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Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 28

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (continued):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament (A/7072 and Add.1-
DC/230 and Add.1; A/7080; A/C.1/959; A/C.1/
L.421/Rev.1)

1. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the first speaker, I should like to inform the members of the Committee that the United Arab Republic has become a sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1. This brings the number of sponsors to twenty-three.

2. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland): On behalf of the Irish delegation—which is not an automatic admirer of great Powers—I wish to express our heartfelt gratitude to the Soviet Union and the United States for having overcome their differences and produced this draft treaty^{1/} to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. We are also grateful to them and to Great Britain for giving assurances to defend against attack or threat of attack by a nuclear Power the non-nuclear-weapon States which ratify this treaty.^{2/}

3. I feel sure the draft treaty would have been less acceptable if it had not been for the work of the fourteen non-nuclear members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament who wrestled with the problem in Geneva for over six years. My delegation offers to them our best thanks for their patience and endurance in representing the points of view of the near-nuclear and other members of the United Nations.

4. The wisdom displayed by the two super-Powers in drafting the terms of the treaty and of the assurances constitutes a turning point in history. The date of 11 March 1968 deserves to be remembered as the date on which the rival super-Powers first formally committed themselves to co-operate in a joint effort to repress nuclear aggression against a non-nuclear

State party to the treaty, and moreover announced their readiness to foster the peaceful instincts of all States party to the treaty by making available all their latest scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

5. The clauses in the draft treaty relating to the dissemination of information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should give a powerful impetus to progress in dealing with the fundamental problem of this marvellous but very dangerous nuclear age. That problem, as I identified it in our intervention in the General Assembly in 1958, is "how to hold our destructive powers in check, how to avoid destruction and anarchy while we evolve and perfect the arts of living in peace, of using our skill and resources co-operatively for our common welfare" [751st meeting, para. 74]. The treaty as drafted deserves success in corralling nuclear weapons and the promise of American-British-Russian nuclear aid for peaceful purposes may well be a first step in doing for the world what Marshall aid did for Europe.

6. All in all, this draft treaty is, I believe, as satisfactory an instrument as it was possible to negotiate in the harsh political climate of the last ten years. I sincerely trust it will be endorsed and ratified with all possible speed by the overwhelming majority of States. By getting the strong support to which it is entitled the treaty will, with God's help, act as a powerful barrier to the production of nuclear weapons by additional Governments which, for various reasons, feel they must keep ahead of their neighbours in weaponry no matter at what cost to the living standards of their peoples or to the evolution of collective security.

7. As I see it, the draft treaty and the assurances demonstrate acceptance of principles which are essential for world peace and development. Not surprisingly, however, the wording of some of the clauses is not fully satisfactory to all Member States; and it would be natural if some delegations were tempted to make support conditional on the inclusion of amendments. But I would strongly urge that, in a vital matter such as this, which affects fundamentally the peace and safety of mankind, all of us should eschew any such temptation. We should not forget that it was only after ten long years of laborious discussions that this agreed treaty was produced by the nuclear Powers at Geneva. Let us therefore heed the advice given us in this debate by Mr. Sharp, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Canada, and "put progress ahead of perfection" [1557th meeting, para. 15], as the combination of circumstances which enabled the nuclear-weapon Powers to reach agreement last March may not persist if the treaty is not speedily ratified by all, or nearly all, States. And mankind may never again get as good

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex I.

^{2/} Ibid., annex II.

an opportunity to restrict the nuclear arms race. Moreover, the ratification of the treaty as it stands, without any alteration or amendment, will help greatly to create a favourable climate for the negotiation of many other desirable—and to my mind necessary—agreements which can of course be negotiated later and incorporated in separate instruments or in protocols to the present treaty. Indeed the forthcoming Geneva Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States will provide a suitable forum for the consideration of matters which might form the subject of such additional agreements.

8. In the dangerous world in which we live, we have rarely any option but to choose between risks. Some of us may fear that, under the treaty as it stands, the economic advantages of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes may be unfairly distributed. This fear is, I hope and believe, unfounded. But, at any rate, it is wiser to take the risk of ratifying the treaty now and amending it later, than to take the risk of having an ever increasing volume of the world's resources and skills diverted from social and economic development to the production of nuclear arms and their ancillary equipment.

9. In short, this draft treaty is, I am convinced, a practical and vital step away from war and towards that peaceful co-operative world which all reasonable men desire. For all States large and small it is, I believe, an infinitely more effective shield against a nuclear holocaust than the most costly armoury of offensive and defensive equipment.

10. There is no need, in this third decade of the nuclear age, to argue the case for a vigorous collective effort to prevent these terrible weapons becoming the conventional equipment of national armies, and ultimately, I believe, of revolutionary groups. Ten years ago in this Committee, the then Permanent Representative of Burma, U Thant, put it in a nutshell when he said:

"There is no end to this process [of dissemination] until almost every sovereign State is in a position to inflict incalculable destruction. If all sovereign States were governed by rulers possessed of even the rudiments of sanity, they would be restrained from committing such colossal crimes by the fear that their citizens also would perish. But experience has shown that from time to time power in this or that country falls into the hands of rulers who are not sane."^{3/}

11. It would be a grave oversight, I submit, if this Committee were to ignore the fact, well known to all of us, that some near-nuclear-weapon States are busily developing nuclear weapons technology and assembling fissionable material. In some cases, as we know, there is growing pressure on the Governments of these States to embark on the production of nuclear weapons. The pressure arises, I believe, from one or more of three main reasons: fear of defeat in a military conflict; desire for prestige; understandable, and indeed laudable, ambition that their scientists should be entirely familiar with the

nature and behaviour of the atom and its use in research and industry.

12. It seems to me that, among many of the non-nuclear States, there is a growing realization that, today, to embark on the production of nuclear weapons would, instead of adding to their security, in fact intensify the risk of, and might indeed precipitate the very attack they fear. Most of them realize also, I believe, that, today, all but a few nuclear States can best seek national safety by helping to organize and support a reliable United Nations system of collective security.

13. The case for such a system was cogently argued by the Permanent Representative of Finland, Ambassador Jakobson, in his brilliant and constructive speech in this Committee on 2 May [1559th meeting]. It will be remembered that he stressed the point that the ratification of the non-proliferation treaty and the assurances given by three of the nuclear Powers carry the promise that the collective security system of the Charter can be revitalized. Let us hope that the remaining two nuclear Powers will soon see their way to subscribe to the treaty and the assurances. By doing so they would make a vital contribution to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and to promoting world peace and economic development, thereby earning the profound gratitude of this very disturbed world.

14. But the sure key to the avoidance of "uncontrollable anarchy"—as the late Dr. Sydney Smith, Foreign Minister of Canada, put it in 1958—is a firm determination to co-operate in developing our rich God-given resources of intellect and material for our common welfare.

15. The three nuclear Powers that have co-sponsored the draft resolution before us have wisely and generously offered freely to share with the non-nuclear States that ratify the treaty all the wealth of scientific nuclear skills which they have accumulated at astronomical cost. It would be the greatest tragedy in history if the non-nuclear States did not now meet them half way and seek true prestige, the respect of mankind, by our contributions to the art of living in peace.

16. There is no State, however small, or however lacking in economic development, which has not a significant contribution to make in reducing international tension. We can all, in the words of Ambassador Amadeo of Argentina, in 1958, help to localize the fire until we can put it out. It was indeed, as we all recall, the African States which first sought and secured in 1961 formal action by the General Assembly to respect the denuclearization of Africa. And it was the Latin American States which first concluded a solemn comprehensive treaty to keep nuclear weapons out of their area. It was therefore Africa and Latin America which translated a somewhat utopian idea into practical politics, thereby blazing the trail for this treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and for the assurances we have been given by Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States.

17. It was fitting that the good example should have been given by the enlightened statesmen of Africa and Latin America. For it is in these regions that the economic shoe pinches most severely.

^{3/} This statement was made at the 960th meeting of the First Committee, the official record of which was published in summary form.

18. The excellent report submitted by the Secretary-General last October [A/6858 and Corr.1] is a solemn warning not only of the danger but of the enormous cost of "going nuclear". And one cannot estimate the true cost of the arms race on earth and in outer space by calculating it simply in terms of roubles or dollars spent by the nuclear Powers on research and military equipment. For we must take into account also that every cent so spent creates further tension and fear, depresses the spirit of national and international generosity, turns the minds of men inwards on their day-to-day grievances, and generates social disruption. And in the end the arms race is paid for in full with compound interest by the under-privileged at home and abroad.

19. Let me conclude by appealing to the non-nuclear States, big, medium and small, to approve and ratify this treaty without delay, and thus prove worthy of the opportunity of rearing their families in peace and contentment. Let us lock the door on "uncontrollable anarchy" and open the way to a better world.

20. Lij Endalkachew MAKONNEN (Ethiopia): It is with a sense of responsibility and concern that I venture today to seize this opportunity in our debate to express the views of my Government with regard to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Let me hasten to add, from the very outset, that Ethiopia possesses no special credentials to speak on this vital matter. My country is certainly not on the threshold of becoming a nuclear Power. Nor is it in a position in the foreseeable future to benefit directly and alone from the application of nuclear energy for peaceful uses.

21. If we are anxious to register our voice today in these discussions on the draft treaty, it is because, together with the rest of mankind, we feel acutely, and with particular anguish, the incalculable danger to which mankind is exposed as a result of the development, proliferation, continuous sophistication and accelerated stockpiling of nuclear weapons. For my country, this concern has also an added poignancy. As a victim of the unrestricted use of gas warfare on the eve of the Second World War, we know only too well the horrors of modern means of warfare, and we have since emerged from that experience stronger in our conviction that the use of all weapons of mass and indiscriminate destruction should be forever outlawed.

22. It is therefore understandable that we should have actively endeavoured to make a modest contribution to all United Nations efforts towards disarmament. As far back as the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, we suggested in this Committee that the Assembly declare the use of nuclear weapons to be against the laws of humanity. At the fifteenth session, we submitted formal proposals to that end, and our efforts were well rewarded when the General Assembly adopted at its sixteenth session the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons [resolution 1653 (XVI)].

23. Ever since the adoption of that historic Declaration, we have spared no effort in our endeavour to

raise the legal and moral norms established by the Declaration to the level of legally binding norms by making successive proposals for the convening of an international conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and their nonnuclear weapons.

24. Our efforts in Geneva also speak for themselves. While supporting the necessity for the urgent conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and working to that end with all deliberate speed, Ethiopian representatives in the Geneva discussions have been forthcoming with constructive proposals on ways and means of making a non-proliferation treaty more effective and more responsive to the needs of the international community both politically and from the point of view of technological and economic development.

25. Within the framework of the Organization of African Unity, we have likewise endeavoured to make tangible contribution to the cause of disarmament by taking an active part in the efforts at present under way to elaborate a convention for the denuclearization of Africa.

26. Such in fact has been the concern aroused by the spectre of nuclear destruction that it is stating the obvious to say that the nations of the world, whatever their other differences, are unanimous in their desire to quarantine and eventually eliminate existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. On this the evidence is overwhelming. Statements of leaders have converged on the necessity to rid the world once and for all of the horrors of the most destructive weapons ever made by man.

27. Among the many statements and declarations, mention must be made in this respect of the declarations of African Heads of State of 21 July 1964 and of the Governments of the non-aligned nations of 10 October 1964, both of which categorically affirmed the imperative need to control the spread of nuclear weapons with the eventual aim of eliminating them altogether.

28. Moreover, on every opportune occasion, the Secretary-General has eloquently and persuasively articulated the great concern and preoccupation of mankind with the possibility of a nuclear war. Nowhere has this concern been lately more forcefully expressed than in his report on the "Effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons" [A/6858 and Corr.1]. By depicting the magnitude of the destruction that could befall mankind in the event of atomic war, as well as the enormous resources required to develop a nuclear armoury, the Secretary-General has rendered an invaluable service to the international community. On both scores his prognosis is too staggering for the human mind to comprehend.

29. It is against the background of such universal concern that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has laboured for the last few years and that we have now started our work in this Committee. With respect to the draft non-proliferation treaty

which we are now considering,^{4/} we have the desire of each and every nation, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, to check the spread of nuclear weapons. This desire affords us a point of common departure which is a great asset that we should exploit to the maximum.

30. However, through years of uncontrolled production and uncontrolled proliferation, nuclear weapons have gained sufficient time to spread their tentacles into the major political actualities of our troubled world so that good intentions and declarations of accord are not sufficient by themselves to stop the proliferation and to bring about the eventual elimination of the nuclear weapon from the world. Nor could it be said that any type of treaty language would in itself suffice to guarantee a complete prohibition of proliferation and multiplication of nuclear weapons in a world in which diverse political, ideological and economic standards orchestrate apparent discord of interests.

31. These and similar formidable political realities have made negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty a long and arduous task. Those of us who participated in the negotiations in Geneva can testify to the amount of labour and delicate balance of political compromises that finally made possible the emergence of the present draft text. My delegation has had other occasions to commend the efforts of the parties primarily concerned and we wish to reiterate our congratulations to the two Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in this regard. As I repeat these same words of commendation and congratulations, may I also reaffirm my delegation's unwavering determination to continue to co-operate in good faith in order to expedite the finalization of the draft in such a manner as will make it generally acceptable to the membership of our Organization.

32. With these few remarks, I now come to the consideration of the most important issues involved in the draft non-proliferation treaty before us. It seems to us very important that these issues be discussed and clarified so that we may proceed with our work with full understanding of the issues and responsibilities involved.

33. The first question that naturally comes to mind is to determine what is and what is not non-proliferation within the context of the present draft treaty.

34. Ideally, as some delegations have persistently and consistently maintained, both here at the General Assembly and at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, a non-proliferation treaty should have been one which aimed at stopping all forms of proliferation, be it horizontal in the sense of multiplication of nuclear Powers or vertical in the sense of continued production and accumulation of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the present nuclear-weapon Powers themselves. This is an ideal, no doubt, we all hope to achieve. For the moment, however, it is clear that the prevailing absence of political will and courage on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers, coupled with the difficulties and complications that would ensue from any attempt to lump together other measures of nuclear disarmament, prevent us from

taking the bold and comprehensive approach to non-proliferation and compel us to consider the present approach as a partial and practical course, short of the ideal goal.

35. The present draft represents an arrangement whereby non-nuclear-weapon nations continue to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever. As such it could, in a sense, be qualified as a treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear States and not of nuclear weapons, since, at least for the time being, it implies the preservation of the status quo in the field of nuclear armory. In saying this I am only stating the obvious and do not intend to minimize the importance of the present draft treaty, whose significance is unquestionable even when it is regarded as a partial and practical arrangement intended to remove certain political roadblocks to realistic and meaningful step-by-step progress towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, of nuclear disarmament.

36. With that understanding of non-proliferation in mind, let me now proceed to deal briefly with some of the main provisions of the draft treaty. It seems to me the best way to go about the investigation of this important document is to examine it in relation to, or rather in approximation with, the principles set out in resolution 2028 (XX) of the General Assembly.

37. Those principles have, in the main, guided the position of my delegation in the discussions of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and, indeed, they have already formed the basis for the joint memorandum of 1 August 1966 of the non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament^{5/}—a memorandum to which my country has fully subscribed.

38. I shall now proceed to the consideration of these principles, relating them as far as possible to the relevant provisions of the draft treaty.

39. The first principle—that the treaty should be devoid of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form—raised such far-reaching problems of political consequence, particularly in the present military alliance structures, that negotiations upon it were long, difficult and frustrating, oftentimes casting a shadow of despair on the prospect of ever arriving at any agreed text on articles I and II. In the end, the presentation of identical but separate draft treaty texts on 24 August 1967 by the United States and the Soviet Union^{6/} marked an achievement of great political significance to the whole process of negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty. The articles leave no leeway, either directly or indirectly, through military alliance or otherwise, for the dissemination of nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon technology in any form whatsoever. It goes without saying that we interpret this to exclude any possibility of transfer of nuclear-weapon technology by a non-nuclear-weapon country signatory to the

^{4/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex I.

^{5/} Ibid., Supplement for 1966 (document DC/228), annex I, section P.

^{6/} Ibid., Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex IV, sections 6 and 8.

treaty to any other non-nuclear-weapon countries or territories.

40. The requirement of this first principle, which aims at making the treaty devoid of any loop-holes, has also raised the issue of peaceful nuclear explosive devices, the production and development of which, as everyone is aware, are equally prohibited by the first two articles of the treaty. Although it may appear ironical and be a matter of great regret and concern to non-nuclear-weapon countries, particularly to those of us in developing nations whose priorities of economic development necessitate the application of all forms of technology, including nuclear explosive devices, it must be admitted that it is the hard core of present scientific reality that the technology of this peaceful device is inseparably identified with that of the weapon itself. It becomes, therefore, a matter of hard choice between this present reality and the principle which we ourselves have set down in order to work out a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

41. The time may well come when peaceful explosive devices can be clearly identified. It should then be possible to review the situation so that maximum benefit is derived from the technological breakthrough that this would represent. But, until such time as science and technology may succeed in differentiating the peaceful from the destructive, we shall have to content ourselves with the provision of the draft treaty which stipulates that the benefits of peaceful explosive devices and their technological by-products shall be made available by the present nuclear-weapon Powers only in accordance with the provisions of the present treaty. These provisions are found in the seventh preambular paragraph and in article V, both of which have been repeatedly elaborated upon by the nuclear Powers in an attempt to dispel apprehensions with regard to this important question.

42. In this respect, we attach great importance to the repeated assurances given by the representatives of the nuclear-weapon Powers; and we wish to refer in particular to the recent statement in this Committee [1556th meeting] by the representative of the United States, Ambassador Goldberg, who expressed in clear and unequivocal terms the determination of his Government, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, to share equitably with other nations parties to the treaty, particularly non-nuclear-weapon countries, all the technological benefits that might be derived from the development of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful uses. In this connexion, we express the fervent hope that nuclear technology will be made available, particularly to the developing countries, under reasonable conditions that are within their means.

43. When it comes to the consideration of the second principle, which requires that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations on the part of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, the present draft has obvious shortcomings. It cannot be denied that the provisions of the present draft do not fully meet the requirement of this principle. Nor should it be expected at the present moment, given the prevailing conditions, that the draft treaty could contain a symmetrical balance of obligations. As I have already attempted to show, the experiences

of the complications involved in the nuclear disarmament negotiations and the apparent lack of bold political decisions, at least for the moment, lead us to believe that attempts to solve other nuclear disarmament matters within the present draft will be met only with perhaps long-drawn-out discussions and negotiations resulting in an inevitable postponement of the settlement of the present issue indefinitely. Yet, in a very important sense, this draft treaty is a political harbinger for a series of accompanying nuclear disarmament measures to be negotiated and settled immediately following the treaty's coming into force. The choice we have to make in this respect is no different from those we confront in our every-day life, in making decisions between what is ultimately desirable and what is practically possible at any given moment. In such circumstances we should do what is possible while continuing to strive for a fuller realization of our ultimate goals.

44. This leads me to the third principle, which requires that the treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. My delegation has consistently maintained and has unequivocally stated, both here at the General Assembly and throughout the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, its view that the draft treaty on non-proliferation should be a step for further nuclear disarmament measures to be negotiated in good faith immediately after its settlement. We hold this to be the *raison d'être* of the present treaty. That is why, as one of the non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, my delegation fully subscribed to that group's joint memorandum of 1 August 1966, which stated, *inter alia*, that the treaty should be a step towards general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. This is one view which, as the records will show, has enjoyed a unanimous acceptance in the entire negotiation process of the draft treaty. It is fitting, therefore, that this view should find expression in both the preamble and article VI of the draft, which link the present treaty with other disarmament issues.

45. With regard to article VI, my delegation has already stated, at the 364th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the view, which we still maintain, that a clearer and more concrete enumeration of the nuclear disarmament measures to be negotiated upon would greatly improve the text of that article and would ensure a definitive commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers to continue negotiations immediately on definite nuclear disarmament measures. In that connexion the suggestions presented by the delegation of Mexico^{2/} are worthy of our serious consideration. It is our view that such consideration and clarification of the relevant articles would fully meet our common concern in that respect.

46. Another of the principles of resolution 2028 (XX) requires that there should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty—and here we come to one of the most important and highly sensitive issues of article III, commonly known as the safeguard article. We are not unaware of the

^{2/} *Ibid.*, annex IV, section 12.

long and difficult negotiations and calculated compromises that have eventually made possible the agreed text as we find it in the draft treaty. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian delegation has maintained and continues to maintain the desirability of a uniform and universal safeguard system based on mutuality of obligations and sacrifices. Although the voluntary decisions and declarations by the United States^{8/} and the United Kingdom^{9/} that they will submit their peaceful nuclear establishments to an IAEA safeguard system outside the framework of the present draft treaty is a welcome gesture in that respect, it is to be admitted that the present drafting of article III is based on less than universal application of safeguards. We express our concern lest such a provision undermine the very purpose of the present draft treaty and endanger its viability as a lasting international instrument.

47. The last but not least principle of resolution 2028 (XX) provides that nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their respective territories. I have already referred in my introductory remarks to the efforts in progress within the framework of the Organization of African Unity for a convention on the denuclearization of the continent of Africa. I wish to pay, in this connexion, a special tribute to the Latin American countries for the lead they have given by signing the treaty for the denuclearization of their continent [A/C.1/946]. My country and, I am sure, many countries on the continent of Africa and elsewhere are watching very closely developments in this historic treaty of the Latin American region. We believe that the extension of denuclearized zones to other areas, including areas of major military confrontation, would substantially contribute to our endeavour to control the spread of nuclear weapons by containing them in their present breeding areas.

48. Finally, we have the all-important question of security guarantees. This is an old issue which has been inseparable throughout from any discussion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

49. Ever since the idea of a non-proliferation treaty was conceived—and here I pause to pay a warm tribute to the Government of Ireland for having taken an imaginative lead in that regard—the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon countries which forswear the acquisition of nuclear weapons has been uppermost in the thinking of participating nations. There is no doubt that the most effective way of providing security assurance would have been the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. Since that has not been achieved and is not likely to be achieved in the near future, we are obliged to address ourselves to the examination of the other proposals for security guarantees that have been advanced so far. My country for one, as I have said earlier, remains convinced that the signing of a convention to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons would greatly contribute

to enhancing the security of all nations and, more particularly, of non-nuclear-weapon States. We still feel and remain convinced that such a convention would also create an atmosphere of trust and mutual confidence conducive to nuclear disarmament negotiations. While thus we maintain and continue to insist upon such a convention to ban the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, we deem it essential for the purposes of the present treaty that it should contain in its provisions appropriate assurances along the lines of resolution 2153 (XXI), which calls upon nuclear-weapon countries, *inter alia*, to refrain from the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which may conclude treaties of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

50. It is only right that the provisions of resolution 2153 (XXI) be sustained and supplemented by the respective declarations that the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom have promised to make before the Security Council.^{10/} Those declarations have not yet been made, and therefore I shall not discuss them in anticipation. The question is to what extent the proposed resolution and declarations will advance and readapt the existing collective security system of the United Nations Charter in a manner capable of responding immediately to the exigencies of nuclear threat or aggression. As a member of the Security Council, my delegation will have occasion to comment on that aspect of the problem when the draft resolution is presented and the declarations are made. We shall certainly examine the resolution and the text of the declarations with all the care and the attention that they deserve.

51. Those are the main issues of the draft treaty. There are also other issues which perhaps are not of such decisive importance but which nevertheless are of sufficient significance to warrant close examination. I need only mention here the review and withdrawal clauses of the draft treaty to be found in articles VIII and X. A non-proliferation treaty, involving as it does a delicate balance of national interests, has to be tested as to whether it is meeting the purposes for which it is designed and as to whether or not it fulfils the needs of the international community. It is obvious that it is only if nations of the world feel that their security need is continually being met by this arrangement that there can be hope for it to succeed. This is as much a psychological problem as it is a problem connected with the subsequent disposition of the nuclear-weapon countries vis-à-vis each other and towards non-nuclear Powers. Thus the paramount responsibility of the nuclear-weapon countries in sustaining a continued climate of mutual confidence cannot be too strongly emphasized.

52. It was, therefore, inevitable that a non-proliferation agreement would have to tackle the twin problem of withdrawal and review—withdrawal because of the overriding consideration of the security of the would-be signatory, and review because of the imperative necessity of making the whole arrangement capable of a self-sustaining readaptation in order to meet the changing needs of the international community.

^{8/} *Ibid.*, annex IV, section 23.

^{9/} *Ibid.*, annex IV, section 24.

^{10/} See *Ibid.*, annex II.

53. After everything is said and done, we will have to assess this draft treaty in all of its aspects—be they shortcomings or strong points. In doing so we should not tire of looking at the draft critically. It is true that we have cause for self-congratulation, but we should not allow such exultation to lead us into the paradox of seeing the tree for the forest or the forest for the tree.

54. Certainly this treaty is only the beginning. It is a choice between the perfect and the impossible and the less than perfect and the attainable. The shortcomings in the treaty are but a reflection of the world situation in which we live. To say that the treaty is not all-embracing is to understate the obvious. After all, it could hardly be otherwise when, out of the five members of the nuclear club, only three support the treaty while the fourth is an outsider and the fifth is much less than enthusiastic.

55. And so the realities of our complicated world make it impossible for us to achieve a fully satisfactory arrangement. But what we should realize is that our options are fast running out. The choice that is available to us is not the ideal nor is it anything approximating it. It is a choice between making a little progress or no progress at all. I do not believe that we should opt for immobility and stagnation.

56. In the view of my Government, the viability of a non-proliferation agreement lies in what will happen in the future, perhaps in the immediate future: it depends first on the speed with which the nuclear-weapon Powers will follow this agreement with real measures of nuclear disarmament. Secondly, it depends on how soon nuclear technology will become the technology of the day and to what extent a non-proliferation arrangement will meet the demands for non-discriminatory technological co-operation. Thirdly, the viability of this agreement will depend on the extent to which the nuclear Powers can co-operate to create a world atmosphere in which nuclear energy will become the means for human development and progress and not the device for mutual self-destruction. These are the imponderables whose significance we cannot now foresee.

57. The most important thing to remember, however, is that the present treaty on non-proliferation is an experimental innovation and, like all experiments, this too has to be watched carefully and continuously so that we may surely move towards the final goal of general and complete disarmament. The momentum that this agreement can generate must therefore be maintained, accelerated and guided to new areas of mutual endeavour. To this endeavour, my Government pledges its loyal co-operation.

58. Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands): I think it is hardly necessary for me to stress the reasons for which the tabling of a revised and complete draft text of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is for my delegation a source of great relief and deep satisfaction. It is the outcome of numerous efforts undertaken during the past years to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. These efforts were given particular impetus by the initiative of Ireland whose Deputy Prime Minister and Minister

for External Affairs, Mr. Aiken, addressed this Committee so eloquently this morning. I should like to pay Mr. Aiken, on behalf of my Government and my delegation, the special tribute which he so fully deserves.

59. Although the Netherlands is not a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and has not participated directly in its proceedings, we have followed closely the deliberations in that body. This has enabled us to formulate a considered opinion on the draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons that has been presented to the General Assembly.

60. I realize full well that the text before us is a compromise resulting from lengthy negotiations and that it does not meet with the unreserved approval of all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, let alone the full membership of the United Nations. We ourselves are not blind to its imperfections and would have preferred in some instances a wording different from the present text. In our view, however, such objections are not such as to prevent final approval of the treaty. On the contrary, they dwindle in the face of the historical moment which may provide us with a last chance to achieve the objective which has eluded us for so many years. We may not incur the risk of letting this opportunity pass by.

61. That is why my Government decided to join the group of sponsors of the draft resolution introduced at the 1559th meeting by the representative of Finland [A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1], which recommends the endorsement of the draft treaty by the Assembly during its current resumed session. My delegation joins its fervent wish to those expressed here over the past few days for positive and speedy action by the Assembly.

62. I shall not prolong my intervention by quoting figures and statistics since the facts are generally known and are readily available in particular in the annual reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and in the outstanding report of the Secretary-General on the use and implications of the acquisition and further development of nuclear weapons. The closing sentences of the Secretary-General's report read as follows:

"International agreement against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreements on measures of arms control and disarmament will promote the security of all countries. The United Nations has the overriding responsibility in this field. The more effective it becomes in action, the more powerful its authority, the greater becomes the assurance for man's future. And the longer the world waits, the more nuclear arsenals grow, the greater and more difficult becomes the eventual task." [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 94.]

I am well aware, Mr. Chairman, that you quoted the same passage in your opening statement, but I think it is of such importance that it is not out of place for me to repeat it because I think that no one will disagree with this solemn admonition, backed by the authority of a group of the world's most eminent and respected scientists.

63. I will now focus attention on the different elements of the draft treaty before us. First of all, one may be tempted to ask whether the present draft treaty does take into account in a reasonable measure the five basic guiding principles embodied in the key resolution of 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965.

64. There is, and I am afraid there always will remain, a variety of views with regard to each of the five points listed in this resolution. It would appear to me that, broadly speaking, the fundamental controversy can be reduced to the common denominator as to whether the treaty offers "an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear powers".

65. I think that this is also borne out by the remarks of the previous speaker, the representative of Ethiopia. I myself may feel obliged to clarify my delegation's views on this particular matter and related matters at a later stage in our debate. Here and now I should like to limit myself to one introductory remark which, by the way, was already made a few days ago by the representative of Nepal.

66. In the opinion of the Netherlands Government, a certain degree of "discrimination" is an unavoidable element of a non-proliferation treaty, since it merely confirms the existing disparity between nuclear "haves" and "have-nots" at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. The different status of both categories should therefore at the outset be accepted as being the lesser evil in the present circumstances. But I do wish to make it clear that we do not propose to acquiesce in a lasting inequality of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Powers.

67. The Netherlands Government, for its part, is willing to accept the present draft treaty as a first, realistic step, acting in good faith on the understanding that the nuclear-weapon States will spare no effort to achieve tangible results in the field of arms control and disarmament, as stipulated in the last paragraphs of the preamble and in article VI of the treaty.

68. Articles I and II of the draft treaty could be considered two sides of the same coin. On the one side, the nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient whatsoever or to assist any non-nuclear-weapon State in acquiring or manufacturing them. Conversely, the non-nuclear-weapon States pledge not to receive such weapons or explosives and to refrain from acquiring or manufacturing them or from seeking any assistance for that purpose. The text of both articles is clear-cut and much simpler than that of previous versions which have been considered by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and by this Committee. This is a positive improvement. Of course, it would be even more reassuring if it were certain that the treaty would be universally signed and ratified by all States. The same observation, in more explicit terms, has already been made by the representative of Finland, and by the representatives of Ireland and Ethiopia today.

69. The purpose of the draft treaty is to prevent the present non-nuclear-weapon States from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons and other

nuclear explosive devices. The provisions of the treaty should therefore aim exclusively at achieving this objective. In no way should these provisions result in a restriction of the use of nuclear energy for other purposes by the non-nuclear Powers which undertake to forswear the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosives.

70. It is gratifying to note that the principle of the further development of peaceful uses of atomic energy is clearly expressed in the eighth paragraph of the preamble and in article IV of the draft treaty.

71. Article IV of the draft treaty recognizes the "inalienable right" of the parties to promote the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to share to the fullest possible extent in the exchange of scientific and technological information in this field. My delegation sincerely hopes that these inherent rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States will be matched by pledges by all nuclear Powers to pool their knowledge and experience with the other parties to the treaty—a pledge already given by the Government of the United States.

72. My delegation interprets article I of the draft treaty to mean that assistance by supplying knowledge, materials and equipment cannot be denied to non-nuclear-weapon States until it is clearly established that such assistance will be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. In other words, in all cases where the recipient parties to the treaty have conformed with the provisions of article III, there should be a clear presumption that the assistance rendered will not be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other explosive devices.

73. This basic principle implies that any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty, co-operating with other countries in the application of nuclear energy for purposes other than for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives, shall be able to continue such co-operation.

74. In this connexion I wish to remind the Committee of the fact that in the field of peaceful application of nuclear energy the Netherlands already participates in a special form of co-operation, namely, the European Community for Atomic Energy, better known as Euratom. The Netherlands Government attaches great importance to this co-operation. It wishes fully to continue this co-operation after having acceded to the non-proliferation treaty.

75. For that reason, the Netherlands and other Euratom countries which wish to adhere to the treaty have a common interest in ensuring that the obligations deriving from the non-proliferation treaty will be no obstacle to the fulfilment of their obligations under the Euratom Treaty. That is one of the reasons why extensive discussions have taken place during the past year concerning the formulation of the text of article III regarding safeguards on peaceful activities.

76. In the opinion of the Netherlands Government the present draft treaty is compatible with its obligations under the Euratom Treaty. The Netherlands Government is therefore prepared, with due observance of the relevant procedures provided for in the

Euratom Treaty, to sign the non-proliferation treaty in its present form as soon as possible.

77. Euratom was the first organization to establish its own multilateral safeguards. From my preceding remarks it will be clear that my Government wishes to keep intact these safeguards which have now functioned for a number of years.

78. In view of the existing co-operation within Euratom and in accordance with the possibility offered in article III, paragraph 4 of the draft treaty, the Netherlands Government is of the opinion that the European Commission ought to conduct the negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency with respect to the safeguards which the Euratom partners desiring to become parties to the treaty will have to accept in accordance with article III, paragraph 1.

79. A basic tenet of good management is to avoid unnecessary duplication. As a matter of principle, the IAEA should therefore make appropriate use of existing records and safeguards, on the understanding that the Agency can satisfy itself that nuclear materials are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In other words, the agreement with the IAEA should be based on the principle of the verification of Euratom safeguards.

80. The Netherlands Government is confident that, spurred by the common political purpose to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, it will not prove to be difficult to conclude the required agreement within a relatively short time and to clear the way for ratification of the treaty.

81. Several other speakers have referred to the privileged position of the nuclear-weapon States. As I pointed out before, the Netherlands Government has from the beginning recognized that a distinction between the position of nuclear Powers and that of non-nuclear Powers is inescapable, at least in the initial stage. At the same time, it is worth while to note that article III, while it is binding upon non-nuclear-weapon States, in no way precludes the nuclear-weapon States from voluntarily accepting the same obligations. I concede that such a step cannot be regarded as a measure having a direct bearing on non-proliferation. Nevertheless, the fact that many non-nuclear-weapon States have urged the nuclear-weapon Powers to assume the same obligations shows the considerable psychological impact and political importance of that step.

82. It is heartening that two nuclear-weapon States, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, have responded favourably and have offered to submit their peaceful nuclear activities to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, when such safeguards are applied under the treaty. My delegation continues to hope that other nuclear Powers will follow suit in due course.

83. The full implications of article III can only be assessed in the context of the two preambular paragraphs dealing with safeguards and of articles I and II of the draft.

84. If one considers all these provisions as a whole it becomes abundantly clear that: firstly, safeguards

shall be applied only to prevent the illicit manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; secondly, the actual safeguards procedures shall be devised and implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties; lastly, recognizing the progress of technological development, a co-operative effort shall be made for research on the development of effective methods of safeguarding the flow of nuclear materials by the use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points.

85. The second principle is already being applied by the Vienna Agency and is embodied in practically identical terms in its safeguards procedures, drawn up in 1965.

86. These safeguards procedures also require the Agency to review them in the light of further experience as well as technological developments. In my view the sixth preambular paragraph of the treaty may therefore be regarded as an instructive "forward look" and as a guidepost, entirely in keeping with the Agency's ultimate objectives.

87. If I have taxed the patience of the Committee by dwelling at length on some provisions of the treaty, it is because the Netherlands Government considers them to be of vital importance. In the threatening shadows of the further spreading of nuclear weapons we seek for security for present and future generations. This security is now within our reach. Let us not lose it by failing in our grave responsibilities as Members of this Organization.

88. Mr. HAMBRO (Norway): The Norwegian Government has for a long time felt that the task now before us, namely, to secure the adoption of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, is of the greatest importance and urgency. This view has often been expressed by spokesmen of my Government. I refer particularly to the speech by our Foreign Minister, Mr. John Lyng, during the general debate of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session [1430th meeting].

89. The Norwegian Government has anxiously and eagerly followed the painstaking efforts made by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and elsewhere over many years in order to elaborate the text which has now been presented to us. The draft treaty agreed upon by the two co-Chairmen is a very great achievement, for which they deserve our praise and gratitude. Let me also take this opportunity of paying a tribute to Mr. Aiken, the Foreign Minister of Ireland, who took the initiative in this matter nine years ago. His foresight and his statesmanship has been a valuable contribution.

90. There are many decisive reasons which have led the Norwegian Government to the conviction that the early acceptance of the non-proliferation treaty is of paramount importance. But, rather than reviewing our position in detail, I should like to draw the attention to the report by the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons [A/6858 and Corr.1].

91. My Government agrees with the statement in the report to the effect that there is an intimate connexion between the problem of ensuring peace and security and the halting of the further spread of nuclear weapons. The report also stresses that the United Nations has an overriding responsibility in this field and that the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will become increasingly difficult as the nuclear arsenals grow.

92. I think that we all agree that a non-proliferation treaty in itself will not solve all the problems raised by the existence of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty is, however, in our view an indispensable first step to further progress in this field. World-wide acceptance of this treaty will also, we hope, release greater energy for peaceful and constructive work and will in itself be a meaningful contribution towards a lessening of international tension and a greater feeling of security.

93. It has been argued both in Geneva and during our debates here in this room that efforts should be made to find a more balanced and comprehensive approach to the control of the nuclear arms race. The long and difficult negotiations in Geneva have, however, shown that such an approach is not possible in practice. The problem before us is so complicated that we should regard it as a tremendous achievement on the part of the negotiators that it has been possible to agree on a text for such a treaty. It is, therefore, our earnest hope that the States that have not yet engaged in production of nuclear weapons will see the problem in its right perspective, and put aside their special preoccupations and special objections and accept the halting of further nuclear-weapon proliferation as an objective of overriding urgency. Thereby, we will take a significant step forward in our common endeavour to limit the risks of a nuclear war with all its terrifying destruction.

94. The most serious objection which has been expressed so far against this draft treaty is that it does not secure a proper balance between the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States on the one side and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other side. But article IV of the draft treaty should to a great degree meet some of the most relevant objections. This article obliges the nuclear-weapon States to assist the other States in the development of peaceful nuclear programmes. It also encourages international collaboration for unrestricted development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Article V carries this collaboration a step further in aiming at securing for non-nuclear-weapon States the benefits of peaceful

applications of nuclear explosions. This article places on the nuclear-weapon States the burden of absorbing all research and development costs incurred for these purposes.

95. My Government gives its full support to the draft treaty and has for that reason sponsored the draft resolution now in front of us. But, at the same time, it recognizes the urgent need to pursue further efforts for the control of nuclear weapons, and we therefore appeal as urgently as possible to all parties, and mainly to the nuclear Powers, to explore every possibility for slowing down the nuclear arms race. We believe that the comprehensive test ban treaty prohibiting the underground testing of nuclear devices should be taken up by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament with the highest priority, and we note with satisfaction that this is mentioned in the preamble of the draft treaty.

96. It is common knowledge that this treaty is the result of hard, protracted and difficult negotiations. We realize, of course, that agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, although a necessary prerequisite, is not sufficient. The treaty must also gain wide support from the community of nations to be effective.

97. The decision that we are called upon to take is of tremendous importance. We believe that we have a great responsibility towards future generations and that we would sadly fail in our obligations should we lose the opportunity that is now before us in a search for perfection. We are now at a crossroads. One path leads to further spread of nuclear weapons, to nuclear anarchy. The other points in the direction away from nuclear war and towards increased hopes for a better future for mankind. It is our earnest wish that those nations which still have reservations concerning this treaty would join with us in our efforts to reach agreement now on the draft treaty.

98. We believe that the acceptance of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a text which has resulted from earnest and serious negotiations, is of the greatest urgency. In our view, there would be a real danger in unduly prolonging the deliberations regarding the various provisions of the draft, or in seeking postponement of the debate beyond this session of the General Assembly. It is our firm belief that we must now grasp the opportunity which will perhaps never present itself more favourably than today.

The meeting rose at 12.5 p.m.