



CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Agenda item 103: The strengthening of international security (<i>continued</i>) . . .	1
Organization of work	12

Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).

AGENDA ITEM 103

**The strengthening of international security
(A/7654; A/C.1/L.468) (*continued*)**

1. Mr. YAZID (Algeria) (*translated from French*):
Mr. Chairman, the Algerian delegation has taken due note of your desire that we should abstain from congratulating you and the other officers of the Committee, so that all I can do is to congratulate myself on the very happy choice made by the Committee in electing you and the other members of the Bureau.

2. In its contribution to the important debate on the question of the strengthening of international security, the Algerian delegation wishes first to stress that the Soviet Union has taken a most useful step in presenting this item for inclusion on the agenda of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly [A/7654]. It shows the profound concern and desire of that country to work for the preservation of international peace and security.

3. On the eve of the commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the proclamation of the San Francisco Charter, the international community must recognize that the principles solemnly proclaimed by it are being seriously threatened, and that our Organization has been unable to face its primary responsibility, the maintenance of peace and security.

4. Peace and security, based on justice, have not been preserved and cannot be achieved in the atmosphere of aggression, domination and exploitation prevailing in the international situation today. Peace and security, based on justice, will be constantly endangered so long as the right of peoples to self-determination and the principles of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are flouted. Peace and security, based on justice, cannot be achieved without respect for the right of peoples to economic independence and development.

5. That view of the international situation is in no way dogmatic or academic, but is founded on the tragic realities

endured by the peoples of the third world: the realities of the Middle East, Viet-Nam, Africa, Latin America and economic under-development.

6. In the Middle East, an armed conflict has been waged for more than 20 years. A territory has been seized by force, a people has been dispossessed and driven from its homeland, a population of Western settlers has installed itself there by terror. Territories of Arab States are occupied by the Zionist aggressor. Are these the peace and security that were promised to the peoples in San Francisco? Twenty years have elapsed, but justice has not been done to the Palestinian people, who have been offered nothing but deceitful words and legal fictions. Today, the people of Palestine has taken its destiny into its own hands and its struggle is becoming an essential factor towards the achievement of real security in the area. Yet our Organization continues to ignore the fact of Palestine.

7. At the other end of Asia, the people united and unshakable in its will for freedom has been fighting for more than a quarter of a century. The Viet-Nameese people has taken up arms to fight imperialism and to ensure respect for its right to independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. The resistance of the Viet-Nameese people to the American aggressor exacts a heavy toll every day in death and destruction. These sacrifices accepted by this heroic people represent a serious contribution to the restoration of peace and security in South East Asia.

8. In our continent, Africa, the alienation of land by the Westerners maintains millions of Africans under the domination and exploitation of foreign racists. The United Nations, which under the Charter was given the task of peacefully leading these peoples to the exercise of their right to self-determination, merely takes routine measures—so-called holding measures—in the form of appeals, recommendations and, in the best cases, regrets. The failure of the United Nations in this respect and its inability to progress towards a just solution of the problems of colonization and *apartheid* cannot be denied. This failure is an additional justification of the decision of the colonized African peoples to take up arms to free themselves. The armed struggle of the African national liberation movements is at present the only positive action for the restoration of peace and security in Africa.

9. In Latin America the stranglehold of American imperialism on the economy of the developing countries has given rise to an explosive situation in which many conflicts may break out. Peace and security can be guaranteed there only through the victory of the forces fighting for national and economic independence and the right to economic development and social progress.

10. The picture we have just drawn points to the fact that international peace and security are threatened only by the retrograde forces of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. This picture would be incomplete if we did not also note the factor of international instability constituted by the relations between the highly industrialized and the developing countries.

11. The highly industrialized countries want to retain, in the field of economic and trade relations, concepts inherited from the period of colonial domination. The formulas for co-operation they propose would make it possible for them to recover many times over the amount of their financial and technical assistance. The control of the terms of trade by some industrialized countries and their monetary and financial manipulations are a serious hindrance to the restoration of conditions of international stability, peace and security.

12. The countries of the third world, which suffer from armed conflict and are still the objects of imperialist, colonialist and neo-colonialist designs, are deeply attached to peace and wish to contribute to the restoration and strengthening of security. They all wish to work sincerely to avert any threat of world conflagration; and we all know what apocalyptic conditions would result from such a conflagration.

13. That is an important task, but it would be incomplete if we did not strive first of all to create conditions of peace and security in those places where today there is no peace and where the people's security is not safeguarded.

14. The problem of the restoration and strengthening of peace and security demands a frank and calm evaluation of the role of the United Nations in this field, which is the very basis of our Charter and the reason why our Organization exists. The concept of the United Nations, set up in 1945 on the basis of the international conditions prevailing at the time, no longer corresponds to the present international situation. A very clear contradiction may be noted between the state of international relations at that time, which it was intended to perpetuate and institutionalize, and the subsequent accelerated development of the world in a direction which some had not foreseen just after the end of the Second World War.

15. The accession of a large number of States to independence, the development of non-alignment, the growing awareness by the developing countries of their solidarity have given rise to a situation which is not in line with the present structures and machinery of the United Nations. Must we stress again the contradiction between the fundamental concept of collective responsibility for the maintenance of peace and the machinery which excludes the greater part of mankind from the most important responsibilities?

16. The operation of our Organization, as defined in San Francisco, is an anachronism which, to a large extent, explains the failure of our Organization and its main bodies.

17. We do recognize that the great Powers have important duties, but they are not exclusive, and can, in any case, never be effectively discharged as long as we continue to

refuse to the People's Republic of China its lawful place in this Organization.

18. The interest which is always accorded by our Organization to the relations between the great Powers should not transform us into a passive assembly merely recording the state of those relations. We want to assume our responsibilities and not be content with a mere illusion of responsibility.

19. The present international situation is characterized by the fact that neither the peoples nor the majority of States can be assured of having peace and security which were the philosophical basis of the San Francisco Charter, and which do not exist for the people of Viet-Nam, for the people of Palestine and for millions of Africans.

20. Neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly has ever been able to restore peace and security based on justice there where they have been really threatened. Aggressions have proliferated without the United Nations coming to the assistance of the oppressed and the victims. The decisions of the United Nations are ignored and flouted; often they are adopted only because everybody knows from the outset that they will be neither respected nor applied.

21. In 1945 the great Powers proclaimed themselves to be the guarantors of a certain concept of peace. It is that concept on which doubt is now being cast as a result of the evolution of the international situation. The appearance in the comity of nations of many peoples wishing to survive in conditions of independence and to emerge from underdevelopment has stressed the fact that neither peace nor security can exist without justice and respect for the right to self-determination.

22. Almost 25 years have elapsed since the end of the Second World War, and during that time the hopes of a generation of men, born of the fight against fascism, have been shattered. Those hopes were for peace and security, based on justice and the right to self-determination. The guns were stilled in Europe, but they were then trained on the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The wars waged against the growing forces of national liberation have never stopped. The tragedy of the so-called "localized" conflicts compels us to rethink from top to bottom the concept of the peace and security which resulted from the compromise achieved between the great Powers a quarter of a century ago.

23. We certainly all want peace and security, but what kind of peace and what kind of security are we concerned with?

24. Such are the preliminary and basic observations which the Algerian delegation wanted to submit to the Committee.

25. The initiative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in submitting for consideration the item on "The strengthening of international security" has already been welcomed by our delegation. It is a new and useful initiative which redounds to the credit of that great and friendly country. We were happy to hear the Soviet

delegation tell us that it was, as always, open to consultations and exchanges of views on its draft text [A/C.1/L.468]. We consider that this text, which is useful as a whole, should be carefully studied by our Committee, both as regards its substance and the ways and means it proposes.

26. Mr. BENITES (Ecuador) (*translated from Spanish*): I do not wish to flout a decision by the Chair, Mr. Chairman, and I shall therefore refrain from congratulating you. But I do not think I would be flouting your decision if I congratulated the Committee on its good sense in electing a person of such wide knowledge, sagacity and experience to conduct its deliberations, and in choosing so distinguished a Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur.

27. As we turn to consider the item before us, let me say that my delegation is grateful to the Soviet delegation for bringing the question before the General Assembly [A/7654]. The discussion of problems relating to international peace and security has tended more and more to become a monopoly of the great Powers with permanent seats on the Security Council; so much so that the medium-sized and small States are gradually becoming rather like the chorus in Greek tragedy, where one or two characters spoke while the chorus warned them of the dangers ahead of them. The inclusion of an item entitled "The strengthening of international security" in the agenda of the current session of the General Assembly enables small States such as that I represent to take part in the dialogue instead of merely playing the admonitory role of the chorus. For that reason I am thankful to the Soviet Union delegation.

28. I have to confess that the Soviet attitude is surprising. It might be thought that the Soviet Union had embarked on an unexpected policy of liberalization if Mr. Malik's words and the text of the "Appeal" did not seem to conceal a doctrine of power which we thought had been buried for ever with the bones of the men who died in the Second World War to bring about a new philosophy of international relations based on the equality of all States, great and small.

29. If the statement by the Soviet representative had been made in 1945 it would then have been interesting and novel. Twenty-four years later it reflects an outlook that could be called conservative. In 1945 "United Nations" meant the nations which had won the war against right-wing totalitarianism. In 1969 the United Nations is the international community organized to achieve its ends, and the Charter is a multilateral treaty whose provisions have the binding force of rules of law.

30. In 1945 the idea of the balance of power, on which the League of Nations was based, was still latent in men's minds, and is reflected in some of the structural features of the Charter such as the granting of privileges under Articles 27, 108 and 109 to the five States which bore the main brunt of the war, as well as in the anachronistic definition of "enemy States" in Article 53. The invitation to us to retrace the path of history and go back to the 1945 position would be an anachronism that could be interpreted only on the hypothesis of an upset in the stable balance of power in Europe attempted at the end of the Second World War to avoid a resurgence of the Powers described as "enemy States".

31. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that even in 1945 a new political philosophy had been outlined, in opposition to the doctrine of the balance of power. The new philosophy was crystallized by two great Western statesmen in the declaration of 14 August 1941 known as the Atlantic Charter. Respect for the territorial integrity of States; the self-determination of peoples, ruling out the possibility of territorial change by force; equal rights for nations great and small; and the recognition of the need for economic and social development as the goal of international co-operation; these were the answer to Hitler's totalitarianism soon after the Soviet Union had abandoned its Berlin militant partner and the Nazis had declared war on it.

32. The generous gesture of all the States which 24 years ago set up this Organization was precisely the abandonment of the power policy and the incorporation of the new philosophy, based on the democratization of international relations, in the Preamble and the purposes and principles of the Charter signed at San Francisco. That is why the Charter had and still has a twofold character: as the organization of the international community to achieve its goals, and as a multilateral treaty whose provisions are binding on its signatories; and it is this twofold character that has allowed it to evolve into a dynamic instrument, constantly developing, which has gradually defined the scope of its norms and developed the full range of its principles.

33. A good example to illustrate the progressiveness and dynamism of the principles of the Charter is resolution 1514 (XV) which Mr. Malik cited as a Soviet achievement. The evolution of anti-colonialism came about through the struggle of many medium-sized and small States even before many of the Asian States and the overwhelming majority of the African States had joined the United Nations. There was first of all the statement of the indivisible unity of the Charter in the face of the colonialist statement that Chapter XI was merely declaratory. Next there was the rebuttal of the colonialist thesis that the administration of dependent territories was a matter of domestic jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. Later there was the definition of factors governing the recognition of self-government. Thus resolution 1514 (XV) was not a brilliant invention of Mr. Khrushchev or an isolated move on the part of the Soviet Union but the outcome of a slow and persistent evolution with which a large group of medium-sized and small States had been concerned for many years.

34. With all due respect to the Soviet Union, my delegation feels that it must examine some of the methods suggested by Mr. Malik and contained in the draft appeal [A/C.1/L.468] which might mean a retrograde step towards the position prevailing until the Second World War and a denial of the democratization of international relations embodied in the United Nations Charter. Let me refer first of all to what Mr. Malik called "the enhancing of the effectiveness of the Security Council... for the maintenance of international peace and security" [1652nd meeting, para. 27].

35. Section V of the Soviet proposal contains two measures: the first is the implementation of Article 28

paragraph 2, of the Charter. It is a decision to be adopted by Members and requiring neither a decision nor an appeal by the General Assembly. The members of the Council are legally entitled to hold periodic meetings and their Governments are at liberty to be represented at whatever level they wish.

36. The second measure proposed also comes within the jurisdiction of the Council. If it does not fulfil its duties, that is its responsibility; Chapters VI and VII of the Charter grant the Security Council full powers. While the measures proposed are not new, Mr. Malik's statement that "only the Security Council... may take decisions binding on all Member States" seems to us important. That statement is not new either. It starts out from a semantic equivocation to reach a political conclusion.

37. According to Article 24 of the Charter, Members of the United Nations "confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf". My delegation has steadily maintained that Article 24 contains the following elements: in the first place a mandate which the Members of the United Nations, namely those that make up the General Assembly, "confer on the Security Council" by giving it "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". The Spanish text has "*responsabilidad primordial*"; the English text reads "primary responsibility". In either language it implies an order of priority, a responsibility in the first instance, primary or primordial, but not exclusive.

38. The fact of the mandate is accentuated by the statement that "in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf". The notion of mandate is further reinforced by the obligation of the Security Council to submit annual reports to the General Assembly. To enable it to fulfil its mandate the Charter has endowed the Council with the powers set forth in Chapter VII.

39. No one knows better than the representative of the Soviet Union that more than a hundred times the veto paralysed the Security Council before the more sophisticated and ingenious method of the residual consensus was devised. The use of the so-called residual powers of the General Assembly in cases where the veto paralyzes action by the Security Council is the exact equivalent of the resumption of his powers by the mandator when the mandatary does not carry out his duty. Any attempt to modify Article 24 or to interpret it in any arbitrary way would imply, in all honesty and logic, a corresponding revision of Article 27.

40. The argument that the only binding decisions are those arrived at by the Security Council is highly dangerous, since it means the supreme concentration of all power in the hands of those members of the Security Council that possess the privilege of the veto. It is true that Article 10 of the Charter provides that the General Assembly may make recommendations on matters falling within its powers and functions; but the fact that it can make recommendations does not deprive General Assembly resolutions of their binding nature when they clarify, define or strengthen

provisions of the Charter. Their only limitation is that laid down in Article 12 in respect of situations or disputes actually being discussed in the Security Council.

41. Resolutions of the General Assembly not constituting recommendations have the same binding force as the Charter provisions they clarify, define or strengthen, since the Charter is a multilateral treaty which imposes obligations on its signatories, and even in some cases on non-member States. The whole struggle against colonialism was carried out under General Assembly resolutions, including resolution 1514 (XV).

42. The entire campaign against racial discrimination and *apartheid* took place under General Assembly resolutions, since the Council's measures—half-hearted and anyway ineffectual—were taken late in the day. Development of human rights was effected wholly under declarations and resolutions of the General Assembly. To deny their binding nature would be tantamount to encouraging those remiss in complying with them to persist in their defiance and would paralyse the procedures for setting up, improving and developing the rules of law embodied in the Charter on which the binding resolutions of the General Assembly are based.

43. It is arguable that the only resolutions of a coercive character are those of the Security Council when they are adopted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII; but obligation must not be confused with coercion. To achieve what Mr. Malik has called "greater effectiveness of the Security Council" all that is needed is for the Council to carry out its functions and duties without the pusillanimous complacency of consensus or the arrogant negation of the veto.

44. Another point that disturbs my delegation is that of regional systems. The Soviet Union case raises two questions. The first is the precise scope the so-called regional systems are to have. My delegation has firmly and steadily maintained that Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter do not create exclusive jurisdiction in favour of the regional arrangements or agencies referred to in Chapter VIII of the Charter as far as the peaceful settlement of disputes of a local character are concerned, since Article 52 makes it clear that they in no way impair the action of the Security Council under Article 34 nor the right of States members of a regional organization to bring their disputes before the Council itself even if the regional organization is considering the question under Article 35.

45. The second question is what it is supposed to mean when the Soviet representative refers to "the efforts of all States of the regions concerned", an idea repeated in the phrase in section IV of the draft appeal: "based on the joint efforts of all States of the areas concerned". This insistence that regional systems must include all the States in the region is a sort of new unanimity rule. All that would be needed would be for one State in a regional system to remain outside for the system to cease to operate.

46. The practical difficulty of defining the concept of region is also important. People speak of Europe, but we have to know which Europe. Asia is subdivided into subregional zones. An Asian regional system would have to

include the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, at least, to be a regional system. Southern Africa, with its systems based on racism, could hardly be integrated into the system of African unity; and a proper solution would have to be sought to ensure representation for the peoples of the territories still under unjust colonial systems.

47. My delegation is very glad to say that there are other points on which it is entirely in agreement with the Soviet proposals. I would like to refer first to the need for a definition of aggression. I have to recognize that the Soviet Union has been steadfast in its belief in this need since the days before the United Nations came into being, as is evident from the proposal made by Maxim Litvinov at the Disarmament Conference in 1932.¹ In 1950 the Soviet Union renewed its request when the item "Duties of States in the Event of the Outbreak of Hostilities" was discussed in the United Nations. My delegation is gratified to be able to say that it was concerned in all the efforts to produce a definition of aggression between 1950 and 1957, just as it was opposed to the delay in achieving such a definition that marked the decade 1957-1967. It would all the same be interesting if that definition were made to serve as a guide to the Security Council or as a basis for judicial action when the time comes to establish the international penal jurisdiction now being held up pending a definition of aggression.

48. We are concerned over the word "appeal" attached to this long document. It is not a declaration of principles or a mere resolution: it is a decision of a new type. Apparently, the Soviet Union's wish is merely to provoke reactions and elicit suggestions. But I should have thought that that would call not for a decision by the General Assembly but for transmittal of the document to Governments in order to ascertain their views.

49. In any event, we consider the valuable ideas contained in the appeal submitted by the Soviet Union well worth studying. In the years that have gone by since 1945 there have been no major wars, but hatred and the will to dominate have played havoc in many places in the world. Today the outlook is bleak for security when we see nuclear arsenals mushrooming and sophisticated weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological, being stockpiled. Serious reflection and an examination of conscience are essential as we approach the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

50. I have to say very frankly that many medium-sized and small nations are perturbed by the concentration of power that has been snowballing over the last few years. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Mr. Magalhaes Pinto, referred in the General Debate [*1755th plenary meeting*] to the frequent shifting of problems from the world forum with its 126 Members to the Security Council with its 15 Members and from the Security Council to four Powers possessing the veto, and lastly, the concentration of power in the hands of the two super-Powers; while Mr. Araujo Castro stated in the First Committee: "Furthermore, we certainly do not believe that a solution to basic world problems can be reached or dictated by a directorate

¹ Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, held at Geneva in February 1932.

of super-Powers" [*1653rd meeting, para. 21*]. This is the view held by many medium-sized and small States, and we share it.

51. My delegation cannot accept any attempt to roll back the world map to where it was at the end of the Second World War when the world was divided into victorious States and enemy States. Nor can it countenance any measure making for the establishment of spheres of influence, whether economic or ideological, whether direct or through regional or military pacts, or whether through unarmed pressure or force upheld by tanks. The peace we seek and the international security we crave for our uneasy present and our desperate future must be based on proscription of the threat or use of force in international relations; on respect for the sovereign equality of States, large and small; on the right of peoples to self-determination and free choice of their own form of government: on the liberation of the territories still under the colonial yoke; on non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States, whether for reasons of ideological subjugation or to achieve economic domination; on safeguards against discrimination and punishment for those who practise it; and on freedom of speech and belief.

52. The work of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States is closely watched by my Government, and the conduct of the great Powers is not always encouraging.

53. In conclusion, I would like to say that as far as my delegation is concerned, the strengthening of security is entrusted to the super-Powers, not as a faculty they are at liberty to exercise or to try to increase, but as a duty they are morally obliged to carry out. We do not want security based on the peace of the dungeon, with slaves muted by the threat of tanks mobilized to show them what they must do. We do not want security obtained by the division of the world into zones of influence based on the erroneous notion of the discipline of power. We want peace with justice, peace without hunger, peace without fear. The world we have created since the Second World War is not what Pangloss called the best of all possible worlds. There are unjust wars against people claiming their right to choose their own form of government and to take their place in the sun without let or hindrance; there are foreign armies occupying territories that do not belong to them; there are colonial wars. The incendiary jelly known as napalm rains down from the sky; thousands of megatons are stockpiled in the arsenals of death; new forms of killing are tried out—death by asphyxiation, burning, hunger due to defoliation, bacteria and bacilli, rickets and viruses. That is the world we are handing on to our children and our children's children. And when the young people in all parts of the world, dissatisfied with the world we have bequeathed to them, raise their voices, they get tear-gas and coshes instead of solutions.

54. The dissatisfaction of young people with the world we have given them turns them towards revolutionary activism, in the fury they often feel against those who offered them a world of equality and turned bourgeois before fulfilling their promise. They take the road of angry nationalism or fall into indifference which leads to the "drop-out", the

world of hallucination or early defeatism. It is our responsibility to give security to this world we live in, not with words that conceal thought or with quibbling; and we have to be grateful to the Soviet Union for having placed this item on the agenda, thus giving those of us who represent small States a chance to speak bitter truths and engage in an honest dialogue.

55. Mr. JACKMAN (Barbados): Mr. Chairman, my delegation, having already offered you its congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee, should now like to express its satisfaction at the firm and understanding hand with which you have been guiding our deliberations, and to extend, at the same time, our congratulations to the other members of the Bureau.

56. A handful of determined men in a medium-sized yacht could represent a very real threat to the security of my country. For that reason we cannot treat a debate on the strengthening of international security as a purely academic matter. And for that reason we should like to pay a tribute to the delegation of the USSR for having proposed the inclusion of this item on the agenda of this session of the General Assembly.

57. We approached this debate with considerable hopes. We reasoned that if the Soviet Union, one of the two most powerful nations on earth, was concerned enough about the state of international security to wish to have it debated here, then there was some hope that we might be at the beginning of a new era of international relations. Speaking at this stage of the debate I must confess that we are a little disappointed. We are disappointed at the substance of the Soviet Union's presentation, and we are disappointed at the response that the item has produced from the other "super-Power" represented in the United Nations. To put it very broadly, it would appear that the Soviet Union considers that international security can be strengthened by appeals, and the United States considers that enough is already being done to strengthen it. No representative of a small State—and I should like to mention that my Deputy Prime Minister in the general debate described Barbados as "an unabashed mini-State" [1784th plenary meeting]—no representative of a State as tiny and as undefended as my own can accept either of those unbelievably optimistic views. Every news bulletin, and every public statement by thoughtful men belies them both.

58. First of all, my delegation would have preferred to see a rather more realistic title for this item. "The strengthening of international security", in the strictest semantic terms, suggests that there is such a thing as international security. The evidence, in fact, is all the other way. We live in a world of international insecurity. Security is in some ways not unlike virginity; a single breach can cause permanent damage. The United States does not possess security; the Soviet Union does not possess security. A determined man in a U-2 and, more recently, another determined man in a MIG have demonstrated that even the most powerful nations on earth cannot really be confident of their ability to erect a totally impregnable screen of security around themselves, whether it be called NORAD or the Iron Curtain. There is no precise equation of power and security.

59. What this debate might do, in our view, is to recognize the permanent state of insecurity in the world and to direct the attention of the international community towards specific and realistic techniques of reducing that insecurity. With all due respect to a nation which has undergone great anguish, suffering and loss of life in the last major international conflagration, my delegation is not convinced that the draft appeal proposed by the Soviet Union does, in fact, meet that need. Despite the eloquent exegesis by the representative of the Soviet Union before this Committee, my delegation finds in the Soviet appeal too much that is tendentious and sweeping and too little that is calculated actually to affect the behaviour of States in the direction of lessening world insecurity.

60. The Barbados delegation has resisted the very real temptation to indulge in the amendment game. We respect the spirit of the Soviet appeal, and in that spirit we should like to offer our own modest suggestions. For the convenience of delegations, and to avoid imprecision, I have put these suggestions into the form of a draft resolution which, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to read:

"The General Assembly,

"Noting with satisfaction that for more than two decades the States and peoples have been able to prevent the outbreak of a new world war,

"Conscious of the fact that this must be regarded as only a limited success, so long as there is no stable peace on earth, and so long as peoples and nations continue to live in insecurity,

"Deeply concerned at the continuance of the arms race, which diverts substantial human and material resources away from the urgent social and economic needs of the vast majority of mankind, and in itself constitutes a continuing threat to peace and security,

"Recognizing that an end to international insecurity can be achieved only through renewed dedication to the principles enshrined in the Charter of the Organization, in particular in Article 2, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, Article 55, Article 56 and Article 73,

"Desirous that the twenty-fifth year of the Organization's existence shall be marked by new initiatives in the search for peace, security, and economic and social progress for all mankind,

"Recalling that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is conferred by the Charter on the Security Council,

"1. Urgently requests the Security Council to give early consideration to the general state of international security at meetings to be convened under the terms of Article 28, paragraph 2,

"2. Invites the Security Council to give special attention at such meetings:

(a) to efforts already being undertaken by appropriate United Nations bodies in the fields of disarmament and

the spread of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, with a view to reaching speedy international agreement to end production of such weapons;

(b) to measures which may be taken by the international community, acting through the appropriate organs, to bring to an end all situations which currently threaten the peace;

“3. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations to give favourable and urgent consideration to the drafting and adoption of a universal declaration on world security, to be ratified at the twenty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly.”

61. This piece of paper is not meant to be sacrosanct; it is meant, as I said, to put together a few ideas in a precise form for the consideration of the Committee.

62. Mr. KHATRI (Nepal): In deference to your wish, Mr. Chairman, I shall limit myself to expressing the satisfaction of my delegation at our choice of such a splendid Bureau, and to pledging my full support in your task.

63. As we read and reread the letter of 19 September from the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union and the accompanying draft appeal [A/7654], together with the most thoughtful and comprehensive statement made in this committee on 10 October by Ambassador Malik [1652nd meeting] in explanation of his Government's idea behind the draft appeal, we are impressed with the genuine concern felt by the Soviet Government with regard to the need for strengthening world peace and security. That concern has been continuous. Great indeed has been the contribution made by the Soviet Union to the strengthening of the purposes of the United Nations. In this connexion we recall vividly the initiative taken by the Soviet Government in the adoption, among other things, of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [resolution 1514 (XV)], the tenth anniversary of which coincides with the twenty-fifth anniversary of our Organization, and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty [resolution 2131 (XX)].

64. The Soviet draft appeal covers a vast array of subjects related to world peace and security, and is devoted basically to a programme of work for the United Nations. But, although both Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Malik have referred to the grave danger to mankind posed by the armaments race, the subject of general and complete disarmament is very conspicuous by its absence in that programme of work. No programme of work would be complete if it did not include disarmament, which, we recognize, is the effective answer to that danger which has aroused such admirable concern in the minds of the Soviet Government.

65. The United Nations is committed to the goal of general and complete disarmament, and the nuclear Powers, permanent members of the Security Council, are under commitment to start on the road of true disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. Disarmament and security

are inseparably linked, and we must ensure that a subject so vitally related to security as disarmament is not omitted from that appeal. The goal of general and complete disarmament could be reaffirmed and an appeal could be addressed principally to the nuclear Powers requesting them to make more sincere and sustained efforts with a view to reaching agreements on real measures of disarmament.

66. Withdrawal of troops from occupied territories, cessation of measures for suppression of liberation movements, practise of the principles of peaceful coexistence, and settlement of disputes by peaceful means—the subject-matter of sections II and III of document A/C.1/L.468—are all points of principle on which Nepal has based its policies.

67. The draft proposals contained in sections IV and V are directly related to the question of strengthening international security. We regard the Soviet proposal for the reactivation of the Security Council as a timely one. As we know, the Council is constitutionally equipped with exceptional power in matters affecting international peace and security. It has a sweeping supra-national authority over all except its permanent members.

68. Provisions contained in Article 27, paragraph 3, make it clear that, even in the case of permanent members, the moral authority and power of judgement of the Council would be supreme if the decision concerned did not fall within Chapter VII of the Charter. But the permanent members have not been prepared, in cases in which they feel that their interest suffered, to concede this moral authority and power of judgement to the Security Council.

69. The Security Council represented the power structure that existed at the end of the Second World War. It was intended by the victorious coalition of Powers to be a strong and effective instrument, in letter and in fact, for the maintenance of international peace and security. Its function was not limited to action after the event. The founders envisaged the role of the Council as that of the guide and leader of events too. Hence the provisions contained in Article 28, paragraph 2. Those provisions were never carried out. The atmosphere of cold war which immediately set in after 1945 was responsible for limiting not only the police function of the Council but also its directing role.

70. All three Secretaries-General of the Organization have made repeated suggestions for the active implementation of Article 28, paragraph 2. The atmosphere, so far as it relates to relationship between the present four permanent members of the Council, has somewhat improved. To that extent, and in a limited way, such periodic meetings could be useful. The fact remains, however, that since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Council is suffering a serious institutional weakness because of the absence of that Power, and this has vitally affected the role of the Council as an effective instrument for international peace and security.

71. Of this we are all fully aware. We also know why it has not been possible to remedy this weakness which strikes at the root of our Organization. Although we believe that the restoration of the rights of the People's Republic of China would be the best measure for strengthening the Security Council and, for that matter, the United Nations, we would

be prepared to join in other efforts aimed at reinforcing the authority of the Council as it is. The draft appeal, in its present form, would urge the Security Council: "to take, where necessary, effective practical steps against acts of aggression, using, whenever required, the full powers vested in the Security Council by the United Nations Charter". [A/C.1/L.468, section V, para. 2.]

72. Considering, however, that the term "aggression" lends itself to different interpretations and in view of the fact that the Council has been increasingly involved in Southern African situations, my delegation would suggest the addition of a sub-paragraph requesting the Security Council to take effective practical steps against those who are responsible for situations that constitute a threat to peace and security.

73. With regard to the proposal concerning regional security systems in various parts of the world, let me say at the outset that as a country which bases its security on strict non-involvement in military alliances and on our own good conduct in relations with other States, we put our primary and abiding faith in the collective universal security system established under the Charter of the United Nations. We do not seek the protection of one State or a group of States against another State or a group of States.

74. Our own historic evolution as a nation has been such that the concept of the regional security system has never been popular in our country. Moreover, we think that the United Nations is based on the concept of peace as one and indivisible. So it has not been possible for us to be reconciled to the idea that regional security arrangements would not in any way involve a conflict of interests with the universal collective system.

75. Perhaps our views in this respect have been governed by our experience, from afar, with the functioning of the so-called regional security arrangements in the contemporary world. Those arrangements are based on the proviso left open by Article 51 of Chapter VII of the Charter rather than on the provisions of Chapter VIII, which intended regional systems to function strictly as a subordinate link to the collective system established by the Charter. Arrangements such as those were too often found to be based on common defence interests directed against a predetermined party or parties. We have no wish to pass judgement on those regional arrangements, but we cannot help reflecting that by organizing opposing special interests and aggravating the arms race they have perhaps not contributed to the harmonization of the differing interests of States, which remains one of the purposes of the Charter.

76. As I said, those arrangements have often been found to be directed against a third party. In the present-day situation, even where they do exist, their utility is being increasingly questioned. Even assuming that regional security arrangements could be made under provisions of Chapter VIII under the authority of the Security Council, the question arises whether the United Nations under its collective system would be able to check and to prevent the suppression of the interests of the weaker nations by the stronger in a given regional group. We know that when arms are accumulated the purpose behind it is their eventual use. We also know that in a community, of individuals or of

nations, the will of the stronger too often tends to prevail over that of the weaker. As it is, in the absence of a permanent member, the People's Republic of China, the United Nations collective system is already enfeebled. Given the present state of world affairs, in many parts of the world, it is difficult to see how regional security arrangements could function even if they were linked, on paper, to the collective system under the United Nations.

77. Our principal concern is that in any system, universal or regional, the rights and interests of smaller and weaker States, which look upon the United Nations particularly as a bulwark of their security, should be protected. There should be a smooth and workable peace-keeping machinery at both political and functional levels in a collective system, which should ensure that the violations of those rights and interests do not go unchallenged.

78. Regarding regional security arrangements, it would be difficult to define their objective. In the first place, how would they function if an aggression occurred from without the group? Secondly, if that happened from within the group, would justice be done and would the interests of the weaker party or parties be protected? Last but not the least, what factors would govern the relations between the group as a whole and a State or States within that region which did not take part in the security arrangement?

79. As we see it, the only remedy is self-discipline on the part of States, particularly those which have greater strength, and the United Nations—a strong United Nations capable of invoking immediate peace-keeping and preventive measures when occasions arise. In the reality of today's world, we think that the questions of war and peace could be considered with any measure of success only when dividing political barriers had been pulled down and conditions for actual collaboration of the People's Republic of China had been set. For us in the United Nations the first programme of work should be the restoration of the rights of that Power in the Organization.

80. It is proposed that the General Assembly address the appeal to all States of the world, including the People's Republic of China, whose policies, in the words of Ambassador Malik "have a marked effect on the general international situation" [1652nd meeting, para. 63]. We fully appreciate the reasons given by the Soviet delegation for making this appeal universal. My delegation has all along supported the "all-State" formula in the work of the United Nations. However, it appears to me that although the question of security is of universal concern it would not be judicious in this case to ask those States which do not take part in the activities of the United Nations, for one reason or another, to study the feasibility of establishing regional security arrangements under the collective system of the United Nations, in which in the existing political circumstances those States are, and would be, prevented from taking part.

81. On the programme of work set out in section VI of the appeal, I have no comment to make except that we would support it whole-heartedly. The task that is being undertaken with regard to the definition of aggression, formulation of principles of friendly relations and co-operation of States, and an understanding on United Nations

peace-keeping operations is one whose importance in the strengthening of international peace and security cannot be over-emphasized. In that connexion may I say that in dealing with this useful programme of work for peace we could hardly omit a reference to a similar programme of work for peace, undertaken at the United Nations, in the field of economic development. Here again, the Soviet delegation might be persuaded to add a third paragraph in this section, or perhaps a new section in the draft appeal, devoted particularly to the question of economic co-operation and development.

82. On the whole it appears to us that the programme of work set out in the draft appeal covers practically the whole range of subjects concerning peace and security. My delegation has viewed the Soviet proposal with the same spirit of sincerity in which it has been presented. I have made known my preliminary observations on important aspects covered by the text of the appeal, not only because it comes from a major Power whose credentials we hold in the highest regard, but also because the proposal concerns a subject in which Nepal has a vital interest. We have made certain suggestions for incorporation in the text of the appeal in a spirit of co-operation; and in the same spirit we remain prepared to consider, and be convinced by, any further explanations that might be forthcoming.

83. Mr. MAURTUA (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): The first item on the agenda of the First Committee is to be the study of the proposal by the Soviet Union [A/7654] concerning the strengthening of international security. No doubt the topic can be regarded as ambitious, but actually, the fact of raising the problem reflects as it were a state of public awareness which calls for the introduction into current international law, and into the machinery activated by international organizations, of effective ways and means of safeguarding and maintaining peace.

84. The experience gathered from past events shows that the strengthening of peace-keeping institutions goes beyond the bounds of merely local institutional aspirations to become a key principle for mobilizing all the constructive elements of international order.

85. As the representative of the Soviet Union said in his presentation [1652nd meeting], significant events have taken place and are taking place nowadays that could direct the activities of States towards strengthening peace in virtue of changes occurring both on the surface and at the very roots of national and international relations. These events are also capable of modifying legislation adopted by international organizations; and since the achievement of peace by all possible means is on the agenda of each and every one of them, it is clear that real progress has been achieved making the situation ripe for further advances. By this I mean that the climate of the cold war seems to be a thing of the past. While it is true that violence among nations is far from having disappeared and that every act against the juridical order has inherent in it a potential danger for the maintenance of world peace, it is also true that the use of force is limited to certain regions.

86. This is important, because peace-making seems more feasible than if hostilities had been widespread, ill-defined or unconfined. Added to this is the fact that international

life is directed, in theory at least, toward the affirmation of juridical values. This is the case, for example, in regard to the affirmation of principles such as self-determination, the attainment of the objectives laid down in the United Nations Charter for defining the trusteeship exercised over Non-Self-Governing Territories or Territories under administration, the declaration and definition of human rights, the attempts to define certain basic concepts such as aggression, or the crystallization of negotiating factors in complex economic issues between States or groups of States defined as economic regions.

87. Starting from this climate not unfavourable for safeguarding and strengthening peace, we can now outline certain objectives that might be regarded as immediate.

88. The idea of the Soviet proposal is as follows: a kind of appeal would be made to the conscience of man to steer international affairs along constructive lines, or at least along lines approximating to the hopes that man has placed in the major international organizations. What is essential is that any appeal in favour of peace should not be limited to the simple task of verifying what were the conditions prevailing at a given moment in history, but should adopt a more creative approach or aim at changing existing conditions for the better. It is a matter of weighing up what has been achieved.

89. Viewed from this angle, the document submitted by the Soviet Union [A/C.1/L.468] does seem to be somewhat vague in its wording. True, the vagueness is imposed on it by the circumstances of the issues outstanding in the international field and the fact that the document apparently makes no attempt to identify the actors in the political drama being acted out in the world. But the exigencies of urgent peace demand a minimum of identification, not in regard to States but in regard to their behaviour, which must reflect certain rules imposed on Governments by the sense of community. These rules do not necessarily have to be very detailed or very numerous. For example, if we refer to section II of the draft appeal, we may observe that it contains a clear mandate in favour of world peace, but since certain situations derive from existing conflicts, a peace-making attitude towards such conflicts is important in order to conform to the action and the spirit of the United Nations.

90. Stamping out colonialism is not an adequate target for the international community. The rule should be to call for the self-determination of peoples, which presupposes that every human grouping has the right to decide its own future and that those who hold office at any given moment must take definite steps to bring about political and social evolution while respecting the will of the people and its cultural identity. It is likewise essential that the provision in section II, paragraph 2, of the appeal should not be negative but positive, expressing a duty imposed by the international community on all States to observe the rules arising out of community status and the validity of the principles of international law contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

91. It should also be borne in mind that in section III of the Soviet proposal, States are requested to be guided in their foreign policies by the vital interests of all peoples in

preserving peace and strengthening international security. It might be better to say that respect for the vital interests of peoples is an effective way of serving the desire for peace. In many instances these interests call for priority or preferential consideration because of their legal and political nature. We know of course that war has not been banished from the international scene. Aggression is a threat and indeed a reality in many parts of the world. There is a dangerous tendency to consider action in violation of the fundamental rights of States as tolerable so long as it is limited; but this disregards the primary and essential character taken on by the basic rights in the functioning of the duties and privileges of nations generally.

92. As we know, international law presupposes a network of rights and obligations that cannot be breached without jeopardizing the single, community concept of peace. In this context, racial discrimination, the violation of human rights, or economic injustice towards States, assume the peculiar characteristics of violations of the general legal order. This approach was considered worthy of consideration in the debates in the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression this year at its session between February and April, at which one representative said he disagreed with the tendency to feel that the definition should be restricted to armed attack as defined in Article 51 of the Charter; and in that connexion it was stated that political and economic pressure should be regarded as included in the concept of the use of force. It was argued that economic pressure could cause death by hunger, which could kill no less effectively than the atom bomb.

93. We are reminded at this point that a new stress should be placed on the need to define acts of pressure or unwarranted economic reprisals as forms of economic aggression, since reaffirmation of the institutions of the Charter and observance of it and its spirit, and compliance with the terms of treaties, contribute effectively to international peace.

94. However, there is another field in which peace can be affected without all the formal elements of the use of force, namely the domestic development of States, since economic or social shortcomings can cause trouble.

95. We must see to it that pressure or indirect action, whether political or economic, by large States on small States does not become, by a sort of analogy with domestic criminal law, a unilateral act of force which claims to be the same as what the jurists in days gone by used to call "penal substitutes", or a sort of punitive war. These disguised acts of force tend today to introduce a form of subjugation by suppressing or curtailing co-operative action, thus distorting the legal nature of international aid, which should be a function of international co-operation but tries to turn it into international sanction.

96. The conclusion to be drawn is that the strengthening of domestic structures is also a positive step in favour of peace. This leads to the drafting of specific rules giving all States the same opportunities in matters of international co-operation and the handling of matters of general interest. It also presupposes timely and necessary co-operation by the more developed States to assist or benefit the

less developed. This latter function in large measure presupposes the interplay of many factors. It means sponsoring and furnishing technical assistance to the less developed countries in response to social need, free of any conditions reflecting the superiority of private over public, general or majority interests. This is tantamount to transforming the ideological background of such assistance so that it is no longer an *ex gratia* function but a compulsory one intended to strengthen by every means the requirements of social balance, which is likewise a reason for peace.

97. Section III of the draft appeal studies the principles of peaceful coexistence and respect for certain principles on two levels: that of non-interference and that of territorial inviolability and the rights of all the peoples freely to choose their social systems. Peaceful coexistence presupposes the functioning of those basic principles and their strict observance. There is no coexistence where there is violation of sovereignty or where any State claims the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another. Nor is there coexistence if the wishes of a State are repressed in order to gain advantage from it, to its own detriment, and in a way in which force should not be used by a powerful sovereign country against another sovereign country.

98. This again inevitably leads us to a moral conclusion, one that the draft appeal does not appear to contain expressly, namely the need to introduce the human factor into cold economic relations so as to make the industrialized States understand and value the aspirations which are vital to the developing countries; to make them appreciate and value the social and political institutions of those countries, since they embody definite aspirations of their society and constitute genuine social and political ideals. Without these moral elements, the confrontation of ideas will continue and may generate discord. This is what the representative of France called for [1657th meeting] as the moral basis of international harmony. I would define it as a task of true moral disarmament.

99. But this cannot be achieved simply by reaffirming existing legislative principles. Legality and justice in social and economic relations are a continuous creation. Legislative principles can crystallize technical, legal or moral factors at a particular stage in the development of social life. But as occurs everywhere, this crystallization—according to a theory of contemporary natural law—is a partial realization of justice, itself a progressive and perennial realization of positive law, which at each stage of its development reacts to the complexity of life involving the examination and control of a wide variety of factors, including the influence of strong national interests that only yield to those factors.

100. Consideration of section IV of the Soviet Union's draft appeal calls for some comment. What it really amounts to is a somewhat curtailed and half-hearted way of formulating the role of regional organizations of States in promoting international co-operation and world peace. It might be deduced from the text that the purpose of these regional organizations is merely world security. To our way of thinking, the organization of States along modern lines leads or should lead to all conceivable forms of co-operation. Regional organizations are therefore a form of

co-ordination which on the basis of the principle of the division of labour and functional specialization leads Governments which are linked together by special historical or geographical bonds to band together in all fields to achieve their community ideals and not only political ends.

101. These regional systems exist, at various levels of development, and are functioning in the United Nations, because their constitutional régimes are compatible with the provisions of the Charter. They exist in Latin America, in Africa and in the Middle East. In Latin America the regional system, which is the oldest of all of them, is based on an egalitarian philosophy with a whole series of objectives. Regional co-ordination in Latin America arose out of common political ideals, geographical links, identical features and neighbourliness. This co-ordination makes it possible for States to share their destiny in such a way that action burdensome for one sovereign State jeopardizes the executive solidarity of all States equally. The system operates on the basis of a series of treaties and conventions regulating every kind of issue. There is a treaty of mutual defence embodying a pact for the renunciation of the use of force in international relations, requiring all member States to settle disputes by peaceful means, and instituting consultation at various levels according to whether conflicts are intra-continental or extra-continental.

102. In the first case, the *status quo ante bellum* operates as an initial step towards peace; in the others, solidarity among the States should make them share among them the burdens of collective security. It can therefore be argued that there are few places where measures for the peaceful settlement of international disputes have been more effectively applied than in Latin America. In no part of the world have those peaceful measures demonstrated their effectiveness as regulating and moderating devices so well as in the Latin American region. International conciliation, for example, should be pointed out as an institution purely American in origin. Its universal acceptance dates from Bryant, and it was found that when the institution comes into operation, it is difficult for a conflict to paralyse pacification efforts because conciliation does not depend on the imposition of legal or political criteria but on the persuasive and highly moral action of the conciliator, actuated by conviction rather than by pressure. Moreover, conciliation is a pacific procedure which calls for the utmost authority on the part of the conciliator; and once started it never stops until a solution has been found. I recall this because it seems appropriate to do so at this moment when international conflicts are crying out for persistent and unceasing action by the organs of peace-making. My delegation considers that the United Nations, through existing treaties and action in many directions by the Security Council, should mobilize this peace-making system more frequently, giving the peace-making organs ample latitude to operate. Hence these points might be taken into account when section V, paragraph 2, of the Soviet proposal is considered.

103. To put the matter briefly, the delegation of Peru is most sympathetic towards the draft submitted by the Soviet delegation. We feel that in the present crisis through which the world is passing, reaffirmation of the peaceful purposes to which we all subscribe is a constructive act. There is never enough time to call attention to the

provisions of the law and to give proper publicity to the peace-loving aspirations of men. But at the same time we have a duty to recall the decisive responsibility of the great Powers for strengthening world security. This responsibility presupposes the solution of their own domestic problems, which consume their energies and may steer the policies of their Governments in the direction of more or less concealed pressures and injustices, to the detriment of medium-sized and small States. Hence the problem is to see disarmament as becoming one day a palpable reality; to make all talk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction a thing of the past and not aggravate the situation with bacteriological and chemical weapons, as at present; to inculcate peace as a profound political conviction; to abolish once and for all the idea of tutelage and discrimination, since they no longer have any place in international affairs; to defend the rights of other men, nations and States as if they were our own, co-ordinating political action in order to ensure full enjoyment of those rights, including the right of States to use or reclaim their natural resources so that the economy will not merely serve restricted groups but will be used to free the masses from poverty and hunger; and finally, to see to it that non-intervention is not simply a principle set forth in conventions between States but a tangible, concrete political fact allowing every State to develop freely without fear of pressure or coercion from other States, not only by armed force but, as stipulated in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), quoting article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States by "attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements".

104. The delegation of Peru considers that the draft appeal will constitute an act of reaffirmation of the spirit of the United Nations Charter and that its full implementation is therefore a commitment involving present and future policies of Member States. Hence the desirability for its adoption to receive maximum support—but genuine support, not mere lip-service. The draft appeal should thus be a matter for consultation with all Governments, not as at present in order to ascertain what impromptu reactions it will elicit from delegations but to enable each Government to take note of even its most recondite points and all the problems it covers, and the legislative and political changes it will entail in the legal structure of Governments if it is to be a concrete reality and not just one more document for the Organization's files. As other representatives have already said, its ultimate adoption might constitute a solemn act celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

105. The CHAIRMAN: We shall hold two meetings tomorrow. I request the Secretary of the Committee to read out the names of the speakers for the morning and afternoon meetings.

106. Mr. CHACKO (Secretary of the Committee): The representatives of the following countries are listed to speak at the morning meeting: Jordan, Denmark, Spain, Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and for the afternoon meeting: China, Sudan, Czechoslovakia, Cyprus, United Republic of Tanzania, Indonesia and Sierra Leone. There are two other delegations listed for the afternoon meeting subject to confirmation.

107. The CHAIRMAN: First of all, I should like to express my gratitude to representatives for speaking with brevity combined with comprehensiveness. As will be noted, we are not fully utilizing our time, particularly at the morning meetings, and it is my hope that from Tuesday onwards we shall be able to hear at least 15 to 16 speakers a day. I indicated on Friday that 58 countries had inscribed their names on the speakers' list. The number has since gone up. I understand that these names were submitted before the deadline. After a more precise calculation the total number is 66. Therefore, if we have to conclude this item by the end of this week, we shall have to make greater progress.

Organization of work

108. The CHAIRMAN: With the permission of the Committee I should now like to revert to a matter related to the organization of our work which was decided at our 1651st meeting on 10 October. At that meeting His Excellency, Mr. García Robles, Chairman of the Mexican delegation, expressed the desire of 23 delegations from Latin America that the date for the submission of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly should be set for the 20th of this month or, at the latest, the 25th and, further, that the disarmament debate should begin in this Committee on 5 November or, at the latest, on 10 November. I promised the Chairman of the Mexican delegation and the members of this Committee that I would enter into consultations with the two co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and with the other members of the Committee and would let this Committee know about the state of progress on the report of the Committee on Disarmament.

109. I have had two messages from the two co-Chairmen through the Secretariat: one was received late Friday afternoon and the other was delivered to me this morning. In these two messages the two co-Chairmen have stated that they have consulted the members of the Committee on Disarmament and that it is their firm intention to submit the report and conclude the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by 31 October at the latest, if not earlier—barring, of course, unforeseen circumstances.

110. The two co-Chairmen have also approached the Secretariat seeking its co-operation regarding the technical aspects of translation and reproduction of the report of the Committee on Disarmament so that it can be finalized in

Geneva and reproduced in New York in the shortest possible time. That is with regard to the submission of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

111. With regard to the other matter—namely, that the disarmament debate should, preferably, commence on 5 November and at the latest on 10 November—I would like to assure the distinguished Chairman of the Mexican delegation and his Latin American colleagues and members of this Committee that I shall, of course, do my very best to meet the wishes that have been expressed, and I am sure all representatives will extend to me their fullest co-operation. I call on the representative of Mexico.

112. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*): As you will understand, Mr. Chairman, I have of course not been able to consult my colleagues, the representatives of the other 22 delegations which paid me the compliment of asking me to speak in their name on the occasion to which you refer. Hence I am now speaking on behalf of my own delegation only. The representatives of the Latin American States are here present, and are at liberty to express their views if they feel so inclined.

113. As far as my delegation is concerned, we consider that, as you yourself said last time, our joint suggestion reflected and reflects what you described as the hopes and expectations of all the members of the Committee. We would therefore have preferred that the co-Chairmen had seen their way to accept the suggestion. But according to reports we have received from our delegation at Geneva, the opinion of the co-Chairmen as just expressed by you was arrived at after all the representatives on the Committee had been consulted and it had been unanimously agreed to accept the date in question. Our representative at Geneva did point out that in our view the deadline of 31 October should this time be fixed and not extendible. We feel that an extension of six days beyond the deadline we had proposed—we said 25 October, so that 31 October would be six days later—would not necessarily prevent the second suggestion we made, namely that the items on disarmament should be taken up not later than 10 November, from being accepted.

114. My delegation was most gratified to hear the Chairman state just now that he will do his utmost to arrange things accordingly.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.