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1. The CHAIRMAN: Before the Committee proceeds with its work today, I wish to announce that Chile has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document

A/C.1/L.447. The number of co-sponsors of that draft resolution is, therefore, now thirteen.

2. Also, before attempting to indicate to the Committee the draft resolution on which we can proceed to vote, and then calling on those delegations that have asked to speak before the vote is taken, I shall call on the representative of Cyprus, who has asked to speak in order to introduce the revised text of his draft resolution, contained in document A/C.1/L.449/Rev.1, which has just been circulated.

3. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I should like first to make a clarification in respect of matters that came up in the statements of certain delegations with regard to my draft resolution.

4. The purpose and effect of the original draft resolution was not to transfer to the Disarmament Commission the subjects with which other United Nations bodies are dealing separately. The function of the Disarmament Commission, under the proposed draft resolution, was to prepare and present to the General Assembly a study of the close relationship among the subjects listed in the draft, with a view to promoting their solution: that is, disarmament, international security through the United Nations, and the economic development of the developing countries. These, as we all know, are very clearly interconnected. There is therefore no interference with the work of other bodies—indeed their work might be facilitated by such a study—and there is no overlapping.

5. After giving consideration to the comments of this Committee, particularly to those of the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, as well as those of the representatives of the United Kingdom and of Canada, and in the light of those comments and of consultations with other members of this Committee, we have made important modifications in our draft so as to restrict its scope to the two most closely related subjects: disarmament and collective security through the United Nations.

6. Any need of broadening the mandate of the Disarmament Commission is thus obviated. Such a study would in no way interfere with the task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which has been performing excellent work in the field of collateral measures in difficult circumstances. We confidently hope that it will continue to work fruitfully in this important field. However, in regard to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, on which two separate plans were submitted by the USSR and the United States in 1962 in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, intensive discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee showed no progress towards agreement on any of the stages or on any of the points in those plans, up to

1964, when the subject was abandoned. That was no fault of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament: the reality is that parallel to general and complete disarmament there should be development of international security which would make disarmament a realizable proposition.

7. Now, while the disarmament negotiations have been thus deadlocked and virtually put aside since 1964, the arms race has been rapidly escalating. The picture before us of a determined, rapid and ominously effective nuclear arms race, on the one hand, and of a hesitant, slow and wholly ineffective effort towards general and complete disarmament, on the other hand, gives cause for deep concern. Should our assumptions regarding the procedure for general and complete disarmament—which so far have produced no results over decades—not be re-examined? Should the lack of international security not be considered in relation to its being a crucial factor impeding progress towards general and complete disarmament and towards the establishment of law and order in the world—because without law and order there is no hope of disarmament? And, more particularly, should there be no studied consideration of this important relation?

8. We do not claim that the procedural methods, as proposed in our draft resolution, now amended, regarding a study and a reappraisal are the best. There may be other and better ones; and we will indeed be happy to consider and support any other proposal for such study that would seem more appropriate. What we are convinced of is the need for such studied consideration of the problem of disarmament in relation to international security so that progress towards world order will become effective, and general and complete disarmament realizable.

9. As now modified, the draft resolution in its preambular part, after referring to the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, recalls the joint statement of agreed principles of disarmament endorsed by the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, which statement was followed by the tabling in 1962 by the USSR and the United States of separate plans on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It notes with appreciation that the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has achieved certain results in the field of collateral measures, but it notes at the same time that the efforts for general and complete disarmament since 1962 have made no progress towards agreement on any of the stages or points of the aforesaid plans. The text continues:

“Realizing with concern that meanwhile the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, has not only been continued but also intensified,

“Convinced of the increasing threat to peace involved in such escalation of the arms race,

“Recognizing that progress on disarmament is interdependent with progress in the achievement of international security,

“Emphasizing the urgent need for a reappraisal of the problem of disarmament in its relation to international security through the United Nations,

“Believing that at the close of twenty-five years of United Nations experience, the time is appropriate for such reappraisal,

“Considering the availability of the Disarmament Commission,

“1. Requests the Disarmament Commission as soon as it reconvenes:

“(a) To give studied consideration to the problem of disarmament in its relation to international security through the United Nations with a view to an integrated solution;

“(b) To present its report to the General Assembly if possible at its twenty-fifth session;

“2. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Disarmament Commission with all necessary documentation and technical assistance of consultants where necessary.” [A/C.1/L.449/Rev.1.]

10. That is the amended draft, and I believe it meets all the criticism that was made of the previous draft. It is simple, and it refers to a very important matter, because the continuance of the present situation in the world presents a very great threat. The world in our days finds itself under the constant threat and fear of a more generalized war and a nuclear conflagration. The implications of a long continuance of such a situation are far-reaching, not only in the material aspect of the problem, but also in the psychological aspect, and the signs of the times are clear enough. The wave of revolt currently to be observed in many parts of the globe among the young may well be an outbreak of their agony in the face of a world which, in our space age, twenty-three years after the establishment of the United Nations, still presents them with the spectre of hatred and war. The interrelation and interdependence between national society and the international community are becoming closer every day. As a result, the lawlessness and anarchy in the international community is now beginning to creep into the national society, undermining its accepted values and its very fabric of law and order.

11. We have to move more determinedly than in the past towards order and security in the international community if we are to counter a reflex deterioration of security and order within the national society. If we drag our feet towards international security—international security through the United Nations—if we refuse to strengthen the Organization, we are consciously impeding the progress of disarmament and the prospect of peace and security in the world.

12. That is what has prompted us to present a draft resolution for a studied consideration of the problem of disarmament in relation to the important aspect of international security through the United Nations.

13. The CHAIRMAN: I have just been informed that some of the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9 and some of the co-sponsors of the amendments in document A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1 have asked to speak in order to give some explanations. I believe that this would be very helpful to me in determining precisely what draft resolutions members feel the Committee could proceed to vote upon. At the same time, it would help those delegations which have asked to speak in explanation of vote before the voting.

14. Therefore, if there is no objection, I shall first call on the above-mentioned sponsors to give their explanation.

15. Mr. TOMOROWICZ (Poland): The discussion concerning the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9, which calls on the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of a group of experts, a report on the effects of the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons, has drawn wide interest and the support of the overwhelming majority of delegations. At the same time, the delegations of Malta and of Trinidad and Tobago submitted amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1. Several delegations have also expressed their views concerning the scope of the report.

16. In agreement with all the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9, and after a thorough analysis of the discussion held on this item in the First Committee, my delegation is ready to include in the draft an appropriate amendment which I hope will meet the objectives expressed by the authors of the draft amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1. We propose, namely, to add at the end of operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9, the following: "taking into account the views expressed and the suggestions made during the discussion of this item at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly".

17. My delegation is convinced that this amendment will satisfy the authors of document A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1 and that in this way we will be in a position to vote on the basis of a uniform draft resolution. We are doing this with the deep conviction that it will permit us to reach unanimity on the amended draft resolution. At this moment I should like to express my thanks to the delegation of Malta and to other delegations for their fruitful contribution to the discussion leading to further progress on the way towards disarmament.

18. Mr. GAUCI (Malta): I listened with great attention to the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union at our 1634th meeting yesterday. In consultation with the delegation of Trinidad and Tobago, I wish to state quite clearly that the objectives of the co-sponsors of the amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1 in no way attempted, even remotely, to undermine, either directly or indirectly, the provisions of the Geneva Protocol.¹

19. Our objectives were mainly to stress that the rationale for the proposed study was essentially that chemical, bacteriological and biological weapons, which have been and continue to be produced, are weapons of mass destruction by their very nature and their possible use and effects, and that, additionally, the proposed study should take into account the position in which the majority of Members of the United Nations find themselves: that of not possessing adequate means of detection and of being unable to take measures of protection against these weapons in the event of their use.

20. In view of conversations, however, which have since taken place with the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9, and of explanations which have

been made, we feel that our basic points will be substantially covered by the proposed study, and we would consequently not insist on a separate vote on our amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1, on the understanding that the views expressed and the suggestions made in the debate on this item in the First Committee will be taken into account by the experts who will be selected to carry out the proposed study, and that this provision would be expressly stated in the terms of the draft resolution.

21. We are grateful to the co-sponsors for having considered our suggestions in this regard and to the representative of Poland for the statement he has just made, and we will therefore vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9 as amended.

22. Mr. BURNS (Canada): Canada, of course, is a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9, which calls for a study of chemical and bacteriological warfare to be made. The principal objects of this study are set out clearly in the preambular paragraphs, and in particular in the second and third preambular paragraphs. It is very important, we believe, that the facts about modern developments in these means of warfare, which could constitute a great threat to civil populations and not only military forces, should be generally known.

23. What are these modern developments? First, there are new gases and other poisons, never used in war, about which a good deal of information has been made public, sometimes in sensational forms. The peoples of all nations ought to be told the sober truth about the dangers of such potential means of warfare in terms that can be understood by the layman.

24. There have also been developments in "bacteriological methods". Many recent books contain some disturbing facts about studies which are being carried on, on ways of conveying disease other than by bacteria; for example by viruses, which are divided into many species, and by special groups of organisms such as rickettsia and others intermediate in size and characteristics between viruses and bacteria.

25. Therefore, the Canadian delegation is of the opinion that it is now technically more correct to use the term "biological methods" than to use the term "bacteriological methods".

26. No implication that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is obsolete, or no longer effective, should be read into draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9. In our view, whether any provisions supplementary to the Geneva Protocol are desirable is one of the questions which can be considered in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in this Committee on the basis of information that will be provided by the proposed study. Canada, of course, has ratified the Geneva Protocol, and we greatly wish that as many non-adhering States as possible would accept the invitation to accede which is contained in operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution.

27. We have just heard of the arrangement which has been satisfactorily concluded between the representative of

¹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, done at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

Malta and the representative of Poland, with the agreement of other co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9. We are in entire agreement with this arrangement which has been made, this slight alteration or addition to the terms of the draft resolution as originally given, and we realize that the amendments which Malta submitted originally were made with the intention of setting up clearer terms of reference for the intended study group. However, the sponsors of the draft resolution had considered whether we should attempt to include terms of reference in it, but we decided not to complicate consideration of the draft resolution in this way. We felt that we should not restrict the liberty of the group of experts to examine all scientific aspects of the question that they considered desirable.

28. Doubtless, some delegations, while agreeing that the scientific advisers the Secretary-General is to appoint should have a free hand in their inquiry, would like to have a better idea of what they are to look into than the terms of the draft resolution itself convey.

29. The Canadian view is that the terms of reference for the experts should specify that the report should include the following data: (1) the basic characteristics of chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare; (2) the probable effects of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons on military and civilian personnel, both protected and unprotected; (3) possible long-term effects on human health and ecology; (4) environmental and other factors affecting the employment of chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare; (5) economic and security implications of the development, acquisition and possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and of systems for their delivery.

30. We believe that those terms of reference, which should not be considered exclusive, cover in a more precise form the points which the representative of Malta included in his proposed amendment.

31. The draft resolution as amended requests that in setting up the terms of reference for the inquiry the Secretary-General should take account of the views expressed in the discussion in this Committee. We hope that he would take account of the views concerning the terms of reference we have expressed and certainly that he would also take account of the views of the representative of Malta as set out in his originally proposed amendment and those he has just expressed in his statement a few minutes ago.

32. The CHAIRMAN: In the light of the statements we have just heard and the views expressed by several delegations during our contacts this morning, my understanding is that we could proceed to vote on the draft resolutions as follows. We are now in a position to vote on two draft resolutions in connexion with item 27. The first draft resolution is that contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9, sponsored by twenty-one Powers. A revised text,² with the slight amendment indicated by the representative of Poland and accepted by the co-sponsors of the amendment contained in document A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1, as explained by the representative of Malta, will be circulated as soon as possible. The second draft resolution

in connexion with item 27 is that contained in document A/C.1/L.448/Rev.2 sponsored by ten delegations.

33. We should then be able to vote upon the draft resolution in connexion with item 28, contained in document A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1-5, sponsored by thirteen delegations.

34. If my understanding is correct, we shall proceed on those lines, and I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes before the vote.

35. Mr. CARACCILO (Italy): I wish to give a short explanation of my delegation's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1-5.

36. The Italian delegation will vote in favour of that draft resolution on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. In voting we wish to stress once again the importance that we attach to an early resumption by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of an intensified and constructive effort aiming at the elaboration of a treaty for a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests under effective control.

37. As I had the honour to indicate in my previous statement [*1606th meeting*], the Italian Government considers this measure of nuclear disarmament to be one that deserves a very high priority among those included by the Eighteen-Nation Committee in its programme of work. Any progress which could overcome the obstacles that have up to now prevented the reaching of an agreement for a comprehensive test ban would prove, in our view, that the spirit and the letter of article VI of the Treaty on non-proliferation are beginning to find concrete realization.

38. I have listened with great attention to what has been said here in the course of our debate on the subject of a comprehensive test ban. Some of the elements that have emerged from the debate bring evidence of the complexities of the task that still lies ahead of us. The interesting intervention made on 5 December by the representative of the United States pointed in fact to the existence of a gap in the field of identification which could not yet be bridged, through technologies available at present, by purely national means of detection [*1630th meeting, para. 22*]. We are confident that efforts and studies will fill this gap in the not too distant future. Yet, in the process, we should not overlook any possibility that may arise of achieving partial progress in this field. That is precisely the concept underlying the Italian proposal on underground nuclear explosions presented in a working paper attached to the report of the last session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.³ In recalling that proposal, which I have already illustrated in my previous intervention on 12 November [*1606th meeting, para. 82*], let me state once again our belief that some practical results could be attained by treating separately the underground explosions for peaceful purposes while continuing intensive efforts aimed at a comprehensive agreement on all explosions. Thus our proposal could permit concrete, even if limited, progress to be achieved through the adoption of a relatively easy measure. While opening up new possibilities for

² Subsequently circulated as document A/C.1/L.447/Rev.1.

³ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 9.

international co-operation in the field of peaceful explosions, the measure we suggested would restrict the area of unverified underground explosions and set up a mechanism which later could be of great value for the solution, which we earnestly seek, of the problem of all underground testing.

39. Mr. CHAYET (France) (*translated from French*): I should like very briefly to explain the vote of the French delegation on the draft resolutions on which the Committee is going to have to vote.

40. The French delegation, whose attitude on disarmament matters is well known, will abstain from voting on draft resolution A/C.1/L.448/Rev.2. It wishes to recall that it has already had occasion during the disarmament debates to state its views on some of the ideas expressed in the preamble of this draft and that it considers it unnecessary to reiterate and dwell on these views again.

41. Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1-5, the French delegation, which will also abstain from voting on this text, merely wishes to point out that the measures envisaged in the framework of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the creation of bodies which would carry out peaceful nuclear explosions are incompatible with the prohibitions contained in item 28 of the agenda referred to in the first paragraph of the preamble of that draft resolution, namely "urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests...". These draft resolutions concerning nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes presuppose, on the contrary, a modification of the Moscow Treaty.

42. Finally, with regards to draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9, my delegation would first like to reaffirm that the French Government, which is a depository of the Geneva Protocol, attaches great importance to that instrument, which it deems should be kept in force. However, we have no objections to entrusting the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the task of investigating the effect of chemical and bacteriological weapons, it being understood that the experts will be able to extend their examination to all biological weapons. We would no doubt have preferred a draft resolution making fewer references to a body which would seem to have a kind of mandate in this field, judging by a reading of the penultimate paragraph of the preamble. However, we note that operative paragraph 4 clearly shows that the General Assembly will have the last word on this report, and that is why we shall vote in favour of this draft resolution, taking into account the amendment just presented by the representative of Poland. On this occasion we should like to welcome the spirit of understanding shown by the sponsors of this draft resolution and of the amendments in document A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1 in solving all existing difficulties.

43. I should like to conclude by saying that we would also attach importance to the study, at a later stage, of the possibility of prohibiting, under effective control, the manufacture of weapons dealt with in this draft resolution.

44. Mr. SOKO (Zambia): My delegation has already clarified Zambia's position on the disarmament items and I have asked to speak only to explain our position on the

various draft resolutions which have already been presented to the Committee.

45. My delegation has followed closely the deliberations of the Committee on the vital question of disarmament. We have appreciated very much the efforts of the developing countries with which we share a common destiny and we feel very strongly that the cause of disarmament is helped these days by these peace-loving countries. On the part of the developed countries we have seen, much to our regret, the production of new weapons of mass destruction—such weapons as the independently or separately targeted nuclear war-heads. What is more disappointing is that these weapons have been tested since the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. We therefore very much doubt the success of that much publicized treaty. Furthermore, we seem to be naive. For example, draft resolution A/C.1/L.448/Rev.2 merely takes note of the favourable disposition of the USSR and the United States to discuss the limitation of nuclear delivery systems. My delegation would have preferred to see an operative paragraph directly appealing to those two Powers to negotiate the reduction of those weapons, if necessary under the auspices of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

46. The debate in this Committee has revealed the widening gap between the nuclear and non-nuclear States on the one hand and the East and the West on the other. On certain occasions one could hardly realize the common basis we have in the Charter of the United Nations. Only a few days ago, we heard that some Powers would not vote for this draft resolution. Sometimes one had the impression that, owing to their privileged nuclear position, these Powers were acting on the basis of some agreements between themselves, because their explanations did not make sense, to say the least.

47. In the circumstances we are left with the choice between an objective search for peace in the world and ensuring the protection of the nuclear Powers. Obviously, we cannot remain in suspension for long. Equally obviously, we have interests of our own which tend to be different from those of the nuclear giants. Thus we see that whereas we of the third world want disarmament to be coupled with the peaceful use of nuclear and other technology, others think that this should be a monopoly of the nuclear Powers.

48. My delegation will support the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9 as well as the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.451, which actually is a compromise draft and as such does not satisfy us entirely. However, as we are looking for a serious beginning of efforts in the direction of securing minimum benefits from nuclear technology for development, we feel that our national interests should be looked at from a wider viewpoint. We also feel that draft resolution A/C.1/L.451 deals adequately with the wider question of disarmament and the related subjects such as the one I have just mentioned. We earnestly hope that those who have not yet decided about draft resolution A/C.1/L.451 will consider and see the wisdom in the efforts that the draft resolution seeks to initiate. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.451 is simple and

straightforward. It refers to specific recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. This one draft can as well be the opportunity for nuclear Powers to show their support for meaningful and realistic efforts in the interest of peace on earth.

49. Before I conclude my explanation of vote, I wish briefly to make reference to draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9, which would request the Secretary-General to have a report of experts made on the effect of the possible use of biological weapons. This report would be on the lines of the other report, which was presented to this Committee during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons.⁴ My delegation appreciates this effort and consequently we shall vote for this draft resolution. We hope that many others will support this most commendable draft resolution. From our observation during the debate on the subject of disarmament we have concluded that the Committee is unanimously agreed on the merit of this draft resolution.

50. Mr. DJOUDI (Algeria) (*translated from French*): The Committee is preparing to conclude part of its debate on the problem of disarmament. The Algerian delegation would like to set forth very briefly its position on some of the draft resolutions submitted to the Committee's consideration.

51. Among the non-nuclear measures, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has considered the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Algeria has already said that it is opposed to all weapons of mass destruction and fully subscribes to the principle of the total prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We therefore add our voice to the voices of those who are working for the outlawing of those weapons which are still being used today against the peoples of Asia and Africa opposing foreign domination or fighting to regain their national sovereignty. Such weapons may be used to wipe out thousands of human beings and we think it essential that all the citizens of all the countries of the world should be told of the effects of the use of those weapons of terror. There is a lack of any extensive information about these effects, a gap which the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9 want to fill by calling upon the Secretary-General to appoint a group of experts to report on the effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We are convinced that such a study would lead not only to an awareness of the need to prohibit the production of these weapons and to eliminate existing stockpiles but would also considerably strengthen existing international instruments.

52. The support given by my country—which has experienced a long war and destruction from which it is barely recovering—to this draft resolution needs no further explanation.

53. Another question discussed by the Eighteen-Nation Committee is that of the urgent necessity to suspend all nuclear and thermonuclear tests. The Moscow Treaty was a first and modest step on the way towards the international

⁴ *Effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.IX.1).

control of arms. That Treaty was of interest mainly because of the change it brought about in the political climate and the hope it engendered. Since the Treaty was signed, however, the great Powers have continued to manufacture a whole system of nuclear weapons and to increase their nuclear arsenals quantitatively and qualitatively, and, despite the appeals and repeated exhortations of most of the members of the international community, the question of the total suspension of tests is still making no progress. Today the technical justifications which have been evoked are losing their cogency as progress is made in seismic detection and tracking. In that connexion the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee have emphasized, in a memorandum annexed to the report of that Committee,⁵ the necessity of concluding a treaty. We therefore endorse the sense of urgency expressed by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1-5, but we do not—and I say this quite firmly—share the regrets expressed in the fourth preambular paragraph, regrets which, in our opinion, seem to go in one direction only.

54. Mr. PILAVACHI (Greece): I should like to make some comments by way of explanation of vote, before the vote, on the question of general and complete disarmament, more particularly on draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9, concerning chemical, bacteriological and biological means of warfare. Indeed, chemical and biological weapons represent one of the most important aspects of the question of general and complete disarmament. They deserve all our attention, since they are systems of mass destruction directed against all forms of life and, therefore, are capable of endangering the civilized world in the same way as other means of total destruction. It is all the more pressing that we should deal with the matter now, since we are being told that, because of technological progress and scientific research, chemical and biological agents capable of inflicting suffering and destruction beyond all imagination can be developed today.

55. We note that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has asked the General Assembly to request the Secretary-General to make a study on chemical and biological means of warfare.⁶ Information of a precise and objective nature is needed in order that further progress may be made in this matter. The deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and of the General Assembly would take place under more favourable conditions and with greater profit if they had the benefit of being based on authentic and reliable data and information.

56. Furthermore, the Secretary-General himself, in the introduction to his annual report to the General Assembly, has stressed the need for a study that would clarify the complex issues connected with the dangers of chemical and biological weapons. To quote his words:

“... a wider and deeper understanding of the dangers posed by these weapons could be an important element in knowing how best to deal with them”.⁷

57. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9 have taken into consideration the views of the

⁵ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex 1, section 10.

⁶ *Ibid.*, document DC/231, para. 26.

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 32.

Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as well as those of the Secretary-General. We have also had the opportunity of hearing several delegations express the same opinion during the general debate on disarmament. The Greek delegation shares those views and considers that a study such as that which is under consideration would be constructive and helpful. We do not think that this approach to the problem could be considered in any way undesirable or negative. We believe that it would constitute a step forward in the right direction.

58. It is for those reasons that Greece, which is a signatory to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, will vote for the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9.

59. Finally, my delegation welcomes the spirit of compromise shown by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9 and the sponsor of the proposed amendment in document A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1, who have agreed to a satisfactory amendment to operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9.

60. Miss BROOKS (Liberia): I should like to make a few brief comments on some of the draft resolutions, before the vote is taken.

61. I must admit that my delegation would have preferred to see draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9 amended in accordance with the proposal of Malta [*A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1*] because we believe that the peoples of the world should be made aware of the great danger of the use of chemical, bacteriological and biological weapons. However, since the representative of Malta has withdrawn his amendment my delegation has no alternative but to support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9.

62. My delegation will also support draft resolution A/C.1/L.448/Rev.2. I think that some very useful comments have already been made by the representative of Zambia and I need not repeat them.

63. Since I have the floor I should like to make a very brief reference to draft resolution A/C.1/L.449/Rev.1, which is submitted by Cyprus. I believe that the question of disarmament is also linked with international security in view of the fact that as long as there are nuclear weapons stockpiles and the continuing manufacture of nuclear weapons there is a great danger that looms over the world. As for small countries such as my country, which believe in nuclear-free zones and which do not want to have anything to do with nuclear weapons, we believe that our safety lies of course in international security. We do not know whether the representative of Cyprus will press for a vote on this draft resolution, but if he does the delegation of Liberia will support it.

64. Mr. KOUYATE (Guinea) (*translated from French*): Our era, which is characterized as the nuclear age, is primarily a time of conflict and international tension. Most of mankind, faced with the threat of weapons of mass destruction, decries the nuclear armaments of which certain States want to become the sole champions in the world today. It regards the armaments race as a vast illusion, for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

signed early this year is far from allaying the fears which nuclear weapons continue to arouse. The peoples of Africa and Asia know this danger only too well.

65. The First Committee at the present time has before it a certain number of draft resolutions on which it will be called upon to take a decision. I should like to state how the delegation of Guinea will vote on the first documents on which we are going to vote in a few minutes. With regard first to draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9, my delegation wishes to congratulate most warmly the authors of that draft resolution and fully shares their concern to make our international community preserve all mankind against the dangers of the use of poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons. In the second paragraph of the preamble reference is made to "the possibility of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons". My delegation wonders whether, in the face of current international tension and the various sources of conflict, certain great Powers have not in fact already had recourse to poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons. The question will remain hanging and the answer will lie in the conscience of each State and of each one of the representatives here in this room. We shall not dwell on this question and shall fully support the draft, recalling, however, that my delegation will reserve its position on the second paragraph of the preamble which says that "the possibility of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons constitutes a serious threat to mankind".

66. We think that the sponsors could have drafted a text closer to reality, one that could be referred to in the future, for we know that last year certain distinguished legal authorities met in a European country and that, during that meeting, certain facts were noted. What was the reason for such a conference, and what were the new factors observed and revealed to mankind? In fact, it was noted that bacteriological means or poisonous gases have been used somewhere on our planet.

67. We shall simply support this document, and we hope that account will be taken in the report of my delegation's reservation on the wording of the second preambular paragraph.

68. Let us now revert to draft resolution A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1-5, which in operative paragraph 1 "Urges all States which have not done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water;" and in operative paragraph 2 "Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear-weapon tests in all environments;".

69. We appreciate at their true value the efforts made by Member States to find a solution to this scourge which threatens to put an end to man's very existence on this earth. However, we do not believe that the efforts made so far can bear fruit, particularly when we consider that a certain number of States possessing nuclear weapons do not at present participate in the discussions on nuclear problems. Our confidence is shaken.

70. It is all very well to prepare resolutions, make statements and issue appeals on paper, but so long as the United Nations does not really come to grips with the

problem in law a solution will never be found to the problem of nuclear weapons with which we are concerned. We are convinced that all the great Powers possessing nuclear weapons must participate in a world conference, not a conference of eighteen nations.

71. The problems of peace, of life and of death concern countries which have no nuclear weapons as much as they do countries which have them. The planet belongs to all of us and the language we speak in this place is the language of the community, of brotherhood, of peace, of security. This language can be effective only to the extent that we grasp the full measure of all the problems confronting us. No great Power can claim a monopoly of the nuclear weapon any more than it can of light, of the sun or the moon. These things belong to everyone.

72. My delegation will certainly not vote against this draft resolution for the reasons it has just mentioned, namely that the efforts made by States, particularly the sponsors of this draft, in no way contradict the views of the Republic of Guinea and its international policy.

73. We believe that an international conference should gather together, without conditions, all States, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons, to discuss whether we are to live or to die. That is why my delegation will quite simply abstain on this proposal.

74. With respect to draft resolution A/C.1/L.448/Rev.2, I do not know whether it is to be put to the vote today. In any case, my delegation will abstain on this text also. Such abstention certainly does not mean that we are unaware of the efforts made by the sponsors of the draft resolutions, but all these problems are linked and cannot be dissociated. Peace and security cannot be dissociated one from the other; life and death are questions affecting all Member States. We are convinced that the Eighteen-Nation Committee has made certain efforts, but so far as Guinea is concerned these efforts are insignificant and represent absolutely nothing, particularly at a time when the international community is deeply concerned about the problem of peace and security.

75. The CHAIRMAN: If there are no other representatives who would like to speak before the vote, we can start voting.

76. The first draft resolution on which the Committee is called upon to vote is the one contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9. I am afraid that it has been impossible to produce a revised text in the time in which we had hoped to produce it, so I would suggest that I ask the Committee Secretary to read out the slight amendment which has been proposed by the representative of Poland on behalf of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution and accepted by the co-sponsors of the proposed amendments to that draft.

77. Mr. VELLODI (Secretary of the Committee): The draft resolution will appear under the symbol A/C.1/L.444/Rev.1. The revision involves the addition at the end of the present operative paragraph 2 of the following phrase: "taking into account the views expressed and the suggestions made during the discussion of this item at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly".

78. I shall read the whole of operative paragraph 2:

"*Recommends* that the report be based on accessible material and prepared with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by the Secretary-General, taking into account the views expressed and the suggestions made during the discussion of this item at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly".

79. Mr. KABANDA (Rwanda) (*translated from French*): My delegation would like to ask for a separate vote on the last words of operative paragraph 6: "and invites all States to accede to that Protocol".

80. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): The draft resolution in its first preambular paragraph reaffirms the Geneva Protocol. Representatives are most probably aware that in the text of the Protocol there is a separate paragraph which stipulates that all parties to the Protocol should exert every effort to induce other States to accede to it. Now operative paragraph 6 of this draft resolution is in complete conformity with that stipulation, which has been ratified by the majority of the States present in this room. I wonder how this stipulation can now be reversed and divided from its very essential requirement.

81. That is why I should like to appeal to the representative of Rwanda—who certainly also supports the Geneva Protocol—not to insist on this separate vote, because that would involve a clear violation of the Geneva Protocol. It would be quite difficult to reaffirm the Geneva Protocol in one paragraph and to violate it in another one. So I would appeal to the representative of Rwanda not to insist on this request.

82. Mr. KABANDA (Rwanda) (*translated from French*): I hope that there will not be any misunderstanding between the representative of Hungary and my delegation. I did not ask for the deletion of the last part of operative paragraph 6; I asked merely for a separate vote. We were told during the general debate that the Geneva Protocol was conceived not on the basis of universality but of reciprocity.

83. As far as I am concerned, I cannot through a vote bind my Government to such a protocol. I must admit that I have not received any instruction from my Government concerning the endorsement in this Committee of the Geneva Protocol. Therefore I reserve the right of my Government to accede or not to accede to the said Protocol. I would therefore like to request a separate vote and must announce that I shall abstain, while reserving the right of my Government to take a stand either for or against the Protocol.

84. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): I am not entering into the substance of the statement of the representative of Rwanda. I wish merely to tell him that if he insists on a separate vote, I must put the motion to a vote in the Committee before we proceed to vote on the draft resolution as a whole. Therefore, I should like to ask the representative of Rwanda to tell the Committee whether he insists on having a separate vote on the words he has indicated, in which case I shall put his motion to the vote.

85. Mr. KABANDA (Rwanda) (*translated from French*): Yes, Mr. Chairman, I should like to insist on a separate vote.

86. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has before it a motion of the representative of Rwanda requesting a separate vote on the last words of operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution on which the Committee is to vote. The last words read as follows: "...and invites all States to accede to that Protocol". The representative of Hungary has objected to that motion.

87. If there are no other speakers, according to rule 130 of the rules of procedure

"...the motion for division shall be voted upon. Permission to speak on the motion for division shall be given only to two speakers in favour and two speakers against".

We have already had one speaker against the motion, and since no other delegation wishes to speak on this matter, I shall put the motion of the representative of Rwanda to the vote.

The motion was rejected by 29 votes to 2, with 63 abstentions.

88. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee is now called upon to vote upon the text of the draft resolution as a whole, as it stands with the revision in operative paragraph 2. Before the Committee votes, however, I shall again call on the Secretary of the Committee for a short announcement.

89. Mr. VELLODI (Secretary of the Committee): In accordance with rule 154 of the rules of procedure, the Secretary-General is required to make a statement before the Committee on the financial implications of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9, as revised [see para. 77]. Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution requests the Secretary-General

"...to prepare a concise report in accordance with the proposal in part II of his introduction to the annual report for 1967-68 and in accordance with the recommendation of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee contained in paragraph 26 of its report".

Operative paragraph 2 recommends

"... that the report be based on accessible material and prepared with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by the Secretary-General, taking into account the views expressed and the suggestions made during the discussion of this item at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly".

90. The preparation of the report called for in the draft resolution may require the services of up to fifteen consultant experts. It is assumed that they will wish to hold a one-week session in January 1969, a two-week session in April, and a final two-week session in June, and that they will spend an equivalent number of days working outside of these sessions. Based on the assumption that these meetings will be held at Headquarters and that they can be integrated into the pattern of conferences already drawn up by the Committee on Conferences, no cost in respect of interpretation services would arise. Assuming that it would be necessary to provide for up to 500 pages of preliminary drafts in four languages, and a final report of 300 pages in four languages, the cost of translation, typing, and reproducing this documentation is estimated at \$34,275. Daily

fees and travel and subsistence payments to the consultants are estimated at \$103,700.

91. Based on the above assumptions, the total cost of the report in implementation of the draft resolution is estimated at \$125,750.

92. Alternatively, should it be necessary to hold the first two sessions in Geneva, in order to meet the desires of the consultant experts or for other reasons, and the final session at Headquarters, instead of holding all three sessions at Headquarters, the cost of the preparation of the report can be estimated at \$165,600.

93. This is being submitted for the information of the Committee. It will appear as a First Committee document,⁸ but since we were not in a position to have it issued as a document in time for this meeting, I felt I should make this statement.

94. The CHAIRMAN: I would now request the Committee to pronounce itself on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9, taking into consideration, of course, the revised text of operative paragraph 2.

The draft resolution was adopted by 112 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

95. The CHAIRMAN: Now I would request the Committee to pronounce itself on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.448/Rev.2.

The draft resolution was adopted by 109 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.

96. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to the voting on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1-5.

The draft resolution was adopted by 108 to none, with 6 abstentions.

97. The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of the United States of America to speak in explanation of vote after the voting has taken place.

98. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I wish to explain the vote of the United States in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-9, which we cast consistent with the reasons I gave in my statement of 5 December. Today I heard with interest the statement of the representative of Canada suggesting certain terms of reference for the study called for under that draft resolution. My Government is in agreement with those terms of reference as suggested by the representative of Canada. We do believe, however, that those terms of reference should be supplemented by the following general conditions and considerations which we suggest might well be observed in making the study. As we understand it, the aim of the report is to provide a scientifically sound appraisal of the effects of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. At the same time, the report should serve to inform Governments of the consequences of the possible

⁸ Subsequently circulated as document A/C.1/L.457.

use in war of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, taking into account General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966, and should contribute to the consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of the problems connected with these weapons. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should be treated by experts with experience in the respective technical fields.

99. The CHAIRMAN: No other delegation wishes to explain its vote. I would remind members of the Committee that tomorrow we shall be taking up the Korean question. I would therefore request delegations wishing to speak to communicate with the Secretariat in order to inscribe their names before we start tomorrow morning.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.