

**United Nations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION

Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1695th
MEETING**

*Thursday, 20 November 1969,
at 3 p.m.*

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Agenda items 29, 104, 30 and 31:

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*)

Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (*continued*):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;

(b) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons;

(c) Report of the Secretary-General

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*)

Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (*continued*):

(a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General;

(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General;

(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General

Page

1

Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).

AGENDA ITEMS 29, 104, 30 AND 31

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7639, A/7681 and A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/989)

Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (*continued*) (A/C.1/988, A/C.1/989, A/C.1/991):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/7741-DC/232);

(b) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655);

(c) Report of the Secretary-General (A/7575)

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1 and 2)

Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (*continued*):

(a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2);

(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General (A/7678 and Add.1-3);

(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General (A/7568 and A/7743)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. RUDA (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): In August this year Argentina became a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, when its membership was enlarged to 26. At that time we expressed our appreciation to the Co-Chairmen for the invitation addressed to us to take part in the Conference. We interpreted this invitation as both a recognition of our endeavours in matters of disarmament and an expression of confidence that we would strive for the achievement of that goal.

2. At that time we said, and I would repeat now, that the Argentine Government welcomes the agreement to enlarge the membership of the Committee, since the new composition offers greater possibilities of achieving results. The experience of the session that ended in Geneva scarcely three weeks ago bears out this statement, since the eight States which are new members of the Committee took an active part and contributed their views to clarify a number of the important problems which are today before this session of the General Assembly.

3. However, in the last few days some derogatory comments have been made regarding the procedure of enlargement. With all due respect for others' opinions, we do feel that in the short time left to us before we conclude our work, to argue or to open a complete debate on this subject would be untimely, incongruous and sterile, particularly as we still have to consider a number of substantive matters which are of greater importance.

4. But, in order to make our position understood clearly and unequivocally, we feel constrained to state that, as far as Argentina is concerned, we have no doubt whatsoever regarding our qualifications to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament or the legitimacy of our becoming a member.

5. I come now to the specific aspects requiring the attention of this Committee. First, we are gratified that bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union recently started in Helsinki, with a view to the limitation of their respective strategic armaments. We congratulate the delegations of those two Powers on this long-awaited event and hope that, despite the words of caution voiced at the talks, it will take less time for results to appear than was needed to set up the talks. There is no need to stress how important those talks are. The impressive development of the technology used to achieve destructive capacity and expand military arsenals by adding increasingly sophisticated and powerful weapons, is the most formidable danger that has ever threatened mankind. The annals of the United Nations are replete with speeches which year after year give warning of the urgent need to end this threat; yet thus far little or nothing has been achieved. Even at the risk of our appeals again going unheeded—though we hope they will not—we must emphasize that advantage should be taken of the opportunity provided by the nascent understanding which has led the two great Powers to open talks in the capital of Finland.

6. The international atmosphere is favourable. Although mutual mistrust has not yet disappeared, the open hostility of earlier years is giving way to increasing co-operation and rapprochement. The main responsibility for continuing along these positive lines and obtaining true disarmament measures, rather than mere palliatives, certainly rests with those who possess the greatest means of destruction. However, it also rests squarely with the other nations, since the wave of destruction which would be unleashed by an armed confrontation would not distinguish between the real protagonists and the spectators. The overwhelming majority of countries is fully aware of that responsibility and has helped to create the *détente* which made the Helsinki meeting possible. For that reason, although they do not take a direct part in the discussions, they have a right to request, if not to insist, that the talks should not merely be conversations but should lead to tangible and immediate results.

7. By the same token, and precisely because of the obligations and rights of all members of the international community to ensure peace and security, we wish to endorse the statements made by other speakers who called for a close relationship to be established between these negotiations of the Soviet Union and the United States and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

8. The Geneva Conference, far from interfering with the progress of bilateral proceedings, could thus really fulfil its mission as the main negotiating body in this field; its contribution would greatly assist the attainment of the desired goal of general and complete disarmament, which is the very basis for the existence of the Committee on Disarmament.

9. One of the items to which we attach the greatest importance and to the analysis of which I shall devote some time, is the one dealing with the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, sponsored by the United States of America and the Soviet Union. This draft

treaty appears in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232,¹ annex A].

10. The statement which the Argentine representative, Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, made to that Committee on 23 October last [445th meeting] explained in some detail our point of view regarding the basic aspects of the original draft submitted by the two Powers. Since the revised text was submitted almost at the closure of the session, we were unable to express an opinion on it.

11. We said that we would make the relevant comments when the question was again dealt with, that is to say in the course of the present session of the General Assembly, where we can count on the valuable assistance of other countries not represented in Geneva.

12. From a comparison of the revised text with the previous text submitted by the Co-Chairmen, it appears that the revised text includes some of the changes requested by Argentina and other delegations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: the abolition of the differential system of "vetos" and the setting up of a review conference with a view to assuring that the provisions of the treaty are being realized and to adopt them to any technological developments which may have been achieved within five years of the treaty's entry into force.

13. We are pleased that the sponsors took these comments into account. However, we must point out that when making concessions—if they can indeed be termed concessions—the Co-Chairmen have opted for those of lesser significance. We need only note that, with regard to the "veto", neither the original separate draft of the Soviet Union [*ibid.*, annex C, section 4] nor that of the United States [*ibid.*, section 12] contained any provision of this type. As to the review conference, it was already provided for in article V of the United States draft; in other words, as we understand it, the sponsors have made no innovations and have merely limited themselves to reintroducing the system which they themselves had outlined in the first place.

14. On the other hand, no substantive changes have been made in the key articles of the draft, such as articles I, II and III, despite the comments which several delegations made in Geneva.

15. Before referring to those points, we think it appropriate to reiterate an idea already expressed by the Argentine delegation in the Committee on Disarmament, which we believe is important if we are to place the treaty in its proper perspective for both sides and if it is to provide an acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations among all States without exception. At the 445th meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation stated:

"... the scope of the draft treaty is very different for two groups of possible signatories. For a few States its provisions have real and strict practical application. I am referring to the great Powers which possess not only the

¹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232.

weapons prohibited under the treaty but also the effective and immediate capacity to emplace them on the sea-bed, and—a most essential factor—the possibility of mutual verification.

“...for the other group, which comprises the vast majority of countries, the main clauses of the treaty are rather of theoretical value. Those are the countries which do not possess nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, do not have the means of emplacing them on the sea-bed and are not even in a position to verify unaided any violation, suspected or real, but which none the less yearn for the conclusion of an agreement such as the one we are considering, because of its significance for security and world peace.”

16. We have before us a draft instrument which is multilateral and not bilateral. To achieve the desirable widespread accession, the majority which is called upon to sign can at the very least demand that its rights should be taken into account and respected, and that the treaty should not merely reflect the interests of the great Powers.

17. In that spirit and intent, I shall now refer to the aspects of the treaty which raise serious difficulties for us.

18. Article I defines the scope of the prohibition and the field of application of its provisions. We know that the prohibition is limited to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We have no real objections to such limitation, so long as that type of weapon represents the greater potential threat; however, to achieve greater clarity, we should have preferred a better definition of what is meant by “weapons of mass destruction”.

19. The main objection to the article lies in the complex procedure for establishing the limits of the sea area to which it applies. On this matter, the draft reads: “... beyond the maximum contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone”. But if we turn to that text it is obvious that in fact the authors wanted purely and simply to set a distance of 12 nautical miles as the limit beyond which the treaty starts to apply.

20. If such is the case, and it undoubtedly is, why is no clear statement made, directly quoting that figure? The original United States draft set the width of the zone at 3 miles, while the Soviet Union draft set it at 12 miles; both did so in clear and precise language. Neither sponsor originally felt it necessary to resort to quoting another international instrument to express its own intentions. Why then, one may ask, once they had agreed on the figure of 12 miles for the purposes of a joint draft, did they deem it essential to use the dubious and complex method of mentioning the Geneva Convention? We are not entirely convinced by the somewhat vague arguments which the Co-Chairmen rehearsed in their statements in the Committee on Disarmament. The objections to the wording of article I which we and other delegations already raised still remain.

21. It should be understood that we have no difficulty in accepting the 12-mile limit. What we do feel is inadequate is the fact that the limit is not set out in the clear and precise

terms which we feel are required by the nature of this treaty.

22. We think that serious objections can be raised to the mention of the Geneva Convention. Only a minority of the States Members of the United Nations are parties to that Convention. Despite that fact, it is claimed that, in order to determine the sphere of application of the treaty, the majority of the countries represented in the United Nations should accept references to a legal instrument to which it has not become a party, although the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in 1958, more than 11 years ago.

23. However, there are further objections. As I said a few days ago in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, the “contiguous zone”, according to the classical definition of international law which appears in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,² is a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea in which the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to prevent or punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea. We therefore ask again what relationship exists between those characteristics and the draft treaty we are examining, which refers to the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction.

24. We should also recall that the contiguous zone is a concept which applies to the high seas; that is to say it applies to the superjacent waters rather than to the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, which are the areas covered by the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

25. Various delegations, including those of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic, also raised other objections on the matter in the Committee on Disarmament and we believe those objections are certainly useful and valid. Among others, the question was asked: what will happen if eventually the Geneva Convention ceases to exist or is amended precisely on those points which are used as a reference for articles I and II of this treaty? Would that mean that those articles would automatically become invalid or would undergo the same modifications as a consequence?

26. It is therefore obvious that a complicated transposition of the Geneva Convention for the purpose of those articles raises considerably more problems than it is meant to solve; this reference should therefore be replaced by a wording which would not lead to such ambiguous interpretations.

27. Otherwise, we shall be obliged to conclude that the reference to the Geneva Convention has only one purpose—to prejudice the breadth of the territorial sea. Such an idea would be totally unacceptable to us, because we do not believe that this method is the most appropriate way of solving the differences existing among States on this sensitive question.

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477.

28. It has of course been argued that the so-called “disclaimer clause” in article II, paragraph 2, was designed to allay any fears or misinterpretations of this nature. However, if that is the purpose of the clause, we find it hard to understand why it did not influence the sponsors, who felt that their interests are better served by using the indirect system of mentioning the Geneva Convention instead of expressing themselves clearly, without any possibility of confusion.

29. The objections raised in relation to article I, paragraph 1, also apply, in our view, to article II, paragraph 1; in that paragraph use is again made of a reference to the Geneva Convention to solve the difficult problem of measurement systems.

30. With regard to article II, paragraph 2, we feel that although its inclusion is appropriate, it is rendered invalid *ab initio* by the provisions which I have already examined; in the final analysis it implies an infringement of the rights inherent in national maritime jurisdiction, whether or not such was the intention of the sponsors.

31. I come now to a subject which has evoked a good deal of criticism from many delegations in the Committee on Disarmament and in this Assembly. I refer to article III of the draft, which deals with the verification procedure. The provisions of the draft treaty are inexplicably vague in our view and are an exception to the generally accepted rule that any disarmament measure, or any measure of “non-armament”, must be accompanied by a system of strict international control. The great Powers have stated that they are satisfied with the system laid down in the draft, which offers them sufficient guarantees. However, what is good or satisfactory for great Powers is not necessarily so for other countries.

32. In the specific case of article III, we believe that adequate safeguards are not provided for the inalienable rights of sovereignty of coastal States over the continental shelf, nor for right to consent to or participate in any verification procedure which may take place on that shelf.

33. There can be no doubt regarding the exclusive and excluding rights of exploration and exploitation which coastal States have over their respective continental shelves, in accordance with customary international law and with various international instruments. A treaty for the denuclearization of the sea-bed certainly cannot innovate in the matter, or presume to do so.

34. This means that any control procedure must inevitably be carried out with the prior knowledge, consent and participation of the coastal State, if it so desires.

35. Since the great majority of countries possessing a sea-coast are not technologically or financially in a position to verify unaided any violation or presumed violation, the treaty must provide a mechanism whereby those countries can take part in the control procedure; in a matter as vital as their own security, countries should not be dependent on the goodwill of other States which have the resources and means necessary to carry out the control procedure. The assistance and co-operation provided for in the draft of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on

Disarmament are optional and depend on uncertain factors which have no place in a treaty of this nature.

36. The Argentine delegation has repeatedly stated in the General Assembly and in this Committee that the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction constitute the common heritage of the international community and therefore are not subject to appropriation or claims of sovereignty for use or occupation or to exclusive utilization by any State or entity.

37. In accordance with this position, we repeat that article III of the draft should, in our opinion, contain an additional clause expressly stating that activities arising from verification must be strictly limited to ensuring the fulfilment of the obligations set forth in the treaty; that they may not constitute a basis for the creation of rights of sovereignty over the sea-bed or ocean floor for the assertion, endorsement or denial of any claim of sovereignty over the sea-bed or ocean floor, and that they will not affect the coastal States' rights of sovereignty or rights of exploration and exploitation over the continental shelf adjacent to its coast.

38. For the above reasons, the Argentine delegation feels that the articles which we have analysed must be changed; it is, as always, willing to co-operate with other delegations which are similarly concerned, so as to submit the relevant amendments.

39. While on the subject, we should like to draw attention to the very small number of ratifications required before the treaty enters into force. This is after all a measure of “non-armament” which should have a wide field of application. Furthermore, all States which could be parties to the treaty possess certain rights the exercise of which they must protect. To ensure the stability of the legal system planned in the treaty, it would therefore be advisable, substantially, to increase the number of ratifications required before the treaty can enter into force.

40. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament describes in detail the work carried out by that body on the matter of chemical and bacteriological weapons and gives the various delegations' points of view on those matters; those points of view require careful study before any significant progress can be achieved. It is obvious, furthermore, that the problem will demand a serious effort on the part of the Committee, which is the technical body for negotiation on the subject. This is recognized by the report, when it states that the Committee “intends to continue intensive work on the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare”. My Government attaches the greatest importance to this problem, since we are a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol,³ to which we acceded recently in response to the invitation formulated by the General Assembly in resolution 2454 A (XXIII), adopted on 20 December 1968.

41. We do not intend to go into details about the grave consequences of the possible use of this type of armament.

³ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature in Geneva on 17 June 1925.

The Secretary-General's report, entitled Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use,⁴ is sufficiently explicit on the matter. We should, however, like to recall that among the annexes to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, there is a working paper [*ibid.*, annex C, section 30] which was sponsored by 12 delegations, including our own. We believe that that paper adequately conveys the urgency of the matter and proposes solutions which deserve to be widely supported by the General Assembly.

42. In particular we wish to stress the need for the Committee to deal with both types of weapon at the same time. We should also prefer them to be covered by a single instrument. However, our position on the matter is flexible and we are prepared to adopt a realistic approach, endeavouring to arrive at possible solutions if those ideals seem difficult to achieve. In that connexion we should like to express our appreciation to the United Kingdom delegation for the revised draft convention it submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*ibid.*, section 20]. It is a valuable contribution towards a better understanding of the subject and towards the solution of some problems of undoubted relevance concerning this type of weapon; it is a serious basis upon which, in our opinion, we should continue to work.

43. In his excellent statement on the subject yesterday [1694th meeting] the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, gave a complete explanation highlighting the importance of the document, which appears as an annex to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

44. The General Assembly is also considering a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, submitted to this Committee by the representative of Poland on behalf of nine countries [A/7655]. Obviously this draft will be of great assistance in the consideration of the subject at present under review; however, we regret that the delegations concerned did not submit it to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in time to allow that specialized body to pronounce upon it this year.

45. With regard to the contents of the draft, my Government was of course unable to make a detailed analysis of the various provisions in the short time since it was submitted. Nevertheless, a preliminary review shows that it does not include a definition of the word "weapons" for the purposes of the Convention. Nor does the draft include a system of verification of fulfilment of the obligations provided for in the treaty, but resorts to a formula which was already used in a similar way in the Co-Chairman's draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/7741-DC/232, annex A]. My Government has already expressed its grave doubts about this system of control, both here and elsewhere. Granted, there are obvious differences between the subjects covered in the two draft treaties, but we could certainly not accept, for chemical

and bacteriological weapons, a system of consultations which it is difficult for us to support even in the case of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, because of its lack of precision. Undoubtedly all these matters call for a more detailed analysis which would take account of the work performed by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It must also be remembered that our policy on the question of disarmament has traditionally been based upon the existence of international control systems offering a reasonable margin of certainty with regard to the fulfilment of any obligations to be assumed.

46. If the General Assembly now went ahead with a detailed consideration of a draft convention which, as I pointed out earlier, my Government was unable to study with the care it deserves, it might create conditions unfavourable to genuine progress on the subject. In fact, it is possible that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament may be studying other documents, while the General Assembly is considering the draft convention. To this procedural confusion would be added the possibility that the debates held in the Committee on Disarmament might be repeated here, with a resulting loss of time.

47. Furthermore, the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament shows that careful examination is still needed of certain matters which must be settled before a definitive solution can be found to the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons; the reason for this is that there is no consensus on the matter. We must recall that the Committee has studied such important and sensitive subjects as the treatment to be given to both types of weapon, (whether in a single instrument or in separate texts), the scope of the prohibition and, if there are to be two instruments, whether one of them should not be limited to prohibition of the use of the weapons and the other to prohibition of production, testing, perfecting and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

48. For these reasons, we believe that the General Assembly should transmit the draft convention [A/7655] to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for consideration, together with the other documents which we are discussing.

49. Argentina has repeatedly stated that there must be a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests. It had been hoped that the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963) would put an end to the nuclear arms race, but those hopes have not been fulfilled. Numerous underground tests of a variety of nuclear weapons have allowed Powers which are parties to the Treaty to continue that arms race by developing new weapons systems and by perfecting existing systems. Furthermore, nuclear Powers which are not signatories to the Treaty of Moscow use their freedom of action to complete their arsenals.

50. We admit that the control system to be adopted is fundamental in a treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. At the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in Geneva, we pointed out that the decision which the nuclear Powers must adopt is basically a political one. It is therefore obvious that that decision must

⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24.

be surrounded by sufficient guarantees to ensure not only agreement on the actual contents of the instrument but, primordially, its practical effectiveness.

51. We have on previous occasions noted the grave difficulties which could arise from the violation of an agreement which doubtless will involve difficult negotiations. I would only add now that, aside from certain measures which might be adopted to reduce the remaining area of disagreement, in order to achieve an understanding the nuclear Powers must be prepared to make concessions ensuring an efficient system of verification. Present evidence, we believe, clearly shows that we are still far from achieving an acceptable margin of certainty through the use of national means of detection, despite the significant progress made.

52. Logically, that does not rule out possible parallel efforts for international co-operation, for instance through an exchange of seismological information, in order to bring us closer to a solution of this grave problem. My delegation was therefore pleased to receive draft resolution A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1 and 2, which was originally sponsored by 11 Powers and was introduced by the representative of Canada [1692nd meeting].

53. I should now like to refer to a matter which is of special importance to my delegation. I refer to the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which was held in Geneva last year. Argentina was an active participant in the debates and later took part in the discussions held here, in the First Committee, to ensure continuity of the work carried out by the Conference.

54. The report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the results of the Conference [A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2] contains a valuable summary of the present state of the process which was begun in Geneva. We must express our appreciation to the Director General and the Staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the efforts they made this year to implement various resolutions of the Conference. However, we must point out that the report does not permit very much optimism with respect to the progress made thus far in the fulfilment of those resolutions. On some aspects, I might even say that progress has been very slight. The reason is that in fact these are matters requiring close collaboration between Governments and the Agency.

55. Among the matters covered by the report of the Secretary-General, two questions should be brought out, which we think are of considerable importance: the question of financing and the problem of the fund of special fissionable materials.

56. Practically no progress at all has been achieved with regard to the special financing of large-scale nuclear projects and the allocation of more funds for technical assistance.

57. Argentina has always considered that the resources allocated to the Agency for technical assistance programmes are far below the needs of developing countries; those needs have shown a steady increase in recent years. The report of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

which appears as an annex to document A/7677 and Corr.1, is extremely clear in this respect. The first sentence in paragraph 9 of that report recalls a very significant fact concerning the financing of the operational budget of the Agency, referring to "the continuing failure to reach the target set for voluntary contributions". As we stated at the thirteenth General Conference of IAEA, held last September at Vienna, the situation with regard to the resources of the Agency for its technical assistance programme remains the same as or worse than in previous years and technical assistance still follows a downward curve compared with total IAEA activity; if this continues, in a few years technical assistance will be insignificant compared to other programmes.

58. The question of financing major nuclear technology projects should also be reconsidered by the General Assembly, so that the States members of the Agency can take advantage of the many auxiliary services which IAEA can provide, thanks to its acknowledged technical competence. It is regrettable that, as we read in paragraph 103 of the Agency's report, the Agency "can have little direct influence in arranging for the provision of capital finance for major nuclear technology projects".

59. Within this dismal picture, one point should be noted: the initiative of the Government of Sweden regarding co-operation in the granting of assistance to developing countries. This proposal, which was examined in the course of the Thirteenth General Conference of the Agency, constitutes an important step which we trust will facilitate future agreements between the Agency and other States interested in promoting technical assistance activities in developing countries.

60. With regard to the fund of special fissionable materials, we think the facilities of the Agency cannot adequately meet the needs of a large power reactor during its useful life. From the outset my country has supported all steps to enhance the authority of the Agency as the international supplier of such materials for power reactors. There can be no doubt that, for the nuclear power needs of many countries, the regular availability from international sources, of the fissionable material required for the operation of power reactors is very important. There is also no doubt that very little progress has been made in this matter since the establishment of IAEA. For that reason, we hope that the Director General's recent efforts will create prospects for international co-operation, in accordance with article XI of the Statute of the Agency.

61. For the reasons I have given, my delegation supports the Secretary-General's conclusions, contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the annex to document A/7677 and Corr.1.

62. The Secretary-General has also submitted a report on the establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control [A/7678 and Add.1-3].

63. My Government has read that report and the opinions expressed in it with great interest and has come to the conclusion that adequate instruments already exist for such a service to function.

64. In fact, the technical competence of the IAEA and the aims and objectives set forth in its Statute very clearly indicate that the functions of an international service of this type come under the mandate of the Agency.

65. The work done by IAEA is well known and there is no need to enter into details regarding its technical ability to undertake tasks of this kind.

66. Moreover, the Statute of the Agency categorically defines the functions and objectives coming within the Agency's competence. In that connexion, I should like to mention the following articles: article II, first part; III A 1, 2, 3 and 6; III C; III D; X; and XI A and B. These provisions of the Statute clearly state the need for centralization within the Agency of all international programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—I repeat, all international programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—including the service I just mentioned, or any other activity aimed at spreading any new contribution which atomic energy makes to general welfare. Those provisions also establish the right of all States members of the Agency to benefit from the international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, without discrimination of any type.

67. As the Statute itself points out, the Agency shall not make assistance to members subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of the Statute.

68. In addition, we must recall the terms of General Assembly resolution 2456 C (XXIII) which defines the basis for consideration of the item and of course in no way contemplates discrimination. Resolution 258 of the thirteenth Conference of IAEA relates to the same subject; its text is consistent with the Statute of the Agency and introduces no conditions incompatible with the provisions of the Statute.

69. I should also point out that the organization and machinery of the Agency have been designed and perfected to provide services of this nature. In our view, the appearance of new programmes for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy certainly does not modify the situation. We can only hope for an increase in the volume of the Agency's activities as a result of member States' greater demands for assistance.

70. Therefore it is logical and most appropriate from a technical point of view that the Agency should provide this service without resorting to any other special body. This is obvious if we consider that at this moment the Agency is studying an amendment to article VI of the Statute, in order that the Board of Governors can adapt itself to the developments which have taken place in nuclear activities.

71. We must not forget the economic cost to developing countries of setting up a special body whose existence would not be justified since an instrument already exists capable of providing such a service. This expenditure, apart from being unnecessary in our opinion, would be totally illogical when we consider that the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is still in the course of development.

72. Finally, my delegation has carefully studied the report of the Secretary-General on the contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries [A/7568].

73. The study prepared by the Group of Experts is a valuable contribution to the knowledge and dissemination of the increasing importance of nuclear technology in current programmes in the developing countries.

74. Aside from some observations which we might make on the report, on aspects which are not strictly technical, we must say that the report gives a complete analysis of the importance of the transfer of nuclear technology in reducing the gap separating the industrialized countries from the developing countries, in the field of general technology.

75. Among the conclusions of the Group of Experts, we should stress the following: first, the prospects offered to the developing countries by nuclear power reactors for the production of electricity—the progress achieved in this field during the last 10 years must be considered spectacular; secondly, the possibilities resulting from the application of nuclear technology to agriculture and the production of food-stuffs and particularly to food preservation; thirdly, the need for major nuclear projects to rely on adequate outside financing which currently cannot be provided by IAEA or the United Nations Development Programme. This problem calls for a long-term study which will enable appropriate solutions to be found within the framework of the existing organs, and in particular the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. At all events it would be appropriate for the General Assembly to adopt a resolution on this matter.

76. A solution to the problem of financing, together with appropriate organization of the IAEA fund of special fissionable materials, will give all member States and not only the developing countries a source which will speed up their economic progress and will undoubtedly be a multiplying factor in the transfer of technology not only in the nuclear field but also as regards industries connected with the production of electrical energy.

77. None the less, the fact that this full and valuable report was prepared by a Group of Experts all appointed by IAEA unfortunately may detract from the effectiveness that was sought in its preparation. At the twelfth General Conference of the Agency, the Argentine delegation had already warned that the idea was not to produce unavailable information, but to present it to Governments through sources that could not mistakenly be thought to favour atomic programmes over other programmes of development.

78. I have concluded my statement and should now like warmly to congratulate the United States delegation on the new feat being performed by the United States astronauts; we certainly hope that they will return safely to their country and to their families.

79. We are sure that all mankind will benefit from the scientific knowledge that will result from this new space triumph, which will thus make an additional contribution to international peace, understanding and co-operation.

Mr. Kolo (Nigeria), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

80. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation joins in the general debate on the questions of disarmament with the intention of doing its best to promote the solution of the great problems before the Committee. We have always felt bound to make a positive contribution to the questions of disarmament, and as we consider it an honour that last summer the Hungarian People's Republic was invited to take part in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament we are fully aware of our increased responsibilities.

81. Conscious of its responsibility, my Government stated in its declaration issued in connexion with the invitation to the disarmament talks:

"The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, in conformity with its efforts to strengthen international peace and security, is willing to endorse any initiative which serves to lessen international tensions, to ward off the danger of war, and to promote general and complete disarmament."

82. General and complete disarmament is our ultimate goal and a source of inspiration for new efforts to attain, step by step, partial—but at the same time very important—agreements. It is the considered opinion of my delegation that there is a direct link between partial disarmament measures and general and complete disarmament. We hold the view that any partial solution could pave the way towards general and complete disarmament, and that, on the other hand, the objective of general and complete disarmament helps us to arrive at partial measures.

83. Consequently, at the very outset we are pleased to express our deep satisfaction that, early this week, very significant preliminary talks started at Helsinki between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic armaments. We wish the negotiating partners success in their important endeavour which might greatly contribute to the lessening of international tensions and simultaneously enhance peaceful co-operation among all nations.

84. The Hungarian delegation has made a thorough study of all the questions included in the agenda of the general debate and will expound its opinion and proposals on some of them at a later stage of this debate. At this juncture, I should like to deal separately with the important question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

85. Three years have passed since the United Nations undertook renewed efforts to enforce the strict observance by all States of the principles and aims of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to condemn any actions contrary to those aims, and to ensure that all States accede to the Geneva Protocol. Three years ago, the efforts initiated by the Hungarian delegation to obtain a comprehensive enforcement of the Geneva Protocol, prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, were described as a forced polemic by some delegations, which accused the promoters of the topic of serving meaningless motives and tried to reduce their arguments to mere propaganda. They were seeking to turn a cold shoulder to

the warnings of eminent and world renowned scientists demanding a general prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons by asserting that those persons were only private citizens, and therefore not responsible personalities.

86. The discussion of this issue in the General Assembly and in this Committee in 1966, however, called attention to a real danger, and progressive world opinion became increasingly alarmed and aware of the hazards matching the horrors of nuclear weapons. In the past three years, more and more data concerning chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons have become known in international politics, and the Secretary-General, in compliance with General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII) initiated by Poland, appointed 14 scientists of international fame to prepare a report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the effectiveness of their possible uses.

87. The Secretary-General's pertinent report,⁵ whose authors the Hungarian delegation wishes at this time to commend for their work, has produced a qualitative change in the body of information about chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The issue has become of primary importance. In this connexion, the Disarmament Committee attached a good number of substantial proposals to its annual report [A/7741-DC/232],⁶ an additional number of States have acceded to the Protocol, and at this twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly there has been no other disarmament question, apart from the nuclear problems, that would have attracted more attention than the issue of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. Nearly forty delegations touched upon it.

88. The awareness of the danger of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons has roused world public opinion. Various countries have expressed their concern at the reality of this danger; scientific workers have appealed to the world public, demanding that chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons be banned from the life of society; health workers have demanded that the criminal planners of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare be stopped; local communities, directly affected by the experiments conducted in death factories and by the shipments of their products at home and abroad, have protested against the menace. These protests have grown into nation-wide dimensions.

89. Public protest is so strong that even in the legislation of States which have hitherto been adamant in refusing to accede to the Geneva Protocol we can see initiatives which we should like to hope can bring positive results.

90. The United Nations has grown up to its task, embracing the support of world public opinion. In the general debate of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly the majority of delegations expressed the view that highly important, urgent and effective measures of disarmament are needed in this field.

⁵ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

⁶ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

91. We find it most heartening that the Government of the German Democratic Republic, which welcomed the decision of the United Nations to deal urgently with the comprehensive question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, declared in a statement on 25 September 1969:

“The German Democratic Republic, which was one of the first States to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, declared the reapplication of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and strictly adheres to the provisions of this document . . .” [see A/C.1/991].

It is ready to undertake obligations to ensure that mankind is freed for ever from these horrible weapons of mass destruction. Here I must mention that the Hungarian delegation on 23 October 1969 requested the President of the General Assembly to circulate the important document in question, but unfortunately, for reasons unknown to us, our request was complied with only after the lapse of an unusually long time on 12 November 1969, although it was dated 7 November 1969.

92. In the opinion of the Hungarian delegation a two-fold task is awaiting solution at present: the prohibition enjoined in the Geneva Protocol—that of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons—should be given universal validity; and a policy decision should be made on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and on the destruction of existing stockpiles.

93. At the meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva a number of proposals were made which are intended to comply, in one form or another, with the demand of world public opinion and to establish a concrete course of action, thus making it possible to set forth in resolutions the efforts made to impose a universal ban on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Hungarian delegation supports these proposals because it is convinced that, from the point of view of a comprehensive prohibition of the use of such weapons, the Geneva Protocol reflects an important standard of international law which has proven its effectiveness by the role it played during World War II.

94. Of the proposals in question we support primarily the idea which the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic put forth at the 424th meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. We agree that the General Assembly, at its twenty-fourth session, should appeal to States not parties to the Geneva Protocol to accede to it or to ratify it before 17 June 1970, the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of this important international instrument. Such an appeal of the General Assembly would be in harmony with General Assembly resolutions 2162 B (XXI) and 2454 B (XXIII), which were adopted by an overwhelming majority.

95. We also highly value and fully support the proposal formulated in the working paper submitted by the People's Republic of Poland on 22 July 1969 [A/7741-DC/252, annex C, section 21]. According to that proposal, the importance and significance of the report of the Secretary-General should be underlined. We are of the view that the report of the Secretary-General completely reinforces the

timeliness of the Geneva Protocol, and the General Assembly should endorse by resolution the report of the Secretary-General.

96. We think it is especially timely, and even indispensable for the realities of our day, that we should endorse the second of the measures proposed by the Secretary-General in the foreword to the report:⁷

“To make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents), which now exist or which may be developed in the future;”.

97. The Committee may remember that, at the time of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, some delegations contested the applicability of the Geneva Protocol to tear gas and other harassing agents. In this respect, the past three years have accumulated further evidence pointing to the complexity of the use of such agents.

98. We have encountered the practice of their use in peace, which has proved that exposure to arthochlorobenzylidene malonomitrile, known as CS for its inventors, Carson and Stoughton, could cause asthmatic and bronchial attacks among persons with impaired health.

99. Agents of the same type have been used in war, and today it is a proven fact that tear gas and herbicides are not humanitarian weapons; they are used in combat or to improve conditions for battle, with the avowed intention to rout the enemy from his fortified position, forcing him to become the victim of bombings, artillery fire and other means of warfare. We have seen such agents being used in peace, in war, and in various conflicts in developed and developing countries alike.

100. I have mentioned all this only to demonstrate the validity of the second measure proposed by the Secretary-General in his foreword. It applies especially if we take into consideration that some States are dragging their heels about signing the Geneva Protocol of 1925 until after their forces are withdrawn from combat, simply because the Protocol might raise questions concerning the use of CS by them.

101. Humanitarian reasons should oblige the General Assembly to lay down in a resolution the affirmation proposed by the Secretary-General.

102. The Hungarian delegation has carefully studied the working paper of twelve non-aligned nations contained in a document [ibid., section 30] which, like the Mongolian or the Polish initiative, expresses the realization that the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in international law is universal, regardless of any technical development attained in terms of such weapons. This working paper reflects our understanding as well.

103. Further on, however, in the operative part of their common draft, the twelve non-aligned countries would

⁷ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

stipulate the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons without direct reference to the Geneva Protocol, by itemizing the various uses to be prohibited.

104. In evaluating that draft we recommend consideration of these viewpoints:

(a) The original text of the Geneva Protocol itself already expresses the prohibition;

(b) The original text of the Geneva Protocol contains a sufficiently exhaustive enumeration ending with the following terms: "all analogous liquids, materials or devices".

105. The Geneva Protocol has the enormous advantage that its general formulation allows an all-comprehensive interpretation. Specialization, a much too specific definition, has its drawbacks: it may have the contrary effect and create loop-holes of evasion. The question arises whether we need a formulation of the prohibition apart from the Geneva Protocol, especially if we take into account that the majority of the Member States have already acceded to the Protocol.

106. We are of the opinion that the draft in question could ensure universal accession to the Geneva Protocol only if, in its operative part, reference is made to the valid and concrete norms of international law.

107. Why is it necessary to extend prohibition to development, production and stockpiling also? Answers to that question are provided by some very important conclusions drawn from the report of the Secretary-General.

108. First, chemical and bacteriological weapons are weapons of mass destruction; they are no less dangerous to humanity than the most developed types of nuclear weapons. Paragraphs 143 to 146 of the Secretary-General's report discuss the effects of chemical substances on populations; paragraph 193 deals with the effects of bacteriological (biological) substances on populations. In both instances, a clear parallel can be drawn between the effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons and those of nuclear weapons. A common feature of those two types of weapons is their impact on several successive human generations. The consequences to man and the long-term ecological effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons are dealt with in an entire chapter of the Secretary-General's report. The reading of that chapter—chapter IV—makes no less horrible an impression than that of a previous report of the Secretary-General on the effects of possible uses of nuclear weapons.

109. Second, the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons requires a relatively smaller amount of material outlay and industrial and scientific facilities than the development of nuclear weapons. As is stated in paragraph 355 of the Secretary-General's report, "the acquisition, storage, transport and testing of chemical and bacteriological (biological) munitions would constitute an economic burden", depending on the level of a country's industrial and military capability, but "compared to nuclear weapons and advanced weapons systems in general, it might not seem excessive". That means that chemical and

bacteriological armament is open to a much greater number of countries than nuclear armament. Thus, the danger of horizontal proliferation exists in this field, too.

110. As regards the quantity of the chemical and bacteriological weapons produced, the cost of production is not a matter of importance: a relatively small input would do to produce a multiple of the overkill, even under comparatively primitive technical conditions. Production costs may rather affect the testing of new types and the use of possible variants and, in this respect, there is a greater danger of vertical proliferation of chemical and bacteriological weapons on the part of countries having a greater economic potential.

111. Third, the effects of possible uses of chemical and bacteriological weapons—and we have no complete knowledge of such effects and, what is more, scientific advancements might lead to the creation of weaponry producing unpredictable effects—constitute a menace to the whole of mankind.

112. As for the degree of danger, the developing countries are, of course, at a disadvantage compared to the developed countries with regard either to delivery systems or to protection, but only to some extent. Because of lack of resources and inadequate medical facilities, the developing countries obviously would find it more difficult to protect themselves, but chemical and bacteriological weapons may also strike developed countries and backfire too, so that not even they can provide themselves with perfect protection. Similarly, the otherwise already over-polluted and crowded big cities of developed countries are at least as much exposed as the densely populated areas of many developing countries. The extent of universal danger is overriding to every country.

113. Special mention should be made of protection against long-term ecological effects. These are also dealt with by the Secretary-General's report, in paragraphs 309 to 311, but other publications also mention that the flora and fauna, for example in Viet-Nam, have been the object of massive testing by chemical weapons for the past six years. The evaluation of the long-term ecological hazards of those experiments is still to be made, just as we still have to find out how extensive areas and how many civilians, children included, have been affected by the dumping of defoliants and herbicides and CS and other gases on certain areas, and how many people have perished as a result.

114. At a meeting in Dallas in December 1968, the American Association for the Advancement of Science discussed the question of the use of herbicides in Viet-Nam, as well as its attempt to promote an on-the-spot study of the ecological hazards of defoliants in Viet-Nam. At that meeting, it was reported that Fred Tschirley, of the United States Agricultural Research Department, had conducted a one-month study of herbicides in Viet-Nam. From his limited observations, he concluded that herbicides had caused serious ecological changes in Viet-Nam and should be investigated in depth as soon as possible.

115. Such a study is hardly possible in view of the wartime risks, but it may provide a basis for comparison to ascertain the long-term ecological consequences of the

so-called civilian use of chemical agents harmful to man in industrially developed countries. Thus, for example, a growing number of countries have decided to prohibit or limit the use of even DDT. After a thorough debate the Second Committee has recently adopted an important resolution [*see General Assembly resolution 2581 (XXIV)*] for the protection of the human environment. Day after day, the world press carries articles and studies on the subject of pollution, many of them characterizing the destruction of nature's chemical balance—a course suicidal for mankind. The developing countries are particularly interested in preventing the use of chemical agents for explicitly military purposes; that is, their more concentrated and thus more hazardous utilization than is usual in agriculture, amounting essentially to a kind of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

Mr. Shahi (Pakistan) resumed the Chair.

116. The effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons are unpredictable. Their power of mass destruction is formidable; total protection is impossible in the short and long run alike, especially if we take into account the fact that their long-term consequences and geographical extent cannot be estimated with precision. It follows that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons is one of the foremost tasks of every country from the point of view of international peace and security.

117. In what I have said so far, I have tried to answer the question "Why is comprehensive prohibition necessary?" In what follows, I wish to state the position of the Hungarian delegation regarding ways and means of extending the prohibitive clause of the Geneva protocol.

118. The Hungarian delegation, also, has signed the letter contained in document A/7655, in which nine socialist countries propose the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and the destruction of such weapons. In signing that letter, the Hungarian delegation kept in mind the necessity of creating a framework for the total prohibition and definitive elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

119. I wish to express the Hungarian delegation's warm appreciation of the excellent statement made on 18 November 1969 in our Committee, by my friend Ambassador Eugeniusz Kulaga of brotherly Poland, in introducing this draft convention, which serves the purpose of bringing about such a framework.

120. I shall touch upon only a few aspects of this problem.

121. The prohibition laid down in the Geneva Protocol is essentially only a collateral measure of disarmament, even if the General Assembly establishes beyond doubt its applicability to the totality of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents. The Geneva Protocol provides for the limitation, or the prohibition of its use in war, of a given type of weapon. Only the conclusion of the proposed convention would mean an effective measure of disarmament, a real step towards general and complete disarm-

ament. The progress thus made would be the elimination of a type of weapon—an entire method of warfare. At the same time, efforts to achieve the conclusion of the convention would be a considerable endorsement of the Geneva Protocol.

122. As is stated in paragraph 374 of the report of the Secretary-General, the universal elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons would not detract from any nation's security, and since the development of such weapons, in spite of the economic burden it implies, offers no proportionate advantage in terms of defence, the proposed convention would work towards international security. That conditions are ripe for a policy decision is proved by the consensus that came about in respect of the solution of this problem at the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

123. International public opinion is today sufficiently informed for us to set aside our misgivings about the conclusion of the convention and to make a policy decision on an important question of disarmament. Conclusion of the convention would constitute enormous practical and moral support for every country in respect of disarmament; it would amount to a moral obligation regarding chemical and bacteriological disarmament akin to that of the Charter of the United Nations regarding international relations. The Charter itself is based on a sense of moral responsibility, compulsion and the substance of the proposed convention would be subject to the same rules of effectiveness and would thus have the same force of observance.

124. Moreover each State, party to the proposed convention [*see A/7655*], would undertake to be "internationally responsible for compliance with its provisions by legal and physical persons exercising their activities in its territory, and also by its legal and physical persons outside its territory". This voluntary obligation at the same time points to one of the practical advantages of the proposed convention; it does not make the policy decision subject to verification. The prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare in our time is not some sort of theoretical problem. Its application in practice is a political reality of our time. It is vitally necessary to ban chemical and bacteriological warfare so as to avoid what would probably be a long and unproductive excursion down the side roads of verification.

125. The proposed convention recommends the simultaneous prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. We think their separation is unwarranted and even dangerous. There are many valid arguments to support discussion, on an equal basis, of both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

126. The two types of weapons are equally classed as weapons of mass destruction, and world public opinion demands the prohibition of both. According to the concurrent opinion of the consultant experts who prepared the report of the Secretary-General, both types of weapons exercise their effects solely on living matter. They are classed in a single group of weapons of mass destruction by more sophisticated weapons systems and it is possible, in principle, for conventional ammunition to be loaded with such agents. Whether we consider the chemical or the

bacteriological (biological) weapons, we can state that there are sufficient accumulations of both types to ensure a global capacity of overkill. Their simultaneous prohibition is, therefore, by all means warranted.

127. In this context, recalling the eloquent and remarkable statement made yesterday by Lord Chalfont [*1694th meeting*], I wish to call his attention to the fact that no clear distinction can be made between chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. It is stated with authority in paragraph 19 of the report of the Secretary-General that "All biological processes depend upon chemical or physico-chemical reactions, and what may be regarded today as a biological agent could, tomorrow, . . . be treated as chemical". Toxins are produced by living organisms but the report regards them as chemical agents. As is known, toxins secreted by bacteria can be manufactured industrially; their composition can be modified, and their pathogenic power increased by genetic and chemical processes.

128. Considering the problem of biological weapons separately as proposed by the United Kingdom, or leaving chemical weapons untouched even though temporarily, as proposed by Canada, would have three negative consequences. First, the development of chemical weapons would be stimulated, although today they represent the most real danger. Secondly, lack of prohibition would enable the development of chemical weapons to spiral upwards at a time when science, with its ever newer discoveries, offers almost unlimited possibilities for such a course. Thirdly, the breaking up of the Geneva Protocol would result in its weakening.

129. Up until now, the two types of weapons have been dealt with concurrently in all international instruments, including the Geneva Protocol, the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first and twenty-second sessions, and the report of the Secretary-General. It follows that not only would their separation be wrong methodologically, but such a half measure would not eliminate the danger and would certainly be counter-productive.

130. The Hungarian delegation holds the view that world public opinion has universally condemned chemical and bacteriological warfare, and that this is due to the universal condemnation laid down in the Geneva Protocol. It is the Geneva Protocol that has created so powerful a current of opinion that the very idea of having recourse to such weapons is held intolerable and arouses deep indignation. On this basis we have set the following twofold task: first, to confirm the Geneva Protocol by universal accession to that instrument, and second, to complete the prohibition enjoined by the Geneva Protocol with the conclusion of the convention proposed by us—to take an effective measure of disarmament to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and to destroy the existing stockpiles of such weapons.

131. This latter measure would enable us to obtain the elimination of a kind of weapon of mass destruction equal to nuclear weapons.

132. Now, I wish to say a few words regarding the problem that was brought up yesterday by the representative of the United Kingdom [*1694th meeting*] and today

by the representative of Argentina: in the draft convention proposed by nine delegations there is no definition of what is understood by weapons, as mentioned, nor of what is understood by components or parts of weapons as the representative of the United Kingdom stated. I admit this is not satisfactorily defined linguistically in any international documents. The term weapon has a presupposed meaning and this meaning is more political than technical; both aspects should be involved when a definition is about to be worked out. It depends greatly not only on the technical facilities and technical characteristics of certain means, but also on the aim and purpose and intention with which they are used, upon the decision on which they are set to work and the framework in which they are utilized.

133. This is a very complex problem and I hardly think that in such a convention we should dwell with a very detailed semantic exercise since everyone knows from a political point of view what are considered as weapons for means of destruction and killing.

134. We are convinced that both tasks I have mentioned earlier have a realistic basis for implementation, and if we can achieve it we shall have made a considerable contribution to solving other problems of disarmament as well. Conclusion of the convention would improve the general atmosphere of international security, which in turn would make it possible to take further steps towards our ultimate goal—general and complete disarmament.

135. My delegation reserves the right to explain its views regarding other problems of disarmament at a later stage of our debate.

136. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): As far as United Nations action in regard to disarmament is concerned, 1969 bears all signs of becoming but an intermediate year. We must recognize how frustrating such facts are, that while on the one hand the nuclear armament race has surged dangerously upwards during the year, proposals for disarmament measures have, on the other hand, not progressed so much as to yield results in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

137. Were it not for the strategic arms limitation talks negotiations, opening these very days in Helsinki, disappointment might have been the main theme of our deliberations. As it now is, we place faith in the preparedness and the political will of the two main nuclear-weapon Powers to curb the armaments race and begin limiting their strategic nuclear arms. This is, by far, the most important move on which the future of mankind may well hinge.

138. Meanwhile, this Committee should devote its attention to elaborating mandates for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed in a businesslike way during its next session in order to finish its work on several specific projects now on its agenda and reported in document A/7741-DC/232.⁸

139. In the chapter on disarmament contained in the introduction to his annual report⁹ to this Assembly, the

⁸ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A.*

Secretary-General of our Organization has set forth in an admirable way the issues confronting us. The Secretary-General has also drawn our attention to the reasons behind the relative lack of success so far in disarmament negotiations. He has listed the promises given in previous resolutions by the General Assembly but still left unfulfilled. In order to speed up the present slow rate of progress, I think we can do no better than follow the very useful recommendations with which the Secretary-General has interspersed his analysis of the situation and respond to the appeal which he has made in paragraph 46, at the end of the chapter on disarmament in the introduction to his annual report that we "tackle anew the complicated but not insuperable problems of disarmament".

140. One important problem in this connexion is, it seems to me, related to what we mean by priorities. For a number of years, highest priority was given to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which then became almost our exclusive concern. Still, more than a full year after its acceptance, it has not entered into force. As a matter of fact, the Treaty remains unsigned by a number of States, which are potential nuclear-weapon Powers. Only one of the three nuclear-weapon Powers that signed the Treaty last year has ratified it. This is, of course, the major obstacle to its entering into force. Only one of the so-called threshold Powers has so far ratified it. My delegation hopes, however, that we may soon see a positive turn of events. In this connexion I may inform the Committee that on Friday last I signed the Government bill requesting our Parliament to approve ratification by Sweden of the non-proliferation Treaty.

141. Discrepancy between priorities stated and results obtained seems to be the rule rather than the exception. One cannot escape the impression that the formal priority afforded the vital disarmament items, for instance in the provisional agenda of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, is not being granted them in the real plans and intentions of the Governments of the main Powers. The matter which gives the clearest evidence of this regretful state of affairs in perhaps the test-ban or—to use the full title of the item on our agenda—the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

142. Year after year, the General Assembly has been passing virtually unanimous resolutions, urging all States which have not done so to adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, and also calling upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend forthwith the tests in all environments, and requesting the Disarmament Committee to take up, as a matter of urgency, the elaboration of a treaty regulating a ban on underground weapon tests. The matter has thus been allotted special priority by the Assembly as well as by the Disarmament Committee at Geneva, but evidently only in a formal fashion. The reality has been different. The report of the Committee indicates that several specific proposals were put forward during the past session to overcome the deadlock on this issue which has existed now for six long years. These various suggestions, however, met on the whole with no positive response by the main Powers. Hence, no progress was made during the session.

143. In spite of this sad situation, we must spare no effort in trying to obtain a comprehensive test ban. Success for

the strategic arms limitation talks would undoubtedly greatly facilitate agreement on a test ban, as the constantly more advanced development of nuclear weapons could then be foregone. If we expect the bilateral talks to yield positive results it is now our duty, through simultaneous work in the United Nations, to elaborate a test ban treaty so that it can stand ready for immediate entry into force.

144. Even without regard to the prospects of SALT, the comprehensive test ban has an independent value. It is one of the major locks on both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear arms. We must not now underestimate the factors which have led the United Nations and the whole world community at large for well over a decade to attach such importance to the test ban issue. These factors are still largely valid. It may be useful to list them shortly once more.

145. The factor which was stressed particularly in the past and which is still highly important is the one of health hazards. We all know of the dangers of radio-active fall-out which were indeed a crucial issue before the partial test ban Treaty was concluded in 1963.

146. That situation has undoubtedly been considerably improved since that time, but nuclear test activity is, however, being carried on in various parts of the globe by those two nuclear-weapon Powers which have not adhered to the Moscow Treaty. Each time they explode a nuclear device in the atmosphere, dangerous radio-activity is spread over very large areas. Also, underground tests have led to radio-active leakages in the atmosphere, in several cases drifting outside national territories, for example, over international waters, thus constituting violations of the Moscow Treaty. When radio-active debris related to such leakages have fallen over my country we have reacted, and shall continue to react, by notifying the Government concerned. However insignificant in radio-active yield and however technical in nature these violations have been so far, all signatories of the Moscow Treaty must be alert so as not, by passivity, to seem to condone explosions that result in leakages.

147. Representatives may be aware of the fact that in recent years scientific research in several countries, including my own, has led to new conclusions concerning the severe danger of radio-active fall-out products, particularly strontium 90, but also tritium which is produced by both atomic bombs and so-called relatively clean hydrogen bombs. It has been shown scientifically that the incidence of infant mortality in the world has increased in an observable fashion due to effects of these products emanating from nuclear weapon testing.

148. Another capital reason for insisting on a truly international solution of the test ban problem is the control issue. It is now a generally accepted fact that the solution of the verification problems connected with a ban on underground tests would be greatly facilitated by the establishment of an international exchange of seismic data. To be effective, the data exchange has to be world-wide. Practically all States can play a role in this field and they must be vitally interested in the effectiveness of this means of observation. Valuable suggestions intended to carry forward the preparatory work needed to establish such a

data exchange system have been made during this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament. They were introduced in this Committee on Tuesday by the representative of Canada [1692nd meeting] when he presented the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1 and 2. I strongly suggest that the General Assembly endorse this proposal which is intended to carry the preparatory work a step further.

149. I will mention one additional reason for the continued priority of the comprehensive test ban; the obvious close link between such a treaty and the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. A final international regulation concerning such explosions can only be achieved in connexion with a decision to halt all nuclear explosions for military purposes, as was stated, *inter alia*, by the representative of Mexico in his statement on 18 November [1691st meeting].

150. The time for action on the test ban issue is now. I have already stressed its close connexion with the ongoing bilateral strategic arms limitation talks. These would undoubtedly be greatly facilitated if progress could be made, in a parallel fashion, on the interdependent test ban. The vast improvements during the last years of the scientific and technical situation, as far as seismic detection capabilities are concerned, constitute a further positive element calling for action now. These improvements in seismic detection methods should be viewed together with the rapid development of so-called earth-resources satellites, designed to make repetitive observations which would enable man to see and assess all sudden changes in the earth's surface. The sensors being used in these satellites are thus more and more effectively supplementing other techniques for monitoring activities on the ground and underground. Alas, they only belong to the national means of the technologically most advanced nations. All other nations have to stake their reliance on the seismic methods of monitoring possible breaches of a comprehensive test ban.

151. As is evident from the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, concrete suggestions were set forth by the Committee during its past session as to possible provisions for a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. The Swedish delegation introduced on 1 April, 1969, a working paper containing a complete draft treaty text [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 6], and we have stated repeatedly that this draft constitutes only one way of reaching our common objective and that other suggestions might be more effective. In addition, I wish to draw particular attention to the ideas which have been presented in the Disarmament Committee by the United Kingdom delegation for so-called phasing-out of nuclear weapon testing, starting with an agreed annual quota of underground test explosions, leading to zero over a small number of years. The adoption of this idea, preferably in some agreement or protocol outside the comprehensive test ban treaty proper, might be useful in order to allow additional time for establishing a smoothly working verification procedure and for experimenting further with peaceful nuclear explosions.

152. I suggest that the General Assembly, in a new resolution on the test ban issue, request the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate, as a matter of

urgency, a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account that concrete suggestions have already been made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as well as in this Assembly, regarding the contents of such a treaty. In order to emphasize further the importance which the General Assembly attaches to this subject, it might be fitting to request the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to submit a special report before a fixed date, say 15 July 1970, in order to give all Member States of the United Nations time for a thorough preparation so that we can get action next year.

153. I have the honour to introduce a draft resolution to this effect contained in document A/C.1/L.486 which is now on the table before delegates. This text is being presented by 10 Member States, namely; Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. It is a privilege for me to speak on their behalf when recommending this draft resolution for adoption by the Committee. I hope that this will be done by virtual unanimity as has been the case with similar resolutions in the past.

154. I wish to turn now to the subject of chemical and biological weapons. In this field, too, there is an urgent need to curb the present arms race. The possibilities for our taking action in this regard now seem somewhat brighter than earlier. There is a new and spreading awareness of the threat which chemical and biological warfare poses to mankind. An outstanding contribution to our increased knowledge in this respect has been furnished by the group of experts, convoked by the Secretary-General under resolution 2454 A (XXIII). Their report,¹⁰ together with the foreword to it by the Secretary-General containing some concrete suggestions as to political action by Member States, constitutes a very valuable basis for our present discussion. Other relevant documents have been submitted by Member States, either individually or acting as a group. I am referring specifically to the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons [A/7655] presented on 19 September by the Soviet Union and eight other delegations to this Assembly. I further refer to the various proposals which were introduced already during the last months in the Committee on Disarmament on this subject and which are covered in paragraphs 39-44 of the report of that Committee. Two of these seem of special importance. The first is the draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare, put forward by the United Kingdom delegation. The second is the working paper which was submitted by 12 members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, including my country, and which contemplates a declaration by the General Assembly in order to confirm the universality and comprehensive nature of the existing prohibition of the use of chemical and biological methods of warfare.

155. The two draft conventions which I have mentioned refer to the third of three policy recommendations made by the Secretary-General in his introduction to the experts'

¹⁰ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

report, namely, banning the very production of these weapons. On this matter the General Assembly could hardly be expected to make definite decisions this year. More time will surely be needed for detailed negotiations. The two texts should, we think, be referred to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with the request to intensify its efforts to reduce the risks raised by the continued development and production of both chemical and biological weapons.

156. More decisive action could, however, be taken here and now on the other two recommendations by the Secretary-General. The first of these is self-explanatory: to renew the appeal to all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This appeal should certainly be issued by this Assembly as it was done in 1966 and again in 1968, and I hope with greater success. Less than one half of the Member States have so far ratified or acceded to that important international instrument. A substantial increase in this number is urgently called for. The suggestion made by the delegation of Mongolia in the Disarmament Committee [424th meeting] that the Assembly should appeal to all Governments to do this in the course of 1970, being the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Protocol, should, in the opinion of my delegation, be endorsed here.

157. In the second recommendation in his foreword to the experts' report the Secretary-General suggested that Member States should make "a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents), which now exist or which may be developed in the future".

158. It is this recommendation that has been dealt with by the 12 afore-mentioned members of the Disarmament Committee. On 26 August they submitted a working paper regarding a proposed declaration by the General Assembly to this effect [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 30], attached to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In two statements before the Geneva Committee on 5 August [425th meeting] and 26 August [431st meeting] respectively, I had the opportunity to indicate the reasons underlying this proposal. It might nevertheless be useful to reiterate some of these reasons in this forum.

159. In the first place it may be stated with confidence that there exists a clear prohibition of the use of biological and chemical means of warfare. It has its deepest roots in bans, some of which are now a century old, against inhuman methods of warfare. I refer to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, which expressed the fundamental principle of the laws of war that the only legitimate object is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. From this fundamental principle, in the last resort, flows the prohibitions of weapons, the effects of which cannot be limited to military forces but which may inflict suffering on civilians and military forces in an indiscriminate manner.

160. I refer, further, to the 1874 Brussels Declaration, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, instruments which are now regarded as expressing customary law and which outlawed asphyxiating or deleterious gases and poisons or poisoned weapons.

161. Several other treaty instruments have contributed to the establishment of the prohibition of the use of biological and chemical means of warfare, notably, of course, among them the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This prohibition has gradually come to be considered and respected as a generally recognized rule of international law, customary law, binding *erga omnes*. In 1938 the Assembly of the League of Nations reaffirmed categorically, without making any reference to the Geneva Protocol, that "the use of chemical or bacteriological methods in the conduct of war is contrary to international law".¹¹ I could go on quoting quite a number of official statements to the same effect. Perhaps I may be allowed to cite just two recent ones, from the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. In 1967 the United States Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Macomber, stated in regard to the Geneva Protocol that "it is now considered to form part of customary international law". Also the recent proposal by the Soviet Union and other States for a convention [A/7655] recognizes the Geneva Protocol as embodying "generally recognized rules of international law". With these facts in view, agreement ought to be possible on a declaration affirming the cogent and universal character of the prohibition.

162. Another reason for taking action now is that in recent years certain queries have been raised, though not from parties to the Geneva Protocol, as to the comprehensive character of the prohibition. If such queries are not authoritatively answered by an affirmation of the comprehensive nature of the prohibition, there is a risk that limitative interpretations may spread and gradually have a destructive influence. It would be tragic indeed if the broad and perfectly valid and rational prohibition, which hardly anyone would have been inclined seriously to question 10 years ago, were to be eroded. The consequences of such erosion could prove catastrophic in the future.

163. My delegation has taken quite some trouble to examine the legislative history of the present prohibition of biological and chemical means of warfare. It is perfectly clear from the records of the 1925 Conference and even more so from those of the League of Nations Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments of 1932 and 1933 and its Preparatory Commission that both parties and non-parties to the 1925 Protocol were convinced that the prohibition, which was most recently embodied in that Protocol, and which one tended increasingly to consider as expressive of law valid *erga omnes* was comprehensive.

164. The question whether lachrymatory gases (tear gases) were covered was also discussed and resolved in the most explicit manner. In a memorandum submitted to the Preparatory Commission for the 1932 Conference,¹² the United Kingdom delegation took the firm position that the term "'other' gases" in the Geneva Protocol included lachrymatory gases. The French delegation, which then and now represents the depositary Government, immediately confirmed that the words "*ou similaires*" in the French text had the same meaning. The delegations of Romania,

¹¹ League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 182 (October 1938), pp. 15-16.

¹² Minutes of the second part of the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference (League of Nations publication: 1931. IX. 1), p. 311.

Yugoslavia, Japan, China, Soviet Union, Italy, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Turkey and Spain fully agreed with the United Kingdom position. No delegation rejected this position. The United States made an oral reservation for the use of tear gas in police work; the matter was left to be finally regulated at the Disarmament Conference and the issue was settled at that Conference. In a unanimous report by a special committee of the 1932 Conference¹³ the prohibition was defined in its resolution to encompass “lachrymatory, irritant, vesicant” substances. It was further explained, in paragraph 5 of its report, that prohibition should extend “not merely to substances harmful to human beings” but to “chemical substances in general”. These definitions, which, as we have seen from the discussion in the Preparatory Commission, related notably to the Geneva Protocol, were not contradicted by any delegation. I may add that both the United States and the Soviet Union participated in these deliberations.

165. My delegation submits that the adoption by the General Assembly of a declaration which is of the kind recommended by the Secretary-General on the basis of the experts’ report and which would affirm that all existing and future means of chemical and biological means of warfare without exceptions are prohibited, would rest on solid ground.

166. To sum up: it seems clear to us that not long after the adoption of the Geneva Protocol both parties and non-parties to the Protocol interpreted it to be comprehensive. No party made any reservations about its scope and it seems highly probable that if a reservation as to the scope of the Protocol was attached to an adherence today, such reservation would meet valid objections. Due to the regrettable fact that in recent years the view has been officially expressed that the use in warfare of tear gas and other harassing agents as well as of herbicides might not be covered by the existing prohibition, it seems necessary that the world community, as represented in this Assembly, takes the step of clarifying and consolidating these prohibitory rules. This is a kind of task with which the General Assembly is familiar; indeed a task expressly laid upon it by the Charter.

167. The text of such a declaration [*A/7741-DC/232 annex C, section 30*], which has been presented by 12 of the members of the Committee on Disarmament, should be a useful basis, we think. It draws heavily on the definitions used by the experts in their report, definitions which are entirely in conformity with the interpretation placed upon the prohibition by parties and non-parties in the past. It further confirms that the prohibition forms part of the recognized rules of international law. To be meaningful, such a declaration should, preferably, be adopted by consensus or near-consensus of the Assembly. I am sure, therefore, that the 12 sponsors of the Geneva working paper will be open to constructive suggestions which might increase the prospects for obtaining such a positive result.

168. I wish now to turn to a third and final and, may I say, briefer subject of my intervention, that of the sea-bed. I need not go deeply into this matter, because in a

statement in this Committee on 7 November [*1680th meeting*] I set out the general views of my delegation on the issues connected with reserving the sea-bed for peaceful purposes.

169. In relation to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*A/7741-FC/232, annex A*], which has been submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and attached to the report of that body, Sweden has already expressed its views in the Geneva Committee. We said then, and we continue to hold the view, that although such an agreement cannot be a substitute for a major disarmament measure, the effective prevention of any nuclear installations on the sea-bed would be an act of forethought and that every step which leads to the stemming of undesirable technological developments is in itself welcome.

170. At the same time we, together with the vast majority of other representatives in the Disarmament Committee, expressed our regret at the fact that the main Powers had not been able to agree on a more comprehensive formula. A partial treaty must at least be combined with a pledge to strive towards a comprehensive one; otherwise it risks having the effect of passively legitimizing all activities other than the one explicitly mentioned. The Swedish delegation, therefore, stressed in the deliberations of the Disarmament Committee the necessity for some effective undertaking that negotiations will be continued in order to ensure a more comprehensive demilitarization of the sea-bed in the future.

171. The present draft treaty contains in its preamble a paragraph to the effect that the parties should continue negotiations concerning further measures leading to “the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race . . .”—and I want to stress the word “race” as indicating something which, to us, seems insufficient. We wish to reintroduce this idea that a similar commitment should be included in the operative part of the treaty, thus constituting a parallel to article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The wording of the draft reads as follows:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith on further measures relating to a more comprehensive prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof” [*ibid., annex C, section 36*].

172. This suggestion was not retained by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States when they submitted their revised version of the draft treaty to the Geneva Committee. As we believe this to be a serious omission in the text at present before us, I have wished to introduce our amendment once again. It was supported in Geneva by a substantial majority of the members of the Disarmament Committee, and I hope it will receive further support here.

173. As we also stated in Geneva, another serious objection to the present draft treaty concerns the verification provisions contained in article III. The delegation of Canada

¹³ Report of the Special Committee on Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons (League of Nations publication: 1932. IX. 46).

introduced a working paper [*ibid.*, section 35] containing alternative language. These ideas received wide support from the Swedish delegation but, again, were on the whole not incorporated in the revised text of the treaty. As we consider the present version of article III totally inadequate, we sincerely hope that improved language will be agreed upon during our current deliberations.

174. The whole problem of verification—that is, access to installations as well as possibilities for international co-operation in verification endeavours—has now come into new and much more constructive light after the presentation of the report of the Sea-Bed Committee [*A/7622 and Corr.1 and Add.1*]. The necessity to create an international régime and an international machinery for the sea-bed has been widely acknowledged. Such an international régime could evidently fill a void in regard to the control functions under the treaty now being debated.

175. Further, we must ensure that the basic principle is firmly endorsed—perhaps in the treaty itself—that the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction constitute the common heritage of mankind and that their exploitation should be regulated by an international régime. A move in this direction would relieve the medium and smaller nations of much of the uncertainty with which they now view this partial solution and it would, undoubtedly, increase the possibilities for crowning this session of the General Assembly with a new agreement in the field of disarmament.

176. In conclusion, I cannot suppress the comment, already eloquently made by the Secretary-General and several delegations, that time is of the essence. The nuclear arms race entails risks and costs out of all proportion to human conditions. The enormous increase in the amounts of technical and financial resources being spent on arms and other military uses epitomizes the total irrationality of the over-all situation. The astronomical figure of \$200,000 million for a single year, estimated by the Secretary-General, has been quoted already in this debate. But such estimates, repeated with upward revisions from year to year, seem to have lost that sharp edge by which they could cut into our imagination. They may tell their terrifying lesson more effectively if translated into information about the abnormal use we make of human resources—absorbing for destructive purposes the thousands of research and technical talents which are so desperately needed for solving pressing problems of development and progress for all peoples.

177. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I will start by saying that the latest news indicates that the astronauts of Apollo II after their two walks on a natural satellite, and the linking, with equal success, of the Intrepid to the main spacecraft, Yankee Clipper, are to start their journey back to earth. May I take this opportunity to ask the delegation of the United States of America to convey to the United States Government our feelings of sincere admiration for this new and fantastic achievement, human and technical. Also, as you Mr. Chairman expressed yesterday, our warm and sincere wishes for the safe return of the astronauts to earth.

178. The debate in the First Committee on the question of disarmament has opened this year under the auspices of a favourable development; the beginning of the strategic

arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union held in Helsinki on 17 November.

179. I wish to join the Secretary-General, you Mr. Chairman, and all the previous speakers in expressing our sincere hopes for a positive outcome of these talks. The significance of these bilateral talks for the future of mankind can hardly be overstressed. It is a historic occasion, indeed it can become a historic milestone on our hard way to peace. As it has been stated by both sides any progress they might achieve towards the stabilization and possibly a reduction of the strategic forces could have the effect of strengthening international security and bringing about a climate of greater trust between the two major Powers. A number of causes of tensions and dangers, inherent in the present dynamics of the nuclear weapons race, could be eliminated. Moreover, a positive outcome of the strategic arms limitation talks would most probably be a catalyst for the accomplishment of other advances in the field of arms limitation.

180. For these reasons, my Government has welcomed, with great satisfaction, the announcement of the opening meeting. Italy expresses today its best wishes for the success of the talks in the interest of stability and peace.

181. The beginning of these talks aimed at bringing to a halt the escalation of the nuclear arms race should give momentum to the work of our Committee, and lead us to double our efforts in carrying out our main task of furthering any possibility of progress, not only in the limitation and control of armaments, but also in the reduction of armaments.

182. My delegation wishes to stress this point, namely, that our efforts should never lose sight of their real objective, which is the achievement of disarmament.

183. In this respect, we fully share the Secretary-General's concern, expressed in the introduction to his annual report.¹⁴ In that report he indicated that it is more than ever the duty of our Organization to come seriously to grips with the subject which is most vital for the peace and security of world disarmament. We believe, in effect, that a sheer balance of power, either nuclear or conventional, cannot create an atmosphere of trust among nations. Nor can it establish a firm basis for a lasting peace. On the contrary, what we need to build a durable peace are effective and far-reaching measures of disarmament which would act as an essential and stimulating factor. Since in our nuclear age there can be no alternative to peace, there can be neither an alternative to disarmament. This must remain the first and foremost goal of all our efforts, if we really want to pursue a new order of friendly relations among States.

184. Amongst the different documents which are on our agenda, and before the Committee, the most important one is the report submitted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on its activity during the two sessions it held in 1969 [*A/7741-DC/232*].¹⁵

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A.*

¹⁵ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

185. The Italian delegation has taken an active part in the work of the Geneva Conference, giving the contribution of its own initiatives and suggestions in an attempt to promote their progress. It is undeniable that an imbalance still exists between the importance and the magnitude of the tasks connected with any programme of disarmament and of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the minor achievements in both fields. But some progress has been accomplished although the road which still lies ahead of us is long and difficult.

186. As a representative of a State member of the Geneva Conference, I would like to list some elements of particular interest contained in the report presented this year by the Conference. These elements refer both to positive steps forward in specific fields and to the general approach to the disarmament problem.

187. Before commenting on the report, I wish to recall that the Geneva Conference has gained, during the months of last July and August, a substantial increase in its membership, following an agreement reached to this effect by the two Co-Chairmen. Italy has already welcomed at Geneva the new members: Japan, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Hungary, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Morocco and Argentina, which have been invited to sit at the Conference. I renew that welcome to those countries. The position of the Italian delegation vis-à-vis the procedure followed in the enlargement of the Committee is stated in the record of its 423rd meeting. I wish to voice here the firm confidence of the Italian Government that the Conference will benefit from the important contribution of its new members representing all continents. It is in this spirit that the decision taken at Geneva by the two Co-Chairmen should be considered, in our view, by the General Assembly in giving its necessary endorsement.

188. The single field in which the greatest progress has been achieved at Geneva, during the course of the last two sessions, is that of the limitation of armaments on the sea-bed. This progress is represented by the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*ibid.*, *annex A*] which has been jointly presented at Geneva by the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Italian delegation acknowledges the great interest attached to this project and wishes, on behalf of the Italian Government, to congratulate the two Co-Chairmen on the success of their endeavours.

189. We believe that the achievement of an agreement to prevent the installation of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and on the ocean floor is in keeping with the stand taken by the General Assembly in favour of reserving the area beyond national jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes. In our opinion such an agreement would represent at the same time an effective contribution to the policy of limitation of armaments, above all of nuclear weapons, as the risk would be avoided of introducing a new and dangerous technological and strategic relationship among Powers which could prove to be an element of possible serious imbalance.

190. We express, therefore, our satisfaction with the important initiative taken by the two Co-Chairmen. The

draft now under consideration has already been the object of close discussions at Geneva, following which some significant improvements reflecting the point of view of many delegations have been introduced in the original Soviet-United States text.

191. Both the United States and the Soviet representatives dwelt at length, in their interventions of last Monday, on the provisions of the treaty. They provided the Committee with valuable comments on its purposes and its contents. We trust that the debate which is now under way will prove to be extremely useful for a clearer understanding of the international community's concern with respect to various aspects of the problems involved. In that connexion, the Italian delegation was gratified to hear from Ambassador Yost how much the United States Government is interested in listening with care and understanding to the comments made here with a view to further improvement of the text.

192. We share at the same time the view expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union that our task now is not to let the moment go by. We feel convinced, however, that there is still enough time for further improvement of some of the provisions of the draft. Probably the main area in which further efforts should be made, in order to find a wider basis for agreement, is that of article III which concerns verification procedures. We think that, in essence, the international character of those procedures should be strengthened. The Italian delegation at Geneva has already set forth at the 441st meeting a number of ideas on how the treaty could be improved from this important angle. We have also taken note with great interest of the opinions expressed at Geneva by other delegations which share our concern on the subject.

193. Our views run along the same lines as those expressed here the day before yesterday with great clarity by the representative of Canada, Ambassador Ignatieff. On this subject we intend to further our consultations with all interested delegations with the aim of reaching agreement on an amended text based on the working paper presented by the Canadian delegation at Geneva [*ibid.*, *annex C*, *section 35*].

194. While we do not object to verification procedures adapted to the particular requirements of each single treaty, we deem it important, however, that there should be a minimum standard common to all multilateral treaties, one which would enforce the principle that verification must be effective, open and international in character, without discrimination.

195. There are other problems which deserve further examination, including the settlement of disputes arising from the implementation of the treaty. In that connexion I wish to recall the positive judgement given by the Italian delegation at Geneva to the working paper provided by Brazil [*ibid.*, *section 29*]. Another problem is the explicit recognition of the rights of coastal States to their continental shelf as in the provision of paragraph 2 of article I of the joint draft. In that respect the Italian delegation restates its preference for a different formulation, one which would exclude in principle the possibility that third States might install weapons of mass destruction in the territorial waters of coastal States with their consent.

196. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has devoted particular attention also to the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. On this subject we wish, first of all, to underline the importance of the report¹⁶ presented by the Secretary-General last July. We congratulate him, as well as his 14 consultants, for having fulfilled so brilliantly the mandate of the General Assembly. The report has attracted wide public attention in Italy, and translation into our language for its publication and broader distribution has been undertaken.

197. At Geneva the Italian delegation expressed the full support of the Italian Government for all measures that could strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which constitutes an international instrument of essential significance in this field. We are also prepared to back any serious attempts which aim at prohibiting not only the use, but also the production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons.

198. With that in view we consider with interest the draft convention proposed by the United Kingdom [*ibid.*, section 20], since it would ban the production and order the destruction of the existing supplies of biological weapons, as well as confirm the prohibition of the use of such weapons for hostile purposes which, in our opinion, is already implicit in the Geneva Protocol. The United Kingdom draft deserves accurate study, even though its provisions do not as yet meet the basic requirements for an effective verification system.

199. On the same point, it should be noted that the draft treaty [*ibid.*, section 4] submitted by the Soviet Government and other Eastern European Governments to the General Assembly seems to be defective as far as the essential element of a verification system is concerned. That is a serious shortcoming which by jeopardizing the effectiveness of the treaty would, in our view, greatly diminish its acceptability.

200. The Italian Government fully realizes how complex is the task of elaborating an effective control system in a field where installations, small and difficult to detect, can be used. In order to overcome such difficulties we consider that it could be useful, as suggested at Geneva by the Japanese delegation, to set up a special group of experts with the task of studying all the problems related to the realization of an effective system of international control.

201. In the meantime, while preparing ourselves for the possibility of moving forward in the field of the prohibition of production, we should seek practical ways to strengthen the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol concerning the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare.

202. During its last session the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament considered also the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and of the cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes. Both problems are of great importance.

¹⁶ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

Even if no concrete progress could be made in either field, efforts have been further displayed at Geneva by many delegations in an attempt to break the impasse. Those efforts testify to the growing interest which Governments and public opinion attach to solving satisfactorily the two elements of the continuing vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

203. The Italian Government has given its own contribution to the discussions in Geneva. In particular, it presented a revised text [*ibid.*, section 13] of the working paper which it submitted last year on the subject of underground explosions for peaceful purposes. It was apparent, however, that the main road towards the achievement of an agreement on a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests is still blocked by the persisting gap on the question of controls.

204. Under these circumstances we think that the proposal of the Canadian delegation [*ibid.*, section 11] aimed at promoting an international exchange of seismological data, might provide the possibility for limited progress which could be useful for improving the prospects of a more comprehensive agreement. I am glad to inform the Committee that the Italian delegation is a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/485 and Add.1 and 2 on the international exchange of seismic data, formally introduced by Ambassador Ignatieff.

205. As for the problem of the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, the United States delegation at Geneva presented an important new suggestion which, in my Government's view, could offer valuable ground for fruitful discussions. It is, in fact, difficult for us to understand why the intervention of IAEA—as suggested by the new United States proposal—to verify the fulfilment of the obligations which nuclear-weapon States would assume under a "cut-off" agreement, should raise any objection while a similar intervention was considered, on the contrary, to be indispensable to guarantee the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by non-nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

206. However important may be the results either achieved or expected in the fields I have just mentioned, we cannot ignore the fact that all the agreements now being negotiated do not imply any prospect of real disarmament.

207. This brings us back to a comprehensive view of the problem which, in our opinion, must embody three categories of provisions: measures to prevent armaments, measures to limit armaments, and measures of disarmament.

208. We were to a certain degree encouraged by acceptance of this approach by members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, even if only in general terms, as indicated in paragraph 37 of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In fact, some of the concepts which the Italian delegation put forward in its working paper presented at Geneva on 21 April for the adoption of an organic disarmament programme [*ibid.*, section 8] are somehow reflected in that paragraph 37, which we consider an interesting part of the report,

potentially opening further positive developments in the future.

209. In this connexion I should like to comment upon the concept of an organic programme for disarmament, which we have sought to promote at Geneva during the two sessions which the Conference held there in 1969.

210. Our initiative stemmed in fact from General Assembly resolution 2454 B (XXIII), by which the Disarmament Conference was urged to renew its efforts regarding the question of general and complete disarmament which had been for some time neglected at Geneva.

211. We believe that it was not our task to submit a new plan for general and complete disarmament nor to submit amendments to the two plans introduced at Geneva in 1962 by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States.¹⁷ These plans are still on the agenda of the Conference, although up to now they have not led to any concrete agreement. Furthermore, from 1962 to the present, no measures for the reduction of armaments have been negotiated, whilst negotiations on collateral measures have been successfully concluded, such as those for the partial cessation of nuclear experiments, for the nuclear ban in outer space, for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and so forth.

212. The significance of the agreements reached in those areas does not need to be emphasized. In spite of certain imbalances which they have inevitably given rise to, such agreements in fact constitute a positive result that augurs well for the possibility of further progress towards a gradual stabilization of armaments. We therefore hope that the efforts made in the field of collateral measures will be continued and intensified.

213. The General Assembly in its resolution 2454 B (XXIII) implied, however, that the negotiations on agreements for arms control, though necessary and important, are insufficient. In fact, it again stressed the need to resume discussions on the subject of general and complete disarmament in order to reach quickly the point of negotiations on effective reductions.

214. Italy shares the concern which is at the basis of the resolution that I have just mentioned. The statements made so far during the course of this debate confirm that this concern is at present widespread.

215. This is the reason for our initiative providing for the elaboration of an organic programme that aims, in fact, at balancing the two approaches to the problem; that of collateral measures, and that of disarmament, placing them both within a single framework.

216. We started from the assumption that: first, negotiations on disarmament cannot pursue only one agreement, one single and global agreement, covering the entire process of disarmament, but rather a series of agreements. Secondly, it is difficult to start negotiations immediately on

the reduction of armaments before favourable conditions have been created for such reduction; nonetheless, it is now necessary to envisage a given moment in which such negotiations should be initiated. Thirdly, negotiations should be continued on collateral measures for the prevention and limitation of armaments with the intent of reaching a certain degree of stabilization; but at the same time efforts should begin immediately to reach an understanding of the whole programme, which obviously cannot be limited to collateral measures since it must also—and above all—deal with disarmament.

217. Such an understanding, naturally, should be sufficiently flexible and should not contain any provision that could become a hindrance to the successful development of negotiations on specific matters. It should give a far-ranging idea of what we wish to accomplish and of the criteria that we wish to follow. Above all, it should unequivocally indicate to all peoples the intention of the Governments to undertake, as soon as possible, negotiations on measures for the reduction of armaments along certain guidelines. The practical aim of the suggestion which we submitted at Geneva is precisely that of having the Conference consider this problem and establish how a programme could be outlined.

218. It could be objected that such a programme is abstract and unnecessary, and that measures for reduction will be achieved when possible; pragmatically, and without having to resort to preventive commitments. To this we can point out that the establishment of such a programme would meet the demands of public opinion, which is asking for greater clarity in the action for disarmament. It would also set a guideline for Governments and stimulate them towards undertaking more decisive efforts for the reduction of armaments. Lastly, by the establishment of a programme the imbalances caused by the adoption of collateral measures, binding only certain categories of States and not others, would be lessened.

219. I agree, of course, with the United Kingdom representative, Lord Chalfont, that we are not going to achieve general and complete disarmament tomorrow or next year, unfortunately. We do, however, believe that a programme of disarmament on the lines that I have just indicated would serve as the shining North Star to guide us in our uneasy navigation toward the safe haven where we all want to arrive.

220. Naturally, the contents as well as the nature of the programme would be open to discussion. An initial solution could be that of adopting a working programme for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament itself. It should, however, be more precise and more binding than the one adopted in August 1968. In any case, there should be a commitment—though necessarily of a general character—by Governments to proceed at a given moment to negotiation of measures on the reduction of armaments.

221. We believe that the report submitted by the Disarmament Conference to the General Assembly, which refers to the need for maintaining a sensible balance between measures for prohibition of armaments, measures for limitation of armaments and measures for real disarmament, already contains some positive preliminary measures

¹⁷ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex I.

along the lines we have suggested. We hope, therefore, to be able to carry out further efforts with the support and approval of the General Assembly.

222. Turning to another important subject, I wish to reiterate here my Government's deep interest in the entry into force, and the subsequent full implementation in all its parts, of the Treaty on non-proliferation, which was signed by the Italian Government on 28 January of this year.

223. We were gratified to hear the representative of the United States of America, in his intervention of last Monday [1691st meeting], reaffirm the other major purposes of the Treaty besides that of arresting the spread of nuclear weapons among nations and thus lessening the risk of nuclear catastrophe.

224. Among such aims, Ambassador Yost recalled: first, the purpose of stimulating progress in the negotiation of effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament; secondly, the purpose of facilitating the world-wide dissemination of nuclear technology for peaceful uses.

225. On the first point the Italian delegation wishes to underline here how important and urgent this task is considered by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which, in its report to the General Assembly states in paragraph 37 that:

"The Committee is convinced of the continued need to give highest priority in its work to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament . . .".

226. On the second point, we concur in considering the full implementation of articles IV and V of the non-proliferation Treaty as being of the highest importance for the viability and the success of the Treaty itself.

227. We have listened with great care to the statement made on 18 November [ibid.]. Ambassador Garcia Robles, giving us a comprehensive evaluation of the interesting and positive developments of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which since its inception we have acknowledged as an outstanding achievement of the Latin American countries in the building of international peace and security.

228. We wish to renew our congratulations to the Mexican delegation, and to the other Latin American delegations, for this successful endeavour, as well as for the encouraging progress made by their Governments in bringing into force all the provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and in setting up the organs in charge of their implementation.

229. I have so far brought to your attention the views of my Government on the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by States parties to the Treaty on non-proliferation with regard to pursuing negotiations in the field of disarmament.

230. Let me now comment on the other equally important subject of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on which the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States last year approved a series of substantive recommendations.

231. I wish to reaffirm the great significance attached by the Italian Government to the strengthening of international co-operation in this field. Speaking from the rostrum of the General Assembly, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Signor Aldo Moro, stated:

"the development of international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy is a specific objective of the non-proliferation Treaty, an objective on which we are concentrating our efforts since the harmonious co-operation among the nuclear and non-nuclear States will depend on it" [1783rd plenary meeting, para. 31].

232. Having these goals in view, while acknowledging the efforts made by the IAEA towards the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, we note that the present capabilities of the Agency do not seem to be sufficiently adequate to carry out tasks which, increasing in number and importance, touch upon the very structure of the international community in the nuclear area. These problems must be considered from a broader and more political viewpoint and as something which is proper to the General Assembly in the exercise of its role as dynamic and leading world centre.

233. In our opinion, the Agency's function is hampered by the fact that the composition of its Board of Governors is not in keeping with present realities and appears to be rather outdated. We trust that the intensive reconsideration of the composition of the Board, which Ambassador Yost referred to in his intervention, will soon bring about, with an appropriate "*aggiornamento*", a satisfactory solution to this urgent problem.

234. It is essential, in our view, to continue exploring the ways and means which could best ensure the implementation of the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, whose continuity, we trust, will be assured.

235. We have benefited much from the excellent reports which the Secretary-General has submitted to the present session of the General Assembly on the three subjects connected with the implementation of the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

236. The Italian delegation wishes therefore to suggest that the General Assembly again request the Secretary-General to include this item in the agenda of the twenty-fifth session, and submit a further progress report on the implementation of the recommendations of that Conference.

237. As for the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, we have already indicated our views in our answer to the questionnaire of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to resolution 2456 C (XXIII) [see A/7678 and Add.1-3]. In this connexion I wish to restate the view of the Italian Government, according to which any decision about the application of article V of the non-proliferation Treaty can be taken only by the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. To this end and in accordance with the provisions of the same article V, they shall have to begin negotiations as soon as possible after the coming into force of the Treaty.

238. On all the items under consideration on which I have touched, I reserve the right of my delegation to intervene again in case it should appear necessary.

239. I shall conclude my intervention by stating that the Italian delegation supports the suggestion put forward by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report for the proclamation of an international decade for disarmament.¹⁸ It seems to us that this proclamation,

advocated by U Thant, more than any other idea catches the deep meaning of the challenge with which we are confronted in our times. It would show how much we are aware of the magnitude of the challenge. It would help Governments and public opinion to rise to the occasion.

240. In the very long history of disarmament negotiations, the next decade—the decade of the seventies—may very well prove to be the decisive turning point for success or failure. Let us all join in our efforts so that it may be the turning point for success.

¹⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, paras. 42-46.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.