peaceful nuclear explosions. We would hope that the Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy will provide an opportunity for assessing and accelerating the programme of work in this whole field.

13. In view of the new importance which the IAEA has acquired in arms-control measures through the non-proliferation Treaty, my delegation considers that close liaison should be maintained between the work of the IAEA in this field and that of the General Assembly. It has been the practice to consider the comprehensive annual report of the agency in the General Assembly in plenary session with little substantive debate on its contents. Much of the report is, however, relevant to the work of this Committee. And we may note that two other reports from the Agency, already referred to, are before this Committee. In the annex to the report in document A/8079, the Director-General of the Agency draws the General Assembly's attention to this excessive duplication and expresses the hope that this should be borne in mind should proposals be considered for further special reports. Perhaps in future the comprehensive annual report of the Agency to the General Assembly should be allocated to this Committee for consideration in the first instance, or, alternatively, the Agency should be requested to prepare an annual report for this Committee on its work in implementing the relevant provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty. It is also for consideration whether other items concerning nuclear energy, such as the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the effects of atomic radiation should not be considered in the context of the disarmament debate in the First Committee.

14. In the context of non-proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be the single most important nuclear-arms control measure which could next be concluded. Nuclear tests continued at an increasing rate of over 50 a year during 1969 and 1970. It is still ominously fresh in our minds that the opening of the twenty-fifth anniversary commemorative session was marked by three big nuclear blasts, one of which was detonated in the atmosphere. This is a warning that every effort must be made during the Disarmament Decade to associate all the nuclear Powers with disarmament negotiations and measures and to secure international acceptance of the principle of a total test-ban treaty. The latter measure could be facilitated by the advancement of international security and *détente*, but it is one in itself which in turn could promote those objectives.

⁷ *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of these Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.68.IX.1), para. 91.

15. Meanwhile, progress must be sought on the technical proposals submitted by a number of delegations to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during the past two years. In particular, progress in seismology detection and identification is reaching the point where there is increasing confidence that the faithful observance of a total test ban could be verifiable. It is to be hoped that the General Assembly will adopt a further resolution this year to pursue the objectives of resolution 2604 A (XXIV) on the creation of a world-wide exchange of seismological data.

16. A measure of special interest also in the context of non-proliferation and nuclear-arms control has been the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which established the first and only nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated area of the world. To date, the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been signed by 22 Latin American States and is already in force for 16 of them. It is an important measure for the promotion of international peace and security and serves as a model for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in other parts of the world. Its effectiveness would be greatly enhanced if Additional Protocol II of the Treaty were signed and ratified by all nuclear-weapon States.

17. The main practical achievement of this year's sessions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been the conclusion, in a spirit of compromise, of a final draft of a treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A]. The fact that the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to many important amendments in order to make the draft treaty more acceptable internationally is greatly to be welcomed. In so far as the treaty represents the beginnings of arms-control measures in relation to the sea-bed and the ocean floor, it has the support of my Government. Article V of the draft treaty, containing a commitment to continue negotiations in good faith on further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, is of special significance. The ultimate objective must be to develop an international commitment that the sea-bed and ocean floor will not be used for military purposes of any description.

18. The scale and growth of world military expenditure has been the subject of increasing attention following the surveys published in recent years by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI). According to the recently published *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/1970*,⁸ world military expenditure, at constant prices, did not rise in 1969 and was estimated at \$180,000 million. This followed three years in which it had gone up by as much as 30 per cent. A fall of some 2 per cent is expected in 1970. However, military expenditure in developing countries, although only about 10 per cent of the total, has been rising faster than military expenditure in the developed countries. By far the largest portion of all military expenditure is accounted for by the conventional arms race. Thus far, apart from the

United States study on the question of conventional-arms limitation [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 36], the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has not devoted much attention to this subject. It would be timely to do so now that some halt is apparent in world military expenditure. Some progress might be made by concentrating attention on regional aspects of the arms traffic.

19. In that connexion the proposals of the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report and of the delegation of Romania on the economic and social consequences of the arms race [A/7994] are relevant. My delegation would favour the undertaking of a comprehensive international expert study of the question, excluding any reference to the harmful effects on international peace and security, which might unnecessarily complicate the task of the experts. Such a study would usefully complement the 1962 report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of disarmament.⁹

20. As regards other non-nuclear measures, international attention has rightly focused in recent years on the problem of chemical and biological warfare, the means of which are classified as weapons of mass destruction. In the past year the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament appears to have devoted considerable attention, in accordance with resolution 2603 B (XXIV) to the question of the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. There has also been a response to the effort to secure universal adherence to the Geneva Protocol of 1925¹⁰ as more and more States accede thereto. Important improvements have been made in the United Kingdom draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 2] and in the draft convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons [A/8136]. However, solutions have not yet been reached to such problems as whether chemical and biological weapons should be treated separately or jointly and what means of verification would be realistic and adequate. There are strong arguments for the thesis that both chemical and biological weapons should continue to be dealt with together and that an effective solution of the problem should be sought on that basis. While acknowledging certain practical difficulties, to separate treatment of those weapons now could well weaken the principles of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and give rise to fear that chemical disarmament might be postponed indefinitely. My delegation is of the view that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should continue its discussion in depth of the whole problem of the elimination of chemical and biological weapons and, in the spirit of accommodation that has characterized recent disarmament negotiations, endeavour to reach solutions on this question which will be internationally acceptable and achieve real disarmament in this category of weapons of mass destruction.

21. The road to disarmament is long and arduous. With the opening of the Disarmament Decade there are grounds

⁹ United Nations publications, Sales No. 62.IX.1 and 62.IX.2.

¹⁰ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

⁸ Almqvist & Wiksell (Stockholm, 1970).

for cautious optimism that, with patience and perseverance and a gradual reduction in international tension, progress can be achieved step by step. Each arms control and disarmament measure that can be concluded has its own importance and bears a relationship to the over-all balance of world forces and to international security. It is essential, as Mrs. Myrdal said in this Committee yesterday [1750th meeting], that the wasteful expenditures of the arms race be diverted to the betterment of mankind. My delegation hopes that 25 years from now the world will be able to look back on the present year as a historic turning point, when positive policies for peace, justice and progress were substituted for the sterile squandering of human and material resources.

22. Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands): The year 1970, the opening year of the Disarmament Decade, has not turned out to be a portent of peace and love. I need not dwell on a diagnosis of this at length. Suffice it to recall the continuing armed conflicts in different corners of the world and especially in South-East Asia and the Middle East. One could also point to the alarming spread of barbarous encroachments on international rules of good conduct and humanitarian behaviour.

23. The year that is drawing to a close will be remembered not only as another year of armed conflicts but also as a time of great unrest and tensions. The tensions and unrest spring—one would be inclined to say “paradoxically”—to a large extent from the “achievements” of technology in our electronic age. While reaching out farther into outer space, our own planet becomes a less inhabitable place.

24. Last year at Christmas time a full-page advertisement appeared in several international newspapers, containing only the following message: “Peace on earth—if you want it.” It is an old theme and an old problem, and the quest for an answer continues. However, peace is of little avail and may be meaningless in a poisoned environment and in a society where man would be inescapably shackled to a mindless technology instead of using it purposefully for a greater freedom of choice. As one author put it, decision-making has become part of a seamless process. A world where everything is interrelated calls for a new comprehensive outlook on life.

25. Against the background of the present world situation, we are now discussing questions of arms control and disarmament. We have before us another progress report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/233]. In particular on this occasion, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, the question arises of whether the 46 additional meetings of the Conference contributed in any measure to containing the arms race, enhancing security and preparing the road towards reduction of armaments and, eventually, our final goal of general and complete disarmament in a just and peaceful world. The limitations of the conference’s pace and progress should be frankly recognized. It is often easy to take a wrong turning, but to retrace even a few steps to what may appear, in retrospect, as “paradise lost” is most difficult.

26. The most frightening aspect of our times is the continuing and endless spiral of the arms race. This applies

to both nuclear and conventional arms. Such arms races are a folly, a tragedy and a danger.

27. According to *The Military Balance 1970-1971*, the well-known publication of The Institute for Strategic Studies, defence expenditure as a percentage of gross national product amounted to 8.6 per cent for the United States and 8.5 per cent for the Soviet Union during 1969. The averages for the remaining countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization for the same year were well below those figures: 3.7 per cent for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 4.2 per cent for the Warsaw Pact countries. However, many countries outside the two alliances spent much higher percentages of their gross national products on defence, ranging in some instances from 10 per cent to 25.1 per cent. Those countries are mostly situated in regions of armed conflicts and hostilities.

28. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General underlined the “regrettable tendency in recent years for the military budgets of the developing countries to increase at a greater percentage rate than that of the world total, which now exceeds \$200,000 million a year”.¹¹

29. My delegation is gratified that since the entry into force in March of this year of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex], a special Safeguards Committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency has made meaningful progress in preparing the ground for the negotiation of safeguards agreements provided for in the Treaty.

30. My delegation wishes to reiterate that it is vital that all potential nuclear-weapons countries accede to the Treaty. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Luns, stated during the general debate in the General Assembly on 1 October [1856th plenary meeting], the success of the non-proliferation Treaty is largely dependent on the attitude of the present nuclear-weapon Powers. If the vertical proliferation of nuclear arsenals is not curbed, all arms control will in the long run be frustrated.

31. The super-Powers have often been urged in the past to stop the arms race and especially to initiate bilateral negotiations on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems. We are grateful that those negotiations have proceeded, with a few intervals, and were resumed only a few days ago. Progress in those negotiations will to a large extent determine the chances for effective reductions of armaments.

32. The annual report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly contains—in conformity with General Assembly resolution 2604 B (XXIV)—a special report on the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests. This special report concludes with a reaffirmation of the well-known American and Soviet positions on the verification issue. The United States position still is that adequate verification of a comprehensive test ban should include provisions for

¹¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 20.

on-site inspections, while, on the other hand, the Soviet Union is basing its position on the belief that the use of national means of detection is adequate.

33. Since the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty of 1963¹² there has been no lack of suggestions and proposals trying to bridge the gap between those two positions. The records testify to the ingenuity, patience and seriousness with which this problem has been dealt with over the past years.

34. The list of proposals is impressive indeed, and it is the more regrettable that so little progress has been made since 1963. The annual average number of tests by all nations has not been decreased in comparison with the situation before the Moscow Treaty.

35. Some headway in the field of international co-operation in seismic data exchange may lead to a fresh look at the various suggestions and proposals which have been or may be made concerning a limitation or a complete halt of underground explosions for military purposes. The possible interrelationship between the strategic arms limitation talks and progress towards a complete test ban is generally recognized.

36. The only practical course open to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the near future is, in our view, not to relent and to continue the exploratory discussions initiated during its last session pursuant to resolution 2604 A (XXIV). For that reason, my delegation is ready to support a draft resolution to that effect. We are, therefore, looking forward to the draft resolution which was announced by the Canadian representative, Mr. Ignatieff, on 2 November [1749th meeting].

37. If, however, for the time being it is not feasible to consider a complete ban on underground testing, perhaps the Committee on Disarmament could also try to proceed on the lines of the different threshold proposals, in combination with some kind of verification by challenge or inspection by invitation. It should also keep in mind the suggestion of setting up a committee or panel of impartial inspectors.

38. May I now turn to another subject to which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament paid much attention during the past session. Almost a third of the annual report of the Committee to the General Assembly has been devoted to the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. It clearly indicates that the thorough discussion of the matter contributed to a better understanding and to a deeper knowledge of the problems involved.

39. We strongly support the Committee's intention to continue intensive work in this field with the aim of reaching agreement on the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

40. As you are all aware, one of the difficulties, which was discussed at length, related to the question of whether there

is any justification for a separate treatment of chemical and biological weapons. There was unanimous agreement that the formulation of a prohibition regarding biological weapons would not be an insurmountable and time-consuming task. Differences, however, arose on the question of whether chemical weapons should and could be banned at the same time.

41. We, for our part, still believe it to be an example of practical wisdom to try to achieve first what seems nearest at hand. That is why we support the principal ideas of the British draft convention [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 2]. Our position does not exclude, however, the prospects for progress on the prohibition of biological and chemical warfare being discussed together. In fact, that is what happened during the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The pragmatic approach which came to be adopted by the Committee proved to be a workable one. It can, in our interpretation, be reconciled with paragraph 6 of the memorandum of the group of 12 in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*ibid.*, sect. 39], stating that both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States.

42. Before concluding my remarks on this subject, I should like to draw attention to the statement of the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Luns, in the General Assembly on 1 October 1970. With regard to the question of the use of defoliants and herbicides in warfare he stated that the Netherlands Government shared the view that destruction of crops by chemical means for military purposes usually meant great suffering for the civilian population and that it was seriously concerned that large scale use of herbicides and defoliants for military purposes might have long-term ecological effects of an unpredictable nature on man's environment. Mr. Luns concluded that his Government thought it necessary to establish a clear rule for the future which would exclude the use of those agents for warlike purposes.

43. With regard to tear gases and similar irritants, Mr. Luns stated in the same context that it was recognized that their use in warfare could in certain cases serve humanitarian purposes. He added, however, that the Netherlands Government was ready—in the framework of international negotiations—to take account of a majority opinion in the United Nations: to wit, that the use of all biological and chemical agents of warfare—including tear gases—should be prohibited.

44. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV), the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament also initiated an enlightening discussion on the drafting of a comprehensive disarmament programme, which could provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations. The discussion was enlightening, because it placed the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which is too often confined to collateral measures, in the perspective of our final goal of general and complete disarmament. The discussion demonstrated at the same time that general and complete disarmament cannot be reached overnight and

¹² Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

that the best way to achieve such a result is to go forward step by step and to concentrate on those measures which at a certain stage are found to be ripe for fruitful negotiations.

45. Several delegations, including our own, made an attempt to formulate in writing a possible approach to a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Informal consultations between a number of delegations also took place, thanks to the initiative of the delegation of Italy in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. From these attempts the exercise undertaken by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia emerged as a substantial document embodying a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament [*ibid.*, sect. 42]. This document was tabled on 27 August 1970, only a week before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament went into recess. For this reason it was not commented upon extensively. I want to say now that we ourselves find the document an interesting paper and we are ready to accept it as a basis for discussion in order to facilitate agreement on the question of a comprehensive programme for disarmament negotiations.

46. May I now say a few words on the question of conventional armaments. In our view it is most urgent to pay careful attention to the increasing build-up of arsenals of conventional weapons and to the international trade in conventional armaments. The expression "conventional weapons" is often used as a means of distinguishing them from weapons of mass destruction. However, I want to repeat that there is nothing conventional about the death and destruction they have brought upon mankind in the many wars and conflicts during our lifetime.

47. Our Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested in his speech to which I referred a few moments ago that—in order to seek effective and non-discriminatory measures to counter the competition and the trade in conventional armaments—it might be useful first to concentrate on the collection of data and on studies of the factual situation.

48. At this juncture my delegation would like to state its agreement in principle with the proposal of the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report that a comprehensive international expert study be undertaken of the economic and social consequences of the arms race and massive military expenditures. The same proposal was put on our agenda by the delegation of Romania [A/7994].

49. Last but not least, a few words on the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. It was an encouraging experience to note that almost unanimous agreement could be reached on the text, which is now attached as annex A to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. This result was the fruit of a spirit of co-operation not only between the co-Chairmen of the conference but also between those two co-Chairmen and the various other members.

50. The two co-Chairmen made a real effort to meet as far as possible the concerns and anxieties of several States. The draft treaty can therefore be presented as embodying the results of our combined thoughts and labours. As I stated in the Conference on the Committee on Disarmament, the

successful outcome of the deliberations on the sea-bed treaty is an important milestone and augurs well for future negotiations on other subjects in that Committee. The new text testifies to the fact that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is a negotiating body in the true sense of the word.

51. My delegation whole-heartedly supports the new draft and strongly hopes that the General Assembly will find itself in a position to commend the draft treaty for approval and an early opening for signature. We have noted with satisfaction that according to article V of the draft treaty, the future parties will undertake to continue negotiations concerning further disarmament measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. In this connexion I want to recall what has already been expressed by my delegation and others in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, that is, that, in the event of further measures of arms control or disarmament on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, the present "geographical area" as defined in articles I and II of the draft treaty may have to be reconsidered [CCD/PV.442].

52. One final word: I have listened with great attention to the very pertinent remarks of the representative of Ireland on the present methods of reporting by the International Atomic Energy Committee to the General Assembly and, through the Secretary-General, to this Committee. I agree with the representative of Ireland that the time has come to review those procedures. They were satisfactory, subsequent to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, held at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968, but it would appear to me that they could be improved and made more efficient. My delegation therefore stands ready to consult with the delegation of Ireland and other delegations, to seek ways and means to improve the methods of informing the General Assembly as well as this Committee of progress made in this field.

53. Mr. ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): First of all I wish to announce formally before the First Committee that on 28 August 1970 Brazil deposited the instrument of ratification of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,¹³ signed at Geneva in 1925. Brazil has always supported the Geneva Protocol and shares the view that it is an extremely important document which should receive universal adherence. In ratifying the Geneva Protocol of 1925, Brazil has given concrete proof of its concern for the question of chemical and biological weapons and of the constructive attitude it has consistently taken in the discussions on this matter in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly.

54. My delegation reserves its right to set forth its views on each and all of the different items under consideration and to comment on the draft resolutions submitted or to be submitted to the First Committee. At this stage of the general debate I shall confine my remarks to some general observations on the problem of disarmament as a whole and to a sobering stock-taking of our failures and shortcomings in this field.

¹³ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.

55. In no other field of action has the United Nations proved so inoperative and so immobile, and this was one of the reasons why we could not find any cause for complacency or self-gratification on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary. It should be said, in passing, that the Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations [*resolution 2627 (XXVI)*] issued on 24 October 1970 is a very disappointing document as far as disarmament is concerned. It fails to establish a solid link between the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade and, even more regrettably, adopts a rather resigned attitude towards the failure of the United Nations in this field. This is a field in which we are confronted with failure, if not with despair. By no stretch of the imagination nor effort of rhetoric can we arrive at any other conclusion. We have recourse to dilatory practices and expedients in dealing with other problems on our agenda. Our only contention is that inaction in this field is infinitely more serious and more ominous, because what we are actually doing is refusing to come to grips with the basic problem, that of human survival.

56. "Human Survival" was the general theme of a conference held last May in this building, under the auspices of the Kettering Foundation. A group of eminent scholars from several countries met to discuss issues of paramount importance to the destiny of man upon earth. At the close of that conference, someone observed that, all things considered, human survival was still possible. However, there were doubts expressed as to whether or not it was desirable. If we do not share the doubt, if we opt for the survival of the human race, this problem of disarmament will some day, somehow, somewhere, have to be considered, discussed, negotiated and ultimately settled. This is a problem which does not brook indefinite delay in its consideration. For this is not only a political problem: it is, by any standards, a human problem, to be solved by man, not by computers; by creativity, not by inertia. We cannot afford to meet this issue with inertia.

57. Once again we are seized of the so-called disarmament items. Once again we shall stress the importance, the relevance and the crucial nature of the items under consideration, and the autumnal rites demand that we close our proceedings with the adoption of some resolutions endowed with preambles and operative parts: "Recalling", "emphasizing" and "considering". We shall "commend", "urge" and "call upon". And, most probably, once again we shall administer with words instead of deeds, with forlorn hopes instead of achievement. We shall restate that disarmament is essential, and, in all probability, the world will go right on building arsenals of doom and despair. And yet the ritual is repeated; the plot is always the same, in spite of some minor alterations in the programme as far as the *dramatis personae* is concerned. The first resolution ever adopted by the General Assembly dealt with problems related to disarmament. There is no way of knowing whether the last resolution will not deal with the same subject.

58. Of course, we are the first to admit that disarmament is a central problem and that, compared to disarmament, all other international problems may be easier to tackle, or even to settle. For that very reason we are prepared not to

be over-ambitious or over-zealous. We are even prepared to be "realistic", although we have a particular distaste for that term, which has become a convenient disguise and justification for inaction and lack of imagination. However, what we were not prepared for was to see that, instead of our making some progress, or even remaining at a standstill, the treadmill would carry us backwards, until we arrived at a point even further away from our goal than we were in 1961, despite the adoption of the over-heralded documents on non-armament. The prospects for disarmament are bleaker and gloomier now than they were in 1961, and the very word "disarmament" has taken on an aura of Utopia and chimera. Realism is pushing us to the brink of nuclear warfare, and the world may be suffocated under layer upon layer of political realism. We may possibly have the consolation of pershing as good, dyed-in-the-wool realists.

59. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], which is a certified document of political realism, makes plans for and looks forward to a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years, before the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty thus condemns nuclear disarmament to virtual oblivion, with the underlying theory that the trouble lies not in the weapons themselves, but in their holders and possessors. The Treaty is a limitation on the sovereignty of some States, not a real limitation on weapons. Nuclear weapons are treated as valid and harmless, provided they remain in the possession of powerful, adult, responsible nations. And vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons has done nothing but accelerate since the conclusion of a treaty which was proclaimed a milestone on the road to general and complete disarmament. As we feared, that Treaty has become an added element in the process of stabilization and freezing of power. Article VI has remained, for all practical purposes, a non-existent article.

60. In the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States are still desperately waiting for implementation. And indications are that political realism, under the aegis of which this First Committee appears to operate—or not to operate—will not permit this important matter to receive more than token consideration at this session of the General Assembly.

61. Men are starving and men are dying on the surface of the earth, and we are happy and content that we are managing to prevent the nuclearization of the ocean floor. We do not wish to appear ungracious or unfair to the efforts of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and of the former Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, but it would be impossible to conceal that the non-proliferation Treaty and the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction we are about to discuss, are very meagre results after 10 years of discussions and negotiations, conducted under the rules of co-chairmanship. It is obvious that in the last decade armaments have prevailed over non-armament, to say nothing of disarmament. The 1960s were the decade of armament, the decade of a frantic and demented arms race. Let us hope the 1970s will do better.

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2.

62. A curious philosophy seems to prevail, according to which the danger now lies in the eventual armament, nuclear or otherwise, of smaller nations, rather than in the mushrooming arsenals of the big Powers, which now contend that, contrary to historical evidence, power brings moderation, restraint and responsibility. We start to speak of reduction of conventional armaments on a priority basis, and registration of the sale and transfer of conventional weapons, while negotiations in the field of nuclear disarmament or nuclear arms control remain deadlocked. We have despaired of the wholesale; we are now concentrating on the retail as a possible excuse for inaction. As in the case of the non-proliferation Treaty, efforts are now directed towards disarming nations which are already disarmed.

63. If the present trend prevails in this age of political realism, power—and by that I mean big power—will remain sacred and untouchable. Never has power been as revered as it is today. Power has always been the object of fear. Now it has become the object of veneration. And power is no longer enough. It now calls for superlatives. How, may I ask members, is it possible to foster the objectives of general and complete disarmament when power commands such respect and admiration? Categories of nations are now being established, as they were established by the non-proliferation Treaty, with power considered to be a sufficient yardstick—the only yardstick, in fact—on the tacit understanding that the powerful will become more powerful and the defenceless even more defenceless. This is a phenomenon which parallels what is happening in the economic field, as the rich nations become richer and the poor nations become poorer. The concurrence of the two phenomena contributes to the stabilization and perpetuation of the *status quo*. The United Nations will have repudiated its purposes and principles if it becomes part and parcel of this process of freezing history.

64. It is obvious that disarmament cannot be settled in the abstract, divorced from political realities, and, in this very limited sense, we espouse realism. This problem cannot be considered as separate from the problem of the strengthening of international security on which we hope for an early resumption of the debate and a joint effort in reasserting the diplomatic role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of international disputes. We said last year and we repeat today that nations do not disarm on a battlefield, and we are living in a state not of peace but of “tolerable warfare”. And it should be said that no warfare is tolerable for those who are immediately involved and suffer directly from its nefarious and destructive effects. We seem to be content with the fact that so far a nuclear world war has been averted and that, as of now, only a small percentage of mankind is engaged in direct and open warfare. But that is statistics, not politics. That is the reasoning of computers, not of human beings. Human life is sacred regardless of the numbers and the statistics involved. We cannot accept the notion of a “tolerable state of warfare” just as we cannot stand for the notion of a “tolerable arms race”. The world at large is too insecure for such highly sophisticated and intellectualized concepts. We must be more simple and much more direct. The problem of power cannot be settled in terms of power alone. Power, as we have said, breeds power; it does not breed peace and security.

65. The proceedings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in recent years clearly show that no serious effort has been made in the field of general and complete disarmament. We have achieved something, but on a very precarious basis, in the field of non-armament, and we have tackled some problems of arms control or limitation of armaments. On the other hand, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks carried on intermittently in Helsinki and Vienna, appear to aim only at the elimination of “over-overkill” with the tacit understanding that overkill, in itself a very gloomy concept, will remain to pollute the political atmosphere of our troubled times. We have stressed the fact that, as peace is being downgraded to *détente* or relaxation of tensions, disarmament is being downgraded to non-armament or arms control.

66. It was to be expected that the increase in the membership of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would prove instrumental in reactivating the Geneva body to the extent of making it more active in the field of disarmament. Yet, notwithstanding the efforts of the new members of the Committee and the action of the so-called mediating nations, it is clear that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament continues to operate under the rules of the elusive but all-pervasive art of co-chairmanship. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament thus runs the risk of becoming a kind of advisory council, an adjunct to the super-Powers.

67. In a draft resolution submitted to this Committee on 7 October under the item dealing with the consideration of measures to strengthen international security, the Latin American nations stressed the intimate interrelationship between the concepts of the strengthening of international security, economic development and disarmament.¹⁵ It is obvious to everyone that we cannot seriously pretend that we are making progress towards the goal of international security while we are bogged down in the field of disarmament. The channelling of enormous resources to the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a serious set-back for the cause of economic development, and it is obvious that every weapon manufactured presupposes potential victims for its potential use. The world is arming to the tune of \$200,000 million a year, which is almost 1,000 times more than the regular budget of the United Nations Development Programme, and the most charitable hope to be entertained is that all these tremendous expenditures are senseless and of no avail. For to admit that they may be necessary, to admit that their usefulness will be justified and warranted by events, to admit that they are not senseless, is to admit that we are facing the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon. We have thus come to the ludicrous point where we cherish the hope that history will prove us foolish and irresponsible. And, anyhow, foolishness is less deadly and nefarious than nuclear warfare.

68. On several occasions my delegation has had the opportunity of stressing its preoccupation with the indisputable fact that the word “disarmament” has virtually vanished from the lexicon and vocabulary of the super-Powers. The impression is now conveyed that the Zorin-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes, agenda item 32, document A/8096, para. 5(e).

Stevenson agreement of 1961, or, in other words, the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations,¹⁶ embodied in General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), has been superseded by new conceptions of political realism or by new gentlemen's agreements based on the concept and practice of immobility. Disarmament is being abandoned as a target or objective. The super-Powers appear adamant in their determination to remain super-powerful, and disarmament, by its very nature, is the negation of power as a valid means to be used in the pursuit of political objectives. A clarification is therefore in order: do the agreed principles of 1961 still stand, and is general and complete disarmament still the target towards which we should direct our efforts? If the agreed principles have become obsolete, if they have been discarded by the super-Powers, then this whole debate, no matter how protracted it may prove to be, is futile and an out-and-out waste of time. In other words, it is imperative to ascertain whether or not general and complete disarmament still remains a serious matter for consideration.

69. Our preoccupation is enhanced by the fact that we detect a whole process of depreciation as regards the validity of the purposes and principles of the Charter. It is obvious that the United Nations is playing an ever-smaller role in the political strategy of the major Powers and it is equally obvious that the same nations are not willing to part with the attributes of power which ensure them special rights and prerogatives in our Organization and in the community of nations. The super-Powers are not aiming at the suppression of power, but at a mere stabilization of power on the basis of two arbitrary historical dates: 1945, the date of the signature of the Charter; and 1967, the deadline for nations to qualify as nuclear-weapon States under the terms of the non-proliferation Treaty.

70. The opening of the twenty-fifth anniversary session of the Assembly was greeted by the simultaneous rumbling of nuclear explosions being set off, while the need for horizontal non-proliferation is being emphasized in all the documents and agreements which embody this new concept of the freezing or stabilization of power. The recent debates in the General Committee illustrate that the permanent members of the Security Council are opposed to any review of the Charter of San Francisco, which means that the theory and practice of power politics, balance of power and spheres of influence will be with us for a long time to come. A review is needed not to revise the present purposes and principles, which remain valid, but, on the contrary, to establish proper and adequate machinery for their implementation. If the purposes and principles were respected and observed disarmament would follow of its own accord. The main factor behind the present arms race, in which the major Powers are not the only ones involved, is the apprehension, or rather the expectation, that in practice the present purposes and principles of the Charter will be discarded and disregarded, and that force may or will be used. The United Nations is being downgraded in its lofty objectives of peace, justice and progress, and the Organization is being gradually reduced to the meagre proportions of an international institute of technology, to pursue aims which may prove to be the common objectives of the major

Powers. The United Nations thus becomes an agency for the achievement of the common aims of the major Powers, and it seems clear by now that disarmament does not rank among those common aims and objectives. Nuclear escalation proceeding at the current pace, fear breeding fear, power breeding power, apprehension breeding apprehension, we may ultimately destroy the whole human environment we are presumably called upon to preserve in our daily endeavours. Pollution might be harmful to the environment, but it does not yet quite measure up to nuclear weapons as far as destruction is concerned. An effort is being made to ensure the survival of mankind, but a simultaneous effort is being carried on for the survival of nuclear weapons and, in the last analysis, this coexistence of nuclear weapons and human beings on the same planet may prove impossible. If we do not reverse the present trend of events in the United Nations, if we discard and ignore the lofty objectives of peace, development and security, then the United Nations may vanish, together with other human institutions, before it can dedicate itself to non-proliferation, birth control and preservation of the environment. Environment is important but there has to be a human being to live in it.

71. The 1970s have been proclaimed by the United Nations as the Disarmament Decade, coinciding with the Second United Nations Development Decade. A definite link ought to be established between these two United Nations programmes, and, in the draft resolution of 7 October, the Latin American nations have stressed their intimate and necessary interrelationship. In this connexion I wish to welcome the inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly, on the initiative of the delegation of Romania of the item economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects on international peace and security [A/7994], for it takes into account the interrelationship that exists between economic development, disarmament and international security. We hope that our debate under this item will prove useful and will permit the adoption of constructive and significant measures. If the nations of the world would dedicate to the United Nations Development Programme just 1 per cent of what they consume for armaments and military expenditures, this would be equivalent to multiplying by 10, and possibly by much more, the programmes and activities of economic development. Some years ago, the delegation of Brazil advanced a proposal to that effect and it was then said that it was only advocating the allocation of "one per cent of human folly". The dangers of the arms race having increased at almost the same pace as the problems of underdevelopment, we might even be a little more ambitious and demanding today, but we can be positive that even this proposal, quite modest in the circumstances, would, if reiterated, find obstacles raised against its adoption and implementation.

72. And yet, in all forums and in all bodies, the effort for general and complete disarmament should be kept alive and reinvigorated. In this connexion, I wish to refer to the excellent working paper presented in Geneva by the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 42]. We shall comment on that document at a later stage of our proceedings, but we should like to express our opinion today that it is a serious and constructive document, which deserves most thorough

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

attention and consideration by the General Assembly now that the Assembly is called upon to set the guidelines and the targets for the Decade. This document may not be perfect—no documents on disarmament are—but it is certainly an excellent basis for discussion. It cannot be discarded, ignored or set aside for the sake of the often-invoked considerations of political realism. It is in fact the most significant document to emerge from the last sessions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It preserves the concept of general and complete disarmament and, if adopted by the General Assembly, with any changes and amendments which might be deemed convenient, it would prove to the world that the agreed principles of 1961 still stand and that disarmament is still a serious question on the agenda of the United Nations, something more than a pretext for the expression of pious hopes and highfalutin platitudes. The question thus remains: is this problem of general and complete disarmament a serious matter for consideration? The General Assembly cannot for much longer evade the question. We have to ascertain whether this is the moment for action and hope or for prayer and despair.

73. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before adjourning, I should like, first of all, to state that, as I

informed the members of the Committee at our meeting yesterday, I intend to suggest that we close the list of speakers in this general debate on the disarmament items at the end of tomorrow morning's meeting. If I hear no objection, I shall consider that the Committee agrees with this procedure.

It was so decided.

74. I should also like to inform the members of the Committee of the fact that we have scheduled two meetings for tomorrow, one at 10.30 in the morning and the other at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. For the morning meeting we have three speakers on the list thus far, and for the afternoon meeting we have only one. As I pointed out yesterday, if we fail to take full advantage of the time available to us, sooner or later we will have to resort to night meetings or meetings on Saturdays. Therefore, may I once again urge members to consider this fact. If delegations are ready to speed up preparations for their speeches, perhaps they would then be good enough to participate in the discussion either tomorrow morning or tomorrow afternoon.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.