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**Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).**

*In the absence of the President, Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

## AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 94 AND 96

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7189-DC/231; A/C.1/L.443)**

**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7189-DC/231)**

**Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7189-DC/231)**

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**Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference (*continued*) (A/7224 and Add.1, A/7277 and Corr.1, A/7327)**

1. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): The First Committee is considering in its current debate, five agenda items connected with the question of disarmament. Among these items is the consideration of the Final Document of the Conference

of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States held in Geneva in September 1968 [A/7277/Corr.1]. In this intervention, I shall confine my remarks to a discussion of this document and reserve my delegation's right to express our point of view about the other disarmament items in due course.

2. The importance of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States stemmed from the fact that it was the first global conference held at the initiative of non-nuclear-weapon countries to consider certain questions of basic importance to them, namely, how their security can best be assured; how they can co-operate among themselves to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and how the benefits of nuclear energy can be made available for mankind. As the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mian Arshad Husain, who presided over the Conference, remarked:

"These problems involve questions of life and death for all nations, great or small, East or West, North or South."

The Conference was without a predecessor. As such, it was fully cognizant of the diversity of circumstances and interests of non-nuclear-weapon States. Despite this diversity, however, its aim was to identify and enlarge the elements of common interest which unite all non-nuclear-weapon States and with which the interests of the nuclear-weapon States needed to be harmonized. Any confrontation between the two groups of Powers was totally foreign to the conception of the Conference.

3. The task of evolving answers to the questions I have mentioned gave a scope to the Conference which was both wider and at the same time more narrowly defined than that of the disarmament negotiations held so far. It was wider because it was not circumscribed by the terms of reference of the disarmament talks and because it engaged the attention of many countries which did not have an opportunity to contribute to those talks. It was more narrowly defined because the items on the agenda of the Conference [*ibid.*, annex III], did not comprehend the whole problem of nuclear disarmament, not to mention the problem of reduction or elimination of conventional weapons.

4. The Conference was attended by ninety-six countries, seven of whom were represented by their Foreign Ministers or Cabinet Ministers, and fifty-four of whose delegations took part in the general debate. The participants shared the view that the Conference provided a forum where the non-nuclear-weapon countries freely exchanged their views and developed their thinking about the problems which involve their survival. Thanks to the presence of the four nuclear-weapon Powers, the Conference arrived at conclusions which took due account of their interests and concerns as well.

5. This is evident from the resolutions in paragraph 17 of the Final Document of the Conference. These include one

resolution relating to measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States [*resolution A*]; one relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones [*resolution B*]; four relating to effective measures for the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament [*resolutions C-F*]; seven relating to programmes for co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy [*resolutions G-M*], and one relating to the adoption of the final document and the implementation of the decisions of the Conference [*resolution N*].

6. It is the last mentioned resolution that brings the matter before the General Assembly.

7. By this resolution, the ninety-two non-nuclear-weapon countries that participated in the Conference have invited the General Assembly, at its present session, to consider the best ways and means for the implementation of the decisions taken by the Conference, and the continuity of the work undertaken, and at a subsequent session, to consider the question of the convening of a second conference of non-nuclear-weapon States. In its unanimously adopted Declaration [*ibid.*], the Conference recommended to the General Assembly the continuation of the efforts to deal with the problems and the consideration of the best ways and means for the implementation of the decisions of the Conference.

8. It may be useful here to recapitulate, in a general way, the main decisions of the Conference and some of the principal questions which engaged the attention of the ninety-six participating States.

9. The Declaration of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States stressed the fact that the future of mankind cannot be secure without the complete elimination, in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, of the use or threat of use of force. It emphasized the necessity of further steps for an early solution of the question of security assurances in the nuclear era. It urged an immediate cessation of the arms race and the acceleration of the process of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Declaration recommended that the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be followed up by measures of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. It pointed out the desirability of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones under appropriate conditions. Recognizing that the possibilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy have increased, the Declaration urged further international co-operation in this area, particularly for the economic development of non-nuclear-weapon countries and for an accelerated development of the developing countries. It stressed the importance of the potential use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes under strict international control. The Declaration also reiterated the need for appropriate international assistance, including financing, for the purpose of greater application of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

10. In the context of the discussions on measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, the Conference unanimously adopted resolution A, which reaffirms the "principle, indivisible in its application, of the non-use of force and the prohibition of the threat of force in relations

between States by employing nuclear or non-nuclear weapons". This resolution further reaffirms that the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence recognized under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter is the only legitimate exception to this overriding principle. Though this resolution evidently does not require any specific measures for its implementation, it is apparent that it reflects a widely shared concern about security and could furnish a background to the continuous search for adequate security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States.

11. It is also evident that a mere reaffirmation of the principles of the Charter and the norms of relations between States does not significantly contribute to a solution of the problem of security. The problem has arisen because the Charter was framed when the qualitatively new situation that would result from the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons was not anticipated. If a restatement of the principles of non-use of force, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, were sufficient, there would have been no need for the nuclear-weapon Powers to extend assurances of security in their individual declarations, or for the Security Council's resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968. Indeed, if the operation of the Charter embodied complete arrangements for security, it would not have been necessary for the super-Powers to establish their respective military alliances.

12. The problem, therefore, with which the Conference had to deal was how to make juridically binding the security assurances embodied in Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and, if possible, to supplement them in the light of, first, the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and, second, the declarations made by the three nuclear-weapon Powers to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and also taking into account the policy statements of the other two nuclear-weapon Powers, namely, that nuclear weapons are exclusively for defence purposes or that there will be no first use of such weapons.

13. On this specific aspect of the question, the Conference had before it three proposals: one submitted by fourteen Latin American countries, the second by three African countries, and the third by Pakistan, in their respective draft resolutions [*see A/7277 and Corr.1, annex IV, paras. 3 (a)-(c)*].

14. The Latin American draft resolution was to the effect that the General Assembly, at its twenty-third session, in order to achieve a solution to the problems of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, convene a conference of all States Members of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and all nuclear-weapon States, for the purpose of concluding a multilateral instrument whereby the nuclear-weapon States would undertake to adopt the appropriate measures to assure the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States, bearing in mind the need to reflect an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon States.

15. The African draft resolution was aimed at establishing a preparatory committee for convening a conference not later than August 1969 for the conclusion of a convention

or protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons through which the nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to attack non-nuclear-weapon States or one another, and States parties to the convention would also undertake to come to the aid of any State, nuclear or non-nuclear, attacked by nuclear or conventional weapons.

16. The Pakistan draft resolution, which was largely influenced by intensive discussions in a drafting sub-committee of the Afro-Asian Group, proposed a precisely-worded formulation for undertakings by the nuclear-weapon Powers in regard to assurances, both negative and positive, to non-nuclear-weapon States which renounce the manufacture or acquisition otherwise of nuclear weapons.

17. The Latin American draft resolution was adopted in the relevant committee by a roll-call vote of 40 to 17, with 25 abstentions [*ibid.*, para. 11]. Following its acceptance by the committee, the African countries and Pakistan did not press to a vote their respective draft resolutions on the understanding that the texts would be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in conformity with paragraph 2 of that resolution and would, therefore, constitute working documents for the proposed conference for concluding a multilateral instrument on security.

18. However, this Latin American draft resolution failed by one vote to receive the necessary two-thirds majority in the plenary session of the Conference. Consequently, in regard to one of the three main questions before the Conference, namely, measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, the deliberations of the Conference was inconclusive. I shall deal with this aspect of the work of the Conference a little later.

19. In regard to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Conference considered that the establishment of such zones, on the initiative of the States concerned, is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting progress towards nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, resolution B of the Conference recommends that all non-nuclear-weapon States, not comprised in the zone established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco,<sup>1</sup> initiate or continue studies concerning the possibility and desirability of establishing by treaty the military denuclearization of their respective zones. It also urges the nuclear-weapon Powers to comply fully with paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII). It is now for the Assembly to endorse this recommendation.

20. The fact that the Conference was concerned with issues of universal peace was demonstrated by the adoption of resolution D which urged the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America to enter at an early date into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. In making this recommendation, the Conference expressed its conviction that negotiations between the two nuclear-weapon Powers should aim at, and lead to, negotiations among all such Powers with a view to the cessation of

the nuclear arms race and to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and relaxation of tensions.

21. It will be recalled that the two super-Powers had agreed to take such a step in July this year. However, no bilateral talks on this question have so far been held. We feel that the next step should be for the Assembly to endorse the appeal contained in resolution D of the Conference which was adopted unanimously. There is reason to hope that the two super-Powers will respond to the unanimous desire expressed by the Conference, if endorsed by the Assembly, and that the bilateral talks will at least commence in the near future.

22. Such bilateral talks would precede the implementation of resolution C of the Conference which requests the Assembly to recommend that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should begin, not later than March 1969, to undertake negotiations for the prevention of the further development and improvement of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of high priority, for an agreement on the immediate cessation of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and the stoppage of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and for the reduction and subsequent elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. My delegation is confident that this request will be acted upon by the General Assembly.

23. One of the principal concerns of the Conference was to consider effective measures for the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. While acknowledging the importance of the non-proliferation Treaty<sup>2</sup> the Conference recognized the urgent need of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons since the danger continued to exist that an increase in the number of States possessing such weapons might occur, aggravating international tension and the difficulty of maintaining regional and world peace and security. Accordingly, in its resolution E, the Conference recommended the acceptance, through appropriate agreements, of the system of safeguards of the IAEA, as it may evolve from time to time, by all the non-nuclear-weapon States. This recommendation is based on the fact that IAEA is most suited to administer safeguards designed to prevent the diversion of source or special fissionable material from peaceful uses to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference has thus recommended the adoption of a dependable measure of insurance against the diversion of source or fissionable material, whether it is produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility established with or without the assistance of the Agency. In our view this recommendation, which is supplementary to the non-proliferation Treaty, if accepted by all States not parties to the Treaty, will effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

24. This recommendation of the Conference gains further value from the fact that the Conference gave earnest thought to the question of improving and simplifying the safeguards systems of IAEA. It emphasized the desirability

<sup>1</sup> Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 91, document A/C.1/946.

<sup>2</sup> Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex).

of promoting activities for the establishment of a modern and efficient safeguards system based on supervision of the flow of fissionable materials, by means of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points. Accordingly, its resolution F laid down appropriate objectives for the simplification, modernization and broadening of the safeguards system. It recommended the establishment within the IAEA of institutional machinery on safeguards of which both countries supplying nuclear materials, and member countries, whether possessing nuclear facilities or not, should form part. Here again is a recommendation which represents an advance in the thinking which has so far been devoted to this question in the United Nations.

25. The resolutions of the Conference have recommended practical measures of international co-operation for disseminating the benefits of nuclear technology taking into consideration the special needs and interests of developing countries. They have given concrete shape to many ideas which were vaguely formulated before.

26. The programmes for co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy absorbed a great deal of the attention of the Conference. This was only natural. Immense perspectives for the progress of mankind have been opened up by nuclear energy and further interest has been stimulated by recent advances in technology and by article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

27. In this connexion the Conference has made a number of recommendations addressed to the United Nations General Assembly, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to nuclear-weapon States, to IAEA and to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

28. First, in resolution J, the General Assembly has been requested to consider at this session the establishment of a nuclear technology research and development programme within the United Nations Development Programme. We are aware that perhaps at this session it may not be possible for the General Assembly to take final action on this recommendation. It is, therefore, our hope that at least the necessary preparatory steps for the adoption of such a programme will be taken.

29. Second, the Secretary-General has been requested in resolution G to appoint a group of experts to prepare a full report on all possible contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advance of the developing countries and to transmit the same to Governments of the States Members of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and the IAEA in order that the General Assembly may be able to consider the report at its twenty-fourth session.

30. Third, the Conference urged the nuclear-weapon Powers to take the following steps:

(a) To conclude with IAEA safeguard agreements consistent with the relevant rules [*resolution F*];

(b) To facilitate to the fullest extent possible, the availability of fissionable materials for the peaceful nuclear programmes of the non-nuclear-weapon States which accept the application of safeguards as envisaged in article III of the non-proliferation Treaty [*resolution H, part III*];

(c) To advise IAEA at regular intervals as to the possibility of their declassifying scientific and technical information which has become essential for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy [*ibid., part I*];

(d) To assume the main responsibility for financing the programmes for nuclear technology research and development for the benefit of the developing countries and for the use of nuclear energy in economic development projects to be instituted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [*resolution J*];

(e) To give a firm undertaking regarding the supply, at reasonable prices and in adequate quantities, of special fissionable materials to a fund, to be established by IAEA, for the benefit of non-nuclear-weapon States and in particular of developing countries [*ibid.*];

(f) To channel into the programmes and the fund mentioned above a substantial share of such financial resources and special fissionable materials as may be released in the future as a result of the adoption of nuclear disarmament measures [*ibid.*];

(g) To provide access for students and scientists, for acquisition of knowledge in the field of nuclear technology, to the scientific institutions and establishments engaged in research and development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy [*resolution M*].

31. Fourth, the following recommendations have been made to the International Atomic Energy Agency:

(a) To continue its utmost efforts—that is, the Agency is called upon to continue its utmost efforts—for compilation and dissemination of public information concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including those related to the peaceful application of nuclear explosions [*resolution H, part I*];

(b) To study appropriate international arrangements to facilitate the exchange of scientific and technical information which has commercial or industrial value and is not publicly available [*ibid.*];

(c) To study further the ways and means of increasing the funds available for technical assistance, taking into full consideration the views of interested countries, particularly those of the developing countries [*resolution H, part II*];

(d) To study the most effective means of ensuring access to special fissionable materials on a commercial basis [*ibid., part III*];

(e) To initiate necessary studies that are deemed advisable on the possible functions of the Agency in the field of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and to examine at an appropriate time its procedures and arrangements and the composition of its Board of Governors with a view to adapting them to its new responsibilities in that behalf [*ibid., parts IV and V*];

(f) To examine the basis on which arrangements can be made to secure finances from international sources for the creation of a "Special Nuclear Fund" on easy terms for financing suitable nuclear projects in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those in the developing areas of the world [*resolution I*]; and

(g) To consider at its next meeting the establishment of a fund of special fissionable materials for the benefit of non-nuclear-weapon States and in particular of developing countries [*resolution J, part II*].

32. These are the recommendations of the Conference to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

33. Now I turn to the recommendation made by the Conference to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Bank has been requested to consider, at the next meeting of its Board of Governors, the establishment for the benefit of the developing countries of a programme for the use of nuclear energy in economic development projects which would be a matter of priority and under which finance would be granted on the most favourable terms as regards interest and repayment [*ibid.*, part I].

34. In regard to the suggestion made by the Conference, we note the contents of the letter of the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development addressed to the Secretary-General [A/7327]. We are gratified that the President of the Bank has expressed interest in the Conference's conclusions. However, he has also expressed concern that the resolution was adopted without any prior consultations with the Bank or any notification to it to the effect that the subject of financing the peaceful application of nuclear energy was to be considered by the Conference. We understand that the Bank was also invited to attend the Conference but declined to do so. It could have anticipated from the provisional agenda of the Conference—which was, we believe, made available to the Bank—that the subject of financing the peaceful application of nuclear energy would be considered at the Conference. Therefore, it was not the Conference that was responsible for lack of consultations with the World Bank. As to the rest of the letter of the President of the Bank, my delegation is giving it further thought and will have more to say on the subject at an appropriate time.

35. Although I have already taken much of the time of the Committee in setting forth the main conclusions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, I feel impelled to place some information before the Committee on what went on in the formal as well as the informal discussions in the Conference on the question of security assurances. The report of the Conference [A/7277 and *Corr.1*] does not and could not present a complete picture. In view of the importance of the subject and the fact that the unanimously adopted Declaration of the Conference has stressed the necessity of further steps for an early solution of the question of security assurances in the nuclear era, it seems necessary to fill, to some extent at least, the gap in the information provided by the report of the Conference.

36. In this context I might here refer briefly to the proposal submitted by Pakistan, the text of which can be found in annex VII of the Final Document of the Conference [A/7277 and *Corr.1*]. This draft resolution contained the following provisions in regard to measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

37. First, the nuclear-weapon States should undertake to refrain from the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State which has renounced the manufacture or acquisition otherwise of nuclear weapons.

38. Second, with regard to the permanent members of the Security Council who have expressed their intention "to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assist-

ance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used", the Pakistan draft resolution proposed that this declaration of intention should be converted into an undertaking to provide such immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State which has renounced the manufacture or acquisition otherwise of nuclear weapons and is the object of the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons.

39. Third, with reference to the right of self-defence, the Pakistan draft resolution proposed that the nuclear-weapon States should effectively respond, jointly and severally, to a request for immediate assistance, in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, by a State which has renounced the manufacture or acquisition otherwise of nuclear weapons if a nuclear attack occurs against that State or if it is subjected to a threat of use of nuclear weapons, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

40. I shall explain briefly the intent of the Pakistan delegation in proposing this draft resolution in the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

41. First, it was to complement Security Council resolution 255 (1968) on security assurances by the inclusion of what is called a "negative" undertaking also by the nuclear-weapon Powers in response to the nearly universal desire of non-nuclear-weapon States.

42. Second, it was to strengthen Security Council resolution 255 (1968) by converting what is merely an expression of intention to provide or support immediate assistance to a non-nuclear-weapon State into a juridical undertaking in order to inspire greater confidence among non-nuclear-weapon States in their dependability.

43. Third, it was to make clearer the provisions of that resolution by replacing the undefined concept of aggression by the words "use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" with reference to the contingencies in which the Security Council resolution can be invoked.

44. Fourth, it was to enlarge the scope of the security assurances to include, besides States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, all States which renounce the manufacture or acquisition otherwise of nuclear weapons—for example the scope should be enlarged to the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

45. Fifth, the intention of the Pakistan draft resolution was also to make the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence meaningful in an age of nuclear weapons when such self-defence cannot be exercised without the assistance of a nuclear-weapon State. Consequently, it proposed that in the qualitatively new situation that would be created by the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State, the nuclear Powers should provide or support immediate



assistance, whether the victim invoking the right of collective self-defence is a member of military alliances or not.

46. In response to the views held in general by the non-nuclear-weapon States, the Pakistan draft text was conceived within the essential framework of the Charter of the United Nations. No security system parallel to the Charter was envisaged, nor did the draft resolution impinge, directly or indirectly, on any of the existing security arrangements into which some of the non-nuclear-weapon States have entered to assure their security.

47. We would be lacking in candour if we did not admit that the non-nuclear-weapon States, including the African-Asian States, found themselves divided on the question whether the security assurances should be extended to all non-nuclear-weapon States or only to those which renounce nuclear weapons. The contention was advanced that under the Charter of the United Nations all Member States are entitled to the benefit of security assurances against aggression—nuclear or conventional—regardless of whether or not they are parties to the Treaty on non-proliferation.

48. On the other hand, it was generally felt that the specific assurance of assistance given by three of the nuclear-weapon Powers in Security Council resolution 255 (1968), paragraph 2, embodied the concept of balance in the responsibility and obligations as between nuclear-weapon Powers on the one hand and non-nuclear-weapon States on the other, and therefore the assistance promised in terms more specific than the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations was intended only for those States which renounced nuclear weapons.

49. In order to bridge these differences and unite all non-nuclear-weapon States, the Pakistan delegation offered to revise its draft resolution on the basis of the following propositions:

(a) All non-nuclear-weapon States, whether or not they renounce nuclear weapons, are entitled, in the event of a nuclear attack or threat in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, to the benefit of immediate action by the Security Council and, above all of its nuclear-weapon permanent member States, in accordance with their obligations under the Charter, and also to the exercise of their inherent right of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.

(b) Those non-nuclear-weapon States which renounce nuclear weapons should be entitled to the negative and positive guarantees set forth in the Pakistan draft resolution, operative paragraphs 1 to 3, which I read out earlier.

50. This suggestion to revise the Pakistan draft resolution, which would have met squarely the argument of non-discrimination put forward by Asian-African States not renouncing nuclear weapons and, at the same time, would have been equally fair to those which did so, was regrettably not found acceptable by the former category of States. Therefore renewed efforts were made at the Conference to find a formula which could be supported by all.

51. At one time the six members of the African-Asian group's drafting sub-committee—namely, Ghana, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria and Yugoslavia—were within sight

of agreement on a draft resolution on negative and positive guarantees, such as were embodied in the Pakistan draft, for non-nuclear-weapon States which renounce nuclear weapons, on the understanding that the modes of such renunciation should not be spelled out in the resolution; in other words, that it should be left to the nuclear Powers, which alone could be the guarantors of security, to determine for themselves which mode of renunciation on the part of a non-nuclear-weapon State would be adequate—whether this should be by adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty or a similar, legally binding, multilateral instrument or by a simple unilateral declaration of intention not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

52. It is unfortunate that this manifestation of the will to prevent division and to forge a consensus proved to be fleeting. In the deliberations of the sub-committee the quest for unanimity had been made conditional on agreement on a related draft resolution as well regarding the convening of a special conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and calling upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to refrain in the interim from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State. Some colleagues in the sub-committee maintained strongly that this negative guarantee should be demanded for all non-nuclear-weapon States regardless of renunciation or possession of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, outside the membership of the drafting sub-committee the view was insistently advanced that only those States not having nuclear weapons on their territories should qualify for this negative guarantee.

53. It was at this stage that Latin America lent a helping hand to achieve a positive outcome. The chairman of the Mexican delegation, Mr. García Robles, informally offered constructive suggestions for the revision of the Pakistan draft resolution. While keeping in mind the substance of our text, he suggested a wording which would bring home to the nuclear-weapon Powers the main concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States on the subject of security assurances and would also ensure for the nuclear-weapon States greater latitude and flexibility to explore in more favourable circumstances and political climate the possibility of strengthening the formula in Security Council resolution 255 (1968).

54. The Pakistan delegation expressed its readiness to accept the suggestions made by Mr. García Robles and also to revise its draft resolution further in regard to the negative guarantee by recognizing that this provision needed further consideration by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament with a view to the formulation of an appropriate assurance on the part of the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, in accordance with operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of General Assembly resolution 2153 A (XXI). In submitting our draft resolution and remaining receptive to suggestions made in the drafting sub-committee of the African-Asian group and by the Chairman of the Mexican delegation, the Pakistan delegation was anxious to articulate if possible the common denominator of the views expressed by the overwhelming majority of the non-nuclear-weapon States on the problem of security assur-

ances. At the same time, all of us sought at every stage of our deliberations to take into account the stated positions as well as the views expressed informally at the Conference by the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States.

55. Our proposal, therefore, was not based on a narrow or sectional approach and was, we felt, in the common interests of both the non-nuclear-weapon and the nuclear-weapon countries.

56. There was no question of uniting the non-nuclear-weapon States in order to bargain collectively with the nuclear-weapon Powers. The Conference was not envisaged as a negotiating body but only as a forum in which to harmonize the diverse views, interests and requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the matter of security against the nuclear threat. Much less was there any thought of undermining universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which Pakistan joined in commending in General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), or of weakening in any way the force of Security Council resolution 255 (1968) concerning security assurances. It was just the contrary. The Pakistan draft resolution accorded express recognition to the commendation of the Treaty by the General Assembly and to the adoption of resolution 255 (1968) by the Security Council. In fact, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States demonstrated in an unmistakable manner the wide and strong support of a great majority of those States for the Treaty.

57. Because of the lack of time at the disposal of the Conference it was not found possible to engage in the extensive consultations which were necessary before a revised Pakistan draft resolution on the substantive aspects of security could be presented to the Conference. The general fear that the duration of four weeks would turn out to be too short for adequate consideration of a subject of such scope affecting the most vital interests of all States proved only too true. Therefore, as I stated earlier, our hopes turned on the draft resolution put forward by fourteen Latin American countries, which proposed the convening of a conference for the purpose of concluding a multilateral instrument on security. As I said before, this text failed adoption by a single vote.

58. May I quote here from the concluding address to the Conference by its President, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. He said:

"The question of security, as the history of disarmament negotiations shows, is very complex. This Conference was not meant to traverse the whole range of this problem. Nor did it embark upon the futile attempt to evolve a single formula for the total security of all countries. But the Conference did focus attention on the problem of security from the nuclear threat and the need to provide such assurances of this security as would be operative independently of all other arrangements, national or regional and multilateral. The discussions in this Conference were also concerned with the relationship between the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the provision of adequate security assurances. Though these discussions have not yet led to any firm conclusions, they have brought to bear a solid body of thought and knowledge on the problem. As a result, the problem will

be discussed, wherever possible, with greater understanding of diverse interests and viewpoints, and with more insight and realism than has been the case so far. We have not arrived at a solution of the problem. But we have perhaps discovered the elements on which an eventual consensus will be based. Such a consensus is one of the prerequisites of a secure and dependable peace."

59. It now seems that a stock-taking of the question of security assurances will remain the task of the General Assembly until a solution which commands the acceptance of the largest number of non-nuclear-weapon countries, on the one side, and the nuclear-weapon Powers on the other, is evolved.

60. In saying this, we are not being dogmatic about any views expressed, including our own, nor do we belittle the importance of the security assurances which have already been given by some of the nuclear-weapon Powers through their declarations, and resolution 255 (1968) of the Security Council.

61. It would be futile to expect the question to be of identical importance to all Member States. Some countries already enjoy guarantees of protection given by nuclear-weapon countries, whether through treaties of alliance or unilateral commitments. Then, there are countries which expect to enjoy immunity from nuclear attack by virtue of their geographical location or their position in the constellation of power relationships. But there are others which are not in these privileged categories. It is they who are most concerned with the problem. Since, however, international co-operation is a primary purpose of our Organization, it is only legitimate to expect that the problem of security against the nuclear threat which at the moment is of priority to perhaps only some countries, will be treated as one which should engage the urgent attention of all Member States lest the further spread of nuclear weapons so enlarges and aggravates it that a solution becomes even more difficult than it is at present, if not impossible. We therefore hope that the Assembly at its present session will take the most appropriate step to keep this problem under review and for its urgent solution. The problem, in its very essence, is of such a nature that it requires an amicable interchange between the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States. Such an interchange is possible only in a climate of receptivity and co-operation, and not in an atmosphere in which one group feels itself subjected to pressures or demands from the other. My delegation sincerely hopes that the establishment of such a climate will be one of the results of this debate.

62. I have taken a good deal of the Committee's time in recapitulating the deliberations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. I have attempted this survey in the belief that the thought and energy expended by the Conference on the problems before it have offered to the Assembly many fertile suggestions. These, if followed, promise to open new vistas for progress towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, for effective security against the nuclear threat, and for the harnessing of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes.

63. The Conference was convened by the General Assembly. Since in itself it was not a negotiating body, only the

Assembly can ensure that its work be continued, its decisions implemented and that its conclusions shall not remain interred in its Final Document. It is, therefore, gratifying that a number of delegations have addressed themselves to the task of framing a suitable draft resolution which would meet these objectives. It can be assumed that the draft resolution, which will soon be placed before this Committee, will be responsive to the necessity of avoiding any duplication of, or encroachment on, the tasks of existing bodies like the Disarmament Commission or the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The draft text will also make evident the extreme care that is being taken not to divide the non-nuclear-weapon countries among themselves nor to set them on a collision course with the nuclear-weapon Powers. The proceedings of the Conference, as I have outlined them, involved immense labour and study and a very useful exchange of views. I hope we are all anxious that its conclusions should not be lost to view, and the Conference should not prove to have been but a brief interlude in the endless, and sometimes arid, history of disarmament negotiations. Since this anxiety is perhaps universal in this Committee we trust that the final text of the draft resolution to be submitted will meet with unanimous approval.

64. Mr. VALDIVIESO (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): My delegation regards it as symptomatic that up to the present so few delegations have asked to express their views on the subject of disarmament, and precisely because we find it so, I shall take the liberty of making a few comments.

65. If I describe this reluctance to speak as symptomatic, it is because we believe it is due not to lack of interest in the subject but to a feeling of impotence in the face of the problem. What can the 122 non-nuclear nations meeting here actually do, or what have they been able to do, in the face of the five nuclear Powers? Little or nothing, in our opinion.

66. This Committee meets every year, drafts resolutions and recommendations, asks for its records to be transmitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and talks and talks and talks. Yet all this paperwork and all this oratorical effort have no influence on the stage we are going through in regard to nuclear disarmament. Let us be honest: what has the United Nations achieved in this field? I leave the question in the air in case anyone wishes to take the trouble to answer it.

67. Nevertheless, some progress has been achieved in the field of disarmament; but it is due either to decisions taken by the great Powers without regard to what we discuss here, or to decisions taken by the small nations, likewise independently of what is decided here. The United Nations, as such, is a bystander in questions that really affect disarmament. When the great Powers come to an agreement among themselves, they at once present us with a *fait accompli*. That was the case with the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty,<sup>3</sup> and also with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII)*], in which, paradoxically enough, the great

Powers faced the very nations that should have adopted a decision with a *fait accompli*. What all this means is that in the highly important matter of nuclear disarmament there is no room for flights of fancy or cosmic illusions. Here the only Powers whose word matters are the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France, and outside the Organization the People's Republic of China.

68. If a nuclear holocaust were to take place and the human race were to rise from the ashes and find United Nations documents as today we find relics of former ages, the human being of the future might quite logically feel that the prevailing disagreement among all the countries in this Organization had caused the disaster. But I am afraid he would be wrong, because not all of us would be guilty. Those responsible would inevitably have been the Powers I have just mentioned.

69. It might be argued that there are palpable facts such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco,<sup>4</sup> the Declaration by the African States making the continent of Africa a denuclearized zone,<sup>5</sup> and finally the recent Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which confirmed what had already been agreed in this very room in June 1968 when the resolution recommending the Non-Proliferation Treaty was adopted. But these facts need to be clarified.

70. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was the outcome of the peace-loving spirit which imbues the countries of Latin America, and the fact that we arrived at that agreement was not due to the initiative of the United Nations. Once it was signed, the name of Tlatelolco became a household word in this Organization for its contribution to the cause of peace.

71. The same can be said of the Declaration by the African States.

72. What was the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty but the acceptance of a decision taken by others? Ready acceptance in the case of my own country; I have to say this, because despite its flaws that Treaty does represent a contribution to the cause of peace.

73. In referring to the United Nations I would like to refer also to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which meets at Geneva. My Government and my delegation hold in the highest esteem the Governments and delegations that make up that Committee and with exemplary enthusiasm try to find formulas which would make effective disarmament viable; but the Committee is over-burdened with work, and it achieves effective results only when the four great Powers composing it agree among themselves outside. But let us not live in a fool's paradise. I still seem to overhear the severe criticisms levelled in this room by the representatives of countries belonging to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament against the decisions which the great Powers adopt almost without consulting anyone.

74. As the representative of my country at the resumed twenty-second regular session of the General Assembly, in this First Committee and in this same room I listened to the general debate on the draft resolution recommending the

<sup>4</sup> Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, on 14 February 1967.

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 105 (A/5975).

<sup>3</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963.



Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is why I can reaffirm what I have just said.

75. Whether we like it or not, this is the truth. Today there are 122 nations represented in this Organization which have a real interest in disarmament but have no means of acting. The great majority have already pledged themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons; we trust that all of them will soon be in the same position. Two continents, Africa and South America, plus Central America and Mexico, have become nuclear-free zones. The effort made by the majority of these 122 nations has been made at the cost of sacrifice and abnegation. Hence the responsibility is no longer ours, and we feel we have no decision to make. This we believe is the reason for the eloquent silence, which must be duly interpreted and weighed by the great Powers, on whose shoulders rests the absolute and total responsibility in this matter.

76. My statement was to be limited to what I have just said; but events have taken place to which we cannot remain indifferent. An important group of nations is at present studying the possibility of setting up a committee which among other things would supervise the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. When the discussion of the draft resolution recommending the Non-Proliferation Treaty took place in June 1968, my delegation took a stand different from if not contrary to that of my countries which today favour the establishment of such a committee. Despite this, my country, a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, today shares the interest of those countries in establishing a committee, and my delegation would like to say here and now that we shall support the idea.

77. The explanation is simple. The acceptance of the non-proliferation Treaty by my country does not in any way imply, as has in fact been said, unconditional acceptance. As far as we are concerned, the Treaty is a good one and should be observed until such time as the nuclear Powers in their turn fulfil the commitment they have assumed under the Treaty and carry out in good faith negotiations designed to achieve general and complete disarmament and to promote nuclear experiments for peaceful ends. If these conditions are fulfilled, my country will maintain its adherence to that instrument. Otherwise, on the expiry of its validity my country will denounce the Treaty as having failed to fulfil our expectations.

78. Meanwhile, in the United Nations and in other international organizations, Peru reserves its right to press with all the means at its disposal for more faithful observance of the commitments inherent in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and we believe that the establishment of this committee would be a valuable contribution by the United Nations to the cause of disarmament.

79. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): The statement by the representative of Peru completes the list of speakers for this afternoon's meeting. May I once again remind the members of the Committee that the list of speakers will be closed at 6 o'clock this afternoon, so that anyone wishing to take part in the debate should inform the Secretariat before that time.

*The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.*