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Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 28

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*)

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament (A/7072 and Add.1,
A/7080; A/C.1/959, 960, 963; A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and
Add.1-3)

1. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*translated from French*): In its constant evolution, which is full of promises and dangers, hopes and threats, the world has reached a cross road. At the very moment when it is faced with an explosive situation, at a time when local wars can quickly turn into a general conflict and lead to disaster, the twenty-second session of the General Assembly has before it an item which, because it is being raised and discussed at the present time, takes on a special significance—I am speaking of the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which has regularly been brought before the General Assembly for seven years without our having been able to achieve any satisfactory results at the previous sessions.

2. This time, however, the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament contains a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons¹ drawn up in response to the common desire of all peoples of the world, with the collaboration of all countries taking part in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee at Geneva, and submitted by the two great nuclear Powers, while the third nuclear Power participating in the work of the Disarmament Committee—the United Kingdom—has endorsed it prior to its submission to the General Assembly.

3. The position of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on disarmament is well known. My Government has categorically stated that our country is in favour of the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and it did so at the time when a proposal on this question had been put

forward by the Soviet Union. Since the difficulties and obstacles which were raised from the outset prevented the adoption of that proposal, the Bulgarian Government has subsequently supported partial measures aimed at laying the groundwork for the solution to the problem of disarmament.

4. Thus, my country has supported every proposal for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons through an international convention to be concluded among all States of the world, for the elimination of devices capable of conveying nuclear weapons, for the banning of nuclear testing, including underground tests, for the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory, for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, for the prohibition of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, and for other similar measures.

5. The adoption of such partial disarmament measures could have created a favourable atmosphere and made an effective contribution to the advancement of the work on general and complete disarmament. For reasons well known to the members of this Committee, it was not possible to adopt them. Nevertheless, the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which is aware of the complex nature of the problem and takes into account the unavoidable obstacles to be overcome in achieving general and complete disarmament, has been in favour—and still is, notwithstanding the difficulties that have arisen—of adopting actions and proposals which, while they are partial measures, can allay mistrust. The Bulgarian Government has also been well aware of the fact that in the present circumstances, the "all or nothing" formula may only conceal passivity or the lack of desire to undertake constructive measures.

6. It is encouraging to note that some progress has already been achieved with regard to partial measures on which the Geneva Committee has been working. The Moscow Treaty partially banning nuclear weapons tests was signed in 1963, and a Treaty prohibiting the orbiting of nuclear weapons around the earth [*resolution 2222 (XXI), annex*] was adopted; those treaties could be said to form part of a succession of collateral disarmament measures. Since then, however, nothing has been done in this field.

7. Another of the specific collateral measures leading towards general and complete disarmament, which the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has supported ever since it was proposed seven years ago, is the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This measure has now come before the Committee in the form of a draft treaty drawn up by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament after preparatory work which called for considerable effort and important concessions on both sides before agreement could be reached. Doubts and misgivings

¹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex I.

have nevertheless been expressed about the wording of the treaty and about certain of its provisions.

8. Of course, if we are thinking of general and complete disarmament and the collateral measures suggested in the past—some of which, put forward by the Soviet Union, were much more sweeping—these doubts and misgivings seem completely natural. However, in order to fit the draft treaty into a group of measures related to general and complete disarmament, we must clearly establish its purpose, what exactly would be solved by its adoption and, lastly, the limits of its effectiveness.

9. Any treaty must, as must in general any legal instrument, have an exactly defined purpose. It must set forth the extent of the reciprocal rights and obligations of the contracting parties and clearly specify the rights and obligations agreed to by the parties.

10. The main purpose and the very basis of this partial measure—the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is the object of the draft treaty—were formulated in the first resolution adopted in this connexion at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly [*resolution 1665 (XVI)*] at the initiative of the Government of Ireland, to which we, along with many other delegations, would like to express our gratitude for its enlightened initiative. That resolution's preamble and operative paragraph 1 call upon

“...all States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons.”

11. In other words, the machinery of the contractual obligations consists, on the one hand, of the nuclear States' obligations not to provide the non-nuclear States with access to and control of nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, of the non-nuclear States' obligation not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons by any other means. This basic point was subsequently endorsed in General Assembly resolutions dealing directly or indirectly with the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, namely resolution 1767 (XVII) and resolution 1908 (XVIII), which recommended taking collateral steps to reduce tension and to promote general and complete disarmament, and also resolution 2028 (XX) which formulated more specifically the basic principles that should underlie the international agreement on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

12. A similar view of the purposes of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is also set forth in the declaration adopted at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Cairo in 1964,² as well as in the statement issued by the Organization of African Unity in July 1964.³

² See document A/5763 (mimeographed).

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

13. Since the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is only a partial and limited step towards disarmament, we cannot expect it to solve such problems as the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons in general, the partial or total destruction of all nuclear weapon stockpiles, the complete and general cessation of nuclear tests, or the prohibition of the use of such weapons.

14. Eager as we are to see the foregoing measures adopted singly or as a whole, we do realize that they have no place in a non-proliferation treaty. At the present stage in the negotiations on the draft now before us, and given the difficulties that exist, it has proved feasible and realistic to reach agreement on one measure only: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We cannot expect the draft now before us to deal with the solution to problems which are not to be included when the non-proliferation question is dealt with. The effect and the political significance of the treaty should therefore be weighed only in direct relation to its expressed objectives and to the possibilities for reaching an agreement at the present time. To have asked that a non-proliferation treaty should solve other questions, such as that of the cessation of all nuclear tests, or that it should guarantee the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and so on, would have been unrealistic and would have meant that objectives were included in the treaty which could not be attained at the present stage in the disarmament negotiations.

15. On the other hand, to wait until a “perfect” and “satisfactory” treaty could be achieved might mean losing the chance of having any treaty at all. In this way, a paradoxical situation might be reached in which the countries which demand a “perfect” and “satisfactory” treaty would be aligned, willy nilly, with the declared opponents of the treaty, and would become, as a result of this irrational position, the involuntary supporters of unchecked and unlimited nuclear proliferation.

16. The balance of the rights and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear parties to the Treaty mentioned in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) has been the subject of lively debate in this Committee. A few delegations have raised some doubts, reservations and objections regarding an acceptable balance in the draft treaty of the rights and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear States, in the sense indicated in the resolution.

17. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that the draft provides for the necessary balance of mutual rights and obligations which the contracting parties have undertaken to respect. Its opinion is based on an examination of the purpose of the treaty, the tasks it has to accomplish, its character, and the actual status of nuclear and non-nuclear States. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons does take into consideration the interests of both the nuclear and non-nuclear States, and above all, the interests of world peace.

18. According to the provisions of the treaty, the non-nuclear countries agree not to accept nuclear weapons of any kind from any source, directly or indirectly, and not to manufacture such weapons—everything being placed under the international supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

19. For their part, the nuclear Powers undertake not to transmit nuclear weapons to anyone. The nuclear Powers parties to the treaty also undertake to collaborate with non-nuclear States in furthering peaceful applications of atomic energy, including the exchange of information, thereby ensuring that the non-nuclear countries will enjoy the most favourable conditions possible for benefiting from the achievements which have already been made in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The nuclear Powers further undertake, under a special agreement or special agreements, or through an appropriate international body, to help non-nuclear countries benefit from all the advantages that can be derived from atomic explosions for peaceful purposes.

20. Another equally important obligation of the nuclear States parties to the treaty is to furnish the non-nuclear States with explosive devices to be used for peaceful purposes at a cost which would not include any expenses incurred in the research on and development of such devices. This benefit provided for in the treaty, which is an obligation on the part of the nuclear countries parties to the treaty, is of the utmost interest to the non-nuclear countries, which will not need to bear the costs of, or spend vast sums on, the research needed to achieve tangible results in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, often amounting to several thousand million dollars.

21. The nuclear Powers further agree to pursue negotiations on effective measures for halting the arms race in the near future and for nuclear disarmament as well as on a treaty for general and complete disarmament.

22. Lastly, the nuclear Powers—and this is an additional obligation to be added to the long list I have just enumerated—undertake to guarantee the security of the non-nuclear countries on the conclusion of the treaty and in accordance with the Security Council resolution.

23. A simple listing of the rights and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear States set forth in the various provisions of the draft treaty therefore shows us that there will exist between the two groups of States an acceptable balance of joint rights and obligations of parties to the treaty as stipulated in the relevant resolutions.

24. Nevertheless, we must face the facts: no legal procedure and no treaty relating to an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could completely eliminate the difference which objectively and in fact exists between nuclear and non-nuclear States. This difference will not disappear completely until general and complete disarmament has been achieved and until existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons have been destroyed. Nevertheless, this question may form the basis of a separate treaty or of a series of treaties which will mark a step forward towards the final goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international supervision.

25. On the basis of these considerations the obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear States under the provisions of the treaty, our delegation feels that the basic provisions of the treaty articles provide a necessary and sufficient balance between the obligations of the nuclear countries and those of the non-nuclear countries. We would be ignoring the true

state of affairs and the situation in the world today were we to make demands on the treaty which now go beyond its content, its scope and the aims assigned to it.

26. The concern felt by some delegations regarding a sure and effective system of guarantees for their countries' security is perfectly understandable. Nevertheless, when we consider the question of security guarantees we must bear in mind the partial nature of the non-proliferation treaty. Furthermore, and especially for small countries, security does not lie in the possession of nuclear weapons or in the ever-existing possibility of gaining access to such weapons, but in the restriction of the number of States holding such weapons and in an international relaxation of tension. The very act of restricting the spread of nuclear weapons already represents a first step towards the security of States. At the present stage in the development of weapons of mass destruction, it would be practically impossible to claim that the destruction and damage could be limited to nuclear States alone. For the moment the only course is to endeavour to prevent other States from becoming nuclear States. Without denying either the usefulness or the political significance of security guarantees at the present time, it would hardly be realistic to demand that the non-proliferation treaty should categorically and effectively settle the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. That would, once again, mean trying to confer on it duties that are not appropriate to it.

27. For the moment, the best guarantee would be the objective non-proliferation provided for in the present draft treaty. On the initiative of the Soviet Government, the General Assembly adopted, on 8 December 1967, resolution 2289 (XXII), which urged all States to make every effort to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Obviously, much time and effort will still be required to attain that goal. If all that was needed was to attach to and incorporate in the draft non-proliferation treaty, in the form of several provisions, a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, that would have been done long ago, and the convention would have been concluded. Further negotiations, discussions and efforts will undoubtedly be required to accomplish this, and of course we shall have to act as quickly as possible.

28. At this juncture, our delegation feels that the draft Security Council resolution⁴ represents a useful step pending the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The nuclear Powers' intention to lend assistance to any non-nuclear State party to the treaty that may be subject to a threat or to direct act of nuclear aggression, along with the statements those Powers have made in that connexion during discussions in this Committee, also represents a positive achievement.

29. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has no doubt that the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would create conditions favourable to the further development of disarmament negotiations. The very limitation in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons would in itself help

⁴ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex II.

considerably in promoting world security and would rouse new hopes for more rapid progress on the question of disarmament.

30. Some delegations of non-nuclear countries that would like to conclude a perfect treaty which would not only reflect existing realities but serve also as an effective instrument for achieving the noble goal they envisage, have expressed the opinion that the adoption of the draft treaty should be delayed. They would like to meet the need for reassuring and automatic guarantees even though, as they have stated from their own experience, there would be nothing sacred about the guarantees. The delegation of one non-nuclear country—one which has no more intention than has my own of becoming a nuclear country—has upheld the view that countries which are not included among the nuclear Powers under the treaty but which have the technology to become nuclear Powers could not forgo the very great benefits to be derived from perfecting devices for carrying out experiments for peaceful purposes unless they were offered serious alternatives. In spite of the fact that such alternatives are set forth in the treaty, the delegation in question has suggested deferring a decision on the adoption of the treaty until the General Assembly's twenty-third session.

31. When we complain about the draft treaty's imperfections, we must bear in mind that it is the result of our having succeeded in working out a compromise. The treaty reflects the troubled times in which we live and the special nature of the matter at hand, and imperfect though it may be, it does solve the main problem, that of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. For non-nuclear countries which, like our own, have no desire to become nuclear countries, the draft treaty is satisfactory in its present form provided it is adopted as soon as possible. For countries with different intentions, it may seem too strict, too rigid and therefore too much of an encumbrance. My country considers the draft treaty to be important also because its conclusion would dispel the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons into two of the world's sensitive areas which lie close to us geographically, namely, central Europe and the Middle East. From the standpoint of my country's security—and we feel this to be true for all non-nuclear countries adjoining or near a potential nuclear Power—it is absolutely necessary that effective measures should be taken to forestall events that could some day bring about a catastrophe. That could be achieved through the adoption of the non-proliferation treaty, which would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The People's Republic of Bulgaria would have preferred the treaty to have been signed last year.

32. Any postponement of the treaty, which is now ready to be put to the vote, would lend strength to imperialist, revanchist and aggressive forces throughout the world and would encourage and promote the chances for success of those who are the determined adversaries of any international understanding. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has already put forward with regard to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons demands which, if fully met, would mean putting off its adoption to an undetermined future date. This was pointed out by the Government of the German Democratic Republic on 14 April 1968 [*A/C.1/959*], when it stated:

"For years the West German Government has made unrelenting efforts to get access to nuclear weapons by various means and methods. Exploiting the scientific-technological progress achieved in West Germany, the West German Government is preparing to manufacture nuclear weapons of its own."

33. By contrast, in the same document the position of the Government of the German Democratic Republic, which is one diametrically opposed to the foregoing, is stated as follows:

"... the Government of the German Democratic Republic supports the early conclusion of the present draft treaty, thus being in full agreement with the vital interests of the citizens of the German Democratic Republic and the demands of the overwhelming majority of the West German population as well."

34. In those circumstances, the feeling of urgency, which is more than ever present, should inspire and encourage all delegations of non-nuclear countries to bend every effort towards adopting the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is convinced that the conclusion of this treaty, while it does not settle the problems of disarmament and security, will surely constitute an important and very decisive forward step along the road to peace and to general and complete disarmament.

35. Mr. OTEMA ALLIMADI (Uganda): Before I address myself to the item on our agenda, permit me to express the deep condolences of my delegation and my Government on the untimely death of our African brother, Mr. Matthews, representative of the Republic of Botswana. As stated by the delegations that spoke in the plenary meeting this morning [*1653rd meeting*], Mr. Matthews not only was respected in Botswana and Africa but earned himself wide international recognition by his educational and diplomatic contribution to his country. We mourn with his family and countrymen their sad loss.

36. The problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons presents a great problem to the world today. The invention of nuclear weapons has made each passing day a doomsday for the whole of mankind. This man-created suicide has posed one of the greatest international problems. The answer to it calls for an untiring spirit of dedication to world peace, pursuit of negotiations on an objective basis and accommodation of conflicting interests so as to achieve a mutual and acceptable compromise in the interest of all States, big and small. This is not an easy matter. The international community should, in seeking to conclude such a treaty, be guided by the desire to make it effective and should reconcile the requirements of effectiveness and security of others. The interests of some parties should not be subordinated to the interests of others. It is in this spirit that the Uganda delegation has always supported any steps leading to nuclear disarmament and will approach the draft treaty in the same way.

37. Before I address myself to the substantive question of the treaty, I wish to express our appreciation and thanks to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for its remarkable work and its success in producing the report within the stipulated time. We fully realize the great

problems the Committee had to face in drafting it. We also extend our heartfelt felicitations to the co-Chairmen for their co-operation in reaching a compromise formula. We hope that this spirit of co-operation will continue and that it will serve as a basis in solving other international problems. This co-operation is indeed a landmark and a welcome step and creates a healthy international climate.

38. Uganda supports a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We support a genuine non-proliferation treaty as a step towards general and complete disarmament. It is in this spirit that we have always supported the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and other decisions of this Organization in this field.

39. In approaching the text of the treaty it is important that we take into account the spirit of the Irish resolution as modified and superseded by General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965. That resolution established principles on which the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based. It emphasized that the treaty should not contain any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form; should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers; should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament; should be acceptable and workable to be effective; and should not adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. These are conditions precedent and not mere expressions. Any treaty on non-proliferation has to be examined in this context.

40. As most of the previous speakers have already pointed out, the present draft is not a perfect document; it is a mere working document. We share this view and go further to suggest that it is the duty of all of us to eliminate the imperfections in order to make its provisions equitable and reciprocal. Those who did not participate in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should be given a reasonable opportunity to put across their views. Our deliberations here should be governed by the spirit of mutual accommodation, and we should try to understand each other's positions to ensure a common standard of agreement worthy of this remarkable endeavour in the search for peace and security. While we advocate urgency in adopting it, we should not shut our eyes to the corresponding duty of urgency in trying to accommodate others. The draft treaty is indeed a highly political document, the spirit of which goes beyond the letter itself.

41. While we are aware of the need to make the best of the short and valuable time left to us, there should be adequate time for the non-members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, as I said before, to make a thorough study and express their opinions after duly noting all the observations and suggestions, including amendments that may be put forward. The norms set by the General Assembly to be followed on this matter must not be eroded by expediency. All countries equally have a primary responsibility for concluding a treaty which, because of its contents and its purposes, is the concern of the entire world. The rush to conclude a treaty should be balanced with mutuality which will ensure endurance of the treaty.

42. My delegation welcomes article IV of the draft treaty whereby non-nuclear-weapon States which are signatories to the treaty will be free to share in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, regarding articles I and II of the draft treaty, they do not seek to prevent either the increase by an existing nuclear-weapon State of its stock or assistance by one nuclear State to another in the manufacture of nuclear weapons for its own arsenals. If we wish to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, we must put an end to both horizontal and vertical proliferation. The further spread of nuclear weapons and an increase in existing arsenals are two equal evils, and we must finally close all the channels thereto. The treaty should inhibit the further development of stockpiling of nuclear weapons if our goal is to ensure the peace of the world. All these aspects of proliferation of nuclear weapons form part of a single whole, and the problem cannot be met by dealing with one aspect of it. The draft as it stands only prevents the emergence of a sixth nuclear-weapon State and the nuclear armament of an existing non-nuclear-weapon State with nuclear weapons supplied by one of the nuclear-weapon States.

43. My delegation is grateful to those who have emphasized the desire of the African countries to conclude a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Declaration adopted in July 1964 by the African Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. However, I wish to point out that their undertaking to conclude a treaty did not mean that they would sign any treaty. The treaty has to be reasonable and impose mutual responsibilities and obligations. This is evident in one of the operative paragraphs whereby they appealed "to all peace-loving nations to accept the same undertaking". The treaty also has to ensure the security of the continent of Africa.

44. It is regrettable that, while the treaty prevents the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States, there is no corresponding article imposing an obligation on the nuclear Powers not to proliferate their nuclear weapons. If this treaty is based on a genuine desire to stop proliferation, there should be a freeze on the existing arsenals. If this is not realized, the treaty will be merely a mirage and idealistic. It will only raise the hopes for peace, while at the same time perpetuating a basis of further proliferation of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers. Concrete measures of vertical non-proliferation must be embodied in the treaty. This element is essential and central to the concept of a non-proliferation treaty. A comparable obligation should be placed upon the nuclear-weapon Powers not to proliferate nuclear weapons in any way. At present, they are free to continue to manufacture more weapons and to improve upon them further. The creation of a privileged status undermines the principles of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers.

45. The treaty does not take into account the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons. The report stresses that:

"... any further elaboration of existing nuclear arsenals would lead to greater tension and greater instability in the

world at large. Both these aspects of the nuclear arms race are significant to world peace." [*A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 82.*]

This danger can be eliminated only by including in the treaty a provision for the cessation of further production of nuclear weapons.

46. The treaty does not fulfil the condition that it should serve as a step towards nuclear disarmament. Article VI is a mere declaration of good intent and does not provide for any definite commitment on the part of the nuclear Powers to proceed with either total or partial disarmament. If there is a serious intention to enter into nuclear disarmament talks, the article should be amended to state when the negotiations would begin and also the time limit. It should also provide for the specific items to be discussed—in particular, the cessation of further production, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles, delivery and international inspection safeguards and a comprehensive test ban. For the time being, there should be an immediate suspension of all underground nuclear tests and a cut-off in fissionable materials. Including such a clause would be a very good gesture on the part of the nuclear Powers and would indicate that they intend to enter into serious negotiations to end the arms race. Those who advocate urgency should do their utmost to reconcile their own interests with the common interest. If the non-nuclear States are to be denied the right to nuclear explosives, the nuclear Powers should also forgo the dangerous activities of underground nuclear tests. They should be allowed only peaceful explosions under international supervision.

47. Besides being inadequate to cover the various aspects of the nuclear arms race, the draft has overlooked the fact that two members of the nuclear club will not be signatories to the treaty. We should face the present international realities. Any treaty which is not based on realities is bound to fail, no matter who signs it or how many. It will not be effective and will be of a temporary nature. The advocates of the present draft treaty should not ignore the essential fact that there cannot be effective nuclear disarmament without the full participation and co-operation of France and the People's Republic of China. We cannot shut our eyes to this basic point if we are to achieve meaningful results. All steps should be taken to include those two nuclear Powers in this exercise. If there is a genuine desire to achieve nuclear disarmament, as article VI of the draft indicates, the People's Republic of China should be invited to participate in our deliberations. We cannot achieve any effective treaty on nuclear weapons if we leave out other nuclear Powers. The gospel of peace must be accompanied by objectivity.

48. It is advisable to avoid fruitless exercises lest history prove us wrong. We should provide for the future and at the same time strive to remedy the existing problems. Our labours should not be spent in vain. Exploration of all avenues leading to the signing of the treaty by all nuclear Powers is imperative. In our view, leaving them out does not enhance the spirit behind the treaty. Universality would ensure effectiveness and durability and, above all, would provide for the peace and security of the world. When we rush, we have to watch where we are going or we may stumble and fall.

49. Another point which the treaty has overlooked is the question of the stationing of nuclear weapons by nuclear Powers in a non-nuclear-weapon State signatory to the treaty. This loop-hole might lead to some abuse and evasion of the provisions of the treaty. If there is a desire to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States, the area of any non-nuclear-weapon State signing the treaty should automatically become nuclear free.

50. Let me now turn to the question of the security guarantees. According to the draft, the security guarantees would be based on the proposed draft resolution co-sponsored by the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, and also unilateral pledges, if the Security Council adopted the draft resolution appearing as annex II to the report of the Disarmament Commission. This is a complex problem as it hinges on the security of many nations. This proposed step has many repercussions.

51. The first is that we might put the cart before the horse. We might adopt the treaty and later on fail to get the guarantees in the Security Council if it turned out that one of the permanent members exercised his veto on the proposed draft resolution. We have to be absolutely certain that such a resolution would be adopted or else we will have a treaty adopted without security guarantees.

52. Secondly, even if the draft resolution is adopted and the unilateral pledges are made, there is no guarantee that, in case of any nuclear threat or aggression, there would be prompt action by the Security Council. Uganda had the privilege of serving on the Security Council in 1966 and we know the problems involved. We should not minimize the present political divisions of the world, nor should we minimize the possibility of a veto at a given time. Even if there is no veto, action may be delayed. Such a delay, of even a few hours, might jeopardize the security of the State concerned. The delay or stalemate might be caused by procedural debate on whether there was any threat or act of aggression. It is clear to all of us that, so far, there is no accepted definition of aggression. This dilemma could seriously hamper the action of the Security Council.

53. The problem of determining what constitutes a threat or act of aggression has, on many occasions, paralysed the discharge of the Security Council's responsibility. These are the realities we have to analyse before we assign more responsibilities to the Security Council. We have to evaluate how far it has succeeded in discharging its primary responsibilities where there have been breaches of the peace. Furthermore, before we sign a blank cheque empowering the nuclear Powers to defend a State which is the subject of nuclear blackmail, we have to assess whether the nuclear Powers which happen to be permanent members of the Security Council have collectively and promptly discharged their duty to restore international peace and security.

54. Another related point is that the unilateral guarantees will be given after the draft is adopted and we cannot tell the precise extent of those guarantees and whether they will be construed as imposing a definite commitment. Lastly, they will not form part of the treaty. They will be mere declarations of good intent without any legal compulsion.

55. It appears that the draft resolution only reiterates the residual right of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. In our view, the draft resolution is no more than a recital of the existing provisions for protection under the Charter. It does not in any way offer greater security than those Charter provisions. The fact that some nuclear States might not sign the treaty weakens the effectiveness of the guarantees. Secondly, the draft resolution does not create any commitment or obligation on the part of the nuclear Powers. It only reminds them of their duties under the Charter.

56. The only answer to the question of security guarantees can be found in the report of the Secretary-General on the possible use of nuclear weapons and in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). The report states that:

“Were such weapons ever to be used in numbers, hundreds of millions of people might be killed, and civilization as we know it, as well as organized community life, would inevitably come to an end in the countries involved in the conflict.” [*A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 1.*]

57. The report further points out that:

“The effects of all-out nuclear war, regardless of where it started, could not be confined to the Powers engaged in that war. . . . But neighbouring countries, and even countries in parts of the world remote from the actual conflict, could soon become exposed to the hazards of radio-active fall-out precipitated at great distances from the explosion. . . .” [*Ibid., para. 40.*]

58. The report further emphasizes that:

“Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament.” [*Ibid., para. 91.*]

59. It is evident that what we should seek to prevent is the possible use of nuclear weapons. Even if the Security Council acted promptly to defend a State which was the object of aggression, the mere use of nuclear weapons to repel the aggressors would tend to destroy or damage the country defended. The neighbouring countries would also be affected. Secondly, the security guarantees to be offered do not in any way protect the non-nuclear-weapon States in case of outbreak of nuclear war between the nuclear Powers.

60. There should be an elaborate provision in the draft treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear parties to the treaty. The provision should also outlaw the use of nuclear weapons by nuclear Powers against one another. This would be a better assurance than that envisaged in the draft resolution. It is only in this way that we shall be facing realities and avoiding self-deceit. Mere resolutions and pledges are not enough. They should be followed by concrete steps, interim or otherwise, to remove this fundamental cause of insecurity. It is therefore the view of my delegation that the draft does not meet the basic principles as contained in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) of 1965. It should provide a more direct juridical and compulsory link with further measures of nuclear disarmament, particularly a comprehensive test-ban

treaty, the complete cessation of production of nuclear weapons, and a freeze on and gradual reduction of the existing nuclear stockpiles and the means of their delivery. The nuclear Powers should not be given a blank cheque to proliferate nuclear weapons.

61. The danger to the security of the world arises not merely from the possible spread but also from the possible use, the continued possession and the further production of these weapons by nuclear Powers. There should be a ban on the use of nuclear weapons as an assurance of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The international safeguards provided for in article III should be extended to all nuclear activities to ensure compliance. The existing stockpiles should be converted to peaceful uses. All these must be linked to the treaty.

62. It is our profound conviction that all possibilities are far from exhausted and that there are still essential areas in which, through genuine negotiations conducted with due regard to the equality of the parties, with patience and in the determination to continue further, progress can be made in improving the draft treaty. While we advocate urgency, we must balance it with the intent of achieving an equitable, durable and meaningful treaty which would ensure peace for everybody.

63. A delay in adopting the treaty in order to give others adequate time to discuss it and make suggestions would ensure unanimity. We must approach this problem with concerted effort and avoid a struggle between certain regional interests and the general interest of the international community. The interest of the international community should prevail. We should strive to reach a common desire and a common will so as to make this treaty an instrument of international peace and security.

64. As I pointed out earlier, many countries have not yet voiced their opinions on the draft treaty. This is true of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Uganda endorses the view that the non-nuclear-weapon States should be given a chance to assess the obligations which they are called upon to assume. The forthcoming Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States will be the proper forum. Any attempt to push through the draft without proper discussion could easily ruin its efficacy and effectiveness. Rigid and regional interests should be put aside in favour of international peace and the security of all. We should uphold the decisions of the General Assembly and avoid defensive positions. Peace is the goal of all States. The present draft treaty is one-sided. The security guarantees must be strengthened and the question of vertical proliferation should be seriously considered as it affects the security of nations.

65. My delegation appeals to those who are advocating urgent blanket support for the present draft treaty to give more time to the non-nuclear-weapon States to consult among themselves. All of us here are dedicated to the achievement of a non-proliferation treaty and we should ensure that such a treaty is meaningful and effective and that it guarantees the security of every nation. There are many problems to be resolved.

66. Mr. JIMENEZ (Philippines): In his policy statement before the General Assembly on 25 September 1967,

referring to the partial draft text of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, submitted on 24 August 1967,⁵ the Philippine Secretary for Foreign Affairs said:

“The gravest of perils would confront mankind if the draft treaty submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union . . . were to be unduly delayed or to fail to be adopted.” [1566th plenary meeting, para. 107.]

67. My delegation therefore welcomes the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of 14 March 1968. We commend the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament not only for being able to comply with General Assembly resolution 2346 (XXII), which requested the Committee to submit to the Assembly on or before 15 March 1968 a full report on the negotiations regarding a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also for concluding its task in drafting the treaty itself.

68. The two co-Chairmen of the Committee, the United States and the Soviet Union, should be commended for their untiring efforts in the long and laborious consultations and negotiations with each other and with the other members of the Committee which brought about the submission of a complete draft treaty to the General Assembly. The other members of the Committee should likewise be commended for their contributions and helpful suggestions.

69. At long last a decisive stage has been reached by the United Nations on non-proliferation. Almost seven years have passed since the “Irish resolution” was adopted by the General Assembly in 1961 [resolution 1665 (XVI)], the first resolution to sound the call for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, and almost four years since the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament began its search for a widely acceptable treaty on the subject.

70. We consider this resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly to be a crucial and momentous one. Will the Assembly be able to face the challenge and lead mankind to the path of international peace and security? Will it take the one big step towards eliminating the threat of annihilation hovering over mankind since the explosion of the first nuclear weapon in 1945? The whole world awaits the reply of the General Assembly with deep anxiety and apprehension.

71. My delegation is of the view that the basic objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been achieved in the draft treaty. It is also our view that the provisions of articles I and II can adequately and effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons if we consider that the objective of all the discussions and negotiations is to bar an increase in the number of the present nuclear-weapon Powers. We note with satisfaction the clarification made by the two co-Chairmen that there are no loop-holes in these provisions that may give rise to any fear that an increase of nuclear-weapon Powers might be brought about surreptitiously.

72. A distinction has been made, however, by previous speakers between non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and

non-proliferation of nuclear-weapon States, or between “horizontal” and “vertical” non-proliferation. My delegation is of the impression that since the first resolution of the General Assembly sounding the call for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, the objective has been to bar an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon Powers. In other words, all the efforts and negotiations on the subject were centred on preventing “horizontal” proliferation, or, as some others would say, the proliferation of nuclear-weapon States. We say this because we are all aware that for the last twenty years the question of nuclear disarmament, which is in fact “vertical” non-proliferation, has been and continues to be before the United Nations. There are, therefore, two aspects of non-proliferation that have received and continue to receive the urgent consideration of the United Nations. We believe that the present draft treaty concerns itself primarily with “horizontal” non-proliferation and leaves to future negotiation the question of nuclear disarmament or “vertical” non-proliferation, as is clearly provided for in article VI. It is for this reason that we said earlier that the basic objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been achieved in the draft treaty.

73. The Philippines is one of the non-nuclear-weapon countries possessing a research nuclear reactor. Our nuclear reactor is subject to the safeguards established by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Not being strangers to those safeguards, which we believe to be efficient and effective, we therefore support the control system established under article III of the treaty under the authority and supervision of the IAEA.

74. Article IV of the treaty preserves the inalienable right of all parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, subject only to the limitations and prohibitions provided for in the treaty. The Philippines welcomes the provision giving the right to all the parties to the treaty to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as the assurance that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States on a non-discriminatory basis.

75. In this connexion, my delegation is gratified to note the pledges made by Ambassador Goldberg of the United States before this Committee on 26 April [1556th meeting] that when this treaty on non-proliferation takes effect, and when it is approved by the United States Congress, it would become an obligation on the part of the United States to share, appropriately and equitably, its knowledge and experience concerning all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the parties to the treaty, particularly the non-nuclear parties, as well as to share with the parties to the treaty the benefits of its research and development programme in the field of peaceful nuclear explosions. Minister Kuznetsov of the Soviet Union, also on 26 April before this Committee, in commenting on the provisions of article IV of the draft treaty, said that those provisions create

“... a good premise . . . for new broad programmes of collaboration between nuclear and non-nuclear States in

⁵ *Ibid.*, annex IV, sects. 6 and 8.

the uses of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Consequently, the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will also be a treaty spreading the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the greatest possible number of States.” [1556th meeting, para. 119.]

76. In referring to the peaceful application of nuclear explosions under article V, Minister Kuznetsov commented that

“The draft treaty provides for setting up a system for international collaboration for the peaceful application of nuclear explosions and states specifically that such collaboration—whether bilateral or through an appropriate international organ—shall not be discriminatory. There is also a provision to the effect that the charge for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. [Ibid., para. 123.]

77. In the light of the pledges made by Ambassador Goldberg and the statement of Minister Kuznetsov, my delegation is hopeful that under the treaty, nuclear energy and the peaceful uses of the atom may bestow upon mankind a bountiful and prosperous future.

78. Although we speak favourably about the treaty, my delegation is not unmindful of the fact that the treaty can stand further improvement. We spoke earlier of article VI in relation to the distinction between “horizontal” and “vertical” non-proliferation. The draft treaty is not an end in itself but is the means to an end which, in this case, is nuclear disarmament. It is our view that the adoption of the draft treaty could pave the way to further agreements on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a halt in the production of fissionable materials, reduction of offensive and defensive nuclear delivery vehicles, and, ultimately, the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. Under article VI, the parties to the treaty undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international controls. Under the last two preambular paragraphs, it is sought to achieve the discontinuance of test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and also to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery.

79. My delegation is of the view that these provisions for nuclear disarmament should have been embodied in the operative paragraphs of the treaty and not only in the preamble. In this way, the advance, step by step, towards nuclear disarmament would be defined, thus strengthening the treaty and meeting the objections from some quarters in this respect. Of course, as we have implied earlier, my delegation is conscious of the fact that this is a non-proliferation treaty and that further steps towards nuclear disarmament could be provided for under later international agreements. But we submit that providing for further steps towards nuclear disarmament in the operative paragraphs instead of in the preamble would make the treaty more convincing both in letter and spirit.

80. We are gratified to note that under article VIII of the treaty, there will be a review five years after its entry into force, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty are being realized. In that review my delegation would certainly be very much interested and would closely scrutinize what had been accomplished under the treaty towards the development of nuclear technology for peaceful uses in the developing countries, and what steps had been taken during the period of five years towards the goal of nuclear disarmament.

81. We have been, and are still, in mortal fear of a possible clash between the nuclear Powers which could eventually result in the destruction of civilization as we know it today. We in the United Nations are engaged in an earnest effort to reduce the tensions in the world and to promote international co-operation and harmony in order to make this world safe and secure not only for our generation but also for generations to come. We are encouraged whenever bridges are built between the East and the West.

82. The present agreement of the two super-Powers, in our view, would greatly enhance humanity’s chances of avoiding a nuclear disaster. We believe that ours is a better world with the treaty than without it. We must not let this significant step towards the much-desired *détente* pass. It augurs well for our future and is certainly a step in the right direction towards nuclear disarmament. We owe it to posterity to appreciate the political impact on international relations of the present situation.

83. In view of the foregoing considerations, my delegation supports the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and will vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-3.

84. Mr. ROA GARCÍA (Cuba) (*translated from Spanish*): The Cuban people shares the aspirations of mankind for a complete and lasting peace. That is why it has contributed, and will continue to contribute as far as possible, to denouncing and destroying the perennial obstacles to the achievement of such a peace. The voice of Cuba is that of a small people which has been struggling for a century to assert its independence and sovereignty. Today, it is dedicated, with incomparable courage and in exceptionally difficult conditions, to overcoming the backwardness inherited from a long economic and political bondage and to building a better society capable of meeting all its material and spiritual needs in keeping with our times.

85. This year Cuba is celebrating the hundredth anniversary of the beginning of its wars of national independence. In the arduous, long and eventful interval between the uncertain prospects of 10 October 1868 and the present day, the Cuban people has paid in rivers of blood for its absolute and final liberation. This harsh and rich experience has also taught the Cubans that only unshakeable adherence to the principles of independence and sovereignty, and the willingness to defend them at all costs, guarantee the freedom and security of nations.

86. Consistent with those views, the Cuban delegation’s approach to the problems related to peace and disarmament has never varied at previous sessions of the General

Assembly. Cuba has maintained the view, based on very well-known facts, that the aggressive policy of imperialism, especially that of the United States, is the main source of threats and dangers to international peace and security.

87. It is all too well known that, since the end of the Second World War, United States monopolies have entered into a frantic race for world-wide domination in all fields. Their capital penetrates into all the less developed countries; they siphon off natural resources; they pirate the small stock of technicians; they buy raw materials at increasingly lower prices and sell their goods at increasingly higher prices; they exploit the work of millions of people and impose upon them a system of poverty, backwardness, ignorance and servitude. At the same time, they retard development and take advantage of the work and amassed wealth of the advanced capitalist countries by systematic investment in the strategic sectors of the economy, wide-ranging entrepreneurial structures, centralized management and high-level scientific technology.

88. It is equally well-known that, in order to consolidate the hegemony of its monopolies, the Washington Government has spread its military bases all over the globe; it has organized many military alliances and aggressive pacts; it manufactures millions of weapons of conventional warfare; it produces and stockpiles atomic bombs and their launching vehicles; it creates new chemical and biological methods of mass destruction like those used against the Viet-Nameese people; it equips, trains and directs mercenary armies; it fosters lackey régimes and pursues a global strategy of aggression that recognizes no frontiers, respects no principle of international law, ignores treaties, aimed as it is at repressing national liberation movements and subjugating independent States.

89. The crudest expression of this policy is the criminal war of aggression being waged by the United States imperialists against the Viet-Nameese peoples and the other peoples of South-East Asia. Further proof of their sinister designs are the continuous acts of provocation against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the threats against the Cuban Republic, the military intervention in the Dominican Republic and the barefaced practice of subversion, interference and blackmail in all parts of the world.

90. Because of these facts of the international situation, the defence of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of small nations is of decisive importance. At the level of international relations the main conflict of our time is between imperialism and the peoples of the less developed countries. It is a relentless battle that will decide the future of the world. For the peoples, victory will mean the right to full development, freedom from hunger, backwardness, humiliation and illiteracy. For imperialism the issue at stake, even more than the preservation of its privileges, is survival, despite the inexorable condemnation of history.

91. It has been the firm view of my Government that, in order to face imperialist aggression, the small nations have no choice but to resist and fight; with regard to our country, subject as it is to constant threat from an atomic Power, my delegation reaffirms that, as a matter of principle and apart from the fact that it could obtain them,

Cuba will never renounce its inalienable right to defend itself with all types of weapons, regardless of their nature and despite the decisions that may be taken on the subject by this or any other international body.

92. The Cuban delegation has therefore expressed serious reservations regarding all so-called disarmament or armaments control questions which this Organization is examining, and has even questioned whether it is in order to discuss them here in the present international circumstances. In accordance with this position, Cuba did not sign the Moscow Treaty of 1963 on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests, nor the treaty on peaceful uses of outer space [*resolution 2222 (XXI)*], nor the Treaty of Tlatelolco on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America [*A/C.1/946*].

93. The Cuban delegation has also abstained from voting on the numerous resolutions relating to these questions which the General Assembly has been adopting in recent years, including all those connected with the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

94. We now have before us a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Union and the United States. This document has aroused grave concern in the Revolutionary Government of Cuba, and we have been instructed to express that concern precisely and clearly in this Assembly.

95. We cannot share the opinion of the advocates of the draft treaty, who regard it as an instrument for the achievement of general and complete disarmament, for the promotion of confidence between States, and for reducing international tension.

96. For a long time there has been a great deal of oratory in this Organization concerning the dangers attributed to the spreading of nuclear armaments. Emphasis has been placed repeatedly on the urgency of preventing other States, besides the present five, from gaining possession or the use of such explosive devices. This limitation has been stressed as an important step on the road which, it is claimed, would lead to world-wide disarmament.

97. The supposedly peaceful purpose of the text before us is based on two premises that are very difficult to substantiate: the first is that the main risk of unleashing new wars lies in nuclear armaments; the second is that the threat of a nuclear conflict lies in the possibility that non-nuclear weapons States might acquire them, but not in those States which have been stockpiling such weapons for years. In other words, according to the advocates of the treaty, the danger to peoples is nuclear armament—not, however, as it is in fact, but hypothetical armament. According to them, in order to eliminate that threat it is sufficient to prohibit nuclear weapons from appearing in countries which do not yet have them, while, at the same time, permitting the building up of enormous nuclear arsenals, which already exist and are capable of destroying modern civilization, and even the production of new weapons by the present nuclear Powers.

98. The fallacious view consciously or unconsciously ignores conventional wars, the only ones known to man-

kind so far, and also the development of the imperialist concepts of "local wars" or "special wars" which have been brutally waged against the peoples of the third world to an increasing extent since 1945.

99. These arguments attempt to identify peace with the absence of direct military conflicts between the great nuclear Powers. Yet, while such confrontations have been held in check by the so-called balance of terror, in fact the imperialists do not hesitate to foster war and aggression anywhere in the world. It would be absurd to speak of peace to the peoples of South-East Asia who are victims of the cruellest foreign intervention; to the Viet-Nameese breasting the waves of bombs, napalm and bacteriological substances; to the peoples subjected to Portuguese colonialism; to the Africans harried by racism and *apartheid*; to the Latin Americans who are setting out on the road to their full emancipation; or to the Korean people living under the constant threat of a new war.

100. The provisions of articles I and II of the draft treaty deny access to nuclear weapon for the States which do not yet have them, while neither those nor any other articles of the text set any limitations on the spiral of armaments—whether nuclear or conventional—of the Powers already possessing atomic weapons. These articles not only do not change the present situation with regard to the existence of mass-destruction devices or lessen the dangers that may well be expected from an intrinsically aggressive Power like the United States, but permit it to continue production of those weapons, expand its arsenals, invent new methods of destruction, transport them all over the earth, introduce them in any territory under its control, perfect its technologies and threaten weaker peoples with their use, and all this under advantageous monopolistic conditions, free of any fear of possible new competitors.

101. The result of this treaty would be to increase the defencelessness of the smaller Powers—indeed, even to sanction it legally by contract—by making them renounce the right to obtain weapons they do not have while, by signing the treaty, they will be obliged tacitly to recognize the right of the Powers that do have them, and therefore of the world's fiercest imperialist Power, to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely. The dangers inherent in instruments of warfare are in no way lessened simply because such devices will not be destroyed or reduced. According to the draft, nuclear weapons could still be freely introduced in the hundreds of military bases the United States has scattered all over the world; the transport of weapons from United States territory to its installations abroad would continue; Yankee aircraft would go on flying over peaceful territories, day and night, with their deadly cargoes; other accidents, like that of Palomares or the most recent one in Greenland, would continue to occur without changing the letter or the spirit of the treaty one whit.

102. But there is something else as well. The United States imperialists are manufacturing small calibre nuclear weapons, and supplying them even to medium-sized units—even battalions—for tactical missions in their conventional wars of aggression. As those weapons are of no use in a nuclear war in the strict sense of the term, it is obvious that the Government of the United States intends to employ them in "local" or "special" wars, and the United States has on

numerous occasions declared that it is prepared and willing to use them in Viet-Nam. The treaty, by failing to provide the non-nuclear States, whether signatories or not, with guarantees against the use of tactical nuclear weapons, leaves United States imperialism free to use them without restriction wherever it sees fit for the defence of its system of oppression and exploitation.

103. This text, strictly speaking, has no relation whatever to universal disarmament, or at least no positive relation. Far from leading towards that goal, the signature of the treaty would be the best proof possible that universal disarmament, in present conditions, is nothing but a fleeting illusion, if not an outright mockery of the threatened and oppressed peoples. In fact, implementation of the instrument we are discussing would divide the world into two categories of nations: those which possess nuclear weapons and those which do not, and would consolidate the present imperialist power relationships and the gap between powerful States and the weak, the developed and the less developed. And all this aggravated by insult added to the injury of mutual consent sealed under contract.

104. If the monopoly of a handful of great Powers over nuclear weapons is sanctioned, is it conceivable that imperialism will thenceforth renounce its control over those devices? What means of pressure could the non-nuclear States exert on imperialism after having consented officially to sanction their inferior international status and accepted the undermining of their sovereignty and independence? How can the great imperialist Powers be induced to renounce the production, possession or use of nuclear weapons in the future, if no objections are raised now, in a formal treaty and if, therefore, their right to do so at their pleasure and convenience is tacitly recognized?

105. The last paragraph of the preamble to the treaty expresses the desire:

"... to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

In other words, the great nuclear Powers would not end the armaments race or destroy their atomic arsenals except under a treaty on general and complete disarmament, that is, in the final stage of the peace-making process.

106. Article VI provides for an undertaking by the parties to pursue negotiations "... on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". Moreover, the commitment to undertake negotiations on nuclear disarmament or a treaty on general and complete disarmament is not linked to any date in the near or distant future.

107. The proposed time-limit of twenty-five years as an initial period for the validity of the treaty is not without significance. In less than a quarter of a century nuclear technology has advanced from the first atomic explosion to

anti-missile missiles, multiple warhead missiles and orbital missiles. Thus it is easy to infer how far it could develop in the next twenty-five years.

108. It is clear that the document contemplates a space of time the length of which would not be within the control of the international community as a whole, but which would certainly be subject to the arbitrary will of the great Powers. During this period they would continue to develop their nuclear and conventional armaments without any limitations or control whatever, while the great majority of States would remain at a more backward stage of technical progress—and not only at the military level, as we shall show later—hoping for the goodwill of the powerful and obviously subject to an even more grave nuclear threat than in the past.

109. It is self-evident that the adoption of this treaty will not result in the destruction of a single nuclear bomb; the possibility of new inventions in the explosives or ballistic field will not be reduced; the manufacture of armaments will not be lessened by one ounce of fissionable material; it sets no limitation on their transport throughout the world; it in no way limits so-called vertical proliferation, namely, the proliferation which only the States capable of producing nuclear explosions are in a position to carry on. The treaty is only concerned with preventing horizontal proliferation among those States which at present lack the capacity to manufacture their own bombs. Those States would renounce this prospect in exchange for a promise by the great Powers to discuss their own denuclearization within the context of general and complete disarmament in conventional weapons; in other words, in exchange for new and greater concessions from the weaker States, and in the doubtful event that international tension would have been reduced and confidence between States strengthened to such a degree that the great Powers would be willing to agree to the sacrifice they are now demanding of the other nations.

110. The majority of the nations are being asked to renounce the possibility of ever possessing atomic means of self-defence here and now, at a time when international tension is mounting and, indeed, is intensifying the mistrust between States, despite the fact that this situation is the result of the aggressive, war-minded policy of disregard for the rights of the weakest pursued by the imperialist Government of the United States, one of the leading nuclear Powers, joint sponsor of the treaty and beneficiary of its provisions. Since the United States delegation is the co-sponsor of the text we are discussing, and the representative of a Government which does not even disguise its intentions of dominating the world and subjugating weak States and nations, the latter have every right to ask: what is meant by the reduction of international tension? How, in the opinion of the treaty's advocates, should international relations be organized so as to strengthen confidence between States and facilitate the conclusion of a treaty on general world disarmament?

111. It is transparently clear that the appearance of this treaty is a result of subverting the rational procedure that could have been followed in the negotiations leading to disarmament. The only way to deal with the problem of non-proliferation, without violating the rights of any

country, would have been to submit it as part of a group of measures to be adopted simultaneously by all States under a system of universal control. Those measures would have to include, first and foremost, complete denuclearization of the great Powers, total destruction of their arsenals, absolute prohibition of the manufacture of those weapons in the future, and the cessation of tests. Only then is it permissible to demand from the non-nuclear States pledges such as those unilaterally proposed by the treaty.

112. When this treaty was drafted, the express mandate assigned to the Eighteen-Nation Committee regarding it was disregarded. What, we may ask, has become of the second principle set forth in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), according to which: "The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers"? Or of the third principle, according to which: "The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament"?

113. The treaty does not provide any effective guarantees for non-nuclear States which might be attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons by the Powers possessing them. It is argued that this basic gap has been bridged by a joint draft resolution of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union submitted in the Eighteen-Nation Committee for approval by the Security Council. But what does this document actually offer? Operative paragraph 1 recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons, or a threat of such aggression, would create a situation in which the supposed action of the Council has already been provided for by the United Nations Charter. Operative paragraph 3 reaffirms the inherent right of self-defence, recognized in Article 51 of the Charter itself, so that it, too, adds nothing new.

114. Operative paragraph 2 does introduce a new element, as original as it is hypocritical. According to that paragraph, the Council "welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used".

115. What is the meaning of this wording? Where would this nuclear threat come from, since it is to be assumed that it would not come from the co-sponsors of the draft resolution? Might it not be the United States Government, whose intention the Council now "welcomes" and which alone has so far had the capacity to use such weapons, as it did in Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Might it not be that the United States Government, whose intention the Council now "welcomes", which has scattered them aggressively all over the world and which threatened to use them against Cuba and, more recently, against Viet-Nam and Korea? The paragraph to which I have referred would establish a "multiple nuclear umbrella" which "certain States" would offer to the non-nuclear States parties to the treaty, and appears to suggest the conversion of the United Nations into a sort of international police force whose creation would not give peoples the slightest security, but would, on the contrary, give them well-founded cause for concern.

116. Moreover, this alleged protection would not cover those non-nuclear States which did not sign the treaty. Does this mean, in the view of the Security Council, that there could conceivably be an attack with nuclear weapons against a State not possessing them, but which may have committed the "crime" of not acceding to one or another international instrument? On what principle would a small State which might be the victim of a nuclear attack, and might not have signed this treaty, find itself deprived of the right to receive "immediate assistance, in conformity with the Charter"? Is the idea to also divide the world into States which could or those which could not be victims of aggression employing nuclear weapons? In what position would that leave those States on which the aggressive aims of United States imperialism are concentrated, such as the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or Cuba?

117. The CHAIRMAN: I apologize to the Foreign Minister of Cuba for interrupting him. Normally I hate to interrupt any representative while he is addressing the Committee. I realize that, when a representative is trying to elaborate his point of view on any item, he must refer to certain points. However, at one of our previous meetings I urged representatives to try to limit themselves to the issues under consideration, that is, the issues under agenda item 28 (a). With all respect I hope that this appeal will be observed. I call once again on the Foreign Minister of Cuba.

118. Mr. ROA GARCÍA (Cuba) (*translated from Spanish*): With regard to what you have just said, Mr. Chairman, I should like to stress the following points. I simply will not believe that here, in the United Nations, representatives are divided into those who have a right to speak and those who do not have the right to speak, depending on the point of view. I am expressing here the views of my Government, the Government of Cuba, which is a Member of this Organization, and I shall simply go on stating them.

119. There can be no doubt that, in dividing the world into two categories of nations, according to whether or not they have the right to possess nuclear devices and in obliging the latter countries to renounce important prerogatives without the compensation of reciprocal concessions by the former, the treaty violates the principle of the sovereign equality of States. The sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States which sign the treaty is also violated by the prohibition it imposes on them with regard to carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and by their subjection to the great Powers in everything related to the peaceful use of atomic energy.

120. Article III of the draft treaty contains another flagrant violation of the sovereign attributes of the non-nuclear-weapon signatory States, by imposing rigid control machinery on them for the application of safeguards regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while at the same time omitting any control measure for the activities, whether peaceful or warlike, of the nuclear Powers which, moreover, have the "go-ahead" signal to exchange materials, equipment or information either for military or peaceful purposes. It is essential to point out that, under paragraph 4 of this article, the non-nuclear-weapon signatory States assume the obligation to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency, within a very short

time, safeguard agreements for control of peaceful development of nuclear energy or its use, with the curious provision that this commitment is to be made in advance and, according to paragraph 1 of the same article, must be in accordance with the Statute of the said Agency and its safeguards system.

121. It is worth recalling that, according to article III, paragraph A, sub-paragraph 5, of the Agency's Statute, these safeguards may be changed or broadened when the Agency judges it appropriate to do so. Moreover, according to article XX, paragraph 3, the Board of Governors can add to the materials subject to safeguards those it considers necessary. In any case, the agreements on safeguards are to come into force eighteen months from the date of the beginning of negotiations, but no explanation is given regarding the situation that would arise in the event of discrepancies between the views of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the subject and those of the signatory State concerned.

122. Article III of the draft treaty provides for complete control over the peaceful nuclear activities carried on by non-nuclear-weapon States, whether or not they are parties to the treaty, when it states that the safeguards procedures would include, in addition to special fissionable material, also source materials, and not only those used at a main nuclear installation, but anywhere outside of it. It also states that the safeguards would be applied to all materials of both classes and to all nuclear activities for peaceful purposes carried out on the territory of the State concerned, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere.

123. This absolute definition covers all peaceful nuclear activities and all nuclear materials of non-nuclear-weapon States, whether or not they are signatories of the treaty, including mines, deposits, stocks of raw materials, laboratories and scientific installations of the most widely varied kind to which nuclear elements are applicable now, or may be in the foreseeable future. The scope of this inspection and control machinery goes beyond the purposes for which it is supposedly set up and opens up prospects of unlimited interference in areas of activity which are strictly within the competence of each State, in flagrant disregard of its sovereignty.

124. Cuba, which has always rejected any attempt at inspection and international control violating its sovereignty, as it did very firmly during the crisis of October 1962, would never sign an international treaty which endorsed those unilateral rights of inspection and control of one country by another or others. In this case, we reject it all the more as the nuclear Powers are exempted from these safeguards, controls and inspections, and are placed in a privileged position which is morally untenable.

125. It should be made clear that according to article III, paragraph 2, non-nuclear-weapon countries which decide, in exercise of their sovereignty, not to become parties to the treaty, are thereby wholly excluded from the possibility of receiving raw materials or equipment for the production of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes from any signatory State. On the other hand, that same article III allows a nuclear Power to obtain source materials, special fis-

sionable materials, special equipment or supplies, equipment or materials specifically designed or prepared for the processing or production of special fissionable materials, in a non-nuclear State, without being subject to safeguards.

126. By the same token, the principles of the sovereign equality of States and that of voluntary accession to treaties are contradicted by the obligation laid down in article X, paragraph 1, by which the party deciding to withdraw from the treaty must give notice stating the extraordinary events which it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests and motivated its denunciation. This requirement is an innovation in the practice of international law and constitutes coercion of States in the exercise of their sovereignty in that it forces them to explain their decisions. The fact that the notice is also to be transmitted to the Security Council seems to hint that the Security Council might question the sovereign will of the State concerned and oblige it to resign. The dependence of the non-nuclear-weapon States on the great nuclear Powers emerges, finally, in the power of veto which the latter arrogate to themselves when the time comes to adopt any modification of the treaty.

127. A basic aspect of the treaty is that referring to the regulations which, as appears from the text, are to be established for the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. First of all, it implies arbitrary and inadmissible discrimination against those non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the treaty, which are denied the right to study, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including access to scientific and technological information on the subject.

128. This decision, besides being unlawful in itself, constitutes a crude threat to the development of those States and a blatant attempt to blackmail them into acceding to this instrument. No ethical, political or legal principle authorizes anyone to determine at their own pleasure the destiny of other peoples, or to treat as their own private property natural resources which, in the last analysis, are the heritage of mankind. It is altogether immoral to set up coercive machinery to oblige small States to accept this instrument which, nevertheless, proclaims itself to be for the benefit of all.

129. Although the non-nuclear-weapon States which become parties to the treaty will be able to receive international assistance for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, it will be subject to the limitations deriving from the rigid system of safeguards which violates their sovereignty and from the conditions which may be imposed on the atomic market by the great Powers which, by means of this document, arrogate to themselves the right to hegemonic control. Those non-nuclear-weapon States are also prohibited from manufacturing, possessing or using explosive nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, which are to remain in the hands of the nuclear Powers which will sell the services necessary to carry out such explosions to the rest of the world at the "lowest possible price".

130. The vagueness of article V is characteristic. On the one hand, it evades any commitment on the regulation of prices and, on the other, it alludes to an international body to be set up for the utilization of peaceful explosions,

adding that this body will have "adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States"; but it does not define the basis on which that "adequate representation" is to be established, or what would be the prerogatives of the nuclear Powers in this body.

131. The Cuban delegation considers it essential to examine the heavy costs the treaty would involve for the countries of the third world. We refer to the less-developed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, subjected for centuries to colonial domination, still condemned to living standards, ideas and methods left behind many generations ago by the industrialized countries, which are now trying, with heroic determination, to make the political, economic, technical, scientific and cultural leap forward that will allow them too rapidly to enter the present age of electronic computers, atomic energy, space research and constant innovation.

132. In a speech made on 13 March 1968, the Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba, Major Fidel Castro, outlined, with irrefutable figures, the tragic situation and dark prospects of the under-developed world. In 1960, the less developed countries as a whole achieved a combined gross product of \$159,520 million for a population of 1,294 million people. In the same period, the GDP of the United States was \$446,100 million for a population of 180 million, and that of the group of developed capitalist countries as a whole totalled \$927,893 million for a population of 643 million. This means that, in 1960, the entire under-developed world produced one third as much as the United States and less than half as much as Europe.

133. According to estimates, in 1975 the entire under-developed world will produce \$301,000 million, or less than half the amount produced by the United States in 1960, for a population which will have reached 1,853 million. The under-developed countries will produce fourteen times less for those inhabitants than the industrialized countries, whereas in 1960 the ratio was 12:1.

134. In 1960, the *per capita* income of the less-developed countries was \$70 to \$85, or twenty-two times less than that of the United States. In 1975, it will be \$90 to \$110, or twenty-five times less.

135. The balance-of-payments deficit of the under-developed countries vis-à-vis the developed countries in 1960 was \$4,640 million; in 1970 it will be \$10,500 million and, in 1975, \$18,900 million. To this tragic imbalance we must add the chronic poverty of those countries, as a result of the pillaging of their resources by foreign monopolies, the amounts of investment capital that are constantly emigrating as profits, and the growing deterioration in the prices of their trade. It is estimated that by 1975 tea, wool and cotton prices will have dropped by 6 per cent; cocoa by 9 per cent; hides and leather by 9 per cent; jute by 14 per cent; and rubber by 32 per cent.

136. A very clear idea of the prospects of co-operation between the developed and the less developed countries is shown by the foreign trade situation, which is the key factor in the economic dynamic of the third world. The less developed countries' share in total world exports fell from 27 per cent in 1953 to 19.3 per cent in 1966. In 1965, the

average annual rate of total increase in world exports was 7.8 per cent, but the less developed countries' exports, excluding oil, increased at a rate of only 4 per cent.

137. With regard to the value of exports of manufactured goods, between 1953-1954 and 1965-1966 those from the developed capitalist countries increased by \$65,000 million, those from the socialist countries by \$10,000 million, and those from the less developed countries by \$3,000 million. In 1965, the backward countries were able to purchase, in exchange for the same amount of their traditional exports, one tenth less imports than in 1960. The annual loss in purchasing power of these countries is about \$2,500 million. Their foreign public debt rose from \$10,000 million in 1965 to \$40,000 million in 1966. Servicing of the debt, which averaged \$500 million per year in 1955, has gone up to \$4,000 million. At the same time, since 1958 the average prices of primary commodities exported by the less developed countries have decreased by 7 per cent, while those exported by the developed countries have increased by 10 per cent.

138. The recent and resounding failure of the second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development held in New Delhi is an unmistakable sign that, with the present world structure, there is no hope of a change in these trends for the next few years. A decisive factor is the high population growth rate in the third world. According to data published on 10 March of this year by the United States Population Reference Bureau, in thirty-two years the population of Latin America will have increased by 157 per cent. The same publication said elsewhere that each day there are more than 190,000 new mouths to feed but not even one third of the 1,000 million additional calories required to feed that human mass is produced and such calories would only produce enough to keep that mass at starvation level.

139. It is all too well known that the Latin American population is growing at an annual rate of 3.2 per cent. And what is the food situation of the inhabitants of these countries, which are basically producers and exporters of agricultural commodities? According to the publication *The State of Food and Agriculture 1967*,⁶ both in Africa and in Latin America, where there has been no increase in food production since 1965, the production of food diminished in 1966. The levels lost cannot easily be recovered because in 1967 it would require an increase of 7 per cent to equal the *per capita* level of 1964.

140. The latest report of the Economic Commission for Latin America records highly unsatisfactory results for the Latin American economy as a whole in 1967.⁷

141. The monstrous solution conceived by the imperialists for the dizzy speed of demographic growth of the under-developed world is no longer even that of enforced birth-control by traditional methods: they now go so far as to prescribe and advocate compulsory sterilization of the human species, actual genocide of the latent seeds for

perpetuating life. As the Prime Minister of Cuba pointed out in the previously mentioned speech:

"Not long ago, the Secretary of State of the United States said with alarm that, if science and technology did not find a solution to this problem, the world would be exposed to a thermonuclear explosion. They are so frightened by these insoluble facts that they already see thermonuclear bombs exploding everywhere. And it would appear that this bomb that is being prepared will go on being prepared and cannot be subjected to agreements or controls of any kind."

142. The appalling tragedy of the third world can be solved only by a prodigious effort of revolutionary transformation of its economic and social structures enabling it to narrow the ever-widening gap that separates it from the developed countries. This presupposes choosing the revolutionary road in order to achieve an accelerated rate of production, to make large investments, to attain a level of equipment far higher than at present, and to make rapid progress in the mastery of science and techniques. The key to this enormous effort will be industrial development, and various elements are needed to stimulate it, including power, the mainstay of all modern industry.

143. Let us look at the problems confronting the less developed countries in this field.

144. It is well known that the problem of the world's power reserves is very serious. Recent studies made by the World Energy Conference predict that the calculable reserves of economically recoverable fossil fuels will be exhausted seventy years from now. Furthermore, water power, which at present accounts for only a small part of world consumption, will be 3 per cent below estimated consumption in thirty years time.

145. Even more alarming is the information that the less developed areas of the world are also those with the lowest *per capita* reserves of conventional power—less than the equivalent of 400 tons of coal—whereas Europe's reserves amount to 1,400; those of the United States, 8,000; and those of the Soviet Union, 25,000 tons *per capita*. It has been estimated that, if the rate of power consumption of the countries of the third world were increased so as to bring them to the level of development of the advanced countries—which would involve a power consumption of 3 tons *per capita* per year, not taking into account the high population growth rate in those areas—the reserves would be entirely exhausted in forty years in Latin America, in less than sixty-five years in the Near East, in less than thirty years in South-East Asia, and in less than 133 years in Africa. These data eloquently demonstrate that the less developed countries will have to look for ways to exploit non-conventional power sources in the immediate future if they wish to take the road to industrialization and growth.

146. In its report *Prospects and Problems of Nuclear Power in Developing Areas*, presented on 11 October 1962 at the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas,⁸ the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency stated:

"The main reason for the interest in nuclear energy is that it has been technically proven as a new source of

⁶ *The State of Food and Agriculture 1967*, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 1967.

⁷ *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 4 (E/4499)*.

⁸ Held at Geneva, 4-20 February 1963.

electric power. The consumption of electric power has in most under-developed countries increased very sharply and more rapidly than the total consumption of energy. The possible market for nuclear power in these areas is therefore growing significantly.

"Furthermore, coal, oil and natural gas are increasingly becoming essential raw materials for important and greatly expanding industries, particularly the petrochemical and metallurgical industry. Several countries therefore would like to preserve some of their resources of coal, oil or natural gas for these purposes and substitute nuclear energy in the production of electricity.

"Lastly, the economical life in several countries depends on import of coal or oil. For such countries the addition of uranium to the conventional sources of power production widens the choice of sources of supply for production of electric energy and therefore lessens the dependence of any one of these sources. From this point of view nuclear power is attractive in regions with relative scarcity of fossil fuels. Several of the less developed areas are in such regions. For instance the present per caput resources of fossil fuel in South-East Asia (excluding China) are 1/10 of those of Western Europe and 1/60 of those of North America."⁹

147. The situation appears even more disturbing when we analyse the present imbalance between the less developed and the developed countries with regard to conventional power sources. According to ECLA and other statistical data of the United Nations, world commercial power consumption in 1959 in terms of oil-equivalent was 2,748 million tons, as follows: developed countries, 2,313 million; less developed countries of Africa and Asia, 352 million; Latin America, 83 million. *Per capita* consumption in kilogrammes was broken down as follows: Latin America, 422; Western Europe, 1,717; Eastern Europe, 1,930; United States, 5,242; other developed countries, 1,620; less developed countries of Africa and Asia, 199; in other words, whereas the industrialized countries consumed 84.2 per cent of total world commercial power, the countries of the third world—which account for two thirds of world population and urgently need to promote their economic growth and raise their living levels—used only 15.8 per cent of the total. Taking Latin America as a whole, commercial power consumption in that period accounted for 3 per cent of world consumption, and the average Latin American inhabitant received only 45 per cent of the world *per capita* average. As further proof of the power lag of the third world as a whole, it is interesting to note the relatively high consumption of non-commercial fuels which, compared to total power consumption, was over 40 per cent in 1955 in the less developed countries, whereas in Europe it was from 5 to 10 per cent, and in the United States 3 per cent.

148. It is obvious that, among conventional power sources, electricity occupies a leading position. In 1959, world electricity production, in thousands of millions of kilowatt hours, was 2,081, of which 1,915 was accounted for by the industrialized countries and 166 by those of the third world. *Per capita* production by region was as follows: Latin America, 318; Western Europe, 1,554; Eastern

Europe, 1,192; United States, 4,489; other developed countries, 1,836; Africa and Asia, 60. It should be noted that, whereas the industrialized countries were responsible for 92 per cent of world electric power production, Latin America accounted for 3 per cent and the African and Asian countries for 5 per cent. We may also mention that in the period between 1949 and 1959, the world average rate of increase in electric power production *per capita* was 8.1 per cent, while that of Latin America was 6.4 per cent, the lowest of any region in the world.

149. As for the electrification coefficient—the ratio of electric power generated to total commercial power consumed—during the same decade it increased at an annual rate of 6 per cent on a world-wide basis, compared to only 3 per cent in Latin America, and remained stationary in the other less developed countries.

150. The disproportion between power levels in the industrialized and in the less developed countries appears in all its impressive magnitude if we recall that the latter are obliged to make profound changes in their economic structure that will enable them to speed up their industrial growth and satisfy all the various needs of their inhabitants. It should be remembered that the larger part of the world's population lives in the third world and that it is increasing at a higher rate there than in other areas.

151. The development of industry inevitably requires an increase in power and heat consumption, particularly of electric power. There is no better illustration of this than the following example: an increase in industrial production of 1 per cent requires an increase of 0.7 to 0.8 per cent in the production of primary power and of 1.1 to 1.2 per cent in electric power production.

152. Moreover, as is well known, one of the main advantages of the use of nuclear energy as a source of electric power production is the low cost and high productivity of the fuel employed. It has been shown that for the production of electricity, one ton of uranium is roughly equivalent to 11,000 tons of coal. It is also estimated that by 1970 nuclear energy will be on an equal footing with conventional power in terms of economic utilization of production plants. According to United Nations statistics, in the period 1970-1975 the power produced in nuclear plants will account for about 11 per cent of total power produced, and in 1975-1980 to about 17 per cent. For Western Europe, the share of nuclear plants in total electricity production will increase from 5.8 per cent in 1970 to 30 per cent in 1980 and 41 per cent in 1985.

153. Apart from its generating electricity, nuclear energy has valuable uses in other fields such as medicine, agriculture, transport, and the industrial and scientific utilization of the so-called by-products of nuclear reaction. As may be imagined, these and new fields will be expanding constantly as nuclear science and technology advance. But all those activities will be held back in the less developed countries, since, because of their enormous technological lag, they will have to depend largely on the nuclear Powers supplying such services, and all the more so as these activities will be subject to a rigid system of international inspection and control.

⁹ Report on the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas, vol. II, *Natural Resources*, p. 186.

154. Nuclear explosive devices for peaceful uses are another important aspect of the situation. These too are denied to non-nuclear-weapon States, even though they may sign the treaty, and those States will have to depend on the sale of services by the nuclear Powers for utilization of these devices. Although in this sector too we can foresee discoveries of further valuable uses in the future, so far there are two activities in which the peaceful use of nuclear explosive devices has proved useful, namely, in carrying out large-scale civil engineering works and in extracting subsoil resources, both essential to backward countries. A monopoly on peaceful explosions could be a business of incalculable size.

155. In short, it may be said that in the not too distant future nuclear energy will be the main source of energy for our planet. But what will then be the position of the less developed countries which now suffer from an acute shortage? What prospects will those countries have of attaining the living levels of the industrialized nations if, in addition to that chronic deficit, there is now to be a monopoly of the new power sources? What kind of relations will there be between the less developed countries and the great industrialized Powers when the latter control the supply of nuclear energy? Who would be so naive as to hope for a more favourable attitude in nuclear trade, a more disinterested spirit of co-operation than that now prevailing in the trade relations between the rich and the poor countries?

156. The outlook could not be bleaker for the peoples of the third world. They will either be forced to depend for ever on the Powers supplying nuclear energy, or they will be obliged to renounce the use of those power resources. Or else, which amounts to the same thing, they will either have to accept permanent subjection to the interests of the great Powers or renounce for ever any possibility of development. This is the tragic choice offered, in the present circumstances, by the proposed treaty. The only dignified alternative open to the countries confronted by this dilemma would be to reject the treaty and, with their own resources, to undertake peaceful development of nuclear energy, which would be impossible for most of them at the present level of their technological and scientific development.

157. Although its most vital interests will be seriously affected by this treaty, Cuba is not in a position to prevent its being approved, as everyone knows by now, reluctantly by many, with silent distaste by others, and with tacit disagreement by still others. We need hardly point out that the peoples whose sovereignty, dignity and development may be compromised by the servility or irresponsibility of their Governments will call those responsible to account and impose the appropriate penalties on them. One does not gamble with the fate of mankind with impunity.

158. We know that many Governments will sign this treaty only from lack of courage and because of the blackmailing articles it contains, whereby a country that does not sign runs the risk not only of forgoing all co-operation in the technological development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, but also of being completely unprotected in the event that it is some day attacked with nuclear weapons by an imperialist aggressor.

159. Cuba will not sign this treaty because, apart from the reasons already given, it rejects, as a matter of basic principle, any kind of pressure or extortion in matters relating to its foreign policy.

160. The course of events may render what is signed today invalid tomorrow. The Cuba that emerged victorious from colonialism—socialist and communist Cuba—believes, above all, in the irresistible force of the peoples and in the invincible power of revolutionary principles. These principles sustain the determination and optimism of the Cuban people in confronting and surmounting all obstacles that may rise in its path; they imbue it with the conviction that the arbitrary, discriminatory, unjust and ominous situation that will result from the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—a breeding-ground of world power created by nuclear monopoly—will one day be overcome by the peoples of the world who aspire, not to a false peace which only the powerful can enjoy, but to a true peace based on the equality of nations and on the right of all peoples to universal respect, social and technological progress, and justice in the enjoyment of the benefits the workers' communities are capable of creating. Fatherland or death! We shall overcome!

161. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of satisfaction to Pakistan that you, a distinguished representative of the United Arab Republic, are presiding over the deliberations of the First Committee at this resumed session. Your hope that our debate would be fruitful and meaningful is already being borne out by the excellent statements that have been made on the text of the draft non-proliferation treaty.

162. Ten years ago, the Foreign Minister of Ireland, Mr. Frank Aiken, alerted us to the danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons which would interpose insuperable obstacles to disarmament and the quest for peace. If today we have at last been able to reach the stage of considering the text of a treaty which would effectively prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons to States which do not yet possess them, it is in no small measure due to the initiative he took in 1958. The world owes a debt of gratitude to him.

163. The Pakistan delegation welcomes the submission of the text of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union—the two co-Chairmen—on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

164. We wish to associate ourselves with the other delegations which have paid a tribute to the two super-Powers and also to the United Kingdom for their will to reach agreement and their readiness to consider the amendments submitted by the non-nuclear States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva for improving the text of the draft treaty. We do recognize that the text submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union on 11 March is a marked improvement on that submitted by them on 24 August 1967 and also on the revised text of 18 January.¹⁰

¹⁰ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex IV, sects. 7 and 9.

165. The draft treaty is a landmark in the history of negotiations on measures of arms control and disarmament. It is by far the most important agreement yet reached on this question of questions. As the Foreign Minister of Brazil has stated, it "may... well... mould the future of international relations". [1560th meeting, para. 58.]

166. General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) set forth certain guidelines to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in negotiating the text of a draft non-proliferation treaty. The question is: to what extent does the text before us articulate the principles set forth in that resolution?

167. First, we agree that the draft treaty is designed effectively to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons to States other than the existing five nuclear Powers, namely, the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China. Three of the nuclear Powers are satisfied that the treaty is without any loop-holes for the proliferation, direct or indirect, of nuclear weapons. The representative of the United States has said that the door to proliferation is locked on both sides and the provisions of the treaty relating to safeguards ensure that it will stay locked.

168. True, the treaty does not provide against vertical proliferation. In principle, Pakistan shares the views and anxieties of the non-nuclear-weapon States that vertical proliferation also, and not only horizontal proliferation, must be ended. However, as the representative of Ethiopia, a non-nuclear-weapon State which is a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, has pointed out, the acute differences among the nuclear Powers:

"... prevent us from taking the bold and comprehensive approach to non-proliferation and compel us to consider the present approach as a partial and practical course, short of the ideal goal". [1561st meeting, para. 34.]

169. Speaking in this Committee at an earlier session, I expressed apprehension that, if we waited until agreement was reached among the nuclear Powers against vertical proliferation, which is attendant with complex problems of verification and control, and over which the United States and the Soviet Union have been deadlocked for nearly twenty years, horizontal proliferation would proceed unchecked. At the moment we are faced with this unattractive choice: either to put an end to horizontal proliferation now or to pursue the goal of ending vertical proliferation as well, exposing ourselves in the meantime to the grave risk of uncontrollable horizontal proliferation. My delegation agrees completely with the representative of the Soviet Union, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, who stated in this Committee on 26 April [1556th meeting] that to tie the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to other measures restricting the nuclear arms race could only result in an impasse.

170. The second principle of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) is that a treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers. I have already expressed the views of my delegation in regard to vertical proliferation. We readily concede that the treaty would

provide some tangible benefits to the non-nuclear-weapon States to assist them in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The treaty would also open the prospect for the provision of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes at the lowest possible cost. However, that the basic defect in the treaty is the "asymmetry in its commitments" is all too clear. The non-nuclear-weapon States are undoubtedly required to undertake heavier responsibilities and obligations than the nuclear Powers. At the same time, we must confess to being sceptical that an even balance can be struck, given the realities of power in the world, and the great disparity in the strength and resources of the non-nuclear-weapon countries on the one hand and the super-Powers on the other. We do not think that it would be realistic to impose obligations on the nuclear Powers similar in all respects to those that the treaty places on the non-nuclear-weapon States. Rather, we should consider what other kinds of obligations could be placed on the nuclear Powers in order to strike a more equitable balance than is envisaged in the draft treaty.

171. We share the views of those delegations which maintain that the text is susceptible of improvement. It is true that article III of the text does not reflect the principle of balancing the mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear Powers and non-nuclear Powers. That article would impose inspection on the nuclear establishments of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty, but not on the nuclear-weapon States. However, even if all the nuclear-weapon States were to accept inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency of such of their nuclear installations as are devoted to civil uses, the principle of balance of responsibilities and obligations would still remain unrealized. For, as long as the nuclear-weapon States are permitted, as is the case under the treaty, to remain nuclear Powers, it will be impossible to place obligations on them equal to those imposed on non-nuclear-weapon States in the matter of safeguards against the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes. This will become possible only when the stage can be set for total nuclear arms control. At present this stage is beyond our reach.

172. For these reasons, the Pakistan delegation is of the view that an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers must be sought not by imposing obligations on the nuclear Powers equal to those prescribed for the non-nuclear Powers with regard to measures of nuclear arms control, but by providing the latter—that is, the non-nuclear Powers—with adequate security guarantees against the threat or use of nuclear weapons from any quarter.

173. In regard to the third main principle of resolution 2028 (XX)—that the treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament—we consider that the present text falls short of this goal. We welcome the inclusion of article VI in the text, for which the credit must be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States that are members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. But, as was so aptly observed by the representative of Ceylon [1565th meeting], an undertaking to pursue negotiations is no more than a declaration of intent, and much less convincing than a definite commitment. In this

context, my delegation considers that the text could have been greatly strengthened by an undertaking to ban underground nuclear weapons tests within the shortest possible time and to pursue negotiations on the cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. In these fields we believe that the area of disagreement between the nuclear Powers is not too wide.

174. The major nuclear Powers have given us a solemn assurance in this debate that they will seriously press forward the search for nuclear disarmament, as pledged in article VI of the text of the draft treaty. We do not question their good faith, and we look forward to tangible results on a wide spectrum of disarmament problems, beginning with a complete cessation of underground tests. We would hope that progress is registered by them by the end of August this year, when the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States is due to convene.

175. The treaty provides for a review, under paragraph 3 of article VIII, five years after the treaty enters into force. The object of the review is to assure that the purposes of the treaty are being realized. We hope that the provision of this long interval will not diminish the urgency of achieving agreements on effective measures to end the nuclear arms race and on measures of nuclear disarmament.

176. The fourth guiding principle of resolution 2028 (XX) is that there should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty. We note that article III of the text provides for comprehensive safeguards to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The safeguards are to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Agency's safeguards system. In this regard, the Pakistan delegation lends its full support to the representative of Japan's views that the agreements concluded between the non-nuclear-weapon States and the International Atomic Energy Agency pursuant to the treaty should provide for international safeguards of identical standards to govern the peaceful nuclear activities of all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the treaty.

177. The fifth main principle of resolution 2028 (XX) is also met in the text. Article VII declares that the treaty will not affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

178. Here I would wish to offer our felicitations to the Heads of African States who adopted a declaration on the denuclearization of Africa in 1964.¹¹ May I also reiterate our warm appreciation to the Latin American countries which, with foresight and courage, concluded the denuclearization Treaty for their region last year. We hope that this Treaty will provide a further impetus for the conclusion of similar arrangements for other regions of the world.

179. Turning again to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without endangering non-proliferation, the

Pakistan delegation welcomes the inclusion of articles IV and V. The representative of the United States has said that paragraph 2 of article IV lays a positive obligation on the nuclear Powers to contribute to peaceful application of nuclear energy, especially in the territories of the non-nuclear parties. He has also pledged that in accordance with the treaty the United States will share its knowledge and experience concerning all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the non-nuclear parties. For his part, the representative of the Soviet Union stated that by the inclusion of articles IV and V the treaty on non-proliferation becomes the treaty for the proliferation of benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the maximum number of States. We would hope that the nuclear Powers party to the treaty will respond affirmatively and promptly to the request of any non-nuclear party which desires co-operation in accordance with article IV.

180. The representative of Italy has suggested an acknowledgement of the principle that all signatory nations are entitled to access to the supply of nuclear fuel and equipment for nuclear plants. We support his suggestion.

181. Explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes are completely banned under the treaty. Instead, under article V, the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are to be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the treaty through appropriate international procedures and on a non-discriminatory basis. Furthermore, it is stipulated that the charge to such parties for explosive devices used would be as low as possible and would exclude any charge for research and development. We also note that under article V such benefits can be obtained on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body pursuant to special agreements.

182. The representative of Sweden has proposed that there should be no bilateral provision of nuclear explosive devices and that such devices should be supplied only through an appropriate international body, whether to non-nuclear-weapon States or to the nuclear Powers. The view has also been expressed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, as well as in this Committee in the present debate, that signatories should be permitted to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under international inspection, either with their own resources or in co-operation with third parties. The question is of surpassing importance to the non-nuclear-weapon States in the field of scientific and technological co-operation, not only for nuclear research but also for economic development. This is a question which could be carefully examined in the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

183. Article IX provides that the treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to the treaty, and forty other signatories, and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. Speaking in the General Assembly on 10 October last year, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan observed that the value of the treaty would largely depend on the extent of the unqualified adherence that it commands. In this context the attitude of the potential nuclear-weapon States will be of crucial importance. Even if almost all the non-nuclear-weapon States signed and ratified the treaty and the near-nuclear-

¹¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session*, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

weapon States did not, the main purpose of the treaty would be defeated. As the representative of Sweden stated:

“...the world will be following with solicitude the actions of these States in relation to the present treaty”.
[1564th meeting, para. 29.]

184. In his statement to this Committee on 26 April the representative of the United States, Justice Goldberg, said:

“We fully expect that every sovereign State represented here ... will measure the treaty by the same yardstick: its own enlightened national interest and its national security.” [1556th meeting, para. 18.]

It is by this yardstick that Pakistan measures the treaty.

185. Several representatives have pointed out that there is a serious omission from the treaty. The omission is of an undertaking on the part of nuclear-weapon States to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the signatories.

186. The representative of Ethiopia has drawn our attention [1561st meeting] to the formulation of such an undertaking in General Assembly resolution 2153 (XXI). The representatives of Ceylon, Japan, Kenya and Nepal have also highlighted this omission from the text of the treaty. The Pakistan delegation shares their concern.

187. Let me now turn to the draft resolution for the Security Council on security assurances in the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States.¹² We are awaiting the promised explanations and clarifications of its provisions by the three nuclear Powers and also the statements they intend to make to supplement the draft resolution.

188. We have listened with close attention to what has so far been said by the representatives of the three nuclear Powers and Canada, commending the draft resolution. We note the evaluation of the representative of Finland that the willingness of the three nuclear Powers to reaffirm the Charter obligation to counter or remove the threat of aggression, in accordance with the Charter, is of immense political significance. We have also listened to the comments of the representatives of Brazil, Ceylon, Ghana, Iran, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal and Nigeria that the draft resolution on security assurances is inadequate and that its provisions would need to be revised. Several of those representatives have made careful and incisive analyses of its limitations and its failure to go beyond the existing provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. The representative of Iran asked:

“Who will feel safer because of those words?”

“We find there no guarantee, no assurance couched in form or words imposing an obligation on anyone.”
[1562nd meeting, paras. 51 and 52.]

He went on to say that this is “a declaration of intention instead of an assurance” [ibid., para. 56].

189. The representative of Austria, which is a European and a neutral country, suggested that the nuclear Powers

should dispel the apprehensions of non-nuclear-weapon States on this complex problem.

190. The representatives of the United Kingdom and Canada have stated that stronger security assurances cannot be given except under a military alliance with the nuclear Powers. That thesis requires careful examination.

191. The question arises why the possibility of envisaging a system of universal collective security which would be free from the built-in limitations of the United Nations and its present composition should be inconceivable.

192. In their statements on 26 April [1556th meeting], the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union have reaffirmed the categorical assurances given to this Committee in December last, of support to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. The representative of the United Kingdom has also welcomed the Conference. On behalf of my delegation I thank them for the reaffirmation of their support, which I have no doubt would be welcome to non-nuclear-weapon States.

193. The nuclear Powers have pledged that, regardless of the outcome of this resumed session, regardless of whether the text of the draft non-proliferation treaty is endorsed or not, that Conference will be held. Speaking in the General Assembly on 10 October last, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan said:

“Last year the General Assembly, in resolution 2153 B (XXI), decided to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States to consider how best their security can be guaranteed against nuclear threat or blackmail. Pakistan had made it clear that the proposal was conceived to complement, not duplicate; to supplement, and not compete with, the work on the non-proliferation treaty of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

“... It is apparent from the report of the Preparatory Committee that it has tried its best to ensure that the non-nuclear-weapon States Conference will deliberate essentially on those questions which arise directly from the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty but are outside the scope of the treaty.” [1594th plenary meeting, paras. 135 and 137.]

That approach continues to guide my delegation in regard to the non-proliferation treaty and to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Whatever decision the present session of the General Assembly may take in regard to the treaty, it cannot derogate from the necessity and importance of that Conference.

194. The representative of Austria has stated [1564th meeting] that, on the question of security assurances, as well as in regard to further measures, outside and complementary to the treaty, which will in due course establish an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, it will be a challenging task for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to make constructive proposals. Other representatives have also made suggestions in regard to the work of the Conference. Mr. Goldberg has stated that the Conference could consider the subject of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov has said

¹² Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex II.

that the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty "provides a good frame of reference for the successful work of the Conference of non-nuclear Powers [1556th meeting, para. 129]. Mr. Mulley, Minister of State of the United Kingdom, considers that the Conference can make a positive contribution to consideration of the procedures for international control of civil uses of nuclear energy, including peaceful nuclear explosions, as well as further steps towards disarmament. Similar views have been expressed by other representatives, and I should like to quote from the statement made by the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Ireland on 6 May:

"Moreover, the ratification of the treaty as it stands, without any alteration or amendment, will help greatly to create a favourable climate for the negotiation of many other desirable—and to my mind necessary—agreements which can of course be negotiated later and incorporated in separate instruments or in protocols to the present treaty. Indeed the forthcoming Geneva Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States will provide a suitable forum for the consideration of matters which might form the subject of such additional agreements." [1561st meeting, para. 7.]

195. The imperfections of the text of the draft treaty have been pointed out by several delegations that have spoken in the debate. Suggestions and proposals have been made for changes in the treaty to improve it. So far the super-Powers have not given any indication of whether they are prepared to consider changes in the text at this resumed session. They have called for action by the General Assembly to endorse the treaty and open it for signature at this session and they have emphasized that time is not on our side and that we should ride on the present wave of opportunity. Other delegations have stated that the endorsement of the treaty should await the twenty-third session in order to enable the non-nuclear-weapon States to recommend improvements in the text.

196. It is undoubtedly true that amendments will be more difficult of adoption once the treaty is approved. The procedure set forth in article VIII of the treaty makes that only too clear.

197. If the nuclear Powers were to give an indication that in the event the treaty is endorsed at this session and opened for signature they would be prepared to consider the negotiation of additional agreements which might form the subject of consideration by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, it might be possible to pave the way for a reconciliation of the divergent views that have been expressed on the question of the endorsement of the text of the draft treaty at this resumed session.

198. We seek not a confrontation between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers but co-operation; not division but unanimity. The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Ireland has pointed out a way by which this can be achieved. If we follow his counsel, the work of the Conference will be doubly fruitful.

199. Some representatives have underlined how the absence of the People's Republic of China from the world Organization will seriously limit the effectiveness of the treaty. Effective nuclear disarmament requires the full participation of the People's Republic of China and France in the negotiations. So also a universal system of collective security which would assure the security of all non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon States predicates that France and China must be enabled to play their rightful roles.

200. More than ever it has become urgent and imperative to restore the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.