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**AGENDA ITEMS 29, 104, 30 AND 31**

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**Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (continued):**

(a) Implementation of the results of the conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2);

(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General (A/7678 and Add.1-3);

(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General (A/7568 and A/7743)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. DE PINIES (Spain) (translated from Spanish): In taking the floor, my delegation will address itself chiefly to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/7741-DC/232, <sup>1</sup> annex A].

2. On behalf of my delegation, I should like to commend the United States and the Soviet Union for the efforts they have made since last spring in order to submit this draft treaty to us. Our congratulations also go to all the members of the Committee on Disarmament, who through their constructive criticism brought about improvements in the original text as submitted by the two Co-Chairmen on 7 October last [ibid., annex C, section 34].

3. Without wishing to detract from the very real merits of the two super-Powers' aims as reflected in this draft treaty, we wish to stress that it is not in the interests either of the small or of the medium-sized Powers, which include Spain, to stand in the way of a treaty as important as the one before us, which could very well constitute a valuable milestone on the way to world peace.

4. Since it is the nuclear Powers which currently possess weapons in this category, it is only fair to recognize the contribution which the United States and the Soviet Union have made towards international *détente*. But we must say that as far as our delegation is concerned this draft treaty is only a collateral disarmament measure, and our feeling of satisfaction would be greater if the two super-Powers embarked without further delay on the effective nuclear disarmament which it is logical for them to initiate.

5. That being said, what scope is left for the non-nuclear-weapon States? First of all, we think it logical that any

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232.

multilateral treaty which as in this case is meant to be universal should prescribe equal rights and duties for all parties. While formally such equality appears to be expressed in the text, we would hope that the collateral measures aimed at limiting the deployment of nuclear weapons would be something more than a mere formal expression of intent. Therefore, it should not surprise anyone that the medium-sized Powers, having regard to their sovereignty and the rights deriving therefrom, should ask that such treaties be sufficiently clear to prevent any subsequent misinterpretations, which could be detrimental to all concerned.

6. This draft treaty, which we feel reflects above all a commendable political *entente* between the United States and the Soviet Union, is guilty in our view of imprecision and of being vague in certain matters of paramount importance to which I shall refer when I turn to the individual articles. The text's ambiguities may have been motivated by the desire of the two super-Powers to complete the agreement rapidly without precluding the possibility of discussing further agreements, of broader scope, at some other time. But their thinking is often difficult for us to follow.

7. Let us briefly examine the articles of the draft. In article I, paragraphs 1 and 2, we do not understand why, in defining the limits of the sea-bed zone beyond which the prohibitions of the treaty would apply, the draft does not purely and simply establish the distance of 12 miles, instead of referring to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.<sup>2</sup> It is well known that many countries, including Spain, have not signed or ratified this Convention. If, as stated in article II, paragraph 2, nothing in the treaty is to be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State party with respect to rights or claims which such State party may assert relating to waters off its coasts, or to the sea-bed and the ocean floor, we see no reason for referring to the Geneva Convention.

8. It has also been said that the distance is set solely for the purposes of the treaty, in other words, for the denuclearization of the sea-bed and the prohibition of the emplacement on it of other weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, the drafts originally submitted by both the Soviet Union and the United States established the limits of 12 and 3 miles, respectively, with no reference to the 1958 Geneva Convention. We believe, therefore, that it would be desirable to write into article I the distance of 12 miles, in order to avoid misgivings which in many cases would be justified.

9. Again in article I, the reference to so-called "weapons of mass destruction" is ambiguous. These words can cover chemical and bacteriological weapons as well as some which are now qualified as merely conventional.

10. We realize how difficult it would be for the two super-Powers to define more narrowly the weapons which may not be emplaced on the sea-bed. But they in turn must understand our concern at the vagueness of this wording. Since the two super-Powers have not seen fit to prohibit

submarines carrying nuclear missiles, under the terms of this treaty, we would equally like to know whether, in view of the ambiguity of article I, self-propelled vehicles carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction would be allowed to move over the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

11. We would also like to make some comments on article III. It must not be forgotten that the implementation of the praiseworthy objectives of this treaty will necessarily affect those continental shelves which extend beyond the 12-mile limit, as they do in the case of many States. The sovereign rights of coastal States over the exploration and exploitation of their continental shelves is recognized in international law. In this connexion, at the 445th meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on 23 October last, the representative of the Argentine Republic aptly recalled the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in respect of the delimitation of the continental shelf between the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands.<sup>3</sup> We must accordingly stress the fact that these sovereign rights cannot be affected by international legal instruments such as the draft treaty which is before us.

12. My delegation fears that article III of the draft, establishing as it does a right of verification for the purposes of the treaty, might lead to the impairment and even the breach of these sovereign rights over the continental shelf. Some system of verification is of course necessary under the treaty. But we feel that such a system must be fair and effective and must not ignore a State's sovereignty over its continental shelf—which is essentially an undersea extension of its territory—even for the purpose of implementing the verification system established in this article.

13. In exercising the stipulated right of verification, the State or States Parties concerned might very well interfere with the sovereign activities of the coastal State, for although the text specifies "without interfering with such activities or otherwise infringing rights recognized under international law", we do not see how in certain cases the work of verification in connexion with the treaty could be done without interfering with such sovereign activities. Therefore, in order to dispel the misgivings aroused by the present wording, my delegation would suggest the addition to this article of a paragraph stating: "The provisions of this article shall not apply to activities which a coastal State carries out, in conformity with international law, in the exploration and exploitation of its continental shelf or in the protection and development of the natural resources of the sea."

14. This additional paragraph would make it possible to prevent verification activities from concealing other intentions, such as observing or obtaining information on peaceful activities carried out by a coastal State on its continental shelf that have no bearing whatsoever on the purposes of this treaty. Otherwise one would again face the problem of the inequality between major and lesser Powers in terms of economic and technical means. We see no way

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477.

<sup>3</sup> *North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3.*

of forcing any of the great Powers to co-operate effectively in verification activities when such verification would not be in their interest. This is one of the reasons why the Spanish delegation would prefer to have verification carried out through an international procedure binding on all States, institutionalized in an international agency. In this regard we find the proposals of the Canadian delegation in the working paper on article III submitted to the Committee on Disarmament on 8 October last [*ibid.*, section 35] to be very constructive. We also believe that the right of the coastal State to participate in verification activities carried out by other parties to the treaty on its continental shelf beyond the 12-mile limit should be explicitly recognized.

15. With regard to article VII, paragraph 3, my delegation considers that the proposed number of 22 countries which must deposit instruments of ratification for the treaty to enter into force is too low. This number might be increased to 45, for example, or, if the number 22 is maintained, it should include the major maritime countries, which could be identified on the basis of length of coastline, volume of fishing operations, proportion of national income derived from marine resources, and so on.

16. We believe that, with goodwill, we can all join together to improve this draft, setting yet another example of genuine international collaboration for the relaxation of international tensions and the achievement of world peace.

17. In our statement in this Committee on 21 October last, on the subject of strengthening international security, we said, among other things, that the establishment of peace was a joint operation in which all States were called upon to make their contributions, and could not be left exclusively in the hands of the great Powers [*1659th meeting, para. 50*], and that the strengthening of international security must go hand in hand with a collective effort—I repeat, collective—to build true peace based on disarmament. I also said that the maintenance of the present balance of terror was a negative and destructive idea which helped to perpetuate fear and mistrust in a world where true coexistence was becoming difficult, if not impossible.

18. In referring to the draft treaty which is before us, the head of the United States delegation, my distinguished friend Ambassador Yost, said in his intervention of 17 November last:

“... we expect the draft treaty to be reviewed carefully in this Committee. . . . We do not believe that this draft, as far as it was developed at Geneva, necessarily represents the last word as a treaty ready to receive broad international support” [*1691st meeting, para. 63*].

This is why the Spanish delegation wishes to place on record its firm desire to co-operate with all member countries in working towards a goal the attainment of which may seem remote but is more necessary than ever—the goal of general and complete disarmament.

19. With regard to the other questions dealt with in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation, while not waiving its right to speak at a later stage, wishes to make certain comments.

20. In the first place, there is the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. We are prepared to support the draft resolutions in document A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3, on world-wide exchange of seismological data, and in document A/C.1/L.486, of 20 November, submitted to this Committee last week.

21. On this important question, I wish to indicate my delegation's satisfaction at the efforts made in the Committee on Disarmament, mainly by Sweden and Canada, to find ways of expediting the conclusion of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. I wish also to say that, while we have repeatedly stressed the urgent need for the Moscow Treaty of 5 August 1963 banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water to be supplemented without further delay and for the countries that have not yet done so to accede to it, we believe that this question is closely bound up with the outcome of the important bilateral talks on strategic nuclear arms initiated by the Soviet Union and the United States on 17 November in Helsinki. We hope that these negotiations will be successful, although no one denies the complexity of the issues and the difficulty of achieving success with the desired speed. However, we do wish, from this forum, to extend to the delegations of the two super-Powers our delegation's most sincere wishes for success, since understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union is the prerequisite for progress in nuclear disarmament.

22. On the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons, my country, which has signed and ratified the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature at Geneva on 17 June 1925, considers that this instrument constitutes a norm of international law and will accordingly support any proposal aimed at strengthening it. In this regard, we feel that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should submit to the General Assembly a single document which would include, and if possible supplement, the contents of the working paper submitted by 12 countries to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 26 August of this year [*A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 30*].

23. My delegation wishes to commend the Secretary-General for his report *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*,<sup>4</sup> and also the group of 14 experts who drafted this important study. We endorse the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in this report.

24. On behalf of my delegation, I wish warmly to commend the United States of America for the decision, announced yesterday by President Nixon, to recommend to the Senate the ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

25. With regard to the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, my delegation feels that the General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to include this item in the agenda of the twenty-fifth session and continue to report to us on the results of further efforts to achieve full compliance with the decisions of that important Conference.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

26. The very commendable efforts of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament must not be construed as relieving the United Nations General Assembly of its obligation to bring about disarmament. My country, which has been following the Committee's work as closely as it can and with very great interest, is somewhat concerned by certain arrangements which, if continued along the same lines, could detract from the effectiveness of our work in New York. The reports of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have been reaching us quite late, compelling this Committee to delay its consideration of these important questions. Of even greater consequence is the fact that Governments of Member States find it necessary to take decisions on matters as complex and far-reaching as the draft treaty before us without having had sufficient time to study them carefully.

27. We have noted that the centre of activities relating to the question of disarmament has been slowly but surely moving to Geneva and we feel it is time to consider the need for regulating the Committee and its methods of work. Since we trust that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will continue to serve in future as a useful instrument for negotiation capable of achieving, in close conjunction with the General Assembly, the distant but imperative goal of general and complete disarmament, it would give us great satisfaction if the States Members of the United Nations which are not members of the Committee were granted observer status in the Committee, as is the case with other United Nations committees. This would dispel many misgivings and help all States Members of the Organization to become more familiar with the work of the Committee prior to the presentation of its report to the General Assembly. These countries could put their suggestions and observations to the Committee at Geneva during the year, thereby expediting the work.

28. Mr. KAYUKWA-KIMOTHO (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (*translated from French*): The problem of general and complete disarmament is one of the problems which preoccupies my country's Government most, since the very fate and survival of mankind depend on it.

29. For several years considerable progress in the field of military technology has made possible the development of new weapons whose power of destruction is such that the mere thought of it has had a traumatic effect on the whole world and filled it with anguish and a constant fear for the morrow. For there is no doubt that at any moment and in very little time everything can be destroyed and eliminated from the surface of the earth.

30. This terrible reality makes the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security even more significant and is in itself sufficient to justify the scope of the efforts that the Organization has constantly made since its inception to halt the arms race and bring about general and complete disarmament.

31. The dangers of a nuclear or thermonuclear war have led, too, to the awakening of a universal conscience. The most authoritative voices of our era have been raised against the mad competition among the nuclear Powers, which do not hesitate to devote tremendous resources to the construction and development of ever more deadly weapons of devastating range.

32. But the concerted efforts of the United Nations and of the conscious part of mankind have not been in vain. A brief glance at the last 10 years enables us to measure the road already travelled, to appreciate with some feeling of reassurance the modest results already reached, and to view with cautious optimism the future of mankind.

33. We are happy to note first that two Treaties have made it possible to free two important areas from the arms race and from any militarization: the Antarctic region, as a result of the Treaty signed in Washington on 1 December 1959, and outer space, through the Treaty signed in 1967.<sup>5</sup> The reservation of those areas for exclusively scientific uses, the prohibition of any military installations whatsoever in the Antarctic, and the prohibition against the placing of any weapons of mass destruction into earth orbit, on the moon or any other celestial body, are already appreciable measures for limiting the arms race.

34. The most significant contributions in the field of disarmament have undoubtedly been the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, signed at Tlatelolco on 14 February 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968. It is hardly necessary to prove how and to what extent those Treaties have helped to diminish international tension, to reduce the rate of acceleration in the acquisition and perfecting of weapons of mass destruction, and to maintain and strengthen international peace and security.

35. But, as I was saying, those are very modest achievements, compared to what remains to be done. My delegation considers no effort must be spared in order to achieve a total prohibition of nuclear testing, which means that a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear weapons tests must soon be concluded. But serious difficulties seem to have arisen in the matter of the control and verification methods in such a treaty. We certainly recognize the importance of seismological systems in the detection of underground explosions, but we must also recognize that gaps and technical imperfections still exist in this field, making, if not impossible, at least difficult, the interpretation of seismological data beyond a certain order of magnitude.

36. My delegation considers that in the present stage of seismological technology, control must be completed by an on-site inspection system carried out by a group of experts chosen by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the basis of their qualifications, honesty, integrity, who would form part of a body to be set up within our Organization. We are convinced that the care with which those experts will be chosen and the fact that they will be under the authority of the Secretary-General may dispel the legitimate apprehensions of countries which fear that such inspections, if not scrupulously controlled, might rather serve espionage needs. Furthermore, it must be understood that inspection will be only a supplementary and temporary measure, to be used until seismological detection techniques are perfected.

<sup>5</sup> Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

37. Perhaps the best way to provide maximum guarantees and security would be to increase the powers of the International Atomic Energy Agency so that it could be entrusted with the control over nuclear tests. That is an idea which could be looked into further. Some delegations have quite rightly considered that the International Atomic Energy Agency, in its present composition, and without any need for a further special body or service, could deal competently with the matter of control over peaceful nuclear explosions. That, in our view, would already imply that the Agency would be able to control and distinguish between peaceful and non-peaceful explosions. In addition, co-operation among States in the exchange of seismological data could be even more effective if it tended to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency by making it possible for it in this way to control underground explosions. We think that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the most appropriate United Nations body to deal with this kind of activity.

38. My delegation also believes in the very close relationship existing between the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the treaty still to be worked out on the prohibition of nuclear tests, on the one hand, and the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses on the other hand. For the limitation of any expansion in those weapons, and the prohibition of their development, would make it possible to rechannel nuclear activities into peaceful objectives. That would also make it possible to redirect enormous financial, technical and human resources towards the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and co-operation among States in this field.

39. We wish to pay a warm tribute to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which asked the Secretary-General to present a report on the conversion of nuclear activities to peaceful purposes and on the ways in which developing countries could derive the maximum advantages from nuclear technology. The various reports of the agencies and specialized bodies of the United Nations transmitted to us by the Secretary-General are favourable to such a conversion, which they consider possible and even feasible within a relatively short space of time. That would mean the start of an era when nuclear technology would serve the progress of man rather than weigh on him as a threat.

40. With regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, we wish to express the hope that many States will ratify it in the near future. We are glad to learn that the two great Powers have finally ratified that treaty, for we hope that it will enter into force very soon.

41. My delegation would also like to state that it is in favour not only of extending the denuclearized zones but also of institutionalizing them through multilateral regional treaties. Ten years have elapsed since the first proposals aimed at the establishment of denuclearized zones. Many initiatives of the most varied kinds have been taken along those lines in central Europe, in the Balkans, in Asia, in Africa and elsewhere. However, the most remarkable initiative, which deserves our respect and admiration, is the one taken by the countries of Latin America, that on 14 February 1967 signed and later ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, a treaty which, despite its shortcomings, has

freed that vast region from military nuclear activities. That historic example deserves to be followed by other States in their respective zones.

42. I now turn to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*A/7741-DC/232, 6 annex A*].

43. This draft undoubtedly reflects the efforts of the two great nuclear Powers to limit the scope of their military nuclear activities. We take note of their goodwill, which is an excellent augury for future negotiations such as those now being carried on in Helsinki, on which I shall speak in a moment.

44. However, my delegation feels it must make some comments. As it stands, the draft treaty is limited in many ways. First, it is limited to the emplacement and installation of weapons. Secondly, to weapons of mass destruction, and thirdly, to the under-sea zone beyond 12 nautical miles.

45. The fact that the draft is limited to the emplacement and installation of weapons of mass destruction is clear and even intentional. The very title of the draft, the statements made in this Committee by the representatives of the two great nuclear Powers, and the records of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, confirm it and sufficiently explain the reasons for such limitation. Thus, in connexion with the discussions in the Disarmament Committee on the question of whether all military activities or only a few weapons should be prohibited, we note the following in the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization:

“The significant difference of opinion centred on the question of the scope of the ban. The representative of the USSR, among others, maintained that complete demilitarization was the only way to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and that limitation of the ban to weapons of mass destruction would not only make verification difficult, but would encourage conventional military activity and thereby hamper the peaceful exploitation of the sea-bed. Most of the members of the Conference tended to agree with this position. The representative of the United States and certain other representatives, on the other hand, maintained that a total ban on military activity on the sea-bed, particularly the emplacement of equipment for tracking potentially hostile submarines, would not permit coastal States to take necessary and vital measures for defence and would also be unverifiable in the difficult marine environment.”<sup>7</sup>

46. However, if we study the scope of the treaty, the statement I have just quoted assumes serious proportions. It clearly shows that there are many other military activities, such as the use of submarines equipped with rockets, the installation of detection equipment, under-water scientific research stations for military purposes and so on, which are

<sup>6</sup> *Disarmament Commission Documents, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

<sup>7</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1, p. 34*

not prohibited in this under-sea zone beyond the limit of 12 nautical miles, that is to say, the maximum limit of territorial waters. That is a disquieting fact. We know that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction recently reached a generally accepted agreement recognizing that the zone beyond the limits of national jurisdiction must be devoted to exclusively peaceful purposes. If that is denied by the statement I have just quoted, many of us will be greatly disappointed. At the same time, article II, paragraph 2, of the draft treaty, which is couched intentionally in rather complex language, would also reserve the sea-bed for certain activities incompatible with the work of the said Committee. It reads:

“Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position any State Party with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, related to waters off its coasts, or to the sea-bed and the ocean floor.”

The least I can say after reading that paragraph is that the task of the Committee on the Sea-Bed is likely to be very difficult and complicated, since the scope of its investigation is thus seriously threatened.

47. It remains that the draft as a whole should receive the careful study it deserves, particularly insofar as it represents a most valuable step towards disarmament, something that we cannot disregard. We hope that the members of this Committee will, during the forthcoming discussions, be able to suggest useful changes so that the text will, in the end, reflect the wishes of the great majority of the delegations. We are already glad to note the content of the third paragraph of the preamble, which makes us hope that in the near future negotiations will take place on other measures aimed at completely barring the arms race from the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

48. The people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo most indignantly condemn the presence of chemical and bacteriological weapons in the war arsenals of certain countries and formally oppose their use. We welcomed with great relief the news that the Government of the United States of America has stated its intention to renounce the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. That is unquestionably an encouraging step on the road of the future negotiations aiming at the total prohibition of such weapons. We wish here to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for having shown, in his remarkable report, all the frightful consequences of the use of these dreadful weapons. It is barely conceivable that men who already possess nuclear weapons capable of annihilating their fellowmen in a few seconds still feel they have to prepare such barbarous and sadistic weapons as the chemical and bacteriological ones. We must urgently take thorough-going measures to prohibit the manufacture, improvement and use of such weapons, and to destroy systematically existing stockpiles.

49. All this alone would be sufficient to justify our interest in the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and

bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons submitted by the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist bloc [A/7655]. We believe that such a convention would complete and reinforce the Geneva Protocol of 1925,<sup>8</sup> which deals only with the use of such weapons.

50. Mankind will cease to be haunted by the nightmare of nuclear annihilation only on the day when, through our unanimous will, we succeed in abolishing the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons, in destroying existing stockpiles of these weapons, and in prohibiting the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. We shall then see the military budgets being used in the fight against the scourges of poverty and illiteracy, nuclear energy assisting in the conquest of disease, and the world opening up to progress of all kinds. But unfortunately we are still far from that wondrous world. We live in a world where we must still realistically face the spectres of war, hunger and disease. Every single step that we take, however small it may be, towards freeing humanity from those scourges deserves our encouragement. It was for this reason that we welcomed with great satisfaction the news of the negotiations that opened in Helsinki between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, concerning limitation of the means of delivery of offensive strategic nuclear weapons, and defensive systems against missiles.

51. We also see in those negotiations the end-results of the long and patient endeavours ceaselessly carried on in the General Assembly and in the Disarmament Committee by States Members of our Organization. Our most ardent wish is that those negotiations may be crowned with success and may offer real guarantees for the future negotiations aiming at the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

52. When we speak of disarmament we must not make the mistake of thinking that it is something that concerns only the non-nuclear States because they fear they may be destroyed. It is a matter of concern to the nuclear Powers as well, who are also threatened by self-destruction. They must therefore carefully think about what they are doing.

53. May the genius of man for ever serve the progress and well-being of the whole of mankind.

54. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I would indeed be presumptuous were I, as a layman in the scientific field of disarmament, to talk about the machinery that should be devised in order to detect the secret and multifarious activities of States, especially those of the major Powers, in creating new and highly sophisticated lethal weapons. That is why I shall speak on this item in what I might call an unorthodox manner which has to do not only with the causes for armament, but also with the underlying factors that have led to its pyramiding increase in the hope that certain modest suggestions that I shall make may contribute to the various solutions that the real experts on the subject have submitted time and again for our consideration in this Committee.

<sup>8</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed on 17 June 1925.

55. I have benefited immensely from the statements of various colleagues, especially those whose countries are members of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. In particular, I must say that my colleagues from Brazil, Sweden and Argentina opened my eyes to many of the facets that I would not have seen.

56. I am going to make a bold statement. I think that the United Nations—all of it—is suffering from a schizophrenic personality. Why? For 23 years we have been talking of human rights while armaments, quite often in the name of self-defence, go on negating the most fundamental right of the individual. I shall substantiate what I have just said.

57. In Paris it was my honour and privilege to be associated with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 3 of which states “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.” But after 21 years, life nowadays is wantonly destroyed, freedom is curbed on a large scale and very few people in the world feel secure. That is why I believe we are suffering from a schizophrenic personality—collectively so, not individually. If it were individually, we would be put in insane asylums.

58. The armaments race is to a large extent responsible for this tragic situation in the world today. Lack of adequate identification with the United Nations is at the root of our trouble. Quite often Member States not only reflect but vehemently defend their narrow national interests. Most of us are experts in the art of rationalization. If we want peace and security we should opt for the high principles of the Charter rather than find excuses for discarding those principles and always talk of self-defence, forgetting that there are many acts of aggression in the world that are cloaked with the phrase self-defence.

59. Disarmament is proceeding at a very slow pace in contrast with the progress which is being made in the field of devising more lethal weapons, especially by the highly industrialized countries. I will later substantiate this statement by giving statistics which I have gathered during the last few months and hope that the two major Powers which I shall name will forgive me. I want them to rest assured that it is not because I like to expose some of their activities in a light which is not favourable to them—far be it from me to do that. It is because, after all, their arsenals are frightening all of us, arsenals that are still being filled to the high heavens and to the skies. And I say skies not by way of analogy for who can assure me that those activities in outer space may not lend themselves to the destruction of mankind one of these days?

60. Protracted negotiations on disarmament have indeed been going at a very slow pace, and time is of the essence. One is reminded of a creeping snail which quite often becomes erratic and retracts into its shell; but let any human being try to induce that retracted snail to come out of its shell!

61. Once in a while we are heartened that we are making progress in Geneva or in quiet talks between the two Powers, or the four Powers for that matter, who own nuclear weapons. Also we have recently been heartened by the willingness of the United States and the Soviet Union to talk matters over in Helsinki. But the armaments race, on

the other hand, has been far from erratic. When we talk about disarmament it is not like that snail that retracts itself. On the contrary, armament has been steady and speedy. It may be described as being like the boring of two moles, each one of them digging frantically, trying to outdo the other, each in a dark tunnel of secrecy. As we all know, the mole has no eyes with which to see, but it has a keen sense of hearing. And no sooner does one of those two moles hear the least sound than, without knowing anything about the other tunnel, it bores frantically underground. This is the situation with many Powers that are increasing their armaments while they are talking about disarmament.

62. I may liken some of those who are talking about disarmament to a person who starts a sentence and either does not know how to finish it or is not allowed by his Government to finish it. This is the situation as it stands today, whether we like it or not. The representative who usually negotiates has a good tongue, not a paralysed tongue, but immediately the politicians send instructions to stop. We small nations witness all this and feel helpless, nay, frustrated. As representatives of sovereign States we come here and each one of us tries to contribute his little bit. Many of us perhaps are experts, especially those who are attending the Geneva Committee, but I must say that most of us are like frightened children. Sometimes we do not know how to go about this subject—whether to deal with it by setting all kinds of instruments that are supposed to register an explosion or show what another State is doing, knowing very well from articles we read that sometimes those instruments do not work or register all that is desired. Hence, States basing their activities on mere guesses run and run frantically and add more lethal weapons to their arsenals.

63. We have heard that politics is the art of compromise, but in the question of armament and disarmament there is no compromise. In armament there is a race. Whereas, politics in its base sense combines the art of demagoguery, hypocrisy, corruption, and how to keep oneself in power at the expense of the peoples of the world; politics in its true sense is the art of harmonizing various interests within the State, and harmonizing the State's interests with those of other States on an equitable basis. However, this does not prevail when we come to the armaments race.

64. One thing may serve as a remedy for what I have just pointed out. Let us remember that we should not always have our strict national interest uppermost in our minds when we address each other in this or any other organ of the United Nations. The Charter is clear, but every day we are violating its high principles and objectives.

65. Now, I want to give an example. Before and during the First World War our host country, this great country of the United States, was noted for its isolationism, especially after President Wilson's disillusionment in the aftermath of the First World War. Mr. Franklin Roosevelt, that great President, gave assurance to the people of the United States in one of his “fireside chats”—I happened to be in New York City at that time and listened to it—when he said, again and again and again: “I promise you that I will not send our boys to perish on foreign battlefields”. But American boys did perish on foreign battlefields. President Roosevelt, with all his greatness, was not a free agent. That

is why I say that we should not always place the blame on certain statements; rather, we should blame the psychology of governments, which quite often is twisted.

66. One might say that that took place during the First World War and that later things changed. But they? I contend that they did not. I would ask the representative of the United States to forgive me for drawing my examples from this country but I do so because I am familiar with what has been going on in this country. I shall come to the Soviet Union and other countries later.

67. None other than Mr. Johnson stated the following on 21 October 1964: "We are not going to send American boys 15,000 miles away from their homes to do what Asian boys should do themselves." There are about half a million American boys now in the Far East. Then, we have none other than my good friend Mr. Rusk. I say "good friend" because I have seen him several times and have had very friendly chats with him. What does he say? I have the text before me and I shall read it out in order to be correct: "The reason for the Viet-Nam war was to prevent China from establishing its power over the masses of the East."

68. Who was behind Mr. Rusk? Who was behind Mr. Johnson? I would say: those who manufacture armaments. I do not know who was behind Mr. Krushchev and who is behind Mr. Brezhnev. Somebody must be behind them. I do not know whether it is the military that is behind them, increasing and pyramiding their arsenals. That is why I say that I crave the indulgence of the representative of the United States, because I happen to be familiar with what goes on in this country, after a sojourn here of about 30 years, on and off, 23 of them in the United Nations. We are witnesses to all this insanity of sending boys to perish on foreign battlefields in order that those who manufacture the arms may benefit.

69. In the First World War there were the steel cartels. I was a young man, in my twenties and I knew about them in Western Europe. They sold steel to both sides, to the Allies and to the Germans, who made arms, and killed each other in a fratricidal struggle. And the people were sent like sheep to the battlefields.

70. We talk in Geneva about whether a device is adequate to monitor certain sound waves or electronically to register certain tremblings of the earth, and so on. But we do not go to the core of the question, the sociological factor, the psychological factor, the human factor—or the inhuman factor if you want to call it that—which lead to the sad state of affairs from which we are suffering today.

71. I promised to give the Committee some statistics. I am told that the United States Government spends 70 cents of every budget dollar on what wars, past and present, cost this country, and on so-called wars of self-defence. Already a trillion dollars have been spent in the span of 12 years. But only a little over 11 cents of the same budget dollar are spent on social welfare services and for Federal support and economic development.

72. Is it any wonder that so many people are disgruntled in this country? If I were an American I would be scared too and I would feel disgruntled. No doubt the Russians are

doing the same thing in their country, spending the lion's share of their budget on armament.

73. I, for one, know that defence contractors have a vested interest in any war machine, in countries big and small. I say that in fairness to the two major Powers. In the Middle East, in the 1920s, it fell to me to take to Damascus a list of smuggled arms bought from a person of the nationality of a mandatory Power—I am not going to mention the name lest it cause embarrassment. I was 20 at that time. The Damascenes were using those arms to kill the soldiers of that mandatory Power. There is no conscience in selling arms or in the armament industry; I say that in fairness to the two Big Powers. There was a national struggle and a person of the same nationality as that Power sold arms that were to kill people who were his compatriots. What do you want worse than that?

74. The former Defense Secretary, Clark Clifford, has said that as of September 1968 the United States had 4,200 nuclear warheads aimed at the Soviet Union, whilst the Soviet Union had 1,200 nuclear warheads aimed at the United States. Of course, now they are meeting in Helsinki and cannot say what I can say. I am not trying to start a cold war with anyone. On the contrary, we would like the two Powers to get together and free us all from the nightmare that looms in the minds of each one of us while we are awake, not asleep.

75. More than ten billion dollars a year are spent to increase the nuclear weapons manufactured in the United States, aimed at the Soviet Union. I do not know what the Soviets have to counteract all this. They must have their own devices to counteract this and similar destructive arms. In addition, Polaris submarines have their own missiles and can totally destroy 160 cities. One hundred and sixty cities of what? The Soviet Union. I would expect the Soviet Union has the power to destroy as many cities, if not more, of the United States.

76. But why go to Mr. Clifford? Mr. Laird, the present Defense Secretary, recently said, "If the Soviet Union is developing a capability that could endanger this nation we must be prepared to counteract it". Here we are going in vicious circles. Some of our colleagues talk about this device for monitoring an explosion and whether it is adequate, and underground explosions now are permissible provided they can be monitored or inspected. This is the report with which we are concerned, but as I said I am going to talk about the subject in an unorthodox manner, because we are not experts and can never claim knowledge of such devices, electronic or otherwise.

77. Indeed, this armament business is becoming paranoïdal. On the one hand, it is feared that the Soviet Union could destroy half the population of the United States, and so the United States must try to emulate the Soviet Union so as to be able to destroy more than half the population of the Soviet Union. Does this acceleration of armament ensure the security of people in the United States, in the Soviet Union and in the small countries? I just mentioned security of life. There is no one who feels secure these days, and if we do not feel secure we act abnormally. That is why there are more abnormal people than normal people nowadays.

78. What would prevent some madman from causing tidal waves by throwing a few atom bombs over either the North Pole or the South Pole? They need not belong to the Soviet Union or to the United States. We are playing with death on a scale unimagined in the past. I must say here that we were all heartened yesterday when, by a stroke of the pen, the President of the United States banned the use and development of germ warfare. Before that what would have prevented someone, as I said in a previous statement in this Committee, from compressing those germs in aerosol bottles and spraying mankind—not one or two people but the entire human species—with those germs? I think this is the greatest Christmas gift we have ever received; the banning by the United States of the use and the development of bacteriological or biological weapons. But the President of the United States stopped short of the chemical weapons which may be as lethal as the bacteriological ones. Perhaps they would not spread like bacteriological weapons, by infection or infestation, but gases also spread. We know how chlorine was used in the First World War and how many suffered when they inhaled it on the battlefields of France. I knew several people who had to gasp for breath when they talked to me because, they told me, they were asphyxiated by chlorine. Then in the Second World War, with all its atrocities and brutalities, no gas was used. But now, after the Second World War, gas is being used. This is a retrogression, not a progression. At least during the First World War those who used chlorine thought it was a lethal gas and should not be used. They also had mustard gas which they did not use. Then what do we find after the Second World War? Chlorine? No. We have napalm and all kinds of gases including nerve gas. I have studied chemistry, but I do not know these new gases. I am not up to the last minute.

79. I will read to you what is going on. Why always talk in abstracts? A soldier in the Far East wrote to his father. I am not going to quote the whole letter, but this is what he said in part: "So they called in some brand new gas masks and then dropped a ton or so of CS . . .". I do not know what "CS" stands for; there are so many abbreviations. It must be the name of the gas. Between brackets he has the words "riot control". And the letter goes on: ". . . and had a little turkey shoot"—not turkey, the bird; this is slang—"killed about 40 to 50. But they drove the gooks out of the bunkers." The "gooks" must be the enemy soldiers. This is too much slang; it will appear 20 years from now in the New American Dictionary, I think. There is an American language here which we have to decipher. The letter continues: ". . . and the gun-ships have been at it ever since. I spent three days in a certain"—I do know what town it says here—"for my headache, slight concussion, and I have been put in for the Purple Heart", one of the great medals, for having flushed out people with that gas and shot them like birds.

80. Napalm has been used in my part of the world. But still we are told that certain gases are necessary as riot control agents and are used when they will help to save lives. How can they save lives when they can lend themselves to flushing out people from holes and killing them like birds? They cannot see; they cannot defend themselves. Even when you send tear gas into those bunkers and shoot—what of the chivalry of war? Where is the chivalry of man to man? What a brute man is to do such

things. As for riot control, I suffered five operations on my eye for a detached retina, trying to regain its sight. What assurance do we have that those people who suffer from tear gas, whether used for riot control or against enemies, will not one day lose their eyesight? And some of us say here: well, it is permissible, with certain exceptions, to use tear gas. How did people control riots before tear gas was used?

81. We worked here on human rights for 23 years, and I read again from that Universal Declaration on Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person." And we still use gas! Why does Mr. Nixon not present us with a New Year gift now that we have received our Christmas gift? And if the Russians have some of these gases, or germs stored for the purpose of war, let them declare it and make us a gift, not on their October anniversary, but before that. Perhaps it could be a double gift by subscribing to the draft resolutions that we have before us.

82. Now I understand why the British made a division between gas and germ warfare. Why? You wanted to go piece by piece, but the race of armaments is very swift and time is of the essence, as the Secretary-General told us in his report. He does not have to tell us as everyone of us knows it. Why do you big Powers, or any lesser Powers that are stockpiling these things, not make a Christmas and New Year gift to mankind? What prevents you from doing it? We have been told time and again that there is no effective defence against full-scale attacks by major Powers on one another. Therefore, why increase the number of more deadly and more sophisticated weapons? What for?

83. Here are some more statistics. The Soviet Union has five big cities, and it has 145 cities with populations of more than 100,000. If 1,600 United States warheads were used against the Soviet Union, it is estimated that about 60 million would perish, as if it were not enough that they lost 20 million during the Second World War. Here, in one stroke they would lose 60 million. It took five years for them to lose 20 million but by the use of a push-button they would lose 60 million. What are they, rabbits? What are human beings: birds or fishes to be treated wantonly—60 million people to perish? Is this not madness and is it not schizophrenia, when we talk of human rights and devise arms to wipe out 60 million Soviets or 40 million Americans, or whatever figures these statisticians or experts tell us can be wiped out in one country or another. And this is not all as three-quarters of the Soviet industries would also be destroyed, that is, if the United States struck first.

84. Now, what if Russia strikes first? Let us see the other side of the picture. They say that the casualties might be about 100 million, more than in the Soviet Union. It is understandable because in New York City and its environs there are 10 million people. Then other big cities, such as Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and the rest will be wiped out and the sum total will be 100 million. I do not know what percentage of the industries will be destroyed. I cannot put everything in these notes. However much of American industry also would vanish.

85. This is all on paper, you say and it is a game of statistics. Fear floats all over the world and fear, if it becomes intense, generates a wakeful nightmare. And when one has a nightmare he is not responsible for his acts. Do not think that those in power are not human beings, susceptible to fear and drawn to annihilation with all the "hot lines" they have, the so-called telephones for emergencies? Things can happen in a split second, through some irresponsible man who is not even a member of the executive body in a Government.

86. There is a hackneyed quotation from the late President Kennedy, hackneyed because it has been quoted so often, but it bears repetition. He said: "Mankind must put an end to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons will put an end to mankind." And a single bullet put an end to President Kennedy. With all due respect to his memory and to his humanity, I ask: did the late President act constructively after making that statement? Here again we say that even Chiefs of State nowadays are under pressure, and the late President Kennedy was under pressure. I do not have to cite those pressures. President Kennedy made the above-quoted statement, but what did he do? He increased the United States defence budget about \$20,000 million. How do you account for such logic? In fairness to him, I think that others are doing the same.

87. How do we expect to have disarmament when the big Powers depend on a network of spying activities that cost billions upon billions of dollars, cloak and dagger, classical spies, agents, call them by whatever name you wish. I do not know what the Soviet Union has spent on spying, but from Americans I know something about what the United States has been spending on spies. I am not going to mention figures, but there are spying and subversion techniques.

88. Perhaps what I am saying will embarrass my colleagues, but I do not care. I am talking for humanity's sake here, I am not talking for the sake of the United States or Saudi Arabia or the Soviet Union. Let us be here as the United Nations and let us be frank with one another. The CIA had activities in Greece in 1948, in Iran in 1953, in Guatemala in 1954, in Lebanon in 1958, in Cuba in 1961, in the Congo in 1964, in British Guiana in 1964 and in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Who is next?

89. I do not have a catalogue of Soviet undercover activities nor do they have to give it to us. In fairness to both great Powers I must say that the smaller powers ape the great Powers. What a mad world, and yet we talk about human rights and peace and security. What a fallacy, what a mockery, what a dastardly trick on individuals who, because they belong to a great country, or any country for that matter, have to spend their blood to save democracy or an ideology or some figment of the imagination so as to enable the evil people to have their own way and destroy humanity.

90. One major Power has made commitments to defend 42 countries against aggression, and the Sixth Committee is still trying to define aggression. Who is going to determine what is aggression and what is defence? The upshot of all this is that modern Governments have not learned anything from the lessons of history. They still deceive their own

people as to dangers from the outside. That has been so throughout history. Some Powers say that they do not interfere in the affairs of others, but they contribute money to create régimes to their own liking, although they declare themselves to be democracies and those régimes are dictatorships. That again is a vicious circle. Democracy has been reduced to a ritual. Instead of the spirit of democracy we have the machine and the votes. Once those who are elected are in power they forget all about their constituents.

91. Unfortunately many Powers need arms to maintain what is called the *status quo*. In this Organization we talk about—what? social progress and economic development. Is that not a contradiction in terms? They need arms for the *status quo*. I am not mentioning them by name as they themselves know who they are.

92. While we talk about disarmament we should see how much research is being done on armaments. In one major country \$8,000 million a year are spent on research for arms, lobbyists, and public relation activities to tell the people that those arms are necessary for their defence. Is that not a tragedy? But why all this? Again we can draw from history a lesson that should be heeded. The First World War was fought because the Allies were afraid that the Germans would win many markets which they had thought secure for themselves. That is understandable as it is the economic factor. Napoleon, for that matter, was motivated by glory. If the factor had been economic, he would not have sacrificed the flower of France, going as far as Moscow and then retreating in the snow, and there would not have been Talleyrand and Metternich, who decried his action. I say this with all due respect to his genius, not only a military man but a man who gave France many things, including a liberal policy and a legal code after the French Revolution. Two world wars have played havoc with empires. Therefore, we find that everything revolves nowadays not so much around glory as around economic factors.

93. I may say that the United States suffered very little in the Second World War; 232,000 casualties, which is negligible compared to the approximately 60 million casualties that Europe suffered, of which, as I mentioned, 20 million were Russians. Is it any wonder that the Russians submitted an item called "The strengthening of international security"? I think we should give them credit for that. It was not for propaganda purposes, I believe, although I may be fooled. They were afraid and they still are; otherwise there would not be a Helsinki conference.

94. This country, our host, which is as great as the Soviet Union, suffered only 232,000 casualties. The Americans have not suffered as much as the Europeans but I believe that the intellectuals in this country are now aware that any major war would perhaps wipe out one-half of the population here. And what for?

95. Economically speaking the Second World War produced two victors: Germany and Japan. If we study the sociology of war we find that the factors are economic. The victor is bankrupt or almost bankrupt nowadays.

96. A *détente*, sometimes called coexistence, is not enough. How do we disarm? By concentrating on devices to monitor what another State is doing? I maintain that we would be wasting our time in this Committee if we followed that course. We should appeal to the two Powers to familiarize the whole world with the havoc a world war would create. The only way to do that, is to utilize one of those information satellites so that everything we say in this Committee—and we would be emboldened to say more—would reach people, not only in cities and towns but also in hamlets and small communities, so that public opinion would become militant in the cause of peace, rather than wait for the outcome of conferences. How many sophisticated lethal weapons does one State or the other have? It is a guessing game and world cannot afford guessing games.

97. No big State nowadays is fighting a war for democracy or to bolster a certain ideology. Again I quote Mr. Rusk, who said: “To prevent China from establishing its Power over the masses of the East: that is why we are in Viet-Nam.” Again the economic factor: Americans have markets in the Far East. Here in the United Nations could we not devise a way by which those markets not only would be sustained but would grow, without having to wage war? Perhaps it is easier said than done but we cannot go on like this.

98. Alarmists are gaining the upper hand in the defence ministry of almost every country. No longer do slogans attract the people of the world. Youth is questioning governments as to why they prevent social progress and economic development by diverting to war uses most of the taxes they levy on young people and their elders. They would like to see budgets devoted to peace rather than to destruction. In almost every country youth is steadfast in refusing to be sacrificed to fill the coffers of industrialists or of those who want to maintain themselves in power at any cost.

99. I will quote what one general said, to show what the war mentality is among certain people who direct the war machines of the State. This general, whom I shall not name so as not to embarrass his country, said: “War justifies the existence of the Establishment, provides experience for the military novice and challenges for the senior officer. Wars and emergencies put the military and their leaders on the front pages.” Shall we allow the military to dominate us? Should any one great country assume the responsibility for policing the world and by what mandate do they police it? To protect their interests. We would like to see their interests grow and flourish but by other means, not arms, because, after all, the maintenance of an arms industry will in the long run bring bankruptcy, and, economically speaking, it is not worth while.

100. Is there any pride in acquiring more and more power? That is not the yardstick to follow in the twentieth century as there is no longer any pride in power.

101. I have spent more time than I should, trying to give a few stray thoughts on how we can perhaps put an end to this armaments race. I have one last suggestion and it is a modest one. I have mentioned in this Committee, and in my speeches in other committees during the last few years on how to ensure international security, the item submitted by the Soviet Union.

102. I would say that the only way to stop the carnage and to prevent the suicide of mankind would be to unify all the partitioned lands that are being used for strategic purposes by certain Powers: unify Viet-Nam and Korea; correct the partition of the Middle East which was carried out in contravention of the principles of the Charter, the principle of self-determination; unify Germany, and neutralize all those States. It is not sufficient to unify them; they must be neutralized. Austria nowadays is a bridge between the East and West. Why should not Korea and Viet-Nam be bridges between South-East Asia and those who have economic interests in that region? Why should not, for example, a country like Germany—and I consider Germany as one—stretch out a hand to the Soviet Union to co-operate with it in developing its limitless resources.

103. Nobody can say the Germans are not as capable as the Americans in industry. The Soviet Union did wonders between 1927 and 1939 during its industrial revolution and I am not talking of the political revolution of 1917. I was in Western Europe when they asked for the aid of American engineers. In 12 years they converted the Soviet Union from an agricultural country to a highly industrialized country, with help from outside of course.

104. What if they opened the gates and participated with the Germans, and other European countries for that matter, to hasten the development of the Soviet Union? Nowadays 60 per cent of manufactured goods are consumed by the United States. Do you know that if the Soviet Union and European countries were to develop their resources they would have twice the consumption of the 60 per cent of the world's manufactured goods that the United States uses. And anyone who has enough to eat and enough to live at peace, will not want war. Then we, the so-called developing countries, will benefit and we will not have to resort to arms; small countries one against the other. The whole key to disarmament is economics and not accelerating the race, making it more swift, because of fear. Otherwise we will be wasting our time and we will be coming, year in and year out, to this very Committee, speaking of devices that may perhaps detect what a rival is doing in the field of armament, and that is not a solution to the problem. Peace can be obtained only by more trade, more industry, more commercial intercourse, and higher prices for raw materials in the developing countries. Then, when there is prosperity, there will be peace.

*The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.*