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1. Mr. FOURDIN (Belgium) (*translated from French*): "There was a general acceptance of the fact that the future of mankind cannot be secure without the complete elimination of the use or threat of force in the spirit of the United Nations Charter." This statement appears in the

final document [A/7277, para. 17, resolution N] issued by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, in which ninety-two States participated, including Belgium.

2. Resolution A of this Conference [*Ibid.*] also reaffirmed, along with other equally important rights and principles, the principle of the non-use of force and of the prohibition of the threat of force in relations among States.

3. In speaking at the general debate on the various items on our agenda which deal with disarmament, the Belgian delegation feels itself bound to stress categorically what it firmly believes to be the very basis of this international Organization, namely, that the spirit of the United Nations Charter must prevail over what the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs in his statement to the General Assembly on 10 October 1968, called "the old recipes—the balance of forces of power, the desire to dominate" [1689th plenary meeting, para. 50].

4. Although we must not underestimate the difficulties which must be overcome before we can achieve general and complete disarmament, every effort must nevertheless be directed towards that goal. The spirit of the Charter will not truly prevail until general and complete disarmament has been achieved. The General Assembly also appears to share this opinion, since year after year it inscribes this item on its agenda and concludes by adopting resolutions which, in practically identical terms, call for continuing efforts to ensure that substantial progress is made towards achieving agreement on this vitally important question.

5. Again this year, at its very brief session, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament included "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" on its agenda.¹ Unfortunately, this agenda was not adopted—on the recommendation of the co-Chairmen—until 5 August 1968, or barely two weeks before the close of the session.

6. Further, we note that this item occupies the last place in the order of priority established by the co-Chairmen. In fact, the Eighteen-Nation Committee has for all practical purposes stopped dealing with the question of general and complete disarmament in the belief that it represents a distant ideal which may not be attainable for many years. It has deemed it more fruitful to devote itself to the study of certain so-called "collateral measures" of disarmament, and to foster the idea of a cessation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race.

¹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 17.

7. In this connexion, article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons states as follows:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*].

8. Both the Treaty and the programme of work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee clearly show that general and complete disarmament is but a distant goal. It is true that the Committee's report states that “some” of its members have exchanged views on the question of a general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international supervision, and that they “emphasized the importance of resuming the consideration of this question”.² Nevertheless, in the meantime the Geneva co-Chairmen, in other words, the two Powers with intercontinental capabilities, have agreed to deal with so-called collateral measures.

9. In this area, the two super-Powers have seemed to want to undertake talks aimed at limiting their missile and anti-missile systems, which threaten to proliferate at a frantic pace.

10. Apart from this hope of bilateral negotiations which the world can only welcome, the Eighteen-Nation Committee will discuss collateral measures for halting the nuclear arms race as well as for chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitations, and the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and ocean floor. I said “will discuss”. In fact, as the Eighteen-Nation Committee's report indicates, the adoption of the agenda represents “progress which will facilitate its work”, the only concrete progress that has been achieved. We must admit that the recent session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee was a short one: it was held off until the adoption of resolution 2373 (XXII), in which the General Assembly commended the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Since this text decisively affects the future of mankind, and since it was welcomed by a vast majority of countries, including Belgium, as an important step towards disarmament, it can hardly be said that the year 1968 witnessed no progress at all.

11. Does this mean that the Committee has rested on its laurels ever since, or that from 16 July to 28 August 1968 it was solely concerned with adopting its agenda? Its report, of course, sets forth some of the questions considered at that session.

12. The question of prohibiting underground tests of nuclear weapons has long taken second place—after non-proliferation—and it was regarded as the ultimate achievement of the 1963 Moscow Treaty³ and as evidence of the desire to put an end to the ever-increasing development of nuclear weapons.

13. Although the report mentions that a useful and fruitful discussion was held on this important question, we are forced to note that in the absence of any agreement on the problem of inspections, the super-Powers have continued their underground tests, the results of which apparently are being used to develop ever more improved miniaturized nuclear weapons. General Assembly resolution 2343 (XXII) has already called upon “all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear-weapon tests in all environments”, and expressed the hope that “States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data”.

14. Belgium, for its part, considers that among the collateral measures, the question of a treaty prohibiting underground testing is particularly urgent. In this connexion, various studies, especially those carried out in Sweden by the International Institute of Peace and Conflict Research,⁴ reveal the considerable progress achieved since 1960 in the area of detection and identification of underground explosions. Modern techniques will undoubtedly be improved in future years. Moreover, if we bear in mind the Swedish suggestion advocating international co-operation in the field of detection, which would further improve the chances of long-range verification, we have every reason to expect that eventually the nuclear Test Ban Treaty can be extended to include all underground tests.

15. Thus the Belgian delegation is convinced that it would be worthwhile to make a close study of the well-known Swedish suggestions dealing with the creation of an international detection club, whose members would develop procedures for the rapid exchange of information. It would also be worthwhile, in the context of this question, to study some other suggestions, such as the compromise inspection plan implicit in the principle of “verification by challenge”, as well as the British suggestion dealing with a quota system for testing before its total prohibition.⁵

16. These conclusions are in line with those arrived at by the eight so-called non-aligned delegations at Geneva which are members of the Committee; in their joint memorandum of 26 August 1968,⁶ these delegations reaffirmed “their strong view that a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests would be an important step in the field of disarmament and would constitute an earnest of the intention of the nuclear-weapon Powers to carry out their obligations in accordance with the Partial Test Ban Treaty”, and further, expressed their “deep apprehension” that “no serious negotiations” had taken place on the various proposals put forward by several delegations, and that they “should be studied further without delay”.

17. In this connexion, we should also refer to one of the resolutions adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, namely resolution L, which underlines the “urgency of a universal and comprehensive solution of the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes compatible with a comprehensive test-ban treaty” [*A/7277, para. 17*]. The Belgian delegation voted in favour of this

² *Ibid.*, para. 31.

³ Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, 1963, No. 6964).

⁴ See, *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex 1, section 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, section 8.

⁶ *Ibid.*, section 10.

resolution, which has the same wording as the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned delegations members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee; it considers it necessary and urgent to establish a régime which will allow for international control and inspection of all explosions for peaceful purposes, without prejudice to the terms of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

18. We know that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States considered two types of problems, one dealing with questions of security and disarmament and the other with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Conference considered "that possibilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy have increased, which is of particular importance for the economic development of non-nuclear-weapon countries and for an accelerated development of the developing countries" [*Ibid.*, resolution N].

19. Since this statement is part of the discussion on general and complete disarmament, I shall not dwell on this second type of problem. However, the Belgian delegation is of the opinion that the economic prospects of nuclear energy and the orientation of related technologies towards humanitarian ends are essentially the concern of the International Atomic Energy Agency and that more light will be shed on them by the Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. We should note in this connexion that this Fourth Conference should provide an excellent way of ensuring the continuity of the work begun by the recent Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

20. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States fully recognized the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency. For example, in section IV of resolution H, the Conference recommended "that the Agency, in relation to the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, initiate necessary studies that are deemed advisable on its possible functions in this field".

21. Instead of giving the priority we had hoped to the question of banning underground tests, the Soviet memorandum [A/7134] gives first place to the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons—a question which had already been discussed at the twenty-second session as a separate item and which was the subject of lengthy discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Last year already, we stated Belgium's views on the proposal to conclude a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We may have some doubts as to the absolute nature of this prohibition and the unreserved commitment contained in the draft convention the Soviet Union submitted last year,⁷ which takes no account either of the hypothesis that a nuclear-weapon State signatory to the convention might, in the case of legitimate defence against an aggression, find itself faced with the choice between defeat and the use of such decisive weapons, or of the further hypothesis of a nuclear threat emanating from a State non-signatory to the convention. In fact, we note that this proposal has not prevented either the continuation of the arms race or continuing experimentation with particular attention to nuclear weapons.

22. I now come to the non-nuclear and other collateral measures included on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee which were discussed during its past session.

23. I shall not dwell on the problems concerned with excluding the sea-bed from the arms race, since this question has already been discussed in the context of agenda item 26. Nor shall I dwell on the question of the elimination of foreign military bases. This question has already been discussed by the General Assembly on several occasions at the request of the Soviet Union, which has once again included it in its memorandum. This memorandum was of course issued before the military occupation of Czechoslovakia.

24. I shall speak only very briefly on the problem of arms limitations at the regional level, merely to recall what was said by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs on 10 October 1968. With regard to Europe, Mr. Harmel recalled the efforts Belgium has devoted to the concept of mutual and balanced reductions of forces for the purpose of creating new confidence between East and West. With regard to the areas of recent conflict, he stressed that "the great States should themselves propose, and call forth from the other States acceptance of a limitation of the supply of conventional weapons and their means of delivery" [*1689th plenary meeting, para. 34*].

25. Following these brief reminders, I shall confine myself to one of the questions which the Belgian delegation feels is of considerable importance and comparable to that of nuclear weapons. I have in mind chemical and bacteriological weapons. It will be recalled that in this connexion the General Assembly adopted resolution 2162 B (XXI) at the initiative of Hungary, and that a draft resolution was submitted by the delegation of Malta⁸ at the twenty-second session aimed at obtaining the revision, up-dating or replacement of the 1925 Geneva Protocol⁹ and the preparation by the Secretary-General of a brief report concerning the nature and probable effects of existing chemical and biological weapons, to be prepared with the assistance of qualified expert consultants.

26. The report submitted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee reveals that the Committee agreed—acting on a British initiative supported by Poland—to recommend that the General Assembly entrust the Secretary-General with the task of appointing a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

27. The Belgian Government considers that the subject deserves serious study to be carried out in a universal atmosphere of peace and without controversy. It recognizes that the 1925 Geneva Protocol is not a completely satisfactory instrument for settling the question of chemical and microbiological warfare.¹⁰

⁸ *Ibid.*, agenda items 29, 30 and 31, document A/7017, para. 4 (a).

⁹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

¹⁰ See, *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex 1, section 7.

⁷ See, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 96, document A/6834.

28. Two years ago, the Belgian representative stressed this point in the following terms, as reported in the summary record of the meeting:

“His country, which had special reasons to be concerned with the problem of chemical and bacteriological warfare, had signed and ratified the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925. . . . the text of the Protocol might well be brought up to date.”¹¹

29. We are therefore in favour of the recommendation providing for a group of experts to prepare a study on the effects of the possible use of these weapons, while drawing attention to the existence of certain gases, neither asphyxiating nor toxic, sometimes being employed as a means of domestic repression. It would be useful if the proposed study were to establish a clear distinction between the chemical weapons dealt with by the Geneva Protocol and tear gas and other gases which are part of police equipment.

30. I believe I have now touched upon the essential questions dealt with in the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Of course, I am aware that I have not commented on every resolution adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, but I have shown how the majority of questions dealt with by that group should be taken up by the Eighteen-Nation Committee, by the International Atomic Energy Agency and by the Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

31. I am also aware that I have not covered all the list of “urgent measures” contained in the Soviet memorandum. This memorandum duplicates the work plan drawn up jointly by the two Committee Co-Chairmen at Geneva; it served as a basis for drawing up the agenda which the Co-Chairmen submitted in their report, but the measures it advocates have not been screened by experts from the Organization, which even the Soviet Union representatives agree to be the proper forum for such an analysis.

32. Belgium does not really find that it contains any new factors for constructively reopening discussions. Nevertheless, we are hopeful that it indicates a readiness for dialogue and a basis for the negotiations in good faith mentioned in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

33. In this connexion, and in conclusion, I should like to say that my delegation shares the opinion expressed by Mr. Caracciolo [*1606th meeting*], who considered that the value of the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament lay in its conciliatory and realistic nature.

Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

34. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I had decided to speak at a later meeting but I find that there is a dearth of speakers. I could have arranged my notes more thoroughly but I think we are so far behind schedule in this Committee that everyone who has decided to speak, I believe, should utilize the time so that we may catch up with our agenda.

¹¹ This statement was made at the 1462nd meeting of the First Committee, the official record of which was published in summary form.

35. Indeed, this subject of disarmament is the core of the agenda of this session—of every session in fact. It is quite understandable that there is a dearth of speakers in this Committee on the question before us. But for a few States represented here, particularly the two super-Powers, the rest of us do not exercise what might be called “world power”. There has been a tendency for those who do not exercise power—not to say the weak States—to compensate for their weakness by long speeches on the subject of disarmament, a subject which is highly specialized.

36. As the Committee knows, when a person cannot flex his arm he has no recourse other than to wag his tongue. But I must submit that there is a kind of malaise which I could feel during the last two or three years because we hear professions by those who exercise power that they are doing their utmost to see to it that we will have world peace. But what do we find? We find conflicts which are more brutal, more sanguinary than what happened after the First World War.

37. Of course, we cannot go on like that because those conflicts have a tendency to spread, and through miscalculation we may even have a holocaust which would spell the end of humanity.

38. Political alignments outside this question are still in a great flux. We hear about certain Powers interfering in the affairs of other States which, in accordance with the Charter, they never should do. But those are only pious hopes on our part because we find that those who interfere in the affairs of other States always have an answer, a plausible answer. It looks like a plausible answer but quite often it is in contravention of the principles of the Charter. Hence, political alignments are still in a state of flux and we see them shift like the sands of the desert. When those political alignments are in such a state of flux how can we expect the ministries of defence of respective States to channel all their efforts towards world peace.

39. Experts of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva are no doubt dedicated to the task of finding ways and means for devising the necessary machinery for achieving world disarmament. Perhaps that is what they are trying to do, in stages. But those experts are governed by the directives they receive from the political leaders in their respective countries. In turn, those political leaders are, to a large extent, under the influence of the man in charge of national defence. By a stroke of the pen defence ministries and their specialists formulate decisions which may alter the whole policy of the State. So, you cannot blame the political leaders—not always, but almost all the time you cannot blame the political leaders—when they find themselves enmeshed by the decisions of their national defence ministers.

40. How can States, especially those who exercise world power, harmonize the policies of leaders, who seemingly work for world peace, on the one hand, with the decisions of their respective ministries of defence on the other hand. That is the whole crux of the question. Political leaders are like us; they are not experts. The ministries of defence have to be consulted—sometimes in a critical situation even before they can say anything to the people of the nation.

41. That is the crux of the whole question of disarmament. Solutions to that question are not easy to find. However, it is our task here in the United Nations to try and find solutions or even imagine solutions which may become practical. Such solutions depend not only on the political climate that reigns between States or among States—between them if these are two but among them if there are many—but it also depends on the change in the international pattern, or political climate, for that matter, which so far has badly regulated the relations of States with one another.

42. The Covenant of the League of Nations as well as the Charter of the United Nations were devised so that the principles that were enunciated therein could transcend bilateral and multilateral treaties between States. But what do we find in the wake of the First World War during the League of Nations era? What do we find happening in the wake of the Second World War when the United Nations was established to ensure world peace?

43. We find the same forces at work that indeed spelt the end of the League of Nations and, God forbid, which may also end up by wrecking our Organization, unless we are careful, not in the distant future but within the next two or three years, to devise the machinery that indeed will lessen the threat of war; and this can be achieved only if we accelerate disarmament on a world scale.

44. This thing goes as far back as the Congress of Vienna, to the time of Metternich and Talleyrand, who were skilful negotiators for their respective countries, and who divided Europe into spheres of influence. That was in 1815; Napoleon was the dominating figure in Europe. People were tired of war and bloodshed, and finally Talleyrand and Metternich tried—successfully only to a certain extent—to see to it that war would be stopped. But, quite often, when we read about the Congress of Vienna and the proceedings during that Conference, we read how many of them said what they did not mean, and meant sometimes what they did not say. However, this question of spheres of influence was not devised in the Congress of Vienna: it was indeed devised in Europe in the sixteenth century, in order to make sure that there would not be a conflict, at a time when in Italy there were small countries like the Republics of Venice and Florence and also while Europe was feeling its way to national unity in certain areas.

45. However, this policy of spheres of influence and balance of power foundered because the architects of that policy saw to it that classes would remain as they were; and hence in 1848 we find an eruption all over Europe: people began to rebel, because they were the victims of the policy of balance of power; and this explains the exodus from Europe to the new world after 1848.

46. Then the balance of power was found to be defective also when Bismarck unified Germany; and then it takes us to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870; and after that war we had the respite of peace until 1914, when the First World War came; and another date in history is 1917, when the people of Russia rebelled, precisely because the leaders of those days wanted things to remain as they were. Hence we find that the policies formulated in the Congress of Vienna foundered—boomeranged. We had thought that the First

World War would solve our problems of disarmament. The slogans of those days were: “the war to end all wars” and “a war to make the world safe for democracy”. What kind of democracy? War breeds war, like violence breeds violence; and democracy becomes only a ritual, especially in times of emergency. And it happens that in the aftermath of each war we find that democracy becomes more hollow, due to the politicians reverting to what is called the “machine”, which is run by professionals; and unfortunately the people become sheep, sheep without horns, and again, through manipulation of the mass media of information, they are driven to the slaughterhouse of another war. This actually happened. The mass media of information are the best handmaidens for policies that quite often end up in war.

47. Well, in 1919 we had the Covenant of the League of Nations; and we know, again from history—and I happen to have been a contemporary of that era in my younger days—that the politicians at the Paris Peace Conference at Versailles fought tooth and nail for privileges and for establishing new spheres of influence by gerrymandering Europe, without the elemental knowledge of nationalities. They cooped Germany into a smaller area; they liquidated the Austro-Hungarian Empire—all on the basis of the policy of balance of power.

48. And then what do we find after Versailles? We find secret treaties, bilateral arrangements, so-called regional defence agreements. I do not want to mention States, lest some of our colleagues be embarrassed, but when one supposed statesman was decrying the war in Ethiopia in the 1930s, that politician or statesman—call him what you will—was sending an emissary to see the one who was waging the war—because it was one person who was waging the war in Ethiopia—encouraging him, by default, by saying, “We do not mind if you go into Ethiopia”—of course, I am paraphrasing; I was not present there—in order to see to it that there would be no alignment with Nazi Germany in those days.

49. I mention this as a typical method that was resorted to for the balance of power. That was really the force that shaped policies. I cited such an example to show my colleagues here that it was done on the basis of spheres of influence—as if the leaders of Europe had learned nothing since the Congress of Vienna took place. Well, they are politicians. You do not suppose that a politician could find time to read history and to learn the lessons of history. You may say, “Well, why didn’t they consult?” They used to consult the clergy in the nineteenth century, and they were always for peace. Then, when religion lost its grip in Europe and elsewhere, they began to surround themselves with professors, who quite often lived in an academic ivory tower. Professors are human. When they surrounded those politicians, they began to formulate policies that were not realistic, and the leaders, whether they were statesmen or politicians, became more confused and had to depend on the men in their ministries of defence. This is the vicious circle that has paved the way to suspicion and also to the deceit that stems from suspicion.

50. We come to the aftermath of the Second World War. Have we made any progress since the years between 1919 and 1939? I submit that we have not in so far as the

exercise of power politics and spheres of influence are concerned. What do we find? I must be explicit here. We find the same bilateral or multilateral agreements—or regional understandings—about defence. They call those treaties or agreements by many names. Where are the principles of the Charter? I do not have to read the Charter—I have a copy of it here—and cite chapter and verse, for I am not now talking about the application of the Charter to the workings of our international community. Everyone knows the principles of the Charter, or the substance of those principles, by heart. There is the same impasse. We have on one hand NATO—I am talking specifically now—and on the other hand the Warsaw Pact. On the question of balance of power, I am not criticizing either NATO or the Warsaw Pact but I am citing them to show my colleagues that we have not made progress since the days of the Congress of Vienna, and indeed we have made very little progress since the period after the First World War. Are we not apprehensive that these blocs, these spheres, will create an imbalance which may finally lead the world into a conflict the like of which even the imagination cannot envisage? I do not want to mention it, but somebody mentioned what happened last August in Europe. What happened last August in Europe frightened the proponents of one bloc. I do not know why they should have been frightened—ask them—but they were frightened. It would have frightened the other bloc had something similar taken place. Who are the victims in these events? The victims are the small Powers, regardless of ideology. They could be socialist or they could be capitalist or they could be called by some other name. This is the impasse that confronts us and is at the root of all this armament, this increase in armaments.

51. Our statesmen, our politicians, are not free today as they used to be centuries ago, when man had not created sophisticated weapons of mass destruction. They are bound by the exigencies of their ministries of defence. They send experts to Geneva, dedicated experts who work all the time they are there. I have been reading their proceedings—that is what I did last night. They try to bargain in a spirit of goodwill, and one should see the *bonhomie* and *camaraderie* between them. They forget they are from the east or the west. I think our illustrious friend, Mr. Foster, finds himself a brother to his Russian counterpart—it used to be my friend, Mr. Tsarapkin, and now I believe it is Mr. Roshchin—and conversely his Russian counterpart finds that they are friends. They talk and try to find ways and means. Then there is a directive. It is just like building a tower—the directives subvert the tower, and it tumbles down. Patient and dedicated as they are, Mr. Foster and his counterpart try to build again. We are confronted with the idea that disarmament cannot be achieved except by stages—one stage after another. It reminds me of an ant that has to go from here to Long Island. I do not know when it will get to Long Island and I do not know whether it will find a straw or piece of drift wood in the stream of the East River. That is the situation confronting us now in the question of disarmament—like an ant trying to make a journey to Long Island.

52. Shall we give up? If we give up, it means the suicide of mankind. Here I represent a country which is typical of all the small countries represented in this Committee and which even depends for small arms on industrial States or

those that produce arms. But we are human beings. We represent human beings that suffer like the human beings of big States, that have the same needs, that have the same fears, that have the same joys. So there is a community among us, the ties of brotherhood that indeed drive us to say what we think, as we are in duty bound to say, courageously, in the hope that a solution will be found for the impasse confronting us.

53. Having said this I think I should be a little more specific on the reports before us. We find the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [*A/7277 and Corr.1*] and I submit that this report merits the attention of the proponents of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. Since it has not been ratified by the requisite number of States to make it effective I hope those States that were really the authors of that Non-Proliferation Treaty would pay attention to the contents of the Final Document I have just mentioned. This is not an academic work. This document emanates from the fear and suspicion of States that do not exercise world power and do not have any nuclear weapons. Protocols can be added to treaties or there can be resolutions in the United Nations making the substance binding on those who vote for them if sometimes protocols are difficult to attach to a Treaty like that. This problem can be solved by the Legal Department of the United Nations.

54. The reason many of us abstained—my country abstained—on the vote on the Treaty was due to the fact that we were not sure about the future alignments between the Powers which have nuclear weapons. How can we be sure? The balance of power changes—I will not say from day to day—from year to year, and spheres of influence also change. There is a nuclear Power which is outside the pale of the United Nations; we do not know what it is doing. I mean China. We recognize ourselves the China that is sitting here with us. We do not know what is happening in China. How can we talk of treaties when China is outside the pale of negotiations? It does not have to be a Member of the United Nations, but some machinery should be devised whereby to ascertain whether the Chinese have the will to be party to such a treaty in the future.

55. On the other hand, we have none other than our friends from France, inasmuch as they mentioned that they would adhere to that Treaty. But I am talking now about other matters. It is not a Committee of Eighteen that we have in Geneva, it is a misnomer as long as the seat of France is vacant. France is a Power to reckon with. You cannot neglect France. Anyone who neglects France in Europe will be sorry and sad. The ingenuity of the French has proved itself since the Middle Ages. France is not a negligible quantity. You can say, “well, we invited France but France does not sit in the chair”. There is no ghost of France sitting in the Chair as in *Macbeth*. Ghosts cannot sit in an empty chair. Something should be done to see why France is not there. Either France is brought to the fold, or France may perhaps give its point of view more clearly to explain its absence from the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We cannot neglect France, more so because a world statesman is the Chief of State in France. At one time he was an illustrious General. It is a rare combination

to have a statesman and General at the same time. You cannot neglect France.

56. When we come here talking about world disarmament in all its phases, we have missing links in the chain. The chain should be one unbroken chain, not a broken chain. How should we do it? Who am I—the representative of a small Power—to say how this should be done? It is up to the two super-Powers; it is up to the representatives of the two super-Powers to suggest to their Governments how these gaps could be filled, because all our decisions will be of an academic nature and we cannot achieve practical results until we have universality when treating the question of disarmament.

57. This question of dealing with all nuclear tests, which we find in the report, is commendable. But since ideas were thrown out about banning underground tests very little has been achieved. Our Swedish friends have an institute now for the study of this matter technically to get instruments for this purpose.

58. But why should we all the time be suspicious of one another? Why should not the super-Powers decide forthwith on the necessity of banning underground tests, indeed all nuclear tests except for peaceful purposes? And those should be joint tests, not joint tests between them but should be United Nations tests, under the auspices of the United Nations. Let any tests that have to be done in the nuclear field be a joint act under the auspices of the United Nations. Otherwise suspicion will be there for ever. How do we know where a mole is once it goes underground especially when we do not have any sonar devices? They call them "sonar" for the sea. I do not know all those delicate electronic instruments for finding things underground, under the sea. We do not possess them. Suspicion will always lurk between these super-Powers and those who are conducting subterranean nuclear tests.

59. I think the only way to solve this problem would be to agree that if underground or subterranean nuclear tests are necessary for peaceful purposes, they should be pooled under the supervision and auspices of the United Nations. I throw this idea to our friends from the United States and the Soviet Union. Maybe they can explore it further. I am not a technician. Maybe those tests are so sophisticated that they do not want to have joint tests. I do not know. But it stands to reason that if you want to get somewhere, such tests should be done jointly under the supervision and auspices of observers, at least, from the United Nations.

60. I come next to the question of chemical and biological warfare. I remember a few friends who were gassed in the First World War. They had to gasp for breath. Only chlorine was used in those days. Chlorine was easy to manufacture and to be compressed as gas in bombs and thrown in any region. I have known a person in this country in the late thirties, in fact in 1939, who I thought had asthma because he would gasp for breath sometimes when he spoke to me. He was from Bridgeport, Connecticut. I could not ask him, "What is the matter with you that you are gasping for breath?" I was told that he was gassed with chlorine in the First World War.

61. But the warring nations in those days had sense—because of fear of course—and after a certain period they banned the use of chlorine gas.

62. What do you find in the aftermath of the Second World War? Chlorine? Chlorine is a simple gas. They have napalm, they have I do not know what. I specialized in chemistry. I was a man who financed chemical projects in my younger days, but my knowledge of chemistry today is less than what they teach in high schools. But I can imagine the diabolical gases that are being invented; they are not only asphyxiating gases, they are gases in the nature of acids that corrode even metals, not only human flesh. A person who is subjected to those gases would indeed be lucky if he died and did not suffer all his life. The suffering of that man from Bridgeport would be like child's play in comparison to what is happening today. And we do not know what other gases the super-Powers and those who are not super-Powers have in their arsenals. We cannot imagine anything worse happening than that one becomes the victim of these gases. Either he dies, or he suffers and he will pray to God to die, when he becomes a victim of these gases.

63. What about bacteriological warfare? We hear about diseases and immunizing the people of the party who can use these bacteria against their enemies, immunizing them in their selfishness while they can kill another person. I remember that our colleague from Hungary three years ago submitted a draft resolution. I do not know if he was serious, but he withdrew it. Some deal was made here. We were told that it was not the time, that the Geneva Convention was there, that we should be careful about the Geneva Convention and that it was a legal question. What is this bunk? Should we glance backwards or look forward? Let us not be fettered by any legal difficulties if we want to save humanity.

64. Why should there not be a treaty banning all lethal gases and all bacteriological warfare? What prevents us from doing that? Anyone who even manufactures these should be considered a war criminal even though there may not be a war, a potential war criminal. What will prevent us from doing this if there is goodwill? We talk about reducing armaments in stages. Let us have a reduction like those underground escalators in London and some here that are deep. They not only take us down but we can walk on those escalators while they are going down. That is the effort we can make here in the United Nations. We find that these escalators that take one down—shall we call them "descalators"?—are static and there are many obstacles in the way and we cannot reduce armaments.

65. This brings me to the last part of my statement which has to do with all the other problems that are adduced in the documents we have before us in the Committee. I end with what I started. Far be it from us, the representatives of small nations who are far from being experts, to be presumptuous by telling our elders in knowledge—not necessarily in years—what should be done and what should not be done.

66. But in concluding my statement I may be allowed as someone who has worked in this Organization for twenty-three years—quite often I have heard it said that those who work in any Organization for such a long time become part and parcel of it rather than representatives of national States—to implore and beseech those who exercise world power to take to heart the common weal of mankind, to

dissipate the fears that even beset children who know about the dangers. Children who used to be carefree now talk about the atom bomb and diabolical weapons. I appeal and beseech those who exercise world power to revert to sanity and not to believe in spheres of influence. I do not say that they should abolish those spheres of influence overnight, but they should read and practise the provisions of the Charter which transcend bilateral and multilateral treaties. It is not only I who say this, I am sure that every representative of any small State will join me in beseeching and imploring the super-Powers and those who have the means of manufacturing lethal weapons to ponder the fact that no one will be immune from destruction and that any conflict that may engulf mankind may spell the suicide of man on this earth. I beseech and implore them to tell their leaders not to be fettered by the chains of decisions of their ministries of defence which, with all due respect to the fact that they have to fend for the countries they represent, may sometimes develop a psychosis or a phobia that if they do not increase their weaponry they will be subject to being invaded or beaten or destroyed by an imaginary enemy.

67. There can be no enemies when we have goodwill. There can be no enemies when we consider that we are all brothers under the skin. There can be no enemies when we realize that greatness is only an attribute of our creator, or nature if we are atheists—and some of us are atheists—and that we are on this earth nothing but ephemeral guests and that before long, as we came from the earth, we return to mother earth; but at least let our generation save that species called homo sapiens.

68. Make our children and the forthcoming generations happy, without the care, without the fear that they may be destroyed. Let us work for world peace through our leaders; it is, I think, the duty of our experts, whether they are in Geneva or elsewhere, to orient our leaders and our politicians to the fact that survival is bound up with goodwill and love amongst men.

69. The CHAIRMAN: This ends the list of speakers for today. We have no speakers for tomorrow. Therefore, if no delegations are going to inscribe their names for tomorrow the meeting for Friday, 15 November, will be cancelled. I think members of the Committee will understand that I

would not like to be the only speaker for tomorrow, and I have the uneasy feeling that the Chairman is speaking more often than the members, but of course if, during the course of today the Secretariat receives names of delegations ready to speak tomorrow, the meeting will be scheduled for the morning. So I will respectfully request the members of the Committee to look at the *Journal* for tomorrow morning to see if there is any meeting.

70. At the same time, I would like to inform the Committee that we are scheduling two meetings for Monday, 18 November. At the same time, on that day, the list of speakers will be closed at 6 p.m., as I had anticipated yesterday.

71. Members of the Committee will have noticed that today's *Journal* also included item 26, on the sea-bed. This was on the basis of the agreement of previous meetings. I understand from my contacts that the co-sponsors of draft resolutions submitted to the Committee are not yet ready to proceed to the vote.

72. I understand that extensive and intensive consultations are proceeding, so may I renew my hope that on Monday we will be in a position to dispose of that item.

73. Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom): I just wanted to ask whether in any event there would be a discussion on disarmament matters on Monday at one or other of the meetings. I would personally like to speak on Monday and I have, I am afraid, to leave on Tuesday, so I would like an assurance that there will be a meeting on Monday on disarmament matters, whether or not our friends of the sea-bed are ready with their business.

74. The CHAIRMAN: I can assure the representative of the United Kingdom that we shall go on with the general debate on items concerning disarmament, as scheduled. In the meantime, if there is an opportunity to proceed to the vote on draft resolutions, we will take that matter up too, at the same time. We will proceed, first of all, to the general debate on disarmament.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.