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Chairman: Mr. Andrés AGUILAR M. (Venezuela).

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Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security (*continued*) (A/7994)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): In drawing up the balance sheet, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, of the Organization's activities in the field of disarmament, we can but concede that the results of the past quarter of a century have not been encouraging. Without minimizing the significance of treaties and agreements concluded in the 1960s, we feel obliged openly to express our dissatisfaction and fear in view of the inexcusably slow progress in the field of disarmament. The rhythm of innovations in the field of armaments and the development of new weapons are being accelerated. New generations of weapons or new weapons systems are becoming operative every few years. The great Powers find themselves on the threshold of a new qualitative change which threatens to alter the existing picture of the world.

2. In contrast, years of negotiations are needed to adopt measures for the prevention and curbing of the arms race. So far we have failed to initiate a genuine disarmament process. A clear proof of this is the fact that the General Assembly dedicated its first resolution at its first session to disarmament, in an effort to achieve the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; 25 years later we do not even have an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. The gap between the activities promoting the armaments race and those tending to reduce or put an end to such development seems to be widening.

3. The arms race, in addition to posing a direct threat to peace and international security, also has very dangerous economic and social consequences: it is freezing the existing relations in the world in favour of the great Powers; it is widening the gap separating them from other countries, particularly from the developing ones; it is obstructing efforts directed towards the democratization of international relations.

4. The most resolute condemnation of the arms race was voiced only recently at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka in

September 1970. The declaration on disarmament which was adopted there states that “general and complete disarmament under effective international control is the most imperative and urgent need of the international community today”. A similar message was addressed to mankind by the Nobel Peace Prize winners in the Declaration on peace and disarmament [see A/C.1/1001].

5. This year’s general debate in the General Assembly has also unequivocally stressed that disarmament is the key issue and the priority question in international relations.

6. The reasons behind the arms race are well known. Crises, the threat and use of force in international relations, local wars and other forms of intervention in various parts of the world are only encouraging the development, production and proliferation of weapons, while States who are victims of aggression are becoming proving grounds for their effectiveness and improvement. The creation of military blocs has given further impetus to the arms race. The best illustration of this is Europe, divided into blocs—Europe, which has been transformed into an enormous arsenal of conventional and nuclear weapons, whose number and quality are constantly increasing. The ineffectiveness of the international security system, within the framework of the United Nations, only perpetuates this dangerous situation. The absence of some countries from the United Nations, notably the People’s Republic of China, in great measure impedes actions in the field of disarmament.

7. The great Powers bear the main responsibility for the arms race and the failure to bring about its cessation. Without their political will and determination to make substantive progress in this field, it is not possible to expect more significant results. We hope that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have been prompted by these aspirations and it is for this reason that we welcome them. A component element of the orientation of the great Powers towards disarmament should be the recognition of the interests, priorities and criteria of other States.

8. In supporting all activities which can contribute to the initiation of the disarmament process, we would like once again to express our firm belief that the United Nations is the most competent forum to deal with questions of such major importance to the international community as those of disarmament.

9. We strongly believe that there exist realistic possibilities of achieving, in the coming years, substantive progress in the field of disarmament. This is of primary interest not only to the small and medium-sized countries, which are hit the hardest by the negative consequences of the arms race, but also to the great Powers, which constantly face the spectre of a world-wide nuclear war. In addition to the political will and determination of the Governments to embark upon such a road, it is necessary to undertake resolute action within our Organization which would facilitate a speedier attainment of the set goal.

10. The Yugoslav delegation feels that a very significant element of this action could be the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the Disarmament Decade. It attaches great importance to the adoption of a disarmament

programme during the current session and I should like, therefore, first of all, to deal in my statement with this particular question.

11. As is known, the non-aligned countries expressed their determination at the Lusaka Conference “to spare no efforts to ensure the success of the Disarmament Decade”. They also declared themselves ready to co-operate closely among themselves and with other like-minded countries to help “in the drawing up of a comprehensive programme of disarmament”.

12. Because of the slow progress in solving the disarmament questions, the General Assembly requested, at its last session, that a comprehensive programme of disarmament be elaborated. Almost a year was devoted to the study of the approaches to be taken, and the basic elements and adequate formulation of a programme. The significance of the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament appears sufficiently clear; perhaps, therefore there is no need for further elaboration of that aspect. In brief, under the circumstances, when after 25 years results of efforts to solve the disarmament problem, despite certain limited solutions, remain unsatisfactory, it is the duty of the international community to do everything possible to expedite the solution of this complex issue. One means of doing this would be to adopt a comprehensive programme, as requested in General Assembly resolution 2602 (XXIV). It seems important to us to point out that the programme does not have, nor can it have, the task of offering substantive solutions for the problems. Solutions can only be arrived at on the basis of concrete and substantive proposals. The programme, therefore, is aimed at facilitating a more rational work on the complex disarmament issues. In other words, it is essential to initiate a continuous disarmament process in order to achieve, in the near future, general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It is self-evident that such a programme should be sufficiently flexible at all stages in order to keep pace with the contemporary requirements of the international community, whatever they may be.

13. Three delegations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia—prepared and proposed such a programme [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 42]. The proposed programme contains, in addition to an introduction, the objectives, principles, elements and phases of the programme, a chapter on peace-keeping and security and, lastly, the procedure for its implementation.

14. The proposed programme is not only the product of the individual and concerted work of the three delegations. As a matter of fact, it was considered by the non-aligned States—the so-called Group of Twelve—in the Conference Committee on Disarmament. The proposal was amended and revised several times so as to accommodate and satisfy the interests of the greatest number of States. This programme also takes fully into account the positions of the great Powers. Its implementation, naturally, will depend primarily upon the viewpoints and political readiness of those States which possess the most devastating weapons. The Yugoslav delegation, like the delegations of Mexico and Sweden, is ready to engage in intensive consultations on the programme with all the delegations wishing to participate in

them, in order to examine diverse viewpoints and to introduce possible changes which would contribute to its widest acceptance. There are strong reasons to adopt the programme during this anniversary session of the General Assembly so that intensive work may already be undertaken under this programme, in 1971.

15. Yugoslavia attaches the greatest importance to the solution of the problem of chemical and biological weapons in the immediate future. This would actually constitute a real disarmament measure. The debate during the previous sessions of the General Assembly, the report of the Secretary-General¹ the many resolutions passed by the General Assembly, as well as a number of facts presented and explored during the consideration of this problem at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, speak convincingly of the importance attached to the solution of this issue. The non-aligned countries members of the Committee on Disarmament, desiring to contribute in a concrete manner to a speedier solution of this complex problem, have submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament a memorandum on chemical and biological weapons [*ibid.*, sect. 39].

16. The Yugoslav delegation hopes that this document will meet with wide support in the General Assembly and that it can serve as a basis for the formulation of a pertinent General Assembly resolution.

17. The Yugoslav delegation would like to stress the fact that it firmly believes this question to be ripe for solution. Its most important aspect, control, was also examined in detail by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. A number of proposals and a variety of concrete facts have been submitted with a view to facilitating a solution. The Yugoslav delegation also presented to the Committee a working paper [*ibid.*, sect. 31], elaborating a system of control combining national legislative measures of renunciation and self-control and measures of international control supplemented by a procedure in case of suspicion of violation of the treaty. It is understandable that, for a successful system of control, further elaboration of a greater number of elements would be necessary. We hope that this session of the General Assembly will contribute to the setting up of a firmer and more comprehensive basis for a rapid solution of this complex issue.

18. On this occasion I should like to inform the members of the First Committee of the decision of the Yugoslav Government on a unilateral renunciation of biological weapons. The Yugoslav delegation was among those that suggested at this year's session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that all Governments consider the possibility of a unilateral renunciation of biological weapons. The decision of the Yugoslav Government of 9 September 1970 reads as follows:

"The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, confirming its dedication to the policy of peace and international security and its obligations assumed in pursuance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925,

deems it necessary to recall the fact that it does not possess, nor does it intend in the future to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or in any other manner possess, biological means of warfare.

"The research work conducted in this area in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will in the future also be limited exclusively to the necessary measures of protection in case the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is exposed to an attack with such weapons."

19. The Yugoslav delegation hopes that it will have the opportunity to deal in more detail with the problem of chemical and biological weapons and, in co-operation with other delegations, to try to make its contribution to finding a more rapid and more widely acceptable solution.

20. The draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and on the subsoil thereof has been revised several times in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Revisions have been made so as to render the treaty more acceptable. In connexion with this treaty, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has done a commendable job. The latest version of the draft treaty [*ibid.*, annex A] was such that delegations to the Conference could express their satisfaction at the general consensus and spirit of compromise that had made it possible to satisfy a large number of requests submitted by many countries either at the last session of the General Assembly or in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The Yugoslav delegation is satisfied with the results achieved and believes that this anniversary session of the General Assembly should extend its general support, thus making it possible to have the treaty open for signature by the end of this year or at the beginning of next year. The representatives of Yugoslavia have pointed out on a number of occasions that our aim is a comprehensive demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. This treaty is only a part of that aim. We sincerely hope that we shall soon make further progress towards the comprehensive demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

21. The completion of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by banning underground tests remains an unfulfilled obligation dating back to 1963. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament does not embody the real special report requested by the General Assembly [*resolution 2604 B (XXIV)*]. The reason for this lies primarily in the lack of progress in the endeavours to stop underground tests. We regret that the situation remains unchanged and that one does not see immediate prospects for concluding a treaty on the banning of underground nuclear tests. In the meantime, the nuclear Powers are continuing to explode nuclear devices. Even on the day of the opening of the session celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, three nuclear explosions were recorded. This is a sad reminder of the actions of the three nuclear Powers. I am sure that the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations would wish on this occasion also to renew their appeal to the nuclear Powers to discontinue immediately all nuclear weapon tests and then to proceed to find a way to institute a contractual prohibition in the shortest possible time. We

¹ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and their Effects of Their Possible Use*, (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

wish once again to stress that the question is primarily one of a political decision, and that technical details of control can no longer serve as an excuse. We also would like to point again to the existing Swedish proposal which, in our view, offers a sound basis for the conclusion of a corresponding convention. Furthermore, the Yugoslav delegation is convinced that the General Assembly should exert additional efforts to have the Moscow test-ban Treaty² completed at the earliest possible date.

22. The General Assembly of the United Nations years ago proclaimed the problem of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as one of the most urgent issues upon which lasting peace and security depend. However, for years now neither the United Nations nor the Committee on Disarmament, nor any other international body, has been dealing substantially with general and complete disarmament. Since 1963 we have adopted several measures, collateral measures, that is, with a view to creating a somewhat more favourable political atmosphere.

23. But instead of engaging after that in an intensive treatment of the problem of general and complete disarmament, we continued to concentrate our energies on partial measures—some of which were not even disarmament measures. The explanations offered are not satisfactory. We cannot agree to have general and complete disarmament replaced by limited and relatively less important measures. We do not wish to create an illusion that substantive measures are being undertaken and full efforts are being made with a view to disarmament. Bearing in mind all this, the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia have proposed, within the comprehensive draft programme of disarmament, the following:

“The problem of general and complete disarmament should be given intensive treatment, parallel to the negotiations of partial disarmament measures, in order to facilitate further clarification of positions and possibilities, including the revision and updating of the existing draft treaties submitted by the USSR and the United States respectively, or the submission of new proposals.”
[A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 42.]

24. It is difficult to know how long the intensive treatment of the question of general and complete disarmament will take and therefore to determine our future actions. It is only by hard work that we can more clearly perceive how to proceed. We firmly believe that this constitutes the most rational course.

25. I should like now to touch upon the question of the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the agreements already accepted or of obligations related to them. On this occasion, however, I should like to refer only to some obligations relevant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]. In connexion with the ratification of that Treaty, my Government issued a statement [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 7] in the Conference of the Committee on Disarma-

ment on 10 March 1970. I quote the following passage from that statement, in which the Yugoslav Government:

“attaches special importance to finding a satisfactory solution to the problem of safeguarding the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and expects nuclear-weapon Powers, on the one hand, to undertake not to use nuclear weapons against the countries having renounced them nor against non-nuclear-weapon States in general, and to refrain from the threat to use them, and, on the other hand, expects that in the event of such a threat, the United Nations will act in a manner as shall ensure effective protection of the non-nuclear-weapon States;

“... ”

“Requests the nuclear-weapon-States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to render all appropriate assistance to the non-nuclear-weapon States in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and expects the International Atomic Energy Agency to adjust itself more fully to the current needs of the international community, particularly to those of the developing countries.”

26. The Yugoslav delegation would like to point out that it is keenly interested in a more intensive and substantive approach to resolving those issues, since no tangible progress has been achieved here.

27. In conclusion, I should like to speak briefly about the intensification of disarmament efforts in general. Yugoslavia has always attached great significance to intensified and more rational work on disarmament. The pace and the work done up till now are far from satisfactory. If we were to continue thus we would never reach our goal. The proclamation of the Disarmament Decade and the acceptance and application of a comprehensive programme of disarmament constitute, in our view, an endeavour to accelerate disarmament activities. But that endeavour should be of such magnitude that it could make it possible to attain the goal we set ourselves.

28. Under the general heading “intensification of efforts” we understand several things. First, we feel that the work in organs presently seized with disarmament questions should be more organized, more to the point and more rational.

29. At the same time we are thinking along the lines of engaging new forums or activating existing ones, primarily as regards regional possibilities so far insufficiently utilized. We agreed a long time ago that regional efforts were vital and, with regard to certain problems, perhaps the most appropriate. Questions falling within the domain of security and disarmament might thus be solved within that framework. A good example is the creation of the nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

30. There are new trends in Europe and the possibility of convening a European conference for co-operation and security in the near future represents one such opportunity that should be fully utilized. Furthermore, we are thinking in terms of activating the Disarmament Commission, which was established to deal with disarmament and whose members are all States Members of the United Nations. All this is fully elaborated in the draft programme of disarmament proposed by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

² Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

31. It is significant that in international relations the idea has gained acceptance that disarmament efforts must be treated continuously and simultaneously by a number of bodies³ if genuine progress is to be made in this particular area. That is something many countries have been insisting upon for years.

32. In that context, we feel that it is of vital importance that efforts aimed at intensifying the work in the field of disarmament should be made known to the broadest possible segment of public opinion, whose role is highly significant. It is with this in mind that we support the Romanian initiative to shed light on and to focus the attention of the world upon the advantages to be gained from disarmament [A/7994]. It rests with all of us to let more people know that over \$200,000 million is being spent annually for military purposes and to let them know what the consequences of this are.

33. Finally, I shall like to state that the Yugoslav delegation looks upon the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations as the year which, among other things, could mark a turning-point in disarmament. Consequently, my delegation is ready to exert additional efforts and to co-operate more closely with all countries which have this goal in view so that as early as next year—on the basis of a programme which the General Assembly could adopt at its present anniversary session—the international community may proceed at a faster pace towards disarmament.

34. Lord LOTHIAN (United Kingdom): I should like to begin my remarks today by expressing my great pleasure at taking part in the work of this twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly. This is the first occasion on which I have had the opportunity to address the First Committee of the General Assembly, and I am glad that it should be under Mr. Aguilar's chairmanship, because his outstanding academic qualifications and his long experience of the United Nations will be invaluable to our work here.

35. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization,³ the Secretary-General has reminded us all of the pressing need to make progress in the arms limitation and disarmament field, and of the far-reaching security and economic benefits that would result. My Government is very conscious of these considerations and I can assure you today, as I assured the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament earlier this year, that we are determined to play an active and constructive role in disarmament negotiations. Our aim now, as it was in the past, is agreement on realistic and practical measures, both of arms limitation and disarmament, for we see measures in both these areas as having the common general objective of improving security for all, if possible at a lower economic cost. For example, my Government favours a study of mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. The countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization offered to discuss this question two years ago and the offer has been regularly repeated.

36. My Government is conscious of the wide-ranging economic and social problems arising from world expenditure on armaments and I hope that this Committee will

take the opportunity afforded it by the Romanian proposal [*ibid.*] of discussing these problems in a constructive way.

37. During the year thought has been given to future objectives in the arms control and disarmament field. The possibilities have been outlined in the draft comprehensive programme tabled in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 42], following the useful Italian initiative in this field. I think we would all agree that it would not be wise or realistic to tie ourselves to a precise pattern for further negotiations. But we must certainly hope that it will be possible to mark this, the first year of the Disarmament Decade, by agreeing to guidelines by which we can chart our course in the years ahead and, in the spirit of the Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations [resolution 2627 (XXV)], towards the achievement of the final goal—general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

38. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in our view, has had a successful session this year; it has made a good start to the Disarmament Decade. There was an auspicious beginning to the year's work when, on 5 March, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]. Since then ratifications have continued. There are now almost 100 signatures and around 60 ratifications. I appeal to those countries that are still considering their position to adhere to the Treaty.

39. Work has started in Vienna on the important task of formulating the contents of safeguards agreements in connexion with the Treaty. Much has already been achieved in the Safeguards Committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency. A significant part of a model safeguards agreement for purposes of the non-proliferation Treaty has been agreed, and the omens for further progress are good. Speakers in Geneva have pointed out the importance of reaching the agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions called for in Article V. My Government shares this view. We believe that further study will be required before the potential contribution of peaceful nuclear explosions can be evaluated in the international context, and that this study can best be done under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We shall therefore be participating fully in discussions in the International Atomic Energy Agency on this matter and in particular in the International Atomic Energy Agency Panel in January 1971.

40. Before the Disarmament Decade opened, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) had begun in Helsinki. In the first part of this year they moved to Vienna and there have been encouraging signs of progress. It is my hope that, as the talks now resume in Helsinki, the greatly increased knowledge of each other's position, and the determined way in which the talks have been tackled, will lead to a basis for understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in this vital field.

41. In the meantime, there is much that the rest of us can do in parallel. While I subscribed to the view that agreement

³ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

on a comprehensive test ban is largely dependent on the results of progress in these negotiations, it is clear to me that verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty will be one of the key issues and that seismic detection will play an important part in this. There is, therefore, much that can be done now on the comprehensive test ban without necessarily awaiting whatever is the outcome of the present round of talks. Certainly we will play our part in any discussions on the comprehensive test ban; the negotiation of a treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments by all countries has traditionally been and remains a major aim of British Government policy.

42. It was for this reason that I was pleased to be able to submit in Geneva a working paper [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 25] on an operational seismic system based on new techniques and designed to give detection and identification capability down to a yield equivalent to 10 kilotons in hard rock. This could be done by the establishment of a seismological network of 26 stations costing in total about £15 million, which could be operational within five years of being given the go-ahead. It may seem disappointing to some, but even with this network and these techniques there would still be militarily significant events in the low-kiloton range which could not be identified by long-range seismic monitoring. We welcome the very helpful Canadian initiative of last year. We were pleased to note the large number of replies [see A/7967/Rev.1] to the Secretary-General's circular and the fact that the bulk of them were positive. However, while these replies will help to clarify the capabilities of the existing seismic stations, they will not of themselves lead to improvement of the existing networks. Neither the Canadian initiative, nor our own outline of a new operational seismic system, solves the problem of identification of events in the low-kiloton range. However, in my view this work deserves to be followed up in an appropriate fashion and my delegation listened with interest to the Canadian representative's remarks on 2 November [1749th meeting], when he indicated the form a resolution might take.

43. If the past year has confirmed the difficulties of detecting events in the low-kiloton range, perhaps I might be allowed to remind the Committee of Mr. Mulley's proposal in 1968 [1609th meeting] for a special committee to consider suspected infringements of a comprehensive test ban treaty, coupled with a quota for test diminishing over a period of years, at the end of which all tests would be banned absolutely. Such a procedure could well facilitate agreement when it is nearing conclusion, and I would like strongly to commend it to all those considering progress towards the complete suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear testing.

44. Perhaps at this point I might say a word about the continuing example and achievement of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,⁴ concerning the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, for which my Mexican colleague, Mr. García Robles, was so largely responsible. On 19 November 1969 [1694th meeting], my predecessor, Lord Chalfont, told this Committee that the British Government would soon deposit instruments of ratification of the two Additional Protocols to the Treaty. This took place on 11

December in Mexico City, and thus in addition to bringing within the scope of the nuclear-free zone those territories in the region for whose international relations the United Kingdom is responsible, we became the first nuclear-weapon State to undertake to respect the nuclear-free status of the zone. I understand that the United States Government has now submitted Additional Protocol II for ratification. May I use this occasion to urge the other nuclear-weapon States to set in hand the necessary constitutional procedures and also call on those States in the Treaty area which have not yet taken steps to do so to ratify the Treaty and waive the provisions of Article 28, paragraph 2.

45. I should now like to turn to the question of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. The third revision of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A] is the result of two year's hard work in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in last year's General Assembly. This is a long time. Perhaps indeed the negotiation of this measure has taken longer than some of us expected, after the initial compromise between the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the scope of the prohibition, which is, of course, the essence of this treaty. But since that time important problems have come to the fore, demanding solution—problems relating to the verification of a treaty, to the law of the sea and to the possibility of further negotiations in the field of sea-bed arms limitation. Thanks to the spirit of co-operation and to the negotiating experience of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, accommodation has been reached on these points too. All delegations contributed their share to the debate and all showed a willingness to reach sensible agreements on the outstanding points of difficulty. These agreements were incorporated in the co-Chairmen's third revision of 1 September this year.

46. This new draft seems to me to meet the principle national interests of us all. And I would remark in passing that the hope was widely expressed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that it would be commended by the General Assembly and opened for signature at an early date. Perhaps it will not be found surprising if I say that this draft is not worded precisely in the way that a purely British draft would have been. But we feel that such considerations must give way to the importance of obtaining general agreement on this measure which, I am confident, is now within our grasp.

47. So I wish to commend the draft treaty to the Committee for adoption. For those who still have reservations, I should like to point out that the treaty contains its own built-in safeguard in the form of provision for a review five years after the entry into force. It contains also adequate provision for continuing negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. This provision, together with the reference to international procedures within the framework of the United Nations in the context of verification, and the important article IV, the "disclaimer" article, makes me hopeful that the

⁴ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

criticisms directed at earlier drafts have now been met. In my view, the treaty before us is a thoroughly worth-while and carefully elaborated piece of work.

48. I should now like to turn to chemical and biological weapons. This subject was during recent decades left rather to one side, and it was only in 1968 that an initiative on the part of the United Kingdom in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament reminded Governments again of the dangers of these weapons of mass destruction and urged action to support and strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925.⁵ One specific suggestion from the United Kingdom which was taken up in the Committee resulted in the useful report of the Secretary-General of 1 July.⁶ Also in July 1969, Britain took its initiative a stage further by submitting at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament a draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare, together with an associated draft Security Council resolution.⁷ Two months later, in September, the Soviet Union and a number of other States came forward in turn with their proposals⁸ for strengthening the Geneva Protocol. A little later came the report of the Director-General of the World Health Organization.⁹ These developments, and the announcement made on 25 November 1969 by President Nixon, have made chemical and biological warfare one of the major issues before us today.

49. The aim of the draft convention first submitted by the United Kingdom at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 10 July 1969 was nothing more nor less than to eliminate completely the possibility that one of mankind's major scourges—pestilence—would come to be used as a weapon of war, and to embark on the quest for effective measures to deal with chemical methods of warfare. My predecessor, Lord Chalfont, said that the United Kingdom delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would go along with the wish of the majority to make a start in the problem of considering chemical and biological weapons at the same time. During the last year, I am glad to say that we have made some progress.

50. This has been the forty-fifth anniversary year of the Geneva Protocol, and I am delighted that Japan, Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Ecuador, Brazil, Malawi, Morocco and Malta have joined the ranks of the adherents to the Protocol, and that President Nixon has transmitted this instrument to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. These are important gains for the Protocol, for the United Nations and for mankind, and if the action of the United Kingdom in raising this topic in 1968 has contributed to the process, I am glad. But it is

only a beginning; we must build on the position. The United Kingdom Government has already welcomed unilateral statements and renunciations of weapons in this field, but these again are not enough. We need proper multilateral instruments binding on Governments and their successors.

51. But while there have been promising developments in this respect, some of the work in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been rather disappointing in its outcome. For example, much of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament's work has been centred on the verification aspect of safeguarding any agreement in this field. Many ideas were put forward, and we are not without hope for the longer term. However, I must in all fairness say that none of the ideas so far advanced, either singly or together, would seem in my Government's view adequately to safeguard an agreement that sought to ban chemical weapons and agents at this time.

52. Some delegations in Geneva suggested that the United Kingdom delegation should say what verification provisions it would be prepared to accept. Frankly this seems to me to misunderstand the British approach. For many years, as I have said, few people even considered the subject of chemical and biological weapons. Even if the many other problems in the way of a viable agreement could be solved, no one could see what possible verification provisions could be made in any agreement on both chemical and biological warfare that strengthened the Geneva Protocol by completely banning these weapons.

53. It was then that the British decided to table a convention on biological weapons alone, which did not depend for its efficacy on verification in the narrow sense of the word but which took into account the nature of the weapon as it exists today. This was the background to our idea of a complaints procedure, and why we have stressed that biological weapons are not, as we at present know them, the sort of weapon one keeps for retaliation. A chemical weapons agreement, however, all delegations are agreed, will require verification. In my view there is nothing to be gained by putting forward suggestions for verification provisions that are impracticable, quite impossibly expensive, or unacceptably intrusive to a large number of nations. But, short of those, measures in the chemical weapons context which would be practicable, effective and negotiable have so far eluded us. We shall continue to study the problem thoroughly, and of course, if we think we might have come across a solution we shall at once put it forward.

54. We have kept faithfully to our promise to consider the two weapons together, but it must be admitted that the discussions in Geneva have largely centred on the problem of chemical weapons. Thus, our warning that, in dealing with both subjects together, we might jeopardize the prospects for progress on biological weapons, is in danger of being borne out by events. The ideas for verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons have been ingenious and clever but, as I have said, they are far from adequate as yet and there is much more hard work to be done in this field. We shall not shrink from the task, as we have not in this past year, but it will take time.

55. In the meanwhile, much less consideration has been given to the problem of biological weapons. Yet it is

⁵ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

⁶ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

⁷ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232, annex C, sect. 20.

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 104, document A/7655.

⁹ *Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons* (World Health Organization, Geneva, 1970).

precisely in this field that there is the greatest danger of a scientific development which could make the agreement at present within our grasp as difficult to achieve as an agreement on chemical weapons. I feel it necessary solemnly to warn the Committee that the biological weapon may not be as remote as many of us think. Further delay could be dangerous. This year saw the first synthesis of a gene and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament we heard an eminent Nobel Prize Laureate in the field of microbiology, Dr. Lederberg, describe how it was already possible for men to manipulate the cross-breeding of different bacterial strains and thus "invent" new diseases which might not carry the risks for the user of the unreliability of current biological weapons, and against which there might be absolutely no known defence [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 41]. For the present, however, mercifully this is not the case, and a treaty banning biological weapons before their further development is, I believe, within our grasp now. I cannot believe that there are Members of the United Nations who, in knowledge of the awful nature of the weapon, would want to hold up such an agreement. Yet by insisting that any agreement must treat biological and chemical weapons equally, that is what they are in effect doing. Surely the banning of biological weapons is so important and urgent that for future generations it might seem criminal to allow progress in this direction to be held back by tying it too closely to a solution on chemical weapons which, as we all recognize, will inevitably take some time to achieve. Let us by all means go on working on the problem of banning chemical weapons but not at the risk of further delay on biological weapons. Every month we delay may bring further discoveries. I sincerely hope that those who are at present advocating the joint prohibition of chemical and biological weapons on lines they know could never be agreed by the world community, will in all conscience now take the decision to deny themselves and mankind the risks and horrors of biological weapons.

56. To sum up, if during this twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly we can agree to make what progress is possible at this stage towards a complete ban on the testing of nuclear weapons; if we can agree that the sea-bed treaty shall be opened for signature; if we can sincerely and wholeheartedly agree to work for the rapid conclusion of a treaty prohibiting biological methods of warfare and to lay the foundation for the more difficult task of dealing with chemical weapons; then we shall, in my view, have made an auspicious and worthy start to the Disarmament Decade. Let us then concentrate in the work that lies ahead on what it is possible and practical to achieve—let our aims be realistic—so that we may play our part in ensuring that the very existence of future generations is not put in jeopardy.

57. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Lothian, for the very kind words he was good enough to address to me at the outset of his statement.

58. Mr. TANAKA (Japan): The present session of the General Assembly is for the United Nations a special occasion in that it commemorates the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Organization's foundation. For those who are concerned with disarmament, this is also the first General Assembly session of the Disarmament Decade. I believe that we might well take this opportunity to reflect anew upon

past disarmament negotiations and ask ourselves how we should approach future negotiations in the disarmament field.

59. As we are all well aware, the latter half of this century is witnessing rapid progress and development in science and technology, particularly in the field of nuclear energy. While such progress and development seem to promise mankind a brighter future, we cannot fail to realize that they have at the same time resulted in an extraordinary expansion and increase in the destructive power of armaments, of which the large-scale development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery is the example *par excellence*. Thus, the 1970s will be a period fraught with both hope and anxiety for mankind, and we shall feel more than ever the urgent need for a real break-through in disarmament negotiations, to dispel the dark shadows cast upon mankind by the double-edged developments in science and technology, and to improve mankind's welfare. I am convinced also that, having declared the decade of the 1970s the Disarmament Decade, we must not let that concept degenerate into a mere slogan.

60. My delegation, therefore, ventures to emphasize the following three points for disarmament negotiations during the 1970s: first, all States should renew their efforts and determination to achieve disarmament and to co-operate with each other to that end; secondly, all the militarily important States should adopt a more positive and sincere attitude towards disarmament; thirdly, the utmost importance should be attached to nuclear disarmament.

61. In my view, the year 1970, the first year of the Disarmament Decade, has already been distinguished by such important events in disarmament history as the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the success or failure of the talks on the limitation of strategic armaments is of vital relevance to the future maintenance of world peace, I earnestly hope that those two countries will, in response to the hopes of the world, be able to achieve concrete results in their negotiations at an early date. At the same time, I should like to emphasize that the outcome of those negotiations will have a decisive influence upon progress in all other disarmament negotiations.

62. It is often said that we are entering the age of exploitation of the oceans. The future of mankind will depend to a great extent on our wisdom in making use of the oceans, which occupy three quarters of the earth's entire surface. Such being the case, we may well congratulate ourselves on the fruitful results of the discussions at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; that is, the successful completion of the third revised draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*A/8059-DC/233, annex A*]. This is an additional accomplishment marking the first year of the Disarmament Decade.

63. While the draft treaty is not entirely satisfactory in every respect, it is generally recognized that maximum consideration is given in the draft to the various suggestions

and proposals put forward by many States in the General Assembly of the United Nations last year as well as in the Disarmament Committee this year. We therefore regard the draft as the best compromise attainable in the present circumstances.

64. I should like to express our delegation's hope that a draft resolution commending the above draft treaty will be adopted with an overwhelming majority, so that we may be able to concentrate our efforts towards the achievement of further measures in the field of disarmament.

65. Let me now turn to one of the questions which received most attention during the debate at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year: the question of the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. The Committee on Disarmament held many meetings this year, including two informal ones, to discuss this problem, and, with a view to finding a solution, a number of delegations put forward interesting suggestions or working papers.

66. However, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament failed again this year to find a solution because of differing positions centring on the two draft conventions submitted by nine socialist States¹⁰ on the one hand, and by the United Kingdom [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 2] on the other.

67. I should now like to deal in some detail with my Government's position on this important issue. As my colleagues here will recall, the Japanese Government has maintained consistently since last year that, with regard to the scope of weapons to be prohibited, both chemical and biological weapons should be considered at the same time, and that the scope of activities to be prohibited should cover the use, as well as the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons. My Government has also emphasized that, in order to facilitate our work on this question, we should first conduct a full discussion on matters of substance relating to such problems as those concerning effective verification, and then, depending upon the results of such discussion, proceed to the question of legal formulations. In line with that position, our delegation continues to believe that it would be most useful, in seeking a solution to the present problem, if the questions relating particularly to effective verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons, which involve complicated technical problems, were considered at meetings with the full participation of experts from the States concerned. The outcome of such meetings would greatly affect our consideration of how to proceed with the present question.

68. The Japanese delegation has in mind the following matters of substance which should be examined further.

69. First, there is the problem relating to recourse to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for investigation of the facts, in cases of suspected violation of the prohibition of the use or of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, as well as the working out of an arrangement to prepare in advance a

roster of experts who could assist the Secretary-General in his investigations, with a view to ensuring that such investigations would be carried out promptly.

70. Secondly, the establishment of possible checkpoints in an investigation and concrete technical methods for the investigation should be considered, as well as the possibility of using the facilities of existing international organizations.

71. Thirdly, the question arises of how to ensure that the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons will not hinder the development, production and stockpiling for peaceful purposes of chemical and biological agents which are being widely used and produced in industry for peaceful purposes, as well as problems relating to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of such ancillary equipment as would facilitate the use of chemical and biological agents for hostile purposes.

72. Fourthly, consideration should be given to the establishment of a reporting system on the statistics for certain chemical substances, giving the amounts produced, exported and imported, and figures for consumption for different purposes, with a view to using those statistics as part of the data forming possible evidence on which a complaint to the Secretary-General is to be based, as well as the question of the criterion for limiting the scope of items to be reported upon to secure the practicability of such a reporting system.

73. Fifthly, there is the question of safe and efficient methods for the diversion to peaceful purposes, or the destruction, of chemical and biological weapons, the stockpiling of which has been prohibited, as well as adequate means of verification of such diversion or destruction.

74. On 28 July of this year, the Moroccan representative submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament an interesting working paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons [*ibid.*, sect. 24]. I should like to note especially the reference by the representative of Morocco in the Conference to the usefulness of convening a meeting of experts to formulate a supplementary document providing for verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

75. Upon the initiative of the Italian delegation, the General Assembly adopted last year resolution 2602 E (XXIV), relating to the Disarmament Decade, in which it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to work out a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at the present session. In response to this request, a number of invaluable suggestions were put forward by the various delegations at the Conference of the Disarmament Committee this year. My delegation believes, for example, that the draft comprehensive programme for disarmament submitted this year by the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia [*ibid.*, sect. 42] is a useful document, which, given a certain adjustment, could be taken into account in our deliberations.

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 104, document A/7655.

76. At the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation emphasized the necessity for our adopting a more systematic and flexible approach towards our future disarmament negotiations.

77. In working out a comprehensive disarmament programme, the Government of Japan believes that the highest priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. In particular, the Japanese Government holds the view that special emphasis should be placed on such questions as a comprehensive nuclear test ban, control of nuclear-weapon delivery systems, and the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons. If these views are properly reflected in a comprehensive disarmament programme, I believe that it will provide the momentum and favourable climate necessary for the progress of our future negotiations on disarmament.

78. It goes without saying that the long-outstanding issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is one of the most urgent and important problems in the field of nuclear disarmament. The urgency and importance of this problem is underscored by the fact that nuclear weapons tests are still being conducted by the nuclear-weapon States. It is all the more regrettable that two of the nuclear Powers should have conducted their weapons tests in the atmosphere in defiance of world opinion.

79. Unfortunately, despite its importance, the question of a comprehensive test ban was not fully discussed at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year, due to a great diversity of opinion as to the means of verification of underground nuclear explosions.

80. While we are ready to admit that the decision of whether or not to prohibit underground tests is a problem involving many political factors, we consider it essential for us to make continued efforts in connexion with the question of how to solve the various technical problems of verification in order to make such political decisions possible.

81. With that in mind, the Japanese delegation ventured to propose at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that, as a first step, we should ban those underground nuclear weapons tests which can be detected and identified at present and, then, when a system of verification capable of monitoring all underground explosions above a certain level has been worked out, agree on a comprehensive underground test ban. On the same occasion, we stressed the importance, if a system of verification is to be completed, of international co-operation for the securing of a proper distribution of seismological stations, the creation of a system of international exchange of seismic data, the establishment of an international monitoring centre, and so forth.

82. In this connexion, I feel that the United Kingdom working paper on verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which was submitted to the Conference of the Disarmament Committee on 28 July this year [*ibid.*, sect. 25] is worthy of our attention. That document deals in detail with the possibilities of setting up the networks of observatories necessary for the detection of underground nuclear tests, as well as with the costs involved in such a scheme and other matters.

83. Basing ourselves on the position stated above, we deem it most important that States should first co-operate to the fullest extent by supplying seismic data in accordance with the request contained in General Assembly resolution 2604 A (XXIV). We should like here to renew even more vigorously our request that States which have not yet done so should comply with the request contained in the above resolution as soon as possible.

84. My delegation attaches great importance to the draft resolution, to which the representative of Canada referred in his statement [1749th meeting], for support for further progress in clarifying the potential role of a seismic data exchange system in the verification process of a comprehensive ban. It is the intention of the Japanese Government to strive to improve the network of observatories in Japan and to contribute as far as possible to international co-operation in this field.

85. The foregoing are the views of the Japanese delegation on the results achieved at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year and on various basic problems to be tackled in our future discussions on disarmament.

86. Before concluding my statement, I should like to emphasize again that the Japanese delegation will do its utmost to co-operate with other delegations in concentrating all our efforts to ensure that our discussions on disarmament during the current session of the General Assembly produce positive results.

87. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): Our thoughts and, consequently, our speeches this year revolve round what the United Nations has achieved during its 25 years of existence. This has resulted in a rather searching examination of the collective conscience of Member nations. In regard to disarmament, such an examination is particularly pertinent, since we are made painfully aware of the fact that the situation has so obviously deteriorated with the passage of time. There have been some advances through agreements in the direction of disarmament, but they have been depressingly slow and marginal. At the same time a military build-up of monstrous dimensions has taken place.

88. In fact, the balance-sheet during this period between quantitative and qualitative increases in military arsenals on the one hand and disarmament measures on the other is sorely negative in the sense that a spectacular increase has taken place both in over-all world armament costs and in the numbers of advanced types of weapon. This is, of course, particularly true of nuclear weapons and their carriers.

89. The widening gap between the two processes of disarming and of arming the world makes for a situation so unsatisfactory that it must be called intolerable.

90. This gap, which is so glaring in real terms, has also created a credibility gap. We announce one "disarmament" measure after another. A considerable amount of work and many efforts have also undoubtedly gone into negotiations on various measures that come under the heading "disarmament". It has to be recognized, however, that the measures so far agreed upon have been concerned with the prevention of armaments rather than with the more important

issues of their reduction or elimination. They have, strictly speaking, been "non-armament" measures.

91. During the whole post-war period only one item of true disarmament involving any elimination of weapons from arsenals has been initiated, namely President Nixon's decision last year to dismantle United States resources for biological warfare.

92. That is also the only decision involving any measure of military sacrifice on the part of the super-armed super-Powers.

93. Among agreements reached multilaterally, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII)*, *annex*], although also strictly a non-armament measure, is obviously one of great potential importance. It may, if it is universally accepted and duly implemented, defuse the latent threat to world security created by the vast amounts of fissile material now becoming available in many countries through expanded nuclear energy programmes, material which could be used for producing nuclear weapons.

94. It should be recognized that the obligations thus undertaken signify a considerable degree of self-restraint on the part of all those nations which are not super-Powers. As the Swedish Prime Minister said in his speech in the General Assembly on the occasion of the commemorative anniversary session:

"These commitments have been made in the evident expectation that they would be followed by concrete measures to prevent the proliferation of such weapons. What we expected was substantial commitment by the nuclear Powers concerning limitations in respect both of the further sophistication and of the quantity of new arms systems." [*See 1874th plenary meeting, para. 24.*]

95. His statement concluded with a plea for a halt in the arms race—an immediate, across-the-board moratorium on further increases of nuclear weaponry: "How otherwise can their confidence in the credibility of the great Powers' willingness to stop the arms race be restored?" [*Ibid.*, *para. 25.*]

96. When the deliberations now move from the general debate in plenary to the First Committee they should not move away from an attitude of anxiety to one of complacency.

97. There are measures that do not need to wait for the laborious designing of multilateral agreements, but regarding which some initiatives can be taken at once. I venture to propose that the United Nations now call an immediate halt to any further developments in the nuclear field.

98. The majority of United Nations Members, consisting of small and medium-sized nations, have appealed for the cessation of the nuclear arms race before—so far in vain. We did so in 1962 in regard to the testing of nuclear weapons [*resolution 1762 (XVII)*], but testing is continuing unabated. Evidence shows that nuclear weapon testing has recently been stepped up. According to figures just released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

(SIPRI), in its new *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/70*,¹¹ there has been a sharp rise in the annual rate of nuclear test explosions. The Institute lists a total of 73 nuclear tests conducted during the 18 months from January 1969 to June 1970. Of these, 51 were American underground weapon tests. The United States also conducted two Plowshare tests and one test-detection test in the same period. The Soviet Union, according to the same source, conducted 16 tests during this period, China two, one in the atmosphere and one underground, and France five, all in the atmosphere.

99. Again, we did call for a moratorium last year, when the General Assembly adopted, by a substantial majority, a resolution [*resolution 2602 A (XXIV)*] appealing to the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to agree, as an urgent measure, on a moratorium on further testing and even deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems. This resolution has not been implemented.

100. We are therefore forced to restate our unswerving demand that a halt in the spiralling arms race be effectuated now.

101. One might wish such a moratorium to be all-inclusive, covering production as well as testing and deployment, that is, all quantitative and qualitative increases of nuclear arsenals. But as the possibility of new technical break-throughs, that is, the development of new weapons, is the crucial element in the competitive situation which we call "the arms race", a demand for the cessation of testing, coupled with similar decisions as to deployment, may be adequate and is certainly also the one most easily implemented.

102. The resumption of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks has renewed hope that a permanent freeze of the quantity and quality of strategic nuclear weapons systems may after some time be agreed to. But the reopening of negotiations this week in Helsinki also gives a renewed opportunity to the United States and the Soviet Union of convincing the anxiously waiting world that a sincere change of course is in the offing. This would be obtained by halting, to begin with for the duration of the talks, all testing of nuclear weapons, testing of strategic missiles and, aiming specifically at preventing development, testing of any new nuclear-missile system, offensive or defensive.

103. If such a moratorium with regard to further development of the nuclear arsenals were achieved, it would give a new impetus also to the work in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. This year is something of a turning-point there also, because we can register satisfaction with the fact that the Conference has completed work on one subject. Practically unanimous support by its members accompanies the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, which appears in annex A of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*A/8059-DC/233*].

¹¹ Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1969.

104. Again, it is merely a non-armament measure and, even as such, it is intended only to stem developments which do not seem too significant when compared with the military planning that is still continuing. But we should not be unappreciative. As a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation has already had the opportunity to support the new draft, which does incorporate several important changes proposed by the non-aligned members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We have also voiced our satisfaction with the methods of work utilized in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to bring about agreement on a common text, comprising detailed consultations and negotiations with all members of the Committee. This procedure will, we hope, be followed also in the future when the Committee engages itself in more important items of its agenda.

105. The Swedish delegation will support efforts here to bring about a speedy adoption by the General Assembly of the treaty text as it now stands.

106. But for the rest, the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is thin indeed. Undoubtedly valuable preparatory work has been done in regard to several prospective disarmament measures, particularly in the fields of chemical and biological weapons and of the test ban. But we have also witnessed again how the process is brought to an abrupt stop just as the point has been reached when not much more seems missing than to switch on the political signal to go ahead. This slow pace in the negotiations, with one or the other of the big Powers constantly putting on the brakes, simply cannot continue.

107. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization last year, the Secretary-General, in putting forward his idea—which was adopted by the General Assembly—of declaring the 1970s a Disarmament Decade, said:

“The nations of the world have what may be a last opportunity to mobilize their energies and resources, supported by the public opinion of all the peoples of the world, and to tackle anew the complicated but not insuperable problems of disarmament.”¹²

He also said:

“The world now stands at a most critical crossroads. It can pursue the arms race at a terrible price to the security and progress of the peoples of the world, or it can move ahead towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, a goal that was set in 1959 by a unanimous decision of the General Assembly on the eve of the decade of the 1960s.”¹³

108. There are thus several reasons—the urgency of the situation, the hope invested in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the fact that one item has after long labours been completed—why we should in this first year of the Disarmament Decade ensure that the disarmament negotia-

tions proceed at a much brisker pace than hitherto. No new machinery is needed for this; we should only utilize the existing machinery more effectively.

109. In order to achieve this, the General Assembly might help the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to set priorities. In view of the promises made and preparatory work undertaken, it would seem to me that the 1971 work plan of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be concentrated on four urgent tasks, namely, following up and completing work on—and I enumerate them without any internal order of rank—first, the elimination of chemical and biological weapons; second, the completion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with rules governing the utilization of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; third, the comprehensive test ban; and fourth, the demilitarization of the sea-bed.

110. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has already devoted considerable activity this year to the first of those items: the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. An account is given of the principal developments in this field in paragraphs 27 and 28 of the report of the Conference.

111. Though no real progress can be reported, I think it is fair to say that the issues involved in further prohibitions of chemical and biological weapons have been clarified. In a joint memorandum [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 39], the non-aligned members of the Committee on Disarmament have indicated their common position on this subject at the present juncture. They have particularly stressed three important factors: first, the immense importance and urgency universally felt regarding the need to reach agreement on halting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and biological agents for purposes of war and achieving their effective elimination from the arsenals of weapons; second, the need to treat together both chemical and biological weapons; and third, the importance of the issue of verification.

112. The two last points are, as a matter of fact, interrelated. There are a number of chemical as well as biological agents that do not pose formidable control problems. Concrete suggestions have been put forward in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to solve the verification problems and I am confident that, given a demonstration of goodwill on all sides, the Geneva Conference will be able to present a generally acceptable system which will ensure effective implementation of the prohibitions that we are seeking.

113. I feel that now the General Assembly could best help the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to accomplish this task rapidly by adopting a resolution urging the Conference to conclude its work on the basis of the approach outlined by its non-aligned members and to submit the result to the General Assembly, in an agreed treaty form, at its next session.

114. A second item where a lead already given must be followed up as a matter of urgency is the question of so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. It is stated in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty that “potential

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 46.

¹³ *Ibid.*, para. 41.

benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis . . . [by means of] a special international agreement or agreements". The article states further: "Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force." The Treaty did enter into force several months ago.

115. It is encouraging in this context that, in regard to the main operative stipulations on controls in article III of the Treaty, current negotiations within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna to establish a network of agreements for the implementation of the safeguards system seem to be progressing in a satisfactory way. The Agency is also preparing methods for observation and control *in situ* of peaceful explosions. But to outline the main agreements, establishing a set of general international rules and regulations for the conduct of such explosions, in essence indistinguishable as they are from weapon tests, should be a task for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. As the deadline for the safeguards agreements, concluded bilaterally between the Agency and individual parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, falls due in March 1972, it would seem fitting that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should submit a draft treaty on the subject of peaceful explosions to the Assembly at its twenty-sixth session.

116. I wish to turn now to the third of the priority items for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, namely, the supplementing of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty of 1963¹⁴ by a treaty which would also ban underground nuclear weapon tests.

117. Last year the General Assembly in its resolution 2604 B (XXIV), adopted by a virtually unanimous vote, requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament "to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, . . . and to submit a special report to the Assembly on the results of its deliberations".

118. We now have before us the special report requested by the General Assembly. It is contained in paragraphs 12-22 of the Conference's report to the General Assembly. A glance at that meagre text will be enough to show that no real progress has been made in the past year.

119. Recently, two Nobel laureates, one in physics and one in medicine—Hans Bethe and Joshua Lederberg—have independently come out with strong, convincing arguments in favour of a complete test ban as being the key issue in any plan for disarmament. The further planning of collateral measures, as well as of general and complete disarmament, could proceed more calmly, allowing for a more systematic integrated approach, if the world could rest assured that continued sophistication of weapons was prevented by the termination of all testing.

120. The urgency of the problem of nuclear testing was blatantly illustrated on the very day the United Nations

inaugurated its twenty-fifth anniversary commemorative session, when the three major Powers carried out nuclear weapon tests. The United Nations must once again strongly raise its voice against this continued defiance—as mad as it is in itself irrational.

121. No one can say that the problems involved in the conclusion of an underground test-ban treaty have not been studied. Several concrete proposals have been put forward in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. I may, for instance, refer representatives to a working paper which the Swedish delegation submitted on 1 April 1969¹⁵ with suggestions as to the contents of a treaty banning all underground nuclear weapon tests. That proposal still stands. It contains, *inter alia*, a comprehensive safeguards article, intended to ensure reasonable guarantees against any violations of the prohibitions.

122. An important element of the provisions for an underground test-ban treaty consists in an organized international exchange of seismological data in order to facilitate the detection, identification and location of underground events. The over-all resources for test-ban monitoring through seismological means have been much improved recently and further improvements are in sight. In this context, I should like to quote from a statement issued as a result of a recent Pugwash Conference on Peace and International Co-operation. In a section devoted to the test ban, the Pugwash scientists—among whom are several prominent United States and Soviet scientists—said the following:

"There was consensus within the Group on the fundamental point that the problems of extending the Moscow Treaty to underground testing are essentially political and that the technical problems of verification are not the real stumbling block. Such difficulties as existed previously in the detection and identification of underground tests have been reduced to such an extent that, in the Group's unanimous opinion, Pugwash is now fully justified in pressing for the immediate negotiation of a ban on tests above a certain threshold as a strict minimum requirement . . .".

They went on to say:

"The Group was also unanimous in strongly recommending the adoption, ultimately, of a complete ban on tests whether or not a foolproof verification system by on-the-spot inspection can be devised and accepted. Such a ban, in the view of the Group, would not present any risk to the national security of either of the super-Powers."

123. A fresh approach is needed on the part of the main nuclear Powers to break the deadlock on the test-ban issue. The General Assembly may help bring about such a change by adopting again a strong resolution urging the rapid conclusion of a treaty banning all underground tests. Hand in hand with such a resolution we should also urge Governments, in another resolution, to contribute to the organization of a systematic world-wide exchange of

¹⁴ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

¹⁵ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232, annex C, sect. 6.

seismological data, which would facilitate the implementation of a comprehensive test ban.

124. The question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed should be retained as a fourth priority item, which would be in the nature of a follow-up—but with a broadening perspective—of work already undertaken.

125. I wish strongly to support the initiative taken in Geneva by the Polish delegation, and reiterated here in the statement of the representative of Poland on 2 November [1748th meeting], that this issue be kept as a live item on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament agenda. With further negotiations thus being ensured, there is no need to spell out in this context the military developments, beyond the emplacement of nuclear weapons, which now threaten the sea-bed and the ocean floor and thus need urgently to be forestalled. Valuable guidelines for the drawing up of further agreements are available in this year's draft sea-bed treaty with reference, for instance, to the delimitation of zones, to methods of verification, and so on. Negotiations on points of detail may well take some time, but as the nations of the world are impatiently interested in preserving the great open frontier of the sea-bed for peaceful purposes only, we should expect to move ahead rather rapidly on draft treaty texts on further prohibitions.

126. Besides these urgent subjects, there is a need for a clearer perspective of further negotiation tasks. In an effort to link together the various measures contemplated or possible in the disarmament field into a meaningful programme of disarmament, three members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Mexico, Yugoslavia and Sweden, as has already been mentioned here today by the representative of Yugoslavia, have presented to that body a preliminary draft of such a comprehensive programme of disarmament [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 42]. It has its origins in resolution 2602 E (XXIV), adopted by the General Assembly last year, by which the decade of the 1970s was declared as a Disarmament Decade. It has furthermore been prompted in part by a feeling that the world community needs some effective procedures in order to facilitate a co-ordination of the various negotiating efforts which are either under way or are being planned, bilaterally or regionally, but which are conducted formally outside the framework of the United Nations. Our Organization needs to be kept fully informed of all negotiations on disarmament in order to be in a position properly to fulfil its functions, including a constant assessment of the situation. It seems to me that the adoption of such a programme would be a fitting demonstration that the United Nations, in this its twenty-fifth year of existence and in the first year of the Disarmament Decade of the 1970s, reaffirms its responsibility for achieving disarmament and continues to consider progress in this field as one of its major preoccupations.

127. In conclusion, I wish to turn the Committee's attention to an important task, on which a decision ought likewise to be taken, although in this case not as a directive to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In his usual lucid appreciation of the present situation in the disarmament field, contained in the introduction to his

annual report,¹⁶ the Secretary-General proposes, *inter alia*, that a comprehensive international expert study be undertaken of the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of the massive military expenditures. The Romanian Government has followed up this initiative by introducing it as a special item on the agenda of the General Assembly [A/7994]. I would like to support the proposal on behalf of my Government. We have taken an active part in the studies on a similar subject, dealt with by the Economic and Social Council and the Second Committee of the Assembly, related to the item entitled "Conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament". A broadening of such studies to encompass the, alas, much more burning problems of the economic and social costs connected with all phases of the arms race seems to us fully indicated. Already that part of the costs which can be measured by military budgets equals the total income of the poorer half of mankind.

128. The conventional arms race, which affects all nations, absorbs by far the largest portion of military expenditure. We need a much clearer and much more concrete picture of the costs involved in this sick race to arm our nations against each other. For all the money spent there is no increase in security for any nation. We would do well to realize, as the Secretary-General reminded us in his statement before the Economic and Social Council in July this year, that armaments must be regarded not as products but as waste. All nations are called upon, again in the words of the Secretary-General, not to accept passively "that the door should be slammed on economic and social development by military priorities".¹⁷

129. Vigorous action along the lines that I have outlined today might, in the view of the Swedish delegation, show that the United Nations is now, finally, in regard to disarmament, turning a disappointing past into a future of real goodwill.

130. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have no further speakers on my list for this meeting. However, before adjourning the meeting, I should like to inform all members of the Committee of the progress of our work and of our plans for this week.

131. For tomorrow, Thursday, we have scheduled one meeting in the morning at 10.30. There are three speakers on the list for that meeting, and there may possibly be two other speakers who are to confirm their readiness to speak. For Friday, we have scheduled one meeting in the morning and one in the afternoon. However, I must draw the attention of members to the fact that so far we have no speakers for Friday morning, and only two for that afternoon. If members do not take full advantage of the two meetings that we have scheduled for Friday and if the time before us is not fully used, I fear that later on we may be forced to hold night meetings or Saturday meetings. Therefore, I appeal to those delegations that can speed up the preparation of their speeches to do so as much as possible so that they may be able to participate in our

¹⁶ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

¹⁷ Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-ninth Session, 1696th meeting, para. 18.

meeting on Thursday morning or at either of the meetings on Friday.

132. In conclusion, I should like to say that in order to have as clear an idea as possible of the duration of the general debate on these disarmament questions, I intend to suggest at tomorrow's meeting that we close the list of speakers at the end of our meeting on Friday morning, that is, at 1 p.m. on Friday, so that by Monday we shall have a

very clear idea of the number of speakers who will take part in the general debate and how best to allocate our time. At the moment I am not making any formal proposal, suggestion or recommendation. I am merely announcing that, if I hear no objection, tomorrow I shall recommend that the Committee agree to close the list of speakers on Friday at 1 p.m., at the end of the morning meeting.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.