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(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 28

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/7072 and Add.1-DC/230 and Add.1, A/7080; A/C.1/959-960; A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-2)

1. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the first speaker I should like to inform the Committee that the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic has become the twenty-sixth co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-2.

2. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): It is with a certain hesitation that I take the floor today. Through our membership of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, Sweden has had ample opportunities to state its views on the matter before this Committee. In annex III to the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>1/</sup> we have listed references to documents and verbatim records which reflect the positions the Swedish delegation has taken during the negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty in Geneva. As this important debate is now unfolding in the wider forum of the United Nations, it might nevertheless be useful to pinpoint a few of the lines of thought which seem to us to remain valid with reference to the steps which are to be taken here and now in order finally to bring these negotiations to a close.

3. Our fundamentally positive attitude to an international outlawing of the spread of nuclear weapons has been known for a long time. May I recall that in the same year as the so-called Irish resolution on non-proliferation (resolution 1665 (XVI)) was adopted by the General Assembly the then Foreign Minister of Sweden, Mr. Undén, submitted a plan aiming at voluntary regional denuclearization.

4. The Swedish Government also made a public statement on the very day the United States and the Soviet Union initially presented separate but identical

draft texts of a non-proliferation treaty, on 24 August 1967.<sup>2/</sup> In that statement, my Government greeted with the greatest satisfaction the fact that the draft texts had emerged. We duly recognized that behind the drafts there already lay, even then, a long and difficult period of preparatory work.

5. We hoped that it would be possible for the negotiators within the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to reach agreement on a final draft text for presentation to the United Nations General Assembly. We declared ourselves ever ready to co-operate constructively in order that the treaty that finally ensued would be as perfect as possible and therefore acceptable to the largest number of States, particularly those of immediate interest with regard to their potential capacity to produce nuclear weapons. We also expressed our trust that while a non-proliferation treaty would be one step forward, it would be followed without delay by other and more effective steps on the road towards actual disarming of nuclear weapons capabilities, senseless instruments of mass destruction as they are.

6. Supporting the goal of barring the spread of nuclear weapons does not, however, free us from obligations to subject the proposed text to conscientious scrutiny. This is particularly important when we are faced with a treaty intended to prescribe far-reaching obligations on nations. While the draft treaty before us today is a definite improvement if compared with the original versions presented by the United States and the Soviet Union last August, some further improvements could no doubt be made and may prove profitable from the point of view of the acceptability and the stability of the treaty.

7. Before proceeding to indicate some specific changes which, even at this late stage, seem to us to be not only widely desired but also practically possible to incorporate without in any way upsetting the treaty structure already established, let me first emphasize that the positive attitude towards an effective non-proliferation treaty, which was reflected in the statement by the Swedish Government I just quoted, is of course very much present in our minds also today. We continue to consider such a treaty to be an important achievement in itself. We also judge it to be important as a promise that the corner may now be about to be turned in disarmament negotiations, from painfully slow groping to a self-generating thrust towards ever more decisive measures.

8. Only in that sense would it seem justified to speak without exaggeration of the great historical importance of the step about to be taken by the

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1.

<sup>2/</sup> *Ibid.*, annex IV, sects. 6 and 8.

Committee and the world Organization as a whole. The barrier which the treaty will erect against the spread of nuclear weapons will not stem any dangerously on-rushing tide. No non-nuclear-weapon country is, to our knowledge, actually preparing to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. The dangerous sequence of events proceeds elsewhere. One might look back to the time when nuclear disarmament negotiations were started in earnest some ten years ago, or to the five-year period since they last registered some success, in the Moscow Treaty of 1963, and measure how steeply the rate of nuclear megamurder capabilities has increased since then. But no realistic picture of the situation would place the risk centre in the non-nuclear-weapon countries. That place belongs uncontestedly to the frightful escalation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery which is going on in the nuclear weapon countries, along with our deliberations on disarmament.

9. This is the fact which has moved so many countries, both in Geneva and here, to voice impatience and anguish: the treaty before us does not really deal with the most urgent matters, if we want to achieve nuclear disarmament. The word "urgency", so often reiterated in this context, is an ambiguous one. One sense is—and I subscribe wholeheartedly to that interpretation—that it is urgent to get the text of the non-proliferation treaty rapidly finalized. But the reason for this attitude is not that this treaty constitutes the most "urgent" measure for curbing the nuclear arms race. In the somewhat longer run there admittedly exists a danger that the desire as well as the capacity to produce nuclear weapons might spread to more countries, and it is of course *per se* worthwhile to seek to forestall this by means of an international convention. But the reason for the present "urgency" in completing the non-proliferation treaty is rather—and here I want to use the words employed by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mulley, in his speech on 1 May—that it has become necessary as "a bridge we must cross before any further progress on disarmament can be made" [1558th meeting, para. 22]. In that respect the world is truly in a hurry. In order to take advantage of that favourable climate for reaching real disarmament measures for which the conclusion of this treaty should pave the way, my delegation is most anxious that there should be no delay in our reaching a decision here. There should be no postponement of the consideration of the draft non-proliferation treaty to any later time.

10. The treaty itself, in its important article VI, contains the pledge that further negotiations on major issues will follow. The emphasis on this point, contained in the statements made on 26 April [1556th meeting] by the representatives of the main Powers, has without doubt fortified the credibility of that pledge. The representative of the United States, Ambassador Goldberg, said that his Government will "pursue further disarmament negotiations with redoubled zeal and hope and with promptness" [1556th meeting, para. 73]. And the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, gave a whole list of concrete disarmament measures on which the Soviet Union, to quote him, "... is ready, in a spirit of good faith to pursue negotiations ..." [ibid., para. 113].

11. In view of these pledges the Swedish delegation is prepared to go ahead with a "stepwise" procedure: that is, at this session of the General Assembly, completing the partial task of a treaty on non-proliferation. We would then expect that this summer's session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament would bring one or two more measures through the mill of detailed negotiations. It cannot be stressed enough how important it is for the rapid implementation also of the non-proliferation treaty that concrete steps on further disarmament measures in the nuclear field should be taken in the very near future.

12. At this hour, however, we should all do our utmost to complete the non-proliferation treaty. For this purpose I have to return—as I stated at the beginning of my intervention here and also predicted in my final one in Geneva, at the 373rd meeting of the Committee—to the improvements which Sweden wants to have incorporated in the text of the draft treaty.

13. One group of amendments, put forward by the Swedish delegation<sup>3/</sup> to the revised draft treaty texts as presented by the United States and Soviet delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 18 January 1968,<sup>4/</sup> was approved by the main Powers and included in the version of the draft treaty now before us<sup>5/</sup>—and, of course, we deeply appreciate this. Some further amendments, presented on 13 February 1968,<sup>6/</sup> dealing with the matter of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, have, however, so far, not been given their place in the draft treaty. Perhaps I should add, for the sake of clarity, that my Government agrees that all nuclear explosive devices must be included under prohibitions against manufacturing nuclear weapons. Technologically, they are identical. But we have sought to suggest a creative compromise for dealing with peaceful explosions so as to satisfy both disarmament and development interests.

14. In article V of the draft—which centres on the subject of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes—we have suggested (a) that the words "non-nuclear-weapon" in the first sentence and at the beginning of the second sentence should be deleted, thus making it possible for all States, incidentally also nuclear-weapon States, to benefit from explosion services. Further, we have suggested (b) that the words "so desiring" and "or agreements" in the second sentence should be deleted, as well as the words "on a bilateral basis or"—this for the purpose of not explicitly sanctioning in a non-proliferation treaty that such important decisions are, for all time, to be taken unilaterally or in a bilateral context by States which possess nuclear weapons.

15. In repeating these proposals here, I want to express the hope that the originators of the draft treaty—the United States and the Soviet Union—will see their way to accept these changes, which are truly minor in relation to the major issues in the draft treaty.

<sup>3/</sup> Ibid., annex IV, sect. 31.

<sup>4/</sup> Ibid., annex IV, sects. 7 and 9.

<sup>5/</sup> Ibid., annex I.

<sup>6/</sup> Ibid., annex IV, sect. 32.

16. Our insistence that those or equivalent changes would amount to rather crucial improvements rests on two main reasons—one concerned with streamlining the legal provisions, the other concerned with substance.
17. First, it is imperative to remove from the text of this treaty any wording which would otherwise create difficulties when negotiating further treaties. Those which we suggest for deletion would have to be removed in any event when the comprehensive test-ban treaty comes to be negotiated in practical detail—which, in our view, should be during this summer. All nuclear explosions would, of course, be forbidden. The conduct of any explosions desirable for peaceful purposes would have to be dealt with as exceptions, which could be granted only by an international body.
18. The same difficulty with the present text will, as a matter of fact, become apparent the very moment we start negotiations on the special agreement concerning those international procedures which are foreseen to ensure the application of the undertakings assured by article V, and, as a matter of fact, explicitly mentioned there. The vast majority of delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have recognized the need for such a separate international agreement. The delegation of Canada, at the 329th meeting of the Disarmament Committee even outlined in considerable detail the possible contents of such an agreement.
19. Our second consideration when proposing these minor textual changes in the draft treaty is that a reassurance should be given to all nations, and particularly to the nations in dire need of more speedy economic development, that the opportunities of all nations to avail themselves of the possible benefits of such a new technology as the application of nuclear explosions to major civil engineering projects would in fact be equal. Only a truly international régime, allowing for international decision-making in regard to permission to undertake explosions and for executive supervision of them in whatever country they occur, would give such an assured equality. It is not possible to admit as a permanent feature of the world's future that some countries, because they are militarily advanced, would also have direct access to important economic and technical benefits of new technologies that others would be able to obtain only in an indirect way.
20. The international agency indicated for the purpose of administering nuclear explosions for peaceful use would have three main functions: (1) to decide if a certain project is sound, technically and economically, and therefore eligible for an exception from the total test ban; (2) to observe and control the execution of the project in order to make sure that it would not be contrary to existing international treaties; (3) to help finance—if the project were to take place in an underdeveloped country—the vast and probably very expensive civil engineering work, prospecting and execution, necessary for the successful application of the nuclear device which is the only part promised to be made available at low charge.
21. It seems unlikely that any one existing international agency would be capable of undertaking all three of these main functions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would probably be the

most suitable organ for the first two tasks mentioned, while agencies like the United Nations Development Programme and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development might assume a new great responsibility for the aid aspect.

22. We do need today a bolder conception of such revolutionary technological possibilities than has been envisaged hitherto. Whenever at all possible, major technological advances should, in the view of my country, lead to internationalized exploitation of new resources. The plans for nuclear Powers' management of nuclear explosions as outlined in the present treaty text can only too easily be interpreted as a freezing of existing monopolistic positions.

23. Let us remember for a moment the spectacular scheme for an internationalization of the whole field of nuclear energy which was outlined in the early days of the United Nations by the United States and which became known, under the name of its spokesman, as the Baruch Plan.<sup>7/</sup> This plan came to nothing. Now there is a new possibility of taking up the noble idea in at least one segment of nuclear-energy exploitation with great promises for the future.

24. I have wanted to indicate, at the cost of some length, the challenging prospect of international action which we want to facilitate with our proposed changes in the text of article V of the non-proliferation treaty. An endorsement of those changes by the nuclear-weapon countries would serve as an important proof of their good intentions, while—it would seem to us—implying only minor concessions on their part.

25. Before concluding, I wish to refer briefly to one more aspect of the present draft treaty to which my delegation has always paid considerable attention. I am referring to the issue of controls, covered by article III of the draft-treaty text. It was, as representatives may remember, only after trials and delays that the United States and the Soviet Union were able to agree on a controls formula. The main cause was the difficulty of harmonizing the safeguard systems of the universal IAEA and the regional Euratom, a matter which I am not going to deal with today, trusting that it will be worked out to the satisfaction of all concerned.

26. Although the Swedish delegation is disappointed that the present wording of article III does not extend controls to all transfers of source or special fissile material, including exports to nuclear-weapon countries, as we suggested in an amendment last autumn,<sup>8/</sup> there are, we must acknowledge, some fairly encouraging signs that the element of discrimination may be decreasing.

27. Partial satisfaction has thus been obtained in respect of peaceful nuclear programmes of some nuclear-weapon States. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have declared that they will open up all their nuclear installations without military functions, for inspection by the IAEA. We greet this attitude with satisfaction and earnestly

<sup>7/</sup> See Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, No. 1 first meeting.

<sup>8/</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex IV, sect. 11.

hope that the example thus set will soon be followed by other nuclear-weapon States.

28. Partial satisfaction may also be derived from the fact that several States, including Sweden, when it comes to exports of fissionable material, equipment, etc., envisage, as a matter of policy, making it a condition that the material exported should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and subjected to IAEA control. It is imperative for the success of the whole idea of non-proliferation that such voluntarily accepted supply policies be maintained, widened and strengthened.

29. The most immediate task for reducing discrimination in the atomic energy field is to ensure that all of what we must call the "key countries" sign and ratify the non-proliferation treaty. Some of these are highly industrialized countries which, under factual criteria, must be said to be close to being "potential" nuclear-weapon States. Another group, partly identical with them, comprises countries which are important as exporters of source or special fissionable material. It is not difficult to draw up a list showing which these "key countries" are in relation to a non-proliferation treaty. I will, however, refrain from doing so and state only that the world will be following with solicitude the actions of these States in relation to the present treaty.

30. The most important aspect of the control provisions, as outlined in the non-proliferation treaty, remains to be mentioned. It is one free from any overtones of apprehension or dissatisfaction. On the contrary, we have obtained one real mortgage on a promising future. It lies in the fact that we have in the arrangements selected for controlling a non-proliferation policy a ready-made pattern for controlling also a complete cessation of all production of nuclear weapons. The IAEA system of safeguards will serve as well for the comprehensive task as for the partial one, for checking to see that nuclear-energy programmes in all countries are not diverted to weapon production. Thus, work on a future treaty on a complete cut-off of production of fissile material for weapon purposes can proceed on a firm basis and without any delay on technical grounds.

31. Several further disarmament measures are likewise maturing in so far as their technical practicality and their legal shape are concerned. I have already mentioned the comprehensive test ban in addition to the comprehensive cut-off. Progress need not be slow if only political tension and mistrust can be dissipated. Cessation of the nuclear arms race should not be an impossible goal, and not even a distant one, if the world will only allow itself to act rationally. This is the spirit in which countries should be able to trust that the non-proliferation treaty is a safe bridge to cross.

32. Mr. HAYMERLE (Austria): To safeguard its national security is the focal point of each country's national policy. This is true for all States, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. It is particularly true for a country like Austria, located in the centre of Europe, at the crossroads between East and West, and committed by its own free will to a policy of permanent neutrality. The strength of its security

being directly related to the degree of international political stability, Austria has a special interest in the creation of a climate of détente and international co-operation, free from the danger of armed conflicts and confrontations.

33. Measures conducive to disarmament or the limitation of armaments are thus of fundamental importance to my country. The Austrian delegation has therefore in the past participated actively in all efforts undertaken by the United Nations to achieve this goal. Among the great number of proposals on which we were called upon to act, we consider the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons before us as the most urgent and far-reaching.

34. We share the opinion already expressed by previous speakers that, in our deliberations on this matter, we have reached a crucial point. The decisions which we will have to take here and now will perhaps be decisive for a new pattern of international relations upon which the security of all our nations will depend.

35. Austria has supported, fully and unreservedly, all initiatives in the General Assembly aiming at the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, ever since the Foreign Minister of Ireland, Mr. Aiken, to whom we wish to pay a special tribute on this occasion, took the first initiative in this respect.

36. In 1961, Austria, together with the delegations of Sweden and other countries, presented to the General Assembly a draft resolution, later adopted by the Assembly as resolution 1664 (XVI), suggesting that an inquiry be made into the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive in the future nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of any other country.

37. In the First Committee, the Austrian representative at that time emphasized that an agreement not to produce, import or store nuclear weapons should be considered as one of the urgent and preliminary separate measures which could be taken pending a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

38. In the following years, all resolutions guided by the same principles have received the full backing of the Austrian Government. We now welcome the progress achieved in recent months at the disarmament negotiations in Geneva which made it possible for us to receive, in the latest report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the text of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

39. We realize that this document is the result of years of long, difficult and exhausting negotiations, and we should like to express our sincere appreciation to those delegations which participated in the Geneva negotiations for their untiring and determined efforts during those years.

40. Austria is not a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We have nevertheless followed the proceedings in Geneva with the closest attention. We welcome this opportunity to express



briefly our position on the draft treaty and its implications. In the assessment of the text, the Austrian Government has been guided by two main considerations. In the first place, would a non-proliferation treaty effectively enhance the national security of our country? Secondly, does the text before us sufficiently correspond to the principles which the Austrian Government has consistently considered of paramount importance in this matter, and which were essentially those embodied in resolution 2028 (XX)?

41. The answer to the first question I have anticipated, in part, by explaining the position which Austria has taken in past years. We are indeed aware of the dangers inherent in the nuclear armaments race. In this respect, our views were once again reaffirmed by the report which the Secretary-General submitted last year on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons. We consider it indispensable to halt this race and to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both horizontally and vertically.

42. A treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would, of course, in the first place provide for an end to a further increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons. However, we feel that such an agreement would also be a precondition for any effective step in the direction of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear Powers. In our opinion, it would be unrealistic to expect substantial progress relating to disarmament in general before a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been concluded.

43. In view of those considerations we are convinced that such a treaty would strengthen the national security of our country. For this reason we strongly support its earliest possible conclusion. It is in the light of that assessment that the Austrian Government has approached the second question, namely, to what extent the draft treaty submitted to the Assembly corresponds to the guidelines set forth in resolution 2028 (XX) and thus to our expectations.

44. An analysis of the text before this Committee leads us to believe, that, to a large extent, that is the case. That is particularly true of article I and article II which, as far as can be foreseen today, would effectively prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, directly and indirectly. We also note that since last year's session of the General Assembly it has been possible to reach an agreement on article III. We have always considered provisions on verification and control an indispensable prerequisite for the functioning of any disarmament agreement. With special regard to the question of nuclear weapons we have attached particular importance to the establishment and wide acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Austria was among the first to accept them and we note with satisfaction that this safeguards system has over the past years proved its effectiveness. We therefore welcome the fact that the draft treaty would entrust this responsibility to the International Atomic Energy Agency. We have full confidence that the Agency would discharge such a mandate objectively and efficiently.

45. The Austrian Government hopes that the further evolution of the disarmament process will make it possible that a system of verification and control will one day be universally accepted. We welcome in this connexion that some of the nuclear Powers have already expressed their willingness to submit their non-military nuclear activities to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

46. The Austrian Government has always attached particular importance to the principle that the proposed treaty should be envisaged as a first and concrete step towards disarmament, and in particular towards nuclear disarmament. We believe that the new article VI goes a long way to meet this objective. In our view the article now contains a clear commitment by all parties to the treaty, including the nuclear Powers. This interpretation was reaffirmed by the representatives of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Goldberg and Minister Kuznetsov, in their opening statements before this Committee [1556th meeting].

47. The principle that the treaty should in no way affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories has been expressly affirmed in article VII of the proposed treaty. In this connexion we wish to pay a tribute, as we already did at last year's General Assembly, to the countries of Latin America for having set an example in establishing in their continent the first nuclear-free zone comprising a large inhabited part of the world.

48. While in the opinion of the Austrian Government the present draft thus reflects to a large extent the principles listed in resolution 2028 (XX), we have nevertheless taken note also of the objections raised in this connexion. We have not been unimpressed by the arguments advanced, in particular that the draft treaty in its present form would not establish an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations, that it would fail to provide for any concrete measure of nuclear disarmament, that it would prevent the non-nuclear Powers from making unrestricted use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and, finally, that the measures envisaged as security assurances in connexion with the treaty would not suffice to allay all preoccupations. These critical observations are perhaps not entirely without foundation.

49. We also would have preferred to see a more appropriate balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations embodied in a non-proliferation treaty. In particular, the Austrian Government would have hoped that the treaty itself would contain concrete and explicit provision for halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, not only horizontally but also vertically.

50. We do not deny the fact that the draft treaty before us is not perfect. But can we realistically expect that at this session the text before us could be substantially improved—a text which is a precarious result of long and exhaustive negotiations? And if we postpone a decision now will we not face the danger of losing the momentum so essential in major political decisions?

51. Confronted with that dilemma, we will have to weigh carefully the arguments in favour of and those against endorsing the document which is contained in the report submitted to us by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

52. The Austrian Government, for its part, has come to the conclusion that we should not delay action any longer. We believe that the positive aspects of the draft treaty far outweigh its imperfections. We see hardly any prospect that further negotiations could achieve, in the foreseeable future, a substantially better balance of mutual obligations in the text of the agreement itself. Yet, we do not believe that this imbalance will necessarily be perpetuated if we conclude the treaty in its present form. On the contrary, we are convinced that further measures outside and complementary to the treaty will, in due course, establish in practice that acceptable balance which, at this time, we were not able to write into its text.

53. This, we believe, is not wishful thinking. The great interest of both nuclear and non-nuclear countries to make sure that this document will not remain a dead letter, and that it will be signed and ratified by the greatest possible number of non-nuclear States, will, in our view, be the best incentive for the nuclear Powers to live up to their obligations under the treaty. Articles IV, V and VI provide in principle for all the measures necessary in this respect. We trust that in accordance with article VI effective steps relating to nuclear disarmament will be taken without delay. We believe that the treaty will indeed facilitate such steps. There is no reason why the co-operation envisaged in article IV should not start right away. We also believe that an appropriate international body—for instance, within the framework of the IAEA—could be set up immediately to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to all non-nuclear-weapon States on a non-discriminatory basis.

54. The very important and complex problem of security assurances for the non-nuclear Powers, which under the treaty would renounce their rights to nuclear weapons, will be the subject of further discussions in the Security Council. We trust that the nuclear Powers will make special efforts to dissipate the preoccupations which many non-nuclear Powers have expressed in this connexion.

55. On all these questions it will be a challenging task for the conference of non-nuclear States, later this year in Geneva, to make constructive proposals.

56. In drawing the balance, the Austrian Government feels that the draft agreement before us would, despite all its shortcomings, open the road to further measures of disarmament and thus effectively enhance the security of all our nations, nuclear and non-nuclear. It would furthermore be instrumental in giving new strength to the process of *détente* in international relations—a process of which the very fact of an agreement between three of the nuclear Powers on so sensitive a matter is, in our view, both a symptom and an auspicious omen.

57. It is for all these reasons that the Austrian Government is ready to accept the treaty in its

present form and that it has decided to co-sponsor the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.421.

58. Mr. SATTAR (Maldives Islands): This is my first occasion to speak at the United Nations. It is therefore a privilege for me to do so under your guidance, Mr. Chairman, particularly at a time when this Committee is considering a most important subject, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

59. Before proceeding to comment on the non-proliferation treaty, I should like to associate my delegation with the introductory remarks of the representative of Ethiopia [1561st meeting] and state that my country, too, does not possess any special qualifications to speak on the topic under discussion. My brief intervention will therefore be limited to the basic principle underlying the preamble and Article I of the Charter of the United Nations, which has a direct bearing on the vital points in the treaty and in our debate here.

60. The draft treaty before us<sup>2/</sup> is the product of many months of arduous discussions and negotiations among the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I pause here to pay our tribute to the Foreign Minister of Ireland, whose initiative ten years ago resulted in this draft.

61. This draft, proposed by the delegations of the United States and the USSR to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, is no doubt a historic step forward on the long road towards disarmament. The Maldivian delegation supports the principle of the treaty whole-heartedly. In this regard, my delegation welcomes the intention the draft treaty sets out to achieve by the halting of the nuclear arms race through—and I quote from the preamble to the draft treaty—"the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons". Non-proliferation of such weapons is, no doubt, an important first step in that direction. Although it does not eliminate the dangers of a nuclear war my country considers it an effort—and I quote again from the preamble—"to avert the danger of such a war" and also as a measure "to safeguard the security of peoples".

62. Indeed, in the opinion of my Government, the most important and urgent need of today is to ensure the security of the peoples of the world, particularly that of the non-nuclear countries, from the dangers of the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons. In discussing this point, the question has been asked whether this treaty will increase the security of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation, while concurring with the affirmative answer to this question, is, however, concerned to note that the danger arising from the very existence of the present stockpiles is not sufficiently covered by the present draft treaty. Nevertheless, the undertaking to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures ... and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament" in article VI of the draft treaty is a definite encouragement to non-nuclear and small

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., annex I.

countries. It is with this "good faith" that my delegation supports the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons before us and the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add. 1-2 which endorses the treaty and, in paragraph 4, requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament "urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures" leading to the ultimate goal of "a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

63. My delegation is of the view that, if the endorsement of the non-proliferation treaty is urgent, the measures that are to follow its endorsement are equally urgent; if the confidence of the Member States of the United Nations and parties to the treaty is considered important now, the continued confidence and support of the treaty by all signatories—in particular its article VI—is more important; and if there exists today a need to give security assurances against the possible use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons, the need to create an atmosphere free of such danger or threats and to make the world a safer place for all mankind is much, much greater.

64. The advancement of science, coupled with many other factors and forces, was responsible for nuclear energy, which, together with its manifold benefits,

has also brought this generation face-to-face with destruction itself. The same principles of science working with the same factors and forces could also ensure that nuclear energy is used solely for peaceful purposes. Surely, "if there is a will, there is a way"; but the will must be firm, and the efforts to find a way sincere. We are now about to take the first step, for there is no doubt that the second or third steps can be taken only after the first. My delegation therefore sincerely hopes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will be able to report substantial progress in its work to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, as the draft resolution requests in operative paragraph 5.

65. On the other hand, if quick progress is not made on further steps towards disarmament, as has quite rightly been stated by the Rt. Hon. Frederick Mulley, "the non-proliferation treaty itself will not succeed in its objective and will collapse" [1558th meeting, para.9]. This is a situation which could only be saved by whole-hearted support of the draft before us and faithful adherence to the treaty.

66. In this statement I have dealt with only one aspect of the treaty, which, I repeat, as my Government views it, leads to the most urgent need of the day.

*The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.*