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AGENDA ITEMS 29, 104, 30 AND 31

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7639, A/7681 and A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/989)

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Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (*continued*):

(a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2);

(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General (A/7678 and Add.1-3);

(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General (A/7568 and A/7743)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Kolo (Nigeria), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

1. Mr. BOGDAN (Romania): Before I proceed with my statement, I should like to say how honoured I am, as a freshman in this Committee, to serve under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Shahi and the Vice-Chairmanship of Ambassador Kolo, and to work with the other experienced representatives around this table.

2. We in the Romanian delegation have studied with great care and welcomed the important statement made by Chairman Shahi at the beginning of this debate [*1691st meeting*]. We fully share the view that this Committee has a great opportunity for taking a number of specific and active measures towards further curbing the arms race, and we assure members that we shall abide by the Chairman's appeal for a businesslike discussion in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill.

3. The importance and aptness of this debate is enhanced this year, in our opinion, by two main factors. In the first place, in spite of all the endeavours undertaken in the disarmament negotiations, the armaments race has not slowed down. The armaments race continues to drain huge resources and material means, thus putting a heavy burden on the progress of all States and peoples; it has reached the edge of a new nuclear spiral, which cannot but aggravate the danger that the ceaseless stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction represents for world peace and security. In the second place, a reappraisal against the background of present-day realities of the *raison d'être* and of the activity of the United Nations—a process which is already under way in our Organization but which is widening in view of the proximity of the twenty-fifth anniversary—is inconceivable without an assessment of the role and the contribution of the United Nations to the cause of disarmament.

4. Bearing this in mind, we feel that the prime consideration which should be stressed here is that any constructive approach to disarmament problems must be based on the fundamental principles of international law enshrined in the Charter.

5. A quarter of a century ago the United Nations chose as its fundamental goal the maintenance of international peace and security and, in order to achieve that goal, to take effective collective measures for the prevention of threats to the peace, for the suppression of acts of aggression, and to bring about the settlement of international disputes exclusively by peaceful means, in conformity with the requirements of justice. In connexion with this aim the United Nations committed itself to contributing to the development of relations among States based on the principles of national independence and sovereignty, equal rights, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual advantage.

6. The provisions of the Charter create the image of an unarmed world where not only is the utilization of force or pressures of any kind legally forbidden, and war is excluded from permissible procedures, but also the utilization of force becomes impossible practically speaking by the achievement of disarmament. Conversely, it seems impossible to us to conceive of an effective measure of disarmament outside the strict observance of the universally valid principles of international law.

7. The extended debates on disarmament within the United Nations, in the General Assembly as well as in the Geneva Committee, have consecrated as a unanimously accepted doctrine the thesis that the main objective of any efficient and realistic programme of disarmament is general disarmament. Naturally, the attainment of that objective is closely connected with the fulfilment of the aspirations of all nations to peace, security, prosperity and progress.

8. The President of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, stated recently:

“Of decisive importance for the improvement of the international climate would be the achievement of general disarmament, in the first place nuclear disarmament—the radical way to eliminate the threat of an atomic war. This would constitute a huge positive contribution not only to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of peace, but also to the general advancement of mankind; the considerable funds allotted to armaments today could be employed for the acceleration of the economic and social development of nations, for bridging the wide gaps existing nowadays in the level of the forces of production, for the material and cultural potential of States and for improving the living conditions of peoples.”

9. We are convinced that general disarmament, the common cause of all mankind, can be viewed only as an extensive collective endeavour to which all States could and should make their contribution regardless of their size, population or economic or military power. It is in that spirit that my country supports the idea of convening a world conference on disarmament, to which all States would be invited, with appropriate conditions being created for the participation.

10. As we have stated time and again, we consider that any realistic approach to the major problems of international life, and especially of disarmament, implies as a basic prerequisite the assurance of the participation of the People's Republic of China.

11. The disquieting nuclear reality frequently evoked in our debates, the provisions of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the numerous resolutions of the General Assembly, the agenda of the Disarmament Committee adopted on 15 August 1968, all point to the primacy of nuclear disarmament. That fact is acknowledged also by the Committee on Disarmament in paragraph 37 of its report [A/7741-DC/232],¹ which states:

“The Committee is convinced of the continued need to give highest priority in its work to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament . . .”.

12. It is time to transform this “highest priority” into a practical guideline for the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. In the view of the Romanian Government, this implies the enactment of a set of measures, including the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and the reduction and eventually the complete elimination of existing stockpiles.

13. Obviously, a realistic approach to the disarmament problem calls for the adoption of collateral measures, paralleling actions directed towards the central objective, general disarmament—and in the first place, nuclear disarmament—and meant to slow down the present arms competition and lessen the nuclear danger.

14. The Romanian delegation takes this opportunity of expressing its satisfaction at the opening of bilateral talks between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive. We hope that these talks, which represent an important part of the efforts of the international community for the conclusion of effective agreements on disarmament, will proceed successfully, thus contributing to the acceleration of the negotiations on nuclear disarmament taking place in the Geneva Committee and, at the same time, having a favourable effect on international co-operation as a whole.

15. In our view an important role devolves, within the collateral measures, on the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, a measure the significance of which goes beyond the framework of the disarmament negotiations.

16. At a time when the principles of law and international legality enshrined in the Charter prescribe the obligation of States to abstain in international relations from the use of force or the threat of force—which, of course, includes the use of nuclear weapons—the conclusion of a convention providing for the formal prohibition of the use of these weapons would represent a materialization, a necessary extension of a norm *jus cogens* in a special case: the case of nuclear weapons.

¹ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.

17. An important step in that direction was taken when Member States, taking into account the general status of international law, acknowledged in the well-known declaration contained in resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 that "The use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations".

18. Until the complete elimination of the nuclear arsenal is attained, the non-nuclear-weapon States—which, in conformity with the non-proliferation Treaty, are renouncing these weapons—have the legitimate right to obtain effective guarantees, through an appropriate international agreement, that they will never under any pretext be subjected to the threat of, or an attack by, nuclear weapons.

19. We have also time and again declared ourselves in favour of banning underground nuclear weapon tests. Such a prohibition would, in our view, represent a collateral measure aimed at slowing down the process of improving existing nuclear arsenals and, consequently, at applying a brake to the nuclear arms race in general.

20. There is a commitment to negotiate such a treaty undertaken by the States signatories of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. However, its conclusion has been delayed, although the advances of seismological research and the proposals submitted to the Committee on Disarmament—among which we should like to commend the valuable Swedish proposal—constitute favourable prerequisites for assiduous negotiations on the matter.

21. Although, as is stated in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly, "... the Committee devoted considerable attention to the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests" [*ibid.*, para. 22], the results are far from being satisfactory.

22. The Romanian delegation notes with satisfaction the continuous assertion of the nuclear-free zones concept which we have consistently upheld and promoted. We have supported the endeavours to create such zones in Africa, in Latin America and in other areas.

23. It is the considered view of the Romanian Government that the establishment of nuclear-free zones, accompanied by corresponding safeguards on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers, represents one of the measures capable of diminishing the danger of the use of nuclear weapons, a measure capable of encouraging mutual trust and good neighbourly relations among the States belonging to the regions concerned, and one which at the same time would exert a positive influence on the international situation.

24. Romania has welcomed from the very beginning the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and follows with keen interest the efforts of the Latin American nations which have achieved the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a widely populated area, offering to the international community an experience to be explored and continued further. We express our appreciation to the delegation of Mexico

through whose care and good offices the United Nations has been kept informed on the debates on this subject.

25. The mutual influence between disarmament and security has been stressed many times during our debate. We consider that the question of European security acquires a meaning for disarmament which goes beyond the limits of the European continent, if we take into account that it is precisely in Europe that we find the main concentrations of arms and armed forces of the opposing military-political groupings.

26. The Romanian Government considers that the essence of European security is a system of clear-cut commitments by all States and specific measures meant to offer a full guarantee to every single State that it is protected from the threat of aggression or of any other act of force or from the threat of the use of force; that is to say, specific measures meant to assure the peaceful development of States in a climate of *détente*, understanding and co-operation.

27. It is in this spirit that we declare ourselves in favour of the adoption of a firm course towards the elimination of the military blocs, of the North Atlantic alliance and, concurrently, of the Warsaw Treaty—a proposal put forward repeatedly by the socialist States parties to the Treaty. Significant steps towards the achievement of that aim could be the dismantling of foreign military bases, the withdrawal of all non-European troops from the continent and the withdrawal of all foreign troops to within their national boundaries.

28. An agreement among European States to refrain from actions or demonstrations of force would acquire great importance within this framework. There is no doubt in our minds that such measures would create a climate of confidence lending itself to a successful approach to the problems of world peace and security, which of course include disarmament.

29. Starting from the concept on which its position of principle is based, Romania has declared itself in favour of the explicit banning by international instruments of all weapons of mass destruction and also of their complete elimination. Romania has acted energetically to try to achieve this aim and accordingly attaches great significance to the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

30. By their particularly dangerous character, by their capacity for producing immediate and long-range effects, both undifferentiated and uncontrollable, these weapons—together with thermonuclear weapons—are contrary to the moral commandments and to the norms of international law.

31. As a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol,² Romania is prepared to support any action which is aimed at strengthening that important international agreement by ensuring that it is acceded to and strictly observed by all countries.

32. Our over-all picture of weapons of mass destruction is completed by the important report entitled *Chemical and*

² United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

*Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use.*³ This report is the conclusion of an action initiated two years ago by the presentation of a similar document regarding nuclear weapons.⁴

33. The Romanian delegation would like to take this opportunity of addressing its congratulations to the Secretary-General—whose permanent interest and deep commitment to disarmament we in Romania highly appreciate—to his aides and to the group of experts who have contributed to the completion of this study. As stated in the report of the Committee on Disarmament, this document “provides a useful and needed basis for further consideration of the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare” [ibid., para. 38]. We attach particular attention to the important conclusions of the Secretary-General which, in our view, should serve as guidelines for future negotiations.

34. Concerned by the incalculable risks and dangers that the weapons of mass destruction represent, the Socialist Republic of Romania, together with other socialist States, asked for the inclusion in our agenda of the subitem “Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons”.

35. To facilitate the conclusion of an international agreement on this matter, the countries which initiated this subitem have presented the draft of a convention which essentially provides for the commitment of States to refrain from manufacturing, stockpiling, improving or acquiring chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and to destroy existing stocks of such weapons [A/7655]. We hope that the draft convention will be examined with due attention and that it will be widely adhered to by States.

36. During the negotiations at Geneva and, more recently, in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction which has just completed its work, Romania had the opportunity of stating its position on the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and on the main constituent parts of a treaty on this matter. An international settlement to prevent the extension of the arms race in the sea-bed and the ocean floor and to ensure the utilization of those territories for peaceful purposes only, in conformity with the resolutions of the General Assembly, in the view of the Romanian Government, would be an important international act.

37. If this objective were not directly attained by prohibiting all military activities on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, it would be important to ensure the continuity of the negotiating process to achieve that end. This could be accomplished by the inclusion in the partial treaty of provisions similar to those included in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

³ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

⁴ *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.68.IX.1).

38. The area of the application of the treaty, which—as advocated by many States, including Romania—should begin from the twelve-mile limit, must serve the aims of the treaty exclusively without impairing the rights won by various States or affecting arrangements now in force or other norms of the law of the sea, and, most important, the rights of coastal States over the continental shelf recognized by the Convention on the Continental Shelf which was concluded at Geneva on 29 April 1958. To avoid any ambiguity it is necessary to include in the operative part of the future treaty an explicit provision stipulating that none of its clauses can be interpreted as infringing upon sovereign rights exercised by the coastal State in accordance with the norms of international law regarding the continental shelf now in force.

39. The implementation of the treaty would require instituting an efficient system of control carried out through the intermediary of an appropriate international body whose exclusive task would be to verify the observance of the commitments assumed under the treaty. The system of control should take into account the interests of all States, without discrimination, to ensure conditions for genuine participation in the control operations of small and medium-sized States which cannot afford the means necessary for carrying out the control. The control provisions should be harmonized with the norms governing the régime of the continental shelf, so that it is important to include in the treaty a clause stipulating that the consent of the coastal States should precede control operations on their continental shelf.

40. In the view of the Romanian delegation the presentation of a revised text of the sea-bed treaty [A/7741-DC/232, annex A], is a positive step. We are examining this new draft in the light of the above-mentioned considerations and we reserve our right to revert to this subject, if need be, later in the debate.

41. Many delegations have paid special attention—and rightly so—to the item regarding the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. In our view this is a new illustration of the fact that nowadays disarmament is a cause for all States—big, small and medium-sized—and at the same time a reflection of the direct links between the vital interests of peoples in nuclear disarmament and their opportunity to utilize atomic energy for development.

42. We believe that IAEA retains an important role in bringing to life the inalienable right of the non-nuclear-weapon States to utilize atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to benefit from the advantages of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. IAEA offers an appropriate framework for the solution of the multiple questions raised in this vast field of international co-operation and in the view of the Romanian delegation the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States would constitute a useful contribution.

43. A review of the main problems of disarmament reveals the lack of progress in the achievement of genuine measures of disarmament. We consider that the absence of significant results in the field of nuclear disarmament should be a matter of special concern as should the neglect during the last few years of the problem of general disarmament by

the Geneva Committee, a body which was invested by the General Assembly with the mandate of negotiating a treaty on general disarmament. As a general rule, the lack of progress in this field is justified by invoking the difficulties related to the technical complexity of the problems posed by the existence of modern weapons, their interdependence, and the need for maintaining the balance of force between different Powers.

44. Those difficulties are without doubt real. However we laymen, who are interested in the elimination of modern weapons but have no experience in that field, wish to understand better the nature and scope of those weapons so as to know what we are talking about; and when we question scientists or specialists their predominant answer is that any escape from the vicious circle of the race aimed at the perfection of such weapons must come through political rather than technical formulas. This conclusion is also confirmed by the practice of the negotiations on disarmament. This is why we are convinced that the essential factor which could overcome the difficulties existing in the field of disarmament is represented by the political will of States, and primarily that of the nuclear Powers.

45. The role this factor plays is reflected in the juridical thinking of States. According to the proceedings of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, the idea of the obligation of States to pursue disarmament negotiations has emerged as a corollary to the principle forbidding the resort to force. The same obligation—to pursue disarmament negotiations in good faith—is also embodied in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

46. It is the considered opinion of my delegation that, starting from the above-mentioned premises, the General Assembly, the Member States are duty bound to contribute fully to a new pace and a new content in the disarmament negotiations in accordance with the resolutions, objectives and principles of the United Nations and with the interests and expectations of peoples. As for my country, a socialist State profoundly attached to the cause of peace, an active participant in the negotiations on disarmament, Romania is firmly determined to act in that way.

47. We feel that the elaboration of a programme of disarmament negotiations and of disarmament measures, including short-term as well as long-range actions, would stimulate the political will of States, would open vast vistas for the disarmament talks, and would allow for the establishment of a reasonable order of priorities and target dates for the achievement of the various measures of disarmament. That would bring us closer to the major goal: general disarmament, and in the first place, nuclear disarmament. That is why Romania, as mentioned in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament “suggested on 3 April 1969 that consideration should be given to proclamation of a ‘United Nations Disarmament Decade, 1970-1980’” [A/7741-DC/232, para. 57].

48. In our view the objectives of the Disarmament Decade should draw inspiration from the principles of the United Nations Charter, from the resolutions on disarmament

adopted by the General Assembly in recent years, from the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, and the provisions of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Obviously, they should take into account the suggestions advanced by various States in the Geneva Committee, in the General Assembly, and in the present debate.

49. On the basis of a first draft worked out in the Committee on Disarmament the programme could be completed in the General Assembly with the wide participation of all Members of the United Nations. Thus the programme could represent the basis for the disarmament actions taken within the Disarmament Decade, making sure that the burning question of disarmament was placed—along with development—in the focus of world community preoccupations during the period 1970-1980.

50. The Romanian delegation expresses its deep satisfaction at the incorporation in the introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization of the suggestion that the period 1970-1980 should be proclaimed as “the disarmament decade” paralleling the Second United Nations Development Decade.⁵ This would enable the international community to merge its efforts in these two fields of vital importance for the advancement of mankind and for the promotion of peace. The idea of proclaiming a disarmament decade has met with interest and many delegations have declared themselves in favour of it during the debates in the plenary Assembly as well as in this Committee. Through its resolution 2499 (XXIV) of 31 October 1969 the General Assembly has endorsed the proposal of a disarmament decade which will coincide with the Second United Nations Development Decade, and in this respect “entrusts the competent bodies of the Organization with the task of presenting concrete proposals to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session”. The Romanian delegation is consulting other delegations with a view to reaching agreement on a draft resolution on this subject.

51. There is no question but that there is a discrepancy between the volume and the duration of the debates on disarmament on the one hand and the results obtained on the other hand, and this is a source of legitimate dissatisfaction and disappointment. But in our opinion it would be a mistake which might have grave consequences if that situation led to discouragement and made us slacken our endeavours to accomplish disarmament. A sober analysis of international realities makes it clear that, despite the obstacles—sometimes big—the ideas of peace, security and international legality are gaining ground. In our view disarmament remains the only alternative to follow, but we should endeavour to follow it in a more efficient way, with perseverance and a sense of responsibility, towards the safeguarding of peace and security, the most vital needs of peoples all over the world.

52. Mr. ORTIZ (Costa Rica) (*translated from Spanish*): My delegation will endeavour to maintain a sense of proportion in its statement on the subject of disarmament, in the conviction that disarmament is equally important to

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, paras. 42-46.

all peoples and to all Powers, great or small; whether victimizers or victims, all are harmed by the brutal use of weapons, and this concerns us all, since we are part of the human race.

53. After long and exhaustive efforts during the first 25 years of its existence to realize the principles of its Charter, the United Nations is now convinced that peace will be possible only after total disarmament of all the nations in the universe has been achieved. That is why it has decided, as a positive working objective, that the next 10 years shall be wholly dedicated to finding the ways to bring about complete disarmament without further delay and has given this formidable undertaking the inspiring title of "Disarmament Decade". We must all heed that appeal. It has been said that arms are more dangerous in the hands of small nations than in those of nations with great arsenals; this means that we all have an obligation to participate in achieving that objective, and in order to do so, we must begin by agreeing on certain definitions.

54. Peace is closely related to security and development, neither of which can be achieved so long as Powers whose armaments are already excessive continue to stockpile means of destruction in vast quantities of nightmarish potential and the horrified world awaits the dread moment when the furies of war will be unloosed, wiping out all the values of every civilization.

55. There is no respite from the fear inspired by the stream of scientific reports that the nuclear Powers have bombs so enormously powerful that a small fraction of them would suffice for the total destruction of the world. When vast sums are spent on weapons which can never be used, while peoples living in fear of destruction are denied the money they must have to meet their basic needs, we do not see this as security. A security built on fear and forcing mankind to live in apprehension can never be a source of peace, and therefore we say that security based on force of arms is not security at all. Security must be based on the noble principles of justice by which all social groups must live, bringing the political stability that springs from the freely exercised will of the world's peoples.

56. Economic development is also unattainable so long as the arms race continues its present tragic course. Arms cost millions, and so does development. The choice is clear: either exorbitant sums are spent on nuclear and conventional weapons or the money is used to fight ignorance, disease and poverty, the scourges which keep so many nations under-developed.

57. It is easy to show that the more weapons a developing country has, the greater the wretchedness among its people. That is why we say that there can be neither security nor economic development until there is complete disarmament, both in nuclear weapons, which terrorize all mankind, and in conventional weapons, which tyrannize individual peoples.

58. Economic development means educating people, opening more and more schools, providing medical care and medicine to control disease, and opening roads and building bridges to open up agricultural areas. Money invested in such undertakings will yield a hundred fold return by

preparing peoples economically, politically and socially for a life of dignity. The rich nations and those which are not rich but also spend fortunes on arms are robbing mankind of its right to a better life.

59. Another characteristic of armed nations is that they maintain the armies with which military and political systems are created. Armies also cost millions, and their leaders know that they were not created in order to defend national territory against aggression or the danger of war with neighbouring countries but are, in fact, centres of strength which, all too frequently, stage coups d'état on the pretext of maintaining an allegedly imperilled order. Thus institutions are damaged and peoples are mistreated and denied the right to elect their own governments. Military coups lead to the enthroning of castes which come to embody the denial of human rights and of any democratic progress.

60. Each coup d'état means a university that does not open, a hospital closed, a road that is not built and, above all, the disillusionment of a people whose sovereign right to vote is violated. These armies maintained for domestic use, armed to the teeth, tyrannize the people and trample on the Constitution after throwing it into the waste-paper basket. Pursuing their dictatorial interests, they extend their influence to all countries, giving support to armed bands known as guerillas which invade these countries, tarnish their sovereignty, spread terror among their people and upset their stability, in violation of the principles of self-determination and non-intervention.

61. For these reasons, disarmament must be total, covering all weapons and nations, whether large, average-sized or small. The evils that stem from the violation of human rights within individual countries and the evils that threaten the whole world are equally pernicious; therefore they must be banned, so that the bright path leading to peace may be cleared.

62. My homeland, Costa Rica, is a small country which has always been determined to live a peaceful and free life, guided by its democratic institutions. It is considered an economically under-developed nation, for it has not been able to attain a sufficiently high income level to be numbered among the developed countries. Its income, already low, is continuing to decline because Costa Rica cannot get a fair price for its agricultural exports but must sell at the prices determined by foreign markets, while at the same time it must buy manufactured goods at the high prices fixed by the super-developed exporters. As a result, my country cannot build up sufficient resources to promote the economic progress that would raise it out of its poverty. But, in its tremendous struggle to improve itself, it has not been guilty of wasting a single cent on arms. Fifty-four per cent of Costa Rica's budget is allocated to education and health, while barely 1.8 per cent is spent on internal security and the police. There is no budgetary allocation for cannons, tanks or airplanes, nor are there any generals, colonels, gold-braided aides-de-camp, lieutenants or soldiers. Twenty years ago a constitutional prohibition abolished the army, and during our two decades as humble apprentices of disarmament our moral position has been strengthened. We are not obsessed by the idea of attacking or being attacked. We have faith in the international

organizations to which we belong—the United Nations, the Organization of American States and the Organization of Central American States. If we should ever become involved in international disputes, we would bring them before these organizations.

63. That is why we are speaking here, to make our modest contribution to the ideals of peace, even though some cynics might suppose that the reason why we have given up arms is that we are an under-developed country. But we must spare no effort to make other peoples realize that it is possible to live without armies.

64. The picture of the world presented to younger generations today is heartbreaking. Young people look up at the sky and see it filled with aircraft carrying atomic bombs capable of destroying the entire world in minutes. They look out to sea and are paralysed by the anguish of knowing that plans are being made to set off in the ocean depths bombs that may cause unforeseeable disasters; they turn their eyes to the land and hear the dreadful sound of underground tests that may perhaps open the gates of hell. Violence is everywhere—in the sky, in the sea and on land. If that is the future we offer to young people—a world of desolation and death—we should not be surprised if they are confused and alienated, trying to break away from the past and clamouring for a glimpse of a future in which it is possible at least to live in peace.

65. In my country we have a popular saying: “You cannot make chocolate without cacao”. By the same reasoning, we should like to point out, turning from abstractions to realities, that there can be no wars without arms, no armies without swords, no guerillas without machine-guns. If we abolish arms, then, as the Bible teaches us, the rest will follow. Peace will come through disarmament.

66. U SOE TIN (Burma): Once again, in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization,⁶ the Secretary-General has alerted the conscience of all the peoples of the world in general, and of the Member States in particular, to the relative lack of progress in disarmament negotiations in the face of mounting global expenditure on armaments together with an uncontrollable escalation of the nuclear arms race. The Secretary-General’s concern in this regard has been very ably supported by the fully documented research made by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and published only a few days ago in its *Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968-1969*.⁷

67. The pursuit of disarmament has held international attention since the late nineteenth century. Beginning with The Hague Peace Conference of 1899, disarmament became the concern of international bodies, a concern that was to grow with the cost of modern armaments and the trauma of world wars. The search for global disarmament continued unabated throughout the periods preceding the First and Second World Wars. When the United Nations Charter was signed at San Francisco in June 1945 the world Organization proclaimed as one of its main purposes and principles

the maintenance of international peace and security. The founding Members entrusted specific responsibilities for disarmament and the regulation of armaments to the Security Council and the General Assembly, thus providing the legal basis for all further activities and negotiations in that field. Under Article 47 of the Charter the Security Council, with the advice and assistance of the Military Staff Committee, was made responsible for formulating plans for the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament. But the events affecting one of the permanent members since 1949 have obviously crippled the role of the Military Staff Committee and also of the Security Council in this regard. Under Article 11 of the Charter, the General Assembly was also empowered to consider the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and to make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

68. The first resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 24 January 1946 relates to the setting up of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the request made to it for the drawing up of plans for the control of atomic energy and for the elimination of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons of mass destruction. In 1947 the Security Council established the Commission for Conventional Armaments [*resolution 18 (1947)*]. That was the period when the United States had a nuclear monopoly and the Soviet Union was considered to be superior in conventional weapons. Naturally, proposals made by the two sides were at cross purposes with a resultant stalemate in the talks. Meanwhile the United States monopoly on atomic bombs was broken by the Soviet Union in 1949, followed by the United Kingdom in 1952. A new Disarmament Commission was established in 1952 by resolution 502 (VI) and was entrusted with the task of preparing proposals for the

“... regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only”.

After two years the discussions moved to a restricted sub-committee consisting of the Big Four and Canada.

69. In 1957 the General Assembly decided in resolution 1150 (XII) to increase the membership of the Disarmament Commission to 25 but the resolution remained still-born. In 1958 the Disarmament Commission became a body composed of all Members of the United Nations on an *ad hoc* basis for 1959 and from 1959 onwards it continued on a regular basis. Meanwhile in September 1959, the Big Four meeting at Geneva decided to create a Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee which was to become the forerunner of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, now the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as the chief negotiating body to resume disarmament negotiations. In 1961 the two super-Powers reached an agreement to enlarge the Committee by adding eight non-aligned nations and on their initiative the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 1722 (XVI) unanimously endorsed the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament established under joint Soviet-United States agreement. The enlargement,

⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 26-46.

⁷ Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell; New York, Humanities Press; London, Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd.

however, took formal effect only after United Nations General Assembly endorsement. Organizationally the Committee on Disarmament remains outside the United Nations body although the United Nations provides services and although it submits its reports to the General Assembly. The non-participation of France and the exclusion of the People's Republic of China remain the negative aspects of this disarmament negotiating body.

70. The framework of the negotiations of the Committee on Disarmament is derived from the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations⁸—commonly known as the McCloy-Zorin statement—issued by the United States and the USSR on 20 September 1961 following an exchange of views held on a bilateral basis earlier. Briefly the principles concern reduction of military potential, sequenced and balanced stages in the disarmament process, timing and transition of such stages, verification to be applied under United Nations framework, institution of the peace-keeping machinery, effort on collateral measures and signatory by militarily significant States and allies. In an exchange of letters enclosed with the statement, the United States maintained that verification must assure that agreed levels of forces are not exceeded, while the USSR expressed strong opposition to the establishment of control over armaments.

71. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament commenced work in 1962 with two draft papers on general and complete disarmament. The USSR submitted a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control,⁹ comprising three stages to be completed within four years, which was later extended to five years. The plan provides, *inter alia*, for the complete elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles by the end of the first stage. The total elimination of nuclear weapons and fissionable material would take place during the second stage.

72. The United States submitted an "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world",¹⁰ also comprising three stages, which provided *inter alia* for ending production of fissionable material and the reduction by 30 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles in the second stage. It also envisaged that stocks of nuclear weapons would be reduced by an agreed percentage and that production would be subject to agreed limitation on the second stage. The total elimination of such weapons would take place in the third stage. The first and second stages would each be completed within a three-year period. The third stage would be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible.

73. The 1964 session was again spotlighted by two major proposals on the part of the two super-Powers. The United States proposed¹¹ discussion on a number of collateral

measures that might be agreed upon outside the framework of general and complete disarmament, such as the prohibition of the use of force for the resolution of territorial disputes, a halt to further increases in strategic armaments through a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles, a verified halt of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the creation of a system of observation posts as a measure to reduce danger of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack, the prohibition of the spread of nuclear weapons and a ban on all nuclear weapon tests under effective verification and control. The Soviet Union submitted a nine-point memorandum¹² on various measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension, such as the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries; the reduction of the total numbers of armed forces of States; the reduction of military budgets; the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries; the establishment of denuclearized zones; prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons; measures to prevent surprise attack; the elimination of bomber aircraft and the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. The common factor of both the United States and the USSR approach lay in the emphasis made on collateral measures—measures that are designed to bring the danger of war under control but do not themselves result in the actual reduction of existing armaments; both the parties, however, advocated a "freeze" or "slow down" in the arms race. Even in this respect no specific progress has yet been made in either the nuclear or the conventional field. At times the Soviet Union has advanced sweeping plans but the omission of provisions for international safeguards under proper verification and control proved unacceptable to the Western Power. Indeed from the outset of the discussions the two super-Powers were diametrically opposed in approach. The Soviet Union placed more emphasis on the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the beginning and the United States adhered to a gradual across-the-board reduction process, on the grounds that its military balance with the USSR rested on its nuclear strength. Until 1968 the international political context had not changed sufficiently to provide the necessary conditions to alter this basic divergency in views between the two great Powers. These factors explain why disarmament progress made so far lies in the area of collateral measures or non-armament measures. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the hot-line agreement of 1963, the Treaty Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1967 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 come under this category.

74. I have gone to such length in setting out these detailed programmes and proposals and the agreements reached so far—for which I should also crave the indulgence of my colleagues—to prove the point that no arms control or disarmament measure is possible unless the major armed Powers are ready for agreement. It is not the lack of authority or of a forum or, for that matter, of plans, programmes, proposals and ideas, that has so far prevented

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 90, document A/C.1/867.*

¹⁰ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex 1, section F; for the text of the amendments, ibid., document DC/205, annex 1, sections E and F.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Supplement for January to December 1964, document DC/209, annex 1, section B.*

¹² *Ibid.*, section E.

the achievement of even a reasonable measure of progress in the disarmament endeavours. It is the lack of political will on the part of these major Powers, resulting from mutual distrust, suspicion and fear, that has so far frustrated all efforts to arrive at any meaningful agreement on disarmament. It is a well-known fact that no appreciable progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament will be possible unless the two super-Powers can at least agree on some concrete measure of commitment as an exercise of self-restraint which would result in the scaling down of their own nuclear armament programmes and eventually stop and reverse the whole order of nuclear escalation. This and this alone could put the disarmament talks in their proper perspective. Since they already possess an enormous overkill nuclear capacity themselves, such a step would not materially affect the security of these Powers, but it would, on the other hand, help to reduce or even remove the sense of compulsion to catch up on the part of the remaining nuclear Powers now outside the scope of the negotiations. It is therefore with a deep sense of gratification and encouragement that we welcome the Helsinki strategic arms limitation talks now being conducted between the United States and the USSR. We join with you, Mr. Chairman, in expressing our earnest hopes for the success of these talks, the outcome of which could really be decisive for the future of all humanity. It is also our fervent hope that the two super-Powers will be able to suspend all further work on the development of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems as called for by the Secretary-General, pending further developments in these talks.

75. Following the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty in July 1968, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament decided in August 1968 on the following four-point agenda for its future work: first, further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. Under this heading come measures dealing with the cessation of testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of the manufacture of weapons, and the reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear free zones, etc. Secondly, non-nuclear measures, such as chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitations, and so forth. Thirdly, other collateral measures, including the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. Fourthly, general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

76. The 1969 session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament marked a new phase in the history of the negotiating body; it met for the last time under its old designation. As may be seen in paragraphs 9 to 12 of its report [A/7741-DC/232], the Committee was strengthened by the addition of eight new members: Japan and Mongolia joining the Committee on 3 July 1969, and Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia on 7 August 1969. The name of the Committee was changed from the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the Committee on Disarmament on 26 August 1969, and the meetings after that were held under the new name of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

77. The decision of the two Co-Chairmen to enlarge the membership no doubt reflected the sentiments and wishes expressed in recent years in the First Committee to expand the composition of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to make it more representative of the international community. We would have wished that this enlargement—which truly reflects the geographic and political balance, while at the same time preserving the Committee as a small and effective negotiating body—could have been done in the manner of the earlier enlargement of 1961, by means of a prior General Assembly resolution.

78. We would extend our welcome once again to each new member of that Committee, with which we have had the most cordial relations. We are particularly gratified that they were able to participate in the Committee's work at its last session and that they have already made some very valuable contributions. We are confident that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will continue to receive the benefit of their wisdom in its future work.

79. Among the wide range of disarmament measures that received the attention of the Committee during its 1969 session, I shall first deal with the issue of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The problem of extending the 1963 partial test ban Treaty to underground tests was held up from 1965 to 1968 during the process of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for the conclusion of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. None the less, the urgency of the case for a comprehensive test ban was constantly stressed as a measure to be linked with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and as a priority obligation to be assumed by the nuclear Powers as a tangible step towards nuclear disarmament.

80. Underground nuclear testing for military purposes has come to denote the nuclear arms race itself, with the word "testing" signifying developing, improving, perfecting, diversifying and, of course, quantitatively increasing nuclear weapon systems. A ban on such testing is therefore required, not only as a necessary first step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race, but also to underpin such agreements as may, we hope, emerge from the strategic arms limitation talks.

81. In accordance with the recommendations contained in General Assembly resolution 2455 (XXIII) adopted last year, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament devoted considerable attention to the consideration of the subject with a view to the elaboration of a draft treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

82. A welcome development in this matter was the decisive and most constructive initiative taken by the Swedish delegation in presenting to the Committee on 1 April 1969 a working paper which set forth suggestions on possible provisions for a treaty banning underground nuclear weapons tests [A/7741-DC/232, *annex C, section 6*]. That working paper contained carefully considered, practical ideas and the document contains the seeds of a prospective comprehensive test ban treaty.

83. Burma supports the Swedish initiative as a gratifying move within the right framework. However, progress towards an agreement continues to be hampered by

differences between the super-Powers on the question of verification, with both sides standing fast on their previously-stated positions. While reaffirming our support for an organized international exchange of seismological data—a concept also which owes its origin to a Swedish initiative, and for further elaboration of which we are indebted to Canada and the United Kingdom—we still feel that the conclusion of an underground test ban treaty, as well as the form and content of its verification provision, will depend ultimately on the political decisions of the Soviet Union and the United States, decisions which will have to be reached as a compromise by way of political gestures of goodwill and concessions to peace.

84. Towards that end the Burmese delegation at Geneva put forward some suggestions at the 408th meeting, which revolved on two ideas. The first concerned a possible review provision related specifically and solely to the underground test ban control provisions. Specifically, it is a formulation that would permit the treaty verification arrangements to be reviewed and adapted after a certain lapse of time. The review arrangement would serve to impart a feature of built-in flexibility to the control provisions and would form a gestation period towards a more mutually satisfactory solution at the appropriate stage.

85. The second related to what might be called the safeguards arrangement for peaceful nuclear explosions in the context of a comprehensive test ban. The idea was that an international agreement for peaceful nuclear explosions would indispensably require a safeguards procedure in the form of international observation to ensure that nuclear tests were not being carried out for purposes other than peaceful. Since this international observation set-up would be established on a mutually acceptable basis among the parties concerned, including the nuclear Powers, the reasoning is that the same international observation could conceivably be acceptable to both nuclear Powers to perform the functions of on-site inspection.

86. The present underground tests are aimed at further development in the sophistication of nuclear weapons. The elimination of that possibility lies only in an agreement on a comprehensive test ban. Therefore the most vital step for an effective cessation of the nuclear arms race lies in the conclusion of a ban on underground nuclear tests to complement the 1963 partial test ban Treaty.

87. The delegation of Burma has accordingly co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.486, which calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments, and requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

88. I now turn to the question of chemical and biological weapons. Ever since the representative of Hungary introduced the subject at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly in 1966 focus has been placed, during successive disarmament negotiations, on the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. In its 1968 report to the General Assembly¹³ the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee

recommended that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. A recommendation was incorporated in General Assembly resolution 2454 (XXIII), pursuant to which the Secretary-General transmitted to the Assembly the report entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*.¹⁴ The report prepared by the group of experts is an eye-opener to us concerning the threat that chemical and biological warfare poses to mankind. We acknowledge the importance of the report and we should like to express our indebtedness to the experts who have contributed to our increased knowledge in that respect. We shall support all genuine moves undertaken in the light of the Secretary-General's recommendations contained in the foreword to the report. We are against the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons of any kind in hostilities under any circumstances and we consider that any improvement on the present prohibition should preferably not exclude this provision. In line with this attitude, the delegation of Burma at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, together with the other 11 neutral members, submitted a working paper on a proposed declaration by the General Assembly which would confirm the universality and comprehensive nature of the existing prohibition of the use of chemical and biological methods of warfare [*ibid.*, section 30]. We believe that the text of this working paper could serve as a useful basis for such a declaration pending the elaboration of an appropriate draft convention on the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

89. I now turn to the question of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*ibid.*, annex A]. In principle, Burma supports international development for the exclusive peaceful uses of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for the benefit of mankind. Accordingly we are in favour of limiting the growth of military utilization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. We would therefore approve a general prohibition that would encompass all military activities outside a delimited coastal zone linked with the concept of a defensive security zone of 200 miles or more as the inherent right of the coastal State. We consider that no other State should have this right other than with the explicit consent of the coastal State. With regard to the limit of the coastal zone, Burma subscribes to the 12-mile theory in preference to the 3-mile one, because a wider band more sufficiently meets national security interests. The views of the delegation of Burma in that respect have been expressed at Geneva during the discussions on the first draft treaty. We still hold the view that a comprehensive prohibition would prohibit the arms race, both nuclear and conventional, from the sea-bed and would best serve the larger interests of security in the world as well as humanity's common purpose of reserving the sea-bed and the ocean floor for peaceful exploration and exploitation in the interest of mankind. However, we are not unmindful of the forceful arguments adduced by those who support a limited ban of this nature, nor do we wish to deny what a sizable number of countries consider they require in the way of certain uses of the sea-bed for defensive purposes, to

¹³ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231.

¹⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

safeguard their own security. In the circumstances, if the general consensus prevailing in the international community is favourable to the scope of prohibition proposed in the revised draft treaty, we would be prepared to accept it as a first step in the right direction. We would, however, wish that a firm assurance regarding further negotiations towards a more comprehensive prohibition should be written into the operative part of the treaty along the lines suggested by the Swedish delegation in its working paper [*ibid.*, *annex C, section 36*].

90. On the question of verification, we realize that, given the difficult geographical environment of and nature of access to the sea-bed, a control mechanism for its demilitarization would involve highly complex technical and practical problems. On the other hand, we do not consider that the present wording of article III is adequate to allay the deeply felt concern and apprehension of the smaller coastal States with respect to resources on the continental shelf. The right of verification as at present recognized in draft article III would be purely academic as far as the small States with less developed under-sea technology are concerned, as they would not be in a position to exercise free access or reciprocity. Because of these limitations, we consider that it would be necessary to devise a verification formula which would institute some form of international co-operation and which would ensure less discrimination in the sense of participation.

91. I should also like to take this opportunity of expressing our appreciation to the Co-Chairmen for the consideration they have given to the constructive suggestions made by the members of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to improving the first text of the draft treaty. We note with gratification that the revised text embodies some of the ideas put forward by the members of that Committee. A number of suggestions of an important nature still remain, on which we assume the two Co-Chairmen have not been able to agree as yet. We felt reassured at hearing what Ambassador Yost said in his opening statement on disarmament on 17 November:

"We do not believe that this draft, as far as it was developed at Geneva, necessarily represents the last word as a treaty ready to receive broad international support. For our part, we shall listen with care and understanding to the comments made here and will be prepared to consider further modifications, if they should seem called for, to meet concerns of the international community." [*1691st meeting, para. 63.*]

It is our firm belief that the text of the revised draft will be further modified in the light of the comments and suggestions made in this Committee to secure the widest possible measure of support by the international community.

92. Mr. TSURUOKA (Japan): In the general debate at the current session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Kiichi Aichi [*1756th plenary meeting*], particularly emphasized the struggle for peace. The Minister stated that the struggle for peace must comprise creative efforts to explore the way and open the road to everlasting peace. He went on to say that this is an ideal for human beings and that our present and future

efforts should be directed towards achieving a state in which all the nations of the world will co-operate with the United Nations and move forward, step by step, towards everlasting peace. He emphasized as a second aspect of the struggle for peace, the efforts to strive towards general and complete disarmament through concrete disarmament measures. The Minister pointed out, moreover, that if, while strengthening security systems under the United Nations, we succeeded in gradually scaling down the armaments of countries, subject to effective verification and without affecting the balance between them, we would, in practical terms, be able to lessen the danger of war.

93. Foreign Minister Aichi's statement is the basic position of our nation on disarmament problems and we think that we can come nearer to the realization of general and complete disarmament only by building up collateral measures relating to disarmament, step by step, seeking every opportunity for taking action on such measures.

94. Last summer Japan became a member of the Disarmament Committee, along with seven other countries, and my Government takes that grave responsibility very seriously.

95. At the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year, some concrete progress was made, notably in the development of the draft sea-bed treaty [*A/7741-DC/232*,¹⁵ *annex A*]. This draft treaty was the result of direct negotiations between two nuclear-weapon countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, and to some extent the draft treaty was modified along lines suggested by other members of the Disarmament Committee. One reason why both super-Powers reached agreement so quickly on the joint draft treaty was undoubtedly that they were responsive to the strong eagerness for disarmament expressed in the declaration and resolutions adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. My delegation, of course, does not think that the problems of disarmament and international security can be solved by any form of confrontation between the non-nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and the nuclear-weapon States on the other. The non-nuclear-weapon States have a clear responsibility to continue impressing upon the nuclear States the urgent necessity of disarmament; but co-operation, not confrontation, between the two groups of States is essential in order to achieve effective results.

96. I should now like to express our views on the various related aspects of disarmament. The Japanese delegation wishes to state how warmly it welcomed the initiation of the United States-Soviet Union preliminary talks on strategic arms limitation on 17 November at Helsinki, an event to which we had long looked forward. The freezing and the reduction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons are the core of the nuclear disarmament question; this consists in a gradual scaling-down of the size of existing deterrents while maintaining the balance of such deterrence. The success, or otherwise, of the talks will have a great effect on other disarmament negotiations such as those on the banning of underground nuclear weapon tests. We cannot expect that these talks will be concluded successfully today or tomorrow; but at the same time we should like to

¹⁵ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

express our earnest hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will strive to achieve comprehensive agreement on strategic arms limitation. However, if a step-by-step approach would facilitate the achievement of that goal, we would welcome such an approach. We should also like to appeal to the two Powers to refrain, while the talks are taking place, from taking actions which are contrary to the aims of the talks and which would detract from their results, now that they have decided to commence negotiations on this matter.

97. In spite of General Assembly resolutions which have for years urged the Committee on Disarmament to take up as its most urgent task the question of banning underground nuclear weapons tests, six years have already passed since the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and underground tests are still not banned. Two kinds of obstacles stand in the way of the conclusion of a treaty to prohibit underground nuclear weapons tests: political obstacles and those of a technical nature. It is gratifying to note that the initiation of preliminary talks on strategic arms limitation between the United States and the Soviet Union has improved our prospects of eliminating the political obstacles.

98. Turning to the technical question, my delegation strongly feels that the problem of developing a means of effective verification which would ensure the observance of an underground test-ban treaty is of the utmost importance. With this in mind, the Japanese representative at the Committee on Disarmament this year submitted a concrete proposal to which I shall refer again in a few moments. Before doing so, I should like to review briefly recent developments in that field.

99. Marked improvements have been made in the past few years in the study of the seismological means of detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests. Technical developments, including the establishment of array stations, made their contribution to such improvements, but a further development of international co-operation may be pointed out which is more important. In May 1966, on the initiative of the Government of Sweden, a conference of the "Detection Club" was held, in which Japan participated. There was also discussion in a study group on seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions, which met in April and June 1968 on the initiative of the Stockholm International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research, with the participation of a scientist from Japan and of other leading seismologists including those from the four nuclear-weapon States. The report of the group of experts, the so-called SIPRI report,¹⁶ states that at magnitude 4.75 and above it is almost 100 per cent possible to identify underground explosions, using the relationship between surface waves and body waves recorded at teleseismic distances. But, as the level of magnitude goes down below 4.75, according to the SIPRI report, identification by teleseismic observation becomes increasingly more difficult. However, future technical advances may make it possible to identify explosions down to the 4.0 level. With our present knowledge, on the other hand, it is unlikely that we shall be able to identify by seismic means

underground test explosions of a magnitude below 4.0. Consequently, if we adhere to the position that no complete underground test-ban treaty can be concluded unless all underground explosions can be detected and identified, the solution to the question might be far away.

100. It was against this background of technological developments that, as I have said, the representative of Japan at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year, put forward a proposal [*ibid.*, annex A] consisting of the following two steps. First, we should agree to outlaw underground nuclear weapons tests above magnitude 4.75, which can now be identified, while securing a commitment by all States to work out, within a certain period of time, a system of verification which would be capable of monitoring all underground explosions above magnitude 4.0. The second step would be the conclusion of a complete underground test ban when a system of verification has been worked out which would be able to monitor all underground explosions above magnitude 4.0. The basic concept of the proposal is to facilitate a political decision by the States concerned for the total prohibition of underground tests by working out a technical device within a certain period which would permit the detection of explosions with substantial military significance. My delegation hopes that the Disarmament Committee will consider these ideas carefully at its next session, together with other proposals which have already been submitted.

101. For example, at a meeting of the Committee on Disarmament this year the Swedish delegation presented a draft treaty to ban underground nuclear weapons tests. There is also a draft resolution [*A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3*] which is based on a working paper circulated by Canada in the Disarmament Committee. This draft resolution would request that each country should submit a list of all its seismic stations and any information pertinent to these stations which would be necessary for the eventual establishment of a system of world-wide exchange of seismological information. My country is one of the sponsors of this resolution because we consider that it may constitute a first step towards the implementation of the Japanese proposal I have just mentioned. We greatly appreciate the initiative taken by the Canadian delegation in the process of formulating this draft resolution.

102. My Government attaches great importance to a step-by-step approach to the elimination of nuclear arsenals. We believe that more attention should be given to the question of limiting definitively the amount of fissionable materials available for use in nuclear weapons. It is our hope that a treaty to halt the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes will be concluded in the very near future.

103. Apart from the political decision, the question of verification has been the biggest obstacle to the preparation of a treaty for this purpose. In the opinion of the Japanese Government a system of safeguards similar to that which is being applied to non-nuclear-weapon States by IAEA should also be applicable as a verification measure in this case.

104. It is for this reason that my Government welcomed the proposal made by the United States at Geneva that the

¹⁶ Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell; New York, Humanities Press; London, Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd.

cessation in the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons should be verified by means of IAEA safeguards. My Government hopes that this question will be studied in the Committee on Disarmament as a matter of urgency in the course of the next year.

105. The report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons prepared by the expert group appointed by the Secretary-General¹⁷ makes it possible to recognize clearly the menace of chemical and biological weapons and serves as a firm foundation on which to base our efforts to prohibit such weapons. The contents of the report should be brought to the attention of the entire world. We hope that a resolution will be adopted by the General Assembly calling upon all Governments to acquaint their respective peoples with the contents of the report by all practicable means.

106. The most important international instrument dealing with the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons is the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Protocol, however, prohibits only the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war. Since it does not outlaw the development, production or stockpiling of such weapons, we cannot regard it as having removed the danger of chemical and biological warfare. Such being the case, the Protocol cannot be considered a completely satisfactory international convention. Nevertheless, the Government of Japan is prepared to consider the ratification of the Geneva Protocol as a manifestation of the desire of the people of Japan to completely eliminate these dreadful weapons from the earth. It is our hope that an agreement to ban not merely the use but also the production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons will be reached at an early date and we are determined to exert our utmost efforts to that end.

107. In the course of the debate on chemical and biological weapons in the Committee on Disarmament this year, the question of whether it was appropriate to separate the prohibition of chemical weapons from that of biological weapons, as envisaged in the draft convention submitted by the United Kingdom [*ibid.*, section 20] was a subject on which there was a marked division of opinion. While appreciating the initiative taken by the United Kingdom, the Japanese representative in the Disarmament Committee expressed the view that chemical and biological weapons have much in common and should be banned all together.

108. It is also well understood that the establishment of a verification system poses the most complicated problem in our task of concluding a treaty on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. In our view, a serious defect in the draft treaty to ban chemical and biological weapons presented by the Soviet Union to the General Assembly [A/7655] lies in the fact that it entirely fails to deal with verification. As regards verification in the case of the use of such weapons, we should reasonably be able to expect that considerable results would be produced if the use of chemical and biological weapons was restrained according to the formula proposed by the United Kingdom at the 418th meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on

10 July this year. According to that formula, in the case of a complaint from a party to the convention which believed that biological methods of warfare had been used against it, the Secretary-General of the United Nations would automatically carry out an investigation of his own and report the results of that investigation to the Security Council.

Mr. Shahi (Pakistan) resumed the Chair.

109. Nevertheless we have not yet found an effective system of verification as far as development, production and stockpiling are concerned. In particular, the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the production and stockpiling of chemical products in peaceful chemical industry are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin and one would not find it easy to determine which agents are being produced or stockpiled for military purposes and which are not. This was one of the main reasons why the United Kingdom draft, setting aside the prohibition of chemical weapons, dealt only with the prohibition of biological weapons. It is therefore urgently necessary to conduct studies of the whole problem of verification on the international level. These problems are being studied in some non-governmental research institutes, but no basis for the international integration of such studies has yet been formed. I should therefore like to suggest once again, as the representative of Japan did earlier at a meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, that we should entrust the study of technical problems relating to verification of the production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons to a group of competent scientists and technologists, formed on an international basis.

110. In the field of the prevention of the arms race on the sea-bed, the United States and the Soviet Union, taking into consideration the views expressed by other members of the Committee on Disarmament, drew up a revised version of their joint draft treaty of 7 October, and submitted it as annex A to the report of the Disarmament Committee. We believe that the General Assembly will play an important role in our joint efforts to render the draft treaty more generally acceptable.

111. Article I of the draft treaty prohibits the emplanting or emplacement on the sea-bed of any objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction. Needless to say, this stipulation should not mean the end of our efforts in this field of disarmament. The Government of Japan feels that we should continue our efforts towards the enlargement of the scope of prohibition as part of our endeavour to bring about general and complete disarmament. In this connexion we welcome the third preambular paragraph, which stipulates that the States parties to the treaty are

“Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race, and determined to continue negotiations concerning further measures leading to this end”.

112. Let me now point out that article I of the draft treaty does not prohibit a coastal State from deploying weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof within twelve miles of its

¹⁷ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.64).

coast. In the belief that the treaty should cover the entire area of the sea-bed and the ocean floor in order to prevent the nuclear arms race from expanding to the sea-bed, we made clear our views at the Disarmament Committee to that effect. Although our views have not changed, we do not wish to delay the conclusion of this treaty unduly by insisting on that point. We have no intention of emplanting or emplacing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed within 12 miles of the Japanese coast. We earnestly hope that other States will also voluntarily abstain from emplanting or emplacing nuclear weapons on the sea-bed within 12 miles of their coasts pending the time when the entire sea-bed is covered by the treaty.

113. The areas to be covered by the treaty will be measured from a baseline drawn in the manner specified in Section II of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.¹⁸ In that context, we understand that any question regarding certain marginal waters which may arise from the implementation of the Geneva Convention and may have an important bearing on observance of the sea-bed treaty will be decided in each specific case strictly in accordance with the rules of international law.

114. I now turn to the problem of verification. Although a stipulation was added to the draft treaty to the effect that States parties which entertain a serious doubt concerning the fulfilment of the obligations under the treaty may refer the matter to the Security Council, many States are still not satisfied with article III.

115. In view of the fact that the new article V concerning a review conference was inserted, we hope that the concrete procedures of verification, including the setting up of an international mechanism, will be examined in the light of technological developments and experience.

116. Finally, I should like to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that this treaty has, as the fourth preambular paragraph points out, the merit of being a milestone towards general and complete disarmament and a limitation in its own right. Having said that, I express my sincere hope that each State will make every effort to complete this treaty so that we may be able to commence work soon on other matters relating to disarmament.

117. Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (*translated from French*): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is especially grateful to you for having suggested that our Committee should hold a debate embracing the various items on our agenda relating to the general problem of disarmament.

118. This procedure not only enables us to hold one general debate, and, as I hope, save a considerable amount of time, but it has in particular the merit of affording us the opportunity of achieving a synthesis and reaching conclusions on a problem whose division into various parts tends to make us forget the fundamental importance of constantly seeing the links between the various aspects. Indeed, whether we examine the new measures relating to the

cessation of the nuclear arms race, or those concerning chemical and bacteriological warfare, whether we study the means to prevent the arms race on the sea-bed and ocean floor or the question of general and complete disarmament, what emerges from all these different debates is always the same, namely, our concern at the alarming level reached by the arms race and the progress achieved by science in this field.

119. For as time goes on the gap between the strengthening of nuclear arsenals and the intensity of the international effort to reduce armaments is widening, and we may well wonder when the political will of the international community will be stronger than its reflex for developing means of destruction.

120. This debate is not basically concerned with the level of technical means at which the limitation or reduction of any specific category of weapons becomes necessary or with the legal conditions governing such reduction or limitation, but rather with the certainly difficult choice between a security guaranteed by constant concern and a desire for protection through exceptional defence measures on the one hand, and the feeling that security could better be assured by the control of the will for power creating all these arsenals, on the other.

121. Unless mankind decides to adopt a consistently pessimistic view of its future, the last 10 years lead us to think that there is more courage and sense of responsibility in the desire for a dialogue than in mutual threats of destruction.

122. Our delegation, with a few others, has had the opportunity to point out before this Committee how direct confrontation between the great Powers has inevitably led to greater mistrust and a resort to force alone to impose their interests. We have also shown what the role of the medium-sized and small States is in such a situation and the result achieved at the international relations level as a result of the intervention of those States, which have effectively succeeded in narrowing down differences and replacing confrontation by dialogue.

123. We also think that it is thanks to those States and their patient efforts that we can congratulate ourselves today on having held negotiations in the disarmament field which in several years have led to relatively encouraging results and, have, in any case, changed the mood of the international community from one of deep anguish to one of great hope.

124. Those efforts have been made in this Committee and in the General Assembly, but the creation in 1961 of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament made it possible to lay down a framework and a procedure and to enable a number of States members of this Committee to assume special responsibility in the common search for means, first of reducing at the political level the tensions that inevitably accompany the arms race, and, after that, of defining the technical and legal conditions for disarmament.

125. Morocco, in August of this year, was invited to take part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. I should like to take this opportunity to thank the two

¹⁸ Signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958. (See United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477).

countries whose representatives serve as Co-Chairmen, and all the other members of the Committee who granted us the privilege of joining in their efforts to discharge one of the finest tasks of our Organization.

126. The Moroccan Government and people are aware of the weight of this new responsibility and we shall spare no effort in the Committee, and in all circumstances, to make a useful contribution. We have always been among those States—few in number in the beginning—which in this Committee, at a time characterized by general scepticism, have defended the cause of disarmament. In welcoming us at Geneva this summer, some delegations spoke of that role. We wish to continue in the same spirit of mobilizing the efforts of all in order to make progress in our negotiations together towards the achievement of ever-more encouraging results.

127. We thought, like other countries invited this year to become members of the Disarmament Committee, that increased membership was in keeping with the desire of its members as a whole and made it possible to ensure wider geographical distribution and a better political balance, thus strengthening the effectiveness of the Committee. We responded to this invitation with the feeling that we were fulfilling a useful role.

128. The Co-Chairmen, in other circumstances, have had occasion to speak and act in the name of the Committee. It seems that this time their decision was taken without a general agreement. We yield to no one in our strict respect for any procedure which has been clearly laid down and which presupposes the consent of all. Our views in this connexion are in complete agreement with those of the delegations which legitimately commented upon this situation. I am convinced that they will also understand, in the same spirit of friendly explanation, that we could effectively contribute to the work of the Committee only in so far as our presence there was sincerely desired.

129. The report presented by the Committee [A/7741-DC/232]¹⁹ deals with the main problems considered in 1969. It is no exaggeration to say that this year important work has been done and that essential aspects of the disarmament problem have been usefully examined. The results are not all commensurate with our hopes, but the report shows that tremendous efforts were made by all delegations and, especially, that a particularly promising atmosphere prevailed, holding out hopes of better results.

130. We think that the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*ibid.*, *annex A*] should be welcomed as a satisfactory result of the work of the Committee.

131. It may be thought that of all disarmament aspects, this may not be the most urgent. The submission of this draft to the General Assembly springs from the same motives as those which led to the signing of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, including the

Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, that is to say, in both cases the major concern was to prevent the arms race from spreading to these two environments. If it did spread, it would be difficult to compel those benefiting from positions they had already established to give them up.

132. On this particular point we think that all the members of the Committee were in agreement that the priority granted to the draft treaty was appropriate because of the urgent need to prevent the arms race from spreading to this new vital element of the human environment, whose resources could in many respects be useful to mankind, and which the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction has revealed as a new dimension for the scientific and economic potentialities of mankind.

133. Before the draft assumed the form in which it is now presented to the Assembly, all delegations introduced more or less substantial changes which made it possible to narrow the gap between the different points of view, particularly those of the Co-Chairmen, which had been rather far apart at the outset.

134. Of course such a draft treaty raises points of law that must be clarified, such as the definition of the zone to which a prohibition would be applied.

135. My delegation has especially urged the need to define this point and has proposed that it should be clearly specified that the prohibition would apply beyond the 12-mile zone, whereas the treaty only refers to the Geneva Convention of 1958,²⁰ which has not yet been accepted by many States. It has also urged that the wording of article II, paragraph 2, concerning the safeguarding of the rights of countries as regards the waters off their coasts should be made stronger and has supported the proposal that this paragraph 2 should form a new article of the draft treaty.

136. We have also held that the treaty should protect the continental shelf and safeguard the rights of coastal States which remain sovereign in the exploration and exploitation of the resources of that shelf.

137. As regards the problem of control and verification of the sea-bed, which we consider very important, while the draft treaty provides for the right of any State Party to exercise verification, using its own means or with the assistance of any other Party, we consider that any Party should have recourse to the Secretary-General to obtain assistance in verification and in the implementation of all obligations resulting from the treaty. Such recourse to the United Nations would avoid any objection there might be to the lending of assistance by one Party to another, which in the present state of international relations could prove incompatible with the political attitude of a number of States towards the Power blocs.

138. The signing of an agreement on the sea bed and the ocean floor would have at least one advantage, since it would prevent the arms race from spreading to that

¹⁹ *Disarmament Commission, Official Records, Supplement for 1959, document DC/232.*

²⁰ Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477).

environment. Such an agreement, we feel, would have beneficial psychological and political consequences on the international arena. It would be an addition to other useful results which have during the last few years contributed to reducing tension and restoring confidence among States.

139. The Committee on Disarmament has, in addition, devoted much attention to the problem of the utilization of chemical and bacteriological weapons, but unfortunately it was not able to present common proposals on this problem to our Committee. The report of the Secretary-General drawn up with the help of qualified experts,²¹ gives us a scientifically well-founded evaluation of the effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the consequences of their possible use.

140. Whether the discussion is concentrated on one draft treaty concerning chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons or on two separate drafts, one relating to biological and the other to chemical weapons, this is only a difference in approach. The two drafts already submitted agree on the need for prohibiting those weapons, which would make it much easier to consider the question in a single document, and this is the approach we would support.

141. Pending the resumption of the work of the Committee on Disarmament on this matter, and in the hope of substantial progress being made towards an agreement, the Moroccan delegation supports the proposed declaration presented by the group of non-aligned countries in the Committee on Disarmament, annexed to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*ibid.*, annex C, section 30].

142. We also support the recommendation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations reiterating an appeal to all States to adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva, 7 June 1925.

143. Morocco has already taken the necessary legislative measures in order to adhere to this Protocol. It will do so at the beginning of 1970.

144. I said at the beginning of my statement that it was essential to consider the disarmament problem in all its aspects in order to see whether actual progress had been achieved and to realize how important is the link between the various aspects of disarmament. The 1963 agreement, known as the Moscow Agreement, was certainly a determining first stage in the progress achieved in the disarmament negotiations. But if at that time it undoubtedly held out the first glimmer of hope, it seems incomplete to us today because it deals only with the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and leaves entirely pending the question of underground nuclear weapon tests, a fact which has enabled the two great nuclear Powers to pursue tests as dangerous as those whose consequences have been limited by the Agreement.

²¹ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

The work of the Committee on Disarmament on this question does not seem to meet with any serious opposition in principle. The difficulty would seem to lie rather in the working out of formulas relating to verification.

145. Divergencies on this score are still very great. Some delegations in the Geneva Committee have on several occasions made suggestions on ways of overcoming these difficulties. Canada, Nigeria, Italy and Sweden have put forward suggestions for the establishment of international co-operation in the field of verification through the voluntary exchange of seismological data. Verification through national means of control seems to us insufficient, just as that of on-site control is unacceptable to some countries.

146. It seems to us that at the present stage in the study of the question the Canadian proposal, supported by other States, has the merit of offering a satisfactory agreement on this problem.

147. In supporting the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, we were hoping that the cessation of underground nuclear tests would be covered by that Treaty. Unfortunately, this has not happened and we consider the Treaty markedly incomplete as long as underground tests continue. We think, too, in that connexion, that it is urgent to appeal once more to all those that have not yet signed the Treaty, so that its scope may be strengthened and it may spread its influence to all areas of the world. During the debate on the Treaty last year we were struck by some of the objections made by countries which are in a special position as regards their security.

148. Discussions during the year on important international political problems such as disarmament have injected into the international situation some elements of cautious optimism which strengthen the tendency towards confidence in the dialogue. New ideas have been put forward concerning European security, for example, and this should make for more flexible positions in Europe, just as the readjustments which would seem to be taking place in Asia and which are tending to strengthen security in that area should reduce the mistrust and the reticence of some Asian countries. Morocco has signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and probably already would have deposited instruments of ratification if the situation in the Middle East had held out the slightest hope of a solution eliminating the consequences of Israeli aggression. The need to ensure that the vital interests of this area are preserved without discrimination is the only factor which has delayed my country's ratification.

149. Last but not least, I wish to mention an especially encouraging factor in the present international situation, namely the opening of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Helsinki. This is undoubtedly one of the most important events of this decade—not only because the meeting, which would, for many reasons, have been unthinkable a few years ago, has finally happened, but also because it opens up useful prospects in the field of disarmament itself and might very well prove to be the occasion for a general dialogue on other problems inherent in the difficulties of present

international relations. We are not usually inclined to rejoice at the setting-up of directorates which want to dictate to the world, still less at the holding of private discussions making world problems the prerogative of the great Powers alone, but we believe that the major difficulties are due to the disputes between the two super-Powers. We must therefore encourage their desire to dispel those difficulties, but the interests of the rest of the international community must at the same time be respected.

150. The multilateral negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament, like the negotiations between the nuclear Powers, could create the impression that we are interested mainly in some partial aspects of disarmament and that the goal of general and complete disarmament had been lost sight of. This procedure indeed contains the danger of dwelling too long on some specific aspects of disarmament to the prejudice of the idea of finality regarded by the General Assembly from the outset as the motive that inspired the inclusion of the question of disarmament on the agenda of the international Organization. We think, like many other delegations, that by dealing successively with various disarmament problems and by trying, more or less successfully, to solve some of their aspects one after the other, we shall facilitate consideration of the problem of general and complete disarmament as a whole, because confidence will be restored progressively and dialogue may gradually regain all its advantages. But we still strongly desire that general and complete disarmament should be dealt with as soon as possible because separate solutions to various disarmament problems such as those we are debating at present concern in fact only the interests of the nuclear Powers, whereas international tension and insecurity and threats to independence and freedom in the world are due mainly to the conventional armaments race. More countries are threatened by this kind of danger than by that of atomic weapons. What I mean is that the nuclear Powers are, after all, so few in number that they can have direct discussions concerning their interests, whereas the vastness of the problems discussed by the rest of the world cannot be solved exclusively by stopping the nuclear arms race. We were among the first, if not the first, to draw the attention of the United Nations to the need to proclaim the denuclearization of some parts of the world and to watch over the imbalance in various areas of it resulting from the conventional armaments race. We are happy to see that the countries of Latin America were able to sign the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,²² although, despite the fact that as early as 1963 Africans succeeded in having a number of resolutions of that nature adopted by the General Assembly, the African continent still has not been recognized in practice as a denuclearized zone.

151. Morocco will continue, within the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, to make every effort to bring about the adoption of an international instrument that will effectively ensure the denuclearization of Africa. By the same token we shall continue to support the creation of areas where a balance of arms will be ensured, for we can see that in the third world in particular, the need

to engage in the arms race, arising out of various disputes between countries of this or that area, is a serious obstacle to the mobilization of all potential resources for the economic and social development of our respective countries. We are aware of the fact that if we are to uphold the principle that the economies effected by the great Powers as a result of disarmament should be used for the development of the international community, it is all the more necessary that we should ourselves endeavour not to burden our own limited resources by engaging in an arms race, for though we always know how such an arms race begins, we never know how it will end.

152. The position of Morocco on the problems I have just described has been entirely consistent for the past 13 years. It is not a passing or opportunistic expression of opinion in a discussion in this or that international organ, but is deeply imbedded in the political doctrine of Morocco, both as regards the definition of our national aims and our desire for peace in the areas where our vital interests are at stake; it rests too on our belief in the importance of dialogue and co-operation among all States.

153. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the next speaker on a point of order, I should like to inform the Committee of an important development which I am sure it will welcome.

154. I have just been informed that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have this morning both ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I feel confident that this move will be welcome to the members of the Committee. It constitutes an indispensable step towards the entry into force of the Treaty. As a result of the action taken today and the previous ratification by the United Kingdom, I believe that we can look forward to the early entry into force of the Treaty.

155. I call on the representative of Brazil on a point of order.

156. Mr. ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): I have asked to speak to raise a point of order, or rather a point of clarification, which may have an important bearing on the conduct of our business on the so-called disarmament items. It is my understanding that in the course of next week, after the list of speakers is exhausted, our attention will be centred on the examination and discussion of the specific draft resolutions or draft amendments which have already been submitted or which may still be submitted to the Committee in the coming days under the different agenda items. As time is running short and as the normal provision for our proceedings under all these items does not exceed a period of two weeks, it is obvious that the delegations which have specific drafts or amendments to submit for the consideration of the First Committee should be encouraged to do so at their earliest convenience so as to allow other delegations a minimum lapse of time to consider and evaluate the drafts and, in certain cases, to consult their respective Governments.

157. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232] includes as its annex A a Soviet-United States draft treaty on the emplacement of

²² Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, signed 14 February 1967 at Tlatelolco, Mexico.

nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor. Although it is clear to everyone that this report is under consideration by the First Committee, it is not altogether clear whether the same could be said of the draft treaty. In effect, nowhere in the report is it stated that the draft treaty is being submitted to the General Assembly. The report limits itself to this statement in paragraph 53:

“This draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof is reported in annex A.”

Furthermore, there is no direct or specific reference to the draft treaty in the list of items of which the First Committee is seized.

158. Nevertheless, it is a fact that many delegations, including the delegation of Brazil, have referred quite extensively to the draft treaty in question. Some of those delegations have expressed their reservations, criticisms and suggestions as regards the terms and clauses of the draft. It is not clear whether the sponsors of the draft will seek some action by the General Assembly on the text. In any event, it is evident to my delegation that any action would be premature before a process of real negotiations had developed. The Sea-Bed Committee has taken a preliminary view of the draft and has signified its intention of reverting to consideration of the text at its session in the spring of next year.

159. I should therefore like to have a clarification from you, Mr. Chairman, on the three following points.

160. First, has the Soviet-United States draft treaty been formally submitted to the First Committee?

161. Secondly, can delegations which have the intention of moving formal amendments to the text of the draft treaty, as of now, do so with specific reference to annex A of document A/7741-DC/232, for example, “amend paragraph such-and-such of article such-and-such of the draft treaty contained in annex A of document A/7741-DC/232 to read as follows”, and so on?

162. Thirdly, if that is not the case, what is then the proper procedure to be followed by delegations which intend to move formal amendments to the Soviet-United States draft?

163. Your clarification on those three points, Sir, would be greatly welcome to my delegation and I am certain, to several other delegations which fail to grasp the exact procedural and parliamentary situation.

164. The CHAIRMAN: In view of the importance of the three questions raised by the representative of Brazil, I should like to have some time for consultations with the delegations concerned before I can give clear and definitive answers to the questions he has put. I hope to be able to do so very soon.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.