

United Nations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 1565th
MEETING

Friday, 10 May 1968,
at 3 p.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Agenda item 28:

Page

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*)

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

1

Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 28

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/7072 and Add.1-DC/230 and Add.1; A/7080; A/C.1/959-960, A/C.1/963; A/C.1/L.421/Rev. and Add.1-3)

1. Mr. AMERASINGHE (Ceylon): The First Committee is now engaged in considering the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament^{1/} and the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is annexed to it; three of the four nuclear Powers Members of the United Nations have been able to reach agreement on the text of the draft treaty. The Committee also has before it a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-3) whose sponsors now number twenty-six. Of the eighteen members of the Disarmament Committee eight appear among the sponsors.

2. The chief authors of the draft treaty, and others besides them, have been at pains to point out that it not merely represents the greatest measure of agreement on this highly controversial issue at present attainable between the two principal nuclear Powers, but also indicates that a sincere effort has been made to meet the wishes of the non-nuclear members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament through substantial revisions in the draft jointly presented in August 1967 by the two major nuclear Powers.

3. The draft treaty marks the climax of innumerable resolutions on nuclear weapons control which have been passed with great fervour, enthusiasm and hope over the last several years by the United Nations. The sentiments expressed and the claims made on behalf of the draft treaty may in the light of past performance and even present prospects appear a trifle extravagant. It is necessary, therefore, to temper this feeling with a touch of realism. As I listened to the speeches on the opening day of the debate on this subject at this resumed session I felt that I was listening to a declaration of the approach of the millennium. The draft treaty must be recognized for

what it actually is. Like the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 it marks only a stage—a further stage indeed—on the steep path that we hope will take us to the summit of international co-operation and the goal of our efforts, which is general and complete disarmament. We all know that the ascent to the stars is arduous, but the antidote to hesitation and faltering in that ascent is the realization that, as Virgil has said, the plunge into darkness is easy.

4. It is twenty-three years since the appalling fury of atomic weapons was demonstrated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki with a carnage and destruction unparalleled in history. It is seven years since the "Irish" resolution, 1665 (XVI) of 4 December 1961, with the robust optimism characteristic of the author of that resolution, the Foreign Minister of Ireland, set out to ask for what appeared to be a Utopian dream.

5. The draft treaty^{2/} meets the requirements of that resolution but it fails to fulfil the requirements of a later resolution which marks a more mature stage in the development of world opinion in regard to nuclear proliferation. I refer to resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965. That resolution called for a non-proliferation treaty based on five principles or what might be termed the *Pancha Shila* of non-proliferation. In our opinion, the draft treaty does not embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers and therefore falls short of satisfying one of those five principles.

6. My Government, however, concedes that the draft treaty is an advance, in that it represents an important measure of agreement on a problem of crucial importance and that it is undoubtedly a progressive step in the moves towards general and complete disarmament. The primary responsibility for ensuring that it does take us closer to general and complete disarmament rests with the two major nuclear Powers which are the chief architects of the draft treaty. These two Powers, and along with them the other nuclear Powers, have made not the least concession, but, while preserving intact their freedom to expand their own nuclear power, claim that the renunciation by the non-nuclear Powers of their right to develop nuclear capacity is in fact balanced by the assumption on the part of the nuclear Powers of the obligation to make nuclear explosive devices available to non-nuclear Powers for peaceful purposes. That obligation could have been fulfilled by the nuclear Powers without their retention of the right to continue nuclear tests. Their failure and their reluctance to perform an act of renunciation which would match the sacrifice which they ask of the non-nuclear Powers is not calculated

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, annex I.

to inspire confidence in the assurances and undertakings relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament which are incorporated in the draft treaty. The nuclear Powers seem to commend self-abnegation to others while practising self-indulgence themselves.

7. We do believe, however, that, with all its deficiencies and disappointments, the draft treaty deserves the widest possible endorsement, for the mere reason that it is better than no treaty at all, that the world would not be worse off with it; on the contrary, if the faith that the non-nuclear Powers would show in the nuclear Powers by endorsement of the draft treaty were reciprocated, there would be some hope of progress. We also believe that the conclusion of this treaty would deprive the nuclear Powers of any excuse or pretext for declining to give practical form to their expressed intention of achieving at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race. For these very reasons, we are not in favour of a deferment of the consideration of this question to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly. Delay might deny us what little we could gain by prompt endorsement.

8. This brings me to what my Government considers to be the inadequacies and deficiencies in the draft treaty. Many others before me, both in the deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in this debate, have drawn attention to these same flaws in the draft. We trust that the suggestions that have been made for improvements in the draft treaty, not merely to dispel the doubts, misgivings and apprehensions of non-nuclear Powers but also to increase the momentum towards nuclear disarmament and, beyond that, general and complete disarmament, will be received and acted upon by the nuclear Powers, and, in particular, the two major nuclear Powers, with the same faith, understanding and goodwill that the non-nuclear Powers would show in supporting the draft treaty. The danger of nuclear war could be lessened and perhaps averted only if those in possession of nuclear weapons agreed not to use them and also gave a firm and categorical pledge of nuclear disarmament. The draft treaty does not make adequate provision in regard to either of those two aspects of the problem. It contains no undertaking by the nuclear Powers that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. It contains no commitment, no firm and categorical commitment, by the nuclear Powers that they will themselves take measures for nuclear disarmament.

9. The philosophical basis of the draft treaty is that the risk of nuclear war is heightened if the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons is increased. The converse of this proposition would be that the risk would be less if the possession and control of nuclear weapons were restricted to those Powers now holding them, even if they were free to intensify their efforts at further elaborating the quality and destructive capacity of those weapons. That is more than could reasonably be expected.

10. It has been urged, on behalf of the treaty, that its preamble brings out the intention of the nuclear Powers to work towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date and that this

declaration of intent is reinforced by what the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom referred to as the "very clear commitment" in article VI. It will be recalled that this article did not appear in the identical drafts presented by the two major nuclear Powers, the co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in August 1967.^{3/} Its first appearance was in the January 1968 draft,^{4/} which states that each of the parties undertakes to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. An undertaking to pursue negotiations is, however, no more than a declaration of intent and is much less convincing than a definite commitment would have been.

11. The test lies not in words and in the verbiage that adorns international instruments but in actions which could be accepted as an earnest of good faith. An extension of the partial test-ban treaty to include underground tests and an undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons on non-nuclear States could have provided some earnest of good faith. In the absence of a clear and unequivocal commitment by the nuclear Powers to refrain from the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, it must be presumed that they consider themselves free to release this terror at their discretion. Even the proposal made by the Soviet Union that the treaty should contain an undertaking by the nuclear Powers that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States on whose territory nuclear weapons are not based has failed to secure acceptance.

12. The apprehensions of non-nuclear-weapon States and especially such of those States as are non-aligned and intend to be non-aligned are not lessened by the fact that the draft non-proliferation treaty does not preclude the participation by non-nuclear-weapon States along with nuclear-weapon States in any military alliance, even where the non-nuclear members of the alliance have no control over the use of nuclear weapons available to the alliance. We are not satisfied with the contention that access to nuclear weapons by a military alliance whose non-nuclear members have no right of control over the use of those nuclear weapons does not amount to proliferation. Membership of a military alliance implies a community of interest, even an identity of interest, so strong and compelling that joint ownership, even without joint control, of the nuclear weapons could be as serious a menace as proliferation in its most restricted sense. There is also here a grave threat to the concept of non-alignment which abjures military alliances that could intensify the cold war. Non-aligned countries might feel their security so imperilled that they would seek to join one of the groups which would ensure joint ownership of nuclear weapons. That would be a disastrous trend. The non-nuclear members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament may be aware of the reasons for the absence from the draft treaty of a firm undertaking by the nuclear Powers either to undertake measures of nuclear disarmament or to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear

^{3/} *Ibid.*, annex IV, sects. 6 and 8.

^{4/} *Ibid.*, annex IV, sects. 7 and 9.

weapons against non-nuclear countries, but the nuclear Powers owe an explanation to this Committee on both those points.

13. Another serious omission from the draft treaty relates to a guarantee by the nuclear Powers to non-nuclear States against nuclear attack or the threat of such attack. The three nuclear Powers have attempted to meet this argument by the draft resolution for the Security Council on security assurances.^{5/} We do not regard the draft resolution as a satisfactory answer to the question that has been raised.

14. In the first place, the draft resolution is based on a concept which has in twenty years defied definition, namely, the concept of "aggression". Secondly, the draft resolution of the Security Council presupposes that, in any situation calling for the fulfilment of the security assurances, the nuclear-weapon States permanent members of the Security Council would have a common interest in going to the assistance of the non-nuclear-weapon State concerned. Both these factors seriously limit, if they do not completely vitiate, the commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to go to the aid of non-nuclear States that are victims of nuclear attack or are threatened with nuclear aggression.

15. The draft resolution could therefore at best have only a mild psychological influence. The procedures of the Security Council being what they are, there can be little confidence in its capacity to act with sufficient expedition in the circumstances envisaged by the draft resolution on security assurances. The real answer would seem to be an international peace-keeping force equipped with all the weapons necessary to deter any potential aggressor. Can an Organization which has failed to reach agreement even on the financing of such a force hope to succeed within the foreseeable future in establishing such an international peace-keeping force?

16. Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution for the Security Council is little more than an invitation to membership of military alliances with nuclear Powers.

17. Article III of the draft treaty has presented the biggest problem and it might therefore appear captious to offer any criticism of it once the two major nuclear Powers have accepted its provisions. My Government, however, is obliged to point out that in allowing for the conclusion of agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency by regional organizations such as Euratom, article III could confer a special privilege on one group of States. It might conceivably enable them to inspect themselves. We have no doubt, however, that there is at least one major nuclear Power which does not belong to any regional organization which could negotiate a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and that that Power is fully capable of preventing any abuse of the provisions of article III.

18. We are glad to note that the provision for making the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions available without discrimination to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the treaty has been elevated from the status of a preambular para-

graph in the August 1967 draft to that of a substantive article in the present draft.

19. We welcome it as the harbinger of a new form of international co-operation. The second part of article V, we note, enables non-nuclear-weapon States party to the treaty to obtain these benefits by special agreement on a bilateral basis. We would rather that the provision for bilateral agreements had been omitted, as was suggested in the Swedish amendment. We fear that any provision for sharing the benefits of nuclear explosions on a bilateral basis might leave a loop-hole for co-operation in the clandestine production of nuclear weapons.

20. This draft treaty must be regarded as only a beginning. Even if it reduces international tension and the risk of nuclear war, it only lessens a risk that still remains deadly. It is as if we were handling a patient whose condition was critical and we barely succeeded in preventing that condition from becoming desperate. The condition of crisis must still be improved. It is incumbent on the major nuclear Powers to address themselves immediately, in all earnestness, to the next stages of action as contemplated in article VI of the draft treaty. These should, in our opinion, be, first, a categorical undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States; secondly, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; thirdly, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the freezing of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons; and, fourthly, the gradual dismantling of the apparatus of nuclear terror. We recognize that progress cannot be achieved without the participation and collaboration of the other two nuclear Powers.

21. Only when those steps have been completed will the world be able to breathe freely and think of the next phase in the process of general and complete disarmament.

22. We have pledged our support for the draft treaty even in its present imperfect and incomplete form. Although we do not favour deferment of a decision on the draft treaty to the twenty-third session, we would request the two major nuclear Powers to consider whether it would not be prudent on their part to revise their draft even at this late stage of the present resumed session so as to accommodate some at least of the suggestions for improvement that appear to be desired by a very substantial number of Members. This would be more than a fine gesture on their part. It would give greater meaning to our association here as an Organization of sovereign and equal nations.

23. In conclusion, the General Assembly, by its resolution 2346 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, wittingly or unwittingly took a date from the Roman calendar, the Ides of March 1968, as the date by which the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should submit its report on the negotiations regarding the draft non-proliferation treaty. The major nuclear Powers have kept to that date. We hope that, in selecting a date for reaching agreement on effective measures of nuclear disarmament, as proposed by us, they will not make the infelicitous choice of the Greek Kalends.

^{5/} Ibid., annex II.

24. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): Nearly seven years after the United Nations General Assembly first discussed the question on our agenda and adopted a resolution calling upon all States, and primarily the nuclear States, to exert every effort towards concluding an international agreement that would bar the road to the further spread of nuclear weapons in the world, there has now appeared a real possibility of taking this important step. This possibility is embodied in the text of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as presented to our Committee in the report of the Disarmament Commission.

25. In the opinion of the Hungarian delegation, all the details, and the merits or shortcomings of this draft, should be examined in the framework of the following basic question: what is the object of the draft treaty?

26. The draft treaty aims at a practically attainable single objective: to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and, by doing so, it aims at the same time at creating an atmosphere favourable to further collateral and comprehensive disarmament measures in the nuclear field and in general as well. In other words, being a restricted measure designed only for one purpose, it has its clearly defined limitations: it only lowers the nuclear barrier. It cannot do more than it says, although the successful conclusion of such a treaty will undoubtedly have positive effects on the prospects of limiting the arms race.

27. In the light of this, there can hardly be any other approach to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons than concentrating on the substance of the matter; that is, on a single and urgent step which halts the obvious spread of these weapons. Such an approach is completely in line with the foreign policy of the Hungarian Government. The records of the debates on the question of non-proliferation, as well as on other collateral measures, show the consistency of our contribution to any effort aimed at limiting the arms race.

28. Indeed, the Hungarian People's Republic, being a consistent advocate of general and complete disarmament, has always been ready to lend its support to any measures—and I wish to underline specifically the words "any measures"—and initiatives conducive to non-proliferation or to the achievement of the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons and other disarmament measures. We are deeply appreciative of the important work done by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and regard the draft treaty as historically significant because it means a fresh step towards collateral disarmament measures. After the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and the 1966 Treaty barring the use of nuclear weapons in outer space [resolution 2222 (XXI)], the non-proliferation draft is another piece of tangible evidence that there can be progress—limited though it may be—towards limiting the arms race.

29. Fully realizing that the spread of nuclear weapons is a global problem and not ignoring other continents, the Hungarian delegation examines the practical significance of the draft treaty first of all from the point of view of European security. The First and Second World Wars started in Europe. The Second World War caused the Hungarian people tremendous suffering, even more than the First World War. It caused the death of

700,000 Hungarians, which was 10 per cent of the adult population, and the material damage ran as high as the total national income of five years of peaceful production.

30. Political developments of present-day Europe remind us constantly that there are still provisions of the Potsdam Agreement which have not yet been implemented. We are aware of the fact that revision of existing frontiers is demanded. Out of past experience, and having witnessed very recent conquest of territories as a result of direct aggression, we know only too well the dangers of such demands. Therefore, everything must be done to prevent a third world war from starting again in Europe, a war motivated by territorial ambitions.

31. The picture of Europe today shows that we have three nuclear Powers on our continent and the largest proportion of States with near-nuclear capabilities. A nuclear war in Europe is almost beyond imagination as far as its effects are concerned. According to the report of the Secretary-General, prepared by his consultative group, the effects of a ground-burst one-megaton explosion bomb, assumed to have been dropped on a city with 1,160,000 inhabitants, are estimated as follows:

"Approximately one third of all the inhabitants would have been killed as a result of blast and fire or from a radiation dose received in the first two days. One third of a million dead is approximately the same number of civilians who were killed by—and I add, conventional—air raids both in Germany and in Japan during the whole of the Second World War." [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 17.]

32. The report further states:

"In brief, a big city of the size that has been described... would for all practical purposes be eliminated by a single one-megaton weapon ground-burst near its centre." [*Ibid.*, para. 19.]

33. In reading that assessment we think of Budapest, the capital of Hungary, which has just about 2 million inhabitants. It would face approximately the same fate.

34. Contrary to the alarming increase of neo-nazi forces elsewhere in Europe, we are satisfied to see the healthy development in the German Democratic Republic, which, together with other European countries, gave valuable support to the draft treaty. I should like to draw the attention of my colleagues to the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Winzer addressed to the President of the General Assembly on 19 April 1968 [A/C.1/959], in which he not only transmitted his Government's positive statement in support of the draft treaty, but indicated to all of us that Dr. Harry Wunsche, an international lawyer, and another expert would be available in case we needed further explanations of the viewpoint of the German Democratic Republic.

35. It is very simple to realize that the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is by no means of interest to Europe only. The danger of proliferation of these most inhuman weapons constitutes a global danger. I fully realize that the war which was started by Hitler caused suffering to coun-

tries of other continents—for example, to Japan, where Nagasaki and Hiroshima are the only examples of the actual use of nuclear weapons in war. With the constantly developing and increasingly sophisticated systems of delivery, there is no continent that can feel safe today. The number of countries which could produce nuclear weapons within two years of a decision to build them is on the increase. I quote an assessment which was given in the 4 December 1967 issue of Newsweek:

"... nuclear reactors in more than 40 countries will be producing enough plutonium by 1980 to build 5,000 nuclear bombs each year".

36. The global danger inherent in the further spread of nuclear weapons has been voiced in many important international forums. I want to refer to two very significant ones. First, there was the summit Conference of the Organization for African Unity, held on 21 July 1964, where the African Heads of State and Government adopted the well-known "Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa".^{6/} Secondly, there was the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo on 10 October 1964, which issued a declaration containing a direct reference to "the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those States which do not ... possess them".^{7/}

37. Both of those highly respectable international meetings made a considerable contribution to the fact that today we have a draft treaty which meets precisely those points that constituted the basic demands of many of the non-aligned countries. Our Committee should always remember those contributions and the important role of the non-aligned countries in disarmament matters.

38. In this connexion the forthcoming Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States may be even more important, since their contribution to the elaboration of concrete measures, within the framework of the present draft treaty, will undoubtedly assist in the effective implementation of the treaty.

39. Even on the basis of my short review, it is obvious that, in a tense and explosive international situation, we are confronted with a real danger of so great a proliferation of nuclear weapons that it may become impossible to have any control at all. Time is running out; something must be done, and done quickly, before it is too late. We just cannot take the responsibility, with regard to our descendants, for waiting and hesitating too long. After seven years of debate we must take action.

40. The realization of the importance of this urgency forces us to select our first argument for avoiding any further delay in bringing the draft treaty to an early conclusion. In annex IV to the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament we find a whole range of documents. Many of these contain proposals aimed at disarmament measures reaching far outside the framework of the draft treaty. We have heard similar proposals during this debate.

41. We do not doubt the sincerity of the proposals for further disarmament measures. At the same time, it seems to us that they are either not yet ripe for a general agreement or would require considerable time to be concluded. In both cases, if we insisted on including them in the present draft treaty, it would cause further delay in the adoption of a treaty on non-proliferation, the necessity for which is disputed by practically no one in this Committee. The present draft should not—in fact must not—be looked upon as a comprehensive document on a series of disarmament questions. There should be no mistake about it; the draft treaty is in the realm of collateral measures. So, if at present we are unable to achieve the maximum results, it does not mean that we should throw away the optimum within our reach today. There is no doubt that with a successfully negotiated non-proliferation treaty in our hands we could look forward to further consecutive limitations of the arms race and further disarmament measures, because that is going to be the effect of the draft treaty when it is adopted. Actually, the preamble and article VI are the convincing pointers in this direction.

42. The Hungarian delegation is fully aware of the controversies concerning the obligations which the signatory States have to undertake. We should like to develop our second argument in connexion with interpretations according to which the draft treaty means discrimination because the obligations are one-sided or unequal. In this connexion, we have three observations.

43. First, agreeing not to give nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States is in itself an obligation for a nuclear Power, according to this treaty. Moreover, the nuclear Powers assume heavier obligations in the Security Council since the relevant draft resolution will bind them to provide immediate assistance to any non-nuclear State that is the victim of an aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

44. Second, in response to the statement that some States are "being deprived of choice in the matter of possessing nuclear weapons" the right question should be asked in the following form: can the possession of nuclear weapons reinforce the security of a small country? Our answer is definitely, no. In trying to obtain its own nuclear bomb a non-nuclear country does not in any way reinforce its security, but merely incurs great material sacrifices. On the one hand such a country, for all its efforts, will never be able to put up a reliable nuclear shield against a mighty nuclear Power; and, on the other hand, it will be unable to use nuclear bombs even in a local conflict because of their self-devastating effect. It is important to notice that, by possessing nuclear weapons, a small country becomes a target and invites the first strike by a bigger nuclear Power since it is even less capable of building up second-strike capability.

45. The whole point is that the non-nuclear countries favouring a solution of the problem of non-proliferation decline to have such a choice inasmuch as other non-nuclear Powers simultaneously renounce it. If the non-proliferation treaty is signed, none of them will have to develop and manufacture costly nuclear weapons of their own. By renouncing nuclear weapons each of the

^{6/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

^{7/} Document A/5763.

parties to the non-proliferation treaty would gain the assurance that all the other non-nuclear countries were also renouncing these weapons. A contract would, in effect, exist among the parties. The premise is that stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is so much in the interest of each non-nuclear Power that it will renounce nuclear weapons itself in order to stop others.

46. At the same time, even a small country can use its resources for the peaceful development of nuclear energy, for developing new technologies, and even new industries producing various peaceful devices or instruments which are in wide demand on the international markets. Thus, instead of incurring great material losses, a small country can increase its national income and can help in accelerating the building up of its important industrial projects on a modern basis. Together with such a peaceful development of nuclear energy is coupled the increasing number of scientists who engage in peaceful research in nuclear sciences and bring fame and benefit to their countries. Hungary's experience in this field during the last decade or so is a gratifying example.

47. Third, there are heated controversies about the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. These explosions are possible only with the use of the same kind of devices which in time of war may be used as nuclear weapons. It is clear, therefore, that the entire ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons must apply equally to nuclear devices used for peaceful purposes.

48. In the opinion of the Hungarian delegation, article V of the draft treaty meets the necessary requirement that there should be no loop-holes in the treaty. To allow for peaceful nuclear explosions would create the very loop-hole which I believe we all wish to avoid. The nuclear Powers undertake to arrange explosions for non-nuclear countries on a non-discriminatory basis and at the lowest possible cost.

49. Thus, far from being discriminatory, the draft treaty would work exactly in the opposite direction: against discrimination. By undertaking not to give nuclear weapons, the nuclear Powers would limit their sovereignty as much as the non-nuclear Powers would in undertaking not to receive nuclear weapons.

50. Our third argument is centred on the question of security assurances. The draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, because its framework is limited to one single objective, cannot deal with the problem of safeguarding all aspects of the security of non-nuclear States. The question of security assurances is the responsibility of the nuclear Powers; it represents voluntary obligations for them as big Powers; and it is in the Security Council where they can and should discharge their responsibilities according to the Charter. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament annexed to its report the text of a draft resolution of the Security Council on security assurances, sponsored by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. In spite of its being a part of the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, it is a separate document and, in due course, it would be considered and, it is to be hoped, adopted outside of our Committee—in the Security Council.

51. The Security Council is part of the United Nations—the founders charged it with the high responsibility of keeping the peace. If the United Nations is our best hope for living in peace, as some critics of the security assurances have been saying in earlier declarations, then there cannot be—and if we really believe in the idea of the United Nations there must not be—any other organ outside the United Nations to give security assurances to make the non-proliferation treaty a really viable international document. Therefore, we regard draft resolution A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-3 and the draft resolution for the Security Council annexed to the report of the Disarmament Commission, as two documents closely related to each other, as two actions of one integrated body.

52. There have been widely publicized different versions as to the best system of security assurances. In the final result, a compromise was born, and we regard the wording of the version submitted as the best one available. The Hungarian delegation holds the view that this draft not only reinforces the Charter but brings it up to date with the reality of the dangers of nuclear weapons. Hungary, as a present member of the Security Council, will do its best to contribute to the adoption of the draft resolution for the Security Council.

53. It is our understanding—and the forthcoming decision of the Security Council should result in the recognition of this—that no nuclear Power would be permitted to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear State. We believe that this reading of the situation is firmly in accord with the spirit and the actual wording of the Charter.

54. After having considered all aspects of the draft treaty, we came to the conclusion that its merits do tip the balance against its shortcomings. On the basis of this assessment and acting upon the instructions of the Hungarian Government, my delegation, together with nineteen other countries, decided to co-sponsor draft resolution A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-3. It is in our best national interest; it is in conformity with our foreign policy; and it is consistent with our international commitments with regard to the Charter, with the statement made by European Communist and Worker Parties at their Conference in Karlovy Vary in April 1967, and with the statement made by six socialist countries in Sofia on 9 April 1968.

55. We realize that the draft treaty is not an ideally perfect document, but certainly the best that we can hope to obtain in the foreseeable future. It is for this reason that we urge all delegations to support the draft treaty. We must not endanger the fruits born of seven years of difficult negotiations. In the present confrontations of world Powers, whether we like it or not, there is no other way to solutions than through compromises. We are not taking risks in this way; on the contrary, we are making certain progress without giving up our main objective to achieve more and further disarmament measures, a complete ban of nuclear tests, a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, banning of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and destruction of nuclear weapons and stockpiles in the framework of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

56. In conclusion, I express the expectation of my delegation that our Committee, in harmony with the interests of peace and security in the world, will endorse the draft resolution.

57. Mr. TSURUOKA (Japan): We have before us the draft text of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which was presented to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in March this year by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States. This draft is the outcome of long negotiations, in which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States jointly played a leading role. I should like to express our appreciation to the representatives of those two countries. We also appreciate the substantial contributions made by other countries, in particular the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

58. The Japanese Government has stressed in various forums during the past several years the importance it attaches to the conclusion of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and continues to believe that the early conclusion of an equitable non-proliferation treaty, acceptable to as many countries as possible, would be an important step forward in the effort to halt the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament.

59. The Japanese Government subscribes to the spirit of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also notes that substantial improvements have been made in the present draft over previous ones. However, there are still several points with regard to the draft treaty which, the Japanese Government believes, require the most thorough consideration. I should now like to set forth our views on these points.

60. Let me begin by quoting the following passage from paragraph 2 (b) of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX):

"The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers."

In other words, one-sided obligations should not be imposed upon the non-nuclear-weapon countries.

61. Several aspects of the problem of acceptable balance should be considered. I have in mind, specifically, the following questions: first, the question of the security of States; second, the question of nuclear disarmament; and third, the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

62. It may be said that the draft text sets the stage, so to speak, but it does not by itself provide, with regard to the questions I have just mentioned, what we would consider an equitable balance of responsibilities and obligations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. The over-all problem, as we see it, is how such a balance can best be achieved in a realistic and practical manner. This problem is of great importance because it will have a direct bearing upon the number of States adhering to the treaty.

63. Permit me to take up, first, the question of the security of States.

64. Under the draft treaty, the nuclear-weapon States will be allowed to retain and continue to manufacture nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the non-nuclear-weapon States will assume the obligation not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. They are being asked to do so at least for a period of twenty-five years, a very long period indeed.

65. This is a very serious matter for the non-nuclear-weapon States, to which, we hope, due attention will be paid by the nuclear-weapon States. It is all the more serious in view of the fact that we dare not be optimistic, much less sure, that all five of the nuclear-weapon States will adhere to the proposed treaty, although we certainly pray that they will. Furthermore, there is no way of telling how many of the non-nuclear-weapon States will adhere to the treaty, particularly those with a nuclear-weapon capability.

66. Taking these factors into account, what is required in order to bring into balance the obligations and responsibilities of the non-nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear-weapon States in this field?

67. It is essential that the nuclear-weapon States should assume the obligation of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States which subscribe to the treaty. Measures are required to protect from nuclear aggression, or the threat of such aggression, those non-nuclear-weapon States which renounce the right to defend themselves by nuclear armament.

68. The Japanese Government has long thought that some form of United Nations resolution might be an answer to this question of security assurances that would satisfy non-nuclear-weapon States. The draft resolution for the Security Council proposed by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States is a step in this direction to which we attach considerable significance from the political point of view, but it cannot be considered that this measure will altogether eliminate the fears of non-nuclear-weapon States regarding their security problems.

69. I should like next to dwell upon the second question, the overriding importance of nuclear disarmament. While the non-nuclear-weapon States will renounce their present nuclear option, the nuclear-weapon States, for their part, will undertake, under article VI of the draft treaty.

"... to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".^{8/}

70. Unless the nuclear-weapon States keep their part of the bargain, the balance of obligations will be upset and the treaty will lose its moral basis. There are certain specific points in this regard which require attention. I wish to emphasize, first, how strongly the Japanese people feel, having suffered the effects of atomic explosions, with regard to the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement banning the underground testing of nuclear weapons. Next, I wish to draw

^{8/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex I.

attention to article I of the draft treaty, which provides, in its second half, that nuclear-weapon States undertake

"... not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices".

Thus, these restrictions are not at all applicable to the nuclear-weapon States in their relations among themselves. This lack of restriction should by no means be taken as an implicit authorization that the nuclear-weapon States may assist, encourage, or induce each other to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. As the representative of a non-nuclear-weapon State, I feel that we are entitled to expect the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from taking advantage of this lack of restriction. Such self-restraint by the nuclear-weapon States would only be in accordance with the spirit of the draft treaty.

71. It is clear to all of us that the non-proliferation treaty will legalize the present distinction between the five nuclear-weapon States and all other States. Even if considerable progress is made towards nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapon Powers, the distinction I mention will not be wholly dissolved so long as nuclear arms remain in the hands of nuclear-weapon States. This distinction will be dissolved only when all nuclear weapons are eliminated from the national arsenals of all States.

72. In the meantime, the present monopoly of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon countries will continue. We must regard this situation as a transitional one and, during this transitional period, all nuclear-weapon States should be urged to refrain from using, or threatening to use, their nuclear weapons in any manner inconsistent with the principles prescribed in the Charter of the United Nations. The Japanese delegation and, I am sure, a number of other delegations feel that this responsibility on the part of nuclear-weapon States should be affirmed by the General Assembly.

73. It is apparent to us, as it must be to everyone, that the tasks to be accomplished in the field of nuclear disarmament are enormously difficult and complex. But we would urge upon all the nuclear-weapon States a continuous, vigorous and determined effort to solve the problems involved and, through progressive steps, lead mankind forward towards general and complete disarmament and a more harmonious and peaceful world.

74. Now I turn to the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which is the third question requiring very careful consideration. In addition to the purpose of preventing the further spread of nuclear weaponry, it should be emphasized that the draft treaty equally involves the purposes of furthering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through international co-operation and, thereby, of contributing to the advancement of human welfare. Clearly, the purposes of the treaty in this regard will not be achieved if the provisions of the draft treaty concerning international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the sharing of potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions turn out to be

empty promises. The Japanese Government, therefore, urges all States to make every effort to the end that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy may be further developed through international co-operation.

75. In order to achieve this purpose, there should be no discrimination between the non-nuclear-weapon and the nuclear-weapon States in the application of international safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities.

76. If, as must be assumed, the genuine motive in presenting this draft treaty is really to achieve nuclear disarmament, the principle that nuclear materials for peaceful uses should not be diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should apply to all countries alike. The Japanese Government firmly believes, therefore, that the nuclear-weapon States should also accept the application of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities as a first step towards nuclear disarmament.

77. We note that the United States and the United Kingdom declared, towards the end of last year, that when such safeguards are applied under the treaty, these two nations will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in their countries, excluding only those with direct national-security significance. We would strongly urge other nuclear-weapon States to declare their intention to the same effect.

78. There is a strong concern among non-nuclear-weapon States that the application of international safeguards might hinder, in one way or another, their peaceful nuclear activities. The seriousness of this problem, in terms of the national interests of non-nuclear-weapon States, can never be understood by the nuclear-weapon States unless they themselves accept such safeguards.

79. In order to minimize adverse effects on the efficient and economical functioning of nuclear industries, safeguards should be simplified and mechanized as much as practicable. I feel I can speak on behalf of all non-nuclear-weapon States in stressing the need for making efforts towards the realization of this objective through the International Atomic Energy Agency.

80. I have one further point to make on the question of safeguards. When agreements are concluded between the non-nuclear-weapon States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, pursuant to the treaty, it is the understanding of the Japanese Government that the peaceful nuclear activities of all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the treaty, including those which are at present under a regional safeguards system, will be subject to international safeguards of identical standards.

81. An adequate supply of nuclear materials is, of course, an essential requirement for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There is really no need to say that the non-nuclear-weapon States, which undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, should not thereby be placed in a less advantageous position regarding access to such materials. The Japanese Government deems it essential, therefore, that when all

nuclear materials under the control of non-nuclear-weapon States are placed under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, the international flow of such materials should be further liberalized. Thus life would be given to the intention of the treaty to promote peaceful nuclear activities through international co-operation.

82. Freedom of research and development are also essential in order to advance the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and it is clear to us that the treaty should never be interpreted or applied in such a way as to hamper or inhibit research and development in this field. The problem of nuclear explosive devices is a particularly important one in the field of research and development.

83. We accept the thesis that at the present stage of nuclear knowledge it is virtually impossible to distinguish between nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes and nuclear weapons. However, if and when the advance of nuclear knowledge makes such a distinction possible, then it is only logical to believe that the restrictions concerning nuclear explosive devices contained in the draft treaty will no longer be applicable.

84. Meanwhile, the Japanese Government interprets nothing in the draft treaty as restricting in any way freedom of research regarding the peaceful application of nuclear explosive devices. Furthermore, we understand that nuclear explosive devices are those designed to release, in microseconds, a large amount of nuclear energy accompanied by shock waves. Accordingly, such devices as fast critical assemblies, reactor excursion experiment facilities, and thermonuclear fusion reactors, which are not designed to produce energy in an uncontrolled manner, would not come under the prohibitions of the draft treaty.

85. Having stated the views of the Japanese Government with regard to the important questions of the security of States, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in relation to the draft treaty, I should now like to state our views on the question of review conferences, another matter which we consider to be very important.

86. Since the non-proliferation treaty must not be an end in itself, but one step forward in a series of arms control and disarmament measures to be taken following its conclusion, it will be crucially important to review its operation periodically, and, we think, at fairly frequent intervals. It is for this reason that Japan has always attached great importance to the review clause on the same level as other substantive clauses of the treaty.

87. The international situation is subject to change; unforeseen developments may occur in the field of science and technology. That is why we think it most important to make full use of the review conference procedure to ensure the effective and adequate operation of the treaty. This is all the more so because the treaty is to be in force for at least twenty-five years, with the possibility of further prolongation for an indefinite period.

88. But the operation of the treaty must at all stages meet the realities of the moment. If it is found at the review conference that it is not meeting those realities

and that the provisions of the treaty as well as its purposes, including nuclear disarmament, are not being fully realized, then I am afraid States party to the treaty might be obliged to re-examine its whole value and reconsider their positions.

89. I should like to state once again that the Japanese Government considers the question of arms control and disarmament to be a key issue in the universal effort to ease international tensions and strengthen trust among States, and we desire to participate and co-operate fully, and in a constructive spirit, in all international endeavours to achieve these objectives.

90. We believe, and I think that all right-minded people would agree, that the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is an important step to be taken towards arms control and disarmament. This resumed session is the first opportunity that all Member States have had to discuss together the concrete text of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We should take advantage of this opportunity and seek to achieve a treaty which embodies an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States so that the participation of as many States as possible can be assured. As I have tried to make clear, the proposed treaty will have serious effects on the national interests and security of all States. I cannot emphasize too strongly, therefore, that the draft treaty requires full deliberation; and I venture to hope that in the course of our deliberations due consideration will be given to the views of the Japanese Government as I have expressed them today.

91. Before I conclude, permit me to quote from the statement made in the General Assembly last September by our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Miki. Mr. Miki said—and his words fully express the feelings of the Japanese Government and people:

"Should a new world war break out in the last third of this century, it would inevitably be a nuclear war spelling the destruction of all mankind. The great and solemn responsibility that we, the living, bear to future generations is to save the last third of the twentieth century from nuclear tragedy and to ensure that the doors to the twenty-first century, which holds out unlimited possibilities for the well-being of mankind, will open to an era of true world peace." [1563rd plenary meeting, para. 31.]

92. Mr. Chairman, my delegation earnestly desires to co-operate whole-heartedly with you and the entire membership of the Committee with the aim that our work at this resumed session of the General Assembly may be brought to a fruitful and harmonious conclusion.

93. Mr. VINCI (Italy): In this Assembly, where we have been discussing for over twenty years the most important issues of the world community, a great hope exists today. Indeed, this session has been reconvened in order to consider the progress made by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament towards a positive conclusion of the negotiations on non-proliferation and to contribute, through a further and decisive thrust, to the reaching of our final goal. The attainment of such an objective implies a serious commitment from all of us and it places upon our

delegations a great responsibility to our countries, to the world and to history.

94. As you, Mr. Chairman, quite rightly pointed out in your opening statement on 26 April, the draft treaty on non-proliferation

"can be considered, without any exaggeration, to be the most important document on which the United Nations has been called upon to act since the very inception of this world Organization" [1556th meeting, para. 3].

95. My country views with deep interest the solution of the problem of non-proliferation and wishes to confirm its intention of continuing to co-operate by all possible means to the achievement at the earliest possible date of this essential step on the path towards détente and peace.

96. Therefore our sincere gratitude goes to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for the thorough and hard work carried out especially during the past few months; to the representatives of the United States and of the Soviet Union for their recurrent testimonies of goodwill which have materialized in their last draft treaty; to the representatives of other Governments who made their contribution with formal proposals or with suggestions; to all the non-nuclear-weapon countries which, with a great sense of responsibility, abstained from initiatives that could impair the attainment of an agreement on non-proliferation. Finally, I think that we should, at the same time, extend our appreciation for the enlightening statements made by previous speakers on some points of common interest. In that connexion, let me recall the statements of the representatives of the three nuclear-weapon Powers in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, who have confirmed their support for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and stressed their intention to co-operate towards the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy among all nations.

97. I should like to pay a special tribute to the distinguished members of Government who have personally come here to speak to us on the subject: Mr. Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, who has given some straightforward views in commending the draft treaty; Mr. de Magalhães Pinto, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, who, while reiterating the keen interest of his Government in the cause of non-proliferation, reminded us of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which represents the first attempt at putting the nuclear genius back in the bottle; Mr. Aiken, Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ireland, to whom we are indebted for the inspiring lead taken in this field and the consequent resolution 1665 (XVI) approved by the General Assembly in 1961 on the specific subject of non-proliferation, which is universally known as the Irish resolution; Mr. Petersen, Minister for Disarmament of Denmark, who made clear the position of his Government on the treaty; and Mrs. Myrdal, member of the Swedish Government, whose invaluable contribution to our work is in the minds of all of us. We are equally grateful to all other representatives who expressed their considered views on the subject and gave fresh momentum to the debate, keeping it on the high level which the subject demands.

98. I shall now try to give the contribution of the Italian delegation to this debate and state the position of my Government on the item before us.

99. The non-proliferation treaty can be considered from two quite different angles: as a collateral disarmament measure—such a definition was given a few minutes ago by the representative of Hungary, if I understood him correctly—and as an instrument for building up the new international community of the nuclear age. Were the treaty to be considered solely from the first angle, its significance and the hopes placed in it would be accordingly diminished and debased. It follows that the treaty should be viewed, in any case, in the larger context of general disarmament to which it would constitute a major prerequisite. However, our ambitions—and in such a matter as disarmament I feel that ambition is not only allowed but compelling—suggest an even greater and higher framework for the non-proliferation treaty, more consistent with the second of the alternatives I have just mentioned: the establishment of a new international society of the nuclear age. The magnitude of the task we are setting should not discourage us—because we consider it our duty further to reduce the dangers resulting from international tension and because we are certain of working in the right direction. At the same time, however, the magnitude of the task demands that we take this first and fundamental step with an awareness of the purpose we are aiming at and of the necessity of an adequate prior assessment of its consequences and effects.

100. A new international society should be a community based upon peace, co-operation, equality and abolition of all technological, economic and social disparities.

101. The principles upon which the new international community of free and equal States should rest could, in the view of my Government, be stated as follows: first, removal of all risks of both nuclear and conventional wars; second, access for all to all land and sea resources; third, freedom of exchanges in all fields, including that of nuclear energy for the peaceful development of all countries; fourth, close international co-operation to eliminate technological, scientific, economic, social and cultural disparities, thus enabling all peoples to enjoy the benefits of technological progress and the general increase in economic and social standards.

102. The non-proliferation treaty must plant the seed and become the premise of a new international society of the sort we are advocating.

103. In that perspective the Italian Government has concentrated its attention—tenaciously, consistently and firmly—on the basic objective of attaining general acceptance of the non-proliferation treaty.

104. The Italian Government has been actively striving to contribute to that end by taking a series of initiatives. May I recall in this connexion the proposal for a moratorium and the one concerning the supply of fissionable materials. By the first initiative, ^{9/} taken on 14 September 1965, we suggested a nuclear moratorium for the non-nuclear Powers, a moratorium

^{9/} Ibid., Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. D.

which, by eliminating the immediate danger of nuclear proliferation, would have allowed, and would still allow if the need arose, negotiations far from the pressure and the concern of possible negative developments.

105. In accordance with those aims and in pursuance of the above-mentioned principles, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs put forward on 1 August 1967 in Geneva the proposal concerning the supply of fissionable materials.^{10/} The essence of that idea was that nuclear Powers, in order to strike a balance with the obligations imposed by the non-proliferation treaty on the non-nuclear-weapon States, should commit themselves to transfer to the non-nuclear Powers certain amounts of fissionable material—to be taken from military stockpiles—at a reduced price, it being understood that part of the amount paid would devolve to a United Nations fund for the progress of developing countries.

106. Finally, having in mind the prospect of possible improvements, we made three suggestions^{11/} in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 20 February 1968, which can be found annexed to the Committee's report.

107. The first suggestion is to include in the draft treaty, where it deals with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, an acknowledgement of the principle that all nations are entitled to have access to the supply markets of nuclear fuel and equipment for nuclear plants. The second is to hold review conferences automatically every five years with a view to facilitating the attainment of the purposes of the treaty. The third is to specify in a precise way the duration of the treaty.

^{10/} *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex IV, sect. 22.

^{11/} *Ibid.*, annex IV, sect. 34.

108. The proposals I have mentioned are aimed at removing reasons that would prevent some States from adhering to the treaty and consequently at strengthening the impact of the treaty by enlarging the number of adherents, as also advocated today by the representative of Japan, who has just spoken.

109. An extraordinary opportunity is given us today to lend decisive impetus to the attainment of a great design. It is important to reach a conclusion and even more important to have the widest possible support and acceptance. This result depends upon the measure to which all countries, non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon States, will be ready to accept their share of sacrifices in adopting all possible improvements, without delaying the attainment of the great goal of the signature of the treaty.

110. If each one of our Governments is prepared, in the paramount interest of peace and of future generations, to lend its co-operation we will no doubt succeed in getting closer to that measure of balances which, although not the optimum desirable, will in any event make it an adequate and effective instrument for meaningful advances in the way of *détente*, of disarmament and of harmonious progress.

111. The present Assembly is the most qualified and authoritative body to bring our labours to a successful conclusion, giving our peoples and Governments the conviction that we have done everything within our power to produce a valid international instrument

112. Allow me to express the fervent hope that the outcome of our important deliberations—through the goodwill and the contribution of all—will win the approval in this forum of all the Members of our international community, paving the way to the adherence, in the near future, also of those States which are not here represented.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.