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*Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).*

**AGENDA ITEMS 29, 104, 30 AND 31**

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- (a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2);
- (b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General (A/7678 and Add.1-3);
- (c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General (A/7568 and A/7743)

**GENERAL DEBATE (*concluded*)**

1. Mr. EL-ERIAN (United Arab Republic): The present session of the General Assembly marks the tenth anniversary of its resolution 1378 (XIV). That resolution, which was adopted unanimously and which is generally recognized as among the most significant landmarks in the history of the United Nations, declared that the question of general and complete disarmament was "the most important one facing the world today". It contained an appeal to Governments "to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem".

2. During the ten years which have elapsed since the adoption of that resolution, a number of important successes have been achieved in the field of disarmament. These include the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, of 5 August 1963, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968. However, a realistic assessment of those ten years cannot but note that, as is pertinently pointed out by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report:

"At the same time, however, stockpiles of both nuclear and conventional armaments were steadily increasing both in numbers and in death-dealing capacity. Thus, despite the successes achieved in the decade of the sixties, the armaments race and military expenditures have mounted at an accelerated rate. The diversion of enormous resources and energy, both human and physical, from peaceful economic and social pursuits to unproductive and uneconomic military purposes was an important factor in the failure to make greater progress in the advancement of the developing countries during the First United Nations Development Decade."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 40.*

3. Since the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, a number of developments in the field of disarmament have taken place at an increased pace, developments which, in the view of the United Arab Republic delegation, could exert a favourable influence upon the future course of disarmament negotiations. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been enlarged by eight countries. The Soviet Union and the United States reached an agreement to open bilateral strategic arms limitation talks in Helsinki and have already begun those talks on 17 November. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, at its session this year at Geneva, accomplished substantial progress and has reported to the General Assembly in the form of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/7741-DC/232,<sup>2</sup> annex A]. During its session this year the Committee also had a useful exchange of views on other issues before it, particularly the question of an underground test-ban treaty.

4. The Secretary-General has also submitted his report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use<sup>3</sup> which, as we all know, was prepared with the assistance of qualified consultant experts and in keeping with the terms of General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII). Members of the Committee on Disarmament welcomed and approved both the report and the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in his foreword to the report, which they considered to be a suitable basis for the Committee's work relating to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

5. Furthermore, a number of socialist countries submitted, at the beginning of the present session of the General Assembly, a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on their destruction [A/7655].

6. In an area related to disarmament, intensive work is under way in the International Atomic Energy Agency on problems relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and particularly on those matters which were considered by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States of 1968.

7. I wish to state briefly the views of my delegation on these developments which I have just outlined and on some of the issues relating thereto.

8. My delegation welcomes the strengthening of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the addition of eight new members. They have already contributed their share of valuable ideas, and we are confident that the Committee on Disarmament will derive much benefit from their participation. Our position on all aspects of this question, and in particular on the procedural one, was set forth in the statements of the representative of the United Arab Republic to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at the 421st and 424th meetings, 22 and 31

July 1969 respectively. I wish to recall our explicit reference in the statement of 22 July to: "... the established right of the General Assembly to manifest its views on the question of the expansion of membership [being] upheld". [ENDC/PV.421, para. 90.]

9. My delegation shares the gratification voiced at the beginning of the bilateral talks in Helsinki between the Soviet Union and the United States relating to strategic arms limitations. Such a decision made in common is in keeping with General Assembly resolution 2456 D (XXIII) which called for early bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. We also share the deepest and most earnest hopes for the success of these talks. For, as rightly stated by the Chairman of this Committee in the important statement he made in introducing the items on disarmament: "Their outcome—and we dare think only in terms of success and not of failure—could be decisive for the future of all humanity." [1691st meeting, para. 7.] As pointed out by a number of speakers during this debate, these talks could be the beginning of the most significant arms control negotiations for more than a generation. They can become a historic milestone on our hard way to peace. The significance of these bilateral talks for the future of mankind can hardly be overstressed. Any progress they might achieve towards the stabilization, and possibly the reduction of strategic forces could, as has been stated by both sides, have the effect of strengthening international security and bringing about a climate of greater confidence between the two major Powers. A number of causes of tensions and dangers, inherent in the present dynamics of the nuclear weapons race, could be eliminated. Moreover, a positive outcome of the strategic arms limitation talks could most probably be a catalyst for other advances, not only in the limitation and control of armaments but also in the reduction of armaments.

10. My delegation also notes with gratification the recent announcement of the simultaneous ratification by the Soviet Union and the United States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. My delegation has always considered the successful conclusion of that Treaty, after ten years of efforts in the United Nations and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as a major positive event. As stated by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report of last year: "The Treaty... has been acclaimed as 'the most important international agreement in the field of disarmament since the nuclear age began' and as 'a major success for the cause of peace'."<sup>4</sup>

11. The United Arab Republic was one of the first States to sign the non-proliferation Treaty, as evidence of the importance we attach to that Treaty. It actively participated in and contributed its modest share towards the efforts which led to the successful conclusion of that Treaty.

12. The representative of the United Arab Republic to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament pointed out on 15 August 1968 at the 390th meeting, that it was

<sup>2</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.

<sup>3</sup> Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

<sup>4</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 15.

advisable that the Conference continue to keep a watchful eye on the evolution of full and universal implementation of the Treaty. In his statement on 15 April 1969 at the 403rd meeting, he drew attention to the fact that in the Middle East a certain country with a long record of aggression and defiance of the Charter of the United Nations remains opposed to signing this Treaty. The implications of such a position are clear and do not need any elaboration.

13. I wish to turn now to the subject of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The United Arab Republic has consistently opposed all weapons of mass destruction and fully supports the idea of the total prohibition of the use and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

14. My country was one of the first signatories of the Geneva Protocol in 1925.<sup>5</sup> At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly the United Arab Republic voted for resolution 2162 B (XXI) which called for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol and urged those States which had not acceded to it to do so.

15. The increasingly acute awareness of the threat which these weapons pose to mankind makes it imperative to take concrete and concerted action without delay. An outstanding contribution toward increased knowledge in this respect has been furnished by the group of experts convoked by the Secretary-General under resolution 2454 A (XXIII). Their report, together with the foreword by the Secretary-General containing some concrete suggestions, constitutes a valuable basis for our present discussion.

16. My delegation fully supports the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the General Assembly should renew the appeal to all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The delegation of Mongolia made a useful suggestion at the 424th meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the effect that the Assembly should address a call to all Governments to accede to the Geneva Protocol during the course of 1970, which is the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing.

17. In his second recommendation in the foreword to his report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons the Secretary-General suggested that Member States should: "... make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents ... which now exist or which may be developed in the future".

*Mr. Kolo (Nigeria), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

18. It is this recommendation that has been dealt with by twelve members of the Committee on Disarmament. On 26 August they submitted a working paper regarding a proposed declaration by the General Assembly to this effect which is attached to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 30].

<sup>5</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

19. My delegation has followed with keen interest the important points made by the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Myrdal, in her statement to this Committee at the 1695th meeting. She pointed out that the prohibition of the use of biological and chemical means of warfare has gradually come to be considered and respected as a generally recognized rule of international law, customary law, binding *erga omnes*. She cited a number of international conventions which were landmarks concluded in the second half of the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century. Those conventions now establish a rule generally recognized as a general rule of international law for the prohibition of inhuman and barbarous weapons.

20. Having briefly stated our views on the prohibition of the use of chemical and biological weapons, I wish now to turn to another equally vital aspect of this question, namely, the prohibition of their production and stockpiling, for it needs no elaboration that the sheer production and stockpiling of such weapons is in itself a great danger. For that reason we welcome the initiative of the nine socialist countries which submitted a draft convention for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons and on the destruction of such weapons [A/7655].

21. We are gratified to note that this draft convention is comprehensive, inasmuch as it deals with both chemical and biological weapons. We therefore support the draft resolution submitted by Bulgaria and other delegations and contained in document A/C.1/L.487 and Add.1 which in paragraph 3 recommends to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: "... that in reaching agreement on the text of such a Convention full account should be taken of the draft Convention ...".

22. My delegation has had the opportunity in the past to express its appreciation for the initiative of the United Kingdom in submitting a draft convention on the subject of biological weapons [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 20]. The views of the delegation of the United Arab Republic on that draft convention have been stated in the Conference in Geneva and I need not take up the time of the Committee by repeating them.

23. I now wish to make a few comments on the important subject of the completion of the Moscow test ban Treaty of 1963. Our delegation, together with nine other delegations, has submitted draft resolution A/C.1/L.486 which the representative of Sweden introduced in the course of her speech at the 1695th meeting of the Committee on 20 November last.

24. There is one aspect of the problem on which I particularly wish to make a few comments. That is with regard to underground nuclear tests. The records of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during the last few years clearly indicate that the means for verifying a treaty on underground nuclear tests exist. We are indebted to Sweden for the great work undertaken by Swedish scientific and research institutions which have, in co-operation with other scientists from all over the world, shed considerable light in this respect. It remains important to emphasize international co-operation and worldwide exchanges of seismological data. The United Arab Republic

has co-operated and wishes to co-operate further in this field. We believe that the maximum universal character of this exchange must be ascertained through international institutions. We hope that the Conference will reach complete agreement. However, if it proves difficult for the time being, attention must be given to a solution by way of an agreement covering those tests of a seismic scale where there is no controversy as to their ability for national detection. A suggestion by the United Arab Republic along those lines was offered some years ago in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

25. I wish now to turn to the question of the prohibition of the arms race in the sea-bed, an area which represents almost three-fourths of the earth's surface. We are gratified that, thanks to the efforts of the Co-Chairmen, we now have before us a draft convention which envisages that such an area will be kept free of emplaced nuclear arms [*ibid.*, annex A]. We made it clear in Geneva, together with other delegations, that in principle we stand for the total demilitarization of the sea-bed. That is an area which is the common heritage of mankind, *res communis*, and it should also be kept from the arms race. We welcome the statements which Ambassador Roschin and Ambassador Yost made at the first meeting of this debate. The representative of the Soviet Union stated:

"Thus the draft provides, first of all, for solution of the most important part of the problem of demilitarization of the sea-bed, namely, the prohibition of the emplacement of the most dangerous types of weapons there. Therefore, in our view, the most important part of the problem is solved: a major step is taken towards complete exclusion of the sea-bed from the sphere of the arms race." [1691st meeting, para. 107.]

26. Ambassador Yost in his statement before the Committee at the same meeting said:

"I have stressed that the present draft sea-bed treaty constitutes a limited step but one that is worth while. I need scarcely add that prospects for further measures of arms control relating to the sea-bed would not be foreclosed by the present draft treaty . . .

"We do not believe that this draft, as far as it was developed at Geneva, necessarily represents the last word as a treaty ready to receive broad international support. For our part, we shall listen with care and understanding to the comments made here and will be prepared to consider further modifications, if they should seem called for, to meet the concerns of the international community." [1691st meeting, paras. 62 and 63.]

27. We welcome those important statements by one of the Co-Chairmen and the representative of the other Co-Chairman of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We also are gratified to note that in the preamble to the draft treaty there is a paragraph which reads

"Convinced that this treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race, and determined to continue negotiations concerning further measures leading to this end." [A/7741-DC/232, annex A.]

However, we think that the suggestion of the representative of Sweden [*ibid.*, annex C, section 36], which we fully support, would strengthen such a provision by transferring to the articles of the treaty itself. This would have the parties to the treaty undertake to continue negotiations in good faith on further measures relating to a more comprehensive prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes.

28. Another point relating to the sea-bed is the question of the delimitation of the zone covered by the treaty. Our delegation shares the view expressed by various delegations that it is inadvisable to delimit the zone by referring to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.<sup>6</sup> That method is bound to result in complications. A number of representatives have raised the question of the possibility of the parties revising the treaty. I should not wish to go into that in detail. We prefer the method used in the original draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union [*ibid.*, section 4] which clearly defined the area as a twelve-mile zone with no reference to any other instrument.

29. We support the principle of consultation. However, we would like to see the article drafted in such a broad and flexible manner as to take into account various situations in practice and to safeguard the inherent right of States to resort to the Security Council. In some cases consultations may not be necessarily from the practical point of view the most appropriate method.

30. These are our views with regard to some aspects of the draft treaty on the sea-bed.

31. Again, I should like to thank the Co-Chairmen for their initiatives and efforts and to express the hope that the views put forward by delegations will be taken into account and that it will soon be possible to complete the work on this important draft.

32. The last point with which I wish to deal is the question of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This comes under item 31 of the agenda of the General Assembly, namely, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which deals with the subject. We are gratified to note that the Secretary-General had produced for us three important and valuable reports in connexion with this item. They deal respectively with the subjects of the three sub-items connected with the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. From these reports one finds that the majority of the replies, so far received by the Secretary-General to his inquiries about the establishment within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency of an international service for nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, support the idea that the Agency is well qualified to perform the role under article V of the non-proliferation Treaty.

33. I am also gratified to hear that the Agency, at its session held in Vienna in September 1969, considered some questions related to the resolutions adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, such as the fund of

<sup>6</sup> Signed at Geneva on 19 April 1958. (See United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477.)

special fissile materials, the financing of nuclear projects, and so forth. We look forward to the completion of the important work and studies of the International Atomic Energy Agency and we would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm our support for it.

34. Before concluding I wish to point out that, whatever differences may exist among us on varying concepts, approaches and emphasis, on the timing and phasing of the different stages and steps involved in the inherently complex process of disarmament, and on the priorities to be established, little difference can exist among us on the urgent character of disarmament and the central position that it occupies in contemporary international problems and in present-day international institutions. This intermediate position on disarmament stems from its basic relationship and reciprocal influence on the maintenance of international peace and security, which is the basic purpose and primary function of the United Nations. The continuation of the arms race confronts mankind with an incalculable threat and putting an end to such a race therefore becomes of urgent and overwhelming interest to mankind and its survival. As efforts towards disarmament progress, they generate a sense of security and trust among States, which in turn becomes instrumental in the achievement of further progress in disarmament.

35. The relationship between people having confidence and faith in the effectiveness of international security and progress in disarmament has been reflected in the important draft appeal on international security submitted by the Soviet delegation at this session [A/C.1/L.468] and which has commanded an outstanding debate in this Committee. In section I it is mentioned that:

“The peoples have no firm confidence in their security and they cannot concentrate their efforts exclusively on the achievement of peaceful objectives—economic and cultural development and improved well-being.”

36. The inter-action, between disarmament on the one hand and the lessening of international tensions and the consolidation of confidence among States on the other, was affirmed in the joint statement of agreed principles on disarmament and in the concept of collateral measures as elaborated by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Basic to that concept is the determination of the world Organization to prevent aggression and once it is committed to repel it and eliminate its consequences. The strict enforcement of the guarantee of the territorial integrity of States as embodied in the Charter, and the effective implementation of the collective security system as elaborated in the United Nations Charter, are essential for the prevention of aggression and for putting an end to violations of the basic norms of the Charter relating to the prohibition of the use of force and the inadmissibility of conquest by war.

37. The impact of disarmament on the shaping of international relations is by no means confined to the field of peace and security, for if the continuation of the arms race presents an incalculable peril, disarmament presents an incalculable promise. The unlimited resources—economic, technological and human—which are at present used for the purpose of the arms race would, in the world of disarma-

ment, be released and be re-channelled for accelerated economic development and social progress and for the pursuit of art and institutions of peace and co-operation.

38. Mr. EL BOURI (Libya) (*translated from French*): Before addressing myself to the agenda, I wish to make a few brief remarks.

39. I should like to associate myself with the comment made by preceding speakers that the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232]<sup>7</sup> was submitted to us very late. My delegation, like the many other delegations which are not members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and which have neither experts nor adequate facilities, found it difficult to study the problem thoroughly in so short a time and to make a useful contribution to the discussion.

40. We must also consult our Governments on the contents of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

41. There is no need for me to repeat that disarmament is still the major concern of a mankind terrified at the prospect of self-destruction. I would emphasize that peace and security do not depend solely on the great Powers, but are the responsibility of the entire international community. The small and weak nations which are the most vulnerable to the disastrous consequences of war are perhaps more interested than any others in the maintenance of peace and the achievement of disarmament. They are making an important contribution to the disarmament discussions and negotiations. I realize that disarmament problems are complex and have a direct bearing on the balance of armaments of the nuclear Powers. The need for bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers has become obvious more than once in the process of nuclear disarmament, as prior agreement between them is a prerequisite for any important step in that sphere.

42. I do not share the view that the trend towards bilateral negotiations between the two great Powers has in any way lessened the usefulness of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In the light of the political and military realities of our day, this may be the only practical way of achieving results.

43. Nevertheless, disarmament is so vast and complex a problem that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should not, in my view, stop its work whenever the two super-Powers enter into negotiations.

44. Glancing through the report of the Conference, I note that little progress was made in the course of this year, that the Committee on Disarmament held fifty-four official plenary meetings at which members put forward the views and recommendations of their Governments, but that no advance was made in solving the fundamental problems of general and complete disarmament.

<sup>7</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.



45. In the introduction to his annual report, the Secretary-General manifests his concern over the lack of progress in disarmament, and says: "The world is standing at what may be regarded in the perspective of history as one of the decisive moments in the grim challenge of the nuclear arms race."<sup>8</sup>

46. The advances made towards nuclear disarmament in the last ten years, namely, the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the Treaty on Antarctica, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, none of them go to the heart of the nuclear threat. Underground testing is continuing, the problems of both the horizontal and vertical non-proliferation of nuclear weapons remain unsolved, and no agreement has been reached to stop the manufacture and further development of nuclear weapons, whose existing stockpiles more than suffice to exterminate the human race.

47. Far from making any progress towards a limitation and reduction of the nuclear threat, despite all the treaties on the matter, as the Secretary-General stresses in the introduction to his report, the world "seems poised on the verge of a massive new escalation in the field of nuclear weaponry".<sup>9</sup>

48. The gap between progress in nuclear disarmament and the thrusting escalation of the nuclear arms race is great, and there seems to be no possibility of bridging it.

49. This frenzied race, far from increasing world security or the security of the nuclear Powers, is fraught with danger for the existing balance between the two super-Powers. As the Secretary-General states in the introduction to his annual report, the present situation of relative stability "could disappear, even if only temporarily, if new generations of nuclear weapons systems were developed and deployed".<sup>10</sup>

50. My delegation nevertheless feels that, despite all the negative factors involved, our present debates are taking place in a favourable climate, because of two events. The first is the opening at Helsinki of strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2456 D (XXIII). My delegation rejoices at the opening of these negotiations between the super-Powers, and I would like to associate myself with the Chairman and the preceding speakers in expressing the sincere hope that these negotiations, undertaken to promote the security of mankind and the peace of the world, will be fruitful.

51. No one is unaware of the importance of these talks. They are a major event which might become a landmark along the arduous path to disarmament, resulting in a

relaxation of tension and a climate of greater mutual trust between the two super-Powers. The Helsinki talks are the touchstone of their good faith as regards genuine nuclear disarmament. If the talks yield constructive results, that would dispel the doubts and suspicions aroused by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

52. The second event I have in mind is the ratification of that Treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union. I congratulate the two Governments for having thus brought the Treaty to life and I trust that there will be further ratifications, so that it can enter into force.

53. In addition to these favourable events, I must mention the entry into force of the Tlatelolco Treaty and the establishment of the agency for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, and I congratulate the Latin American delegations on this achievement.

54. These are encouraging facts, which lead us to hope and trust that, faced with the dreadful prospect of a nuclear holocaust, man may be able to rise to the challenge.

55. I should now like to make a few comments on the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

56. The fact the draft treaty before us represents the agreed views of the two super-Powers is in itself encouraging; it may prove that they have really entered upon an era of negotiation which, it is to be hoped, will soon lead to the long-awaited era of co-operation. Nevertheless, in this atmosphere of optimism and approval, I cannot but note that the procedure followed in formulating the draft treaty has caused a number of delegations to make certain reservations.

57. When the small nations express satisfaction because the two super-Powers have reached agreement, they are entitled to express also some doubt and concern with regard to the role of international organizations, more particularly of the United Nations, and of the small and medium-sized nations which are its Members.

58. At this stage, I have only the following comments to make on the substance of the treaty.

59. I note that no reference whatever is made in the preamble to the fundamental principle that the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are the common heritage of all mankind.

60. I also question the pertinence of a specific reference to the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.<sup>11</sup> My delegation would have preferred the inclusion of the territorial zone of twelve miles, as proposed in the original draft of the Soviet Union [*ibid.*, annex C, section 4]. The reference to the Geneva Convention may introduce some ambiguity and give rise to differences of interpretation. Moreover, as we all know, the Convention in question has not yet been generally recognized as a rule of contemporary international law; to my

<sup>8</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 26.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 28.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 29.

<sup>11</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477.

knowledge, thus far fewer than forty States have ratified it. My own country, like most of the developing countries, has neither signed nor ratified it as yet.

61. The reference to the contiguous zone is also not pertinent, since under article 24 of the Geneva Convention, it is "a zone of the high seas", and no reference is made to the bed or subsoil of that zone, as was done with regard to territorial waters in article 2. The contiguous zone obviously means superjacent waters rather than the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the soil thereof; since the draft treaty is concerned solely with those three any reference to the contiguous zone may either prove obscure or lend itself to various interpretations and prejudice a very important point examined by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, namely, the separate treatment and legal status of the sea-bed and the ocean floor on the one hand, and the superjacent waters on the other.

62. My delegation has reservations with regard to the methods for controlling the implementation of the treaty proposed in article III, as the matter calls for painstaking study. However, I can say here and now that most coastal States lack the technical resources needed for that purpose. My delegation regrets the absence of an international machinery to effect such inspection.

63. I shall confine myself to these few remarks, which I was encouraged to make by the statement of the United States representative [1691st meeting] that his Government would welcome all comments aimed at improving the text.

64. I take this opportunity to express to the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States my delegation's satisfaction at and appreciation of their initiative in seeking to exclude the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the terror-inspiring nuclear arms race.

65. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has also given special attention to the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons. In that connexion, I would convey to the Secretary-General my delegation's gratitude and congratulations for his tireless efforts and precious contribution to the cause of disarmament. His report, entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*,<sup>12</sup> prepared with the aid of experts, deserves our praise.

66. This report, which was discussed at length in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, paints a horrifying picture of the consequences of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Together with the Secretary-General's introduction, which contains some wise suggestions, it furnishes useful information on which we can base our conclusions. My delegation supports this report and all the recommendations in it.

67. There are other documents before us as well, but I fear that the General Assembly will not have time to study them all and take a decision on them, more particularly as regards a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical and

bacteriological weapons. My delegation nevertheless supports the draft resolution submitted by the group of twelve Powers of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/C.1/L.489 and Add.1], which is in line with the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report.

68. No progress has been made with regard to the cessation of nuclear testing underground since the matter was debated by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, although five years have elapsed since the signing of the Moscow Treaty.

69. Constructive proposals that would have solved the control problem were put forward by a number of delegations, particularly the Swedish delegation, whose tireless efforts over a number of years to find an answer to this problem my delegation admires and appreciates. I incline to the view that the question is political rather than technical. It is closely linked to the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, and I hope that the constructive results of the Helsinki talks, which all mankind awaits, and the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will make it possible to achieve prohibition of nuclear tests underground.

70. Enormous sums are spent annually on the arms race. For the current year, the figure has been estimated at \$200,000 million; this amount was expended for the manufacture and stockpiling of weapons that can cause our own destruction, at a time when two thirds of the world population are fighting against poverty, disease and ignorance.

71. Next year the United Nations will celebrate its twenty-fifth anniversary. I trust it will take that opportunity to demonstrate to anguished mankind that it is resolved to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and that it has made some headway towards that goal.

72. The Secretary-General's suggestion to designate a disarmament decade deserves approval. In so complex a matter, a long term programme is a necessity. The disarmament decade coincides with the Second United Nations Development Decade. Disarmament and development are both inextricably linked with the maintenance of international peace and security. The world will have neither peace nor security so long as the stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction continue to grow. It is also true that it will have neither peace nor true disarmament so long as the gap between the rich and poor countries continues to exist and so long as justice, law and the principle of self-determination do not prevail in international relations.

73. In conclusion, I should like to quote the warning in paragraph 41 of the introduction to the Secretary-General's annual report, which reads:

"The world now stands at a most critical cross-roads. It can pursue the arms race at a terrible price to the security and progress of the peoples of the world, or it can move ahead towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, a goal that was set in 1959 by a unanimous decision of the General Assembly on the eve of the decade of the 1960s. If it should choose the latter road,

<sup>12</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

the security, the economic well-being and the progress not only of the developing countries, but also of the developed countries and of the entire world, would be tremendously enhanced.”

74. Mr. SUJKA (Poland): The Polish delegation has already had an opportunity to present its views with regard to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The chief of my delegation submitted, on behalf of the nine co-authors, the draft treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, contained in document A/7655. Today I should like to deal with some other elements of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232].<sup>13</sup>

75. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as well as the current debate in the First Committee, indicates that there is a consensus as to the need for tangible steps in the field of nuclear disarmament. Sharing that view, Poland declares itself in favour of an early undertaking of such steps.

76. We therefore welcomed with great satisfaction the announcement of the opening of the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations on the key issue of limitation and reduction of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. Whatever progress is made in that all-important field, it undoubtedly cannot fail to exert a positive influence upon the prospects of negotiating agreements in other important areas of nuclear disarmament.

77. The logic of disarmament negotiations has it that any progress, whether in the form of a new agreement or merely in the form of steps increasing the effectiveness of the already existing agreements, tends to stimulate further efforts in the field of disarmament.

78. This logic is confirmed by the history of the negotiations on the partial disarmament measures which have been successfully concluded. Important milestones in this regard were such measures as the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and, most recently, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

79. Those measures cannot and are not meant to be a substitute for general and complete disarmament. However, in adopting the step-by-step approach to solving the problems which are most topical and most ripe for solution, we do not depart from—on the contrary, we get closer to—the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

80. Collateral measures of disarmament, by reversing the arms race in areas which are generally agreed to be the most dangerous, are instrumental in reducing the risk of potential conflicts inherent in that arms race. Such a course in itself tends to generate a greater sense of security among nations.

The practical implementation of such partial measures, moreover, helps accumulate valuable experience that may be most useful in the search for solutions to further collateral steps in the field of disarmament.

81. The above considerations argue persuasively for the need of increased efforts, both to ensure full effectiveness of the partial measures already agreed upon and to seek new dimensions in proscribing further areas and forms of the arms race.

82. In that dedicated effort it is indispensable, first of all, that States refrain, in the military sphere, from any step which, directly or indirectly, could detract from the effectiveness of the existing agreements, thus rendering more difficult the negotiations relating to further collateral disarmament measures. It is necessary that the accomplishments attained so far be reinforced with new steps which would consolidate and further increase their effectiveness.

83. The prevailing international situation, as well as the current state of the nuclear arms race, makes imperative the earliest entry into force of the most important of measures, the non-proliferation Treaty.

84. While its principal objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to States not possessing them, it is also of paramount importance as an instrument of international co-operation, not only in the field of disarmament, but also in the realm of the peaceful application of nuclear energy. Precluding all forms of proliferation, the Treaty opens up broad vistas for nuclear disarmament, both general and regional.

85. Fully aware of those facts, Poland was among the first signatories of the treaty and ratified it last May. The treaty has been signed by an overwhelming majority of States. However, this instrument will not become fully effective unless and until it is signed and ratified by States which are generally known to possess a highly developed industrial and technological potential in the field of nuclear energy.

86. Poland welcomed with satisfaction the simultaneous ratification of the non-proliferation treaty by the Soviet Union and by the United States. We note with satisfaction the recent signature of this treaty by the Federal Republic of Germany and what we now expect to be an early ratification of the treaty by that country. We are deeply convinced that these developments will create favourable conditions for the ratification of the treaty by other States, thus bringing closer the day when the treaty enters into force. In this connexion I have to state that the Polish delegation listened carefully to the important statement of the representative of the Netherlands at our 1699th meeting. We attach great importance to his announcement that new efforts are being made with a view to an early ratification of the treaty by the Euratom member States.

87. The entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty adhered to by all European States would create conditions conducive to a further search for regional measures of disarmament most appropriate for Europe, measures to which Poland, as is well known, has always attached considerable importance.

<sup>13</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.



88. Poland has always been in the forefront of efforts towards regional measures in the field of disarmament and international security. Their value and significance basically stem from the fact that they consolidate, on a regional scale, the effectiveness of certain general principles and international agreements, while at the same time supplementing the latter with important new elements adopted to the specific requirements of the security of the given region. The concept of regional confidence-building and disarmament measures harmonizes the interests of regional security with the more general interests of the international community. Such measures have proved to have considerable appeal, and the idea of their implementation in various regions of the world has won world-wide support. Let me only recall the General Assembly resolutions on denuclearization of Africa, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America and the general recognition by article VII of the non-proliferation treaty of the right of States to create regional zones free of nuclear weapons.

89. The fundamental premises of Poland's foreign policy, its historical experiences and its geographical location fully explain our strong interest in the implementation of both regional measures of disarmament and a wider system of collective security in Europe; the area of key importance for the prevention of a new world war. It is there, in the heart of Europe, that the two military groupings, armed with the most up-to-date weaponry, come into direct contact. An armed conflict in that explosive area would be particularly dangerous to world peace.

90. Because of such considerations, the Polish Government has submitted a number of proposals which regionally, in Europe, have been instrumental in promoting the non-proliferation debate. The acceptance and implementation of such concepts as the Polish plan for a nuclear-free zone and the plan for freezing nuclear armaments in Europe, both of which have retained their timeliness, would certainly lead to the slowing down of the arms race. The resulting improvement of the international climate would certainly contribute to the creation of conditions of lasting security. As in past years, Poland is ready to take an active part in the search for suitable methods for the realization of regional disarmament in Europe.

91. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in its report has submitted a draft treaty presented in Geneva by the two Co-Chairmen concerning the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*ibid.*, annex. A].

92. We note with satisfaction that the draft treaty contains effective provisions concerning the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. It also envisages the establishment of a verification system and other provisions designed to ensure compliance by States parties with the respective treaty obligations. It is, therefore, a partial measure of disarmament whose application would make impossible the spreading of the nuclear arms race to the vast environment of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, an area of tremendous economic potential for mankind. The treaty would also supplement the system of agreed measures designed to halt the nuclear arms race with a new and important document that expands the sphere of peaceful international co-operation.

93. Therefore we consider that it is indispensable to take all possible steps to bring about an early finalization of the question of the conclusion of the treaty that would take due account of and reconcile the rights, the interests and the positions of States in that regard.

94. The Polish delegation is convinced that that measure would constitute an important link in the negotiations designed to secure exclusively peaceful utilization of the sea-bed through its complete demilitarization. Our conviction stems from and is confirmed by the stipulations contained in the preamble of the draft, which states that the treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race and declare that the parties to the treaty intend to continue negotiations concerning further measures leading to that end.

95. A further important question which has attracted much attention in our discussions is the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear underground tests, item 30 of the agenda.

96. The Polish delegation believes that that question is ripe for solution on the basis of the existing means for detection and identification which are currently at the disposal of States. At this juncture, we are pleased to note draft resolution A/C.1/L.486 introduced by the representative of Sweden. We find ourselves in agreement with that draft resolution and are convinced that its approval will be a positive step towards an early suspension of all nuclear tests.

97. Progress in the implementation of the above-mentioned partial measures of disarmament would certainly enable the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva to proceed to the negotiation of other important problems referred to in the Committee's agenda of 15 August 1969.

98. Any measure which contributes to nuclear disarmament contributes at the same time to a significant expansion of international co-operation in the sphere of the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

99. The agreements leading to the cessation of the nuclear arms race that have so far been concluded, first and foremost the non-proliferation Treaty, offer the best illustration of the point in question. Obligations and rights of States in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy constitute an integral part of that Treaty.

100. The Treaty has confirmed the rights of the non-nuclear States not only to benefit from research and peaceful applications of nuclear energy, but also to participate in international exchange of facilities, material, and scientific and technological know-how in this field. The Treaty has also created opportunities for States to share fully in any benefits that can be derived from peaceful nuclear explosions carried out under agreed procedures. At the same time, the Treaty has recognized the competence and responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the field of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy relative to the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty.

101. In the period that has elapsed since the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty there have been created premises which we deem to be essential to the actual realization to those rights.

102. First, the International Atomic Energy Agency has already taken measures designed to adapt its programme of work and assistance pertaining to the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy to the requirements stemming from the non-proliferation Treaty. In its resolution GC (XIII)/RES/256 of 29 September 1969, the General Conference of the IAEA envisaged the expansion of the scope of its investment assistance to the developing countries in order to promote their capabilities in the sphere of the peaceful application of nuclear energy, primarily with regard to the power industry, and the utilization of isotopes in agriculture, industry, medicine, hydrology, geology, etc. Another resolution of the IAEA General Conference, resolution GC (XIII)/RES/258, also of 29 September 1969, has opened the way for the Vienna Agency to proceed at an early date to carry out its responsibilities in connexion with the use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, in accordance with its mandate under the non-proliferation Treaty.

103. Secondly, the nuclear-weapon States signatories of the non-proliferation Treaty have expressed readiness to expand their assistance to the developing countries in the field of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. They have decided to increase supplies of fissionable materials for the Agency, as well as of other services and materials for the non-nuclear States. At this juncture, I should like to recall the offer which the Soviet Union recently made to the IAEA regarding services in the enrichment of uranium-235.

104. Those developments represent a starting-point most conducive to implementation of further objectives and tasks in the field of the peaceful application of nuclear energy. I shall not be revealing any secrets if I state that there is still a long way to go in that regard. It would be necessary, for instance, to introduce more co-ordination into the various forms of assistance granted to the non-nuclear-weapon States, in order to remove certain striking disproportions that are still visible.

105. In the opinion of the Polish delegation, there are many ways whereby those disproportions could be removed. Some valuable suggestions in this regard can be found in the document submitted by the United Nations Development Programme on its participation in the development of nuclear technology [A/7677/Add.1]. It seems to us that assistance pertaining to training, research and industrial advisory functions in the field of isotopes and ionizing radiation, and involving, of course, the supplying of the necessary equipment and installations, will be instrumental in further expansion of the sphere of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

106. We share the views of other delegations, and support the opinions expressed in the Secretary-General's reports concerning the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2 and A/7678 and Add.1-3] that the tasks can be effectively implemented by the IAEA, which is fully equipped in that regard.

107. The possibilities of carrying out the tasks arising from the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy are closely and directly linked to the progress made in the realm of disarmament. Such steps as the reduction and, finally, the elimination of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, the release of financial and human resources now frozen and wasted away in the manufacture of ever more lethal nuclear weapons, the ridding of the international atmosphere of the rampant suspicions and egoistic ambitions that are bred by the mere existence of nuclear weapons, would create the most beneficial premises for the peaceful application of nuclear energy everywhere. This is, I dare say, one more consideration, and not the least important one, which should guide us in our efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament at the earliest possible date.

108. Mr. LEGNANI (Uruguay) (*translated from Spanish*): Before proceeding with my statement on the item under consideration, I should like to convey my delegation's warm congratulations to the delegation of the United States on the recent exploit in space by that country's astronauts. This new space voyage will increase man's scientific knowledge and its attendant benefits. It represents a triumph of unique importance for the scientists and those who played a leading role in the exploit and deserves the recognition of mankind.

109. Questions relating to disarmament have always aroused great interest among States, both large and small, but today that interest has changed into deep and anxious concern. The reasons for the change are only too well known.

110. Whereas until now international security, conditions for the present and future development of every State and, in the last analysis, peace or war between peoples, have been at stake, this final choice is not expressed in the same or similar terms today.

111. It is no longer merely a question of avoiding explosions of aggression which could produce millions of victims. Nor is it any longer simply a question of preventing uncontrolled physical violence from destroying the lives and property of large numbers of people. Nor is it simply a matter of a determined effort to ensure that changes in the behaviour patterns and way of life of society, and new adjustments in human communities are effected peacefully and gradually and not by a catastrophic unleashing of violence.

112. Today, weapons systems are so sophisticated and their range is so extraordinary that, in matters of disarmament, the choice before us is one of life or death for the human race.

113. Man's destructive capacity has increased incessantly and with breath-taking speed. The report of the Secretary-General, dated 10 October 1967, on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, states: "The enormity of the shadow which is cast over mankind by the possibility of nuclear war makes it essential that its effects be clearly and widely understood. . . . Were such weapons ever to be used in numbers, hundreds of millions of people might be killed, and civilization as we know it, as well as organized

community life, would inevitably come to an end in the countries involved in the conflict.”<sup>14</sup>

114. After recalling the terrible effects of the first two bombs used in time of war, each of which had a yield of 20 kilotons, that is to say, an explosive force equivalent to nearly 20,000 tons of conventional chemical explosive (TNT), the same report pointed out that it was necessary to build up a picture of what would happen if an attack were carried out not with kiloton nuclear weapons, but with hydrogen bombs or fusion bombs, whose yield is expressed in megatons, that is, in unit yields equivalent to one million tons of chemical explosive.

115. The views expressed in the aforementioned report concerning the danger of the use of nuclear weapons have become even more relevant today because the destructive power of nuclear weapons has been constantly increasing. Atomic explosive power estimated at several tons of TNT *per capita* of the world population has been produced.

116. In addition to the destructive power of nuclear weapons, there are the chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons for mass destruction, on which we have the valuable report entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and Effects of Their Possible Use*, prepared by the Secretariat with the assistance of qualified scientific experts, which assesses the consequences of the possible use of those weapons. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization the Secretary-General points out that chemical and biological weapons have less destructive power than nuclear weapons, but that

“...these two are weapons of mass destruction regarded with universal horror. In some respects they may be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons because they do not require the enormous expenditure of financial and scientific resources that are required for nuclear weapons. Almost all countries, including small ones and developing ones, may have access to these weapons, which can be manufactured quite cheaply, quickly and secretly in small laboratories or factories. This fact in itself makes the problem of control and inspection much more difficult.”<sup>15</sup>

117. The report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons provides, *inter alia*, the following very interesting data:

“Since the Second World War, bacteriological (biological) weapons have also become an increasing possibility. ... The greater threat posed by chemical weapons today derives from the discovery and manufacture of new, more toxic compounds. On the other hand, bacteriological (biological) agents already exist in nature and can be selected for use in warfare.”<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.68.IX.1), para. 1.

<sup>15</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 30.

<sup>16</sup> See *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24), paras. 5 and 6.

118. The report adds that during the last war, ... “amongst the new agents which had been produced and stockpiled ... were such highly lethal agents as Tabun and Sarin”, and that it would in fact be impossible to protect “soil, plants, animals and essential food crops against short- and long-term effects” of such weapons.<sup>17</sup> The report goes on to state that “the particular threat posed by chemical weapons today derives from the existence of new, and far more toxic, chemical compounds than were known 50 years ago” and that “bacteriological (biological) agents of warfare are living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them, which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked”.<sup>18</sup>

119. It should be pointed out that a conflagration in which all the war potential attained in chemical, bacteriological (biological), nuclear and radio-physical weapons was used, that is to say, the total system of conventional instruments of war, such a conflagration, I repeat, would lead to the annihilation of the human race, of all forms of animal and vegetable life, or, in other words, to the disappearance of living protoplasm from the planet, and, in the final analysis, to the disappearance of any sign of life.

120. Accordingly, the alternative today in matters of disarmament is far broader and more comprehensive than that described earlier; it is purely and simply a choice between life or death on this planet.

121. In the light of the true picture of the gigantic dimensions of the disastrous consequences of a new world conflagration, the old Roman saying “*Si vis pacem, para bellum*” has become quite meaningless and it is a matter of urgency to adopt measures that will provide security for all States in the world and enable human societies to evolve, change and be transformed on an unshakable foundation of peaceful human coexistence.

122. We agree with the view expressed by the Secretary-General in his report on the question of general and complete disarmament that “to know the true nature of the danger we face may be a most important first step towards averting it”.<sup>19</sup>

123. In fact, it is of particular importance to know and to disseminate information on the nature of the danger we are facing; the same report states that:

“...informed people the world over understandably become impatient for measures of disarmament additional to the few measures of arms limitation that have already been agreed to”.<sup>20</sup>

124. The report on chemical and bacteriological weapons states that:

“...an aroused public will demand and receive assurances that Governments are working for the earliest

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 7 and 11.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 15 and 17.

<sup>19</sup> See *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.68.IX.1), introduction, para. 4.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 94.

effective elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons”.<sup>21</sup>

125. In fact, while the knowledge of the nature and extent of the danger of a new conflagration may be a first step towards averting it, a second important step in the same direction would be to disseminate that knowledge as broadly and intensively as possible; the United Nations and Member States could help to ensure that it is made available to people throughout the world in a concise, clear and easily accessible form.

126. The common man everywhere, the man of flesh and blood, who, in accordance with his reason and his feelings, pursues the relative happiness to which he may aspire, the man who finally dies without wanting to die, the man who makes up and in the last analysis forms world public opinion, who does not want to hasten his own end, will no doubt form a force irresistibly opposed to the arms race and to war.

127. The opinion of the common man has a unique institutional value in the functioning of our international Organization and in the functioning of all Governments and all States in the world. It is natural and normal that it should be so, because national and international institutions have been set up, improved and consolidated by man to shelter, protect and serve man. The effectiveness of our decisions and recommendations depends on his opinion, even though the Organization wields no authority, and the authority of the standards regulating the domestic life of States depends upon the opinion and the concern of the common man who wishes this authority to exist.

128. Because of the determinist theories which gravitate obscurely but undeniably in the minds of men, because of a periodic illusion eternally repeated throughout human history, which presents power itself as the best way of attaining security, we have seen the virtues of power extolled yet once again and have witnessed the praise and admiration lavished on the stockpiling of weapons, the constant improvement of weapons and the extraordinary and insuperable deterrent power of weapons which results from their immense destructive capacity.

129. The weakening of the unity of power, organized by the Charter principally in a political rather than an entirely legal form, as would have been fitting, has brought about the return to a balance of power which, in the present circumstances, according to the current and apt expression, is a “balance of terror” dominating the entire international scene.

130. The time has come for all Governments of all States, in accordance with the appeal by Albert Einstein in 1955, to understand and publicly acknowledge that a world war cannot serve their purposes.

131. Doubtless, it will not be easy to undo what has been done or to change course in order to achieve security. Nevertheless, our delegation believes that however difficult,

complex or arduous the problems to be solved and the obstacles to be overcome, the joint efforts of the United Nations and the Governments of all States, directed towards the final objective of general and complete disarmament, will achieve gradual success, so that collective security will be strengthened and the danger of a war of extermination allayed.

132. Our delegation welcomes as a particularly auspicious event for the security and peace of the world the fact that at the same time as questions relating to disarmament are being debated in the United Nations, direct negotiations on the same subject have been started and are being carried out at Helsinki between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. This means that there is a continuing desire for an understanding which will facilitate the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the exercise of the responsibility devolving on all Member States in the fulfilment of one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations, namely, the maintenance of international peace and security.

133. Uruguay, which has no military power and is essentially pacifist, contributes to this debate its love of peace and justice, its unshakable faith in law and its decision to contribute to the efforts of those States which are inspired by a noble desire to contain force within the limits of the law.

134. On 28 April 1968, the Government of Uruguay signed the Agreement on the Rescue and Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Earlier, on 27 January 1967, it had signed the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Furthermore, my delegation will support all measures which will render international co-operation effective for the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

135. Uruguay signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America on 14 February 1967 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 July 1968, and will support every effort to reach a universal agreement on general and complete disarmament, a position which is based on the doctrine it has consistently maintained, namely, that the international community must be governed solely and exclusively by the rule of law.

136. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was signed by Uruguay on 5 August 1963 in Moscow, and my Government will support any measure which will lead to the suspension of underground tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

137. The delegation of Uruguay also supported the four parts of the General Assembly resolution relating to the work of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (General Assembly resolution 2456 (XXIII), A, B, C and D). It is interesting to recall that in one part of this resolution the General Assembly reiterated the recommendation of the Conference concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the appeal for full

<sup>21</sup> See *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24), para. 377.



compliance by the nuclear-weapon Powers with General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII), in which the Assembly had invited those Powers to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco; in the part C of the resolution the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the possible establishment, within the framework of IAEA, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; in the part D of the resolution the General Assembly urged the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles.

138. My delegation would like to refer briefly to one of the measures resulting from the efforts of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1969, to prevent the arms race from spreading to the sea-bed and the ocean floor. With regard to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/7741-DC/232,<sup>22</sup> annex A], my delegation feels it is appropriate to draw attention to the following: first, the generally accepted principle of the peaceful use of this area should lead naturally to the complete disarmament of the sea-bed and the ocean floor; second, article I, paragraph 1, of the draft treaty prohibits only the use of weapons of mass destruction “beyond the maximum contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone”, which obviously implies implicit authorization of the use of other weapons beyond the zone indicated, so long as they do not cause mass destruction; third, the draft treaty does not specify which other weapons, apart from nuclear weapons, cause mass destruction; fourth, the effectiveness of the prohibition established remains, in practice, within the discretion of the States possessing nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, because those States which do not possess them are not in a position to ascertain whether the weapons or objects used or emplaced by other States beyond the prohibited zone are authorized weapons or not; fifth, it is not clear from article III how and in what way States Parties will exercise the right to verify the activities of other States Parties when doubts arise concerning the fulfilment of the obligations assumed “without interfering with such activities”; sixth, the draft treaty does not seem to represent a very decisive step “towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race”, as stated in the third paragraph of the preamble. In fact, in the area indicated in article I, paragraph 1, “the States Parties . . . undertake not to implant or emplace on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof . . . any objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction”. However, in conformity with article I, paragraph 2, the coastal State may emplace in the contiguous zone objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, when exercising the authorization to implant weapons of mass destruction, the coastal State would not be committing actions prohibited under article I, paragraph 3, and could have recourse to assistance

and aid from any other State in effecting that emplacement. In addition, non-nuclear weapons or other weapons which are not weapons of mass destruction may be emplaced on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond national jurisdiction, which in accordance with generally accepted opinion represent the common heritage of mankind.

139. This draft, therefore, is a limited and modest step towards disarmament.

140. My delegation, which would be happy to support a treaty that would bring about complete disarmament on the sea-bed and ocean floor, will support any measure, however modest, that would lead to disarmament, and we have made the foregoing comments in a constructive spirit, in the belief that amendments could be made to the draft which would improve it considerably, in line with our common purposes.

141. With regard to the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare, it should be acknowledged that praiseworthy efforts have been made which call for our sincere gratitude.

142. The draft declaration by the General Assembly submitted by 12 States [ENDC/265, *ibid.*, annex C, section 30], after a clear and precise beginning, condemns and declares as contrary to international law the use in international conflicts of any chemical or biological agents, and lucidly reflects the reaction of the human conscience to the possible use of such weapons.

143. Furthermore, this Committee has before it a well-thought out draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in document ENDC/255/Rev.1 [*ibid.*, section 20] by the United Kingdom delegation at the 43rd meeting and the informative statement made in this Committee by the United Kingdom representative, Lord Chalfont, at the 1694th meeting, the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, which contains excellent provisions, submitted at the 1693rd meeting by the Polish delegation on behalf of nine countries [A/7655], and the very useful working paper [A/C.1/L.491], submitted by the Canadian delegation.

144. The measures proposed will no doubt make it possible to achieve the best solutions. Accordingly, it is necessary to create an effective system or mechanism which will make it possible to verify the effective fulfilment of the commitments entered into to prevent the use of chemical and biological weapons.

145. We feel that the proposals made should be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament so that it may examine them during its future work, as has been announced.

146. The prohibitions and limitations which are being sought and which we are all anxious should be worked out with regard to nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and chemical and bacteriological weapons,

<sup>22</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.



should be extended to all types of conventional weapons, because while we appreciate the primary and fundamental concern to avoid a military explosion which would devastate the earth and while we also appreciate the noble concern to humanize war, what we really want is to avoid armed conflicts.

147. Patiently and laboriously, by easing tension, overcoming suspicion, reconciling views, and compromising on matters of self-interest, we can work out arrangements and commitments which will establish the aforementioned limitations and prohibitions and will have the undeniable virtue of bringing relative calm to the world.

148. However, we maintain that this calm, which we certainly do not disdain, although we deem it insufficient, would always be an armed calm, less dangerously armed but armed none the less; a calm with sentinels, an unstable calm, or with a balance which could be broken by the appearance of any disturbing factor.

149. The international community, States, and individuals need security, which is the absence of danger, rather than calm, which is the absence of violence. To that end, we should replace the political organization of power, enshrined in the Charter, by the legal organization of the international community.

150. True security lies in legal security, which derives from the protection of the law, not the coercion of force. That point has been lucidly illustrated in the brilliant lectures given by an eminent teacher from my country, Dr. Alberto Domínguez Cárpora, and has been consistently maintained in the Faculty of International Law and in the foreign policy of Uruguay.

151. Collective security will be achieved by the effective and permanent guarantee of the rule of law, and by the submission of all international conflicts to legal methods of peaceful settlement and, in the last resort, and on a compulsory basis, to an international court of justice, without differentiating between legal and political disputes.

152. Mankind has never before had greater opportunities or surer ways of strengthening collective peace and security. The same formidable weapons of mass destruction which man has developed may become formidable tools for the mass production of goods and services and, consequently, promote collective well-being on a scale never before imagined by man. That is the prospect which emerges from the reports submitted to the General Assembly by the Secretary-General concerning the contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries [A/7568] and the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, held in Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968 [A/7677, Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2].

153. The multiple creative and constructive use of nuclear energy, the use of recent discoveries and the new tools of modern science and technology would be an incentive for the production of food and electrical energy, would help to improve basic and other industries, would improve health conditions in general, and would make it possible to build public works of all kinds and ensure the maximum exploitation of natural resources.

154. Economic and social development would become a reality; social justice would become a fact and the realization of the potential abilities and opportunities of human beings would be facilitated, thus creating an environment in which peaceful human coexistence could develop.

155. In the opinion of my delegation, general and complete disarmament, the rule of law and economic and social development constitute an unshakable foundation for peace and security among peoples.

156. Mr. MUGO (Kenya): Once again this Committee is engaged in the discussion of one of the very important items on its agenda, and perhaps the most important. I say the most important because all the development man has so far achieved after long years of hard toil, and whatever achievements he will make in days to come, can be eclipsed within a matter of hours if he fails to institute effective control and eventual elimination of the weapons of destruction now in possession of some Powers. The importance of the question of disarmament therefore need not be emphasized.

157. Coming to the substance of the matter, my delegation would like at the outset to express its appreciation concerning the bilateral talks which have opened in Helsinki between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States on the limitation of strategic arms. The whole world has looked forward to these talks for some time now. The initiative which the two super-Powers has taken is therefore very commendable. It is the hope of my delegation that the conclusion of these talks will contribute immensely to our cherished goal of disarmament.

158. My delegation also welcomed the ratification of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water by the Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Indeed, this ratification by the two super-Powers is yet another encouraging gesture in the work of this Committee. My delegation hopes that this move by the two Governments will pave the way for further signatures and ratifications so that the Treaty can come into force in the not too distant future.

159. One of the items in this debate is the question of chemical and biological weapons. We have the report of the group of experts who were appointed by the Secretary-General elaborating on the effects of the possible use of these weapons.<sup>23</sup> This report is a reflection of the hard work and competence with which the group of experts discharged their assignment in this highly complex subject. From the information provided we are left in no doubt that these weapons are weapons of mass destruction and that their effects are not confined to both space and time. The possible use of these weapons therefore spells extinction of the whole of mankind. The extreme danger posed by these weapons becomes even more pronounced when we realize that many countries possess the necessary potential and expertise to produce them.

<sup>23</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

160. The banning of the production, stockpiling and use of these weapons therefore becomes even more urgent. It is within this context that my delegation welcomes the statement made by President Nixon on 25 November 1969, renouncing the first use of chemical weapons, also lethal biological agents and weapons and all other methods of biological warfare. It is the hope of my delegation that more and more States will renounce these weapons.

161. We would urge the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to work out a comprehensive treaty banning the development, production and stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons to supplement the Geneva Protocol of 1925,<sup>24</sup> taking into consideration the contents of the draft conventions which have been presented to this Committee by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other socialist countries [A/7655] on the one hand and the United Kingdom [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 20]<sup>25</sup> on the other.

162. I should like now to turn to the question of suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. My delegation holds the view that without these nuclear tests it would be impossible to develop and perfect nuclear weapons. The banning of nuclear tests is therefore a major step towards disarmament. It is in this spirit that the Government of Kenya welcomed and signed the partial test ban Treaty of 1963, which banned testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. That Treaty, however, did not cover all environments and testing of nuclear weapons continues underground. The explosion of these nuclear devices produces radioactive fallout products which have been known to cause such hazards as an increase in infant mortality. The need for an early comprehensive test-ban treaty therefore need not be emphasized.

163. Some delegations have contended in this Committee that our present knowledge in seismology is not sufficiently advanced to warrant the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. One wonders whether this kind of reasoning is conducive to an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation holds the view that the delay in bringing about a comprehensive test-ban has been occasioned not by inadequacy of our seismic knowledge, but rather by the mistrust prevailing among the nuclear Powers. In this connexion my delegation supports the creation of a world-wide exchange of seismological data, which in our view would create the necessary confidence and atmosphere to facilitate the early realization of a comprehensive test-ban Treaty. Our compliments go particularly to the delegations of Sweden and Canada which, among others, have made very valuable contributions in this sphere. Let me reiterate the stand of my delegation that nuclear and thermonuclear tests should be urgently stopped in all environments and that the time for this action is now.

164. I should like to turn briefly to the draft treaty jointly presented by the Governments of the United States and the

Soviet Union on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*ibid.*, annex A]. While we welcome this treaty as a step in the right direction, my delegation is, however, puzzled that the authors of the treaty did not consider it appropriate to widen it to ban emplacement of these weapons in the whole area of the sea-bed and the ocean floor to include that area within national jurisdiction. This omission does not augur well for our work in disarmament and we would urge the authors of the treaty to consider making it more comprehensive. Other delegations have made other suggestions for improvement of this draft treaty, especially on the article dealing with verification and inspection. These suggestions should also be taken into account as they would undoubtedly assist in the disarmament work in this new area.

165. Turning now to the question of implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which mainly dealt with matters of international security and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we must express our dissatisfaction at the reports which have been issued on this subject. Most of those reports reveal that the international bodies and agencies which had been asked to submit reports concentrated on facts as they are today and made hardly any attempt to explore how the decisions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States could be implemented. My delegation would therefore urge that further efforts be made to explore in greater depth ways and means of implementing the results of the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

166. We should like to make a particular reference to the contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries. We are aware that nuclear technology can greatly help to boost the agricultural and other industries of the developing countries. Nuclear technology, however, has so far been by and large a monopoly of a small number of developed countries. My delegation would therefore support the early setting up of an appropriate machinery to ensure the transfer of benefits of nuclear technology to the developing countries.

167. In our intervention in this Committee at the 1611th meeting of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, we referred to the wastage of valuable resources which are being used for armaments while the gap between the developed and the developing countries continues to widen. We also stated that even in these developed countries which are spending fantastic amounts on these armaments, pockets of poverty can be seen here and there. As we start the Second United Nations Development Decade, my delegation hopes that the rich countries which are allocating substantial amounts of their resources to armaments will consider seriously channelling these resources to peaceful uses and particularly to the assistance of the poor, developing countries. In this connexion, I should like to end my intervention by supporting the proposal made by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report that the Members of the United Nations should decide to dedicate the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

<sup>25</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232.

<sup>26</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, paras. 42-46.

168. Mr. SHARIF (Indonesia): Before I proceed, may I be permitted to congratulate the delegation of the United States of America on the magnificent achievements of the three astronauts who two weeks ago completed man's second survey on the surface of the moon.

169. My delegation would like to join the Secretary-General, the Chairman of our Committee and all previous speakers in expressing its sincere hope for a successful conclusion of the strategic arms limitation talks in Helsinki between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

170. In its intervention last year on the item under discussion today, my delegation strongly urged that:

“... bilateral talks between the two super-Powers ... be undertaken promptly, as we are of the opinion that any real progress towards nuclear disarmament”—and any aspect of disarmament for that matter—“will depend on how far”—these two major Powers—“are willing to adjust their national interests to correspond with the interests of the whole world and with mankind's universal desire for peace.” [1628th meeting, para. 87.]

171. With the talks in Helsinki now in their third week, I hope that some real progress will be achieved and that, even without too much publicity, serious efforts are being made towards greater trust between the two major Powers so as to enable the whole of mankind to concentrate more on the betterment of the economic and social conditions of all peoples in our planet today. We realize the tremendous obstacles and the intricate problems involved, but we are reassured for the present political climate, when the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Yakov Malik, introducing the item on the strengthening of international security on 10 October, said among other things that “the sombre days of the ‘cold war’ are now a thing of the past” and that “confrontation should give way to negotiation”. [1652nd meeting, para. 25.]

172. In fact, the question is not so much of disarmament itself, but rather of how to diminish and if possible to dissipate the distrust and suspicion that bedevil the two opposing parties. As much as they think, however, of the importance of their own interests, my delegation believes that it is also incumbent upon them to consider the presence of others in this world, not aligned to any of their political groupings. A future nuclear war would never be a limited war, and a global war will bring mankind total annihilation, as, in view of the destructive power of present-day nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, the survival of a victor-party is totally excluded. It is the survival of mankind that is at stake.

173. The first question before us is general and complete disarmament. Also covering nuclear disarmament, it is a question related closely not only to the survival of mankind, but equally to peaceful relations among nations and the security of the nations themselves. Conscious of our responsibilities under the Charter for “regulation of armaments” and the consolidation of peace, the question of disarmament has been on our agenda ever since the establishment of our Organization in 1945.

174. Thanks to the great attention of world leaders and the growing understanding of the urgency for the need of a solution, and in the face of mounting political tension and the progress of nuclear science and technology, on the proposal of the then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, the problem of mere “disarmament” was elevated for discussion in the historic fifteenth session of the Assembly in 1960 to “general and complete disarmament”.

175. During the discussions that followed, which resulted in a deep understanding of this fundamental problem on whose solution, in fact, the preservation of the peace and security of nations depends, what is now known as our goal emerged: general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

176. From session to session we have adopted resolutions stressing the importance and urgency of an early agreement on disarmament in general, or on collateral measures which may lead to such general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Facing political and other difficulties during the negotiations, we have changed our machinery quite a number of times. We have had disarmament commissions consisting of a different number of members, including one consisting of the Assembly as a whole. We have had a negotiating Committee, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, established by the two major Powers and endorsed by our Assembly by resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961. We are now told that the membership of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has been expanded to twenty-six countries and that it has assumed the new name of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

177. We listened carefully to the statement of the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, who, on 18 November, as a member of the former Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, directed the attention of this Committee to the incorrect and misleading statement in paragraph 10 of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232]<sup>27</sup> on the question of the enlargement of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. My delegation associates itself with the delegation of Mexico and many other delegations that have expressed their reservations with regard to the procedures that led to that transformation.

178. As long ago as 1966, when evaluating the achievements of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament during its five years of existence, my delegation expressed the hope that the membership of the Committee would be rotated among the Members of the Organization, on a regular elective basis for a fixed term, as was done in the case of the principal organs of the Organization, as such elected members might well improve the democratic character of the Committee and new members might bring also a new atmosphere and new ideas for discussion.

179. On the expansion of the membership of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, my Foreign Minis-

<sup>27</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

ter in his statement before the plenary meeting on 1 October stated *inter alia*:

"In 1960, my Government welcomed the establishment of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee as a result of the two-Power agreement in Geneva, and now welcomes the increase of membership in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament from eighteen to twenty-six members. Although the General Assembly has not yet been concerned with the election of the members of the Committee, it is our hope that the increased membership will be of help in achieving more positive results.

"We are happy to note the substantial increase of non-aligned nations represented in this Committee. We hope that, as suggested, the membership of the Committee will rotate on an elective basis in accordance with the representative character of all major United Nations organs." [1774th plenary meeting, paras. 121 and 122.]

180. Our position has not changed and we will continue efforts to achieve our goal.

181. Concerning progress of the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation has noted with appreciation that attached to the report of the Committee in document A/7741-DC/232 are the proposals and working papers on the several subjects at issue. As a non-member, both of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and of the new Committee on Disarmament, my delegation would like to congratulate the new members and express its gratitude to all the members of the Committee for having devoted their time and energy to finding a solution to each of the individual subjects. We have not achieved spectacular results as yet, but God willing, with renewed efforts and the assistance of eight new members, we hope to see more results reflected in the Committee's report to the twenty-fifth session of the Assembly, next year.

182. On the provisional agenda in paragraph 14, we have noted the enumeration or mere listing of the four most important subjects during the period under review: first, cessation of nuclear arms-race and nuclear disarmament; second, non-nuclear measures; third, other collateral measures; fourth, general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. We fail to see a more directed comprehensive agenda of essential subjects and principles, as an over-all programme directed towards our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

183. In the report itself, my delegation had hoped to find more information on the progress of the discussions on the issues, in particular on the eight agreed principles of the United States-Soviet joint statement; that, *inter alia*, is also requested by United Nations resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961. Having stressed in our statements each year before this Committee the need for discussions on conventional weapons, my delegation regrets further that the present report does not make mention of any discussion on that important item.

184. I hope that, as my delegation stated during the debate on the strengthening of international security, the

new Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will also find time to discuss this question, which is of direct importance for the preservation of the sovereignty and national integrity of all developing, newly independent nations and decisive for the political and economic stabilization of those countries. I shall come back to this issue later.

185. On the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, my delegation is grateful that, as reported in paragraph 21, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament devoted considerable attention to the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. We also have studied the working paper of the Swedish delegation [*ibid.*, annex C, section 6] and the further recommendations concerning the verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty submitted by Nigeria [*ibid.*, section 9]. Like the British proposal on the phasing out of nuclear testing<sup>28</sup> and the Japanese proposal to prohibit underground tests above magnitude 4.75 on the seismic scale [see 1697th meeting] as a provisional measure which would be progressively lowered as detection methods improve, they all need our closest attention as they are aimed at an early acceptance of the principle of the total test ban. My delegation has found the same spirit also in the draft resolution on the exchange of seismic data [A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3] and hopes that progress in seismology detection and identification may reach the point where confidence would be established that the faithful observance of a comprehensive test ban treaty could be verifiable.

186. On the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor, my delegation has had occasion to emphasize before this Committee the importance of the seas surrounding the islands in an archipelago, like my country and others, not only as part and parcel of the national life and a God-given source of living for the people of those islands, but for the security of the entire nation as well.

187. Indonesia attaches great importance to the demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor. We have been able to study the development and changes from the original Soviet draft of 18 March [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 4] until it has become, as we know today, the joint USSR-United States draft of 7 October 1969 on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*ibid.*, section 34], presented as annex A in document A/7741-DC/232.

188. We welcome the idea. On the draft articles, however, my delegation would like to state that my country is not a party to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.<sup>29</sup> For that reason, we should like to put our reservations on record on any provision of that draft which refers to the 1958 Convention mentioned earlier. We endorsed, fully and whole-heartedly, the unique position of an archipelago State in regard to the adjacent waters surrounding the component islands, which was

<sup>28</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/231, annex I, section 8.

<sup>29</sup> Signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958. (See United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477.)



elaborated so ably by Mr. Laurel of the Philippines at the 1702nd meeting on 27 November.

189. Although we agree in principle with the idea of non-emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction, it should not encroach upon our national territorial jurisdiction, whether directly or indirectly. A further study is no doubt needed, and we also agree with the various delegations who stated that the matter should be considered again at the next regular session.

190. As an important subitem my delegation is pleased to see that the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons is now being dealt with extensively by this Committee in recognition of the threat which chemical and bacteriological warfare poses to mankind. Chemical and bacteriological agents of warfare represent indeed a particularly inhuman variety of weapons of mass destruction. Their use has therefore been prohibited as a crime against humanity and a gross violation of the generally recognized rules of international law.

191. We are grateful to the Secretary-General, who, acting under resolution 2454 (XXIII), has made it possible to pool the knowledge of the best available experts in his comprehensive report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.<sup>30</sup> We are equally indebted to Ambassador Kulaga of Poland for his detailed statement and further elaboration on this report. [1693rd meeting.]

192. My delegation agrees with him fully that that report will make public opinion aware of the dangers involved in these weapons, and should therefore be publicized in as many languages as is considered desirable and practicable. Its contents should be disseminated through various media of information and communication so as to reach as many people as possible.

193. Furthermore, we agree that a convention on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should include not only the prohibition of the use of such chemical and bacteriological weapons, but also—and this is more important—the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling or acquiring by other means of chemical and bacteriological weapons. My delegation is pleased to note in article 2 of that draft that, as proposed by the Soviet Union and eight other socialist countries in document A/7655, present existing stocks of chemical and bacteriological weapons would, with the necessary precautions and within a fixed period of time, be destroyed or diverted to peaceful uses.

194. However, my delegation would like to see further provisions included on an effective international verifying machinery, or control procedures and measures, or even sanctions to prevent possible further use, production, development and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

195. Efforts to that end are made in articles III to V of the British draft in document ENDC/255/Rev.1 [*ibid.*,

section 20]. My delegation believes that with more good will and less suspicion, the forthcoming sessions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament could work out some compromise and produce a joint draft which would include the maximum guarantees for all mankind against the use of chemical and bacteriological agents in warfare.

196. On the question of nuclear-free zones, my delegation would like to congratulate the delegation of Mexico and other Latin-American countries parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, on their establishment of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL).

197. Although at present the Treaty is effective in fourteen of the twenty-two signatory States, that organization will ultimately secure an area of more than 20 million square kilometres and its 260 million human beings from the danger of becoming a target of possible nuclear attack, while avoiding the wastage of their resources, indispensable to the economic and social development of their peoples, on the production of nuclear weapons.

198. That example of our Latin American brethren deserves high praise and admiration. The difficult situation in which we find ourselves in our part of the world will easily be understood, when at this time no adequate safeguards can be obtained from a State, not a member of our Organization, which is in possession of nuclear arms and hostile to most of its neighbours.

199. On the three subitems of the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States my delegation would like to recall the two main aims of that Conference; namely, to find international security guarantees as a result of the nuclear arms race, and adequate methods to realize the potential of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

200. We have tried to suggest measures to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, since, in our opinion, Security Council resolution 255 (1968) does not in fact provide for the needed security guarantees. Safety from nuclear attack can only be effectively guaranteed by stopping altogether the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and by destroying the existing stockpiles.

201. We should, further, concentrate more on programmes of co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in particular those relating to the economic and scientific advancement of developing countries. Many of those activities are no doubt within the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and we should therefore continue to improve the existing machinery and find remedies for its deficiencies so that it is of benefit to all its members—the developed and the developing nations alike. Proposals to amend the Statute and increase the membership of the Board of Governors are already under study, but nothing has been done as yet to increase the funds for its technical assistance programmes.

202. The representative of Yugoslavia has already pointed out, at the 1694th meeting, the insufficiency of funds for the implementation of even the modest projects already ne-

<sup>30</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).



gotiated, and has stated further that the IAEA programme of technical assistance in the past ten years has not even exceeded the sum of \$1.3 million annually, covering barely one quarter of the requests. Those requests have come, naturally, mostly from developing nations, but we know that they are not entirely dependent upon grants or gifts from the developed nations, as the raw material for fissionable material, plutonium 239 and uranium 233, is found in many developing countries. If exploited and complemented by the technical skill and finances of the developed nations, these natural resources will bring wealth and benefit to both developing and developed nations. We hope to see in the not too distant future more joint efforts in that field.

203. Finally, I should like to call the attention of this Committee to the question of conventional weapons.

204. It is the considered view of my delegation that that question is, in the light of present political developments, second only to nuclear disarmament as the most important question for the newly independent developing countries to which my country and almost two thirds of the membership of this Organization belong.

205. We have often noted rebellions and unrest within these newly independent nations, most of which have pledged themselves to a foreign policy of non-alignment. Some have even been the victims of aggression from outside. In fact, no nation at this stage of world political developments could permit itself to remain unarmed and defenceless. Weapons are needed to maintain law and order and to preserve the national integrity or internal security which is the prerequisite for a stable political situation and economic development of the country. In view of political developments on the international scene, each country should also have arms in order to defend itself against aggression from outside. Experiences of the Second World War, the suppression of freedom-fighters for independence in colonized territories, espionage and intervention in the internal affairs of other States have taught us that many forces still exist in this world of today whose aim is to dominate other nations and peoples for their own economic and other interests.

206. It is true that nations should not live on the basis of suspicion, as in the words of the Charter they should: "...develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;". However, when peace seems to be possible only on the basis of strength, we must base our policy on realities.

207. In order to preserve and defend the nation's independence, the people are ready to sacrifice. They have in fact gone through tremendous sufferings and hardships. Independence brings with it also many responsibilities, including self-government, but first and foremost the responsibility to defend the hard-won independence. When, as in my country, even under the colonial régime the colonial Government was not in a position to defend the territory by itself, and when it was overpowered by other foreign intruders, the colonized people realize only too well that after independence the entire question of the security and defence of the nation is in their own hands.

208. Newly developing nations have, generally speaking, no weapon industry of their own. However important, they need first and foremost the development of their natural resources and of those industries which will assist the economic uplift of their standard of living.

209. Thus, they will depend for their arms for many years to come on imports from outside, for which they are compelled to use a large portion of their meagre foreign exchange earnings. Further, we are familiar with practices by which, to meet the difficulties in payments, grants, easy payments, credits and other facilities are extended in exchange for a regular supply of armaments which are so vitally needed for their very existence.

210. The weapon trade is indeed an important part of world trade and in the case of the developing nations it still consumes an important portion of their foreign exchange earnings. My delegation would like to associate itself with the statements made by Ambassador Ronan of Ireland [1696th meeting] and Ambassador Scott of New Zealand [1701st meeting] who have expressed their concern at the massive increase over recent years in the trade in conventional arms as reported by the survey *World Military Expenditures 1966-1967*,<sup>31</sup> published by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and publications of the Institute of Strategic Studies and in the *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968-1969*<sup>32</sup> issued by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. A regulation on the trade in conventional arms for the maintenance of the security and integrity of a nation may well assist the newly developing nations in the utilization of their resources for their economic development. The present position of newly independent nations should not be misused by the weapon-producing countries, so that, for the sake of a regular supply of weapons to maintain law and order for the purpose of accelerating their economic development, they need not abandon their policy of non-alignment.

211. As has been stated by many speakers before me, there is no doubt that the huge sums allocated to military expenditures amounting to the astronomical figure of \$200,000 million each year would be of more benefit to mankind if they were used to finance the countless development projects in all parts of the world. Numerous discussions have been held and resolutions adopted with a view to directing the use of the funds, which would be released through essential reductions in military expenditures, for the financing of the economic co-operation and technical assistance programmes in the developing nations. It is to be regretted, however, that none of those funds has been obtained.

212. We may have better success within the context of the forthcoming Disarmament Decade, which we agree is to coincide with our Second United Nations Development Decade. Renewed efforts should therefore be jointly planned. As a start, my delegation is reminded of the item entitled "One Day of War for Peace" which is already on our agenda. The delegation of Cambodia deserves our

<sup>31</sup> Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.

<sup>32</sup> Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell; New York, Humanities Press; London, Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd.

respect and gratitude for its thoughtfulness in inscribing that item on our agenda this year, and to the delegations of Madagascar, Rwanda, Senegal, Mauritius, Niger and Congo (Brazzaville) we are equally indebted for initiating the resolution which was adopted by an overwhelming majority by the Second Committee the day before yesterday.

213. From the preceding, it is clear that the question of conventional weapons is a complex and highly delicate but urgent question. It is essential that we find an early solution to the question of a regular supply of conventional weapons to newly independent nations to defend their sovereignty and national integrity against rebellions from inside and aggression from outside, and thus assist them in achieving political and economic stabilization in their countries. The Charter requires such "regulation of armaments" under Articles 11, 26 and 47. We fully recognize that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva is already facing a workload of considerable proportions, but we hope that it will not fail to give first priority attention to this problem, presented by the rapid acceleration of the conventional arms race.

214. Permit me in conclusion to comment on the status of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. When present world developments make it necessary for our Organization to assign such widely ranging responsibilities of the utmost importance to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, elevation of the status of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament from its present status to that of a Disarmament Council as a principal organ in the context of Article 7 of the Charter is, in the considered view of my delegation, fully justified. With the present number of twenty-six members, which seems to be generally agreeable to most if not all of us, a change of membership from among the Members of the Organization on an elective rotating basis for a fixed term, as in other principal organs, might well improve the democratic representative character of the Council, while new Members might also bring a new atmosphere and new ideas for discussion.

215. Those are our general observations on the several subitems of the question of disarmament on which we will base our position in considering the specific proposals contained in the draft resolutions which have been or may be presented on this item.

216. The CHAIRMAN: There are only two more speakers on my list to conclude the debate on the various items on disarmament. I do hope, therefore, that the Committee will agree that we shall continue in order to avoid returning for another meeting tonight. Since I hear no objection, I shall call on the next speaker, the representative of Venezuela.

217. Mr. AGUILAR (Venezuela) (*translated from Spanish*): The participation of a large number of Member States in the debates on the strengthening of international security and on the various items relating to disarmament is unequivocal proof not only of the far-reaching importance of those questions but also of the genuine interest of all States, large, medium and small, and their manifests will contribute to the consideration and solution of problems which affect them all equally. It is generally felt that these debates have been on a high level and that the many

statements made, far from obscuring the problems or complicating their solution, have served to reveal areas of agreement and roads which may be very promising.

218. In the view of my delegation, all these considerations must lead us to the conclusion that these major questions should be discussed in the competent United Nations organs and that each year in the General Assembly and specifically in this First Committee there should be as complete a review as possible of what has been done or left undone during the year on those subjects.

219. With his customary perception, the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Araújo Castro, has said that it is encouraging to see how the First Committee is dealing with political and security problems this year.

220. Disarmament, which is closely linked to international security and development, cannot and must not be a subject reserved for the exclusive competence of the super-Powers or a small group of countries selected at their discretion. The entire international community can and wishes to contribute to these efforts and must be given an opportunity to express its views and to participate in the consideration of those problems.

221. The experience of these first twenty-four years of the United Nations shows that very limited results have been achieved through organs made up of a very limited number of States or through bilateral discussions or negotiations between the two super-Powers. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963, is an important step, but a limited one, for it does not provide for the destruction or reduction of nuclear weapons arsenals and leaves open the possibility of underground testing. Since in addition it does not cover all the States with nuclear capacity its benefits are still somewhat limited. As its name indicates, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed in Mexico on 14 February 1967, is not intended to eliminate weapons of that kind, since they do not exist in the area, but to prohibit completely the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapon, as well as the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of these weapons.

222. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed on 1 July 1968, not only consecrates a division of the world into States possessing these weapons, which are few in number today—and States that do not possess them—which constitute the vast majority—but is intended solely to prevent the latter from acquiring nuclear weapons.

223. Other treaties, such as the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed on 27 January 1967, also have a limited objective and do not involve the destruction or reduction of nuclear or conventional weapons. The same may be said of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the

ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/7741-DC/232,<sup>33</sup> annex A].

224. The latter instruments prevent, or claim to prevent, the installation or use of nuclear weapons within the confines of the earth, in the marine depth or in outer space, but the greater danger of the existence of these weapons in the populated areas of the earth and in the sea remains. Furthermore, the arsenals of the atomic Powers are growing at an accelerated rate, with increasingly effective weapons.

225. The situation, as described in a recent publication of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,<sup>34</sup> could not be more discouraging or disquieting. According to this publication, military expenditure in the world has grown rapidly since 1965. It increased by 10 per cent in 1966 and 1967 and probably by 6 per cent in 1968, so that world expenditure for military purposes is almost 30 per cent higher than three years ago. The description this publication gives of the nuclear and conventional arms race, is terrifying.

226. The Secretary-General was therefore quite right in recommending that the next decade should also be a Disarmament Decade. We are pleased to have sponsored, with the delegations of Brazil, Chile and the United Arab Republic, the amendment to the draft resolution on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Organization, which contained that idea.

227. Since that amendment was adopted almost unanimously, next year the United Nations will initiate the Disarmament Decade, in conjunction with the Second United Nations Development Decade, thus demonstrating its will to make a major effort in those two vital areas, which are so closely linked.

228. As the Secretary-General proposes, in the introduction to his annual report, during this Decade we must make:

“... a concerted and concentrated effort ... to limit and reduce nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, to reduce conventional weapons and to deal with all the related problems of disarmament and security ...”<sup>35</sup>

229. A strategy is required for this Decade too. We need, to be sure, skill or ingenuity to address ourselves to so complex a task. The final goal, the ideal, must, of course, be general and complete disarmament, but a realistic assessment of the present situation gives no grounds for hope that this goal is close at hand. We believe, therefore, that without losing sight of this supreme objective we can and must proceed by stages. To reject or underestimate the efforts which have been made to avoid the use of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in specific geographic areas or spaces, within or beyond the confines of the earth, or all the efforts that are being made to

prohibit the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, for example, and to insist that we should take up, once and for all, the problem of general and complete disarmament would not be a realistic and constructive attitude. What we must stress—and this is what I did at the beginning of my statement—is that those steps, while important and positive, are not, strictly speaking, disarmament measures and that those limited agreements cannot be considered as anything more than stages in a process which must lead, sooner or later, to the renunciation by all States of the use of force and to general and complete disarmament.

230. All Member States must participate in formulating the strategy for this Disarmament Decade. We know that, for reasons of efficiency, it is advisable to assign the task of analysing all aspects of the highly complex questions raised by disarmament and the preparation of studies and draft treaties to committees with a limited membership, but we believe that this practical requirement can be combined with the advisability of establishing appropriate machinery so that all interested States may, if they so desire, contribute to this work, which is of general interest. It is worth while considering the idea that has already been mentioned by some delegations during the debate of establishing a category of observers to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It is the general practice in the United Nations that all Member States which do not belong to one of its organs, functional commissions or committees may be represented in those bodies by observers having the right to speak, and this practice has proved its worth.

231. It would also be desirable to revise the procedures used for the enlargement of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which is now called the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. First of all, we must say that we have no objection to the old and new members of that Committee. We believe that all can make, or have already made, a technical or political contribution. We shall not undertake an analysis of the legality or the juridical validity of this procedure. Other speakers have already examined this aspect in detail. Moreover, the very fact that the procedure used gives rise to juridical doubts is a negative factor which might well be avoided in the future. However, it is clear that the remarks made by not a few Member States essentially reflected a well justified dissatisfaction with the system of election, which is closer to that for joining a fraternity or an exclusive club, than that for joining a committee clearly linked to the United Nations system. It has rightly been said that the enlargement of this Committee responds more to political criteria than to the goal of achieving an equitable geographic distribution, in view of the increased membership of the United Nations.

232. Another idea which would be worth studying is that of convening the Disarmament Commission at appropriate intervals in order to consider the results achieved by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and to review goals and working procedures.

233. As early as 1958, the General Assembly, by its resolution 1252 D (XXIII), decided that the Disarmament Commission should, for 1959 and on an *ad hoc* basis, be composed of all the Members of the United Nations.

<sup>33</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232.

<sup>34</sup> *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968-1969* (Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell; New York, Humanities Press; London, Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd.).

<sup>35</sup> See *General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 43.

However, by resolution 1403 (XIV) of November 1959, it decided that the Commission should continue to be composed of all Members of the United Nations. Thus, the General Assembly considered it appropriate that all Members of the United Nations should participate in the debates on disarmament.

234. With regard to priorities, my delegation believes that while the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction undoubtedly deserves the highest priority, a serious and consistent effort should none the less be made to limit and reduce conventional weapons which, according to all the available information, constitute a current danger to peace in many regions of the world and, what is equally serious, place a heavy burden on the economies of developing countries and are mortgaging their economic and political independence for generations.

235. One of the most discouraging aspects of the current arms race is that it is spreading to developing areas of the world. In the Middle East, in other parts of Asia, in Africa and even in Latin America, actual or potential conflicts, rightly or wrongly, are leading many States to acquire and maintain in operation expensive weapons, to the detriment. I repeat, not only of urgent social and economic problems but also of their own independence.

236. Because of these circumstances, the trade in these weapons has become not only a lucrative activity further enriching the large industrial countries, but also a highly effective means of political infiltration and influence.

237. For these reasons, while we view with great interest the beginning of the talks in Helsinki between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic weapons, and sincerely hope for a successful outcome, we believe that early consideration should be given to effective ways and means of bringing about the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons, not only in developing countries but in all countries.

238. I should now like to refer briefly to agenda item 104, concerning the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

239. Besides the Secretary-General's report on this matter, which despite certain omissions, is a useful contribution to our knowledge of the subject we have before us the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the nine-country proposal for a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons [A/7655].

240. Our position on the various questions raised in connexion with this item is as follows: first, we believe that for many reasons which have already been adduced in the course of the debate it is desirable to retain standard treatment for both types of weapons, which have features in common. Although we understand the reasons why the United Kingdom presented its draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 19], we believe that not only their use but also their development, production and stockpiling should be prohibited.

241. Second, we trust that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will consider that and other initiatives with due attention and urgency, since as the Secretary-General's report entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, and the Effects of Their Possible Use* states in its conclusions [para. 376]: "The momentum of the arms race would clearly decrease if the production of these weapons were effectively and unconditionally banned."<sup>36</sup>

242. With regard to agenda item 30, entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests", we shall merely express the hope that an agreement will soon be reached on the total suspension of such tests. We welcome certain initiatives such as those relating to the international exchange of seismological data and other proposals submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, for by facilitating the solution of the problem of verification, they are helping to bring about an early agreement. Venezuela, for its part, is prepared, within the limits of its means, to take part in the international exchange of seismological data, proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3.

243. With regard to agenda item 31, entitled "Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States", we should like to reiterate our interest in the establishment of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control. I shall not dwell on this matter, since the Secretary-General's report includes the comments of my Government on the subject.

244. I do not wish at this time to prolong my statement by detailed comments on the report relating to the contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries [A/7568], for the preparation of which we are grateful to the Secretary-General, or on the report on the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/7677, Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2]. It is obvious that the application of nuclear technology in the developing countries would be beneficial in direct proportion to the capacity of the States concerned to make use of it and the nature and scope of the projects to which it proved applicable. For that reason, it would be desirable that, in considering the financial aspects of training, ... of technology and so on, the extent to which such contributions could promote the development of large areas should be taken into account.

245. Finally, I would like to state briefly our view on the approach which should be taken to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/7741-DC/232, annex A]. It is clear from the debate on this matter that many States have serious and substantial reservations—which we share—with regard to this draft. In the circumstances, we support the idea that this draft treaty, whose purpose is undoubtedly praiseworthy, should be carefully studied by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. Once the opinion of that body is

<sup>36</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.



known, the General Assembly will be in a better position to take a decision on the subject.

246. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*translated from French*): In its earlier statement on disarmament [1704th meeting], my delegation made some preliminary comments on the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons, a question on which numerous proposals have been submitted to the General Assembly. With some other socialist countries, Bulgaria requested the inclusion in the agenda of this session of the item on the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons [A/7655].

247. The same countries also submitted a draft resolution on the matter [A/C.1/L.487 and Add.1]. We have always held that the main purpose of disarmament negotiations was the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament—a prerequisite for world peace and security.

248. We readily recognize that the conclusion of a convention such as proposed by the socialist countries is only a partial measure. It is, nevertheless, an important measure which might be conducive to a proper atmosphere for the examination and solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

249. As my delegation emphasized in its earlier statement, the socialist countries turned to the consideration of partial measures and solutions solely because certain Powers—and everyone knows which Powers I mean—showed no desire to work for general and complete disarmament.

250. The reasons for the aversion universally inspired by chemical and bacteriological weapons have been admirably explained by many representatives, including the Polish representative, who submitted the draft convention to the Committee [1693rd meeting]; hence I need not dwell on them. Those who long ago signed and ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and those who, like the United States, declared only recently that they were going to ratify it, share the view that the effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons would be such that it would be sheer folly to think of using them.

251. Nevertheless, so long as enormous stocks of chemical and bacteriological weapons exist, so long as such weapons are being developed and the armed forces instructed in their use, there is always the danger that they might be utilized in particular cases, as did, in fact, occur in the very recent past.

252. The idea of using those weapons is so repugnant to every normal human being that in his report, entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*,<sup>37</sup> prepared in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2454 (XXIII) with the aid of a group of highly qualified experts, the Secretary-General

makes the following recommendations to the General Assembly in his introduction:

“1. To renew the appeal to all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925;

“2. To make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents) which now exist or which may be developed in the future;

“3. To call upon all countries to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons.”

253. Bearing these recommendations in mind, the nine socialist countries, including my own, prepared the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The preamble of this draft reaffirms the purposes and principles of the 1925 Geneva Protocol containing universally recognized rules of international law on the matter, and invites States to comply strictly with them. As I have just said, the Secretary-General makes the same recommendation when he asks Members of the United Nations to take steps to strengthen world security. The draft convention also provides in its article 5 that each State shall undertake to take as soon as possible, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, the necessary legislative and administrative measures “to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and to destroy such weapons”. That, too, is the basic purpose of the Secretary-General’s recommendation which I just read out.

254. There is unanimous agreement that the positions taken in the Secretary-General’s report on chemical and bacteriological weapons are a prerequisite for any real progress towards chemical and bacteriological disarmament. They must be used as a starting point if the way is to be cleared for general and complete disarmament.

255. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom delegation is still pressing for the draft convention submitted to the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva last August [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 2]. While agreeing with the Secretary-General’s suggestion in the introduction to his report on chemical and bacteriological weapons—which the United Kingdom representative himself quoted [see ENDC/PV.418]—that it is necessary “to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons”, the United Kingdom delegation nevertheless seeks to limit the scope of the action to be taken at this session of the General Assembly to the non-utilization and prohibition of biological weapons alone.

256. The reasons given for thus restricting our efforts at this session—and consequently, in the Committee on Disarmament during the year to come—to the prohibition and elimination of bacteriological weapons only, are pecu-

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*



liar. According to the United Kingdom representative, chemical weapons have many tactical uses and are essentially employed on the battlefield [1693rd meeting]. Such an explanation is odd, to say the least. Furthermore, it has long been superseded by the Geneva Protocol, which forbids the use of chemical and similar weapons precisely because their field of action extends far beyond the actual battlefield.

257. The United Kingdom representative's second argument was that it is very important from the practical point of view to ascertain what offers the best chances of attaining the objective of prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

258. That is an unconvincing argument, and yet it is used by men who pose as realists in disarmament questions. Such a manifestation of "realism" at the beginning of an important undertaking—at a time when the General Assembly is defining the objectives to be pursued by the Committee on Disarmament in its forthcoming negotiations on chemical and bacteriological disarmament—does ill service to the international community in its pursuit of disarmament.

259. Adopting the lowest common denominator, i.e., endorsing the position of those who are opposed to the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, would mean to doom in advance all negotiations in this matter during the year to come to a very limited result—if any. At the same time, it would give additional arguments to the opponents of the elimination of chemical weapons. Lastly, it is being too kind to those who have been finding extensive tactical uses for those weapons, for, as the United Kingdom representative stressed in another context, it is thus that they have always been used in the past.

260. It is not, however, by being too kind to those who do not want complete disarmament as regards chemical weapons that true realism is manifested. On the contrary, it can be manifested only by insisting that the urgent need for a complete prohibition of these weapons—a need demonstrated by their horrible effects—must be taken into account, and also by giving world public opinion the attention it deserves.

*Mr. Shahi (Pakistan) resumed the Chair.*

261. I naturally take note of the United Kingdom representative's statement that his Government is as anxious to eliminate chemical as biological weapons. I hope that he will be guided by that attitude rather than by the proposals in his draft convention.

262. The United Nations cannot and must not turn a deaf ear to public opinion, which clamours for the complete prohibition of both chemical and bacteriological weapons. This universal demand has found its echo in the Secretary-General's report on those weapons. It should not be forgotten that it was public opinion—and, above all, public opinion in the United States—which led the present United States Administration to declare that it was ready to ratify the Geneva Protocol. Nevertheless, although the Protocol is a valid international instrument prohibiting the use of

chemical and bacteriological weapons, it ought to be supplemented by another international instrument providing for the destruction of such weapons.

263. It is difficult to conceive that States Members of the United Nations could take the position which is to be glimpsed in certain speeches, namely, that the General Assembly should give instructions to the Committee on Disarmament reducing its work to a search for the least common denominator, an action which would be equivalent to embracing the uncompromising attitude of a certain Power which they are trying too hard to please. On the contrary, the task of that organ, set up to deal with the most important question of our epoch—disarmament—is to make a concerted and imaginative effort to find solutions in keeping with contemporary realities. To make it consider only those realities which some, in their obstinacy, seek to create, would be to limit unduly the scope of its work.

264. I am convinced that the General Assembly will take steps to adopt the recommendations in the draft resolution submitted by the nine socialist countries [A/C.1/L.487] including mine, which have produced a draft convention to be used by the Committee on Disarmament as a basis in working on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

265. These recommendations are perfectly clear and would lead to the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

266. I am also certain that the draft resolution submitted by Hungary, Mongolia and Poland [A/C.1/L.488], asking States strictly to respect the principles and purposes of the Geneva Protocol and asking those States which have not yet done so to accede to it, will meet with general support. My delegation believes that the adoption of the draft resolution submitted by the socialist countries will be conducive to the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons and, consequently, to general and complete disarmament.

267. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has now concluded the general debate covering the four disarmament items. I should like to thank all members of the Committee for their co-operation in making it possible for us to conclude the very important and necessarily lengthy debate by this evening. In particular I should like to thank the representative of the United Arab Republic, whose co-operation enabled us to make full use of this afternoon's meeting.

268. Now that the general debate has been concluded, the Committee, in accordance with the decision taken at the 1686th meeting, as contained in document A/C.1/984/Add.1, will proceed to the consideration of the draft resolutions relating to the disarmament items. Following consultations with a number of delegations, it has been suggested that instead of taking up the draft resolutions in the order indicated, we should use the time profitably for consultations by the Bureau with the sponsors of the various draft resolutions as to the order in which they should be taken up. Some delegations have pointed out that it would be difficult to adhere to the decision taken by the Committee in this respect because a number of draft

resolutions in regard to the various items are in the discussion stage and all of them may not be submitted by tomorrow. Hence, I should like to put it to the Committee whether it would wish not to have a meeting tomorrow morning, so that the sponsors of the various draft resolutions and other interested delegations may consult together and exchange views, and so that the Bureau may also carry on consultations with them in order to reach agreement about the order in which we should take up the various draft resolutions.

269. If that is agreeable to the Committee, there will be no meeting tomorrow morning and that time will be devoted to consultations. There could be an afternoon meeting, when we could take up the discussion of the various draft resolutions in accordance with any consensus, agreement or understanding that might be reached in the

consultations tomorrow morning. I should like to put this to the Committee and would be grateful for its guidance.

270. I take it that the Committee has no objection to the suggestions made by me. Therefore there will be no meeting tomorrow morning. There will be a meeting scheduled for tomorrow afternoon. I shall be grateful if at a time convenient to the sponsors—I hope not later than 11 o'clock—it will be possible for them to meet me and my colleagues on the Bureau in order that we may try to reach some understanding. I shall be available for consultations here in this room.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.*