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**Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).**

**AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 94 AND 96**

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.443)**

**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7187-DC/231)**

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**Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament (*continued*) (A/7132, A/7223, A/C.1/L.443)**

**Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference (*continued*) (A/7224 and Add.1, A/7277)**

1. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) (*translated from French*): Despite considerable differences of opinion on many questions, the general debate at the current session of the General Assembly has revealed that there is complete unanimity on one major matter, namely the opinion that

the international situation has been steadily deteriorating in recent years and that it is becoming increasingly alarming. Most speakers have also very clearly brought out the two main factors in this ominous development: the arms race and the increasingly frequent resort to violence in international relations.

2. It seems clear to me that these two factors underlying the changing world situation are closely connected. The only reason for arming is to exercise violence or to defend oneself against it, and one has recourse to violence because one has the means to do so, because the military potential of the one who practises violence, or of his protectors, enables him to do so. In order to try to halt the downhill slide towards catastrophe, ways must be found of halting the arms race both by reducing and ultimately by eliminating at least the most destructive weapons, and at the same time ways must be worked out to ensure respect for the principles which should govern relations among States, for the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and, first and foremost, for the principle of prohibiting the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State.

3. How do matters stand on these two fronts? What have we done to find answers to the problems contemporary history is creating in the two areas I have mentioned for us, the United Nations, the main hope for mankind in our time?

4. The nuclear arms race has been carried on with great intensity in recent years. The production and spread of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery have continued. The weapons, and more strikingly their means of delivery, have been improved. From single war-head nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles, we are now passing on to multiple war-head missiles. New means of delivery are being developed.

5. We are told that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are preparing to take a step forward in this field. This step will entail the production of anti-missile missiles and of more new delivery vehicles, both offensive and defensive.

6. It seems to be generally agreed that the arms race between these two Powers on this higher level will be not only much more costly than on the present level, but that it will, in addition, be more dangerous. At the present time, we are told, the race has ended in a dead heat. Neither of the two parties has acquired first-strike capacity over the other so as to prevent it from being answered by an equally destructive counter-strike. At its present level, the arms race evidently could not alter this state of affairs. Thus, it would seem to be losing its *raison d'être* and could be halted. On

the other hand, an arms race on a higher level, on the level of anti-ballistic missiles, would provide opportunities for one side or the other to achieve temporary superiority. Thus in practice it could go on indefinitely if, at a moment of imbalance, the final catastrophe was provoked.

7. According to widespread opinion, the moment thus seems favourable for halting the nuclear arms race, a race which is clearly the greatest folly in which human beings have ever engaged.

8. What have we done to put an end to this folly?

9. It is true that we have done something. We have succeeded in halting nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.<sup>1</sup> We have succeeded, in principle, in preventing the placing of nuclear weapons in outer space [*resolution 2222 (XXI), annex*]. Recently, a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] has been drafted, approved by the General Assembly, and signed by a large number of States. This very Committee may take the first step towards a decision to demilitarize the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

10. Obviously, all this represents something. However, when we consider the extent of the threat hanging over mankind, the growing threat of ultimate catastrophe, these measures are totally inadequate. They represent merely a limitation, and a partial one at that, of the size of the arms race or, as in the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, only an attempt at limitation. We cannot be sure of having halted the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons, and we are certain we have not halted the vertical spread of these weapons. We are far from having achieved nuclear disarmament, which is the indispensable step towards our highest aim, complete disarmament.

11. We can never sufficiently emphasize or repeat that there can be no freeze or standstill in this area. We must either go forward, or backward.

12. In short, nothing but a forward movement towards general disarmament can restore hope to mankind and confidence among nations, for so long as there is no confidence, we shall inevitably continue to arm ourselves.

13. What has been done and what can be done to set off this forward movement?

14. For several weeks each year for many years, we in this Committee have been discussing disarmament. We adopt resolutions, and very good ones indeed, but they do not set any definite time-limit for taking concrete measures. Then we go home and wait for the next session of the General Assembly. We risk doing no more than that at this present session.

15. Yet we have a Disarmament Commission made up of representatives of every United Nations Member State. Is it not time for us to ask why it has not held a meeting for

three years? Is there nothing it could do, nothing it could discuss, no decision it could take?

16. We are told that this Commission has given way to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and that this is reasonable and understandable.

17. I ask this question: is this self-effacement and total passivity of the Commission really so reasonable? Do the results achieved thus far by the Eighteen-Nation Committee justify the Commission's total passivity? Would it really be a waste of time to try to revive the Commission and, through its authority, to give impetus to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, *inter alia*?

18. A perusal of the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament<sup>2</sup> has convinced me, as it must have convinced many others, that this Conference needs a new impetus. Above all, its report is replete with matters on which exchanges of views have occurred, exchanges which have remained just that. Its only activity which has borne fruit was its part in drawing up the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, we should point out that the main work on this Treaty was accomplished outside the Conference, as has twice been the case in previous years with regard to two other similar agreements.

19. We must therefore recognize that the results of the work of this sole permanent international body on disarmament are very far from encouraging, notwithstanding the well-known efforts made by several of its members.

20. In this room there are many representatives who represent their countries on the Eighteen-Nation Committee. They may even all be present. I hope they will tell us openly and sincerely what prevents them from making progress. Of course, we can guess at the reasons. But we would like them to tell us themselves. Their statements will be very helpful to our discussions, and to those of the Disarmament Commission, should it meet in the near future.

21. In concluding this portion of my remarks, I would hope that our deliberations will on this occasion lead to conclusions which will not consist merely of hopes and exhortations to wisdom, but which will go beyond that. At this juncture, we should redouble our joint efforts towards working out practical measures and going forward with greater dispatch.

22. Our discussions in this Committee should therefore—in keeping with circumstances—concentrate above all on the question of deciding how to make swifter progress. And if lack of time prevents us from finding a solution to this problem, we could make up for that by convening a session of the Disarmament Commission for the beginning of next year. We are ready at this time to make a formal proposal to that effect if the Committee responds favourably to our suggestion.

23. A hardly justifiable—I might even say unjustifiable—lethargy also characterizes the development of international

<sup>1</sup> Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, 1963, No. 6964).

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231.

co-operation as regards the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. This tremendous discovery, perhaps the most important since the discovery of fire, is far from being used as it might be for general economic development, and especially for the economic development of the majority of mankind, namely, for the economic development of the developing countries.

24. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States held recently at Geneva with the participation of representatives from ninety-six States, including the nuclear States, a useful conference in many ways, gave a great deal of attention to this question. In a series of excellent resolutions [see A/7277, para. 17], it indicated the practical means by which we could make more rapid progress in this field. Of course, these are only recommendations. The experience of our Organization has taught us that it usually takes a very long time for a recommendation to be put into effect and that often it is not put into effect at all. Thus, we are justified in wondering what should be done in order that the recommendations of the Conference do not remain—at least not for too long—merely recommendations. This is one reason—and not the only reason—why my delegation is in favour of creating an *ad hoc* United Nations body which would be entrusted with continuing the work begun by the Conference and which would work to implement the recommendations made by the Conference. Such a body would not be duplicating any other United Nations body either as regards the peaceful use of atomic energy or with regard to security, a subject I shall come to in a moment.

25. We are in the very midst of the nuclear era, and it would be a matter of course to have a body dealing, on behalf of the entire international community, with all the new problems inherent to our era.

26. I do not believe anyone will disagree with me when I say that the problem of international security is a very different one now in the nuclear era from what it was before. States are now divided into two very distinct categories—nuclear States, on the one hand, and non-nuclear States, on the other. One might say that the problem of security has been split into two. It presents itself differently to each of the two categories of States.

27. The nuclear States—or, to be more precise, the two nuclear super-Powers—see this problem above all from the point of view of their respective and comparative nuclear potential. Thus, they seek a certain degree of common security in the balance between them and they both appear at present to be favouring an initiative designed to preserve the balance in their respective arsenals which they have achieved at the present time.

28. For the non-nuclear States, the problem of security is totally different. Anyone who has closely followed the general debate at the plenary session of the General Assembly this year must have been struck by the impressive number of speakers from non-nuclear countries who expressed the same feeling, a feeling of insecurity in the face of the growing power of the nuclear States. Their main point dealt with their own experience or that of other similar countries over recent years, an experience arising from the fact that violence was for the most part employed by nuclear countries or by their protégés acting in the shelter of the nuclear arsenals of their protectors.

29. While the problem of security is thus being posed in an entirely new way, or rather, in two entirely new ways, where the rights and duties of States are concerned we are still ruled by the Charter, a document which dates from the beginning of the nuclear era and whose basic provisions existed even before the adoption of the Charter. Let me explain. Under the Charter, States have only one indisputable right, that of legitimate individual or collective self-defence, and no precisely defined duties.

30. This right is no innovation of the Charter added to the rules of international law that had preceded it. The law of legitimate self-defence and mutual defence has been in existence ever since there have been States. Thus, we must take note of the fact that there is here an enormous gap. Whereas we are living in the nuclear age with its special threats to international security, we are, from the point of view of the rights and duties of States in the matter of security, living in the era of the Peloponnesian War, or even earlier.

31. Of course we have the United Nations, and along with it we have the Charter provisions covering security, more particularly Chapter VII. With these provisions, the right of States to legitimate mutual defence has taken on a new dimension. Today, it is possible for a State which is threatened or attacked to call upon the international body which is the United Nations and to request its aid and assistance against the threat or the use of force.

32. I shall not in this connexion reopen the debate which has so often been held on the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the United Nations in this connexion. Our Organization, which is indisputably useful in so many respects, and which is certainly irreplaceable, has not satisfactorily fulfilled its main duty. It has fallen far short of achieving its main purpose as set forth in the first paragraph of Article 1 in these famous words: "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace . . .".

33. There is no need to reopen this discussion. Nevertheless, I should like to say one thing, since it concerns a very recent event. I am referring to Security Council resolution 255 (1968) dealing with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the statements made on that occasion by the representatives of the three permanent States members of the Council which are nuclear Powers. It would be hypocritical to ignore the fact that the guarantees which the three nuclear Powers offer to non-nuclear States in their statements do not increase the degree of security of the non-nuclear States in any tangible way. The main fact, namely the ineffectiveness of United Nations bodies where security is concerned, is simply ignored in these statements.

34. At Geneva, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States deserved credit for having, among other things, raised the problem of international security as a whole in the nuclear era. In its final statement [A/7277, para. 17, resolution N], it expressed the opinion that there is a need to adopt measures for working out a speedy solution to the question of security in the conditions existing today.

35. At this Conference, it was proposed that a special conference should be convened to work out a solution for the first and most urgent step to be taken towards a universal system of collective security. This first step would consist of a multilateral instrument containing guarantees given by the nuclear Powers to the non-nuclear Powers.

36. The Yugoslavian delegation is wholeheartedly in favour of such an undertaking, and we share the opinion of those who feel that our Committee would be well advised to recommend that the question of convening such a conference should be included in the agenda of the next session of the General Assembly. In order to achieve success, an international conference on security in the nuclear era should be well prepared. Certain preliminary problems should be studied, discussed and solved. The conference should be preceded by bilateral and multilateral consultations on a number of questions. This work could be taken up in the interval between the current and the next sessions of the General Assembly.

37. Who is to carry out and who should organize this difficult and complex work? We would suggest that the body entrusted with continuing the effort initiated by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States could be authorized to undertake it.

38. In setting up a new body, which we feel should include both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, we should make it competent to deal with two types of problems peculiar to the nuclear age, two types of problems with which no other United Nations body has so far been entrusted: first, the formulation of a United Nations policy with regard to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, a policy whose implementation would be entrusted—by the General Assembly, of course—to Member States, to the International Atomic Energy Agency, to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and to other international agencies and bodies, as well as to the United Nations Secretary-General; secondly, as study and elaboration of steps to be taken in the matter of international security, which Member States and United Nations bodies—primarily the Security Council—could implement on the recommendation of the General Assembly.

39. Work on this second point would be carried out in the spirit of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, which reads as follows:

“The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.”

40. Here I would emphasize that apart from the questions of disarmament being dealt with or to be dealt with by the Disarmament Commission and the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, no United Nations body has ever taken up or is now studying general principles or the preparation of possible General Assembly recommendations in this field. This is virgin soil awaiting the plough ever since the Charter was adopted in 1945.

41. In my statement I have made no specific reference to several items on the Committee's agenda. My delegation reserves the right to return to these items.

42. On the other hand, in this statement I have dwelt on the question of security which does not appear as such on the agenda, but which is so obviously very closely linked to the question of disarmament that it deserves our attention as much as does disarmament in the strict sense of the word, and it is equally urgent that we should deal with it.

43. Complete and universal security in a totally unarmed world is such a distant goal that we cannot attain it in one move. We can go forward only by stages, and to progress from one stage to another is difficult.

44. However, to make a genuine and serious advance towards the great ultimate goal there must be a general determination to go forward in that direction. Such determination should arise out of the equally general conviction that there is no other way to avoid running headlong into disaster.

45. A climate favourable to this last point seems to be developing. Some erroneous concepts which have prevailed over the world scene for the past twenty years have lost much ground and are continuing to do so. I am thinking particularly of the concept that systems of alliances or blocs represent a valid and lasting solution to the problem of national security for both strong and weak countries. Today, we realize that seeking security through the establishment of blocs has served only to exacerbate rivalries, and that this has led to the present state of widespread insecurity on both sides.

46. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and the general debate held during the current plenary session of the General Assembly lead us to conclude, *inter alia*, that present or future membership in an alliance does not and would not make the vast majority of weak States feel secure from threats. These are the States that voiced almost unanimously a cry of alarm, a cry unrelieved by any expressions of confidence in military alliances.

47. As for the nuclear Powers, and particularly the two super-Powers, it seems to us that a doubt pervaded the Assembly as to the extent to which they were aware of their own long-term interest. One often had the impression that they were still unable to rid themselves of the illusion that a lasting peace—which they cannot help but want themselves—can be built on bilateral arrangements which would ignore the interest of others, with recourse to such methods as the demarcation of spheres of influence.

48. Therefore these Powers must eventually come to the conclusion that such arrangements will lead them in the wrong direction. Such arrangements are bound to be temporary and constantly open to question, a continual source of conflict among those whose interests and whose love of freedom are ignored. They can be nothing but sources of tension and conflict between the great Powers and between the super-Powers themselves.

49. The final statement of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, one of the finest documents the

United Nations has produced in several years, expresses this same idea as follows: "... peace and progress could not be safeguarded for any nation unless the security of all nations is assured".

50. An unshakable peace, which must be our supreme goal, cannot be other than a democratic peace, with equality and freedom for all nations, large and small.

51. Mr. BURNS (Canada): In his statement to the General Assembly on 2 October 1968, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said the following:

"Last spring, with high hopes, the General Assembly, in its resolution 2373 (XXII), overwhelmingly commended the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Its action reflected the belief, widely shared throughout the world, in the constructive effects this Treaty could exert in the cause of peace: that nuclear weapons need never be used in war; that, if generally ratified, the Treaty would create a powerful barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons; that it would spur the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and that it would commit all signatories to negotiate in good faith for both nuclear and general disarmament. To bolster these hopes, the Treaty was accompanied by important assurances to non-nuclear Powers of security against nuclear attack and nuclear threats. Already more than eighty States have signed the Treaty, but still others must sign and ratify it if its purposes are to be fully achieved.

"My Government is well aware of the blow recent events have dealt to international confidence. But progress in nuclear arms control, to which great-Power co-operation is particularly essential, is not a narrow interest of any one Power or group of Powers, great or small; it is an urgent and overriding interest of the human race in sheer survival." [1677th plenary meeting, paras. 56 and 57.]

52. On the following day, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the USSR, addressed the General Assembly and in the course of his statement he said:

"The Soviet Union proposes that all the nuclear Powers should immediately begin negotiations on cessation of production of nuclear weapons, reduction of stockpiles and the eventual complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control. During such negotiations it is prepared to arrive at an understanding concerning not only the whole complex of measures but also certain separate steps leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

"The Soviet Government proposes that an agreement should be reached on specific measures for limiting and subsequently reducing the strategic vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons. The significance of such a measure, if taken, is obvious to all." [1679th plenary meeting, paras. 114 and 115.]

53. Under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, parties to the Treaty bind themselves "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" [see *General Assembly*

*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. We have heard, in the statements from which I have just quoted, that the two major nuclear Powers are ready to begin negotiations on the most important of the measures which can halt the arms race, an agreement on concrete steps in the field of the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles. These statements reiterate the expressed intention of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to begin talks on this subject. This intention was welcomed in the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>3</sup> and the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, in its resolution D [see A/7277, para. 17], strongly urged the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to enter into such negotiations at an early date.

54. We have heard the willingness of the Soviet Union to enter into those negotiations repeated in the statement yesterday of the representative of the Soviet Union.

55. Canada believes that it is essential that such negotiations should begin soon if there is to be any significant progress in arms control or disarmament measures. In our view, it is extremely important to maintain the momentum created by successful negotiation of the non-proliferation Treaty, and to take the next logical step forward to which signatories have committed themselves under article VI. For this reason, we strongly urge that strategic arms limitation talks should commence before the end of the present session of the United Nations General Assembly.

56. A comprehensive test ban treaty, immediate cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons are among those measures which the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament decided to place on its agenda for priority attention, provision for which is made in its report. In fact, proposals on these questions have been on the table in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, as well as in this Committee, for several years now. We must say, however, that the prospects for agreement on an underground test cessation would be very much brighter if negotiations on strategic nuclear arms limitation were making good progress. While both super-Powers are developing these weapons, it is natural to suppose that some tests will be considered necessary—or at least that there will be pressures on the Governments of those Powers for the continuation of testing.

57. The same difficulty comes up, in a somewhat different way, in connexion with the other measures that most delegations think should follow the non-proliferation Treaty, the cessation of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, the so-called "cut-off." If the great Powers are developing new weapons and elaborating delivery systems for them, and producing more of both—as the absence of any agreement to limit them implies—how can we expect that they will agree to stop making the explosives for these weapons?

58. I hope that what I have just said regarding this measure and the comprehensive test prohibition will ex-

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 17.

plain why Canada thinks it is vital, if there is to be progress towards effective measures of arms control, that the great nuclear Powers should enter into meaningful negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons and their vehicles, both offensive and defensive.

59. While the comprehensive test ban and the cut-off have, as I have said, been on the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament agenda for quite some time, in the last three years the Eighteen-Nation Committee, in accordance with the recommendations of this First Committee of the General Assembly, and for many other good and obvious reasons, concentrated its efforts on the production of a non-proliferation treaty, which, as you know, was commended in General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), after discussion in this Committee last May and June. The hope was expressed in the resolution that there would be the widest possible adherence to the Treaty by both nuclear Powers and non-nuclear-weapon States.

60. As we have been told, over eighty States have signed the Treaty. Unfortunately, these eighty do not include the majority of the "threshold" States that are among the most advanced technologically, but which do not now possess nuclear weapons. Of the eight nations usually listed in this category, only Sweden and my own country, Canada, have so far signed the Treaty. While we have heard various explanations as to why the other States have refrained from taking the first step to adhere to the Treaty, we do not find them very convincing. One would have thought that after the warning conveyed by the Secretary-General's study on the possible effects of the use of nuclear weapons, and the economic and security consequences of acquiring them, no State could be blind to the results which the proliferation of nuclear weapons would have in the world of today and tomorrow.

61. Many States which wish to improve their nuclear science and technology, and to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy for themselves have been concerned about the implementation of the provisions of articles IV and V of the non-proliferation Treaty. If these articles are read with attention, it will be obvious that the provisions for making the benefits of nuclear energy available to those States which are desirous of receiving them only become an obligation if the Treaty enters into force. The conditions for the Treaty's entry into force are set out in article IX, paragraph 3.

62. It would therefore be in the interest of all States hoping to benefit by these contingent promises to exert all their influence towards the signing and ratifying of the Treaty by a sufficient number of States to enable it to enter into force with the least possible delay. In particular, the ratification of the Treaty by those States which have the ability to produce a nuclear weapon within the next few years, or are reputed to have that ability, is greatly to be desired, as I have already said. It would be a great setback to the cause of nuclear disarmament, and the freeing of the world from the menace of a nuclear war, if a situation should continue where each of these States waits for action by another before it signs and ratifies. Canada has signed the Treaty and intends in due course to ratify it. The Canadian delegation believes that it is important for all States which have signed the Treaty to make the danger of further delay clear to those States which have not signed.

63. I have already mentioned the comprehensive test ban. Many delegations, including the Canadian, have long supported the view, expressed in resolutions of this Committee and the General Assembly ever since the Moscow test ban Treaty<sup>4</sup> was signed, that there should be a prohibition on underground tests of nuclear weapons, thus making the cessation of testing all-inclusive. The difficulty has been that the United States and the Soviet Union cannot agree on what kind of control or verification is necessary to give assurance that all parties to a treaty to prohibit underground testing are respecting their obligations. I do not wish at this time to enter into the rather technical subject of identification of nuclear explosions by teleseismographic means, but I should like to pay tribute to the efforts being made by Sweden, through their Institute of Peace Research, to elucidate the scientific questions which are the root of conflicting stands in this matter. Canada has been co-operating with Sweden in this most important research on co-ordination of national research findings.

64. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has recommended that the General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to organize a study on chemical and biological warfare.<sup>5</sup> One hears fears expressed that chemical and biological agents may be developed into systems of mass destruction of all forms of life. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament formed the opinion that it would be desirable to have authoritative, independent information on some aspects of this means of warfare for use in further discussions of the subject. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament considered that the value of the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons<sup>6</sup> indicated that a similar study should be made of chemical and biological warfare. The Canadian delegation reserves the right to speak further on this matter when a resolution in regard to it is presented.

65. While nuclear war and armaments understandably have occupied most attention in discussions on disarmament, many representatives have pointed out that in certain areas of the world there are races to acquire the most modern conventional armaments. These aggravate suspicion and hostility, and so threaten peace. I would quote what the Honorable Mr. Sharp, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, said in his statement to the General Assembly on 9 October 1968:

"In the days of the League of Nations, efforts were made to impose some restraints on the arms traffic by publicizing statistics about weapons and other types of armaments transferred between States. In our view, the concept of an international register of arms transfers should be revived.

"My Government is interested, too, in the possibility of limiting supplies of armaments in regions of acute

<sup>4</sup> Treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, 1963, No. 6964).

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 26.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.IX.1.

political and military confrontation and has noted with approval the recent indication that under certain conditions the Soviet Union favours the implementation of 'measures for regional disarmament and the reduction of armaments in various parts of the world, including the Middle East' " [1687th plenary meeting, paras. 62 and 63].

66. In concluding, the Canadian delegation would once more emphasize the extreme importance it attaches to the signing and ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty by those States which have not yet done so, particularly those States which are capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons and those approaching that capability. We also stress again our view that further real progress towards control of the nuclear arms race and disarmament requires the opening of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of offensive and defensive weapons systems.

67. The CHAIRMAN: Since I have no further speakers for today on my list, is there any delegation wishing to speak at this stage? I see none. Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to make a few comments. I should like to start by noting that the pace of work in our Committee is rather slow and, therefore, discouraging. We had to start discussing the disarmament items before we had dealt with any of the various proposals on the previous item. We now have very few speakers on the list for the disarmament items so that we are forced to cancel meetings which had been planned, therefore failing to utilize the precious time we had between now and the end of the session. Of course it is not my intention to force the pace of the Committee's work, but I feel that it is my duty, as Chairman of the Committee, to say that, if we do not have sufficient speakers for the forthcoming meetings, I shall be forced to close the list of speakers on the disarmament items either on Friday or Monday morning.

68. I should like to draw to the attention of members of the Committee that we have less than five weeks at our disposal, and therefore I need hardly stress how serious the situation is becoming for our Committee.

69. Now members will recall that last Monday, the day before yesterday, I said that it was my hope that the Committee could resume consideration of item 26 on the sea-bed on Thursday, 14 November, that is tomorrow, in the hope that we could vote at that meeting on the various draft resolutions and amendments which have been tabled. I shall therefore include item 26 in our agenda for tomorrow's meeting. At the same time I am aware that intensive consultations are proceeding on this item.

70. I hope that if we are unable to take up item 26 tomorrow—and, on this point, I would like to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that we have only one meeting scheduled for tomorrow, in the morning—we will then be able to take up that item on Friday.

71. I wish to appeal most earnestly to those who are taking an active part in the consultations to co-operate with the Chair in ensuring adequate progress in our work.

72. With regard to the items on disarmament, may I conclude by asking once again that all those who wish to participate in the general debate should put their names down on the list kept by the Secretary of the Committee. As of now, we have one speaker for each meeting, and some are listed tentatively for tomorrow, Friday, Monday and Tuesday.

73. Once again, I repeat my appeal to those who are involved in the consultations to intensify and accelerate those consultations, and those who wish to speak on the items on disarmament should put their names down on the list.

*The meeting rose at 4.20 p.m.*