



CONTENTS

Agenda item 28:

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*):

- (a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation  
Committee on Disarmament . . . . . 1

**Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY**  
(United Arab Republic).

**AGENDA ITEM 28**

**Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*):**

**(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation  
Committee on Disarmament (A/7072 and Add.1-  
DC/230 and Add.1, A/7080; A/C.1/L.421 and Add.1)**

1. Mr. KLUSÁK (Czechoslovakia): The resumed twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly has started the consideration of the draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons annexed to the report which was submitted by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on 14 March 1968<sup>1</sup> in keeping with resolution 2346 (XXII). Our deliberations should constitute a decisive step towards a successful conclusion of several years of talks on this subject matter. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic considers the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty as the key opening the door to other measures conducive to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the gradual elimination of the danger of a nuclear war. We associate ourselves with the Secretary-General who, in the introduction to his report on United Nations activities in the period from 16 June 1966 to 15 June 1967, noted *inter alia*:

"...it is difficult to conceive of any agreement in the foreseeable future on any other measure of disarmament if it is not possible to reach agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons" [A/6701/Add.1 para. 14].

2. The question of non-proliferation has been for a number of years on the agenda of disarmament negotiations. The experience gained from those deliberations clearly proves that, proportionately to postponement of a solution of the problem, the complications making the attainment of an agreement more difficult have become ever deeper. This is caused, on the one hand, by political developments in various parts of the world and by new factors profoundly affecting relations among States, and,

on the other hand, by progress in the field of technology. Growing application of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes creates the material basis from which a number of other States might initiate the production of nuclear weapons within the foreseeable future. At the same time, certain new phenomena in the field of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, particularly as far as the possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions is concerned, have created new problems which must be taken into account in the solution of the question of non-proliferation.

3. At the same time, these significant events of a political and technical nature persistently underscore the importance and urgency of the conclusion of an effective treaty preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons. We highly appreciate that, thanks to efforts extending over several years, the world has, in the course of time, come close to a point where the solution of the question of non-proliferation is within our reach. It is our duty towards our nations to make use of that opportunity.

4. Therefore, it is the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation that, at its current session, the General Assembly should do its utmost to crown the non-proliferation negotiations with success on the basis of the draft treaty before us.

5. The draft treaty is the outcome of long, difficult deliberations. A number of its provisions reflect a carefully balanced compromise motivated by efforts to meet, to the maximum degree possible, the interests and requirements of various groups of States. This is unavoidable and fully understandable in the case of a treaty of such a nature. It would be unrealistic to expect that such a treaty could fully satisfy the wishes and demands of every State. On the contrary, we must rather expect that in some of the questions dealt with in the treaty, a number of States, in view of their interests, would prefer different formulations better corresponding to their requirements and ideas. From the point of view of the international community as a whole, however, the most important question is whether the draft treaty before us adequately ensures the solution of the cardinal problem, namely, the prohibition of the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Our participation in the elaboration of the draft treaty, and our understanding resulting therefrom as to both the final results and the obstacles that had to be overcome in the past years, lead us to answer in the affirmative.

6. Our interest in the early conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty is decisively affected by the location of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic—a small, non-nuclear-weapon State, in the heart of Europe where the situation has remained unsound practically since the end of the Second World War, and where there is a strong concentra-

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1.

tion of armed forces of the two groupings having nuclear weapons at their disposal. Numerous proposals aimed at improving this state of affairs have so far not been conducive to concrete results. Influential forces, to which we have drawn attention many times in the past, have also obstinately tried to prevent the adoption of effective measures against the dissemination of nuclear weapons. This certainly has not contributed to the improvement of the situation. It is therefore fully understandable that, as a socialist State permanently striving for the strengthening of international peace and security, we are very much interested in the bringing-about of measures that would conduce to the strengthening of peace and mutual confidence in relations among European States. One such measure is a non-proliferation treaty which would guarantee that other European countries, as well as non-nuclear-weapon States in other parts of the world, will not acquire nuclear weapons. This would undoubtedly contribute to the stabilization and invigoration of the atmosphere in Europe.

7. However, our interest in non-dissemination is not dictated solely by European considerations. A treaty on non-proliferation would be a universal measure of world-wide reach. The danger of the spread of nuclear weapons concerns, in our view, other regions as well where the situation is likewise strained, where there are States which could start producing nuclear weapons or which could try to get them from the nuclear-weapon Powers. The political, military and economic burden of nuclear armaments would thus be borne by other States, the number of which would constantly rise.

8. It is therefore quite natural that, at the beginning of the sixties, when it became evident that an agreement on radical measures leading to nuclear disarmament was not attainable in the foreseeable future, it was primarily the non-nuclear-weapon States which stood for the adoption of measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and which considered them an important step to prevent a further increase of the danger of a nuclear war.

9. The fact that some nuclear Powers as well joined the ranks of those advocating the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty should not lead us to the conclusion that the treaty no longer corresponds to the interests of non-nuclear-weapon States.

10. May I be permitted now to explain in brief the position of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, one of the non-nuclear-weapon States, on some problems that have attracted the most attention during negotiations on the non-proliferation draft treaty? One of the most important questions closely connected with the treaty is the problem of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. In the first place, we must clearly realize what can be expected and required from the treaty in this respect. We are convinced that the conclusion of the treaty will, in itself, contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. However, in view of its limited character, the treaty cannot fully do away with the danger of a nuclear war and wars in general. Therefore, it cannot set up as its objective to guarantee fully the security of any of its signatories. We support, however, the justified requirement of non-nuclear-weapon States that the treaty should contribute as much as possible to the attainment of that goal. Non-nuclear-

weapon States, which will assume the obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons, have the right to require—in connexion with the treaty—sufficient guarantees that they will not become victims of nuclear aggression.

11. At the conclusion of the negotiations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in March 1968 the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom submitted a proposal<sup>2</sup> containing an acceptable solution of this question based upon a Security Council resolution which would be accompanied by unilateral declarations of those three Governments.

12. We know that some non-nuclear-weapon States are not fully satisfied with that proposal. As far as the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is concerned, we would consider a commitment by nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States signatories of the Treaty on whose territories there are no nuclear weapons as a more suitable solution. That would be a significant step which would directly and considerably contribute to the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to the reduction and eventual elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and to outlawing nuclear weapons. It is, however, our opinion that the question of the forms of guarantees should not create an obstacle to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. That would adversely affect not only the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States but also further disarmament negotiations. Unless a non-proliferation treaty is concluded, the security of non-nuclear States will not be ensured, and moreover a significant measure opening the road towards further steps conducive to the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war will not be taken.

13. Of course, the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty cannot and will not terminate the efforts aimed at eliminating the nuclear threat. On the contrary, this question will and must remain on the agenda. It will constitute a significant factor underscoring the urgency of other measures aimed at nuclear disarmament, among them, primarily the treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

14. When it released the energy of the atomic nucleus, mankind entered a new epoch, an epoch of the utilization of immense resources of nuclear energy. It is a sad fact that the first steps taken in that field involved the use of nuclear energy to destructive ends, the production of nuclear weapons. In the beginning, much more attention and efforts were channelled in that direction than into the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

15. However, gradually the orientation of using nuclear energy for accelerating the progress of mankind comes ever more to the fore. The interests of all nations require that the doors for further quick advances in this sphere should be opened as widely as possible.

16. Similarly, just like all other States, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is very much interested in further speedy progress in this field. Primarily in the field of power production, where we have very limited resources, we count

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, annex II.

on vast uses of nuclear energy in the near future. However, we consider it imperative that the most favourable conditions be created for rapid development in other aspects of peaceful uses of the atom as well.

17. In that aspect we attach great importance to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We do not share the apprehensions that the treaty could become an obstacle to further development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On the contrary, by preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons it would significantly contribute to doing away with the impediments that have existed so far in the development of international co-operation in this field.

18. The draft treaty devotes considerable attention to the question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It confirms the fact that the treaty must not prevent the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. On the contrary, it should and will create a suitable framework for the development of such activities both in individual States and on the international level.

19. However, a serious problem emanates from the fact that nuclear energy can be applied for peaceful purposes in different forms. At present it is evident that one of the possible forms is the utilization of nuclear explosions for the realization of certain projects which would be of considerable economic significance for some countries. From the point of view of the non-proliferation treaty the difficulty resides in the fact that such explosions would have to be made with explosive devices which, as is well known, do not differ from nuclear weapons either with regard to the technology of production with regard to effects. Therefore, it was and is imperative that a non-proliferation treaty should solve this problem in a corresponding way. If the treaty does not cover all nuclear explosives it will lose any practical sense.

20. The draft treaty, in our opinion, shows us a suitable way towards the solution which would embrace both sides of the problem. It prohibits proliferation of nuclear weapons on the one hand; and, on the other hand, explosive devices in any form. At the same time, it also determines the basic principles of appropriate international procedures which would ensure non-nuclear-weapon States the possibility to utilize nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under advantageous economic conditions and without any discrimination. The proposed solution is beneficial for a number of States which, in view of their economic situation and level of technical development, would encounter serious difficulties in their efforts to utilize nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

21. It is well known that some States do not find such a solution ideal. However, in spite of the reservations which might be raised against the proposed solution, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic considers it as a regulation which is acceptable and which fully corresponds to objective conditions. We are confident that the appropriate international procedures specified in article V of the draft, which must be negotiated with due account to the interests of non-nuclear-weapon States, will create a proper basis from which non-nuclear-weapon States could utilize, under reasonable conditions, the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions in a way compatible with the prohibition of disseminating nuclear weapons.

22. Czechoslovakia attaches great importance to the question of control which would ensure consistent implementation of the treaty. This question is dealt with in article III of the draft. A suitable system of controls was, in principle, already elaborated in the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was approved by an overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations and has been successfully applied to peaceful nuclear establishments in a number of countries. Czechoslovakia belongs to those States which approved the safeguards system of the IAEA, and, as early as 1966, expressed its willingness to accept under certain conditions the IAEA safeguards covering its activities in the field of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Therefore, we consider article III of the draft treaty, which assigns the responsibility for control to the International Atomic Energy Agency, in conformity with its safeguards system, as appropriate and adequate both from the point of view of the effectiveness of the treaty and from the point of view of its acceptability to the highest possible number of States.

23. In conclusion, I should like to clarify briefly the Czechoslovak position on the important question of the relation of non-proliferation to other nuclear disarmament measures. In this connexion, during the long debate on the draft treaty, views were expressed to the effect that it would be correct to prohibit at the same time the so-called vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, or that the non-proliferation draft treaty should constitute an integral part of the whole complex of measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to liquidation of existing nuclear weapons. As to our position on those views, I should like unequivocally to reiterate that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is an unreserved advocate of the implementation of consistent measures conducive to nuclear disarmament. It is no secret that we would prefer to be considering today a draft treaty on the liquidation and prohibition of nuclear weapons, or some other measures concerning the substance of nuclear disarmament, instead of a draft treaty on non-proliferation.

24. We are, however, convinced that, in present conditions, it would not be beneficial to link the non-proliferation treaty with some other measures of wider scope, because there is no hope that these last could be agreed upon and implemented in the near future. That would inevitably lead to delays which might nullify all our efforts made during the preparation of the non-proliferation treaty. In this question, time does not side with the efforts to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons. There is, as is generally known and understood, a real danger that, within a very short time, there will be further unfavourable developments in the field of nuclear armament which would render the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty useless and at the same time could substantially and adversely affect the solution of any other nuclear disarmament question.

25. We are fully aware that a non-proliferation treaty does not affect in any way the existing nuclear weapons, and consequently does not eliminate the danger of a nuclear war. We see its significance in the fact that, even if we cannot eliminate the danger, the adoption of the treaty would at least prevent the intensification of that danger. That would result from the fact that the number of States capable of unleashing a nuclear war would not increase.

26. We do not in any way consider a non-proliferation treaty as a culmination of efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, we see it as a beginning, as a significant step towards implementation of further, far-reaching measures. We consider provisions of article IV of the draft treaty—in which the Contracting Parties would undertake to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the arms race, with special emphasis on nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament—as a binding commitment in this respect.

27. We expect that the conclusion of the treaty on non-proliferation will give a new important impetus to disarmament negotiations. That might create a favourable atmosphere in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which should start negotiations on further steps in this direction without delay. Important subjects which should be considered by the Committee are contained in a number of General Assembly resolutions, as well as in the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union at this Committee's meeting on 26 April [1556th meeting]. It should not be too difficult for the Committee of Eighteen to select from the long list of subject matters those measures the adoption of which could be agreed upon within a short time.

28. In our view, an important part in further negotiations will be played by the conference of non-nuclear-weapon States to be held in Geneva this summer. Its considerations could substantially contribute to the immediate elaboration of other concrete measures which emanate from or which are linked with a non-proliferation treaty, particularly to the study of problems connected with all-around applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

29. In this statement of ours, we have explained the main reasons motivating our support for the immediate conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty as formulated in the draft before us. We should like to express our expectation that the General Assembly, at its current session, in harmony with the interests of peace and security in the world, will endorse the treaty and adopt the draft resolution submitted on 1 May [1559th meeting] by the representative of Finland [A/C.1/L.421] and co-sponsored by the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

30. Mr. BUDO (Albania) (*translated from French*): After a four-month recess, the twenty-second session of the General Assembly has been resumed in accordance with the joint decision taken by the two great nuclear Powers which, after their failure to impose their draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons during the first part of the session last autumn, insisted that the session should be resumed because of their strong desire to achieve success for the draft at all costs and as soon as possible.

31. There is no need to recall here all the bargaining and all the efforts undertaken by the Governments of these two countries to force non-nuclear countries to agree to a treaty which will deprive them of the right to possess such weapons. Those activities are well known and began several years ago, when the first deals on the partial test ban treaty were made, and have in the main consisted of lengthy secret negotiations between the two Powers supported by a vast

propaganda campaign, intense diplomatic activity and continuous pressures brought to bear by those Powers against other countries in order to force them to support and adhere to the draft treaty. The two Powers finally reached agreement at the sinister meeting between Johnson and Kosygin which took place last summer at Glassboro, immediately following the imperialist and Israeli aggression against the Arab countries. As is well known, the agreement was embodied soon afterwards on 25 August, in identical draft treaties which were officially submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee at Geneva by the United States and the Soviet Union; these texts were completed this year and the final text appears in annex I of the Committee's report now before the General Assembly.

32. The attitude of the People's Republic of Albania to this sinister plot of American imperialism and of the revisionist leaders of the Soviet Union has been clearly stated many times here at the United Nations and elsewhere. The Albanian Government, which is deeply devoted to the principles on which its foreign policy is based and especially to the principle of the sovereignty and sovereign equality of all States, large and small, to the sacred right of every country to take the measures needed to safeguard its security and independence, and which firmly adheres to its position of unreserved support for the cause of the freedom and security of all peoples and peaceful nations, is totally opposed to the American-Soviet plot and has strongly denounced its authors' real aims.

33. It is obvious that the proposed draft is not a disarmament measure and will in no way serve disarmament, contrary to what the false and identical arguments repeated by the representatives of the two Powers would have us believe. The treaty does not affect existing stocks of nuclear weapons; it contains no clause prohibiting the use and production of those weapons or imposing any kind of restrictions on the United States with regard to its nuclear bases in various parts of the world or to the dispatch all over the world of submarines and aeroplanes carrying nuclear weapons. On the contrary, its provisions tend to establish once and for all whatever monopoly these two Powers still hold in the field of nuclear weapons and to strengthen their privileged position in that respect vis-à-vis the non-nuclear countries. Like the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water signed in 1963, the present treaty enables its authors to pursue the nuclear arms race and further to improve those weapons, as well as to continue to resort to nuclear threats in carrying out their plans for world hegemony. The two treaties are mutually complementary. They have the same aims and serve to promote the aggressive and warlike policy of the American imperialists and the implementation of the vast American-Soviet conspiracy against the peoples and countries struggling for freedom, independence and national sovereignty.

34. Thus, the goal of the sponsors of the draft non-proliferation treaty is to ensure for themselves a position of supremacy over the countries which do not possess atomic weapons, to bring those countries under their control, and to make use of nuclear weapons to threaten and blackmail the revolutionary peoples of all countries. The two Powers nurture the hope that under the conditions that would be created by the treaty's entry into force, the non-nuclear



signatory countries, would have no alternative but to seek the protection of one or another of them, in line with their plans for dividing up spheres of influence. The proposal for nuclear guarantees which those two Powers are offering to non-nuclear countries ratifying the treaty is intended to serve the same ends.

35. It is no secret to anyone that the main target of the sponsors of the draft treaty has been and remains—as it was in the case of the Moscow Treaty—the People's Republic of China, which is the principal obstacle to the success of their counter-revolutionary and neo-colonialist plans. That is clearly recognized by peaceful Member States and confirmed by the world press. The American imperialists and the renegade leaders of the Soviet Union have constantly tried at all costs to prevent China from having nuclear weapons. Yet, as we know, the People's Republic of China has thwarted those plans; it has broken American-Soviet monopoly in the field of nuclear weapons once and for all, an action that was welcomed with great enthusiasm by all of progressive mankind. The peoples of the whole world have warmly greeted the outstanding achievements of Chinese science and technology in this field, for not only do they help to defend the great Chinese people, but they are also of historic significance in that they promote the world movement for the national and social liberation of peoples everywhere and work against the plans for war and aggression of imperialism and those who serve it.

36. This enthusiastic reception attests to the confidence which the peoples of the whole world have in the People's Republic of China, the impregnable bulwark of their revolutionary cause. The fact that they view the situation correctly also demonstrates that it is not proliferation, but the policy of aggression and world hegemony of the United States and the support given that policy by its collaborators, which are the cause of their concern and of the present international situation in which the American imperialists and their partners carry out acts of intervention and armed aggression in various parts of the world.

37. With regard to the so-called proposal of a nuclear guarantee, which is to be in the form of a Security Council resolution, no one can seriously believe that it will really be a guarantee favouring the peaceful countries that may ratify the treaty. One feels bound to ask who is offering this so-called guarantee. Is it the American imperialist aggressors, public enemy number one, and the revisionist traitors of the Soviet Union, who are their main accomplices in the vast conspiracy against the freedom and security of peoples everywhere? If so, what is the good of such a "guarantee" which rests precisely with two Powers which are also colluding against the peaceful Member States that are being invited to ratify the treaty? Who is going to guarantee those countries against this major threat? Against whom are these two great nuclear Powers offering this peculiar guarantee? Is it against themselves, or against another great nuclear Power which does not participate in the Organization? Obviously elementary good sense makes us conclude that the latter alternative is the only valid one. Therefore, in advocating this so-called "security guarantee", or what has come to be called "nuclear umbrella", the two Powers have mainly the People's Republic of China in mind. In other words, this is a further agreement in the formation of the American-Soviet nuclear military alliance against the

People's Republic of China and all countries and peoples devoted to freedom and independence. The provisions and the very wording of the agreement leave no doubt whatever about its sponsors' aggressive aims and about the seriousness of such a measure, which is designed, on the pretext of some alleged threat of nuclear aggression mentioned in this agreement, to promote the implementation of the aggressive plans that are being hatched by American imperialism and the Soviet revisionists against revolutionary peoples throughout the world.

38. The very fact that the two Powers are submitting this agreement in the form of a draft resolution to be adopted by the Security Council,<sup>3</sup> in which they enjoy a privileged position, is the best illustration of their aggressive intentions. Need we add that experience has furnished ample proof that the Security Council and the United Nations itself can act only against the interests of the cause of freedom and peace for the peoples of the world?

39. Obviously, any Government truly mindful of its own country's vital interests, of its sovereignty and security, and determined not to play these two Powers' game of political aggression and world hegemony, must seriously consider the consequences that could ensue from its acceptance of the draft treaty on non-proliferation and the proposal for "security guarantees", the criminal purposes of which are absolutely clear.

40. The United States of America is today the centre of world reactionism; it is continuously increasing and extending its aggressive actions, it interferes in the domestic affairs of peaceful countries, perpetrates aggressive acts and armed aggression in various parts of the world, supports the oppressive and aggressive policy of its colonialist partners and puppets, foments and encourages conflicts between nations everywhere, attempts to strengthen aggressive military blocs and to set up others, and frantically pursues its race in armaments, including nuclear weapons. It was no accident that on 26 April, the very day on which the American representative opened the discussion here on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons [1556th meeting], the United States carried out its biggest underground nuclear test, which raised to 129 the number of explosions of that type set off by the United States since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on testing.

41. For several years now, the American imperialists have been engaged in a savage aggression against the heroic Viet-Nameese people, whose valiant struggle to protect their country against the Yankee invader has earned them the sympathy and admiration of people throughout the world, including those of the American people. The American imperialists aided and abetted the Israeli fascists in carrying out last summer's aggression against the Arab countries which is still going on today.

42. Wherever peace is being threatened and violated, wherever the rights of peoples and nations are being brutally trampled upon, American imperialism, which systematically practises the policy of intervention and aggression, is primarily responsible.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*

43. In this savage and bloody action against the peoples of the world, the United States of America today has as its principal partner the revisionist leaders of the Soviet Union, with whom it has set up a new "holy alliance" aimed at stifling the peoples' national and social liberation movements and at suppressing the struggle the peace-loving countries are waging to protect their national independence and sovereignty. Today, the greatest threat to the world is the collusion of America and the Soviet Union to achieve world domination by those two Powers. This vast counter-revolutionary conspiracy entered into a new stage at Glassboro with the joint preparation of new plans and new plots against peoples throughout the world: against Viet-Nam, against the People's Republic of China, against the countries of the Near and Middle East, and against other countries in various parts of the world.

44. As we have pointed out, the two Powers also reached agreement on the provisions of the draft treaty on non-proliferation which we are now discussing. The events that followed the Glassboro plot provide the best proof of the truth of our statements about this vast conspiracy, which we denounced immediately after the meeting.

45. Faced with savage acts of aggression and oppression by the imperialists and colonialists, headed by the United States of America, and with the vast counter-revolutionary American-Soviet conspiracy, peoples from all over the earth are responding with ever-increasing vigour, constantly expanding their struggle for liberation, inflicting defeats upon the enemy and moving ahead with confidence and with an unshakeable faith in the victory of their just cause. Today, the symbol of the revolutionary liberation struggle is the heroic struggle of the glorious Viet-Nameese people, who have won victory after victory and have, especially of late, dealt crushing blows to the Yankee aggressors. That struggle is an enormous support and a great source of inspiration for the revolutionary forces throughout the world, and for the world-wide anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist liberation movement. The universal struggle being waged by the great mass of the black population in the United States is an integral part of the great popular struggle for national and social liberation against American imperialism and all its supporters. As a result of the gigantic struggle the peoples of the world are waging on an international scale, imperialism—and especially the United States of America—now finds itself facing serious and insoluble problems and is involved in large-scale general political and economic crisis.

46. The progressive and peace-loving States which are Members of this Organization are playing an active role in this historic struggle to destroy imperialism and colonialism, to protect the peoples' sacred right to freedom and self-determination, and for world peace and security. Consequently, we feel it is both meet and right to address those States to which we are bound by common goals, to ask them very frankly and sincerely to consider carefully the consequences that could result from their acceptance of the proposals put forward by the two Powers concerning the so-called "non-proliferation treaty" and the "security guarantees". In our opinion, their accession to those documents would not serve the principles of their peaceful, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist policy. Quite the contrary, such accession would be a dangerous step that could

seriously affect the principles of the sovereignty and sovereign equality of States, it would further open the way to American-Soviet nuclear blackmail and threats, it would go against the struggle and the vital interests of the peoples of every continent and it would seriously prejudice the cause of international peace and security.

47. We fully understand the concern felt by peace-loving States with regard to the threat being posed by the aggressive policy of certain Governments; however, the proposals made here have nothing to do with their legitimate aspirations. On the subject of West Germany, Albania has always firmly opposed its rearmament and the supply of nuclear weapons to it. Our attitude to that matter, as to the entire German problem, remains unchanged. Furthermore, it is well known that we have constantly denounced the inconsistency and treachery of the Soviet revisionist leaders with regard to the German question, and have pointed to the heavy responsibility they bear in the matter of the German Democratic Republic and the German peoples, and of the cause of European peace and security. However, it is clear that the non-proliferation treaty will not prevent West Germany from possessing nuclear weapons. We see proof of that in the equivocal wording and in the dilatory and complicated procedures of article III of the draft treaty, as well as in the statement made by the American Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, at the last meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group of the NATO bloc, in which he clearly stated that the non-proliferation treaty would not change anything and would not prevent the member countries of that aggressive bloc from continuing their co-operation in the field of nuclear weapons, and especially their plans for nuclear war.

48. The People's Republic of Albania has always held to a very clear and undeviating position of principle. We have been and we remain in favour of the total and complete prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons, as well as the complete destruction of the existing stockpiles of those weapons. The draft treaty, however, has nothing to do with those noble aims.

49. For the two nuclear Powers, the draft treaty sets forth only rights and no obligations, whereas for the non-nuclear countries it lays down only obligations which infringe upon their sovereignty and their basic rights. There can be no doubt that the treaty represents a cynical and aggressive act against peace-loving countries. As for certain purely formal obligations assumed by the sponsors of their so-called undertaking to proceed to disarmament negotiations, those, like the disarmament farce itself, are nothing but a swindle, a smokescreen to conceal the true aims of the two Powers and to mislead public opinion and lull the vigilance of the peoples of the world.

50. It must be realized that the proposal for "security guarantees" is further and even clearer proof of the fraudulent nature of the draft treaty on non-proliferation and of the aggressive plans of the sponsors of the proposal. Obviously, in those two documents, the American imperialists and the revisionist leaders of the Soviet Union are aiming to consolidate what nuclear monopoly they still possess, to pursue the nuclear arms race, to bring non-nuclear countries under their control and to continue to use nuclear threat and blackmail so as to act as international

policemen and lay the ground for the implementation of their aggressive plans against the revolutionary peoples of all countries, in keeping with their policy of world hegemony.

51. Therefore, to endorse the two drafts before us is tantamount to supporting, wittingly or unwittingly, the great world-wide American-Soviet conspiracy against the people. We hope that peace-loving Member States will thwart this sinister plan and reject both these drafts, which are contrary to their vital interests and national sovereignty, and to the cause of freedom and security for the peoples of the world.

52. The peace-loving people of the world will certainly defeat all the criminal plans drawn up by the two Powers. The historical process of the advance of human society is not being determined by the imperialists and their accomplices, but by the peoples themselves in their struggle for national and social liberation.

53. We live in the century of historic triumphs for the world-wide anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist peoples' movement, in the century of their liberation from all oppression and exploitation. Their struggle is growing and spreading and is sure to sweep away American imperialism and its supporters, along with their plans for world domination.

54. At this time all peace-loving Member States should close their ranks in the common struggle against the aggressive policy of American imperialism and its partners and respond fully to the legitimate aspirations of peoples throughout the world to freedom, independence and peace.

55. The delegation of the People's Republic of Albania expresses the hope that Member States devoted to the basic principles of the Charter and to the peoples' inalienable rights will defeat this piece of trickery in the form of a draft treaty on non-proliferation and its corollary, the proposal concerning "guarantees", which are the product of the great American-Soviet conspiracy.

56. Mr. DE MAGALHÃES PINTO (Brazil)<sup>4</sup>: Brazil has unequivocally taken its place among those countries which have consistently committed themselves to the cause of the banning of nuclear weapons, as called for by several General Assembly resolutions, dating back to the so-called Irish resolution of 1961 [*resolution 1665 (XVI)*]. This has been a steadfast position of our foreign policy, whether at this Assembly, at the Geneva meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee or at the councils on the regional level. By signing and ratifying the Treaty of Mexico [*A/C.1/946*], Brazil, moreover, gave witness to its determination to fight for the banning of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

57. The Brazilian delegation feels prompted to set forth its views on the important question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the light of the report submitted on 14 March by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and of the Soviet-American draft treaty, appended to that report as annex I.

58. Seldom has the United Nations been called upon to express its views on a topic with such a direct bearing on peace and security, mutual understanding and the progress and development of all peoples. From our deliberations here, there may very well emerge consequences and results likely to mould the future of international relations.

59. Hence Brazil deems it necessary, and even imperative, that the widest debate should be held on this issue, so that all Governments may have the opportunity to give expression to both their hopes and their apprehensions. We know that the matter is an urgent one, requiring prompt action but, likewise, we are aware of the fact that less than mature solutions and less than equitable measures may well aggravate the very inconveniences and dangers that we are seeking to forestall. The question is too important for us to make it contingent upon circumstances of a procedural nature, either of time or of place. The future of our peoples and of all nationalities is the very essence of our debate and thus we must carefully weigh the measures as well as the recommendations to be adopted. The non-nuclear world is squarely confronted with a dilemma and a choice.

60. The Government of Brazil considers the debates carried out at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to have been both useful and rewarding. Not only have they allowed for progress in the evaluation of problems and questions entirely without precedent for world public opinion, but they revealed in addition an increasing degree of awareness as regards the peaceful use of nuclear energy as one of the main resources to be applied to the process of economic development. Thanks to the work done by the Disarmament Committee, the General Assembly has today at its disposal more positive and comprehensive data for a new evaluation of the subject.

61. Despite the undeniable progress that has been secured, Brazil regrets that the formal necessity of the presentation of the report prior to 15 March 1968, as requested in resolution 2346 A (XXII) of 19 December 1967, did not permit a detailed consideration of all the important proposals, amendments and suggestions advanced by the majority of the countries sitting in the Committee at Geneva.

62. The draft contained in Annex I was submitted to the Disarmament Committee by the delegations of the United States of America and the Soviet Union on 11 March, three days prior to the closing of the Committee session. The Committee as a whole was thus unable to pass judgement of any kind on the draft. Although it has incorporated four of the twenty-seven amendments submitted to the Disarmament Committee, the text of annex I basically represents a bilateral understanding between the two super Powers as to the maximum of reciprocal concessions which could be made in order to meet some of the claims and suggestions of the non-nuclear nations.

63. The task now falling upon the Assembly is one of enlarging this maximum area of agreement to such a point that it will no longer fall short of the minimum requirements of resolution 2028 (XX), adopted almost unanimously by the Members of the United Nations.

64. The negotiations in which we are now engaged should be directed towards a true and lasting understanding

<sup>4</sup> Mr. de Magalhães Pinto spoke in Portuguese. The English version of his statement was supplied by the delegation.

between the nuclear weapon Powers on the one side and the non-nuclear nations on the other, so that we can actually proceed towards an acceptable balance of reciprocal rights and obligations. Negotiations would be meaningless without this understanding. The non-nuclear Powers are called upon, in the interests of international peace and security, to accept the limitation of some of the rights inherent in their sovereignty. The least that can be expected in the negotiations involving this multilateral act is, therefore, that these countries be given the opportunity to plead for measures which would preclude the possibility that a desirable renunciation of the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons imply an undesirable renunciation of the beckoning promises of advanced technology, progress and development.

65. In the course of the Disarmament Committee meetings in Geneva, the delegation of Brazil endeavoured to make it clear that the Soviet-American draft does not satisfactorily observe the principles enunciated in resolution 2028 (XX). By way of example, the proposed draft does not establish an acceptable balance in the mutual obligations of the five nuclear Powers and of the non-nuclear nations, and it fails to include any real and tangible commitment on the part of the five nuclear Powers to proceed with either total or partial nuclear disarmament.

66. On the other hand, it fails to recognize the rights and obligations of countries, such as the Latin Americans, which have already concluded a regional treaty banning nuclear weapons, reaffirming the inalienable right of all its participants to make unrestricted use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and most particularly for economic and social progress. By its Article 18, the Treaty of Tlatelolco [A/C.1/946] specifically permits the signatories to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under international inspection, either with their own resources or in co-operation with third parties.

67. The enforcement and observance of the draft treaty under its present form would have the result of widening considerably the scope of the Charter of the United Nations which entrusted the five permanent members of the Security Council with special powers and responsibilities. This was done with sole and exclusive reference to the problem of the maintenance of peace and international security. New prerogatives are now conferred, in a field which extends into economics, science and technology, upon the five Powers which carried out nuclear explosions prior to 1 January 1967, namely, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China. Restrictions which the Charter of the United Nations envisaged only in matters of international security would now encompass the field of scientific research.

68. The world is thus called upon to repose unlimited confidence in those five Powers, regardless of the undeniable fact that an absolute mutual trust does not as yet prevail among those five self-same Powers. It should be noted, moreover, that one of these five nuclear Powers so proclaimed and identified by the draft treaty under consideration is not a Member of the United Nations and is not bound therefore by the duties and obligations assumed under the Charter which, parenthetically, is not mentioned

either in the preamble or in the operative part of the draft. This confidence would have to be reposed in them for an initial period of twenty-five years.

69. The General Assembly of the United Nations must not forgo its grave responsibilities towards this problem and must endeavour to secure compliance with the basic principles set forth in resolution 2028 (XX). The General Assembly will have to seek to avoid the practical consequences of what might amount to an oligopoly of science and technology.

70. In the field of atomic co-operation, the non-nuclear States would be subjected to the obligatory control of the International Atomic Energy Agency, while the nuclear Powers would be exempted from this obligation and enjoy a quite different and privileged status.

71. On the other hand, the system of security assurances proposed by the three nuclear-weapon Powers does not represent a valid and balanced counterpart to what the non-nuclear countries are entitled to expect when they renounce the possession of nuclear weapons. The formal obligation on the part of nuclear-weapon States not to employ their nuclear weapons against the signatories of the treaty and not to threaten them with the use of such weapons would be the indispensable follow-up to the obligations imposed upon the non-nuclear nations. It should be pointed out that a similar commitment has already been undertaken, in so far as the Latin-American countries are concerned, by two of the nuclear Powers when they signed the second additional protocol to the Treaty of Mexico which states that

“The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries also undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America” [A/C.1/946, *Additional Protocol II, Article 3*].

72. I believe that the very least we can expect from the world-wide treaty on non-proliferation is that it should recognize the rights and commitments already accepted as a part of their positive international law by the Latin-American countries in their regional pact. On the other hand, the system of security assurances as envisaged in the draft resolution to be tabled before the Security Council does not create any commitment or obligation on the part of the nuclear Powers which are not already contained in the San Francisco Charter.

73. For all these reasons, the delegation of Brazil would appreciate hearing the opinions and views of the States which did not participate in the Geneva proceedings. In a statement, on 8 February 1968, before the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Brazil emphasized the over-riding need for consulting all the Governments since all of them will be expected to assume rights and obligations and to accept a strict system of controls under the terms of the treaty.

74. During the last round of meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva, the Brazilian delegation drew attention to several points of the draft which call for some observations.



75. We should now like to raise a new point. The draft treaty, as has already been pointed out, characterizes as a nuclear-weapon Power a country which exploded a nuclear weapon or device before 1 January 1967. Let us suppose that, at any given moment, a new State succeeds in carrying out this type of explosion. What would happen then? In becoming a party to the treaty, would this new nuclear State be admitted as a non-nuclear-weapon State, exempted from any of the rights and obligations assumed by the nuclear-weapon Powers? And, to be more specific, could this State transmit to other States data and elements of nuclear technology for belligerent purposes? In this connexion, from the reading of article I, we conclude that, although the nuclear-weapon States are prohibited from assisting, encouraging or inducing any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or in any other way to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such explosive arms and devices, at the same time they are left surprisingly free to “assist”, “encourage” or “induce” other nuclear-weapon States now and in the future.

76. The Brazilian delegation would like to reiterate here a question it raised in Geneva in general terms on the provision of article X, paragraph 2, which sets an initial minimum period of twenty-five years for the duration of the treaty. Does this not discourage all hope for the attainment of the objectives of “general and complete disarmament, under effective international control”, as set forth in resolution 1722 (XVI)? How can the General Assembly of the United Nations, which adopted norms for the negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, endorse a provision which is based on the admission, or at least on the assumption, that the arsenals of nuclear weapons can still grow and proliferate for an initial period of twenty-five years and that vertical proliferation can be allowed to proceed unchecked?

77. These few examples indicate that the text, in its present form, falls short of meeting the interests and rights of non-nuclear-weapon countries and contains serious deficiencies. It is incumbent upon the General Assembly in this or in other stages of discussion to seek, with the aid and assistance of the nuclear Powers, a valid alternative which will enable us to evade the painful dilemma which confronts the non-nuclear countries: either to accept the status of permanent technological dependency or to accept the risk of being deprived of scientific and technological co-operation in the development of nuclear research.

78. This task calls for patience, imagination, courage and determination. Above all, it requires frankness and objectivity, moderation and prudence, since the subject, given its importance and magnitude, transcends by far the domain of political propaganda and peremptory statements. The non-nuclear countries are here to defend rights which are assured them by the Charter of the United Nations and by principles universally recognized by international law. We realize that a perfect and absolute balance is not easily attainable in negotiations between nuclear and non-nuclear countries. The General Assembly, with its realism and political experience, does not require, in this particular, more than an acceptable balance. Concern with our progress and our future does not permit us to renounce this minimum objective.

79. Brazil reaffirms its support for the idea of a non-proliferation treaty which, fair and equitable, will effectively avert the risk of the dissemination of nuclear weapons while, at the same time, encouraging the widest possible use of nuclear energy in all its forms for the economic and social development of all peoples. The treaty which bans nuclear weapons in Latin America is responsive to this two-fold objective.

80. We shall now have occasion to hear the comments and suggestions of over a hundred countries which have not as yet voiced their opinions on the merits and shortcomings of the draft. If its co-authors intend the treaty to be in force for a period of twenty-five years, we should not start out upon such a long road in too short a time. In this connexion, we believe that the forthcoming Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, which the General Assembly has scheduled to be held within four months, will provide a natural forum for clarifying the positions of the non-nuclear countries with regard to the commitments they are called upon to undertake. The important thing is not to close the doors to negotiation prematurely.

81. Brazil firmly expresses the hope that the nuclear countries, on the one hand, and the non-nuclear countries, on the other, will succeed in reconciling their positions and points of view. This understanding is not only necessary it is altogether feasible, provided the fundamental rights of nations are safeguarded. We should thus have found the wisdom to place the interests of peace far above our existing differences of opinion.

*The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.*