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GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): We are now reaching a crucial stage in our proceedings, as we are called upon to consider and analyse anew the question of general and complete disarmament and related questions, in the light of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232]<sup>1</sup> and other documents and papers submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with specific requests contained in several resolutions of the General Assembly.

2. My delegation considers it appropriate that the present debate on disarmament should follow closely our interrupted but still open debate on the strengthening of international security. It strikes us as a rather futile and pointless exercise to speculate on whether security should take precedence over disarmament or the other way around, namely, that we should proceed by establishing that disarmament is the necessary prerequisite to security. The debate on priorities could go on indefinitely, for ever and ever, with weapons piling up in the national arsenals and with security fading away to the point of panic and destruction. In reality, efforts towards security and efforts towards disarmament should be parallel to or, rather, should be convergent towards the same goal of peace among nations. Peace will never germinate from the teeming, mushrooming arsenals of nuclear or non-nuclear weapons. It was, therefore, only natural that the first resolution of the first regular session of the United Nations General Assembly should have been dedicated to disarmament. It is one of the oldest and still the greatest of the problems confronting the world.

3. It is roughly estimated that the nations of the world are expending over \$200,000 million per year on military preparations or related activities, and, with the growth of insecurity everywhere, these figures are likely to grow much

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.

Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).

AGENDA ITEMS 29, 104, 30 AND 31

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/7639, A/7681, A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/989)**

**Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (continued) (A/C.1/988, A/C.1/989, A/C.1/991):**

**(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/7741-DC/232);**

**(b) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655);**

**(c) Report of the Secretary-General (A/7575)**

**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/485)**

larger, thus increasing the dangers of a conflict. Tragically enough, the most optimistic view that can be held is that, since such armaments will never be put to use, the expenses are absurd and senseless and only represent a tremendous waste of money. To accept such expenses as necessary and justified would be tantamount to admitting the possibility of a nuclear cataclysm. The fervent hope of mankind is, therefore, that such gigantic efforts will prove meaningless and pointless. Should those weapons follow the normal way of weapons, the way of detonation, then a count-down is in order for the existence of man upon earth. We cannot visualize any problem more serious or more cogent. If we do not find a solution to this problem, then we shall have neither the time nor the opportunity even to discuss any other problem. For mankind, it is a problem of life and death. It is as simple and as tragic as that.

4. We have said before that we hope that the accumulated weapons will not follow the normal way of weapons and suddenly detonate. However, even short of detonation, they are already having a most deleterious effect in preventing the allotment of resources, know-how and techniques to the cause of economic development and social progress. The trigger has not yet been pulled, the button has not yet been pressed, and a cycle of destruction and death is already in process. For the first time in history, available resources and newly discovered techniques would be in a position to stamp out hunger and misery across the globe, should even a small portion of such war-bent effort be directed and channelled to economic and social purposes. By our present actions, we are ruining the very lives we claim to be determined to preserve.

5. Disarmament is basically a problem of power and historically all problems of power have so far been settled by the sheer operation of power itself. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament faces the difficult challenge of settling this problem through negotiation and by peaceful means. Disarmament is a central problem and all other world problems are, so to speak, reflected in it. It thus becomes a spectral problem. No matter how difficult to settle, any other political problem, even the problem of Viet-Nam, even the problem of the Middle East, even the problem of Berlin, is relatively simple to settle, compared with the problem of disarmament. In any other given settlement, each of the parties would have at least an approximate idea of what it was winning or losing, of what it was giving or taking, of what it was yielding or securing. The consequences of any concessions in the field of disarmament, which lies within the specific field of power, are extremely difficult to evaluate.

6. A solution reached today on any other problem may be changed or altered tomorrow if a Power or a group of Powers conserves the means ultimately to dictate or force a diverse solution, while a false step in the field of disarmament may be irreversible, since it strikes at the very roots of power. For all these reasons this problem is much more than an item on an agenda of a committee of an international Organization.

7. That is why we regret that the limited time at the disposal of the First Committee will not allow for a detailed and thorough consideration of each of the so-called disarmament items. The simple examination of the item

related to the implementation of the conclusions and recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States<sup>2</sup> would, for instance, normally justify the need for a lengthy and unrestricted debate on the all-important question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We must now consider a wide variety of subjects, namely, general and complete disarmament, nuclear disarmament, collateral measures of disarmament, international service for nuclear explosions, the application of nuclear technology to economic development, the banning of nuclear weapons from the sea-bed and the ocean floor, chemical and bacteriological warfare. There is, of course, no disputing the fact that the above-mentioned questions are both correlated and independent. Therefore I shall attempt to use a comprehensive approach to all these questions, but I must reserve the right of my delegation to revert to each of the items at a later stage in our proceedings when the appropriate occasion arises or in the light of specific texts before the First Committee.

8. In perusing the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, one becomes aware of its most striking feature, the absence of almost any meaningful reference to general and complete disarmament, a problem which is relegated to part III, section D, just one step in front of the routine closing paragraph and the signatures of the two distinguished Co-Chairmen. The Committee had been entrusted, by resolution 1722 (XVI), with the specific task of undertaking, with the utmost urgency, negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We have lost track of our assigned goal to the point where, in the lexicon of the super-Powers, the word "disarmament" has been superseded by the words "limitation of armaments". The following text is quite revealing inasmuch as it appears to establish a new order of priorities, which strikes us as tantamount to revising the terms of reference conferred upon the Geneva Committee by the General Assembly in resolution 1722 (XVI). I quote from paragraph 37 of the report:

"The Committee is convinced of the continued need to give highest priority in its work to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, with due consideration to maintaining a balance among various measures to prevent armament, to limit armament and of disarmament."

All the emphasis now is on the collateral, not on the essential, aspects of the problem of disarmament.

9. Certain other passages of the report are likewise very significant and revealing. I refer to those dealing with the enlargement of the former Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which now reports to us under a new letter-head, hitherto unknown to the General Assembly. It is said in paragraph 9 that "the Co-Chairmen engaged in extended discussions regarding the possibility of a limited enlargement of the membership of the Committee". Further on, it is reported in paragraph 10 that one of the objectives of the Co-Chairmen was to "preserve the Committee as a small

<sup>2</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 17.*

and effective negotiating body". Reference is made in the same paragraph to the fact that "the question of the enlargement was discussed"—I stress the word "discussed"—"at informal plenary meetings of the Committee" and that "members of the Committee expressed their views concerning the enlargement and the procedure adopted for its implementation at a formal plenary meeting on 31 July 1969". However, possibly because of an oversight in the drafting or a lapse in the composition, it is not made explicit how the enlargement was decided and who was responsible for that decision. After the information provided in paragraphs 9 and 10, paragraph 11 states, out of the blue, that "representatives of the following States joined the Committee", etc. It might be worth-while clarifying such points, which may puzzle historians of the future not fully conversant with the theory and the practice of co-chairmanship, to the study of which the representative of Mexico made a most valuable and revealing contribution yesterday in his statement in this very Committee room [1691st meeting]. Ambassador García Robles asserted himself as one of the most subtle, relaxed and penetrating analysts of the new, elusive all-pervasive art of co-chairmanship. His statement should, I venture to say, be attached as a permanent addendum to the Co-Chairmen's report. As a latter-day Champollion, Ambassador García Robles provided us with a Rosetta stone which will prove extremely helpful in deciphering some hitherto obscure and esoteric passages of the same report.

10. We have stated before and we reaffirm it today: we have no objection to the admission of the eight additional members. On the contrary, we have welcomed each one of them, since we are sure that all will bring an important contribution to the proceedings of the Geneva Committee. We just wanted to know, and now we do know, to whom we should extend thanks for the enlargement of the Committee.

11. The Government of Brazil welcomed with particular satisfaction the announcement made in Moscow and in Washington on 25 October 1969 that preliminary discussions between representatives of the United States of America and the Soviet Union would start at Helsinki on 17 November 1969, yesterday. Such a decision made in common is in keeping with General Assembly resolution 2456 (XXIII), which called for early bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. We wish to express our full appreciation of the decision taken by the two Governments and we hope, for the furtherance of the cause of peace and security, that such negotiations will produce early and fruitful results. We cannot fail to point out, however, the desirability of establishing a solid link between such bilateral negotiations and the proceedings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament so that efforts towards disarmament may be harmonious and conjugated. We express the hope that the two Co-Chairmen will, to the extent warranted by circumstances, keep the Committee informed on the progress of the negotiations through progress reports, the first of which could be made at the opening of the next session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Again we wish to emphasize the view that peace and security are not the exclusive concern of the major Powers, but the common responsibility of the whole international

community. We have come to the rather unexpected situation of seeing the United Nations as an inadequate forum for the discussion of certain political matters; let us shun any trend to consider the Committee on Disarmament as an inadequate forum for negotiation on disarmament matters. We should preserve the Geneva Committee as a "negotiating" Committee, not as a body which is consultative to but not always consulted by, the two super-Powers. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is composed of twenty-six fully-fledged members, not of two members and twenty-four observers. With certain reservations of a purely procedural character, the paramount importance of the Helsinki talks and their relevance to international peace make all of us fervently wish that they will be successful and that they will prove to be a decisive stage in the process of *détente* in the relations between the super-Powers.

12. I shall refer now to annex A to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which contains a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, submitted by the Co-Chairmen of the Conference. At Geneva, Brazil had the opportunity of expressing its views on the draft treaty and of contributing to the debate on it. My delegation submitted two documents incorporated in the report, dealing with control provisions and settlement of disputes [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, sections 29 and 32].

13. In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the delegation of Brazil expressed regret that the draft treaty did not incorporate a concrete commitment to reach an agreement on a more comprehensive prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes, in keeping with the expressed wishes of the General Assembly. The Brazilian delegation also indicated its disagreement with the linking of the limits of the zone exempted from the treaty prohibition with the limits of the maximum contiguous zone provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,<sup>2</sup> a Convention which has been ratified by less than a third of the membership of the United Nations. My delegation asserted that the main difficulties raised by the draft treaty consisted in the highly controversial provisions of article III, which completely ignore the rights enjoyed by coastal States on their continental shelves under customary international law and the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,<sup>4</sup> and indeed imply an impairment of those rights, an implication which should be fully weighed by the coastal States.

14. The Brazilian delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament suggested, furthermore, that the control provisions should be clearly formulated in order to prevent situations in which, under the covering allegation that a normal verification of compliance was being sought, operations would actually be deployed that could threaten the security and the sovereignty of the coastal State and its interests and rights regarding the resources of the shelf. And

<sup>3</sup> Signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958 (see United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477).

<sup>4</sup> Signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958 (see United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 499 (1964), No. 7302).

Brazil proposed that, in order to protect the security and the interests of medium-sized and small Powers, a provision be added to the draft treaty with a view to enabling the coastal State to participate effectively in control operations that took place on its continental shelf.

15. The Brazilian reservations on the matter were shared by many other delegations to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which could not agree on any recommendation on the draft treaty in view of the fact that the revision submitted on 30 October still did not take into account the serious objections raised at the Conference. On the other hand, acting in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 2467 A (XXIII), the Sea-Bed Committee is presently seized of the matter and is in the process of considering the draft treaty, and, in reporting to this Committee, will undoubtedly help the General Assembly in taking a decision on a matter which ought to be considered not only on the basis of military and strategic premises but also in the framework of the civil uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor and of the coastal State's rights on its continental shelf. My delegation hopes that a real negotiating process will develop in the First Committee, that the final text of the treaty will be one which gives satisfaction to the aspirations of all, and that for once "the autumnal rite of unexpected agreements", to which Ambassador Leopoldo Benitez of Ecuador referred some days ago [1676th meeting], will not overlook, for the sake of sheer hurry, the legitimate interests at stake. The Brazilian delegation fully supports the concept of a treaty for the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and, having stated its reservations on the present draft in Geneva and having repeated them some days ago in the Sea-Bed Committee, is prepared, in a spirit of co-operation and good will, to hear the views and the suggestions concerning an improvement on the draft presented by the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. For our part we are ready to talk, to discuss and to negotiate.

16. Meanwhile, my delegation reserves its right to state its views at a subsequent meeting on the substance of the draft treaty presented by the two co-Chairmen.

17. The item on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons is one of the most delicate and complex that the First Committee has yet faced. This may well be one of our lengthiest discussions on the subject of disarmament. Though these remarks are not meant to be negative or pessimistic, our lack of experience on the subject and the way we are going to start this discussion, as I shall point out later in my intervention, indicate how many obstacles we have to face before coming to any concrete results. When I mention "concrete results" I do not even refer to the distant goal of the destruction of the arsenals loaded with chemical and bacteriological weapons, because before we reach that goal previous steps must be taken, starting with the delimitation of our objectives.

18. In the first place we must know how significant those stockpiles are, in what countries they are located, what they comprehend, how they are being developed, both in quantity and in quality, what means of delivery are being produced, and how much is being spent upon them. The

first and indispensable step for our deliberations is to produce accurate information, since action can only be taken after the necessary information is acquired. The information on this subject is so scarce that it is difficult to know how to proceed on the factual and practical basis that might lead to a useful discussion.

19. No one denies that man abhors the mere existence of such weapons. No Government would ever refuse to vote for recommendations aimed at the destruction of such weapons. But there is a long path ahead of us from these feelings and intentions to practical steps in the right direction. The path seems even longer when we consider that arsenals of chemical and bacteriological weapons are increasing every year, together with increasingly sophisticated means of delivery.

20. We have three subitems under the item entitled "Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons". The first is the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; the second is the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, and the third is the report of the Secretary-General.

21. I think it would be more reasonable and logical to start the analysis of this item with the third subitem, namely, the report of the Secretary-General.<sup>5</sup> This report, a very precise and comprehensive study of the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, reveals the high calibre of the experts called to prepare it. We have no doubts as to the scientific and technical knowledge displayed, the result of which represents a most valuable contribution to some aspects of our deliberations. But in spite of our sincere praises for the work achieved by the group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General—an important technical and scientific study on the theoretical and practical effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons—my delegation must state that the report falls short of its purpose.

22. For the sake of illustration, let us make a comparison with the report of the Secretary-General entitled *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of these Weapons*.<sup>6</sup> In this report we find the same technical and scientific analysis on the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons. It also contains a study on the effects of the use of nuclear weapons on the environment. In reading it we are apprised of possible damage which could be caused by nuclear weapons to human beings, animals, plants, buildings and systems of communication. But, unlike the report on chemical and bacteriological weapons, the report on nuclear weapons goes much further. In that document, produced two years ago, we are informed of the amount of money some countries are spending on their nuclear weaponry, the impact of such expenditure on the economy of the

<sup>5</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

<sup>6</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.IX.1.

producing countries, and the manpower required to develop a meaningful system of nuclear weapons.

23. This format, unfortunately, was not adopted by the group of experts on chemical and bacteriological weapons. Except for a few historical examples, not a single country is mentioned; no expenditure is suggested; the numbers of laboratories and of people working for military purposes in this field are not even hinted at; the types of means of delivery at the disposal of different countries have been ignored.

24. It seems to my delegation that it is only fair to ask why this method of work was adopted by the group of experts. The First Committee and the General Assembly should be clearly informed of the reasons why those two reports, both dealing with weapons of mass destruction, have strayed so far apart in their criteria of presentation. Was it a decision of the experts themselves? Was this pattern adopted in accordance with instructions from the Secretary-General? Or is it so prepared because there was no information provided by the Governments which are most technically advanced in the field of chemical and bacteriological warfare? This last question is provoked by resolution 2454 A (XXIII) of last year, in which it is stated that the General Assembly:

“Calls upon Governments, national and international scientific institutions and organizations to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of the report”.

25. It is difficult for my delegation to assume that this resolution, unanimously approved by the General Assembly, did not meet with the compliance of those very Governments which voted for it, because it is the co-operation of Governments in providing fundamental information that will enable us to start a meaningful debate on this question. Then and only then can we say that we are seriously tackling this item of our agenda. Otherwise, we may go ahead with all possible exercises in drafts and texts, but in reality we shall be groping to find our way in a very dark room.

26. The United Kingdom has prepared a draft resolution on the prohibition of biological methods of warfare together with a draft resolution to be adopted by the Security Council [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 20]. The first observation that occurs to my delegator with respect to the British draft convention concerns the split introduced in the consideration of the two methods of warfare. According to the British proposal we should first dispose of biological weapons, leaving the question of chemical methods of warfare for a later stage. The arguments for that procedure put forth by the British delegation at Geneva and in New York have not been convincing enough to rally a significant number of supporters. Both methods of warfare, chemical and bacteriological, have traditionally been considered in the same context, as, for instance, in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

27. The Soviet draft [A/7655] is comprehensive in scope and in that respect would merit a higher priority in our consideration as far as our final goal is concerned. However, most unfortunately the Soviet delegation stopped in the middle. We do not find in the Soviet draft any provision relating to the essential elements which we usually call “verification and control” and no mention is made of the question of settlement of disputes. The British draft, on the other hand, confronts us with some challenging suggestions on the question of verification and control and my delegation is convinced that those suggestions might serve as a serious basis of negotiation in connexion with this specific aspect of any treaty on disarmament.

28. Finally, I should like to refer to the working paper presented at Geneva on 26 August 1969 by the twelve mediating nations, on a declaration by the General Assembly regarding the prohibition of the use of chemical and biological methods of warfare [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 30]. My delegation wishes to recommend this draft to the First Committee and hopes that it will receive the unanimous support of the General Assembly. I shall not dwell on its provisions because not only do they seem self-explanatory, but they also meet all possibilities of agreement in the present stage of our deliberations. Its preamble and its operative part, in the form of a declaration, represent the minimum we can achieve and the minimum we can present to public opinion as a result of our endeavours on this most controversial issue.

29. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will, we hope, be called upon to pursue these deliberations, having already at its disposal, among other documents, two draft conventions, a statement of the Secretary-General, a report of a group of experts and the records of our present meetings. More information, especially on a factual basis, is, as I said before, still required. In this connexion we also hope that some machinery may be devised, with the co-operation of all Governments concerned, to collect fundamental elements for our future work.

30. If the path before us is long and arduous, that is only one more reason to face it with decision and speed. Let me state that Brazil hopes that all future efforts in this field will always take into account the final words of the introductory statement by the Secretary-General in the report of the group of experts:

“To call upon all countries to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons.”<sup>8</sup>

31. I now turn to agenda item 31, namely, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. First of all I should like to comment briefly on the question of the contributions of nuclear technology to the development of the developing countries.

32. My delegation feels that it was very appropriate that the General Assembly, in accordance with resolution G of

<sup>8</sup> Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, should call on the Secretary-General to appoint a group of experts to prepare a report on all possible contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of developing countries.

33. The need for universalization of the benefits of nuclear energy has kept growing. Today nuclear technology may represent the only real hope for breaking the vicious circle of underdevelopment in which the vast majority of mankind is trapped. However, the benefits of atomic energy have so far been confined to a small number of developed countries while for the rest of the world atomic power still raises the spectre of death rather than the foundations of a new life.

34. The delegation of Brazil believes that the report of the group of experts [A/7568] may well constitute a very useful first step towards the establishment of a comprehensive strategy for the development of the developing countries on the basis of the full utilization of the immense potential of nuclear technology. The report contains an interesting description of some of the most outstanding applications of nuclear technology and, in some cases, also presents an analysis of the economic and financial questions involved in the adoption of such applications.

35. Of course, we do not necessarily agree with all the statements included in the report. This is particularly true of some statements regarding questions of a rather more political than technical nature. In this connexion we should also like to say that it is regrettable that the group apparently was not informed of some very relevant decisions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, whose resolutions on the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not even mentioned in any of the chapters of the report.

36. Also, to judge from chapter V of the report, the group was not aware of the fact that the General Assembly, by its resolution 2456 C (XXIII) had requested the Secretary General to prepare a report on the establishment, within the framework of IAEA, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control. We feel that information about this task entrusted to the Secretary-General could have been helpful to the group in the drafting not only of chapter V of the report but also of chapter VI, which deals with international co-operation in promoting peaceful nuclear technology.

37. On the other hand, there are many of the conclusions of the report that my delegation would like to endorse. I wish to refer particularly to the question of the financing of the utilization of nuclear technology. As the report points out, the utilization of nuclear technology by the developing countries will require considerable funds, varying in accordance with the magnitude of the projects planned; major nuclear projects will require special capital financing arrangements. As noted by the group of experts, IBRD is the only source of capital funds within the United Nations system. The Bank, however, submits any application for a loan to normal banking criteria. As the report emphasizes, these criteria are not designed to take account of indirect benefits that are likely to result from the introduction of nuclear technology in a developing country.

38. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also stressed this point in its report which is contained in the annex to document A/7677 and Corr.1. In paragraph 97 of its report, the Agency listed some of the advantages that could be gained by the developing countries from these indirect benefits: (a) they would be able to "... familiarize themselves with the technology which will become of major importance in the generation of electricity throughout the world in a few decades (The pioneering 'uneconomic' nuclear power plant may often be the first step in a long-term programme whose economic viability has already been established)"; (b) they would diversify their sources of fuel supply, which is bound to strengthen the bargaining position of the developing country concerned in buying fossil fuels from other countries; and (c) scientific and technological progress would be promoted, thus stimulating development in technology, engineering and scientific education.

39. The inadequacy of narrow economic criteria to judge the economic impact of the introduction of nuclear technology in developing countries is further demonstrated by the comments of the group of experts on nuclear-power programmes and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. With reference to nuclear-power programmes, the group cites the point that

"... in almost all of the advanced countries, the first commercial-sized nuclear power plants were not regarded as 'economic' propositions and were not required to satisfy, or even approach, strict economic criteria. The first and, in some cases, the first few plants were seen as ventures into a vital new branch of technology required by the national interest. All the early commercial power plants which are working at present in the advanced countries, where capital is more freely available, were subsidized". [Ibid., para. 114.]

In connexion with the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the report of the group of experts notes that the "true economic advantages of this technology may well be more in the opportunities that it offers than in the actual cost of any particular project" [ibid., para. 218].

40. From these examples it should be clear that a flexible approach for the financing of the application of nuclear technology in developing countries is absolutely necessary. We feel, therefore, that the General Assembly should endorse the recommendation made in this report, in which the group of experts

"... expresses the hope that international sources of finance, especially IBRD, will review the positions taken so far on the prospects, criteria and conditions for financing major nuclear installations, bearing in mind not only the immediate benefits from initial projects, but also the long-term contributions that such projects could make to developing countries." [Ibid., para. 262.]

41. We also agree with the Group of Experts that the problem of the financing of applications of nuclear technology in developing countries should be given careful and thorough study by the General Assembly and other competent organizations in order to find appropriate solutions. I shall revert to this matter when I deal with the

question of the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

42. I now turn to the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment, within the framework of IAEA, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control [*A/7678 and Add.1-3*]. This report, as we know, was prepared by the Secretary-General at the request of the General Assembly, in accordance with resolution 2456 (XXIII) of 20 December 1968.

43. We were gratified to see that the idea of the establishment, within IAEA, of an international service for the purpose of making nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes available to non-nuclear-weapon countries members of IAEA has received wide support from the Members of the United Nations, as is demonstrated by the report before us.

44. The views of the Brazilian Government on this matter are well known. If a serious effort is to be made to close the widening gap between developed and developing countries, we consider it essential that all tools of nuclear technology should be available to the developing countries for the acceleration of their economic development. We supported resolution 2456 (XXIII) because we feel that peaceful nuclear explosions can play a major role in the economic development of developing countries.

45. We believe that, within the United Nations system, the best form of international co-operation to ensure access for the non-nuclear-weapon countries to the benefits resulting from the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be the establishment, under IAEA, of a service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. This would enable the Agency to work to fulfil its statutory obligation to promote and assist research in and the development and application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, we feel that such a service should give special attention and consideration to all possible contributions of nuclear energy, in the form of nuclear explosives, to the acceleration of the economic development of developing countries.

46. In our reply to the Secretary-General's consultation on the establishment of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, we made clear some of the basic considerations which in our view should guide the organization of the aforesaid service within the framework of IAEA. In the first place we have insisted that the creation of the service should be accompanied by a firm undertaking by the nuclear countries to supply the nuclear explosives required for the execution of specific projects formulated by the non-nuclear-weapon States and approved by the Agency. We feel that this obligation of the nuclear-weapon Powers must be at the basis of the proposed international service if it is to contribute effectively to the sharing of the benefits of nuclear technology by non-nuclear-weapon countries.

47. In this connexion we were pleased to note that, as stated in the Secretary-General's introduction to the report, the United States

“... concluded its reply with a statement that no shortage of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful nuclear

explosions was anticipated, thereby implying that an international review of peaceful nuclear explosion projects would not be necessary from the point of view of availability of those devices.” [*A/7678, para. 16.*]

It is therefore clear that no major difficulty of a practical nature would be involved in obtaining from the nuclear-weapon States a commitment to supply through the service the nuclear explosives required for the execution of specific projects.

48. This should be paralleled by the right of all the non-nuclear-weapon States which are members of IAEA to obtain the execution of these explosions for peaceful purposes in a non-discriminatory manner and at the lowest possible cost. In our opinion the details of the execution of the explosions may be left to the specific regulations of the service; but it is of paramount importance to make clear from the outset that all non-nuclear States members of IAEA have a right to share equally in the benefits to be derived from the functioning of the service.

49. This is in conformity with the provisions of article XI of the Statute of IAEA. As noted in paragraph 5 of the report of IAEA, contained in part III of document A/7678, the Agency is authorized under its Statute:

“... to make available its own resources and services to all its Members”—I repeat, “to all its Members”—“for projects involving peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, and upon request to assist any Member or group of Members to make arrangements to secure necessary financing from outside sources to carry out such projects.”

50. However, some of the replies included in the report of the Secretary-General have suggested that the participation of non-nuclear-weapon countries in the proposed service should be made contingent upon their adherence to certain international agreements on nuclear weapons. I want to make it quite clear that the Government of Brazil does not accept the subordination of the proposed service to those other international agreements. We favour the unrestricted participation of all nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Agency on a non-discriminatory basis with no conditions attached other than adequate control and supervision by the Agency of the execution of the projects.

51. The idea of adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a pre-condition for participation in the proposed service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes becomes even more unreasonable if we take into consideration the fact that in accordance with the non-proliferation Treaty itself any nuclear State party to that Treaty may assist a non-nuclear-weapon State, whether party to the Treaty or not, in the field of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In this respect I refer the Committee to pages 362 and 363 of the record of the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate in February 1969.

52. On the other hand, it should also be borne in mind that not all nuclear-weapon States are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, it being thus perfectly possible to envisage a situation of co-operation in the field of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes between a nuclear and

non-nuclear-weapon State, neither being a party to the non-proliferation Treaty. The proposed service should obviously be capable of assisting this form of co-operation, along with the application of the appropriate safeguards.

53. If the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not establish itself as a pre-condition for international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, if the nuclear power States parties to that Treaty remain free to enter into agreements concerning peaceful explosions with non-nuclear-weapon countries which have not signed the Treaty, if the Statute of IAEA authorizes the Agency to make available its resources and assistance to all—I stress “all”—its members, why should discriminatory clauses aimed at subordinating the proposed service to the non-proliferation Treaty be brought into this discussion? We are convinced that this is not only a misinterpretation of resolution 2356 C (XXIII) but also a contradiction of the provisions of the Statute of IAEA.

54. We should also like to take exception to the suggestion contained in some of the replies to the Secretary-General that the service whose establishment is being studied is the same thing as the international body to be concerned with peaceful applications of nuclear explosions under article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. We entirely agree with the Government of Italy, which in its reply to the Secretary-General stated that:

“... the activity contemplated for the Agency in this field concerns the matter dealt with in resolution 2456 (XXIII) independently of the arrangements provided for in article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is, indeed, the opinion of the Italian Government that the choice of the international body provided for in the aforementioned article will have to be made by the countries which are signatories of that Treaty after its entry into force.” [*Ibid.*, para. 18.]

55. However interesting the question of how article V of the non-proliferation Treaty may be implemented may be, we maintain that it has no direct connexion with the problem under consideration. Indeed, this effort to reinterpret resolution 2456 C (XXIII) as an offspring or a by-product of article V of the non-proliferation Treaty is in clear contradiction to the position taken by some of the signatories of that Treaty when resolution 2456 C (XXIII) was adopted. Were that resolution indeed a first step towards the “appropriate measures” referred to in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty, it would be incomprehensible that some of the promoters of that Treaty actually voted against that resolution or abstained from voting.

56. In this respect I should like to quote from the statement by the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Malik, before the First Committee on 17 December 1968, when he explained the position of the Soviet delegation on what was to become resolution 2456 C (XXIII):

“... my delegation also objects to the draft resolution because it utterly ignores the existence of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is not even mentioned in passing.” [*1643rd meeting, para. 41.*]

57. In the light of that statement, I believe it is not necessary to insist upon the fact that the “international service” object of resolution 2456 C (XXIII) now under consideration is totally independent of whatever action or measure the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty may intend to take in connexion with the implementation of article V of that Treaty.

58. Let me now deal briefly with the report of IAEA contained in part III of document A/7678. The Brazilian delegation believes that this report makes some very interesting points concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives and the role that IAEA, under the provisions of its statute, may be called upon to play. In this context we feel that paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of this report are particularly noteworthy.

59. However, we believe that it should be pointed out that this report was drafted basically from the standpoint of resolution GC(XII)/RES/245 of the General Conference of the Agency, resolution 2456 C (XXIII) of the General Assembly, implementation of which is the object of the present debate, was only briefly referred to in the introduction to the Agency’s report. Thus the report of IAEA is limited in scope and does not fully explore all aspects of the Agency’s possible role in the event of the establishment within its framework of a service for peaceful explosions. Also the report dwells on questions not really relevant to the study requested of the Secretary-General by the General Assembly, such as the question whether or not IAEA is supposed to assume the functions of the international body referred to in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty.

60. Very frankly, we would have preferred to have from the Agency a report centred upon resolution 2456 C (XXIII) of the General Assembly, omitting questions extraneous to that resolution.

61. I wish to add that it is the view of the delegation of Brazil that the fact that a non-nuclear-weapon State member of IAEA benefits from the proposed service should not in any way impinge upon its right to develop to the fullest extent its own nuclear technology, either by its own means or through agreements with other nations, nuclear or non-nuclear, for duly substantiated peaceful purposes under adequate control and international supervision. Nor should the establishment of the service within the framework of IAEA preclude the eventual creation of similar services for like purposes within regional bodies.

62. Furthermore, we wish to express our agreement with those States which in their replies to the Secretary-General emphasized that the service to be organized within IAEA should have a far-reaching scope of activities and concern itself with the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions as a whole—from the preliminary feasibility studies to the questions of supervision and control of experimental and application explosions.

63. To sum up, the delegation of Brazil believes that the proposed service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be established within the framework of IAEA and should operate under the provisions of the Statute of that Agency. The specific regulations concerning the

functioning of the service should be entirely compatible with the Statute of IAEA; in fact, the service should be a mechanism to enable the Agency to fulfil its statutory obligations to promote and assist research in, and the development and application of, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

64. I wish now to examine briefly the question of the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. When we read the report by the Secretary-General on that matter, the first point that strikes us is the statement that:

“None of the international organizations, specialized agencies or international bodies concerned which were requested to submit information in accordance with this paragraph”—that is, paragraph 6 of resolution 2456 A (XXIII)—“made any report or reference to the questions of disarmament or security.” [A/7677 and Corr.1, para. 3.]

65. The fact that this very important aspect of the deliberations of the Conference was not considered in the report points in itself to the need for consideration of ways and means to promote the implementation of the decisions of the Conference.

66. The chapters of the report relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not encouraging either. The implementation of resolution J of the Conference, which was the object of a special paragraph in resolution 2456 A (XXIII), does not seem to be fostered by the reply of IBRD. On that subject, I had the opportunity of referring earlier in this statement to the analysis made by the group of experts in their report on the contributions of nuclear technology to developing countries and to the report of IAEA annexed to the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the results of the Conference. I reiterate our agreement with the recommendation of the group of experts to the effect that the General Assembly should give careful consideration to the problem of the financing of applications of nuclear technology in developing countries, in order to find appropriate solutions.

67. For the sake of brevity I shall not dwell on the details of the implementation of each and every resolution of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. I shall limit myself to stating that, in the opinion of the Brazilian delegation, the report of the Secretary-General confirms the correctness of the position of those delegations which during the twenty-third session of the General Assembly proposed that the responsibility of following the implementation of the results of the Conference should be given to a specific body within the United Nations. We believe that position is still valid today.

68. In 1970 the United Nations will commemorate its twenty-fifth anniversary. That year should be a year of reappraisal and a year of planning in all fields of activity of this Organization. This is particularly true for the question of disarmament and the question of the security of nations.

69. The United Nations started its work, soon after its inception, by tackling the problem of disarmament. The first resolution adopted by the General Assembly, on 24

January 1946, established a Commission which was requested *inter alia* to make specific proposals “for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other weapons adaptable to mass destruction”.

70. Since then, various organs of the United Nations as well as parallel specialized bodies have dealt with the many aspects of the problem of disarmament. However, we have not been able to come up with a solution to this problem and the present situation, despite some collateral measures achieved, is undoubtedly more complex and more difficult compared with that prevailing in 1946.

71. Just a few weeks ago we discussed in the First Committee the problem of the strengthening of international security. From the lively proceedings of the Committee, it is quite apparent that this very important question still demands an urgent solution and that there is a general feeling that concrete measures should be taken by this Organization to ensure that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace and security, in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter.

72. During that discussion it was generally recognized that the problem of the security of nations is closely linked to the questions of disarmament and of the economic development of the developing countries. Just a few days ago, on 31 October, the General Assembly adopted a resolution endorsing the call of the Secretary-General for the proclamation of a Disarmament Decade, which will coincide with the Second United Nations Development Decade [*resolution 2499 (XXIV)*]. By the same resolution, the competent bodies of the United Nations were entrusted in this respect with the task of presenting concrete proposals to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session.

73. In the view of the delegation of Brazil it was most fortunate that the Assembly decided to declare the decade of the seventies both as a Disarmament Decade and as a Development Decade, and we feel that a serious and dedicated effort is required from all Members of this Organization in order that real and concrete progress on those two paramount questions can be achieved during the next ten years.

74. I shall not dwell on the matters related to the Second Development Decade since they are under consideration by another Committee of the General Assembly. I should like, however, to share with this Committee some thoughts on how we should proceed to make the Disarmament Decade an effective contribution to the peace and security of the world.

75. In the opinion of my delegation we have three main tasks before us as regards the preparation of the Disarmament Decade. First, we should analyse the work that has been done in that field during the twenty-five years of existence of the United Nations and draw up a balance-sheet of the results accomplished. Secondly, we should examine how that work was effected and what improvements could be made in the methodology adopted to date, with a view to the attainment of speedier and more concrete results during the course of the next decade. Thirdly, we should establish a well-defined strategy—a strategy for disarmament—to ensure that the goal of general

and complete disarmament will be reached in the shortest possible time. That strategy should include a time-table of measures to be adopted during the Disarmament Decade so that by 1980 general and complete disarmament will be a reality.

76. Those are not easy tasks and they should be approached with serious intent and an open mind. Also, they involve issues of concern to all Members of this Organization and therefore all Members should be called upon to co-operate in this effort, since no nation can be less interested in or less concerned with international peace and security than any other nation.

77. In the light of all these considerations, and having in mind particularly the requisites of competence and representation, we believe that the General Assembly should call for a meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to examine the whole problem of disarmament and related questions in preparation for the Disarmament Decade. The Commission should be convened early in 1970 in order to have ample time to consider all relevant issues and to be able to report its conclusions, together with concrete proposals, to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

78. We earnestly believe that this is the most appropriate course to be followed and the one most likely to yield positive results.

79. It would be impossible to over-emphasize the importance of the present debate on the disarmament items. For too long, for too many years, we have been sitting, discussing, speculating, without any real or tangible results. We have been discussing issues of this kind so assiduously that some of us have come to be described as disarmament experts. The truth is that there is no such thing as a disarmament expert, since the world has not as yet had any significant experience in disarmament. All of us are apprentices and the records will reveal that we have been poor and not especially gifted apprentices.

80. Disarmament—or even arms control—cannot be achieved in the abstract, apart and aside from political reality. The prevalent trend among the major Powers is to demand that all medium-sized and small nations repose unlimited confidence in their supposedly common purposes, while each of those self-same major Powers will not deposit any confidence at all in the purposes and intentions of the other major Powers, or in the small Powers either, for that matter. Distrust and suspicion are prevalent and rife in the world of today and disarmament cannot sprout from the roots of fear and animosity.

81. Some weeks ago, within the framework of our debate on the strengthening of international security, we had occasion to state that no significant advance will be achieved in the fields of peace, security and disarmament, until nations, big and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, developed and developing, effectively renounce the use of force or the threat of force for the prosecution and attainment of political objectives. Unfortunately, the major Powers act in the field of disarmament on the assumption that their relative power will of necessity remain untouched and unchanged. Furthermore, they establish as a necessary

premise that the political and the strategic framework of 1945 will endure till the end of time, which is a delusion since, in any case, it is even now no longer the same. They establish as another necessary premise that 1 January 1967 is a permanent watershed and dividing line for nuclear and non-nuclear nations and quite recently they have come to the conclusion that danger lies in the possible arms efforts of small nations, not in the arsenals of the super-Powers. Thus we cannot escape the conclusion that the present efforts on the part of the super-Powers in the field of disarmament are aimed at a process of power stabilization rather than at a process of real disarmament. This is why all the present emphasis rests on arms control and limitation of armaments, which presupposes the maintenance of the “over-kill” capability of the two super-Powers.

82. Let us have the courage to face it: the problem of disarmament will never be settled in abstract terms or through Byzantine discussions around negotiation tables or in committee rooms. It will never be settled until there is a fundamental change in attitude by both individuals and nations, until the use of naked force is banned from the society of civilized men and until the principle of the sovereign equality of all nations becomes a reality, accepted and practised by all.

83. Disarmament should be more than a mere methodology of power. Disarmament should aim at something nobler and more inspiring than the mere stabilization and freezing of power and power should not remain for ever, as unfortunately it is today, the only yardstick used to gauge the acts of men and the actions of States. That is why we are bound to revert to our debate on international security and to direct our efforts towards revising the United Nations Charter, so that it may become an expression of justice and cease being an offspring of power.

84. We cannot live for ever in the year 1945. Time and history did not stop and were not frozen either in 1945 or in 1967. As is said in the third Chapter of Ecclesiastes, verses 1 to 3:

“To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven:

“A time to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted;

“A time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up.”

85. We have already killed and broken down too many things. Now should be the time to heal and to build up.

86. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first time that I have had the opportunity of speaking in this Committee at this session, may I say what a pleasure it is to be back here at the United Nations working under the distinguished chairmanship of you and Ambassador Sule Kolo, both valued friends, as well as to be in the company of so many other friends and colleagues with whom I have had the privilege of working in the past in this place.

87. I should also like to associate myself with the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union in expressing the

appreciation of those who have been working at Geneva for the continuing and unstinted support given to our work by the Secretary-General and the devoted members of the Secretariat, of which the presence of the Secretary-General at the opening of our discussion yesterday [1691st meeting] and the emphasis given to arms control and disarmament matters in his annual report are but two additional examples.

88. I am pleased to have this opportunity of giving the Committee a brief account of Canada's contribution to the activities of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva and to put forward the views of the Canadian delegation on the various questions covered by the report of the Disarmament Conference to the United Nations General Assembly [A/7741-DC/232].<sup>9</sup>

89. This debate takes place at a time, as previous speakers have pointed out, when the hopes of mankind are heavily involved in the current efforts to halt the nuclear arms race, an objective to which the United Nations General Assembly at its last session gave the highest priority. Ever since the strategic arms limitation talks were first proposed by President Johnson more than two years ago, the Canadian Government has stressed the urgency of opening the talks. Most recently the concern of the Canadian Government was expressed by Prime Minister Trudeau speaking in the House of Commons at Ottawa on 24 October, when he said:

"No single international activity [therefore] rates higher priority in the opinion of this Government than the pursuit of effective arms control and arms limitation agreements. Canada refuses to submit without protest to the present nuclear hegemony. It is deeply concerned at the failure of important nuclear Powers, the USSR, the United States, China and France, so far to ratify the non-proliferation Treaty, article VI of which binds parties to negotiate in good faith on measures leading to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, to nuclear disarmament, and to general and complete disarmament. At the same time that ratification is delayed, the development of multiple warhead rockets continues in two of these countries, a development that could make satellite inspection and verification of arms control agreements impossible. The world now stands at a crossroads which, if passed unwisely, could lead to the destruction of mankind."

90. This hegemony of the major nuclear Powers—this so-called vertical proliferation—cannot, of course, be countered or curbed, in our view, by horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Instead, the present situation calls for determined efforts by the two major nuclear Powers, as required under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, to halt further development and deployment of strategic nuclear arms.

91. Canada therefore welcomed the Soviet Union's recent response to the United States Government's invitation and the beginning of preliminary discussions relating to strategic arms limitations, at Helsinki on 17 November. We are also, in this Committee, in debt to our Soviet colleague for the

emphasis he laid in his opening speech yesterday [1691st meeting] on the terrible prospect which faces mankind if the nuclear arms race is not limited or stopped through negotiations.

92. These strategic arms talks between the United States of America and the Soviet Union could be—and indeed should be—the beginning of the most significant arms control negotiations for more than a generation. This seems to be the point of no return, beyond which lies an unbridled technological competition that may well be unverifiable for arms control purposes. Therefore we welcome the intention of the United States and the Soviet Union to seek stability and security through negotiated agreements rather than in a race for strategic superiority.

93. Indeed, the principal importance of the strategic arms limitation talks is precisely the opportunity they provide for the two major nuclear Powers to come to grips with the arms race. However, the very fact that the United States and the Soviet Union will be discussing this crucial issue is in itself an important positive step. Through the exchange of information that will inevitably be involved we hope that both sides may move into a new era of confidence and stability, with the knowledge of respective strengths replacing mutual suspicion and with a realization of common interest in human survival supplanting the waste and destruction of our most precious resources.

94. We realize, of course, that there is a close and logical link between progress on a comprehensive test ban and progress on the strategic arms talks which began yesterday. We realize also that political decisions to end all nuclear weapon testing depend on an improvement in international relations and a growing sense of security and *détente*. This is not to say, however, that we accept the idea that nothing can be done in the meantime to prepare the way for the complete cessation of weapon testing, which is the most obvious and constant reminder of the continuation of the dangerous nuclear weapon race.

95. Responding, therefore, to paragraph 3 of Assembly resolution 2455 (XXIII), which specifically expressed the hope "that States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data", Canada, with the support of several delegations, urged at the Geneva Conference that action should be taken to explore a more effective international system of seismic data exchange on a voluntary basis. This was done because of the usefulness of such an exchange in clarifying and, it is hoped, eventually overcoming divergencies which exist on the vexing problem of verification of a comprehensive test ban.

96. As a first step in that direction my delegation put forward a proposal directed at ascertaining precisely what governments with seismic capabilities were willing to make available to a world-wide exchange of seismic data [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 14]. We acknowledge that that is but a first step but we think it is a necessary and vital one.

97. We followed up that proposal with an informal meeting of the whole Conference, in which seismic experts participated, entirely devoted to this subject. Subsequent to that discussion we revised our working paper, taking into

<sup>9</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.

account the many constructive and helpful comments which were made at that informal meeting. We now wish to submit formally, with the co-sponsorship of certain delegations, among which can be found some that supported the concepts in our proposals at Geneva, a draft resolution which has been circulated as a document of this Committee—document A/C.1/L.485 of 17 November. Essentially the contents are the same as those of the revised working paper of 18 August appended to the report of the Disarmament Committee [*ibid.*, section 15]. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.485, namely, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and the United Kingdom, share a common interest in trying to bring about voluntary international co-operation in seismic data exchange and invite further co-sponsors to add their names to the list.

98. A further measure to which we in Canada attach the greatest importance is, of course, the coming into effect of the non-proliferation Treaty, which the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Sharp, in addressing the United Nations General Assembly [*1769th plenary meeting*], noted had been signed by so many but ratified by so few. The reason for the urgent need to ratify this important treaty is that not only would it help restrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons but it would also serve to open up new possibilities for effective co-operation in the harnessing of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. It thus represents a most significant step forward towards greater sanity and safety in the atomic age.

99. We also welcome the report from our Mexican colleague, Mr. García Robles, on the progress made on the subject of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. The general conference of the new agency set up, largely as a result of his efforts, for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, inaugurated in Mexico City on 2 September of this year, marks a most hopeful development in restricting nuclear proliferation.

100. Throughout the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Canadian delegation has maintained that the best hope for progress in arms control and disarmament is to identify areas in which members of the Conference could find common ground. I think we have been successful this year at Geneva in identifying a number of areas in which such common purposes exist. I refer, of course, to two important measures: the question of the elimination of chemical and biological weapons and the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed.

101. On the first of those questions our deliberations were greatly aided by two documents which came before us. I refer to the report of the Secretary-General prepared in response to Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII)<sup>10</sup> and the draft convention on biological weapons submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom [*A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 20*]. More recently proposals have been put forward by the USSR and certain other socialist delegations dealing with chemical and biological weapons [*A/7655*]. Regrettably, these proposals were not available at the time

<sup>10</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

when the discussions at Geneva were focused on the elimination of chemical and biological weapons but were put forward later in the Assembly.

102. Using the report of the Secretary-General as a springboard and taking into account the proposals submitted by the United Kingdom delegation for the elimination of the research, development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons, I believe that the Conference had a very useful discussion. Nor do I think that I overstate the case when I say that common ground was established among us to ensure that whatever action we should recommend to the Assembly should not in any way derogate from the prohibition of the use of chemical and biological weapons in the 1925 Geneva Protocol.<sup>11</sup> The members of the Conference recognize that the Geneva Protocol retains its importance as the primary basis of existing law prohibiting the use of these terrible weapons. Equally, members of the Committee, I think, found common ground in expressing the hope that States which have not already done so will adhere to the Protocol as soon as possible in order to strengthen the foundations of the restraints which now exist.

103. In our approach to this problem, therefore, I wish to emphasize that the policy of the Canadian Government accords a high priority to the problem of the elimination of both chemical and biological methods of warfare, with adequate provisions for verification to ensure compliance. Our attitude, therefore, to the various proposals that came before us at Geneva was that progress on one type of weapon should not exclude progress on another.

104. The significance of the contribution of the United Kingdom delegation was, in our view, that it was the first document that attempted to go beyond a prohibition of use—or rather, to consider the reservations of many Governments with regard to the provision in the Geneva Protocol on “first use”—and to grapple with the problem of prohibiting the research, development, production and stockpiling of those weapons.

105. I know that during our debate at Geneva there were differing opinions expressed on whether the problems of the prohibition of research, development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons should be considered simultaneously or separately.

106. In the view of the Canadian delegation, whatever may be the merits of the question of procedure of whether chemical and biological weapons should be considered separately or simultaneously, we believe that if there is to be progress beyond the prohibition of first use contained in the Geneva Protocol, we must go to the heart of the matter, which is the prohibition of the research, development, production and stockpiling of both kinds of weapons. In this respect the British draft convention, in our view, pioneered in showing the way.

107. Of course, we now have before us the draft convention banning both chemical and biological weapons, submit-

<sup>11</sup> *Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare*, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

ted by the delegations of Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union [*ibid.*]

108. I do not propose at this stage to go into the details of this proposal, which no doubt will be discussed in full whenever the specific problems of banning chemical and biological weapons are taken up again at Geneva, where, in our view, their further detailed consideration belongs. I can say, however, at this stage that the Canadian delegation welcomes any constructive aspect of those proposals which might assist in the pursuit of eliminating all those horrible weapons from war.

109. But we doubt whether, apart from a general discussion of those proposals in the time available, the United Nations General Assembly can make decisions on the important substantive issues involved. Therefore it seems to us inevitable that, after the debate which will take place in this Committee, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should, taking into account the useful comments made here, go back to detailed study of the problem with a view to a point-by-point negotiation of the necessary agreements.

110. I have already referred to the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological weapons. I revert to it only to emphasize our appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the many outstanding experts who assisted him in the preparation of this report for furnishing such an authoritative basis for our future discussions. There is a great deal of information required if we are to come to practical and effective measures to eliminate the use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. We regard the Secretary-General's report as an essential beginning to this necessary process of education, information and negotiation.

111. We hope very shortly to submit to this Committee, together with other like-minded delegations, a draft resolution which will reflect the views I have just expressed. The elements of that draft resolution will be a revision of the one we submitted on 26 August 1969 in document ENDC/266, which is contained in annex C of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly. At this stage I would make only two comments.

112. First, it is intended to reflect a desire to consolidate the common ground which emerged from our discussions at Geneva.

113. Secondly, it recognizes the difficulty of arriving at substantive decisions in the United Nations General Assembly in the time available, without further study of the complex problems involved at this stage, while taking into account the valuable report of the Secretary-General and the other proposals which have been submitted and which should serve as the basis of further progress in the conference of the Committee on Disarmament on this question.

114. Lastly, I should like to make a few comments about the draft arms-control treaty for the sea-bed [*A/7741-DC/232, annex A*]. Negotiations on that draft treaty

occupied a major proportion of the latter part of this year's session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. While it is aimed at preventing the extension of the nuclear arms race into a new environment rather than at eliminating weapons which already exist, the importance of the proposed treaty lies, in our view, in the fact that the Co-Chairmen, after prolonged negotiations, were able to agree on a joint draft which they submitted on 7 October.

115. We welcomed that text as substantial evidence that the two nuclear super-Powers had found an important area of common purpose in proposing the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor.

116. Our discussions at Geneva, moreover, resulted in some progress towards the objective of finding a text more acceptable to the international community and responsive, in particular, to the needs of those countries like Canada, with extensive coastlines and continental shelves.

117. In the course of the discussions which took place after the joint draft had been submitted on 7 October, it was not possible in the time available to reach a consensus on all the articles of the Co-Chairmen's draft.

118. The Canadian delegation welcomed what we call this self-denying agreement of the two great nuclear Powers. We also welcomed the improvements in the previous text of the Co-Chairmen as evidence of a willingness to reach a more generally acceptable text through further negotiation in the United Nations General Assembly.

119. In this connexion, we welcomed in particular the statement of the United States Co-Chairman when he recognized that:

“The General Assembly will, of course, wish to consider this text carefully and in our view it might be possible to decide at a later date whether any future modifications should be incorporated in response to the desires of the international community.” [*CCD/PV.447, para. 22.*]

120. The Canadian delegation, for one, believes that further modifications will have to be incorporated in the draft treaty in response to the desires of the international community, because in its present form it falls short of our expectations and those of many other countries.

121. In particular, it is the view of the Canadian delegation that a treaty which is to command general support must give reasonable assurance of compliance. Both the texts submitted by the Co-Chairmen on 8 October and on 30 October provide for “the right to verify”.

122. However, this right of verification has not been clarified by reference to any specific verification procedures to which signatories of the treaty might have recourse in order to resolve doubts or disputes that might arise about a suspect installation. It does not extend to the right of close inspection, for instance, of suspected installations; nor does the draft treaty provide adequately for the rights of a coastal State with respect to the resources of its continental shelf. Accordingly, we expressed our reservations about the adequacy of the verification article as it stands.

*Mr. Kolo (Nigeria), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

123. Members of the Committee will know that the Canadian delegation at Geneva, with the welcome assistance and support of many of our friends here today, concentrated on attempting to secure a verification article which will give the necessary assurance to States great and small, technologically developed or developing, that any reasonable fears or uncertainties that the treaty is not being complied with can be made with procedures generally regarded as fair and equitable to all.

124. It was with this in view that we put forward our working paper of 8 October [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 35], which I described as a checklist against which the right of verification could be further examined and clarified. All in this Committee I am sure have had an opportunity to study that working paper. For our part we are proceeding with consultations with a view to submitting an amendment based on our working paper. We shall be submitting this shortly in order to facilitate a detailed discussion of the draft treaty text here.

125. The three questions of principal importance on which many of us, including Canada, have expressed concern on verification are, I believe, the following. First, that verification procedures must be devised which would guarantee the legal right of all States party to the treaty to initiate the verification process and to obtain assistance, if necessary through appeal to an international organization, and not have to rely solely on the goodwill of the two nuclear Powers. This should ensure that States fearing the existence of threatening installations would be able to invoke international arrangements, through which they could be reasonably assured that the prohibitions of the treaty were not being violated.

126. Secondly, we have said that in certain cases close physical inspection, if necessary with the help of States with advanced underwater nuclear capabilities would be necessary to provide assurances of effective verification, and we have asked that this contingency should be provided for in the treaty.

127. Thirdly, the treaty should contain a clear provision to ensure that in carrying out verification on the continental shelf full account should be taken of the special rights and interests of a coastal State in connexion with possible military activities on its continental shelf, and indeed of the interests of all parties in the region of any suspected violation.

128. At this stage, however, the Committee is offered an opportunity of taking an important first step to extend arms control to the environment of the sea-bed and ocean floor which the Assembly has set as an important objective. As a result mainly of the efforts not only of the Co-Chairmen but of several midwives, critical or otherwise, the fact was that a baby was born at Geneva. The prospects of this child now depend on what sponsorship may be forthcoming for its adoption by this Committee. If the Co-Chairmen are responsive to the suggestions from others as to how this baby could be made more attractive, by accepting certain necessary improvements, then the child may stand a good chance both of adoption and of healthy growth.

129. We for our part in the Canadian delegation repeat the pledge we gave at Geneva that we are willing to do our best to try to reach an agreement on textual changes which would make the draft sea-bed treaty generally acceptable, as well as co-operating in reaching a consensus on the other important matters before us in this Committee.

130. In this spirit, but with the hope and intention that this session will register concrete progress in all the matters before this Committee on arms control and disarmament, the Canadian delegation reserves the right to intervene again in greater detail on the separate items as they arise.

131. The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Ignatieff, the representative of Canada, for his kind compliments to the Chair.

*The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.*