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Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 28

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament (A/7072 and Add.1-DC/
230 and Add.1; A/7080; A/C.1/959-960, A/C.1/963;
A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2)

1. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the first speaker, I am indeed pleased to announce to the Committee that the co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have informed me that they have agreed to certain amendments to the draft treaty which is at present before the Committee.¹ I am sure that we all agree that this is a very positive and encouraging step in response to certain desires mentioned during the general debate. The co-Chairmen, I am sure, have taken it in the spirit of the United Nations, in recognition of the validity of those desires, and to allay the anxiety of some members of the Committee.

2. I am confident that we all welcome this spirit. Moreover, I am informed that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution [A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2] have agreed that the new revised text of the treaty shall be the official text to be annexed to the draft as indicated in its operative paragraph 1. The text of the revised draft treaty will be circulated shortly² in English and later in the remaining official languages. However, in order to familiarize the members of the Committee with the content and text of the new changes, I shall ask the Secretary of the Committee to read them out.

3. Mr. VELLODI (Secretary of the Committee): The following are the revisions to the draft treaty.

4. The ninth preambular paragraph will now read:

"Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to

undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament".

5. There is a new final preambular paragraph which will read:

"Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources".

6. There are some changes in some of the articles of the draft treaty, and I shall now read the new text of those articles.

7. Article IV, paragraph 2, will now read:

"All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the future development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."

8. Article V will begin:

"Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development."

9. The rest of article V will read as follows:

"Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements."

¹ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex I.

² Subsequently circulated as document A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2/Add.1.

10. Article IX, paragraphs 2 and 3 will now read:

"2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

"3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967."

11. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the first speaker, I should like to announce that New Zealand has become the thirtieth sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2.

12. I now call on the representative of Nigeria who wishes to make a short statement.

13. Mr. KOLO (Nigeria): As my delegation takes the floor for the second time during the current debate on this most important subject, I should like to express our gratitude for the opportunity offered us to pronounce ourselves once again on the draft non-proliferation treaty now before us, in the light of the many valuable contributions made by many delegations and the informal consultations that have taken place here.

14. During my delegation's earlier intervention on 8 May 1968 [1563rd meeting] we had attempted to focus the attention of the Committee on the various proposals made by the Nigerian delegation at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva—proposals which we believe are constructive and aimed at improving the text of the draft treaty. At the same time, we also stressed the urgent need for concluding a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons as early as possible in order not to defeat our objectives in this regard. From statements made so far by many delegations we believe that we are all agreed on the need for an acceptable non-proliferation treaty which would perform the urgent task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

15. There have been two significant developments since our last intervention. In the first place we note that the co-sponsors of document A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2 of 28 May 1968 have amended their original draft resolution to include and further strengthen the obligation of nuclear-weapon countries signatory to the treaty and the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to pursue urgently the question of vertical proliferation. The draft resolution also has accepted the important need to intensify international co-operation in the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. We are happy to note also that the draft resolution now affirms the principle of the United Nations Charter concerning the respect of sovereignty of States in connexion with threats or the use of force in international relations.

16. The second important development concerns the amendment proposals submitted today by the two co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. These amendments take into account a number of proposals made both here and in Geneva by various delegations including the Nigerian delegation. In particular, we note the amendment to article IV of the draft treaty which we pressed for consistently during the negotiations in Geneva. Article V also includes the type of safeguard my delegation considers important if the treaty is to prevent any loop-hole in regard to the dissemination of information concerning benefits from the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. Other amendments in line with the general views expressed by some other delegations have also, we note, been included in both the revised texts of the draft treaty and the draft resolution.

17. My delegation is fully appreciative of the spirit in which these various views have now been accommodated. These amendments should, in our opinion, lead to a wider acceptance of the draft Treaty.

18. In the light of these encouraging developments and, particularly, as we feel convinced that it is of the utmost importance to conclude a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as early as possible, my delegation finds itself now in a position to co-sponsor the revised draft resolution [A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2]. In doing so, we are well aware of the importance and significance of the forthcoming Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States which is due to be held in Geneva next August. My delegation feels strongly that that conference should be held as planned. We feel that it has an important role to play, particularly in connexion with the formulation of procedures and methods that may require to be introduced for making the present treaty effective. We also feel that any major decisions which may emerge from that conference could still be accommodated within the treaty in view of the provisions of article VIII of the draft treaty concerning amendment proposals.

19. The CHAIRMAN: Nigeria has now become the thirty-first sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2.

20. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The Byelorussian SSR has been consistently and tirelessly fighting for the strengthening of international peace and security. It is only natural that, once nuclear weapons made their appearance, we should have been actively advocating their prohibition and liquidation with a view to averting the threat of nuclear war, and supporting partial disarmament measures, including measures to limit the nuclear arms race. From the first days of the existence of the United Nations, jointly with other socialist and peace-loving States we have been constantly striving for the conclusion of agreements and the creation of conditions under which the world would know neither armaments nor wars. Thanks to the vigorous efforts of the socialist and other peace-loving countries, we now have an effective Treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. In accordance with the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of

States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the launching of nuclear weapons into orbit or placing them on celestial bodies has been forbidden. Furthermore, the United Nations has adopted a Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

21. In the present circumstances, the principal task of this resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly is, as proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2, co-sponsored by my country, to approve the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as drafted in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. This treaty, which is in itself an important step towards nuclear disarmament and greater international security, will also facilitate further negotiations on effective measures to stop the nuclear arms race in the near future and to secure nuclear disarmament, and also on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

22. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not a new item for the United Nations. Quite a number of resolutions have been adopted on this question, mentioning its urgency and high priority and, as stated in resolution 2153 B (XXI), saying that

“the emergence of additional nuclear-weapon Powers would provoke an uncontrollable nuclear arms race”.

23. These resolutions take note of the progress made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, contain appeals to States to settle their remaining differences, set out the principles on which a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based, and, lastly, set a specific time-limit for the completion of work on the treaty.

24. All this is now behind us, and the General Assembly has before it the text of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which takes into account not only the earlier resolutions but also many additional proposals by States Members of the United Nations, as has been clearly explained both by members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and by representatives of non-member countries.

25. I note with satisfaction that the overwhelming majority of speakers have stressed the importance of a successful solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and its great significance for international peace and security. Their statements demonstrate that the Members of the United Nations understand that the task before us is to halt the spread of nuclear weapons in the interests of all countries and peoples.

26. I should also like to draw attention to the fact that almost all speakers expressed agreement with the basic provisions of the treaty, contained in its articles I and II which prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to and its manufacture in non-nuclear countries and are the heart of the treaty. As many delegations stressed in their statements, these provisions truly stop up all the loop-holes to any further spread of nuclear weapons and thereby ensure compliance with the recommendations contained in the General Assembly resolutions.

27. In the course of the discussion, some questions were raised and considerations put forward with regard to separate provisions of the non-proliferation treaty and the possible effects of its conclusion, the purpose of the speakers being to penetrate to the very essence of this important international problem. That is certainly not surprising, for the treaty has a close bearing on the interests of States in such important fields as security, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the realization of a broad range of disarmament measures. However, other questions were raised with the clear intention of casting aspersions on the treaty and discrediting the very idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I will say frankly that the delegations taking that line are few in number, and that it is not they who determine the character of the present session of the General Assembly. Nevertheless, they are here, and we cannot pass over their comments in silence.

28. Thus, some delegations have alleged that the non-proliferation treaty does not take into account some of the principles laid down in resolution 2028 (XX), while in fact they advanced new proposals which bear no relation to the treaty. Some of them have been asking purely theoretical questions, along the lines of: “What will happen if that which cannot occur, occurs?”

29. Such an approach is hardly helpful in erecting a barrier to stop the spread of nuclear weapons; and I omit mention of those who openly oppose the treaty and thereby play into the hands of elements which are anxious either to acquire or to manufacture nuclear weapons. It is an open secret that there are aggressive forces in the world favouring the transfer of nuclear weapons to other countries, and that there are those eager to obtain such weapons in one way or another. Some say so openly, while others conceal their true intentions. Some are in power, while others are in opposition to the official policy of their Governments, which favour the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

30. We must bear all this in mind and, in analysing the text of the treaty submitted to us [A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2/Add.1], be true to our main purpose, which is that:

“The treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form”.

as stated in resolution 2028 (XX).

31. Does the text of the treaty before us achieve this main purpose? In our opinion it does. The provisions contained in its first three articles are proof of that. Article I provides as follows:

“Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”

32. Under article II, the non-nuclear-weapon States, in their turn, undertake

“...not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

33. Thus, by means of reciprocal and equivalent obligations on the part of nuclear and non-nuclear States, all access to nuclear weapons is closed, while compliance with these obligations is guaranteed by the provisions of article III of the treaty. We must be very careful not to weaken the treaty provisions, and not to leave even the smallest loop-hole permitting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

34. In this connexion, we cannot agree with those delegations which advocate manufacture or acquisition by non-nuclear-weapon States of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. As other representatives have mentioned before me, it is not possible to make a nuclear explosive device that will serve peaceful purposes only, for any such device can be used for destructive as well as for creative purposes, and must therefore be prohibited. But that in no way curtails the opportunity of the non-nuclear States to use nuclear explosions for creative purposes, for digging canals and making harbours, and for other large-scale engineering projects. Article V of the treaty now makes it mandatory on the parties to the treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available, through appropriate international procedures, to non-nuclear-weapon States on a non-discriminatory basis. Moreover, the charge for the explosive devices used will exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear States will be able to obtain such benefits either under bilateral agreements or through an appropriate international body, on which non-nuclear-weapon States will be adequately represented.

35. These provisions of the treaty refute the argument that if non-nuclear-weapon States are prohibited from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, this will allegedly hamper their technological progress and make them economically dependent on the nuclear States. Looking at the matter dispassionately, I believe everyone will agree that from the scientific, technological and economic viewpoints it is inconceivable that a developing non-nuclear State, busy with building its national economy and raising the level of living of its people, should be able by its own efforts and with its own resources to produce a nuclear explosive device for peaceful purposes that would be either more highly perfected or cheaper than that which it can benefit by under article V of the non-proliferation treaty.

36. Consequently, it is self-evident that, objectively speaking, if the non nuclear States themselves are allowed to produce peaceful nuclear explosive devices, there can be an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons and that a back door will be left open through which nuclear weapons can come in.

37. During the discussion many delegations expressed concern lest conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation

should injure the economic development of non-nuclear countries or curtail their access to the great scientific and technological achievements of our day in the nuclear field. We are profoundly convinced that there is no real foundation for any such doubts or misgivings.

38. On the contrary, the non-proliferation treaty will become an important factor in international life and will unquestionably promote the economic, scientific and technological development of non-nuclear countries. The treaty does not affect their sovereignty. It will be of particular importance for the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America which do not have the requisite resources and potential to carry out nuclear research and use atomic energy for peaceful purposes independently and which consequently need assistance from Powers that have amassed impressive knowledge in the application of nuclear energy.

39. Even someone who studied the draft treaty in the most carping spirit would fail to find a single provision that limited the possibilities of using nuclear energy for the economic and social development of the nuclear and non-nuclear States parties to it. For example, article IV of the draft treaty states explicitly that nothing in the treaty affects the inalienable right of all the parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. The treaty also sanctions the right of all the parties to it to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and provides that measures shall be taken to facilitate such exchange. Under the treaty, all the States parties to it shall be able to acquire source or special fissionable material, and also equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes. Simultaneously, the nuclear Powers solemnly undertake to collaborate, particularly with non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation treaty, in promoting the further development of application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Essentially this means that for the first time the nuclear States assume a direct treaty obligation, by universal international agreement, to help non-nuclear countries in putting to use the scientific knowledge and experience they have accumulated in the field of nuclear energy, for the scientific, economic and social progress of the non-nuclear countries and with due regard to the needs of the developing regions.

40. The conclusion of a treaty containing obligations of this kind furnishes a reliable international basis for broad and many-sided collaboration between nuclear and non-nuclear countries, between States far advanced in nuclear research and the uses of nuclear energy and developing countries. Through such collaboration, the developing non-nuclear countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America will have broad access to the scientific knowledge and the technology needed for the peaceful application of nuclear energy. For the vast majority of non-nuclear countries, this is the shortest, most rational and economically advantageous path to the storehouse of those benefits which peaceful application of nuclear energy confers upon mankind today and which will greatly increase as time goes on.

41. Much was said in earlier debates regarding safeguards of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States in connexion

with the non-proliferation treaty; some of the comments made were identical in meaning, but most of them were mutually contradictory. That is hardly surprising, for the membership of the General Assembly includes countries with different social systems and political coloration, countries which are members of various military alliances, and non-aligned States. The fact that very different proposals are being advanced on this subject shows that views on solving the problem differ. Consequently, the principal aim in working out security safeguards should be to find a realistic solution that would enhance the security of all States.

42. It may be said without fear of successful contradiction that all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, would see a real guarantee of greater security in the increased capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and repel aggression, especially nuclear aggression. Therefore the adoption by the Security Council of a special resolution on security assurances, together with corresponding declarations by nuclear States, will be a major step towards guaranteeing the security of States and the maximum that can be had in the present circumstances. This concept was not generated spontaneously. It was shaped in the course of protracted and complicated negotiations on security safeguards in response to the wishes of non-nuclear countries, and it is in the interests of all countries, since adoption of such a resolution by the Security Council would constitute a new and important measure for reserving and strengthening the peace, with special reference to the threat of nuclear attack.

43. The significance of the security safeguards is considerably heightened by the mention in the preamble to the treaty of the extremely important principle of the United Nations Charter that States must refrain in the international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and also by the declarations of States that they intend to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament.

44. A number of delegations have been saying, without any reason that we can see, that the text of the treaty submitted to us supposedly fails to take into account the principle stated in resolution 2028 (XX) that:

“The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers”,

and that it confers certain privileges on the nuclear States. A careful study of the present text of the treaty reveals the very opposite. Under the treaty, the nuclear States assume heavy responsibilities, and their obligations are far greater than those prescribed in earlier United Nations resolutions.

45. Extremely important provisions in this regard are contained in article VI, under which each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Consequently, the treaty, which stops the spread of nuclear weapons, is not

merely in itself a step towards disarmament, as recommended in resolution 2028 (XX), but also leads to other measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. This was convincingly argued in the statements made by Mr. Kuznetsov, head of the USSR delegation, on 26 April and 20 May 1968, and in the statements of representatives of many other countries which are advocating disarmament and peace.

46. Certain representatives have said that the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be solved in conjunction with other disarmament measures, and in particular with the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and reduction of their stockpiles.

47. However, our experience of post-war negotiations on disarmament shows that such negotiations are not easy and are usually protracted. Therefore any attempts to link the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with other measures to limit the nuclear arms race and with disarmament could only lead to an impasse, so that even the question of non-proliferation would not be settled at this time. In those circumstances, nuclear weapons would spread unhindered to countries which do not now possess them and the arms race would continue at the present pace. Indeed, it is likely that, as a result of the appearance of additional nuclear Powers, the arms race would be greatly speeded up.

48. Like many other delegations, my delegation favours the banning of underground testing of nuclear weapons. Let us imagine, however, that we had made the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water conditional on banning underground tests as well. It is obvious that, had we taken such an attitude, this Treaty, whose usefulness is recognized by the great majority of States, would not have come into being. The same may be said of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.

49. That is why we are convinced that the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be dealt with in isolation from the other questions and that every effort must be made to accelerate its solution—to facilitate rather than hinder its solution. We all know perfectly well that the draft treaty submitted to us is the result of long efforts by many States. It contains formulations mutually acceptable to the socialist and the capitalist countries, and to the developing countries which are pursuing a non-capitalist course of development. It regulates the questions relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

50. Of course, like many other delegations, we should be delighted to examine today such other matters as a treaty on general and complete disarmament, have a clear definition of aggression and liquidate aggression with its consequences, establish peace on earth and develop broad economic, commercial, scientific and technical co-operation in all areas on a non-discriminatory basis. We must not falter in our efforts to solve these weighty problems. But that should not prevent us from approving, without any postponement, this important measure on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which meets the interests of both the nuclear and the non-nuclear States, since it reduces the threat of thermonuclear war, whose dreadful

effects are so well described in the Secretary-General's report. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a sort of boundary, having crossed which we can, with better chances of success, move on to our principal goal—prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, general and complete disarmament.

51. The additions and amendments to some of the provisions of the treaty just announced by the Chairman prove that those in favour of concluding the non-proliferation treaty at an early date are really showing goodwill and a desire to find mutually acceptable formulations taking account of the wishes expressed by various countries in the course of this debate. In welcoming this step on the part of the co-authors of the treaty, my delegation would also express its conviction that the treaty will now command even broader support.

52. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is, of course, open to all States for signature and it would naturally be best if all nuclear and non-nuclear States were to become parties to it. Active support by an overwhelming majority of States would not only increase the binding force of the treaty, but would impose a certain moral and political obligation on those States which, for one reason or another, are not yet ready to become a party to this international agreement. Even if certain nuclear States do not sign it at this stage, the treaty will lose none of its value, for it prevents the spread of nuclear weapons and reduces the danger of hostilities with use of nuclear weapons—in other words, it solves the problems it is called upon to solve.

53. The Byelorussian delegation considers that the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be approved within the next few days by this session of the General Assembly, and it appeals to all other delegations to support the 31-Power draft resolution. Such action on their part will serve the interests of international peace and security.

54. Mr. JOHNSON (Jamaica): I have been particularly heartened by the announcement by you, Mr. Chairman, that the co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have agreed to certain most meaningful changes in the draft treaty under discussion. The proposed amendments to the draft resolution, now co-sponsored by thirty-one Members, are also most welcome. It will be readily understood that the statement I am making today was prepared in relation to the original text of the draft treaty submitted. Naturally we shall now study carefully the proposed amendments communicated to us at the beginning of this meeting by you. On the face of it, many of our concerns have been met. It is hoped that on close examination that will be confirmed. We hope too that our concerns will have been so fully met that we could contemplate co-sponsorship of the draft resolution. I shall now proceed with my prepared statement.

55. The presentation of the draft treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is an important political fact and I should like to record the gratitude of my country to the co-Chairmen for the useful framework that they have furnished, a framework aimed at preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons.

56. It is also against this background that my country wishes to record its appreciation of those nuclear-weapon States that are taking positive steps in an effort to halt the spread of nuclear arms. In this connexion, the draft treaty before us represents an important first step.

57. Disarmament and more particularly nuclear disarmament are the overriding concern of all countries. The waste and destruction wrought by war and the sad legacy that the effects of the use of nuclear weapons could leave to future generations cause us to have very vested interests in achieving the end of proliferation and dissemination of nuclear weapons. Also, nuclear energy offers to mankind a very great potential for economic and social development. The peaceful use of the atom ought to be the primary aim of all countries. It is in this context that Jamaica approaches the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.³

58. My delegation has examined the text of the draft treaty in the light of the principles set forth in resolution 2028 (XX), keeping ever in mind the interests and concerns of the world community and, naturally, more particularly those of our own. For Jamaica, as a developing country, there are two principal categories of concerns which need to be considered on the short- and long-term bases. The first category comprises the economic and technological benefits which may be derived from the treaty or hampered by it. The second comprises the need for security guarantees or assurances.

59. The draft treaty could adversely affect the economic and technological development of under-developed countries. Contrary to some statements that have been made in this Committee, the denial of access to the technology of nuclear explosions is not the main burden of the criticism by non-nuclear States. Certainly we are aware that peaceful nuclear explosions are applicable to large-scale excavations and earth works, to the tapping of underground natural resources and to some areas of pure science. My delegation recognizes that this restricted technology is not an urgently required element in our economic development. But the acquisition of all the scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is of supreme importance.

60. Articles IV and V of the draft treaty are the beginnings of what could be another attempt at a charter for the economic and technological advancement of under-developed countries. But the articles themselves are vague. Article IV proclaims an inalienable right which is in fact circumscribed by the very text of the draft. Paragraph 2 of that article speaks of the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information. It is to be expected that exchange in this sense could not imply reciprocity. More importantly nothing is said about the access to scientific and technological information.

61. We believe that the point is too important to be left unattended. In this regard the suggestions of the representatives of Chile and Mexico on access to technological and scientific information are most apt and useful. But

³ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1.*

beyond this, it is necessary to have additional agreements or protocols negotiated to complement the provisions of these articles. The use of cheap nuclear energy is a distinct possibility which could be one of the keys to over-all industrial and economic development. However, in order to exploit this possibility fully, an under-developed country would require adequate educational and technological training programmes. Article V as well needs to be spelled out. As it stands, it is not precise enough. It contains an insufficient commitment to an international régime to assist in and supervise the use of explosive devices for peaceful purposes. Here again, we support the suggestion made by the Mexican representative, provided that the door is left open to more than one consequential multilateral agreement.

62. If non-proliferation is one way of preventing the use of nuclear weapons, then surely an even more significant way is to reduce the likelihood that countries already in possession of these weapons will put them to use. In the light of the third principle of resolution 2028 (XX), this treaty could not be said to adequately represent a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. Quite simply, we the non-nuclear-weapon States are not in a position to give up that which we do not yet possess. Those who possess have not committed themselves to give up their possessions.

63. Article VI is the closest commitment to non-proliferation in this treaty and it does not go very far. Granted it is a commitment of a declaratory nature to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race. The wording of the article leaves much to be desired. The nuclear Powers are not committed to halt or even slow down the manufacture of nuclear weapons. We understand that this is as far as the major nuclear Powers are prepared to go and, for this reason, my delegation can only echo the view of the representative of Sweden when she said that the danger to the world does not lie with us non-nuclear States, but elsewhere.

64. My delegation would now like to look at the security assurances provided by the draft resolution of the Security Council. This draft assumes that any of the three nuclear Powers will go to the defence of any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty threatened by nuclear attack. This is hardly credible. In addition, aggression has never been defined and determination of situations which threaten international peace is in many instances based on political considerations rather than on the facts of the matter. It is not inconceivable that the question regarding what constitutes a nuclear threat could share in the Security Council a fate similar to some notable items which have been brought before the Council as threats to the peace.

65. I should like to make it clear that, in the spirit of its formulation, my delegation believes that the draft resolution has much to commend it; but interpretation continues to be the basis of action. In this context, the assurances set forth in the draft resolution are too broad to inspire unqualified confidence. Thus, we are obliged to ask "What would be the relationship to the Charter of this resolution which it appears, in effect, establishes a tripartite governing board of the world, parallel to the Security Council of the

United Nations"? If this resolution is giving no more than what is contained in the Charter, then its significance would at best be minimal. If it adds to the Charter provisions, can it be that this draft resolution would give a novel interpretation to the Charter in some of those aspects which relate to the maintenance of international peace and security? Undoubtedly it is a fact of great political importance that the three major Powers are prepared to make this sort of commitment.

66. It would be preferable to have in the body of the treaty a pledge by the nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as some form of reaffirmed commitment, through the Security Council, against nuclear threats of aggression.

67. It is the belief of my delegation that it is in the inherent right and interests of those non-nuclear States that have the means to do so to acquire raw materials and to pursue such research and processing as would lead to the production of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control.

68. As a non-nuclear State, it is difficult for us not to consider that it would be preferable for the twenty-third session of the General Assembly to endorse a text of a non-proliferation treaty, for by then the non-nuclear-weapon Member States—some 120 of them—would be in a better position to contribute to the refinement of those areas of the draft treaty which up to now seem to lack adequate formulation.

69. Here I heartily endorse the remarks made earlier today by the representative of Nigeria. However, by these remarks I have made, my delegation does not intend to minimize the value of the draft treaty under review, but simply to underscore the importance that my country attaches to the forthcoming conference of non-nuclear-weapon States. It is expected that that conference will attempt to delineate those areas in which the provisions of articles IV and V of the draft treaty may be amplified by additional protocols or agreements.

70. It has been repeatedly stated that definitive action on the draft treaty at this session of the General Assembly is a matter of urgency. We have been told that the draft treaty represents a bridge that we must now cross, a first step that we must now take, before further progress on disarmament can be pursued. It is in this spirit that my delegation is intending to consider favourably the provisions of the draft treaty on which negotiations are now taking place, aimed at improving the formulation. I gather that this has been done. This means that the forthcoming summer session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is of crucial importance, and we are prepared to accept the word of the major Powers which have suggested specific issues on which negotiations can begin immediately. We have been made to understand that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty is a condition for the further discussions that are to take place. It must also be our understanding that, should these discussions prove fruitless, the review conference envisaged by the treaty would take that fact into account.

71. Mr. NSANZE (Burundi) (*translated from French*): Mr. Chairman, the resumed twenty-second session of the

General Assembly provides the delegation of Burundi with another opportunity to pay tribute to your professional merits, and to the vast experience which has given you the skill with which you have presided over the First Committee's work. Because of the close ties between the United Arab Republic and the Republic of Burundi, my Government notes with pleasure the honourable and dignified way in which you have carried out your duties in dealing with a problem as difficult and complex as that of disarmament.

72. The draft treaty before the Committee has some positive and therefore praiseworthy aspects. It corresponds entirely with the view of my Government which, failing total and immediate disarmament, proposes a process of gradual disarmament as a possible alternative. The Burundi delegation is fully convinced that such a procedure, if scrupulously carried out, can effectively reduce the tragic possibility of a world-wide nuclear eclipse. To avert that possibility, disarmament must clearly be carried out step by step.

73. No one disputes the fact that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one aspect of nuclear de-escalation, and in this connexion the terms of the treaty contain an important factor with respect to the principle my delegation supported during last year's disarmament discussions, as can be seen in our statement of 15 December 1967, as follows:

"General and complete disarmament has today become an imperious need. It is logical to assume that the peak of the nuclear age is not to achieve total and immediate disarmament... even if it is not possible to establish mathematically in advance a time-table covering the whole disarmament process, it is nevertheless true that disarmament will have to be carried out in stages.

"That process of gradual disengagement is in our opinion extremely urgent, at any rate its primary stage, which would be the first milestone along the road towards general disarmament with a view to avoiding an atomic holocaust.

"In order of priority, the first step to be taken would be to put a brake on armaments race; that should be the initial objective of any disarmament programme, the final objective being complete world disarmament." [1552nd meeting, paras. 164 to 166.]

74. The numerous attempts which have been made to solve the disarmament question indicate that of all problems, this is the most complex.

75. Its difficulty at the present juncture is understandable, both because of its scope and of its importance: its scope because it affects world security and its importance because the existence of mankind and the sovereignty of nations are at stake.

76. Continuous efforts have been devoted to disarmament. Restricting our consideration to only one century, we find that international councils of wise men have been working unceasingly both on the regional and on the international level to banish from our planet the most destructive weapons such as explosive shells in 1868, poisonous weapons in 1874, and 1889, aircraft bombs in 1932 and, in our own era, nuclear weapons.

77. Everything goes to show that every attempt seems to have been made already to banish war, the worst of the long-standing scourges of humanity. And yet, the outcome of many meetings held on disarmament leaves us with the disappointing impression that no concrete results have been achieved, an impression that negotiations have resulted over the course of innumerable meetings, only in bogging down their participants ever more deeply.

78. Owing to the broadening of the base of the body entrusted with disarmament, and owing too to its heterogeneous nature, there is reason to hope that the current negotiations under way within this Committee will yield results in the foreseeable future.

79. In order to attain the final goal of the United Nations, general and complete disarmament, the dialogue taking place between the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers must be marked by an essential mutual tolerance through all the successive steps that must be taken.

80. This Assembly is not unaware of the mediocre results achieved in a decade of drawn-out discussions held within a closed circle at Geneva. The delegation of Burundi is of the opinion that in order to safeguard mankind itself, every sacrifice must be made to prevent further setbacks.

81. My delegation is unable to accept the prospect of a thermonuclear holocaust which would strike our species because of the unyielding stands taken by one side and another, and we are fully convinced that every Member of the Organization has the duty to join in averting the peril we all face. For its part, my delegation is determined, within this Committee or outside it, to promote and explore every opportunity for working out a juridical formula that could provide equal advantages to States parties to the treaty. Our delegation, which hopes that the sponsors of the non-proliferation treaty and the projected resolution [A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2] will not take offence at our constructive and pertinent remarks, which are dictated by a genuine desire to co-operate, and which firmly hopes, too, that differences will be looked on as useful complementary factors, would like to mention some considerations which it deems might be appropriate.

82. Ever since the draft treaty was submitted to the Committee, it has provoked a chain reaction. The feeling of delegations which have expressed either reservations or criticisms with regard to the document may be explained by the fact that this attempt to prevent a war resulting from the armaments race gathered strength which led it in the very direction one had feared, namely, towards a monopoly of the use of nuclear power. Articles I and II are blatant proof of this.

83. The closely linked provisions in the first five articles reveal a clear determination to fix firmly the strategic balance maintained by a handful of guarantor Powers. From an impartial viewpoint, the new situation which would come about through adherence to this treaty would be tantamount to preserving the *status quo ante*. The treaty is intended to give legal approval to the closing of access to the nuclear club once and for all.

84. We must ascertain, *inter alia*: first, how to clear up the ambiguity concerning control in article III; secondly, how

to discover clandestine stockpiles or how to prevent their reconstitution; thirdly, how to eliminate delivery vehicles; fourthly, how inspection would be carried out, a subject which is not explicitly mentioned in article III.

85. Articles IV and V appear to be designed to set up a world divided into two camps, characterized by a nuclear supremacy from which very few would benefit.

86. I should like to say something about those notable features in the treaty which characterize its weaknesses. Throughout the debate, which has gone on for over a month, many of the previous statements have pointed to the doubtful elements in the document, so that my delegation does not need to dwell unduly on details.

87. Nevertheless, my Government, in a spirit of realism and objectivity, takes note of the fact that the body which has been working on disarmament at Geneva since 14 March 1962 deserves to be commended for having helped to bring about such close rapprochements between opposing views formerly held by the nuclear super-Powers. Today, differences in the timing of operations are no longer so basic as to make it impossible to foresee some short- or medium-term solution.

88. At the present stage, adherence to the treaty involves the making of considerable concessions. Refusal to make deep-reaching changes would render the final move towards general and complete nuclear disarmament an uncertain one, and would lead, for the rest of the way, to stumbling-blocks resulting from intransigent positions. For how can we hope to reach agreement on as complicated and controversial a question as that of general disarmament if those negotiating do not succeed in finding solutions to such lesser problems as non-proliferation, the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, the cessation of their manufacture, the liquidation of nuclear stockpiles, the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and the evacuation of foreign bases?

89. The preceding remarks cover an aspect which other delegations have already adequately emphasized. Burundi, however, as a member of the Organization of African Unity, must consider other aspects, which are strictly African and concern Africa directly.

90. Commitments made by States in respect of such complex legal machinery as that contained in the treaty makes it necessary for them to take stock of the geographical factors which affect them. A comparison between the various regions making up the world Organization leads us to the conclusion that the strategic balance in the nuclear era rests on the super-Powers' possession of a nuclear striking force which enables them to inflict intolerable damage on each other.

91. However, if it is true that this situation is enough to ensure the national defence of the leading atomic Powers, and if their strategy and policy are controlled by the concern to safeguard their respective interests, it is none the less true that they are also serving a coalition of States which share their way of life and thus benefit from the advantages which accompany the thermonuclear capacity of the guarantor Powers.

92. On the other hand, there are some territories which are not in a position either to take advantage of the protective shadow cast by the great Powers or to shelter in it, or to rely on their nuclear shield. The States in this position are correspondingly less prepared to join in a legal scheme without the guarantee—a solemn one, if not a sure one—that their security will not be imperilled by the strategic implications of the document.

93. Since Burundi is a firm believer in any principle and hypothesis which can lead to a just formula for prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it must take a stand in keeping with the situation as it exists in Africa. It is obliged to do so by the over-all continental situation vis-à-vis Afrikaner nazism. The Republic of Burundi, numbering itself among the African countries absolutely determined to combat *apartheid* until the myths it has created are disproved, intends to act in line with the facts as they exist in Africa.

94. On the basis of these continental circumstances and because of the uncertainty created by an Afrikaner arsenal aimed at certain African States, my delegation wonders whether there would be the same unanimity in defending the treaty if these defenders were to be collectively and directly threatened.

95. It seems to us that the United Nations is faced with a dilemma whose solution is both difficult and painful. The truly sovereign Africa has adopted a sacrosanct principle: it will not allow itself to be deluded by independence so long as the rightful owners of southern Africa are subjected to the nazi madness of the Afrikaners. Since the latter show no sign of coming to their senses in the near future, it follows that Africans are not prepared to capitulate. The treaty passes over the risk which is nevertheless foreseeable, of an attack in which Africa would be the stake, for to ignore any possibility of nuclear threat from the forces of *apartheid* would denote either defective vision or a stubborn determination to hide from reality.

96. If in the end, an ingenuous approach were to prevail and if, in a spirit of co-operation or over-confidence, Africa were to give in to entreaties, what could it expect in return? Past experience makes us doubt the great Powers' future resolve to come to the assistance of Africa against its probable potential aggressor, Pretoria. The attitude of the great Powers to the insolent defiance of the Afrikaner Government borders on outright surrender. If these same great Powers have been noted for their reluctance to mete out to that Government a punishment infinitely less harsh than that of the ultimate weapon, then there are solid grounds indeed for wondering about the part they will play in defending Africa against its relentless enemy. If that enemy were to unleash an atomic arsenal against its neighbours, it is doubtful whether the States which have joined in the treaty would resolve to wipe out the Afrikaners for the Africans' benefit. Such are the vital issues of our continent which give rise to the legitimate concern felt by the delegation of Burundi.

97. In the light of the foregoing, Africa must needs set up a security system designed to meet any eventuality.

98. The stress laid on the role to be played by the super-Powers is at once a credit to their skill and a

recognition of the fact that because of their central position within the United Nations their impartiality will undoubtedly play an incalculable role in setting up a system of guarantees from which the entire international community can benefit.

99. We are convinced that this aspect of the problem is crucial and that it clearly reveals the highly vulnerable situation in which the draft treaty could leave Africa if we persist in upholding exclusiveness for some to the detriment of others.

100. Burundi's plea on behalf of Africa may give the impression that our continent is on the brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. We admit that atomic weapons are far from being the result of spontaneous generation, just as we recognize that the infinitesimal number of States which now command nuclear arsenals will not have a monopoly over them for ever.

101. If we take a long-range view, we can foresee the time when African countries will be faced with the obligation and when it will be possible for them to have supplies of such weapons, and when, too, they will even be technically able to provide themselves with an embryonic nuclear force over a period of a few years.

102. The proposed conference of non-nuclear-weapon countries could open up a road leading more surely to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty which would be more acceptable to a greater number of adherents. My delegation is in favour of convening a conference of non-nuclear-weapon countries. Although some States still enjoy a monopoly on nuclear weapons, it would be wrong to leave it to them to interrupt or continue their activities at will. Other countries have an equal right to play a role in guiding the destiny of mankind, of which they are a part. This truth has been ardently supported by George Kennan, who stated over seven years ago:

"We are not the sole owners of our globe. We are only cohabitants of it, along with so many others. We therefore have no right, under the pretext of self-defence, to provoke or risk its destruction, or even to poison its atmosphere with our nuclear tests. Our own security is but a secondary matter in the face of the problems of all mankind, something that we sometimes forget."*

103. An international meeting devoted to finding ways and means of promoting disarmament is not so much of special interest to its participants as it is to mankind itself, including the Powers which control thermonuclear energy. The basic purpose of such a meeting could not be more precisely defined than as being the founding of a peace club with the task of protecting and immunizing against nuclear contagion the countries not yet contaminated. We hope that the holding of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States will contribute in large measure to bringing new enlightenment to the sponsors of the treaty as well as to future signatories and adherents.

104. In his speeches devoted to world peace, Colonel Michel Micombero, President of the Republic of Burundi, attaches great importance to the use of nuclear energy and

science for useful and peaceful purposes. He does not conceal his disapproval of the use of nuclear weapons.

105. This firm stand grows out of the danger of the military use of nuclear energy which threatens to cut short mankind's life on earth in the more or less near future.

106. While recognizing that the drafting of the treaty is an indication of a sincere determination to proceed towards disarmament, my Government nevertheless regrets its restraint.

107. We believe that the fate of mankind is at stake, and as members of the human race we have a right to defend this cause, whatever arguments are used against it for nationalist motives which are all too often biased.

108. The treaty will act as brake on the arms race; however, in order to escape completely from nuclear catastrophe, it is essential to find a solution to the problem as a whole, from the evacuation of foreign bases to eradication of nuclear devices and explosives.

109. In conclusion, I should like to add that my delegation will carefully consider the changes submitted to us at this meeting, and we undertake here and now to play as large a part as possible in seeking a solution satisfactory to all the parties concerned.

110. Mr. VALDIVIESO (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): Ever since the beginning of the discussion on disarmament in the General Assembly of the United Nations, the delegation of Peru has co-operated most actively with a view to promoting the success of all the resolutions calling for negotiations on this vitally important problem.

111. Our delegation took a similar position when the possibility of signing a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was considered, and although our country did not take part in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, we followed its work at Geneva with the greatest attention and interest.

112. In line with this approach, Peru signed the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, served as a member of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, and voted in favour of the resolution to convene that meeting [*General Assembly resolution 2346 B (XXI)*]. The delegation of Peru attaches great importance to that Conference, and considers that its convening should not be dependent on the results of the meeting in which we are participating here.

113. Peru was also one of the countries which, at the regional level, promoted the signing of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [*see A/C.1/946*], better known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It acceded to that international instrument in the desire to denuclearize a large zone of the American continent and avoid contamination of the environment. The Peruvian delegation, which participated in the preparatory work on that Treaty, put forward some suggestions which were then included in it. One of them defined the territory covered by the Treaty. Article 3 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco states that

* Translated from the French.

for the purposes of this Treaty it is to be understood that the term "territory" includes "the territorial sea, air space and any other space over which the State exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation".

114. That definition arose from the concern of our Government to defend the fish resources of the sea area near our coasts from environmental contamination.

115. Thus, being aware of the importance of any international measure designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the resulting contamination of the environment, the Government of Peru has studied the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with the greatest attention, and in view of the positive advance which an agreement in this delicate sector of nuclear energy would represent, we have decided to support its adoption.

116. We know that the draft before us suffers from some defects, and therefore we understand the reticence with which some nations accept it and the extreme position taken by other countries which consider that it will not protect us from latent threats. Fundamentally, however, we consider that this draft treaty is the result of an agreement between the two greatest atomic Powers, and we trust that its success will encourage those nations to seek new areas in which it may be feasible to reach agreement, thus helping to remove the threat of a new and devastating conflict.

117. To our Government, the crucial point of this draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is that relating to the explosion of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. It is the differences in interpretation concerning these explosions which have led to the existing division between the countries which support the treaty and those which wish to improve its wording or are completely opposed to it.

118. In this divergence of views, the Government of Peru takes a position of principle which, moreover, is supported by scientific arguments. It is undeniable that the technology for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from that used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and that we are far from having a device which does not result in contamination of the environment when it explodes. Furthermore, the manufacture of these devices obviously presupposes a highly advanced level of technological and scientific development which necessarily involves the testing of nuclear weapons. It is inconceivable that an explosive nuclear device which releases energy in a perfectly controlled situation and does not contaminate the environment could be manufactured without first passing through the previous stage of this technology, which involves the explosion of uncontrolled nuclear energy. The destructive power of these nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, if their manufacture is not prevented by a treaty, would be left to the arbitrary decision of each State possessing them or, as it is now expressed, "to the will to use them".

119. It is precisely the fear of the proliferation of nuclear devices and the ravages resulting from their use that has inspired the signing of regional declarations and treaties and, in the specific case of our country, has led us to accede to the Treaties of Moscow and Tlatelolco and to deprecate the nuclear tests being carried out by France in the Pacific.

120. It is undeniable that this draft treaty on non-proliferation in going further than the Treaty of Tlatelolco with regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful uses, is designed to set a further limitation on the Latin American countries parties to that Treaty.

121. The Treaty of Tlatelolco generously permits nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Article 18 of that Treaty reads:

"The Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons"

In other words, for peaceful purposes it permits the explosion of atomic bombs. Of course, when we signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, it was assumed that there was a difference between a nuclear weapon and a nuclear device, a difference which may be seen on reading the definition of nuclear weapons in article 5.

122. Therefore, we think the non-nuclear countries should facilitate the conclusion of an agreement aimed at avoiding the proliferation of atomic explosions. Everyone knows that there are about ten nations which, within a few years—some within only a few months—would be capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Today, when the nuclear club is confined to five nations, we see how difficult it is to reach an agreement. Can we imagine what Byzantine procedures it would require to negotiate and adopt another, even more acceptable one at a time when there may be fifteen or more of those atomic countries? Can we be sure that later on the countries which now oppose the draft treaty will not urge us to sign another one like it? We feel that in this matter, more than any other, we must be realistic. Since Peru does not intend to become an atomic country, we choose the lesser evil. In this our reasoning is as follows: the fewer the nuclear Powers, the greater the possibilities of concluding agreements that may lead us to general and complete disarmament, which is the goal to which mankind aspires.

123. However, our acceptance cannot be unconditional. The subject we are dealing with makes that inevitable. We cannot ignore the significance and scope of the provisions of this draft treaty, which legally recognizes and confirms and for a long time the *de facto* inequality now existing between the non-nuclear countries and the atomic Powers. That is why we feel it necessary to demand of those Powers that, being aware of the grave responsibility they assume in submitting this draft, they fulfil the obligation arising from article VI of the text. This obligation, although confined in the text to conducting negotiations in good faith, is very broad and morally binding. We also hope that to realize the objectives set forth in the preamble to the treaty, the nuclear Powers will harmonize their policies so that the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the elimination of all existing stockpiles of such weapons, and of nuclear weapons and their carrier vehicles in national arsenals may become a reality, for these are the objectives of the treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control which the nuclear Powers have undertaken to finalize in the near future.

124. We wish to appeal to the nuclear Powers which hesitate to sign this treaty to review their position in view

of the disinterested attitude shown by the non-nuclear countries—some of which are as developed as the nuclear Powers—in renouncing a right to possess nuclear power in the interest of world security. As long as those nuclear Powers remain outside this and other agreements restricting the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons or devices, that security will be precarious and we shall go on living anxiously under the balance of terror.

125. It has been said and repeated many times here that the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons visualizes only horizontal, not vertical, proliferation and no one would venture to question that. However, we believe that in the present international circumstances it is difficult to advance further in the delicate and complex matter of complete disarmament, regarding which this draft treaty marks a significant step forward. For us, the “acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers”, referred to in resolution 2028 (XX) of the General Assembly, will be achieved only when the treaty on general and complete disarmament is concluded between the great Powers. Everything else would be mere speculation, and until that treaty is concluded this treaty on non-proliferation will remain incomplete. For this reason, I wish to establish clearly that the Government of Peru would be willing to assume the obligations provided for in the treaty on non-proliferation on the understanding that the nuclear Powers undertake to negotiate and sign a treaty on general and complete disarmament within a reasonable period of time. Otherwise, that strict balance of mutual obligations will not be established, nor will the wish expressed by all nations through resolution 2028 (XX) of the General Assembly be satisfied.

126. If the negotiations conducted by the nuclear Powers lead to practical and tangible results within a reasonable period of time and help to create an atmosphere of international harmony, the non-nuclear nations will gladly accept the sacrifice involved in renouncing the right to develop nuclear science to the full. Should these negotiations become prolonged, involved in Byzantine complexities, or show signs of a desire for world hegemony, the non-nuclear nations parties to the treaty on non-proliferation could withdraw from it in accordance with article X.

127. In fact, that article establishes as a justification for the withdrawal of a State extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of the treaty which jeopardize the supreme interests of that State. Nothing would be more “extraordinary” than the failure of the nuclear Powers to honour the commitment to negotiate the agreement on general and complete disarmament. Moreover, the supreme interest of a nation is its security and, if it feels this is threatened by the persistent antagonism involved in a vertical proliferation of atomic weapons, no one can object if a State, in full exercise of its sovereignty, withdraws from the treaty and protects itself from the danger inherent in the arms race in the way that best suits its interests.

128. However, it is not only considerations of security that may cause the withdrawal of a State from the treaty on non-proliferation. The only commitment to be expressly assumed by the atomic Powers under the treaty is that established in article V concerning the co-operation they

are to give in extending to the non-nuclear countries the potential benefits deriving from the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Any kind of discrimination, condition or bargaining procedure that might be established in granting this type of assistance would be a violation against the sovereignty of the recipient country, jeopardizing its supreme interests. We must be most emphatic in stating that we, the non-nuclear countries, will not be content with high-sounding declarations or vague offers on this point, for we are fully aware of our sacrifice. The Government of my country, as the Government of a developing country which realizes the problems resulting from this situation, attaches the highest priority to this type of assistance.

129. Our peoples will have to apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in order to emerge from the economic lethargy to which a harsh topography, among many other factors, relegates us. That is why my Government stresses its inalienable right—which is recognized in the treaty, but will need to be made tangible through practical measures—to develop the entire vast field opened up by nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as an indispensable condition for its development.

130. We must demand and hope that the co-operation offered by the nuclear States will take tangible form and be intensified until it reaches proportions sufficient to satisfy the just aspirations of the non-nuclear countries. My delegation considers that an express reaffirmation on this point by the nuclear Powers would be a positive contribution, and we join in the suggestion already made in this chamber by other delegations that the assistance for peaceful purposes should include the resources deriving from the cessation of the arms race and implementation of the agreement or agreements that may be concluded to achieve general and complete disarmament.

131. My delegation listened with great interest to the statement made by the representative of Ireland [*1573rd meeting*], whose delegation has contributed so much to bringing about this treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, when, in speaking on this point, he expressed his hope that the atomic Powers would proceed to grant this assistance on the same basis and on the same scale as the United States did in granting aid under the Marshall Plan.

132. To sum up, the delegation of Peru declares that it will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2. We also wish to state that we attach great importance to the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to be held at Geneva. We regard the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a first step on the road to general and complete disarmament and, actually, we are giving a vote of confidence to the nuclear Powers so that they may in the near future conclude an agreement to that effect which, then and only then, will make it possible to lay down the mutual obligations recommended in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) and to divert to peaceful purposes the abundant resources now being used not for the benefit but to the detriment of mankind.

133. In so doing my delegation is simply reaffirming the foreign policy of Peru in its faithful adherence to the San Francisco Charter.

134. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Today the First Committee is completing its general debate on the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

135. This debate has lasted for nearly a month and a half and has certainly been on a high level. There is hardly another case in the practice of the United Nations of such a thorough and responsible discussion and such concern to find a solution to the problem.

136. That the discussion has been so constructive, meaningful and searching is to be explained, above all, by the realization that it is extremely important to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in order to avert the threat of nuclear war. The various views and considerations advanced show that representatives are familiar with the problem and have thoroughly studied the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

137. In brief, the discussion in the First Committee has been serious, meaningful, and very useful.

138. Varied as the views expressed have been, the debate has revealed one feature common to the statements of nearly all delegations. This common feature is a clear desire to put a stop to any further spread of nuclear weapons, to achieve cessation of the nuclear arms race and bring about nuclear disarmament, and to ensure that the energy of the atomic nucleus should serve exclusively the peaceful labours of mankind. This approach is in line with the vital interests of peoples, and with their desire to establish peace on earth and create favourable conditions for economic and social progress and a higher level of living.

139. Many delegations have commented on separate provisions of the draft treaty prepared by the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the draft resolution of the General Assembly approving the treaty.

140. The USSR delegation, as it has said before, studied carefully all the comments and considerations put forward. It did so in the sincere desire to understand thoroughly the positions of delegations and to take into account all the proposals aimed at giving the treaty maximum effectiveness in the present international situation.

141. After all aspects of the matter had been closely examined and weighed amendments and revisions were made a few days ago in the draft resolution submitted by thirty-one States for adoption by the General Assembly.

142. Today the co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee have submitted to the First Committee an amended and expanded draft of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

143. Thus, the Committee now has before it two documents improved by taking account of the criticisms and proposals of the representatives of dozens of countries, namely: a draft treaty on non-proliferation and a General Assembly draft resolution on the subject.

144. At this point, the USSR delegation would like to advance a few supplementary considerations.

145. What is the essential content of the amendments and revisions made to these documents? What wishes are they intended to meet?

146. Many delegations in commenting on the problem of security expressed the desire that the connexion between the non-proliferation treaty and the United Nations Charter should be made explicit. They accordingly proposed that appropriate references to the Charter, emphasizing that the treaty is an organic part of international legislation on the maintenance and preservation of peace, should be included both in the non-proliferation treaty and in the General Assembly resolution.

147. This wish has been taken into account. A new paragraph has been included in the preamble to the treaty, reading:

"Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least divergence for armaments of the world's human and economic resources".

A paragraph to the same effect has been included in the draft resolution on non-proliferation to be adopted by the General Assembly.

148. The proposed additions are of great importance. Renunciation of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State is a fundamental principle in the maintenance and preservation of peace. The Soviet Union will continue its unremitting efforts to see that observance by all States of these obligations under the United Nations Charter becomes inviolable international law.

149. The establishment of this link between the non-proliferation treaty and the United Nations Charter, particularly taken in conjunction with the Security Council resolutions on the obligations of nuclear Powers to protect non-nuclear States in accordance with the Charter from nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail, will offer greater assurances of security to the non-nuclear countries.

150. The Committee has also discussed at length the question of the peaceful uses of atomic energy as it relates to the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty. While noting the profoundly beneficial effects which this treaty is bound to have on the economic, scientific and technological development of non-nuclear countries, many delegations at the same time pointed out that the material possibilities of peaceful application of atomic energy offered to non-nuclear States by the treaty should be spelled out. Many of them rightly said that developing countries are particularly interested in making peaceful use of nuclear technology to accelerate their economic development and increase the well-being of their people.

151. Considerable work was done in order to introduce appropriate provisions, meeting the wishes of the non-

nuclear States, into the non-proliferation treaty and the relevant General Assembly resolution.

152. First, article IV of the treaty, dealing with the peaceful uses of atomic energy, now contains a new provision to the effect that all the parties to the treaty will take measures facilitating not only the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but also the exchange of nuclear equipment and materials. This important amendment of article IV of the treaty, which greatly expands co-operation in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, is undoubtedly in the interests of non-nuclear States. Furthermore, the preamble of the draft resolution to be adopted by the General Assembly now contains similar provisions, emphasizing the right of States under the treaty "to acquire source and special fissionable materials, as well as equipment for the processing, use and production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes".

153. Secondly, article IV of the treaty, dealing with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, now includes a provision which emphasizes that the parties to the treaty will co-operate in contributing to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States party to the treaty, "with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world". This amendment needs no comment, for it speaks for itself. Special attention will be paid to co-operation in the uses of atomic energy for peaceful purposes with developing countries in the form of assistance in the use of scientific knowledge and experience, and also of exchange of equipment, materials, and the necessary scientific and technological information. This is what many delegations have asked for.

154. Thirdly, article V of the treaty, dealing with peaceful nuclear explosions, now contains a number of amendments, defining more clearly the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States to use nuclear explosions for the development of their national economy, both through an appropriate international body and pursuant to bilateral agreements. The article now specifies that negotiations on the subject of the potential benefits to States from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body, shall commence as soon as possible after the present treaty enters into force.

155. Naturally, the necessary preparatory work can begin before the treaty has entered into force. We take it that the corresponding international agreement or agreements will be based on certain general principles which are in accord with the treaty and which will govern the procedures whereby any benefits from the applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States. Such procedures must, of course, be worked out with the very broad participation of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty interested in the use of nuclear explosions for their national economic development.

156. In addition, this article now includes a provision stressing that the peaceful application of nuclear explosions in accordance with this treaty must be made "under appropriate international observation", with a view to

excluding any possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions being used by non-nuclear-weapon States to obtain the special information needed for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

157. During the debate, certain States sought to cast aspersions on the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by alleging that it would deprive non-nuclear-weapon States of an opportunity to use nuclear explosions for peaceful development. I should like to emphasize once again that this interpretation bears no relation to the aims and purposes of the article on peaceful nuclear explosions. However, in order to remove any doubt in that regard, article V now contains a revised formulation which, in clear and precise treaty language, not only reaffirms the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to enjoy the benefits of any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, but sets forth the practical ways in which this can be done.

158. The full text of article V of the draft treaty, in its new version, was read out by the Secretary of the First Committee at the beginning of this meeting, and there is therefore no need for me to do so once again.

159. Taken together, the amendments made to those parts of the treaty and of the General Assembly resolution on non-proliferation dealing with the peaceful applications of nuclear energy lend added strength to the international basis for broad and varied co-operation between nuclear and non-nuclear countries, between States greatly advanced in nuclear research and States which are only beginning such research.

160. The non-proliferation treaty will promote the economic, scientific and technological progress of non-nuclear countries. It will be of particular importance in this regard for those developing countries which are not yet in a position to carry out independently large scale projects in applying nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and which therefore need assistance from States that are more advanced in these matters. If the non-proliferation treaty is concluded, the non-nuclear countries parties to it will be given broad access to the benefits of scientific and technological progress in the peaceful uses of the atom. The treaty imposes precise obligations on the developed countries with regard to lending assistance to developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

161. Many delegations expressed the view that it should be made clearer that conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would not be the end of the matter, but that it would be followed by other measures for nuclear disarmament and cessation of the arms race, measures that would gradually lead mankind to general and complete disarmament.

162. This line of thought is in full accord with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which has been consistently fighting for the elimination of nuclear weapons and for drastic disarmament measures. Our country has proposed a programme of general and complete disarmament designed to achieve in a short period of time a world without weapons, a world without war. Believing as we do that general and complete disarmament is one of the most important problems of our day, we are continuing to work

actively for progress towards the solution of this problem in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, in the United Nations, in all other international forums, and in negotiations with individual States.

163. After the various considerations advanced in the debate on disarmament questions in this Committee had been carefully examined, certain amendments were made to the draft treaty. One such amendment is in the preamble, in which the parties to the treaty now clearly and unambiguously declare their intention

“to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament”.

164. Corresponding additions have been made in the draft resolution to be adopted by the General Assembly. The preamble of this text now stresses that effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament must follow the non-proliferation treaty “as soon as possible”, while operative paragraph 4 now includes an appeal not only to the Eighteen-Nation Committee but directly to the nuclear-weapon States

“urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”.

165. The purpose of these amendments and additions is to trace a clear and definite path to further business-like negotiations on disarmament and to ensure the most favourable conditions for their success.

166. The discussion of the item entitled “Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” has now reached what may be termed its culminating stage. The amendments and additions introduced into the non-proliferation treaty and the General Assembly resolution on the basis of the debate in the First Committee meet the wishes and considerations put forward by many delegations. The moment of choice, the time to decide this question, has now come for every country, and we hope that they will duly appreciate what is the result of long and sustained effort.

167. The USSR delegation appeals to representatives of all States Members of the United Nations to support the thirty-one-Power draft resolution on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. By adopting this resolution the General Assembly will make a major contribution to an early conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty and will crown with success years of international effort.

168. Cessation of further spread of weapons of mass destruction will be an important step towards disarmament and towards the strengthening of international peace and security.

169. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): This afternoon, we in this Committee are concluding our general debate on the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As is your practice, Mr. Chairman, you have accorded to all members who desired it the opportunity to speak, and to some, including my own delegation,

to do so more than once. I wish again to record my appreciation to you for those opportunities. Every delegation, therefore, has had the opportunity to state the position of its Government on this important subject.

170. That extended debate should be held on this question is entirely proper, for it is a question of world-wide scope and transcendent significance. Speaking for the United States, I should like to express appreciation for the serious and constructive tone of the debate and for the valuable contributions to it which so many members have made.

171. As I made clear in my earlier statements during this debate, the draft treaty text of 11 March which was reported to the Assembly by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was the result of four years of intensive negotiations and reflected the views of many Governments, nuclear and non-nuclear, from many regions of the world. From the very beginning we have been encouraged by the broad and general support manifested in this debate among the membership for the non-proliferation treaty. It is a great tribute to the constructive work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

172. In our consultations, as well as in the general debate, suggestions, however, have been made for improvements both in the draft resolution and in the treaty text, in order to clarify them and to broaden even further the support and acceptability of this historic treaty.

173. It is not easy to revise the text of a treaty arrived at after such protracted negotiations and involving such important issues. Nevertheless, out of respect for the views expressed and the suggestions made in this Committee, and in deference to the Committee's proper role in considering such a treaty, the sponsors of the draft resolution and the co-Chairmen who have the primary drafting responsibility for the treaty, have made a major effort to meet the legitimate concerns which various members have expressed by modifying both the draft resolution and the draft treaty. The revised draft resolution and draft treaty [*A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2 and Add.1*] are therefore the product of a wide effort to arrive at a generally acceptable consensus.

174. As regards the draft resolution, on Wednesday [*1576th meeting*] the Committee heard the statement by the representative of Finland, Ambassador Jakobson, describing the changes which the co-sponsors of the resolution have made in their draft.

175. As regards the draft treaty itself, today the United States and the Soviet Union, as co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, have presented a revised treaty text incorporating a number of changes in response to the suggestions made.

176. The First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, has presented the comments of his Government on the revised treaty text. I should now like to describe the revisions in that text on behalf of the United States.

177. The revisions correspond to three major purposes which various delegations have emphasized in putting

forward their suggestions in this general debate: first, to strengthen the provisions for sharing in the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; second, to strengthen the provisions of the treaty calling for further and prompt measures to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit existing nuclear arsenals; and third, to enhance the security of the signatories by reaffirming the principles of the United Nations Charter regarding the use of force and threats of force in international relations.

178. As regards the first category, sharing peaceful uses of nuclear energy, changes have been made in articles IV and V. There are three changes in article IV, all in paragraph 2. The first change, originally proposed by the delegation of Nigeria, provides that the parties not only "have the right to participate in," but also "undertake to facilitate", the fullest possible exchanges for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Thus, the right to such sharing is recognized explicitly not only as a right of non-nuclear Powers but also as a commitment to action by nuclear Powers and all others in a position to contribute thereto.

179. Also in article IV, the character of this sharing has been broadened by specifically including "equipment" and "materials" in addition to scientific and technological information. This change corresponds to a view strongly voiced by the representative of Italy and shared also by Belgium and other delegations.

180. Also in article IV, there has been added an important phrase at the end, relating to the obligation of parties in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing to the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In addition to the phrase which emphasizes that this is to be done "especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty", there has now been added the significant phrase, "with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world". The importance of this addition is self-evident. It constitutes explicit recognition of the particular needs and requirements of the developing areas of the world in the field of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This change is based on a suggestion by the representative of Chile, Ambassador Uribe, and was also desired by many other delegations from African, Asian and Latin American countries.

181. In connexion with these changes in article IV, I call the Committee's attention also to certain corresponding changes in the draft resolution. The second paragraph of the preamble of the resolution, as revised, stresses the importance

"... of intensifying international co-operation in the development of peaceful applications of atomic energy".

182. An entirely new fourth preambular paragraph makes it unequivocally clear that, under the treaty:

"... all signatories have the right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and will be able to acquire source and special fissionable materials as well as equipment for the processing, use and production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes".

183. These changes, in both the treaty and the draft resolution, should dispel any remaining concern regarding the treaty's effect on the use of nuclear energy for peace.

184. I come next to article V, which relates to peaceful nuclear explosions. This article has been strengthened in several ways in our desire to respond to concerns voiced by various delegations, especially those in Latin America. Among other things, the new language binds the parties explicitly and emphatically:

"... to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty ...".

185. It will be noted that the revised text makes it clear that States may obtain the benefits from peaceful application of nuclear explosions:

"... pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States."

This language contemplates a basic agreement defining the functions of the appropriate international body and holds open the possibilities of a series of separate international agreements dealing with particular projects.

186. It is important that the primary agreement—defining the function of the international body—be negotiated promptly. For this reason we have added the sentence that:

"Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force."

We trust that this language will remove any doubts about the intention of the nuclear-weapon States which are in a position to do so to provide such services under appropriate international observation and at the earliest practical moment.

187. Let me add, lest there be any doubt on this score, that the provision concerning negotiations is not intended in any way to preclude preparatory consideration of this matter before the treaty enters into force. We assume that all interested States will wish to begin studies and consultations promptly. Many States, including the United States, will promptly begin or continue studies and consultations already under way. I should also note that this subject is on the agenda of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

188. We are grateful to the head of the delegation of Mexico, Mr. García Robles, and his colleagues of the Latin American working group, Ambassador Turbay Ayala of Colombia and Ambassador Piñera of Chile in particular, for suggestions which formed the basis for these changes, and also to other delegations that expressed their great interest in them.

189. I come now to the second major category of changes, those relating to further measures of disarmament.

190. During this debate, most delegations have clearly recognized that it would be inadvisable to try to include in

this treaty any specific list of further disarmament measures, lest, by attempting too much in a single treaty, we should end by achieving nothing. There was widespread sentiment, however, that everything possible should be done to ensure that the treaty will be followed as soon as possible by additional measures to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce existing nuclear arsenals—a view with which the United States emphatically agrees.

191. To give further expression to this widespread desire, an important addition has been made to the ninth preambular paragraph of the treaty. As revised, this paragraph now declares the intention of the parties “to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and”—this is the new, additional language—“to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament”. This change was made pursuant to a suggestion by the delegation of Yugoslavia.

192. Again, in connexion with these changes in the treaty, the co-sponsors have also made certain corresponding revisions to strengthen the draft resolution. In the fifth preambular paragraph, which relates to this matter of further disarmament measures, the words “must be followed by effective steps” have been revised to read “must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures”. Moreover, a significant change has been made in operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, so that the request urgently to pursue negotiations on such measures is now addressed not only to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, as before, but also to “the nuclear-weapon States”. And, in this connexion, operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution has also been significantly broadened, in line with a suggestion by the delegation of Japan, to express “the hope for the widest possible adherence to the treaty by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States”. By making these changes, the sponsors express their hope for universal adherence to the treaty by all States.

193. The third category of concern which has been expressed in this debate has to do with the problem of the threat or use of force, particularly of attack by nuclear weapons. The United States is convinced that the question of security assurances against such attacks or threats can best and most appropriately be dealt with in the context of action under the United Nations Charter. We have of course given careful study to the statements made by many delegations on this question. Those statements have served to underscore our conviction that the draft resolution on security assurances which the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom intend to propose in the Security Council,⁴ and the declarations which they intend to make, constitute the most appropriate and effective solution that can now be devised for this problem—a solution whose joint support by these three States, commanding the overwhelming preponderance of nuclear-weapon power in the world today, is a deterrent factor of the first magnitude.

194. In this connexion, however, we have benefited from valuable suggestions from a number of delegations, particularly Japan, for strengthening both the draft treaty and the

draft resolution by relating them more explicitly to relevant principles of the United Nations Charter. And this is in accord with the security assurances proposal, which, as I made clear in my statement of 15 May, is fully in harmony with the Charter. Accordingly, new final paragraphs have been inserted in the preambles of both the revised draft resolution and the revised draft treaty, reaffirming applicable principles of the Charter. I call the Committee's attention particularly to the final preambular paragraph in the revised text of the treaty, which recalls that:

“...in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources”.

This citation of basic Charter principles provides a significant and fitting premise to the operative sections of the treaty.

195. A change has also been made in article IX of the draft in order to eliminate a concern voiced by several delegations. This concern was that article IX, as it then stood, might, in theory, allow the treaty to be frustrated by a nuclear Power which failed to ratify after signing it. To obviate this possibility, the three depositary Governments are now named in the second paragraph of article IX: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States—the same three depositaries which the General Assembly approved for the space Treaty—and the third paragraph provides that the treaty will enter into force after those depositary Governments, all of which fully and unreservedly support the treaty, and forty other signatory States have deposited their instruments of ratification.

196. Finally, in revising the draft resolution, we have made several other changes in language, which appear in the text which has been read out by the Secretary of the Committee to accommodate the views of several delegations.

197. Before concluding, I wish to comment briefly on the matter of safeguards, which is the subject of article III of the draft, since this is a matter which has been discussed throughout our debate.

198. My delegation is deeply gratified by the widespread support and favourable comment which this very important article has drawn in the course of the Committee's deliberations. We are heartened by the widely shared view that the safeguards prescribed by article III will not only serve to verify important treaty obligations but, in so doing, will also provide a significant impetus to co-operation among the parties in the development of nuclear energy for peace.

199. In presenting the draft of article III to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 18 January, at its 257th meeting, the United States representative enumerated three principles regarding the safeguards and the

⁴ *Ibid.*, annex II.

safeguards agreements called for by article III. I should like to repeat those principles for you.

200. First, there should be safeguards for all non-nuclear-weapon parties of such a nature that all parties can have confidence in their effectiveness. Therefore, safeguards established by an agreement negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system must enable the IAEA to carry out its responsibility of providing assurance that no diversion is taking place.

201. Second, in discharging their obligations under article III, non-nuclear-weapon parties may negotiate safeguards agreements with the IAEA individually or together with other parties; and, specifically, an agreement covering such obligations may be entered into between the IAEA and another international organization the work of which is related to the IAEA and the membership of which includes the parties concerned.

202. Third, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the IAEA should make appropriate use of existing records and safeguards, provided that, under such mutually agreed arrangements, the IAEA can satisfy itself that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

203. We are convinced that the safeguards agreements called for by article III, in keeping with these principles, will be worked out in a timely manner so that we will all soon begin to reap the benefits of enhanced security and of peaceful progress which the safeguards will bring. And, as the offer of the United States to accept such safeguards demonstrates, we are confident that the safeguards will not impose any industrial, economic or other burden on any party.

204. Some delegations have raised questions about the meaning of certain terms used in article III, about the effect of its provisions, and about the applicability of treaty safeguards to uranium mines and ore-processing plants. The representative of Canada, in his statement of 23 May [1573rd meeting], provided helpful answers to many of these questions and also referred to the records of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament proceedings which specifically dealt with these questions.

205. I should like only to reiterate a point already made by several representatives: namely, that in IAEA practice and under its approved procedures, IAEA safeguards are not applied to uranium mines or to ore-processing plants. The application of Agency safeguards to nuclear material begins only with the uranium concentrate which the uranium ore-processing plants produce. The draft treaty does not require any change in the existing procedure by extending the application of Agency safeguards closer to the mine from the concentrate output stage.

206. Of course, exports of uranium ore to non-nuclear-weapon States by parties to the treaty would be subject to the provisions of Article III, paragraph 2, and such exports would have to be under the conditions specified therein so that the source or special fissionable material which would be derived from this ore in the recipient State would be subject to the safeguards required by the treaty.

207. In this statement I have described significant changes and, I believe, both clarifications and improvements in the text of both the non-proliferation treaty and the draft resolution supporting it. We believe that these changes will further broaden the appeal and the acceptability of this historic treaty.

208. I conclude by joining with our co-Chairman, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in presenting for this Committee's approval this draft treaty in its totality.

209. This treaty will serve three major and important purposes. First, it will serve to assure that control over nuclear weapons, with their catastrophic power of destruction, shall spread no further among the nations of the earth. Its first two articles, articles I and II, taken together, will help lock the door to nuclear weapons proliferation from both sides. The treaty will bind nuclear-weapon Powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States and the latter not to manufacture or otherwise acquire them. Second, it will facilitate the way for all nations, particularly those in the earlier stages of economic development, to share in the peaceful blessings of nuclear energy—without arousing fear lest that energy be diverted to nuclear weapons. In addition, it ensures that any benefits arising from the development of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will be available to all parties under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, without discrimination. Third, it will establish a new and solemn treaty obligation, especially upon the nuclear-weapon Powers, to press forward the search for nuclear disarmament.

210. Furthermore, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom have agreed to take an unprecedented and historic step in an attempt to ensure that appropriate measures are taken to safeguard the security of non-nuclear States adhering to this treaty. To this end they have proposed a Security Council resolution and accompanying declaration designed to lay a firm political, moral and legal basis for such assurances.

211. I submit that this treaty which, as presented, is the joint product of the deliberations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in this Committee is fully deserving of the overwhelming support of the General Assembly. This Committee has before it now an opportunity which may never recur to move the nations of the world a long step away from war and chaos and towards stability, co-operation and peace. I am confident that the Committee will not fail in discharging this great responsibility.

212. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I should like to make some brief comments on the revised draft resolution and the revised text of the treaty on non-proliferation [A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2 and Add.1].

213. May I remind the Committee that in the first statement I made in this Committee on 2 May 1968, I pointed out:

“The aim of my Government was, and still is, to give the best opportunity to all delegations, especially those whose countries are not members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to express their views on the

item under consideration. We welcome in fact an exhaustive discussion that should take place in order to increase the number of supporters of the treaty and we believe that this can be done more effectively without anticipating the results of our deliberations.

"I wish to make the position of my delegation unmistakably clear. Italy is in favour of a treaty on non-proliferation and it is our fervent hope that, at the outcome of this session, there will be such a treaty open for signature and ratification and adhered to by the widest possible majority of Member States." [1559th meeting, paras. 63-64.]

214. In this connexion I should like to acknowledge the efforts made by the co-sponsors of the draft resolution to meet our points in the revised text which they submitted last week.

215. Today the representative of the Soviet Union also emphasized that the discussion that had taken place was a constructive discussion on a high level. I fully share that view and I firmly believe that the discussion which has taken place not only has made it possible to clear our minds and give every single delegation every chance to make the views of its Government quite clear, but also has made it possible to co-operate in that movement that we had advocated in order to obtain a treaty which would command wider support and be more acceptable to a greater number of delegations.

216. This brings me to the revised text presented to our Committee today and to the comments made by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, and the representative of the United States, Mr. Goldberg.

217. We have taken note with gratification of the considerable changes which have been brought into the draft treaty on non-proliferation. We believe that they are a great improvement. As far as my country is concerned, I should especially like to emphasize the changes made in article IV which, as Ambassador Goldberg has just said, was one of the points which had been strongly stressed by my delegation and by the delegation of Belgium and other delegations. In this connexion, I should like to express my gratitude to all those delegations—with apologies for the fact that at this moment I am unable to enumerate them—that supported the suggestion which we had been submitting since August 1967. My Foreign Minister, Mr. Amintore Fanfani, submitted a proposal concerning the supply of fissionable materials—in other words, concerning free access of all non-nuclear countries to nuclear fuel and to the widest possible knowledge in the nuclear field. I think that it was one of the main concerns of all non-nuclear countries, including my own, that we should be sure that there would be no increase in the gap in the technological, industrial, economic and social fields be-

tween the more developed countries—especially in this case the nuclear-weapon countries—and the other countries.

218. Another point made by the representative of the United States—and I should like to express my appreciation in this connexion—was his mention of the safeguards prescribed by article III and the comments he made on that specific article of the draft treaty.

219. In conclusion, I should like to say that we think that the improvements made in the draft resolution and in the draft treaty on non-proliferation, really open the road to what we advocated in the statement I made on behalf of the Italian delegation on 11 May [1565th meeting]—that this not only should be a step forward in this context but also should facilitate further steps in the larger context of general disarmament. This is a major prerequisite for that process of disarmament. At the same time, we believe that if that takes place we shall finally be proceeding on the road to building a new society, a new world of the nuclear age.

220. I should like to inform you that my delegation has come to the conclusion that it can now co-sponsor draft resolution A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2. I would ask the Secretariat to inscribe the name of Italy among the sponsors of the draft resolution.

221. The CHAIRMAN: Italy has become the thirty-second sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2. With the statement of the representative of Italy, I declare the general debate on item 28 (a) closed.

222. Originally I had scheduled a meeting for Monday afternoon. However, in the light of the formal submission of a revised text of the draft treaty and in order to give delegations ample time to consult their Governments and prepare their statements or explanations of vote on the draft resolution which is before the Committee, I shall cancel Monday's meeting. Moreover, representatives may recall that it was previously agreed to close the list of speakers on the draft resolution on Tuesday at 1 p.m., but, as we are not going to have a meeting on Monday and in view of the latest developments, I propose to close the list of those representatives wishing to make statements or explanations of vote on the draft resolution at 6 p.m. on Tuesday. So that it will be possible to plan our programme in advance, I urge members of the Committee who wish to participate in the coming debate to inform the Secretary of the Committee as early as possible of their desire to do so.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.