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AGENDA ITEM 28

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*):

**(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
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DC/230 and Add.1; A/7080; A/C.1/959-960;
A/C.1/963; A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-3**

1. Mr. VRATUSA (Yugoslavia): The Yugoslav delegation welcomes the fact that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has submitted to the General Assembly, in good time, its report and other documents related to it.¹ We also recognize with appreciation the fact that the Co-Chairmen of the Committee, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have succeeded in presenting for our consideration a draft treaty on non-proliferation.² The important question of how to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has, as we all know, already appeared several times on the agenda of this world Organization and those of other international bodies, including the conferences of non-aligned countries. However, it is at this resumed session that every Member State of this Organization has for the first time been given an opportunity to discuss the draft treaty.

2. A successful completion of this undertaking would in itself create favourable conditions for new endeavours in the field of disarmament and international security.

3. It is the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation that the draft submitted for our consideration represents, surely, an instrument for effectively halting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form to other countries. It therefore may represent a valuable contribution to security in the world, especially in Europe. Besides, in comparison with previous drafts, the text before us marks a degree of progress in its provisions regarding the peaceful use of atomic energy and control of the use of that energy for peaceful purposes, while at the same time opening certain

perspectives for other measures in disarmament and providing for a periodic verification of the validity and the implementation of the treaty through review conferences every five years. However, the Yugoslav delegation would like to stress that there are still provisions in the draft that require further improvement, in view of the observations and suggestions brought to the fore in the negotiations thus far.

4. We are ready, on our part, to continue at this session with efforts towards this end in a spirit of mutual understanding, taking as a point of departure the common interests of the international community—peace and progress—as well as the equality of all countries, and bearing in mind, of course, the special responsibility of the nuclear Powers in this field.

5. It is our belief that General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), embodying the five well-known principles, represents the best instrument for identifying the extent to which the draft that has been submitted really fulfils the tasks outlined in that important document.

6. In examining the implementation of the principles mentioned in the text before us, one has to take into consideration the complexity of the issue as well as the fact that in relations among countries the elements of power policy are still present in such a considerable degree that in themselves they represent a serious obstacle to disarmament. In such a situation, the United Nations has been compelled to adopt a step-by-step procedure in dealing with problems relating to security and disarmament. It is therefore understandable that the apprehension and anxiety of nations for their security and independence continue to be permanently present at discussions concerning world affairs.

7. Yugoslavia, although not a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, has followed closely and with great interest the efforts to produce a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Within its possibilities, it has also been making its own contributions to the aims of the United Nations in that field, that is, to produce a treaty that would meet the needs and expectations of all countries. On a number of occasions in recent years, the views of Yugoslavia concerning this issue have been set forth in public statements, in parliamentary debates and in numerous consultations with friendly Governments. In this connexion I should like to draw attention only to the Memorandum of the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to the United Nations Disarmament Commission on 3 May 1965,³ and to its

¹ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1.

² Ibid., annex I.

³ Ibid., Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/216.

special statement of 11 April 1968 on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that statement my Government set forth the position of Yugoslavia in the present circumstances and put forward some ideas and suggestions for further consideration.

8. The Yugoslav Government views the problems of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons within the context of safeguarding peace and the development of international relations. It considers the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty an important initial step in the direction of the relaxation of international tension and the creation of a more favourable atmosphere in all regions of the world. That is why the Yugoslav Government is convinced that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty should have as a basis an acceptable balance of obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States which would lead to concrete measures of disarmament, primarily to nuclear disarmament; provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of guaranteeing the security of non-nuclear-weapon countries; contribute to the existing system of international security; and ensure equal rights to the non-nuclear-weapon States to share in the benefits accruing from the use of atomic energy, including the results of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

9. In this connexion, my Government attaches special importance to the requirement, several times reiterated in this Assembly and at various other international forums, that the nuclear Powers should without delay pursue negotiations aimed at concluding treaties and achieving other measures on vertical non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as well, primarily on the completion of the 1963 Moscow test-ban Treaty, on the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, on the halting of the nuclear arms race, and on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

10. Regarding international security in general, Yugoslavia welcomes the provisions of the treaty that will keep the door closed to any kind of proliferation to other countries. However, this provision in itself does not cover the problem of security as well. Therefore, Yugoslavia supports the efforts aimed at adopting solutions which would commit the nuclear Powers, on the one hand, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the States signatory to the non-proliferation treaty which have no nuclear weapons on their territories, and, on the other, to ensure that United Nations machinery will function in such a manner as to provide effective protection to the non-nuclear-weapon countries if they are victims of a nuclear attack or are threatened by nuclear weapons. In addition, it is our opinion that further measures, such as the discontinuation of the training of other countries' armies in the use of nuclear weapons, the removal of those weapons from foreign territories and the liquidation of nuclear bases abroad, as well as the establishment of denuclearized zones, should be stimulated, as this would contribute genuinely to the solution of the problem of international security. For the same purpose, it is indispensable to develop a form of control which would provide assurances against any misuse for military purposes of the provisions governing the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

11. As far as the balance of obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States is concerned, the urgency

should be stressed of undertaking measures that not only would prevent an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States but also would start a process of denuclearization of nuclear-weapon States.

12. The Yugoslav delegation is convinced that only a treaty that reflects the interests of the largest segment of the international community can be lasting and effective, as only such a treaty will enjoy the broadest support. Consequently, the number of signatories is an important factor—but not only the number, since everybody knows that the treaty would not be effective if potential nuclear Powers were not among the parties to it.

13. Should a non-proliferation treaty prove to be unacceptable to a certain number of countries, the end result would be that some of the most advanced near-nuclear States would not subscribe to it, or would not ratify it, or would not enter into an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and so forth, or perhaps would soon drop out. Such a development would be contrary to our wishes and aspirations and would involve not only the failure of the treaty but a serious setback.

14. In considering this important problem, I should like to emphasize that two out of the five nuclear Powers are not participating in the search for a treaty. We would all welcome it if France, whose policy represents an important factor in the present-day world, could find a way to contribute actively to the efforts of the United Nations in this field, as well. On the other hand, let us hope that the United Nations will muster the necessary strength and readiness to attain universality soon and, especially, to reach within this framework a just solution to the question of the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in our Organization. There is no doubt that this would be of great importance for further, more efficient United Nations activities in the field of disarmament, and that of international security as well.

15. Like many other countries, Yugoslavia does not belong to any military or other alliances. We believe that the world community should develop a system of international security based on disarmament that would effectively protect every nation from the threat or use of force and from any other form of aggression. That, in turn, would give the greatest safeguards to all peoples, regardless of differences in their social systems, and contribute to the consolidation of peace.

16. We should also like to see the more intensive development of a system of international co-operation that would enable every State and nation to share the experiences and the results of the work of other peoples in all fields, without political conditions, especially having in view new possibilities on the basis of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. We are, therefore, extremely interested in having our international community free of elements which render difficult co-operation on the basis of equality, mutual respect and solidarity.

17. In the light of those considerations, I should like now to add some comments concerning the issues of special interest to Yugoslavia, as a socialist and non-aligned country. Those issues are: disarmament, security, and the

use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Many speakers who preceded me explained in a very convincing way the essence of the problem. Therefore I shall limit myself to indicating those aspects which I feel to be especially relevant at this stage of our debate.

18. There is general agreement that it is most essential to have the non-proliferation treaty serve as a step to facilitate the initiation of the process of nuclear disarmament and to pave the way to general and complete disarmament. For that reason we should highly appreciate any initial step which could be taken in this direction and which could create conditions conducive to further progress in this field. In this context we regard as a matter of utmost urgency the requirement that the nuclear Powers undertake to pursue negotiations as soon as possible with the aim of achieving agreement on other measures.

19. In reference to the Yugoslav Government's statement of 11 April 1968 on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, I have enumerated various measures that, in our view, represent issues of priority, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament. We do not consider that all these measures should be undertaken simultaneously, immediately or in the order given in the above-mentioned statement, nor do we understand that the acceptance of the non-proliferation treaty should be made conditional upon them. Yugoslavia, however, believes that it is possible and necessary to begin, in the very near future, adopting these and other similar measures. Such a course of action would definitely serve as tangible proof of the readiness of the nuclear Powers to embark upon the road to disarmament, and would lay the ground for the confidence on the basis of which further progress towards general and complete disarmament could be made.

20. In this connexion, my delegation has noted with satisfaction that the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. Kuznetsov, in his statement to this Committee on 26 April [1556th meeting] reiterated the readiness of his Government to proceed to talks on a series of issues relating to nuclear disarmament. In the same way, we listened with equal appreciation to the statement of the head of the United States delegation, Mr. Goldberg, at the same meeting, who, with reference to the treaty we are discussing now, stressed that this document was designed to establish a new and solemn treaty obligation, especially upon the nuclear-weapon Powers, to press forward the search for nuclear disarmament. A similar pledge was given also by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mulley, in his speech on 1 May [1558th meeting], in describing the treaty as a bridge leading to further progress on disarmament.

21. The problem of guarantees is no doubt of central interest to an overwhelming number of countries. Security guarantees as offered in the draft resolution for the Security Council⁴ and in the anticipated statements by the three nuclear Powers are no doubt an expression of the interest of those nuclear Powers in contributing to the solution of this question. Those guarantees, however, are not of such a nature as to be sufficiently convincing.

Therefore, we feel that, with a sense of great urgency, we should consider jointly how the guarantees extended through the Security Council could be made applicable and effective.

22. Furthermore, it is very difficult to explain with convincing arguments why it should be impossible for the nuclear Powers to take upon themselves an obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to this treaty which do not have nuclear weapons on their territories. After all, this is an obligation stemming from the request of General Assembly resolution 2153 (XXI) to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. May I add that, on the one hand, such guarantees have already been proposed during the deliberations in the United Nations and elsewhere and, on the other, they were actually extended to the Latin American countries, under the terms of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [A/C.1/946], by the Powers that signed the relevant Protocol of that Treaty.

23. In insisting on such guarantees we want to stress once again that we would prefer a general prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We believe that this should be one of our next steps. For the beginning, however, we feel that we should undertake at least this limited ban. Let us not forget that this very Assembly, by adopting the Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons, [resolution 1653 (XVI)], has already proclaimed that:

“Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization.”

24. Finally, with respect to the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to share in the benefits accruing from the application of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions, for peaceful purposes, I should like to say that the suggestions advanced by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, on 9 May [1564th meeting], intended to eliminate grounds for any possible discrimination in that field among the parties to the treaty, deserve our close attention. In that connexion, I would suggest that it would be appropriate for us to consider the possibility that negotiations on the establishment of an international body, referred to in article V of the draft, and for the formulation of a draft treaty regulating this question should commence immediately after the signature of the present treaty.

25. While speaking about control over the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the Yugoslav delegation would like to add that it would be necessary to exert additional efforts to ensure the equal treatment of all States. It is the considered opinion of my delegation that appropriate attention should also be given to the more precise definition of the substance and modalities of control to be embodied in such agreements: in other words, to formulate a model treaty on control.

26. In dealing with all these issues, I have in mind also the possibility of the forthcoming conference of non-nuclear-weapon States, which should constitute a step forward from what we are able to achieve at this session of the

⁴ Ibid., Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex II.

General Assembly. In formulating its agenda, that conference should, above all, pay attention to the problems which could not be solved through the non-proliferation treaty but which, however, are of far-reaching importance for the stability and effectiveness of the treaty itself, as well as for the other measures linked by their nature to the problem of disarmament.

27. It is the profound hope of my delegation that we shall be capable at this session of reaching solutions acceptable to the largest majority so that we may be able to open a new chapter in our work soon. We should not spare any effort to use every opportunity to contribute to that end. The readiness of all Member States of this Organization to proceed in that direction will act as a stimulating force if permanently strengthened by actual deeds along the lines of the solemn declarations and pledges made at this session of the General Assembly.

28. Mr. FARRELL (New Zealand): For almost ten years now, New Zealand has given its full support to efforts within the United Nations to take action to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Today, there can no longer be any serious dispute about the dangers we shall face if the proliferation of these weapons is allowed to go unchecked. Nobody's security will be enhanced; the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, whether by design, miscalculation or accident, will enormously increase; and the obstacles in the way of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament, formidable enough at the present time, may well become insurmountable. We shall live virtually at the mercy of the unwelcome products of our technology. That that is the sort of world that awaits us, if we do not act, was confirmed in the plainest terms by the Secretary-General, in his report last year on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons.

29. The process of translating our common concern about the spread of nuclear weapons into a binding agreement to stop it has been painfully slow. The negotiations have been difficult, and they have been frustrating not only to those most intimately concerned but also to the rest of us who have anxiously awaited their outcome. In the meantime two more States have begun to develop nuclear weapons. Others have moved several paces closer to the same capability. Our environment has become more precarious.

30. It is therefore of the greatest significance that we now have before us, and have for the first time, a complete draft treaty that is designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The treaty reflects the efforts of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon Powers. One of the basic requirements—that it have the support of the two major nuclear Powers—is met.

31. As the product of lengthy negotiations the treaty inevitably bears the marks of compromise. There can be few of us in this Committee who would not have preferred to see some different formulations if the choice had been ours alone. We ourselves certainly recognize that it is not a perfect text. Given the range of vital national interests on which it touches, perfection could hardly have been

expected. In the view of my delegation, what we should consider is not whether the unattainable has been attained but rather whether the treaty will adequately achieve its purpose. Will it effectively bar the acquisition of nuclear weapons by further States? Will it open the way for additional concrete measures of disarmament? And will it achieve these two objects without inhibiting the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy?

32. Those are the questions that must determine our attitude towards the treaty; and it is in the light of those broad considerations that we have concluded that it should be endorsed by the Assembly without delay. We accordingly welcome the draft resolution introduced by Finland and now sponsored by a total of twenty-six Powers [*A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-3*].

33. The core of the treaty is to be found in articles I and II. The nuclear-weapon parties to the treaty would undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient whatever and not to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon States in acquiring or manufacturing them. The non-nuclear-weapon States for their part would be bound not to receive such weapons or devices and to refrain from acquiring or manufacturing them or from seeking any assistance for that purpose. Those two central provisions are more clearly drafted and more certain in their effect than earlier versions. To the extent that it is possible to deny loop-holes to States parties to the treaty, those articles constitute an effective and balanced formula to that end.

34. The enforcement of those provisions will, of course, confirm the existing disparity between countries that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not. Inequality in that sense is inherent in the very idea of non-proliferation, and any assessment of the balance of concessions made by nuclear and non-nuclear States parties to the treaty must take that into account.

35. This is not to say that it is inherently desirable that the great majority of us should renounce the possession of nuclear weapons and that five should not. The desirable state of affairs is one where no Power possesses these weapons. But regrettable though it may be, the choice before us in present circumstances is not between five nuclear Powers and no nuclear Powers; it is between holding the figure at five and seeing it climb inexorably to ten, fifteen, twenty. We do not find this choice a very difficult one. I recall here that the Foreign Minister of Brazil, looking at the treaty as a whole, observed in the present debate that:

“The world is thus called upon to repose unlimited confidence in those five Powers, regardless of the undeniable fact that an absolute mutual trust does not... prevail among those five self-same Powers.” [*1560th meeting, para. 68.*]

It may be questioned whether this confidence must be unlimited, but there is undeniable force in his remark. Yet from the viewpoint of a small country such as New Zealand, with nothing approaching nuclear ambitions, the prospect of relying on the varying degrees of responsibility of five nuclear-weapon States is still a good deal more attractive than relying on similarly varying degrees of responsibility of fifteen or twenty.

36. Essential to the effective operation of the rules of articles I and II is the system of safeguards contained in article III. This part of the treaty has been subjected to criticism in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and again in our debate here, on the ground that its provisions are unequal in their operation. That criticism is not without point. New Zealand, while it would have no difficulty itself in accepting the safeguards in article III, is among those countries that would have wished to see the safeguards system extended to the nuclear as well as to the non-nuclear parties to the treaty. We do recognize, however, that the special character of this treaty to some extent sets it apart from other measures of disarmament for which universal controls will be absolutely essential. What seems most important is that the unequal application of safeguards in the non-proliferation treaty should not serve as a precedent for further measures of disarmament. We have heard no suggestion that it should. We are also reassured by the fact that two of the nuclear Powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, have declared their intention to place their peaceful programmes under the safeguards system of article III. It would be even more reassuring if other nuclear Powers were to make similar declarations.

37. The security gained by the possession of nuclear weapons may be illusory. Nevertheless, States that renounce these weapons are entitled to expect some assurance of protection from nuclear attack. We are encouraged by the fact that the three nuclear Powers participating in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have indicated their intention to submit a draft resolution to the Security Council under which they would commit themselves to assistance to any non-nuclear State party to the treaty if that State were subjected to a threat or act of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used.

38. It is, I believe, agreed on all sides that this treaty cannot be regarded as an isolated, let alone a final, measure. It is both a crucial step in the control of nuclear weapons and a condition of further progress on disarmament. At a time when the nuclear arms race is taking an upward spiral with the development of another generation of still more sophisticated offensive and defensive weapons, that progress is needed more urgently than ever.

39. It has been argued that the provision in the treaty that looks directly towards further measures of disarmament, article VI, should place more specific obligations on the nuclear Powers, should tie them down to a step-by-step programme. If that had been possible it would indeed have been welcome. New Zealand does not, however, accept that the only course open to the non-nuclear States, which are anxious to see further advances made, is to insist that the treaty be reshaped in this manner. The record of the negotiations preceding this treaty, and of other disarmament negotiations as well, suggests that the result of such insistence might well be a complete failure to make progress of any kind. If that were to be the price of a demand for action on several fronts at once it would surely be much too high.

40. New Zealand can also not accept that the conclusion of the treaty in its present form would in any way inhibit further progress. Limited and imprecise though it may be,

article VI of the draft treaty does embody formal and binding undertakings to work in good faith towards disarmament. It is not directed solely towards the nuclear Powers but it obviously bears on them most heavily. Provided that the rest of us do our part we shall be entitled to ask—and to ask with increasing insistence with the passage of time—what the nuclear Powers have done to make good their pledges. The fact that there is provision in article VIII for a review conference as early as five years after entry into force of the treaty should help to ensure that demands for early and significant agreement are given due attention. We do not suggest by this comment that the implementation of article VI must involve a conflict between the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers. It is, we believe, in the interests of both that further concrete agreements be reached at the earliest possible date. Indeed, as other speakers in this debate, among them the United Kingdom, Finland and Ethiopia, have already made plain, if this important purpose of the treaty is not fulfilled then the treaty as a whole is not likely to endure as an effective and useful instrument.

41. The three nuclear-weapon States that have taken part in this debate have all given some indication of the measures of arms control that they believe should be taken up as a matter of urgency when the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament resumes its work. So have many of the non-nuclear-weapon States. New Zealand, for its part, has urged on more than one occasion and urges again now that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing should have the highest priority. An end to all nuclear tests would be a logical corollary to an agreement on non-proliferation and indeed there is specific, if indirect, mention of such a measure in the preamble to the treaty. A comprehensive ban would do much to slow down the futile and dangerous competition among the nuclear Powers to refine and expand their weapons systems. That this competition is in full swing at the present time is evident; four out of the five nuclear Powers are testing. Of these, two are testing in the atmosphere and one of them is engaged in this activity in the South West Pacific not far from New Zealand. This is of continuing concern to the Government and people of New Zealand and other territories in the area. We express once again the hope that it will stop, along with all other atmospheric testing.

42. It is a legitimate demand that the present treaty should not inhibit any State in its development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Some non-nuclear-weapon States in particular have been preoccupied with this aspect of the treaty. Substantial improvements have been made in the text of the draft which appear to go a good distance towards meeting their understandable concern. Preambular paragraphs in the original drafts have been expanded into a positive statement, in articles IV and V, of the rights of all States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information.

43. The use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes has presented special problems because of the inescapable fact of nuclear technology that a “peaceful” device is also potentially a weapon. We believe that it follows inevitably from this fact that if there is not to be a serious gap in the

treaty, the basic rules in articles I and II must apply to all nuclear explosive devices, whatever their purpose. Any resulting disadvantage suffered by non-nuclear-weapon States does, however, appear to be offset by the provision in article V that the benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosions shall be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States without discrimination and at the lowest possible cost.

44. New Zealand's approach to the present draft treaty reflects the fact that we are a small nation. We do not have the desire to "keep our options open" which must inevitably influence, directly or indirectly, the attitude of larger States. Nevertheless, as a country now on the threshold of its own programme for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, New Zealand does have a direct interest in ensuring that legitimate nuclear development is not hamstrung by the safeguards in the draft treaty designed to control military applications of nuclear energy. It is our considered assessment that the relevant provisions in the treaty do adequately protect our present and future freedom to develop New Zealand's own peaceful nuclear programme.

45. Allow me to conclude by referring once again to the central purpose of the treaty presented to us. It will not by itself make the world a safe and secure place. But it is the indispensable next step in the control of armaments and for this reason is needed with the utmost urgency. My delegation is aware that there are some who still have reservations. We believe, however, that the Assembly should ponder very carefully indeed the consequences of failing to take now the opportunity for which we have been waiting so long. Is there really any chance of further progress without this agreement? And can we face with equanimity the prospect of no further progress at all? New Zealand joins with others in asking for the endorsement of the treaty at this resumed session.

46. Mr. GALINDO POHL (El Salvador) (*translated from Spanish*): The co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have submitted a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to the General Assembly. This treaty merits careful consideration in view of the important matter it is designed to regulate and its implications for international security, scientific and technological co-operation, and regional and national development programmes.

47. Seldom in recent years has the United Nations had before it an initiative likely to have such fruitful consequences, and seldom have States faced such a delicate decision, since most of the members of the international community are themselves probably about to limit some of the powers they exercise as rights inherent in their statehood.

48. The draft treaty is an attempt to respond to the repeated demand of the peoples of the world that the technology of atomic weapons be kept under international control and that the dangers threatening the survival of mankind be reduced. The extent to which this goal will be achieved will depend on the quantitative and qualitative support given the treaty designed for that purpose. In particular, it is important that it be accepted by those

countries which have the industrial and technological capacity to manufacture atomic explosives, or will acquire it in the next twenty-five years.

49. This draft treaty has been the subject of discussions and over twenty-five proposed amendments in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Those proposals indicate the problems the treaty raises, and they must be considered and weighed in the decision-making process of each State, since only a few of them have been included in the revised text now before the General Assembly.

50. The draft covers a small and relatively less controversial field of international agreement, since it avoids the more difficult and complex field of the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the destruction of atomic arsenals and disarmament. Thus, the threat of a nuclear holocaust which has hung over mankind for some years will continue as it has until now.

51. My Government has analysed some of the most important questions raised by the draft and has come to the following conclusions.

52. Firstly, there is a marked contrast between the safeguards provided by article III to be applied to the obligations assumed by the non-nuclear-weapon States under article II and the total absence of any inspection, effective guarantees or recourse in reference to the obligations to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon Powers in accordance with article I.

53. Article VIII, paragraph 3, provides for a forum where the implementation of the treaty can be reviewed, including its application by the great nuclear Powers, thereby affording an opportunity to obtain specific information on the effectiveness of its contractual provisions. In that forum we will be able to observe how "the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized". My Government would, of course, prefer to have this conference meet regularly every five years without having to be convened on request by the majority of the parties to the Treaty. Despite all this, the absence of safeguards in respect of the obligations of the great nuclear Powers in terms equal to those guaranteeing fulfilment of the obligations by non-nuclear-weapon States is still a cause for concern, not only because of the imbalance between the commitments of the two groups of States—which is at variance with General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX)—but also because of the obligations as such, since legal norms should be accompanied by the means for their enforcement.

54. Secondly, article III of the draft makes the non-nuclear-weapon States subject to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This safeguards system is set forth in the Statute of that Agency, and article XII, which applies in this case, was last revised on 31 January 1963 and is subject to review by the Agency's Board of Governors. Very broad powers are given to the International Atomic Energy, even though the needs of technological progress may make it inevitable to grant supervisory power in terms so broad as to include regulatory powers in a specific field for should the safeguards

system be consolidated as it now stands, it might quickly become obsolete in view of the rapid technological progress of recent years.

55. Thirdly, a short time ago the Treaty of Tlatelolco [A/C.1/946] marked the decision of the Latin American States to abstain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. Thus, those countries have voluntarily limited their activities in the atomic field by international agreement. The scope and provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco are not always identical with those of the draft under consideration here. However, this could hardly be otherwise, because although the Treaty of Tlatelolco reflects the state of international relations at the world level, it responds to the conditions peculiar to the Latin America region. If the international community, which is confronted by different problems and limited by other factors, wishes to achieve agreement in certain specific areas, it must work out appropriate norms for much more complex tensions and circumstances. It must be accepted, since it has been fully proved, that the technology for producing nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes also makes it possible to produce weapons of war. The norms of these two international legal instruments are not mutually exclusive, but they would have to be co-ordinated rationally in the light of legal doctrine and rules of interpretation. I wish to take advantage of this occasion to recall the capital importance that the accession of those countries which have not yet signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco would have for that valuable instrument.

56. Fourthly, each State will have to judge whether the draft treaty now before us could slow down development, according to the conditions of its own development and the respective plans and programmes. At a particular level of development, some atomic programmes—naturally, those for peaceful development of the atom—can act as an incentive on scientific and technical capacity. El Salvador, at its present stage of development, trusts that articles IV and V of the draft treaty—particularly if the texts are improved in accordance with the working document prepared by some of the Latin American countries—will guarantee that we will have the necessary assistance for the peaceful uses of the atom, which is the only aspect of that source of energy and power that interests us.

57. It is in our national interest to have access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. El Salvador considers that it would be an achievement if the States possessing such knowledge and resources would commit themselves, by international agreement, to make them available on request, since present and future scientific and technological information will be factors for promoting development in a society increasingly dependent on knowledge and its application.

58. Fifthly, the treaty would legalize the present division of the world into States having and States not having nuclear weapons. In other words, it would maintain the position of pre-eminence enjoyed by a limited number of States—those with the right of veto in the Security Council—since other States would renounce competition with them in the atomic weapons field. However, if other States should enter the atomic race, they would not obtain the security they wish, since they would stimulate competi-

tors and accelerate the manufacture of nuclear weapons by the Powers already possessing them. Thus, to increase the number of countries having nuclear weapons does not add one whit to the present precarious system of international security. Legalizing this situation through the consent of the international community, despite all the anxiety it creates, is a way of limiting the risks of atomic catastrophe, a limited security measure, and a price we must pay for the cause of international peace and security. We shall gain nothing, but rather lose, if by the end of this century, we have fifteen or twenty instead of five nuclear Powers.

59. There is a critical point in international relations at which the best system of guarantees can break down and collapse, even though it is established through treaties or even institutions. Our efforts must be directed towards ensuring that this critical moment will never arise again, that there will never be another time in which the civilized norms of coexistence collapse and when force, more or less disguised by reasons, becomes a decisive factor. For, if that were to happen, it could mean the suicide of the human race. The great nuclear Powers must come to an agreement that gives substance to article VI of the draft treaty, in accordance with which the parties, without exception, undertake "... to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". Armed peace has always led to catastrophe at some point, and only the disappearance of atomic installations and nuclear tests can provide the necessary security in this field. No security is possible with weapons aimed and ready to fire. Security lies in the understanding, confidence and co-operation shown in the international organizations. To seek security by nuclear armament is to repeat the catastrophes that darken the history of mankind.

60. The guarantee offered by the three great nuclear Powers through the draft resolution which will ultimately be submitted to the Security Council, whereby any threat levelled by a nuclear-weapon State against a non-nuclear-weapon State would meet with an appropriate response in conformity with the United Nations Charter, is an attempt to offer the maximum guarantee possible in the present circumstances. In fact, this type of guarantee would normally be embodied in another article of the draft treaty. However, in view of the possibility that some of the Powers which have exploded nuclear weapons before 1 January 1967 would not sign the treaty, the contractual article would be without effect with respect to those countries.

61. The signatory States can aspire to a legally complete guarantee through a provision in the treaty, so far as their mutual obligations are concerned. The circumstances which led to the pledge of the guarantee through a resolution of the Security Council do not eliminate the need for an article on this subject in the operative part of the treaty. We are well aware of the obstacles the Security Council encounters in the fulfilment of its functions; but certainly the agreement of the Powers with the right of veto would make the treaty an incontrovertibly effective instrument. The possible resolution of the Security Council and the solemn and categorical statements of the representatives of the three great nuclear Powers during this debate might be

understood as an implicit promise not to use the veto. However, only three of the five nuclear Powers are backing this draft resolution of the Security Council, so that the guarantee contains a lacuna from the outset and therefore gives rise to some doubt regarding its effectiveness. We are faced with the uncertainty of the Security Council. Yet, when all is said and done, we do not have any more perfect organs or machinery, and we must work with what we have, because otherwise we would have to renounce international understanding altogether.

62. Actually, my country hopes that the atomic Powers will adequately meet the immense and difficult responsibilities deriving from the destructive power at their disposal, and that they will end the armed vigilance that is constantly bringing mankind to the verge of an atomic holocaust.

63. Sixthly, at this time there are five Powers which have exploded nuclear weapons. The other countries could be divided into two sub-groups by analysing the terms and implications of the draft treaty: one, the sub-group of countries which, during the initial period of entry into force of the treaty, could, if they so decide, manufacture nuclear explosives; the other, the sub-group of those countries which do not expect, regardless of the supposed speed of their development, to acquire that capacity.

64. El Salvador belongs to the second sub-group. The crux of the matter rests with the first sub-group because its decision will determine the effectiveness of the treaty in the next twenty-five years. We would not get very far if, theoretically speaking, the great nuclear Powers and the States not expecting to have the industrial and technical capacity for producing nuclear weapons in the next few years should reach an agreement, even though they had the ratifications of the forty non-nuclear States which under article IX, paragraph 3, would bring the treaty into force. But the lasting success of the treaty depends on the great Powers, and I am referring not only to the way they fulfil the obligations of article I—although that is extremely important—but also to the agreement that can give substance to article VI which declares the intention to disarm. The support the draft treaty may receive at this time from the international community would, in all frankness, be loaded with reservations. How long can some of the peoples of the international community, however advanced and respectable, determine the biological fate of mankind? It is madness to proliferate nuclear weapons; but it is inadmissible that five Powers should decide the destiny of mankind.

65. International security would be much more gravely threatened if, at the end of this century, instead of five nuclear Powers we should have fifteen or twenty, and the risks of nuclear catastrophe, even by mere accident, would be much greater than they are today. Therefore, it is in the interests of all—the large, medium-sized and small States alike—to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

66. The text we are considering could be improved. But the crux of the matter is to decide how far improvement is possible, in view of the specific circumstances of the international scene at present.

67. The draft before us is the outcome of what may be called the international *détente*, and must be examined as

part of a process. Actually the use of outer space for warlike purposes is already prohibited [*General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex*]; the Antarctic⁵ and the Moscow Treaties are already in force, and we also have the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The draft treaty on non-proliferation covers part of the vast and perennial problem of international security. The treaty on non-proliferation, inspired by those precedents, is a link in a long chain, another step in the efforts to organize international security and co-operation. Achievements in international organization are built up, piece by piece, and we must therefore learn to restrain our impatience and take full advantage of our opportunities with complete realism, without renouncing the ideals of a morally, economically and politically better society than the one in which we now live.

68. There is an old Spanish proverb which says that the best is the enemy of the good. Pursuit of the best sometimes leads us to let pass something which can be considered good, or at least acceptable. The tendency to seek perfection can complicate negotiations interminably and aggravate problems instead of easing them. Nevertheless, States have the full and complete right, before committing themselves, to measure and weigh all the factors involved in their decision and to have a reasonable amount of time for that purpose; to consider how far they can grant the international organizations regulatory powers, and what degree of unspecified regulation they are willing to accept, on the understanding that, as unspecified regulation increases—for here too there are degrees—so do the roles of the executive and of jurisprudence.

69. Complex matters can be best understood when broken down into their simple parts, according to the Cartesian rule; in practice, more or less complex problems, particularly those of international relations—where we have only recently gone beyond the law of the jungle—must be broken down and solved by parts. If we seek to solve everything all at once and renounce a modest agreement because it falls far short of satisfying our aspirations, if, in this case, we were to make the agreement on non-proliferation depend on an agreement on general disarmament, or at least on nuclear disarmament, we would be taking a very ambitious decision which would require a great effort to carry out and, in the meantime, atomic arsenals would be growing to uncontrollable dimensions.

70. This treaty would not cure the ills of the present time, but it would prevent them from growing worse. This Treaty would involve different contributions of effort and sacrifice on the part of the signatory States, but everything would come under the common denominator of the interest of the great, medium-sized and small States in the cause of peace and co-operation.

71. My country would be receptive to examining specific proposals for improving the text of the treaty, provided they take up only a reasonable amount of time. My country feels that such a debate should be conducted with the greatest frankness, the greatest receptivity to all opinions, and the broadest possible examination of the proposed text. My country considers that the draft, with all its weaknesses, is nevertheless a positive step towards orga-

⁵ See United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, 1961, No. 5778.

nizing the present-day international world, that it covers a small part of the complex problem of international security, and promotes international co-operation so far as control of the atom is concerned.

72. El Salvador realizes the weak points of the draft but, aware as it is of the pitfalls of a perfectionist stand, it does not wish to do anything that would complicate or delay an important international move. If in this Assembly the consensus of opinion is in favour of certain revisions in the text before us, we would be willing to make a constructive contribution to its amendment. If, on the other hand, that should not be the general opinion, and if there should be no way of reaching sufficiently well-grounded and viable agreement on such possible amendments, we would be willing to endorse the text of the draft treaty in its present form.

73. El Salvador knows that we are not engaging in a mere academic exercise but are considering a document which has taken much time, effort and dedication to prepare, and which represents the points of agreement, or of concession and accommodation of the great nuclear Powers. We should therefore be doing a disservice if we failed to recognize the constructive significance of the present draft and to accept the effort of the great nuclear Powers as heralding better days in international relations.

74. El Salvador considers this pragmatic act—accession to the draft treaty—an act of faith, provided that there is no conflict between intelligent practice and loyalty to ideas. The technology of destruction has brought present-day society to such a pitch of danger that, when faced with the decision, we must accept whatever may aid international peace and understanding; for when confronted with the alternative of the apocalypse, all reservations and criticism must give way and we must act, without sacrificing our national sovereignty, as human beings faced with total catastrophe beyond remedy or point of return. The days of the balance through terror of fifteen or twenty years ago have given way to something rather more positive: understanding through terror. In those circumstances, if no specific and viable proposals are forthcoming, El Salvador, aware of the precariousness of the present time, will support the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

75. Mr. OULD DADDAH (Mauritania) (*translated from French*): The pressing need to work out an acceptable solution to the non-proliferation aspect of the nuclear disarmament problem has already been brought out during this discussion in the First Committee.

76. Mr. Chairman, before giving my Government's views on this basic question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania would like once again to express its satisfaction at the firm and courteous fashion in which you are presiding, with authority and skill, over our labours. We admire the tactful efficiency with which you succeed in keeping our discussion focused on the basic subject of the debate. Today, in paying you and the other officers of the Committee a well-earned tribute, the Mauritanian delegation would like to assure you, as it has in the past, of its whole-hearted co-operation.

77. The Islamic Republic of Mauritania, a peace-loving non-aligned country, is acutely aware of the considerable impact which a successful conclusion to our consideration of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons can have in connexion with the security and with the economic and social development of peoples everywhere, especially in the under-developed countries. The people and Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania welcome with interest any development that can bring us closer to general and complete disarmament.

78. A few days ago, before the General Assembly [*1647th plenary meeting*], my delegation mentioned the distaste for violence felt by the people and Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. In that same statement, which was made during the discussion on the serious problem of South West Africa, the Mauritanian delegation again emphasized the deep devotion of the Mauritanian people and its leaders to peace and to the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. Peace, security, harmony in international relations, justice—those are the values to which we aspire most, the values to which my people and its leaders, aware of what they are and of what they stand for, have always been and remain ready to make their modest contribution. The Islamic Republic of Mauritania, an under-developed country with a small population whose vast economic and human potentials have so far been little exploited, has no foreign military base on its soil and is certainly not one of the countries which, through its own resources or through the aid it receives, might in the near future become a nuclear Power.

79. We hope that reason and wisdom will prevail among mankind; in other words, we hope that the frantic race to destroy the human species—as evidenced by the production and stockpiling of weapons which are made more deadly and destructive every day as a result of technological and scientific progress—will be slowed down and then abandoned.

80. In our view, and in that of the rest of the world, complete and general disarmament is a basic problem the successful solution of which can have the most beneficial results for security and for the development of peoples everywhere. The Mauritanian people and its leaders hopefully hail any encouraging sign and any step made towards a real solution to the serious problem of disarmament.

81. We support—and as a founding member of the African continental organization we shall continue to support—the Statement of the Heads of State and Government of the members of the Organization of African Unity in which the African countries members of the Organization of African Unity solemnly declared, on 21 July 1964,⁶ that they were prepared to undertake, in an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or possess nuclear weapons. At Cairo, in October 1964, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, a non-aligned country, joined in the statement made on the same subject at the second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries.⁷

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

⁷ See document A/5763 (mimeographed).

82. The Islamic Republic of Mauritania greeted with respect the profoundly important Treaty of Tlatelolco [A/C.1/946], in which the Latin American countries in their wisdom, and displaying the political and humane qualities for which they are renowned, took in 1967 the historic decision to make Latin America a nuclear-free zone.

83. We have regarded the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water signed at Moscow in 1963, and the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [resolution 2222 (XXI), annex], as steps—small and tentative, no doubt, but steps nevertheless—towards our goal of general and complete disarmament.

84. We are well aware of the serious threat which hangs over the world owing to the destructive power of nuclear weapons. In this connexion, the Mauritanian delegation would like once more to extend its gratitude to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the report to the General Assembly dated 10 October 1967, in which it is stated:

“The basic facts about the nuclear bomb and its use are harsh and terrifying for civilization. . . . The ultimate question for the world to decide in the nuclear age—and this applies both to nuclear and non-nuclear Powers—is what short-term interests it is prepared to sacrifice in exchange for an assurance of survival and security.” [A/6858, para. 42.]

85. After clearly presenting this serious problem, the authors of the report reach the following conclusions:

“So far as international security is concerned, it is highly possible that any further increase in the number of nuclear weapons States or any further elaboration of existing nuclear arsenals would lead to greater tension and greater instability in the world at large.” [Ibid., para. 82.]

“The solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons, or indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them.” [Ibid., para. 91.]

86. Does the draft non-proliferation treaty that is submitted for the Committee's consideration take sufficient account of those pertinent comments in the Secretary-General's report? Is this draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is being submitted to the General Assembly in keeping with the recommendations made in resolution 2028 (XX), which was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the Members of our Organization?

87. If the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania is asking these questions after other delegations have already done so during their participation in the debate it is because it wishes above all to make clear the spirit in which it has carefully considered the draft treaty on non-proliferation.

88. It is also because we feel that the danger which the authors of document A/6858 very objectively and rightly

see in both the proliferation of nuclear States and in the build-up or maintenance of existing nuclear arsenals, is dealt with very incompletely and one-sidedly in the text of the draft non-proliferation treaty before us. From this standpoint we can state that the draft non-proliferation treaty is but a partial answer to the need for security which must be both its justification and its goal. It sets up no obstacle to prevent the terrifying stockpiles of nuclear weapons which the nuclear Powers already possess from being improved or increased.

89. My delegation feels that, within the United Nations, a document as important as the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be considered with the genuine desire to enable all States to find in it elements which would meet their deep and legitimate concern about their security and their longing for well-being. The concern caused in the world by the increase and improvement of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately dispelled merely by denying the non-nuclear Powers any opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons or to carry out unsupervised nuclear research. Sufficient emphasis has already been placed on the present draft's lack of balanced obligations between the nuclear Powers which are prepared to adhere to the treaty and the non-nuclear Powers whose adherence to this incomplete document is being insistently requested. We are told that the text of the draft treaty on non-proliferation contains the maximum concessions the largest nuclear Powers are prepared to make to each other.

90. My delegation finds that to be a strange argument. What are we really seeking? An agreement between the great Powers whose vast capabilities are obvious and who may not need this discussion to list the items on which they can agree? Or is the United Nations trying to create conditions that will enable the nations of the world to find a way to dispel the threat of nuclear war for their peoples by the gradual but resolute destruction of all nuclear weapons?

91. The Mauritanian delegation is convinced that the prime concern of Committee members as a whole is to draw up a document that can help to improve international relations by creating greater world-wide security which would make possible the non-proliferation and, after that, the destruction of nuclear weapons.

92. Articles II and III of the draft treaty call upon the non-nuclear States to make major concessions which are nowhere sufficiently offset in the body of the draft.

93. The nuclear Powers that are eager to have the General Assembly adopt the draft non-proliferation treaty retain their right to continue to increase and improve their nuclear weaponry without any limitation other than the vague provisions in article IV of the draft.

94. As for the security guarantees to which the non-nuclear States rightly attach the utmost importance, they are totally absent from the treaty provisions. A draft resolution refers them to the Security Council which, under the terms of that draft resolution:

“1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the

Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.”⁸

95. Such a provision assumes a trust in the Security Council by the nuclear Powers which some of the unhappy events of our era hardly warrant. What methods have the permanent members of the Security Council in fact used to implement the decisions which that responsible body has taken to terminate the intolerable situations prevailing in southern Africa and in the Middle East? These are but two examples that cause the peoples of the world, in their bewilderment, to wonder how much of the tremendous confidence placed by them in the United Nations has been lost as a result of the culpable inertia of the great Powers, and to what extent too the United Nations has lost any real control it might have had over the realities of today.

96. In making that comment, the Mauritanian delegation derives some comfort from the fact that certain nuclear Powers have denounced the scandal to which it has just referred, both inside and outside the Organization. The whole world owes a deep debt of gratitude to those Powers, whose example and whose actions have greatly contributed to the liberation and to the economic and social progress of peoples everywhere. Such action, regardless of the way in which those fomenting hotbeds of tension and oppression in various parts of the world may try to present it, is an important factor for the maintenance of international peace and security.

97. Nevertheless, the United Nations, when faced with serious violations of the fundamental principles of the Charter, is itself immobilized by the action of certain Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council.

98. In the light of this serious situation, what good are the illusory guarantees offered in the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council? In connexion with this draft resolution, we might well wonder why the nuclear Powers which are sponsoring the draft refuse to include in the provisions of the draft treaty itself the type of guarantees they are prepared to offer to the non-nuclear countries, as confirmed by their promised declarations. Obviously, the inclusion of guarantees in the text of the non-proliferation treaty would be logical and would add to the clarity of the treaty, and therefore merits consideration.

99. Furthermore, a non-proliferation treaty is required which can be widely approved and implemented by States, yet insufficient importance is attached in this treaty to the absence of two of the five nuclear Powers in the world today. These two nuclear Powers, whose action and great influence can considerably hinder the implementation of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, have had no part in the preparation of this draft. They surely see in the document as many, if not more, loop-holes as have been pointed out by a large number of non-nuclear Powers. These are grave defects which it might be well to remedy before the treaty is adopted if the document is to have some chance of success and of being put into force.

100. In this connexion, the Mauritanian delegation, along with some of the delegations that have already taken part in this discussion, would like to emphasize the danger inherent in the persistent refusal to restore the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. That great nuclear Power's absence from our deliberations is having extremely unfortunate repercussions on important decisions which the United Nations might be able to take. My delegation is hopeful that the desire to give the United Nations greater effectiveness and authority will cause all Member States to help in the admission of the People's Republic of China to the Organization.

101. The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania believes that the few gaps and shortcomings in the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons it has felt impelled to mention, along with those already brought out by many other delegations, demonstrate the need for a thorough study and a serious improvement of this treaty. That will take time; however, the Mauritanian delegation is of the opinion that this is the price we must pay to render viable any projected document on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. From that standpoint, my delegation believes that it would be most useful to allow the meeting scheduled for July 1968 to be held before the General Assembly adopts the draft treaty which is now before the First Committee.

102. Mr. HUSAIN (India): In discussing the report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee concerning the draft of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly is engaged on an urgent and important task to which the Government of India has given the most careful consideration and attaches great significance. The deep and abiding interest of the Government of India in the field of disarmament is well known. India has been firmly and consistently of the view that all nuclear weapons, being weapons of mass destruction, must be completely eliminated. The idea of an immediate cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests pending their complete prohibition under a comprehensive test-ban treaty was first mooted by the late Prime Minister Nehru. India was one of the first countries to sign the 1963 Moscow partial test-ban Treaty. Ever since then the Government of India has expressed the hope that the Treaty would be signed by all countries and has urged that the prohibition be extended to underground tests as well. Further, India has supported efforts to prohibit the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

103. My delegation has taken an active part in the deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. In that forum we have pleaded for various collateral measures—in particular, in relation to nuclear disarmament—as an integral part of the basic and ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament.

104. It was in keeping with this approach and policy that, in 1964, India took the initiative in inscribing for the first time on the agenda of the General Assembly an item under the title of “Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”,⁹ and

⁸ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex II.

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 2, document A/5758.

not—if I may repeat the words—under the title of “Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons”, as had been the case in 1959 and in 1961. And it is in this new and modified form that the item has continued to figure in the agenda of all subsequent sessions of the General Assembly.

105. I recall the wording of the inscription by India in 1964 of the item “Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” because it was done after due deliberation and forethought. The difference between dissemination and proliferation is, I submit, not a matter of mere semantics but one of substance and significance. These are two facets to the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons: the first is that of dissemination, that is, of transfer and receipt of weapons and weapon technology, and the second is that of production, that is, manufacture of nuclear weapons. Our persistent plea that the international community should concern itself with proliferation in all its manifestations rather than with only one aspect of it has, in our view, been fully vindicated by the past history of the efforts to prevent proliferation. Those efforts were designed to stop only dissemination, without imposing any curbs on the continued manufacture, stockpiling and sophistication of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear-weapon Powers. The fact that the number of nuclear-weapon Powers increased from one in 1945 to two in 1949, three in 1952, four in 1960 and five in 1964 is proof enough of the failure of this limited approach. I may also recall that, in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, the representatives of the United Kingdom and France repeatedly warned the international community that, unless the existing nuclear-weapon Powers stopped further production of these weapons themselves, there would be additional countries which would decide to develop their own nuclear deterrent. And, indeed, that is what has happened.

106. The urge to seek greater security—imaginary or illusory though it may prove to be—by acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be curbed by a prohibition applied only to those who do not possess them. It can be effectively controlled only by attacking the root of the problem—namely, the state of insecurity caused in the world by the possession of those weapons of horror and mass destruction by a few Powers. The desire to emulate the example of those who have become nuclear-weapon Powers will be difficult to resist as long as the world lives in a state of imbalance. It can be eliminated only if we do away with the special status of superiority associated with power and prestige conferred on those possessing nuclear weapons.

107. It is evident that the nuclear menace can be eliminated only by nuclear disarmament, but it is equally evident that the first step that we take in this direction should be not only to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons but also and simultaneously to inhibit the further development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. In other words, a way out of the present impasse can be found only through a simultaneous prevention of both aspects of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, vertical as well as horizontal. Both these aspects of the proliferation of nuclear weapons form part of a single whole, and the problem cannot be successfully dealt with by tackling only one aspect of it. This consideration is basic and central to our concept of a non-proliferation treaty.

108. In this connexion, it may be recalled that of the five principles enunciated in resolution 2028 (XX) which pro-

vide the guidelines for the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty, the first principle requires that “The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form”. The reference here is to both nuclear-weapon Powers and non-nuclear-weapon Powers. General Assembly resolution 2153 A (XXI) of the following year, which expressed apprehension equally about the possibility of “an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon Powers”, and about “an increase of nuclear arsenals”, again underlined this principle.

109. The report of the Secretary-General which has been so frequently referred to and quoted here, also lays stress on this when it states:

“So far as international security is concerned, it is highly probable that any further increase in the number of nuclear weapons States or any further elaboration of existing nuclear arsenals would lead to greater tension and greater instability in the world at large. Both these aspects of the nuclear arms race are significant to world peace”.
[A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 82.]

110. The Secretary-General’s report has made no distinction between the two aspects of the nuclear arms race. Wherever it has talked of the evils of a further spread of nuclear weapons, it has simultaneously warned us of the dangers of the further development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

111. The United Nations, having thus recognized that the actual proliferation of nuclear weapons in the nuclear-weapon countries was a matter of major preoccupation to be viewed with equal apprehension along with the possible or likely increase in the number of nuclear-weapon countries, it is clear that a draft non-proliferation treaty should have sought to meet this apprehension. In our view, the only effective way in which that could have been done was to include an obligatory provision in the treaty for a cessation of any further production of nuclear weapons. In respect of nuclear-weapon countries this would have meant writing into the treaty itself what has been called a “cut-off” of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes. I should like to stress that this would not involve nuclear disarmament, since it would not require the destruction of a single nuclear weapon. The question of nuclear disarmament—in other words, the reduction or destruction of existing nuclear arsenals—would be a matter to be dealt with subsequently and in stages. It is a well-known fact that the present stockpiles of nuclear weapons possessed by the nuclear-weapon States have long since reached an over-kill capacity. Where is, then, the justification for the nuclear-weapon Powers continuing to produce more weapons, when they can kill each one of us not once but several times over, and a man dies only once? The argument of differences over the question of control preventing an agreement on the stoppage of further production of nuclear weapons is not convincing. The same system of controls which may be prescribed for non-nuclear-weapon States could be applied to nuclear-weapon States, because, once a cut-off in production has been agreed to, all facilities at present producing fissile material for weapon purposes would be switched over to production for peaceful purposes. With the stoppage of further production of nuclear weapons, no risk to national security

would be involved—because, so far as the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons are concerned, there would be no reduction or diminution in them or control over them, and, so far as the extension of safeguards to nuclear-weapon States is concerned, again there would be no risk to national security, because all their facilities would have become peaceful. Under those circumstances there would be no room for any fear of industrial espionage or unfair commercial competition, about which concern has been expressed in certain quarters.

112. When General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) speaks of a balance of obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, it does not suggest or imply the idea of a compensation or a quid pro quo. It means that, while the nuclear-weapon Powers undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons to anyone, the non-nuclear-weapon Powers should undertake not to receive such weapons. Similarly, while the non-nuclear-weapon Powers undertake not to produce nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon Powers in their turn should undertake not to produce any further nuclear weapons. Indeed, the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations formulated by the United States and the Soviet Union in September 1961, which have guided all disarmament negotiations, required that all measures towards

“... disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all”¹⁰

but that, unfortunately, is not so in the case of this draft treaty.

113. It has been claimed that this treaty will do more than any treaty of our time to push back the fearful shadow of nuclear destruction and that it will make all of us more secure than we would be in the absence of such a treaty. It is not clear to us how that is so, for, apart from the possible danger from an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon Powers, the draft treaty does not—I repeat, does not—concern itself with the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons or their augmentation or their further sophistication. It does not in any way curb the nuclear-weapon Powers; and, since only nuclear-weapon Powers can cause nuclear destruction, the fearful shadow of nuclear destruction is not being pushed back, and we are, therefore, not likely to be any more secure tomorrow than we are today without the treaty.

114. It has been said that, if we were to attempt to achieve agreement on all aspects of disarmament at this time, the negotiating difficulties would be insurmountable and we would end by achieving nothing. Agreement on all or even on some aspects of disarmament, if I may say so, is not what many countries within and without the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—and certainly not my country—have urged. It has not been suggested that we seek either a full-fledged measure of nuclear disarmament or no nuclear disarmament at all. My Government has been a firm believer in the validity of the step-by-step approach towards

nuclear disarmament and we do recognize that it is not possible for a perfect treaty on nuclear disarmament to emerge immediately. We have never put perfection before progress, nor have we adopted an “all or nothing” approach. Furthermore, the delegation of India has never suggested that a non-proliferation treaty should in itself become a vehicle or a measure of full-fledged nuclear disarmament. But we do feel that so long as the augmentation and sophistication of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear-weapon Powers continues unchecked the interests of the security of the world will not be advanced. Measures which do not involve an element of self-restraint on the part of all States—nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States—cannot form the basis for a meaningful international agreement to promote disarmament.

115. There is another feature of the draft treaty which causes us concern even within the limited scope of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. It does not prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, nor does it prevent the training in the use of nuclear weapons of the armed personnel belonging to non-nuclear-weapon States. Also, while article I calls upon the nuclear-weapon States not to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, it does not prohibit one nuclear-weapon State from assisting another nuclear-weapon State, which may not have reached the same degree of sophistication in the development of its nuclear-weapon technology, by providing technical aid, say, by way of blueprints for the manufacture of more sophisticated nuclear weapons. These loop-holes, being contrary to the very first principle enunciated in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), are a matter of deep concern to a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States.

116. This leads me to the question of the link between a non-proliferation treaty and disarmament. Principle 2 (c) of General Assembly resolution 2020 (XX) requires that

“The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament.”

117. Some of the members of this Committee have spoken of the draft treaty before us as a first step towards nuclear disarmament and have hailed it as an important step in the chain of direct and indirect steps towards disarmament and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. I beg to submit that this view is not supported by the relevant preambular paragraphs or article VI of the draft treaty, which deal with this question. They contain a mere declaration of intent, which cannot provide any credible commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers. The preamble mentions the desire for “the liquidation of all [their] existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery . . .”, but there is no provision in the draft itself regarding the stoppage of vertical proliferation, as suggested by India and certain other countries. There is also no time limit within which the objective of halting the nuclear arms race is to be achieved. In fact, the quarter of a century provided for in article X as the initial duration of the treaty appears to endorse and legitimize the present state of affairs and to legalize, if not encourage, the unrestricted vertical proliferation by the present nuclear-weapon Powers, which—it

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

is now claimed—it is not reasonable to curb in the present world situation.

118. It has been stated that article VI creates a juridical obligation, but this is not so, because the undertaking “to pursue in good faith” does not create any definite or enforceable juridical obligation on the part of the nuclear-weapon States corresponding to the obligations undertaken under article II by the non-nuclear-weapon States. It is an imperfect obligation with no sanction behind it. Even the areas within which the negotiations are expected to be pursued have not been defined. It has been argued that it would not be wise to specify at this stage in the treaty itself the measures of disarmament on which negotiations are to be undertaken, because agreement might well become possible on other measures. This view is not convincing. We all know from our experience of past negotiations that agreements in the field of disarmament are difficult to negotiate because of the complexity of the issues involved and their vital connexion with the security of nations. If even the areas of disarmament on which agreements are to be sought cannot be defined now, how could there be any hope of such agreements being reached? The unfortunate fact is, as has been mentioned by several delegations, that certain areas like a comprehensive test ban on which agreement seemed possible at one time are eluding us now because of the development of newer weapon systems and the intensification of the arms race.

119. Article VI does not give any tangible form to the declaration of good intent, there being no sense of compulsive obligation or even a sense of urgency to pursue negotiations for nuclear disarmament as a preliminary to general and complete disarmament. What is required is something in the nature of a nuclear moratorium, as was suggested in 1965, of which the essential element was that if nuclear disarmament was not achieved within a specified time limit, the non-nuclear-weapon Powers, as an instrument of persuasion and pressure, would reserve to themselves the resumption of their freedom of action.

120. In order to introduce a sense of urgency and compulsiveness and to exercise pressure and persuasion on nuclear-weapon Powers to take early steps towards nuclear disarmament, various suggestions have been made which the sponsors of the draft treaty have not found acceptable. Some of the suggestions which deserve to be mentioned here are: firstly, a review conference should be held automatically after every five years; secondly, the failure to move towards nuclear disarmament within a reasonable period should be an additional ground for withdrawal from the treaty; thirdly, if specific nuclear disarmament measures are not taken within five years, the situation thus created should be examined and the necessary action taken; fourthly, article VI should make specific mention of urgent negotiations for the suspension of underground tests, a freeze in the production of nuclear delivery vehicles and an agreement on the eventual reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals and their means of delivery.

121. We are all aware that there is no family planning among nuclear-weapon Powers, that there are already four or five generations of increasingly more sophisticated nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. There is a development in hand of MIRVS (multiple independently

targetable re-entry vehicle systems) which is expected to increase the nuclear weapon power of a missile by a factor of ten or more. In addition to anti-ballistic missiles and Poseidons, there is talk also of FOB3 (fractional orbital bombardment system), MOBS (multi-orbit bombardment system) and the Space Bus. Each of these developments gives rise to the inevitable action-reaction phenomenon, making even more difficult the halting of the nuclear arms race, as has been evident from the inability to make even the 1963 partial test ban Treaty comprehensive.

122. India, as is well known, has pleaded for various collateral disarmament measures for two decades now and has always regarded the non-proliferation treaty as one of those measures. But we still need to be convinced that the draft treaty before us does amount to a collateral disarmament measure. In order to become generally acceptable the treaty must have a provision for some degree of compulsiveness and a reasonable time limit, indicating a sense of urgency on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to move towards nuclear disarmament, thus paving the way for general and complete disarmament; otherwise, this non-proliferation treaty—and it does not matter by whom or by how many it is signed—will not be effective and will not last and our labours will have been in vain. Let us not, therefore, provide a false sense of security to the world.

123. If I have dwelt at some length on the disarmament aspect of the non-proliferation treaty, it is because I wish to emphasize the limitations of the kind of treaty now envisaged and the serious implications of those limitations, particularly for countries in Asia and in the Pacific, which arise from the fact that, whatever the reasons, all the nuclear-weapon Powers are not associated with our deliberations. It is a matter of concern to India that, across its border, a major Power—the People's Republic of China—continues to conduct nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere in flagrant violation of the will of the international community and in total disregard of the grave dangers posed by such testing to the health and welfare of millions of peoples and their future generations. In a little over three years, China has conducted seven nuclear tests, including that of a thermonuclear device. The People's Republic of China is not subject to the discipline of the international community, nor does it accept the generally accepted norms of international behaviour, nor could it be depended upon to observe the restraints needed for the maintenance of international peace and security.

124. It is therefore understandable that the growing nuclear-weapon capacity of the People's Republic of China is a matter of deep concern not only to non-nuclear-weapon Powers but also to nuclear-weapon Powers. This concern, so widely shared all over the world, only further emphasizes the urgency of an early and effective implementation of measures of nuclear disarmament and it further underlines the need, to which I have earlier referred, for an acceptable and balanced non-proliferation treaty to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon Powers, including the People's Republic of China, and to provide a more direct juridical and compulsive link with measures of nuclear disarmament.

125. The other disturbing and discriminatory feature of the draft treaty concerns the one-sided prohibitions on

non-nuclear-weapon States in respect of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. It prevents them from conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In this connexion I need hardly recall the serious and protracted discussions on Plowshare programme in 1958 and 1960, when the need for and possibilities of peaceful nuclear explosions by all was recognized, but the problem of modalities connected with the test-ban treaty made it difficult to come to an agreement. I also need not recall that the drafts of the treaty presented by the United States¹¹ and the Soviet Union¹² in 1965 made no mention of nuclear explosive devices.

126. We have been told that, as provided for in article V, if the non-nuclear-weapon States were to deny themselves the technology of carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions, any potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, as and when these become economically and technically feasible, would be made available to them at economically attractive costs. We do not doubt that the nuclear-weapon Powers wish to give generously of the benefits of the peaceful uses of the atom, but, under the treaty, there is no binding commitment or a positive juridical obligation to provide the assistance since the undertaking is only to "co-operate". However, the issue involved here is something more basic than the mere question of distribution of benefits. Nations everywhere should be free not only to share in the benefits, but also to acquire the knowledge to extract such benefits by themselves and to have the freedom to use such knowledge.

127. Since nuclear technology is the technology of the future and is likely to become the most crucial and potent instrument of economic development and social progress, it would obviously be invidious for a greater part of the world to become wholly dependent on a few nuclear-weapon States for the knowledge and application of this technology. The proposed treaty creates a juridical discrimination between States according to whether they possess nuclear weapons or not, regardless of the fact that it is unwise to divide the world into a few "haves" and a lot of "have-nots", who would become dependent on the goodwill of the "haves" in regard to development in the vital area of nuclear energy, thereby making them subject to pressures. And when it is proposed that this should be done for an initial period of twenty-five years regardless of any technological breakthrough during this period, would this not widen the economic and technical gap which already exists and which the developing countries are striving so hard to close? The only just solution would seem to be that instead of dispensing "benefits on a bilateral basis", which gives to the nuclear-weapon Powers full latitude for discriminatory treatment by making available benefits on their own terms and to whomsoever they like and for whatever purposes they like, peaceful nuclear explosives should be institutionalized under international control for the benefit of all nations.

128. As regards the question of controls, the solution, in our view, should be sought on the basis that their scope is

clearly defined and that their implementation would not hinder in any way the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy by all countries. Prime Minister Nehru, speaking in the Indian Parliament in 1954, said that India was willing to accept controls in common with other countries:

"... provided we are assured that it is for the common good of the world and not exercised in a partial way and not dominated by certain countries, however good their motives."

129. The Indian Government has been consistently of the view that the guiding principle that should be followed in regard to safeguards is that they should be universally applicable and be based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria. The draft treaty places all safeguards and controls on the non-nuclear-weapon States and none whatsoever on the nuclear-weapon States. We are aware that two nuclear-weapon States, the United States and the United Kingdom, have made declarations indicating their willingness to accept safeguards, but this acceptance, apart from the fact that it is not agreed to by other nuclear-weapon Powers, is subject to reservation about national security, the scope of which would be defined by the nuclear-weapon States themselves, making in practice the application of the safeguards illusory.

130. There is another feature of the proposed system of safeguards which is unsatisfactory, as it could create discrimination among the non-nuclear States themselves. Paragraph 4 of article III speaks of non-nuclear-weapon States, parties to the treaty, concluding agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency "either individually or together with other States". Since it is not stated that these agreements would be uniform, one not being more onerous than another, the interpretation which is being given by interested countries would suggest that different criteria might be established, which is objectionable.

131. I should now like to refer to the question of the security implications of the relationship between non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon Powers. The problem of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon Powers from the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons arises from the possession, the continued stockpiling and the further sophistication of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. Any real and credible guarantee of security to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of such weapons could be provided only through nuclear disarmament when nuclear weapons had been completely eliminated. Hence India's insistence on the importance of making progress towards nuclear disarmament.

132. It is, however, obvious that action in this field of genuine and lasting security would take time and would have to be sought through stages. Until such time, and as an interim measure, so long as nuclear weapons remain in the armouries of a few countries, the nuclear-weapon States have an obligation to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States that their security will not, in any way, be threatened by the use or the threat of use of such weapons, and also that these weapons will not be used as an instrument of pressure, intimidation or blackmail. It is in this context that we have to consider the question of security assurances.

¹¹ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965*, document DC/227, annex I, sect. A.

¹² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/5976.

133. Almost at the end of the last session of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom proposed the draft of a Security Council resolution.¹³ But, for lack of time, there was no opportunity to consider the proposed draft which we now need to discuss in this Committee.

134. My Government would welcome any steps that might be taken by the nuclear-weapon States in concert with non-nuclear-weapon States to make more effective the role of the United Nations for the purpose of providing effective security. The hopes of mankind rest on this. The obligations cast by the Charter of the United Nations on Member States, and more particularly on the permanent members of the Security Council, make it necessary for them to discharge their responsibilities in strict conformity with the Charter to ensure peace in the world.

135. But any security assurances that may be offered by nuclear-weapon States could not and should not be regarded as a *quid pro quo* for the signature of a non-proliferation treaty. The draft of a non-proliferation treaty should be judged by itself and on its own merits. As I have already stated, the threat of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States arises from the possession of such weapons by certain States. This threat has nothing to do with the signature or non-signature of a particular non-proliferation treaty, as the threat has existed in the past and will remain, even after a non-proliferation treaty has been concluded, until such time as the nuclear menace has been eliminated altogether.

136. The assurance of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is an obligation and not something which the nuclear-weapon States could or should demand as a price for the signature of a non-proliferation treaty. The linking of security assurances to the signature of a non-proliferation treaty would also be contrary to the Charter because in respect of the maintenance of international peace and security the Charter of the United Nations does not discriminate between those who may adhere to a particular treaty and those who may not do so. Specifically, it violates the principles of equal rights of all nations mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article I and the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members enshrined in paragraph 1 of Article 2. The Charter aims at providing security in an equal manner to all nations. The proposed draft Security Council resolution, therefore, goes against the basic principle which should govern the problem of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. It is the view of my Government, therefore, that the whole question of security assurances should be dealt with separately and independently of the non-proliferation treaty now under consideration.

137. I have not commented on the draft of the resolution on security assurances proposed to be introduced in the Security Council, nor have I expressed the view of the Government of India about what would be regarded as credible security assurances for the entire international community. On the credibility or otherwise of the assurances offered, our views will be expressed at the appropriate time.

138. Having stated the views of the Government of India with regard to the basic features of the treaty and the question of security assurances, I should now like to reiterate the policy of my Government about the utilization of nuclear energy. It is well known that many years ago, and after a most careful national evaluation of all aspects of the problem, the Government of India made a statement of policy that it intended to utilize nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. This policy of the Government of India was based in its firm belief in disarmament, which made it necessary not to do anything to escalate the nuclear arms race.

139. As early as 1957, Prime Minister Nehru, referring in Parliament to the programme of development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, reiterated his Government's policy by saying:

"We have declared quite clearly that we are not interested in making atom bombs, even if we have the capacity to do so, and that in no event will we use atomic energy for destructive purposes. I am quite sure that when I say this I represent every Member of this House. I hope that will be the policy of all future Governments."

140. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, speaking in Parliament on 14 March 1968, reiterated this policy. She said:

"India has repeatedly announced that she is not making an atom bomb and that she is developing her nuclear energy programme exclusively for peaceful purposes."

141. The Government of India has continued to adhere firmly to this national decision. Let me add that this decision was taken at a time when the international community was not seized of the question of a non-proliferation treaty. It is, therefore, a national policy, unrelated to the present consideration of the draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, speaking in Parliament as recently as 24 April 1968, said:

"The choice before us is not only the question of making a few atomic bombs, but of engaging in an arms race with sophisticated nuclear warheads and an effective missile delivery system. Such a course, I do not think would strengthen national security. On the other hand, it may well endanger our internal security by imposing a very heavy economic burden which would be in addition to the present expenditure on defence. Nothing will better serve the interests of those who are hostile to us than for us to lose our sense of perspective and to undertake measures which would undermine the basic progress of the country. We believe that to be militarily strong it is equally important to be economically and industrially strong. Our programme of atomic energy development for peaceful purposes is related to the real needs of our economy and would be effectively geared to this end."

142. In conclusion, I should like to stress again that the danger to the security of the world arises not merely from a possible spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States, but equally from the continued possession and further production and sophistication of these weapons of mass destruction by the existing nuclear-weapon Powers. India shares the common anxiety that this danger and risk

¹³ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex II.

should be checked and eliminated. We share the sense of urgency that this end should be achieved as early as possible by common consent and international control. To quote again from a statement made by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi:

“Mankind today is at the crossroads of nuclear peace and nuclear war. There can be no doubt we should take the road to nuclear peace.”

143. We are convinced that this common objective—which all of us here and mankind in general share—cannot be achieved except through a viable treaty, one which will take into account not only the fears of a few but the preoccupations of all, impose equal obligations on all, confer the same benefits of security and progress on all, and will, therefore, become acceptable to the international community as a whole; a treaty which will endure—one that will not merely take cognizance of the undeniable realities of political fact and military power and technological superiority as they exist in the world of today, but also provide for the equally incontrovertible realities of the changes that will occur in these various fields in the years to come.

144. A treaty of this kind, with its far-reaching political and economic implications for all the nations of the world,

must not be based on a discriminatory approach. We have been opposed to the division of the world in terms of ideologies and military alliances, or in terms of rich and poor nations. The proposed treaty adds one more category to the divisive forces which have bred fear and distrust and have generated tensions. A non-proliferation treaty, therefore, if it is to be effective, viable and generally acceptable, should prevent both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Powers from proliferating. It should contain an acceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities. It should be a real and meaningful step towards disarmament. It should not in any way hamper the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These are all principles which have been embodied in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).

145. After most serious and careful consideration, it is the view of the Government of India that the draft treaty before us does not conform to these principles and therefore my Government cannot subscribe to it. Our vote on the draft resolution endorsing the draft treaty will be determined accordingly.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.