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Committee on Disarmament 1

Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 28

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*):

**(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament (A/7072 and
Add.1-DC/230 and Add.1; A/7080; A/C.1/959-960,
A/C.1/963; A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-3)**

1. Mr. MAPANZA (Zambia): The Zambian people share the hope of many States for a genuine and lasting peace. In fact, my Government and people have tirelessly contributed, within our meagre and scant resources, to the achievement of mankind's most cherished goal—peace. This is why my country has unequivocally upheld the Charter of the United Nations, scrupulously adhering to the ideals and purposes for which our Organization was created. For the same reason, Zambia has consistently advocated the total and unconditional liquidation of the iniquitous system of colonialism, together with all the evils that go with it. We believe, as do many others around the world, that real and lasting peace cannot and will not be attained unless and until the face of the earth is rid of its remaining pockets of racism and exploitation and the principle of equality among nations is universally espoused. Further, we hold the strong view that peace cannot be attained until the ever-widening gap between the world's so-called haves and have-nots has been eliminated.

2. I submit that we are here to exchange views and to devise the most effective ways and means of ensuring that this generation and those yet to come are spared a nuclear holocaust. My delegation's assumption is that no delegation, individually or otherwise, will attempt to coerce or stampede us into approving the draft treaty or the draft resolution now before this Committee until the complexities of the problem, the rights and responsibilities, are fully analysed and grasped by all. Each decision we take must be the result of consultation and discussion. We will reject any other approach with vigour and without fear.

3. We are fully conscious of the historic origins of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, since many delegations have already exhausted this

aspect of the item, my delegation will not, therefore, abuse the patience of this Committee.

4. Zambia, like other countries, attaches maximum importance to the vital task of securing peace for mankind. That is why we have supported efforts aimed at achieving complete disarmament under appropriate international supervision. We would fully support any measures for the elimination and destruction of all weapons of mass slaughter. We wish to state very clearly that Zambia does not believe that the danger of a nuclear war lies merely in the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons. We believe that the survival of civilization and mankind, as such, is gravely threatened by those who continue to manufacture and stockpile nuclear weapons. This is Zambia's first position of principle on this all-important matter. We are of the opinion that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty of the nature of that now under discussion here would not go far enough towards securing the objectives of peace and of paving the way for complete disarmament as envisaged in resolution 2028 (XX) of 1965. The adoption of this draft treaty in its present form would, in our view, place the monopoly of the possession of nuclear weapons in the hands of a few Powers, some of which pursue policies which leave a lot to be desired. I will elaborate and develop this point later.

5. The United Nations has demonstrated its profound concern with regard to the dissemination of nuclear weapons by adopting innumerable resolutions urging the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to formulate a non-proliferation treaty without delay. The African States expressed their concern for curtailing the proliferation of nuclear weapons when the assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its first regular session in Cairo in 1964, adopted the declaration called "Programme for Peace and International Co-operation". Other continents, in particular, Latin America, have adopted similar declarations as an expression of their determined effort to denuclearize their respective zones.

6. Under consideration in this Committee now are the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,¹ and a draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-3, seeking the approval of the Assembly at this resumed twenty-second session. We welcome the opportunity to examine this draft treaty and to improve upon it. Consideration of a matter of such dimensions and significance cannot be easy. We agree with the Chairman when he said that our discussions were going to be difficult.

¹ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1.

7. Like many other delegations we believe that any meaningful non-proliferation treaty must meet the very minimum requirements of operative paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965. Those requirements are:

“(a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;

“(b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;

“(c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;

“(d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;

“(e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.”

8. Can we say, with conviction and certainty, that the draft treaty now before us² includes all these important requirements? In the view of my delegation the treaty falls far short of these requirements and, in fact, increases rather than diminishes the fears and suspicions expressed by a number of non-nuclear-weapon States. It cannot be said in good faith and with justification that our apprehensions are baseless or unfounded. In our view the draft treaty, if adopted as it stands, would allow vertical proliferation to continue. This treaty would be neither workable nor effective since it excludes two super-Powers, nor do we see this draft as a step towards general and complete disarmament.¹

9. We believe that, by non-proliferation, is meant prevention of both horizontal and vertical dissemination of nuclear weapons—but, as the draft stands, only the spread of nuclear weapons from nuclear to non-nuclear States is being stopped. Those that already possess nuclear weapons are being given a blank cheque to add to their arsenals which have already assumed alarming proportions.

10. It is absolutely necessary that non-nuclear-weapon States that sign and accede to or ratify the treaty are not denied access to nuclear technology for peaceful explosions. In our view, articles I and III of the treaty would have to be re-drafted to conform more to the legitimate aspirations of the non-nuclear-weapon States to apply nuclear explosive devices to peaceful rather than military purposes. Then, of course, a method could be devised, with the help of experts, to ensure that nuclear devices for peaceful purposes are not diverted to military purposes. We are sure that this is not an insurmountable difficulty. All these complexities, which require sustained research and planning, ram home one important factor—namely that consideration of this draft treaty should be characterized by the lack of hasty action, emotion or self-advantage. That is why we also see merit in waiting for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. We feel that an opportunity should be offered to the non-nuclear-weapon States to examine the draft in detail. Decisions of that historic

Conference could have a bearing, direct or otherwise, upon the various ramifications of the treaty. My delegation cannot sufficiently emphasize the fact that the treaty should, to say the very least, be the outcome of a broad, concerted international effort. After all, the question of peace concerns all States, big or small, rich or poor.

11. In article V, the draft would seem to limit benefits from peaceful application of nuclear explosions to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the treaty only. We believe that these benefits should be enjoyed by all States whether non-nuclear States party to the treaty or not. We, however, hold the view that membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency is in itself a qualification for a non-nuclear State non-party to the treaty to derive benefits from peaceful application of nuclear explosions. Therefore, the provision of article V does not, generally speaking, impose any penalty on those non-nuclear States which will not sign and ratify the treaty, if adopted.

12. In article VIII, it is implied that amendments can be proposed only after the treaty has entered into force. Is it surely not more logical and expedient that amendments to the draft treaty should be presented and considered here and now before the treaty is ratified? We disagree with the approach that amendments can be made only after the treaty becomes effective. Why has the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee brought the draft treaty here? Are we to act merely as a rubber stamp of the Disarmament Committee, or, *ipso facto* and more appropriately, of those that drafted this treaty? We would strongly venture to suggest that the Assembly should not be subjected to such a demeaning role.

13. It is stated in article IX, paragraph 3 that the treaty:

“... shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and 40 other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.”

With due deference to those that drafted the treaty, my delegation finds the figure “forty” absurd and unrealistic. We feel that the adoption of and accession to this treaty by Member States should reflect the serious desire of the entire membership to do away with the weapons of terror and death. It would be a farce for a treaty of this nature and magnitude to enter into force after only forty non-nuclear-weapon States had acceded to it. Greater thought should be given to this pertinent point. And in our desire to assist the Committee, my delegation would propose that two-thirds or a half of the membership of this Organization would be about adequate for the treaty to enter into force.

14. Now let me turn to the draft resolution containing guarantees or assurances submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom.³ Obviously these assurances fall far short of our expectations.

15. First, the guarantees have been given within the present cumbersome framework of the Security Council. By operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution the Security Council would welcome

“... the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accord-

² *Ibid.*, annex I.

³ *Ibid.*, annex II.

ance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”

16. Unless the three guarantor Powers—that is, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States—have now suddenly decided to agree on every international problem, we cannot see how the United Kingdom or the United States, or, for that matter, the USSR, will be prevented from applying its veto in defence of its national interests. We have had numerous problems before the Security Council which have ended up in a deadlock simply because the permanent members did not agree. Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence, the Viet-Nam conflict and the Israeli aggression in the Middle East are but a few examples of big Power intrigue and self-advantage.

17. Who is to determine whether aggression is being committed? Take the question of Viet-Nam. We know very well who the aggressors are, and yet one side persistently accuses the other of aggression. My delegation would propose that the word “aggression” should be defined within the context of and for inclusion in the treaty. In addition, retaliatory measures to be taken by the three nuclear States party to the treaty against a nuclear aggressor should clearly be defined for the purpose of the treaty.

18. Another loophole in the treaty is that we invariably assume that either France or the People's Republic of China will commit nuclear aggression against one or another of the non-nuclear States party to the treaty. Apart from the fact that this guarantee would seem to encourage aggression against and penalize non-nuclear States that are not signatory to the treaty, the assumption of a nuclear attack upon a non-nuclear State by either France or China only is, to us, unfair and presumptuous.

19. We know who are perpetrating so-called local or limited wars in defence of what they term freedom and democracy. We also know who threaten to use short-range nuclear weapons against a weak small nation.

20. To crown it all, there is no assurance of assisting a non-nuclear State party to the treaty in case either the United Kingdom or the United States or the USSR should attack it. It is, therefore, to be assumed that the type of aggression the assurances cover is either Chinese or French. My delegation rejects this assumption and we feel that it departs substantially from the spirit of resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965. This matter should be taken seriously, especially in view of the dark clouds hovering over Viet-Nam.

21. I should perhaps mention here that the Zambian delegation would find it extremely difficult to take seriously the assurances of the United Kingdom, a country which has an impressive record of broken pledges and promises on the question of Southern Rhodesia. May I add that the United Kingdom had pledged, in writing, to make good any dislocation which my country's economy would sustain in the course of implementation of the British-sponsored selective mandatory sanctions. Now the United Kingdom has washed its hands of this and cynically argues that any dislocation of Zambia's economy in the applica-

tion of sanctions will be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as Zambia's domestic problem. The United Kingdom has thus unashamedly abdicated its responsibilities and broken its well-known pledges, written and unwritten, to assist us in the difficult task of finding alternative routes to the sea and thus embolden us to play our full role in toppling the racist minority illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. Instead of honouring its promises and pursuing honest policies, the United Kingdom has pursued, and is still pursuing, policies which protect and shelter the rebels. That is why the rebels are still fully in control, at the expense of the 4 million Africans, who to this day remain both voteless and voiceless in the affairs of their country.

22. I have dwelt somewhat at length on the United Kingdom's despicable policies in Southern Rhodesia in order to expose the futility of the pledges and assurances of a responsible Power. We all know that the United Kingdom has not failed or hesitated to threaten to use its veto to stop an Afro-Asian draft resolution which would advocate force by either the United Kingdom or the United Nations. Today, we small non-nuclear States are being offered guarantees and assurances of assistance in the event of a nuclear attack. It is extremely difficult for Zambia to take the United Kingdom's declaration seriously, particularly because of the United Kingdom's “kith and kin” policy in southern Africa. We remain unconvinced that the United Kingdom would send its troops to die for Africans in the event of a nuclear attack. It is quite clear that no nuclear Power will assist a beleaguered small nation unless the big Powers prove, in the words of the last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, that “any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States”.

23. That is the core of the matter. Big Powers, or the guarantors—in this case, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States—would act only if their own national interests were in jeopardy.

24. Another loophole—a rather serious one—is that aggression is being rewarded, because those small non-nuclear States which do not ratify the treaty will not be rescued in the event of nuclear aggression. We are of the opinion that all non-nuclear States are entitled to the aid and help of nuclear States, and a treaty which does not contain this vital provision promotes, directly or indirectly, the aggressive designs of certain Powers such as South Africa, which is well on the road to becoming a nuclear Power, regrettably, with the support of certain Western Powers, notably the Federal Republic of Germany.

25. We further hold the view that a treaty to which the People's Republic of China—an ever-growing nuclear Power—and France are not party cannot be effective. We regret that China is not represented here. It is now urgent that the lawful rights of the great Chinese people be restored to it.

26. Aggression is aggression, whether it comes from China, France, the United Kingdom or the United States. In this treaty the drafters have anticipated only aggression by China or France, the two nuclear Powers which are not

likely to sign the treaty. What if one of the three nuclear States party to the treaty launched a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear State party to the treaty? My delegation would like to know what would be the role of the United Nations in the event one of the three nuclear States party to the treaty launched an attack, using nuclear weapons, on a non-nuclear State.

27. Furthermore, my delegation would like to know what would be the role of this Organization if two nuclear States party to the treaty were to embark on a nuclear war, the fall-out of which would invariably affect citizens of non-nuclear States not engaged in the conflict. These questions give rise to serious concern to my delegation. Yes, the possibility of this happening exists. Is this Organization going to resign itself to the role of passive onlooker, paralysed either by the veto or by big-Power self-advantage? This kind of treaty is, to say the least, unsatisfactory and if we are going to renounce our right to self-defence—and this is what this treaty amounts to for non-nuclear States—then we must have meaningful and workable guarantees. As the treaty stands this requirement has not been met.

28. We could not agree more with those delegations that have stated that the draft treaty is here for discussion and improvement. In that context, my delegation is ready and willing to subscribe to those consultations and discussions. It is our hope that the drafters will give us a hearing, for the question of peace concerns all States, regardless of their size or level of development.

29. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the next speaker, I should like to inform the Committee that Afghanistan has become the twenty-seventh sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1.

30. Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands): If I take the floor for the second time during this debate, it is merely to touch upon three aspects of the draft non-proliferation treaty. I did not have the occasion to do so before, and since all three have received a considerable amount of attention I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to express the opinion of my Government on the provisions concerning peaceful nuclear explosions, cessation of the arms race and denuclearized zones.

31. Article V of the draft treaty should be seen in the light of the seventh and eighth preambular paragraphs as well as of article IV, which, taken together, leave no doubt that the non-nuclear-weapon States have an "inherent right" to benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices for other than warlike purposes.

32. Now in article II of the treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon Powers undertake, briefly stated, not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosive devices even if they are intended for peaceful use. This remains a controversial issue which has pervaded the discussions in this Committee and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament over the past few years.

33. My delegation consistently has been on the side of those who argued in favour of a prohibition, as now

embodied in article V of the draft treaty. It is a logical corollary to the prohibition of the manufacture or acquisition by non-nuclear-weapon States of nuclear weapons.

34. Nuclear explosions, even for the express purpose of peaceful uses—and assuming they can be conducted in such a way as to conform to the criteria set forth in the partial test-ban treaty—are identical with and indistinguishable from the testing of nuclear weapons and are therefore inconsistent with the aims of a non-proliferation treaty.

35. The first United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and the foundation of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in 1957 initiated a new phase in the post-war era. In the course of the past decade, much progress has been made towards accelerating and enlarging the contributions of atomic energy to peace, health and security throughout the world. The representative of the United States has referred to these promotional activities, in particular of the IAEA, in connexion with article IV of the present draft treaty. During the same period, however, there was a growing awareness of the fact that the peaceful atom goes hand in hand with its "dark companion".

36. The treaty now before us is the outcome—long overdue—of pressing and increasingly urgent demands by almost the entire membership of the United Nations to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. It is to be regretted that the awesome destructive power of nuclear energy was demonstrated long before the world at large became familiar with its manifold beneficial applications. On the other hand, this fatal course of events had at least the advantage of pointing to an unmistakable moral.

37. The practical use of peaceful nuclear explosive devices has not yet outgrown the experimental stage. When the time comes for practical applications on a large scale the devices themselves will undoubtedly prove to be of a highly sophisticated character. As long as the technology and the effects of such devices remain, as they are now, indistinguishable from those of nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear-weapon States are duty bound to abide by the fundamental principles they themselves have set down with a view to elaborating a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

38. I wish to associate myself whole-heartedly with the very pertinent remarks made on this subject by the representative of Ethiopia in his statement on 6 May [1561st meeting], and by several other speakers preceding me.

39. My delegation feels that article V of the draft treaty contains a satisfactory procedure, giving the non-nuclear Powers sufficient guarantees against any form of discrimination. Moreover those Powers are relieved of incurring the cost of research and development. The potential benefits to non-nuclear-weapon States ensuing from the provisions of article V have been clearly set out by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union.

40. In view of the novelty of the problem it may be wise to content ourselves in the text of article V with words such as "appropriate international procedures" and "an

appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear Powers", so as not to prejudge any future decisions.

41. But I, for one, believe that the organization through which appropriate arrangements might be reached and which is well qualified to supervise any actual peaceful explosions is the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Both the Statute of the Agency and certain guidelines which have already been or could usefully be adopted by the Board of Governors would, in my opinion, be very well suited to implement the provisions embodied in article V of the treaty.

42. In her intervention on 9 May [1564th meeting] the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, made a distinction between three main functions for an international organization administering peaceful nuclear explosions. She felt that the IAEA would probably be the most suitable organization, first, to decide on the soundness, technically and economically speaking, of a given project, and, secondly, to observe and control its execution, in conformity with existing international treaties.

43. I am convinced this would indeed be the case, because of first, the role assigned to the Vienna Agency under article III, next, the provisions of its Statute, and the activities of its secretariat known as

"... pre-investment studies for the evaluation of the feasibility of nuclear power in certain countries and regions".

44. It is undoubtedly true that the third function mentioned by Mrs. Myrdal, the financing of future "Operations Ploughshare", may place great new responsibilities on agencies like the United Nations Development Programme and the International Bank. With regard to this particular aid aspect, I should like to remind this Committee that the IAEA has already acquired some experience in the past as "Executing Agency" for UNDP projects. I trust that the Agency would not fail to take the initiative and approach the UNDP or any other suitable organization under the circumstances described by the representative of Sweden. One of the Agency's main achievements since its inception has been the steadily increasing degree of co-ordination with other United Nations organizations.

45. I realize full well that the question of supervising peaceful nuclear explosions is not only of a technical nature but may also be linked with political considerations. Bearing this in mind, I should like to point out the following to those delegations which have stressed the special responsibility of the General Assembly.

46. The IAEA is not a United Nations organization comparable to the specialized agencies, which fall under the competence of the Economic and Social Council. The agency is directly responsible to the General Assembly itself. The agency's annual report is a regular item on the agenda of the General Assembly—and, I venture to predict it will deserve and attract more attention at future sessions.

47. Article III.B.1 of the Agency's Statute states, *inter alia*, that it shall conduct its activities "in conformity with

policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded world-wide disarmament and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies".

48. It is therefore within the power, and even a responsibility, of the General Assembly to make such recommendations directly to the IAEA as it sees fit and to request special reports with regard to peaceful explosions. Similarly, the Assembly can, if it so desires, further the conclusion of a special international agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions which would govern the activities of the IAEA as "the major technical arm of the United Nations in the field of atomic energy".

49. I wish to assure the representative of Mexico that I am in no way insensitive to the concern which he voiced in his lucid and comprehensive intervention on 16 May [1509th meeting]. But it will be clear from the foregoing that my delegation, while recognizing the special problems involved in the matter under discussion, feels that there is no need for amending the present wording of article V.

50. The last four paragraphs of the preamble as well as article VI of the draft treaty deal with the cessation of vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, a problem which many previous speakers have brought into prominence, and rightly so, in the course of this debate.

51. Paragraph 2 *c* of resolution 2028 (XX) requires the treaty itself to be a step towards disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. I have already pointed out that my delegation shares the opinion of other delegations, like those of Austria and Sweden, which regard the present draft as a first, realistic step on the road to nuclear arms control and eventually disarmament. It is obvious that the non-nuclear contracting parties undertake, in fact, to give a "unilateral example" by renouncing the option for a nuclear-weapon programme. Ideally, one could conceive that this undertaking should have called forth equally stringent treaty obligations on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to halt the nuclear arms race in which they have involved themselves.

52. It is quite a different matter, however, to translate this ideal into practical terms and to agree upon explicit and binding commitments, including specific measures and time-limits which could be incorporated in the treaty itself. At this point, I wish to pay a tribute to the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which have insisted on several occasions that the treaty should at least be coupled with or followed by meaningful measures to stop and reverse the spiralling arms race. As far as I am aware, this appeal has never been challenged. But once again, in trying to implement this principle one cannot ignore the stark realities of the present over-all strategic situation.

53. In the view of my delegation it would have been unwise to try to link the non-proliferation treaty formally with specific measures to stop vertical proliferation. I think this Committee will agree that if we combine the proposals which have been made over the past years by the nuclear-weapon States and other Powers, we arrive at a rather impressive list of priorities.

54. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have repeatedly stated their positions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. On 27 January 1966 President Johnson sent a message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament⁴ in which he put forward a number of detailed proposals with a view to containing and ultimately reversing the nuclear armaments race.

55. Similarly, in a message dated 1 February of the same year,⁵ the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, set forth his views on the subject under discussion. In his intervention in this Committee on 26 April [1556th meeting] the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Kuznetsov, indicated, by summing up a number of topics for negotiation, the direction in which his Government felt the disarmament talks should proceed; and two days ago he was even more specific.

56. While the proposals emanating both from the super-Powers and from other countries show some encouraging similarities, there is as yet no consensus on the order of priorities. I venture to submit that it would be futile and even counter-productive if this Committee were to seek to establish such an order of priorities in or outside the text of the draft treaty. I hasten to make one notable exception, namely, the complete test ban, which figures prominently in paragraph 11 of the preamble to the draft treaty. But, generally speaking, it is my delegation's considered opinion that the goal of "defusing" the current arms competition will most likely not be reached by trying to impose on the negotiators a rigid pattern. I foresee rather that, in the end, it will be achieved as a result of a gradual "process".

57. Accepting in good faith the earnest determination of the main protagonists to live up to their obligations under article VI of the draft treaty, I feel that allowance should be made for a certain leeway. By successfully "managing" certain issues, be it tacitly, by mutual example, or in formal agreements, unexpected avenues for progress in other fields may open up.

58. My delegation hopes that, at an early stage, it will prove to be possible to have fruitful discussion, both between the United States and the Soviet Union and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, on a freeze and the eventual reduction of offensive and defensive strategic delivery vehicles.

59. The most disquieting aspect of the next spiral in the nuclear arms race is its predominantly qualitative character and the ever increasing refinement and sophistication of both anti-ballistic missile systems and specialized offensive weaponry.

60. Non-nuclear-weapon States becoming parties to the treaty may rightly feel that their signature and ratification is an act of self-denial. I submit that the nuclear-weapon States themselves will have to exercise—as we expect them to do—a clear measure of self-restraint in the months and years ahead. They will have to give concrete proof that they have become less arms-race minded. The hard test for the

main negotiating Powers may well reside in their unwavering purpose and will to avoid over-reacting and even to risk under-responding, in a given situation. The representative of Belgium has also underscored the great responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear Powers.

61. A serious cause for concern remains the rapid progress of the People's Republic of China in its nuclear armament, which inexorably leads the world further away from the ultimate goal of general disarmament. My delegation is, therefore, like many other delegations, deeply convinced of the urgent need to further the participation of the People's Republic of China in the forthcoming negotiations.

62. I should like to express the particular satisfaction of my delegation at the inclusion of article VII in the draft treaty. At this juncture I wish to pay tribute to the Heads of African States who were the first to raise the question of ensuring the total absence of nuclear armaments from their continent and to the Latin American States which actually blazed the trail by establishing a nuclear-free zone under the Treaty of Tlatelolco [A/C.1/946].

63. It is a privilege for me to inform this Committee that, on 15 March, the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands signed Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco on behalf of the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam. My Government hopes that the nuclear Powers which have not yet done so will see fit to sign Protocol II to that Treaty.

64. In conclusion, I should like to take my cue from the title of a novel by that great writer of the sea, Joseph Conrad. The world is now hovering close to *The Shadow-Line* between the perilous balance of terror of the present and international security for the future. I hope that by endorsing the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the twenty-second session of the General Assembly will chart a steady course finally to cross that fateful line.

65. Mr. RUDA (Argentina) (*translated from Spanish*): The Argentine Republic has always firmly supported all initiatives concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

66. This attitude has been expressed in two ways. In the General Assembly my country has, since the question was first taken up, supported all the resolutions urging the conclusion of an instrument in this field and has voted for them.

67. In addition to this permanent position which we have assumed in the General Assembly, Argentina has also signed and acceded to the international agreements aimed at freeing humanity from nuclear danger. My country was a co-sponsor of proposals that were incorporated in the Antarctic Treaty, signed on 10 December 1959, prohibiting the carrying out of nuclear tests in the Antarctic and the depositing of radio-active waste in that area.

68. We signed the Moscow Treaty, banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [2222 (XXI)], which prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons in outer space.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1966 (DC/288), annex 1, sect. D.

⁵ *Ibid.*, sect. F.

69. At the regional level, my country participated actively in the preparation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and duly signed it. We consider that the rules of that Treaty have made a fundamental contribution to the solution of delicate problems, and that it contains satisfactory formulas for the protection in this field of the fundamental interests of the contracting parties.

70. We now have before us the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Its Annex contains the text of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the co-Chairman of the Conference on 11 March 1968,⁶ and the draft resolution of the Security Council on security guarantees,⁷ as well as the draft resolution submitted by twenty-six countries [*A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-3*] that support the draft treaty.

71. My delegation has noted with particular satisfaction the agreement of the two great nuclear Powers—with the approval of the United Kingdom also—on the submission of the draft treaty on this subject to us.

72. It is obvious that in a political problem with such a wide impact, one of the requirements for achieving an effective instrument is the co-operation of the great nuclear Powers. In addition to being a positive agreement because of its substance, it is even more positive in that it shows the beginning of a climate of constructive dialogue between those Powers. My country takes note of this auspicious event and regards it as an important stage in the improvement of international relations in the spirit of our Charter.

73. In the same spirit of international co-operation and with the desire to contribute our ideas on this matter, since Argentina is not a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, my Government has studied in detail the draft treaty submitted on 11 March. It is common knowledge that only a limited number of States are participating in the discussions of the Disarmament Committee. It seems logical to us that the other Governments should have the use of this forum to express and make known their doubts and aspirations, which we trust will be accepted in the same constructive spirit by the sponsors of the draft treaty. Although the text submitted shows considerable understanding between the great Powers and is a fundamental basis for the creation of an atmosphere conducive to disarmament, we believe that we should not be hasty in concluding this instrument without first discussing the proposed text with calmness and goodwill.

74. Although timeliness is always an important consideration in the adoption of a treaty, it should not become a barrier to detailed consideration of the instrument to be adopted, particularly in view of such complex problems as those we hope to settle. We cannot believe that the understanding between the great Powers is so fragile that failure to formalize it immediately can cause it to collapse in a short time. We wish to believe that this treaty rests on

more solid foundations of understanding and, therefore, in the spirit of co-operation which has always inspired my country in the United Nations, we should like to make some remarks on the text of the draft in the hope that they may be given due consideration by this Committee, together with those made by other countries.

75. As we understand it, there are two fundamental values which this draft treaty should protect. The first is the security of each member of the international community. This instrument should not be an instrument for the subordination of some countries. My country feels that national security must be duly taken into account and effectively guaranteed by those who, owing to their greater military power, bear the main responsibility in the nuclear sphere.

76. The second fundamental value which must be protected is the technological progress of all our countries, particularly those in the process of development. Such technological progress is the key to economic and social development today. Moreover, it is well known that one of the basic factors which intensifies the differences between the developing and the developed countries, and influences the maintenance of peace, is precisely this so-called technological "gap".

77. The chief dilemma posed by this treaty is to achieve a balance that will effectively guarantee national security, to which we all have a right and, at the same time, to obtain an instrument which will not be a barrier to the nuclear technological development of our countries but will, on the contrary, be a useful instrument in enabling all of us to enjoy the benefits which nuclear techniques promise us in the near future.

78. I wish to point out that it is of fundamental importance to my Government that this treaty should, on the one hand, not constitute a hindrance to our economic development and, on the other, that it should not provide the legal basis for a technological dependence which has been increasingly emphasized recently. Argentina will be grateful to receive all the assistance it may be given by the great Powers to develop its nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, but it cannot agree to remain subject to constant dependence in this field, particularly since our country already has the bases for the nuclear technology necessary to our economic development. Therefore, to us this is not only a matter of security problems, although we consider that aspect of major importance, but also and basically a problem of development.

79. With these points in mind, we shall now proceed to comment on the draft treaty.

80. Firstly, my delegation considers that, as we understand it, the draft treaty limits the powers of the non-nuclear-weapon States as regards an entire line of research connected with explosions for peaceful purposes. In this regard, the formula worked out in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, particularly in article 18, seems to us suitable for covering the interests of the developing countries. We should have liked to see a similar formula in the Geneva draft. Furthermore, we do not see why the treaty casts doubt, to some extent, on the good faith of the non-

⁶ See *Official Records of the Committee on Disarmament, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex I.

⁷ *Ibid.*, annex II.

nuclear-weapon States with regard to explosions for peaceful purposes, when the draft itself rests on that assumption of good faith regarding other basic points.

81. Apart from this general remark on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, it is clear that under article V of the draft the future Parties to the treaty which are nuclear Powers do not actually assume any specific obligation, and that the wording of this article V is extremely vague. If we analyse this article in detail, we will see that the commitment of the nuclear countries is confined to mere co-operation "through appropriate international procedures"—which are not defined in the treaty and have not been defined in this debate either—in connexion with "potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions". It also contains another vague reference to charges, mentioning that they "will be as low as possible".

82. The last part of article V states that it is understood that non-nuclear-weapon States may obtain the potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body. The substance of this wording too, as we read it, is not specific enough. There is nothing, at this moment, to prevent countries from obtaining those benefits on a bilateral basis; at the same time, however, there is nothing stated clearly in the treaty as to what that appropriate international body is to be, when it is to be set up, and on what basis.

83. These obligations of co-operation imposed on the nuclear States are in marked contrast with the clear-cut and specific obligations assumed by the non-nuclear-weapon countries in articles II and III.

84. The same remarks apply to article IV. Nobody denies the inalienable right of nations to their own development and the treaty is right in stressing this. But that is merely a declaration.

85. Paragraph 2 of article IV contains another vague wording concerning the exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on the co-operation nuclear countries must give in this field to those that do not have nuclear weapons.

86. Both articles IV and V, as we interpret them, contain only general declarations which, if we wish to turn them into effective and specific obligations, must be supplemented in the future by instruments clearly establishing how and in what measure the nuclear States are to co-operate in the advancement of nuclear science in the less developed countries.

87. In connexion with the same subject of technological development, we see that in article III, referring to the control system, there is an obvious imbalance of obligations as regards the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We think there is no reason whatever to differentiate between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon countries with regard to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, because, fundamentally, this distinction disappears once we actually enter that field. The distinction in the treaty between two types of countries is based mainly on a military criterion related

to the possession of nuclear weapons. We do not see why the countries not possessing those weapons should be subject to inspections of their peaceful application of nuclear energy, while those with nuclear weapons are not subject to this type of control where the same purposes are involved.

88. The absence of control, as we see it, may easily imply concealment of certain processes and methods, the main use of which may be in the area of peaceful activities, which would give some countries a technical advantage over others, even outside the military field. If the desire to co-operate, referred to in articles IV and V, really exists, access to nuclear information in the respective fields should be facilitated.

89. In practice, article III on control may easily thwart the general aims of the peaceful utilization mentioned in articles IV and V.

90. Another matter which is a source of concern to my Government is the exchange of nuclear equipment and materials. This is a problem which has not been clearly defined in the treaty, even where such equipment and materials may be exclusively for peaceful purposes. In this respect, the incorporation of the amendment to article IV of the draft submitted by the delegation of Italy during the Geneva discussions would have constituted an important improvement in the treaty. We refer specifically to the addition, after paragraph 1, of another paragraph reading as follows:

"2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to acquire source and special fissionable materials or equipment for the use of source and special fissionable materials for peaceful purposes."⁸

91. The failure to insert this proposal of Italy leaves a serious gap in the draft. Its insertion, on the other hand, would have served to dispel some of the doubts existing with regard to the facilities for the supply of equipment and materials. If this point is not included, the non-nuclear-weapon States may be restricted in their purchases on the nuclear equipment and materials market. These limitations may also be applied to the sale of such materials and equipment, a field affording interesting export possibilities. Should these restrictions be established, it would be necessary to consider the creation of a compensatory system.

92. I shall now turn to the problem of general and complete disarmament.

93. As other delegations have pointed out previously, my Government also considers that the proposal in article IV is insufficient and merely a declaration of good intentions. In problems of such importance as the cessation of the nuclear arms race and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, a much more specific text is necessary concerning the obligations assumed by the nuclear Powers if the intention is indeed to maintain the balance of responsibilities and obligations

⁸ *Ibid.*, annex IV, section 34.

referred to in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). We realize that it is not easy to find final formulas in the treaty for problems that have been under discussion for three years; at the same time, however, the major nuclear Powers should understand that the sacrifice to be made by the non-nuclear-weapon countries under the system of the treaty is extremely high, without their receiving sufficient assurances that would hold out the prospects of a more promising future for the maintenance of international peace and security. Despite this advance in the field of horizontal non-proliferation, there is no indication at this time that would allow us to assume there will be a reduction in the arms race among those who possess the most weapons. Paradoxically, this treaty is for the disarmament of the disarmed.

94. The final provisions of the draft also call for comment by our delegation. We believe that in these provisions, in the spirit of resolution 2028 (XX), there is no balance between the procedure for entry into force and the procedure laid down for amendments.

95. The conditions for the treaty's entry into force are extremely liberal, since it is sufficient that the treaty be ratified by the nuclear-weapon signatory States and forty other signatory States. But with regard to the procedure for amendment, it must receive approval by the majority of the Parties to the treaty, including the nuclear-weapon States and the other Parties which are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

96. The disparity is obvious, and we believe that the conditions set up are too rigid for the treaty to be put into effect, especially in the light of the constant development of nuclear technology and particularly since, in this field, everything indicates that we are still at the beginning of an era and it is very difficult to foresee where it will end.

97. In article X, referring to the right of the Parties to withdraw from the treaty, we think the impact of the above-mentioned problem of technological development has not been sufficiently considered. Article X is correct in establishing that member countries, in exercise of their national sovereignty, may withdraw if they judge that extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of the treaty have jeopardized the paramount interests of their countries. Naturally, we have no objection to this, and it seems to us in keeping with the principle of the sovereign equality of States which is one of the bases of our Charter. But it may turn out that technological progress becomes so extraordinary that the non-nuclear-weapon countries, restricted as they are in carrying out certain actions in the nuclear field, find themselves obliged to withdraw from the treaty so as not to be left behind completely and subject to the technology of other countries. We feel that this consideration with regard to nuclear development should be duly taken into account.

98. The same reasoning applies to the concept of the indefinite maintenance in force of the treaty in paragraph 2 of article X.

99. I shall now go on to the draft resolution concerning the security guarantees which the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union are to submit to the Security Council.

100. We now wish to outline our country's position on this draft resolution, also in the fullest spirit of co-operation, although it will be examined in detail in the appropriate forum.

101. The draft resolution reaffirms the inalienable right of individual or collective defence in case of armed attack against a Member of the United Nations, in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter.

102. As far as my country is concerned, particularly on the basis of Article 51, we believe its security is legally and effectively protected against armed attack by the inter-American instruments currently in force and by the United Nations Charter.

103. Nevertheless, apart from the individual matter of my own country, we think the assurances given in the draft resolution have an importance which goes beyond our own security and which to a large extent affects the maintenance of international peace and security in other, more sensitive areas of the international community. Therefore, we believe that the draft resolution should contain an additional guarantee of a negative kind whereby the nuclear Powers signatories of the treaty would assume the obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the treaty. Such a declaration would be a categorical confirmation of the terms and principles of the Charter. It would greatly relieve international tension and would undoubtedly help to improve the existing international situation.

104. We have made all these remarks in the most constructive spirit, in an effort to improve the text of the draft, and on the understanding that this treaty will be one stage in the achievement of even more important objectives. We hope they will not go unheeded, and that they may serve as food for thought for those having the rights of sponsorship and the main responsibility for the text.

105. To sum up, my delegation, confirming our traditional peaceful position, supports everything implying the banning of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, because it is essential to prevent the danger of nuclear war and thus ensure peace. At the same time, however, my delegation affirms and reiterates the determination of my Government to defend the principle of national independence in everything it does as regards research and development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

106. Mr. ECOBESCU (Romania) (*translated from French*): An objective analysis of contemporary events brings us to the conclusion that the elimination of war as a method of resolving conflicts between States is the fundamental question dominating the whole problem of establishing world peace.

107. The peoples and nations of the world are keenly interested in their economic and social development and in creating living conditions which reflect the scientific and technological discoveries that have enriched our era. The essential prerequisite for such a broad process which would raise man to the summits of civilization and progress must be the strengthening of international peace and security. That is the only context in which today's incredibly swift

technological and scientific development can be fully implemented for the benefit of all countries.

108. In our era, when the existence and continuing improvement of nuclear weapons, the most destructive weapons imaginable, are creating unprecedented dangers for mankind, there is no more pressing need than the achievement of disarmament.

109. General disarmament, and in particular its main component, nuclear disarmament, fully meet the need for guaranteeing to all countries equal conditions of peace and security, and for enabling peoples everywhere to devote their efforts and their resources to the work of peaceful construction and development.

110. The Socialist Republic of Romania is resolutely and consistently fighting for the attainment of nuclear disarmament, for the elimination of atomic weapons and existing stockpiles, and for halting the construction of such weapons, a sure way of doing away forever with the threat of nuclear war. At the same time, the Romanian Government is in favour of partial and temporary measures, such as the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a step which can have favourable effects on nuclear disarmament problems as a whole and which is currently attracting the attention of world public opinion.

111. The twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly, resuming its work, is examining the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which appears as an annex to the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament submitted to the General Assembly and to the Disarmament Commission on 14 March 1968.⁹

112. The text before us is based on similar proposals submitted by the USSR and the United States on 24 August 1967 to the Eighteen-Nation Committee,¹⁰ drafts in which some of the suggestions and proposals certain States had made during the negotiations were incorporated in various forms.

113. At the present time, the discussions concerning the draft treaty have moved out of the sphere of the body specializing in disarmament problems—the Eighteen-Nation Geneva Committee—and are being held within the most representative world body, whose task it is to consider problems of peace and security, namely the United Nations.

114. The Romanian delegation sees as both heartening and useful the fact that the negotiations have met with a wide response and lively interest at the international level, and regards this as proof of the general recognition of the major importance attached to the problem now under discussion. This interest is quite understandable, considering the implications and significance of a treaty designed to deal with such an important subject as nuclear energy and affecting the vital interests of every country in the matter of its security, its economic development, and its technological advancement.

115. The Romanian delegation feels that the lengthy negotiations which took place in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the subject of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were a stage that had to be gone through to achieve a useful and valid international agreement.

116. In a constructive spirit, Romania has on many occasions expressed its view both on the content of the draft treaty and on the nature and progress of the negotiations which went into preparing it. It is still working for the conclusion of a treaty that can satisfy the fundamental interests of States in the area covered by the treaty, namely, nuclear energy.

117. Convinced that a non-proliferation treaty must, by its very nature, not only erect a solid barrier against the spread of nuclear weapons, but also provide for effective steps towards nuclear disarmament, offer real security guarantees to States which forgo the acquisition of atomic weapons and enable all parties to it to have free access to the achievements of peaceful nuclear science and technology, Romania submitted proposals to the Eighteen-Nation Committee which were aimed at strengthening the draft treaty in these areas.

118. The draft treaty, which was initially discussed by the Committee at Geneva, was improved as a result of the inclusion of certain proposals put forward by some of the participating States, including Romania, an indication that the efforts made to draw up a treaty that would serve the interests of international peace and security were well-justified and useful.

119. We are convinced that the text can be improved even further, and that the present debate in the United Nations offers a good opportunity for a careful and many-sided examination of the draft treaty in which are expressed the joint hopes of all nations to find the most appropriate solutions to the basic problems of our time: peace, security and progress.

120. In view of the fruitful results mankind expects from the implementation of a non-proliferation treaty, it is only natural that in taking up this important matter we begin with some basic assumptions which, in the opinion of the Romanian Government, must ensure that the treaty will provide for effective steps towards nuclear disarmament, extend security guarantees to States which renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and will in no way hinder scientific research into nuclear energy and its use for peaceful purposes by all countries under equitable control.

121. Along with other States which took part in the negotiations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, Romania supported the view that the non-proliferation treaty must be a link in a chain of measures which have as their final aim the total eradication of the nuclear threat. In this connexion, the question of the role of non-proliferation in the body of measures aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament assumes great importance. The Romanian delegation has on many occasions expressed the opinion that every measure dealing with nuclear weapons, whether partial or more embracing, must be subordinated to this main objective.

⁹ *Ibid.*, document DC/230 and Add.1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, annex IV, sections 8 and 6 respectively.

122. A precise instance which reveals this basic requirement for the non-proliferation treaty is to be found in the well-known General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), paragraph 2 of which lays down that

“The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament.”

123. Although not properly speaking a disarmament measure, the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is none the less capable of creating favourable conditions for achieving disarmament by including the commitment to undertake measures leading to nuclear disarmament, such as the halting of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the destruction of existing nuclear weapon stockpiles, and the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles from national arsenals. For that reason we consider the opinion—which has also been brought out in our discussions here—according to which the treaty will be truly lasting if it contains or gives rise to concrete disarmament measures to be particularly apposite.

124. Another essential prerequisite for the treaty concerns the security guarantees to be given to non-nuclear-weapon States. Romania has consistently favoured the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of all other weapons of mass destruction. My country's position in this connexion is based on the belief that the outlawing of all weapons of mass destruction, beginning with nuclear weapons, would have a highly favourable effect on the disarmament question and on the international situation as a whole. Thus it is entirely fitting that until existing nuclear weapons have been totally destroyed and until the nuclear threat has been finally eradicated, non-nuclear-weapon States should be provided with appropriate security guarantees.

125. That is why we share the view, which was fully expressed during the Committee's work, that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be achieved under guarantees given to all nations renouncing those weapons that they will never become the victims of an atomic aggression or be threatened with aggression by nuclear weapons. The nuclear States must solemnly undertake never to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances, and not to threaten to use them against States which do not possess such weapons and which have undertaken not to manufacture or acquire them.

126. The ambivalent nature of nuclear energy—on the one hand a destructive force giving rise to incalculable dangers and, on the other, a source of energy and of economic and scientific progress—has constantly been brought out during the negotiations. Whatever their level of economic development, States are showing an ever greater interest in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. That is a wholly legitimate concern, for access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the most varied fields of activity is an indispensable aid of the utmost importance to the economic, scientific and over-all technological development of any State.

127. Therefore each country is eager to see that no obstacle is put in the way of its opportunities to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, either as regards its own

capabilities or its access to supply sources of fissionable materials, or to scientific and technological information concerning the peaceful use of atomic energy—in short, each country is eager that the non-proliferation treaty should ensure a solid legal basis for fruitful and necessary international collaboration in this sphere.

128. This being the case, a strong barrier must be erected against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but this must not impede in any way the peaceful use of atomic energy which is necessary to ensure a development free from any political or economic conditions and from any impediment arising out of the methods used to verify the application of the provisions of the treaty.

129. In view of this major concern of all States, it has become necessary to ensure that the control measures set forth in the treaty and motivated by the need for an effective verification of the duties assumed by the contracting parties should be restricted to the purpose of the treaty, namely, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

130. Inspection should not be unreasonably extended to areas which do not of themselves entail the risk of proliferating nuclear weapons. We share the opinion that unless this principle is adhered to, inspection could become a brake on the activities of States in employing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

131. A treaty designed to establish precise legal relationships in such a fluid sphere as that of nuclear energy—which is continually witnessing ever more spectacular developments—must be provided with a system capable of absorbing the changes which occur and of setting in motion machinery that can permanently ensure its proper functioning.

132. If the treaty has these characteristics which should give it special strength, along with the other indispensable elements that may be seen in its content, it will prove to be a necessary measure, in keeping with the interests of countries throughout the world, a factor for strengthening the security of States, and a gateway towards further disarmament measures, in particular nuclear disarmament.

133. Romania is in favour of concluding the treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It has tried, and is still trying, along with the other States to bring into existence this international instrument which it regards as an effective means to avert the atomic threat, as a measure for the international easing of tension, and as a contribution to strengthening the peace and security of peoples everywhere, as well as a means of increasing trust and co-operation among States and of creating new prospects for the efforts that are being undertaken to achieve nuclear disarmament.

134. Mr. PEREZ GUERRERO (Venezuela) (*translated from Spanish*): The delegation of Venezuela has followed the course of the present debate on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with great interest and wishes briefly to state its position, bringing up to date what we said in this same Committee during the twenty-first regular session of the General Assembly [1444th meeting].

135. First of all, we attach great importance to the conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear

weapons. We already showed this by signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which pursues that objective within the Latin American area. We are aware of the long road that had to be travelled to reach the present point, and there can be no doubt that the agreement of the two super-Powers embodied in the draft treaty submitted for our consideration is an achievement of outstanding importance.

136. The delegation of Venezuela believes that on a matter of such importance, haste must be avoided. But it feels that any delay which might imperil the pooling of efforts and intentions necessary to halt so-called horizontal proliferation must also be avoided.

137. Secondly, together with many other delegations, we view this treaty as a further step towards the achievement of the objective of general and complete disarmament. However significant the treaty on non-proliferation may be in itself, it cannot be considered as an isolated act. It can only become fully effective if it is speedily followed by other measures of vertical denuclearization. Indeed, more than any other circumstance, the present stockpiles of nuclear weapons are likely, in the next few years, to lead to a nuclear holocaust. Certainly the possession of these weapons by a greater number of countries would increase the danger of their possible use by any country that could succeed in producing them. That, like a bolt of lightning, would set off a universal conflagration.

138. We understand that, in the present circumstances, the nuclear Powers have been unable to reach agreement on the destruction of their arsenals of atomic weapons. But there are intermediate steps, such as the banning of underground tests—which would come under the Moscow Treaty—and the moratorium on the production of those weapons, since the existing ones alone would be enough to annihilate all mankind. Their destructive capacity has been highlighted by the interesting and hair-raising report of the twelve experts appointed by the Secretary-General [A/6858]. Would it not be possible for the nuclear Powers that sponsored the present draft resolution to subscribe to an agreement on vertical denuclearization, in which it would be stipulated that the provisions concerning the destruction of nuclear weapons would be implemented only when that agreement was signed by the other nuclear Powers?

139. In any case, the world will not be free of nuclear terror until it is free, totally free of nuclear weapons. This is too obvious to be ever forgotten.

140. In line with these ideas, and taking advantage of the constructive rapprochement of the two great nuclear Powers, efforts should be made to extend the area of co-operation between them to include other areas related to disarmament and peace efforts in general. Such a co-operative attitude could take the form, for example, of multilateral arrangements—or perhaps bilateral ones, to start with—on the exploration and peaceful conquest of outer space. Combining the efforts in this vast field would considerably reduce the gigantic resources now being invested, thereby permitting more rational programming of their different aspects and various stages. The space race, however fascinating without the destructive trend of the arms race, nevertheless has a disturbing feature in common with that trend in that it calls for substantial resources

which must be withheld from the development of the third world—a task second in priority only to the establishment of peace in the areas of the world affected by actual or virtual conditions of war. Unfortunately, such universal recognition of the high priority of development is far from being reflected in the allocation of resources commensurate with the pressing and enormous needs. This is partly due to an insufficient will to act in accord with our common responsibilities, but also to the heavy expenditures on other types of plans and programmes.

141. Effective co-ordination of efforts designed to extend the knowledge of outer space would facilitate the achievement of the objectives which, even though they might be less ambitious in scope and timing, would not thereby lose their importance for mankind. This is a field of international co-operation which has not been properly explored, and the agreement not to use outer space advances for warlike purposes clearly indicates that much can still be done if there is an incentive to do so.

142. Better understanding in such matters would undoubtedly encourage the participation of all peace-loving countries in the utilization of scientific and technical progress for the benefit of mankind.

143. These considerations bring us back to the main subject of our discussion, which is that of our most immediate concern. The Venezuelan delegation, in reviewing its position regarding the draft treaty, would like, thirdly, to mention the great interest many delegations have already expressed in not hindering, but rather in ensuring and facilitating, the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by the non-nuclear-weapon signatories of the treaty. Like other speakers before us, we recognize that the Governments sponsoring the draft have introduced provisions in article IV which are a marked improvement over the preceding texts. The Venezuelan delegation, aware of the need to provide all the safeguards necessary to ensure fulfilment of the treaty's objectives, considers it necessary to set up clearly defined international machinery which can forestall any possibility—either by intention or inertia—of perpetuating an oligarchic monopoly in a matter of such overwhelming importance to mankind as that of enlisting the atom in the service of peace.

144. Lastly, the Venezuelan delegation shares the view that it is not too late to make some further improvements in the draft treaty, besides those that may result from future revisions, for which the procedure should be in line with democratic rules of participation. Many delegations have made pertinent comments and interesting suggestions which are well worth taking into consideration.

145. It is essential to facilitate the signature of this treaty by the greatest possible number of countries, which should include all those having the technical capacity to enter the field of nuclearization. Otherwise the treaty on non-proliferation would lack effectiveness in the achievement of its specific objectives.

146. The generation which has witnessed the creation and growth of atomic weapons cannot escape the responsibility incumbent upon it to halt the nuclear race and then, as soon as possible, to eliminate this weapon of frightful destructive power.

147. Inspired by the common wisdom of all peoples, let us hope we will know how to use nuclear energy for building and strengthening universal peace in the interests of prosperity and justice.

148. Mr. HYDE (Sierra Leone): Almost ten years ago, the first initiative towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was taken in the United Nations by the Foreign Minister of Ireland, Mr. Frank Aiken, who, by his far-sightedness, has contributed so much in our Organization to the progress of peace and the prevention of war. Those ten years have been spent in debate, producing a series of resolutions during the sixteenth session of the General Assembly in 1961, and more specific guidance in 1965, 1966 and 1967, for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has to be commended for the report it has produced. The Sierra Leone delegation appreciates the difficulty of the task that faced that body and the magnitude of the scope of its results given present and difficult international commitments and the spheres of influence that the super Powers, especially, and others have. We are, however, to consider the treaty that has emerged after years of labour and after the sudden production of identical drafts by those two super Powers, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which command the largest arsenal for mass destruction and human suffering. We would again urge that those Powers that are in control of such incalculable amounts of armour—both nuclear and the so-called conventional—would begin serious negotiations to relieve the world of the fear and tension their explosives create. We would again urge them to move towards the elimination of weapons from our world. Ironically enough, during the twenty-three years of the United Nation's existence, the world has witnessed a stupendous increase in armaments, both conventional and nuclear, and a proliferation of both. Our world today has arms enough for the total annihilation of all life and property, and there is no clear indication that this increase will not continue.

149. Sierra Leone has consistently urged and supported the general principles underlying disarmament—by which we mean total and complete disarmament. We realize that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will be a step towards disarmament.

150. The Sierra Leone delegation associates itself with the same spirit which inspired the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and spurred it on in its deliberations. This very spirit moved the Government of Sierra Leone to declare in July 1964, at the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, its readiness

“... to undertake through an international agreement, to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or to control atomic weapons”.

151. It was this self-same spirit that caused the Sierra Leone Government, along with other African Governments at the same Conference, not only to appeal to all peace-loving nations to accept the same undertaking, but also to appeal to all the nuclear Powers to respect and conform to the above declaration. Further, the Sierra Leone delegation in October of the same year, 1964, joined

with other Heads of State and Government of non-aligned countries in Cairo in issuing a declaration seeking similar objectives. Sierra Leone also welcomed the 1965 limited nuclear test ban Treaty which it signed as having accepted in 1966.

152. Here in this First Committee, the Sierra Leone delegation warmly welcomed last year the Latin American Treaty signed in Mexico whereby the illustrious peoples of Latin America, in their desire to banish from their part of the world the bane of nuclear weaponry, presented an example to other peoples in other geographical regions when they declared Latin America a nuclear-free zone.

153. However, we have to examine what is included in the draft treaty on non-proliferation and, in the light of that appraisal, to take a decision on the usefulness of it and the contribution it makes towards total and complete disarmament.

154. First, we realize the fact that there are five nations with nuclear armament capability and another twenty with potential nuclear armament capability within a few years if they desire. Happily, some of the latter have given unilateral undertakings that they would not embark on making their own atomic weapons.

155. They are to be congratulated for their firm decision and their willingness and example to all alike, both great and small Powers, in the quest of relieving world tension. Others, and here I must admit it is mainly those States involved in areas of disorder and conflict, have not given a clear indication of the position they would take.

156. This has to be a source of worry for nuclear States and non-nuclear States alike, for proliferation on the now accepted horizontal level, on which the treaty concentrates, could take place. Their assurance here and promise never to move from the ill-defined border of “atoms for peace” to “atoms for war” should help considerably in our quest for peace, even in this limited treaty. If even one of those twenty potential countries would not commit itself, the limited goals of this treaty would have been circumvented.

157. For us in Africa, with the tensions in southern Africa, the consequences of this possible horizontal proliferation could be great. Africa as a whole is striving to become a nuclear-free zone. Other nations have not permitted it to remain so. South Africa has the near potential for making nuclear weapons if it wishes. We are all well aware that in its approach to any problem—even though it uses the same words, “freedom, independence”—it is at an opposite pole. Freedom has meant bondage in areas of South African influence; and independence such as the General Assembly seeks for South West Africa has meant greater emphasis by South Africa on colonization and all that it involves. What guarantee then has any African country that, even if South Africa gave an assurance, it would not be the kind of assurance that would have a meaning opposed to the universal interpretation, as we have seen over “human rights” and the agreement on South West Africa and the succession of the United Nations to the League of Nations?

158. In this connexion we cannot predict whether South Africa would sign on the dotted line. We, too, have

observed the ambivalence of all the great Powers on matters touching South Africa. Not one of them would have anything to do with the Council for South West Africa—a United Nations responsibility. The reasons were varied, but the result was identical. Four of our five Members in which we repose confidence for peace and security are keen and competing trading partners of the South African régime. Three of them make use of South African bases and these three, amongst others, supply arms to South Africa which they cannot guarantee will not be used to attack African States. France, a major supplier of arms to South Africa, is understood not to be participating in the treaty. Is it not possible that nuclear proliferation might ensue under such friendly auspices? We cite this as a possibility which can have the gravest consequences for Africa; and all indications are that Whites would never fight Whites in Africa in defence of the indigenous inhabitants. Would not this same complacency apply in a nuclear holocaust if it were to take place in southern Africa, where there exists a grave threat to peace and security?

159. From past performance and the history of the United Nations, especially concerning South West Africa, we cannot expect more. How then can some of these same Powers urge us to sign on the dotted line and wish us to do so rather hurriedly and blindly?

160. Now let me turn for a moment to those States that have nuclear capability. Five States—France, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America—all have "the bomb" and can deliver it wherever they wish, when they wish. They are in the position of strength and can operate outside of any United Nations sponsored treaty, as indeed all of them have done when it suited them. Each one can, if it wishes, supply—or not supply—a non-nuclear State or a near-nuclear State with the information necessary for proliferation. Indeed, there is a great restraint on their part in this connexion. We commend them for it. However, this very restraint that they now exercise should be looked at more sharply in relation to the draft treaty. Each one can, without a treaty, refuse to proliferate horizontally, and each has so refused. What, then, is the main purpose of the draft treaty?

161. On the other hand, the majority of the non-nuclear States are so engrossed with the bare necessities of life—education, health, employment, housing and, generally, a better standard of living for their people—that they have neither the will nor the finances to meet the prohibitive cost of the acquisition of even "atoms for peace"; for them to wish for "atoms for war" would be a pipe dream.

162. In his report to the General Assembly on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons, the Secretary-General indicated that for a modest nuclear capability the cost would be "at least \$1,700 million, averaging \$170 million a year" [*A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 67*] over a ten-year period. To have something that would be considered worth while, the cost would be over \$560 million a year. The report further states:

"It thus appears that there are only about seven countries in the world, other than the five nuclear

weapons Powers, that could contemplate an added expenditure of \$170 million a year to develop a modest nuclear armament without reallocating a major part of their technical resources from constructive activities. For the small nuclear capability suggested, costing \$560 million a year, only the seven appear capable of finding the necessary resources." [*Ibid., para. 75.*]

163. Seriously, therefore, it is not the non-nuclear States that could present a threat to peace. It is the nuclear States and those seven to twenty that are near-nuclear States. A renunciation of proliferation by all of these would be an important first step rather than the other way round as the draft treaty suggests.

164. If I have laboured the distinction between the nuclear States, the near-nuclear States and the non-nuclear States, it is because, for us, this is the situation as it exists and a reality with which to cope. A treaty must make this tripartite distinction and ensure that its provisions account for the balance that Members envisaged when they drew up and voted almost unanimously for resolution 2028 (XX). It can be argued that that resolution speaks only of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. We maintain that the non-nuclear Powers, while having a great deal in common, constitute the two classes which we have mentioned. Any draft, therefore, has to take into rather serious consideration the expectations and desires of the near-nuclear States if the treaty is to be made workable.

165. Resolution 2028 (XX) was quite clear as to what was intended. By that resolution, the General Assembly

"*Urges* all States to take all steps necessary for the early conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;"

Under operative paragraph 2 of that resolution the Assembly

"*Calls upon* the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, to reconvene as early as possible with a view to negotiating an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. . ."

166. According to our understanding of those paragraphs, the intention was to stop both the dissemination—the so-called horizontal proliferation—and the stockpiling—the so-called vertical proliferation. What the draft treaty would do would be to stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons. It might even, without proper safeguards, increase vertical proliferation. The intent in general, therefore, is to prevent what does not exist; that is, the threat of the present non-nuclear-Powers to obtain or manufacture their own nuclear weapons for mass destruction. In any event, all the nuclear Powers could, without the existence of a treaty, exert such a control—as indeed they have done. It is common knowledge that the two Powers which most recently entered the nuclear armament field had to do most of the work by themselves because aid and information were not easily accessible. The draft treaty, therefore, in this broad sense has failed to meet the expectations of most of us. Almost every delegation that has spoken has said that the draft treaty could have been improved. We wish that, on these general lines, it could still be improved to embody

what was envisaged in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 2028 (XX).

167. So far, I have referred to the draft treaty in general terms. Now, Mr. Chairman, permit me to deal with specific matters relating to it.

168. I would recall, first, resolution 2028 (XX), in operative paragraph 2 of which five main principles are listed. Principle *a* reads:

“The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form”.

The draft treaty certainly goes a little way to satisfy this principle. It certainly makes it binding on non-nuclear States not to acquire nuclear weapons either directly or indirectly. It also makes it binding on nuclear States parties to the treaty not to transfer, either directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons to current non-nuclear Powers. This is the so-called horizontal proliferation. It does not prevent the vertical accumulation of more massive means of destruction, either directly or indirectly, single-handed or jointly, by the nuclear Powers. Each of them can stockpile according to its particular whims and caprices. In this sense, and in conformity with the generally accepted use of the word “non-proliferation”, the draft treaty contains loop-holes for the nuclear Powers.

169. Principle *b* states:

“The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers.”

This principle implies that there are indeed two groups of parties to the treaty: the haves in the nuclear club and the have-nots. As always in matters affecting these groups, the lesser brethren are asked to give more and receive less. That happened in New Delhi; and we are here re-enacting that scene. While Sierra Leone would emphatically support the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the treaty has to be examined in the light of our national interest, and we must ensure that we are not by this treaty condemned to remain in our present state of industrial interdependence. The nuclear Powers are really giving up only what they cannot do now just the same; they will not be sacrificing anything with the treaty.

170. Now permit me to turn to the security guarantees that have been stated and embodied in a Security Council draft resolution of 7 March 1968.¹¹ Questions that have been asked but not satisfactorily answered include the definition of “aggression” and why these guarantees could not have been contained in an article of the draft treaty. We are disappointed also in the Security Council’s lack of sufficient mobility for the taking of concerted action on any issue that might touch a permanent member, in view of the possibility of the use or threat of use of the veto. Even in the case of comparatively minor action, there is endless need for bargaining lest a permanent member register a “no” vote. Action on Southern Rhodesia is hampered precisely because two of those Powers hold that sword of

Damocles over other members’ heads. Yet we are now asked by those two and the Soviet Union to place greater faith in the action they might wish to take during a nuclear war. With that kind of mechanism, we might all be stricken with radiation, if nothing else, by the time action is considered in the Council. Of the five that have the bomb, France, by all reports, is not going to participate in a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The People’s Republic of China is not a Member of the United Nations and, therefore, not a member of the Security Council. That country is not expected to sign the treaty. How, then, can the primary organ for peace and security in the United Nations operate, under these unfavourable conditions? Whether all of us like it or not, the People’s Republic of China has the bomb, and we should be behaving like ostriches if we ignored that fact as the existence of one-fourth of the world’s population has been ignored. What confidence can nuclear Powers generate in non-nuclear Powers when one of the five with the bomb is excluded by design from the United Nations and another, by its own choice, is an outsider as far as the treaty is concerned and supposedly, therefore, an outsider as far as action in the Council is concerned? That two of them can operate outside the treaty is a fact of startling reality and sober importance in the consideration of the draft.

171. Almost all the delegations that have spoken have indicated two things: first, that the treaty could have been better; and, second, that it is a step towards disarmament. We agree with both statements.

172. Many questions have been asked, and some amendments have been put forward. The proposal by the representative of Sweden seems to command great attention. Sweden’s clear discourse on the need for such an amendment as a necessary step towards further elaboration of the treaty adds strength to the belief that the text of the treaty could be improved. Many other delegations have also suggested amendments worthy of serious consideration. To improve the text of the treaty, members seem to be willing in a constructive way to make suggestions which can further the progress of peace. This adds to the belief expressed by some other delegations that some Member States require more time to study and make up their minds on what course of action to follow. Precisely because this treaty is of such complexity and importance, it needs to be studied by experts. As all agree, it is a step, indeed a vital step, in the slow process of total and complete disarmament. Because it is a vital step in a slow process, great care should be taken to ensure that the foot is on very firm ground. The fact that almost every delegation has referred to the imperfections of the draft is an index to the quicksands that might be just beneath the surface. Time, therefore, is needed by delegations of small countries to assure themselves that the imperfections that are found in the treaty are not such as are fundamental and likely to hamper, perhaps for a long time, the difficult negotiations that lie ahead.

173. At this session we can discuss at length the various proposals that are being put before us. Delegations both large and small have something to gain from such an exercise. The world situation is not likely to worsen in the next few months. Indeed, there are indications that the temperature of “hot areas” might drop. Would it be too

¹¹ *Ibid.*, annex II.

much to ask that in a situation like this countries be allowed a few more months to study the draft treaty and then pronounce themselves during the twenty-third session? If in that way we can achieve unanimity, it will be well worth while waiting a few months.

174. Finally, let me say this. Since the end of the Second World War and the founding of the United Nations, wars have been waged continuously. Behind every war fought, behind every battle, there has been the direct or indirect

presence of a major Power. This is not to say the major Powers are the primary operators of wars. It is only to urge them—while they are urging us to accept this draft—to take a parallel step towards world peace and security and to show the same kind of enthusiasm towards that goal as they now display in their efforts to persuade us to accept the draft treaty.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.