



Thursday, 2 May 1968,
at 3 p.m.

NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 28

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*)

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/7072 and Add.1-DC/230 and Add.1, A/7080, A/C.1/L.421)

1. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now continue the general debate on agenda item 28 (a). Members may have noted that a draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.421 has been circulated under this item. According to that document the draft resolution is co-sponsored by twenty countries; now it is co-sponsored by twenty-one countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Lebanon, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. I call on the representative of Somalia on a point of order.

2. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Would you be good enough to include the name of Somalia as among the list of co-sponsors?

3. The CHAIRMAN: Somalia will be added to the list of co-sponsors. The co-sponsors now are twenty-two countries.

4. Mr. JAKOBSON (Finland): The task of making a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is perhaps the most difficult ever undertaken by multilateral diplomacy. It goes to the heart of the strategy of the great Powers and the security of all States. It affects the prestige and pride of all nations. It is interwoven with the most sensitive political relationships. Its technological and economic implications are far-reaching. It is not surprising, therefore, that agreement on a draft treaty on non-proliferation has been preceded by a long and complex process of negotiation and debate.

5. Close to ten years have passed since the first initiative in this direction was taken by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Ireland, Mr. Frank Aiken, and I should like to take this opportunity to pay

tribute to his farsighted statesmanship. In the following years we can record a number of significant achievements in international efforts to contain and to reduce the threat inherent in the very existence of nuclear weapons: the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, the unilateral announcements of the United States and the Soviet Union in 1964 of their intention to reduce production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and, last year, the conclusion of the Treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space [resolution 2222 (XXI)] and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [A/C.1/946].

6. Yet, year after year, in spite of ever more pressing demands by the General Assembly, agreement to put a halt to the further spread of nuclear weapons continues to elude us. Now, at last, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has been able to comply with these requests. This is an event which marks a turning point in the continuous efforts to bring nuclear arms under international control in the interest of a more peaceful and secure world. We have now come to the moment of decision. A non-proliferation treaty is within reach. We should grasp this opportunity without hesitation or delay.

7. The draft treaty attached to the report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee ^{1/} bears the signatures and the joint endorsement of the two co-Chairmen of the Committee, the representatives of the United States and the USSR. The third nuclear member of the Committee, the United Kingdom, has joined in the recommendation. The unanimity of these three Powers is a notable achievement in itself. In saying this, I do not wish to ignore the fact that two of the five Powers which the text of the draft treaty recognizes as nuclear Powers, the People's Republic of China and France, have not participated in the negotiations leading to the non-proliferation treaty. This creates a serious gap in the international order relating to nuclear weapons to which the treaty proposes to give a legally binding framework. Yet, it should be recognized that these two nuclear Powers in actual fact have not taken any action to disseminate nuclear weapons. They have, in practice, behaved in accordance with one of the leading principles of the non-proliferation treaty. It would not seem unreasonable to assume that they will continue to follow their established policies in this respect.

8. Looking beyond its material effects, the non-proliferation treaty will have a profound impact on international relations in general. It will have particular relevance to the key issues of European security and to the strengthening of the present trend

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex I.

leading from detente to increasing understanding and co-operation between European nations. It provides encouraging proof of the willingness of the leading Powers, whatever their differences, to work together for the maintenance of international peace and security. It will help to create the sense of mutual confidence that is necessary for the peaceful solution of other problems and for further progress in disarmament. It will indeed be a major step towards a more peaceful world.

9. I now wish to comment on some aspects of the draft treaty in the light of the discussions that have taken place in the Disarmament Committee. My Government, though not a member of the Committee, has closely followed its work through special observers in Geneva, and we have examined with particular attention the question of the link between the non-proliferation treaty and future disarmament and arms control measures. Obviously this is one of the central issues before us. Many Governments will decide their attitude to the treaty in the light of their judgement of its impact on the prospects of making future progress in the field of disarmament.

10. As far as my Government is concerned, we have repeatedly stated our conviction that the goal in nuclear disarmament must be to put an end to the vertical as well as to the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have given support to what has become known as a package solution designed to put a stop to the proliferation, testing and production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. All the Nordic countries expressed themselves in favour of such a solution in the communiqué of their Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Helsinki in May 1965.

11. We now find that, according to article VI of the draft, the parties to the treaty undertake to pursue negotiations

"in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

By the institution of review conferences, the treaty provides a mechanism for verifying whether its purposes and provisions are being realized.

12. These provisions form the link between the non-proliferation treaty and future disarmament and arms control measures. The link is no doubt weaker than many of us had hoped. In the Disarmament Committee's debate, a number of non-aligned countries have voiced the opinion that the draft is not satisfactory in this respect. They have made the point with varying degrees of insistence that there should be a stronger commitment on the part of the nuclear Powers to achieve disarmament—that the treaty should not limit itself to a declaration of intentions on the part of nuclear Powers but should provide for specific and enforceable measures of disarmament and arms control.

13. Yet the course of the negotiations has shown conclusively, in our view, that insistence upon making the non-proliferation treaty conditional upon other related measures might well paralyse action altogether. The non-proliferation treaty is not only an arms control measure of crucial importance in itself; it has in fact become a necessary prerequisite for

any future progress in the field of disarmament and arms control. As the Secretary-General has pointed out,

"... it is difficult to conceive of any agreement in the foreseeable future on any other measure of disarmament if it is not possible to reach agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons" [A/6701/Add.1, para. 14].

14. The Finnish Government firmly believes that this important step will in fact lead to others and that, from arms control, we shall go on to disarmament. This is not a matter of good will or good faith on the part of nuclear-weapons States. Nor is it, in our view, a point of confrontation between countries possessing nuclear weapons and those which do not have them. It is in the interest of both to make sure that the non-proliferation treaty will accelerate the process of disarmament and arms control measures, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons, and to work together to this end. If the treaty fails to achieve this purpose, it will not endure.

15. Let me now turn to some other aspects of the draft treaty, in the first instance its provisions on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

16. Within this set of problems, the question of peaceful nuclear devices has presented special difficulties in the Disarmament Committee. It is understandably of particular concern to a number of developing countries which want to be assured that they will have at their disposal the very best tools which science and technology can offer to exploit their natural resources. It is generally admitted, however, that any State which produces a nuclear device—however peaceful in purpose—has at the same time in its hands a potential nuclear weapon. For this reason all nuclear devices, without distinction, have been included in the prohibitions of the draft treaty. On the other hand, the draft provides that any potential benefits from peaceful nuclear devices will be made available to all parties to the treaty through appropriate international procedures without discrimination. In our view, settling this problem through organized international co-operation, as the treaty sets out to do, not only is the only technically feasible solution but also the only way in which nations without adequate economic, technological and scientific resources of their own can expect to share in the benefits which peaceful nuclear explosives may one day offer.

17. On other peaceful uses of nuclear energy, article IV makes it clear that the treaty is intended to promote the peaceful application of nuclear power, on both a national and an international scale. This article assumes special importance in view of the increasingly important role that nuclear power is expected to play in the years to come. Previous speakers have already mentioned estimates of the expected increase in the use of nuclear energy. It can be taken for granted that within a relatively short time the power generated by nuclear reactors will be a primary source of energy. These perspectives underline the importance of international co-operation in this field to countries such as Finland, for instance, which cannot expect to rely exclusively on national means to benefit fully from the progress of the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

18. For my country, this issue has in fact an immediate interest. Having harnessed all our available sources of hydroelectric energy, we have turned to nuclear power. Our plans, which have reached a decisive stage, entail the establishment by the early 1970s of a first nuclear power station with a capacity of approximately 500 megawatts and at least two additional stations by the end of the decade. The first nuclear power plant in Finland will be constructed in co-operation with other nations more advanced in this field. We are simultaneously engaged in negotiations on bilateral co-operation agreements in the field of peaceful nuclear energy with a number of interested countries.

19. These bilateral co-operation agreements also touch upon the question of safeguards. We have no difficulty in this respect. Our nuclear power plants, as is already the case with our research reactors, will be put under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Consequently, article III of the draft treaty, which institutes safeguards for all non-nuclear countries, will be neither a problem nor a novelty for us.

20. One of the basic resolutions of the General Assembly on the non-proliferation treaty requires that the treaty be effective. This purpose can hardly be fulfilled without adequate provisions for control. We are well aware of the particular difficulties connected with article III which were mainly responsible for the fact that the draft treaty could not be submitted to the Assembly last autumn. It would have been tragic indeed if, through failure to reach a compromise on safeguards, the treaty itself had been put in jeopardy.

21. According to the provisions of article III, only the non-nuclear parties to the treaty will be subject to safeguards. This aspect of the treaty has given rise to criticism in the Disarmament Committee. On the other hand, there is undeniable validity in the point that the application of safeguards solely to non-nuclear countries stems from the very character of the treaty, which is to guarantee that countries which do not possess nuclear weapons stay non-nuclear.

22. Fears have also been expressed, particularly on the part of those non-nuclear countries which have attained an advanced level in peaceful nuclear technology, that the application of safeguards in the manner prescribed by the treaty would give some nuclear Powers an unfair competitive edge technologically and commercially. The unilateral pledges of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to submit all their peaceful nuclear installations to international controls should go a long way towards allaying these fears.

23. The non-proliferation treaty will be the first international agreement of universal scope in the field of disarmament and arms control to embody an element of international control. In this instance, the task of instituting controls will be facilitated by the fact that the international machinery already exists in the form of the safeguards system of the IAEA. We are confident that the Agency, under its Director-General, Dr. Eklund, will be able to perform its important tasks under the treaty with integrity and impartiality.

24. I shall now attempt to assess the impact of the non-proliferation treaty on the basic issue of security. Much of the uneasiness with regard to the treaty stems

from the belief that the non-nuclear countries will be made to give up something for nothing: that by abandoning their nuclear option they will be weakening their security. My Government has consistently taken a different view. The President of Finland, Urho Kekkonen, when introducing in May 1963 his idea of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, based himself largely on the argument that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would not add to the security of a nation but would tend to increase the risks it faces.

25. This case is persuasively argued in the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons. The report states: "Having nuclear weapons on one's own territory might bring with it the penalty of becoming a direct target for nuclear attack." [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 84.] The report concludes that the solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in increasing the number of States possessing nuclear weapons, but rather in international agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, prohibiting all nuclear tests, creating nuclear-weapon-free zones and in other measures of arms control and disarmament. The non-proliferation treaty is a step on this road. By reducing the danger of nuclear war and providing an impetus for further measures of arms control and disarmament, it will increase the security of all nations.

26. Of course, each country will consider what effect adherence to the non-proliferation treaty will have on its national security. In each case the answer will depend on the assessment of the Government concerned. We know that, in some countries, the prospect of giving up the nuclear option by adhering to a non-proliferation treaty has, in fact, produced a sense of insecurity. This has led to a search for appropriate means to safeguard the security of non-nuclear States in conjunction with the non-proliferation treaty.

27. To a neutral country like Finland, this issue poses questions of fundamental importance. A neutral country seeks security, not by relying on the protection of one Power or group of Powers against others, but through a policy designed to keep it outside of all armed conflicts. A neutral country can, therefore, neither seek nor accept security guarantees which might weaken or destroy the credibility of its policy of neutrality.

28. But, obviously, this argument does not apply to the United Nations system of collective security. Acceptance of the security guarantees provided by the Charter of the United Nations is not incompatible with the duties and obligations of a neutral State. On the contrary, a neutral State has a vested interest in promoting the development of a peaceful and rational world order, based on the efficient functioning of a universal collective security system. It is indeed an essential element of Finland's foreign policy to do whatever is in its power to strengthen the peace-making and peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations.

29. We therefore welcome the declared intention of the three nuclear Powers to sponsor in the Security Council a resolution on security assurances, the draft of which^{2/} is attached to the report of the Eighteen-Nation

^{2/} Ibid., annex II.

Committee on Disarmament. In their statements in the ENDC, the representatives of the three Powers have indicated that, in conjunction with Security Council action on the proposed resolution, they will declare that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear State, would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear Powers would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the Charter.

30. The obligation to act in such circumstances is, of course, not a new one. It rests with every Member of the United Nations, and particularly with the permanent members of the Security Council. Nevertheless, the willingness of the three nuclear Powers to reaffirm this obligation in the present historical context, and in the manner proposed, is, in our view, of immense political significance. It may be too bold to say that this foreshadows the transformation of the balance of terror into an internationalized nuclear deterrent within the institutional framework of the United Nations. But it does carry the promise that the collective security system of the Charter, based as it is on co-operation between the permanent members of the Security Council, can be revitalized in the interests of peace and security for all nations.

31. Mr. Chairman, I have concluded my statement outlining the position of the Finnish Government on the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Allow me now to draw the attention of the members of this Committee to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.421, which has been circulated this morning with the names of twenty delegations—and I understand that two more names have been added today. The twenty-odd co-sponsoring delegations have been good enough to ask me to introduce the draft resolution on their behalf, and I thank them for the confidence they have shown in entrusting this task to the Finnish delegation.

32. The present group of co-sponsors consists of both nuclear Powers and non-nuclear States, members and non-members of the Disarmament Committee, neutral countries and members of military alliances.

33. The purpose and contents of the draft resolution which is now being submitted for the consideration of this Committee and the General Assembly are clear and straightforward. The sponsors and, I am sure, the overwhelming majority of all Member States, are convinced of the urgency and great importance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

34. They have considered the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament dated 14 March 1968, and are deeply appreciative of the historic work of the Disarmament Committee on this subject. They are convinced that the non-proliferation treaty, the draft of which is attached to the Disarmament Committee's report, will be an effective measure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. They are further convinced that an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed by effective steps on cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament and that the non-proliferation treaty will contribute to this aim.

35. The sponsors therefore commend to this Committee and to the General Assembly that they:

(1) Endorse the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the text of which is annexed to the draft resolution;

(2) Request the depositary Governments to open the treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date;

(3) Express their hope for the widest possible adherence to the treaty;

(4) Request the Disarmament Committee urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; and finally,

(5) Request the Disarmament Committee to report on the progress of its work to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

36. In commending this draft resolution and the non-proliferation treaty itself, the sponsors have acted under the conviction that the treaty is a vitally important arms control measure in itself, that it will contain and reduce the threat of nuclear war, that it will help to create greater confidence among nations, and that it will make it easier to agree on other issues. We must not fail to take this opportunity to move towards a more secure and peaceful world.

37. Mr. KHATRI (Nepal): My delegation has consistently supported the basic idea behind a non-proliferation treaty. We consider that such a treaty would be the first, and a very important, step towards nuclear disarmament. We further consider that the very fact that a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been presented by the two super-Powers, is a significant proof that the world has emerged out of the era of the cold war and has entered into an era of peaceful co-operation. It is a matter of great satisfaction to all peace-loving peoples of the world that the two super-Powers have exhibited their political will to work together on a treaty on non-proliferation. We wish to pay tribute to the two super-Powers for their co-operative spirit in accommodating as many suggestions from other members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as they considered possible.

38. My delegation believes that, although a non-proliferation treaty by itself cannot eliminate the dangers of nuclear war, it is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. We maintain that vertical non-proliferation is as essential as horizontal non-proliferation, if we are to save mankind from the scourge of a nuclear war. But we also feel that, if non-proliferation cannot be achieved in both those directions, achievement of horizontal non-proliferation would also contribute greatly towards international peace and security. We have already vested the five permanent members of the Security Council with special power under the United Nations Charter and by recognizing their sole right to remain nuclear we shall be vesting them with additional power. It is, in a sense, a realistic approach, although the non-nuclear-weapon States will have to depend entirely on the discretion

of the former in order to avail themselves of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for their economic progress.

39. The draft treaty has been accused of being discriminatory. But so long as vertical non-proliferation is not achieved, a non-proliferation treaty is bound to be discriminatory, in nature, and we must accept this reality. At the same time, we appeal to the nuclear Powers that, if they have found that countries are willing to sign a non-proliferation treaty only after being assured of firmer commitments regarding nuclear disarmament by the nuclear Powers, such assurances should be given by them in order to allay any doubt in the minds of non-nuclear-weapon States. The trend of the debate in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament clearly indicates that many members of the Committee have expressed their desire to receive from the nuclear Powers clarification of their intention to undertake concrete measures of vertical non-proliferation.

40. Currently, the non-nuclear countries in general, and the developing countries in particular, are experiencing the danger of a technological gap between the nuclear and non-nuclear countries. Underground testing of nuclear weapons has helped to further widen this technological gap in addition to the existence of an ever-increasing economic gap between the developed and the developing countries.

41. Much as we would like to have the draft treaty embody to a greater degree a generally acceptable balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, His Majesty's Government of Nepal, in the light of its policy of supporting any limited measure of disarmament and arms control, has nevertheless found itself in general agreement with the idea of the draft treaty. We earnestly hope that the treaty will be followed by other measures of arms control and disarmament with the goal of attaining complete nuclear disarmament.

42. Although we have expressed our general support for the draft non-proliferation treaty, we would have been happier if article VI of the draft treaty were less vague as to the commitments being undertaken by the nuclear Powers regarding the cessation of the nuclear arms race and general and complete disarmament. We would have preferred it if article VI had clearly reflected the commitments the nuclear Powers are actually undertaking. We refrain from proposing specific measures in view of the desire of the super-Powers not to be tied down to any particular measure and also in view of the fact that there already exists a wide consensus as to what these measures should be. I am referring to a ban on underground nuclear explosions and a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials.

43. A ban on underground explosions is a measure that has been ripe for agreement for a long time, but one that has remained unattained because those who have the power to bring it about have been reluctant to make the necessary political decision. We feel that, once the non-proliferation treaty is concluded, the political decision required for a ban on underground explosions cannot be postponed any longer under the convenient pretext that it is the other side which is holding up agreement. It is imperative that all States

be prohibited from conducting underground nuclear explosions, not just the non-nuclear Powers, in the same way that the 1963 Moscow Treaty prohibits all countries from conducting tests in the remaining environments.

44. Non-nuclear countries which adhered to the Moscow Treaty did so because its prohibitions were also applicable to the nuclear Powers and the exemptions for underground explosions applied to all. But now that the non-proliferation treaty would deny the option of conducting underground explosions to non-nuclear Powers it would amount to their having signed a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In other words, provisions of the Moscow test-ban Treaty would in effect be extended to cover underground explosions but applicable only to the non-nuclear Powers; whereas, under the Moscow test-ban Treaty, the nuclear Powers had pledged to take the initiative to reach agreement on underground test explosions and to be the first ones to sign it.

45. We therefore propose that, in order to balance their obligations, the nuclear Powers should agree to halt all underground explosions. If they are unable at the moment to agree on a treaty banning such explosions, they should, along with non-nuclear Powers, at least agree to declare a moratorium on them. I am assuming here, of course, that the question of peaceful explosions would be separated from the non-proliferation treaty. This moratorium would initially last for a period of five years and could be extended at the first review conference envisaged under the non-proliferation treaty.

46. Exemptions would be made for peaceful explosions that would be managed and controlled by an international body, perhaps the International Atomic Energy Agency. No country could then unilaterally conduct any underground explosions, peaceful or military. The sole discretion to permit peaceful explosions would rest with this international body, which would assess the feasibility of the proposed project and then request one of the nuclear Powers to carry out the explosion. This would apply equally to nuclear Powers. That is to say, if a nuclear Power requires peaceful explosion services, it too would have to get permission from the international body which might then allow the country itself to conduct the explosion or assign another nuclear Power to carry it out. Such a moratorium would, of course, have to be worked out in a separate agreement so that even if the moratorium broke down the treaty would endure. But this proposal most likely may not be acceptable to the nuclear Powers.

47. As we all know, the super-Powers are now engaged in the biggest and most formidable spiral in the nuclear arms race. While anti-ballistic missile systems are being strung across their respective countries, anti-anti-ballistic missiles and other dangerously sophisticated penetration devices are being perfected. All these require the nuclear Powers to engage in underground testing with increasing frequency and larger yield. This is underscored by the fact that on 26 April—on the very day we opened our debate on the non-proliferation treaty—the United States of America conducted its most powerful underground explosion to date. The explosion conducted in

Nevada was reported to be a hydrogen bomb with a yield sixty times greater than the Hiroshima bomb. The Soviet Union also conducted an underground explosion of a similar yield on 27 October 1966. The United States test was related to the development of an anti-ballistic missile warhead.

48. This shows clearly why the super-Powers are not ready to accept a ban on underground explosions and are liable not to accept our proposal for a moratorium on such explosions. But there is no question that such a moratorium will help the non-proliferation treaty by isolating the vexing issue of peaceful explosions. Countries which are strongly opposed to any prohibition on peaceful nuclear explosions by non-nuclear Powers might favour such a moratorium, if it also applied to nuclear Powers. Knowing that the super-Powers are not likely to accept such a moratorium for themselves, we proposed that, as a last resort and as a final concession, the nuclear Powers be exempted from the moratorium. The moratorium would then apply to non-nuclear Powers only, which would, for a period of five years, refrain from conducting peaceful nuclear explosions.

49. Since the question of peaceful nuclear explosions is at present an issue more of theoretical than of practical value and is liable to remain so for at least five years, this moratorium should not unduly worry those non-nuclear States which would like to retain the option to conduct such explosions. At the review conference that would coincide with the termination of the moratorium, the non-nuclear Powers could decide if they would be willing to extend further the moratorium. Their decision would naturally be based on the extent to which the nuclear Powers had satisfactorily implemented their pledge to promote the development of peaceful nuclear energy in non-nuclear countries and how well they had lived up to their promise to provide peaceful explosion services in a non-discriminatory manner and at advantageous cost.

50. In this instance, too, we suggest that the moratorium remain separate from the treaty, because we believe that there is a lot to be said for isolating the treaty from issues that threaten to delay it and for treating them separately.

51. To sum up, our suggestions regarding underground explosions are as follows: we believe that underground explosions should be prohibited under the treaty but should be prohibited for all. If, however, the nuclear Powers are not ready to accept this prohibition for themselves under the non-proliferation treaty, they might, along with non-nuclear States, agree to a moratorium on all underground explosions for five years, with the International Atomic Energy Agency responsible for the management and control of peaceful explosions exempted from the moratorium. But, if the nuclear Powers are not willing to accept even the moratorium, they would be exempted from it. The non-nuclear Powers would, however, accept the moratorium at the end of which they would decide if they want it to continue. The moratorium would be separate from the treaty.

52. Another vexing issue is that of control. The bone of contention here is that, while non-nuclear States are being called upon to accept international

surveillance in a technological and economic sector of growing importance, the nuclear Powers are not called upon to do the same. The whole problem could of course be solved if we could relate the control issue to a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for military purposes. If a cut-off were to come about, all nuclear reactors in all countries could be placed under the IAEA safeguards system to ensure against clandestine or unauthorized production of weapon-grade fissionable material by anyone. This is a simple and seemingly naive solution but should go a long way towards solving the control problem. Together with the moratorium on underground explosions that we suggested earlier, a cut-off would meet the demands of non-nuclear States who feel that these two measures should be a minimum *quid pro quo*. Furthermore, a cut-off would also bring about an end to the anti-ballistic missile race, because the installation of anti-ballistic missile systems requires large amounts of fissionable material.

53. We have put forward our suggestions in the belief that less emphasis should be placed on escape and withdrawal clauses and more on a firm commitment to extensive nuclear disarmament.

54. Now I should like to touch upon the question of the so-called security guarantees and, specifically, the proposed draft resolution of the Security Council on security assurances. We feel that the resolution, if adopted, might considerably dim the hope for a peaceful world that a non-proliferation treaty is supposed to create and would serve to keep the world under the constant threat of nuclear war. The resolution embodies a threat of nuclear retaliation by nuclear members of the Security Council against another nuclear Power that has been deemed to have threatened a non-nuclear State party to the treaty. But, when the international community has not even been able to agree on what constitutes "aggression", how do the authors of the draft resolution propose to come up with a universally agreed definition of nuclear aggression and the threat of such aggression? Furthermore, since four nuclear Powers: the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and France, as permanent members of the Security Council, have the right to veto any complaints against them, this resolution might be considered by implication by the remaining nuclear Power, namely the People's Republic of China, as being directed solely against it. Therefore, we feel that what is required is not a threat of possible nuclear retaliation by a group of nuclear Powers against another but the creation of an atmosphere of goodwill and co-operation among all nuclear Powers. This can be achieved by restoring without delay the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, thereby allowing that great nation, and nuclear Power, in its own right, to carry out the responsibilities vested in the great Powers by the Charter. By its definition of a nuclear-weapon State, the draft non-proliferation treaty has recognized China as a nuclear Power. This implies that even those countries who have consistently opposed the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations have recognized the People's Republic of China as a nuclear Power. We greatly appreciate this positive development.

55. My delegation is convinced that security is not to be found in guarantees or alliances directed against a third party. Guarantees and alliances have not worked up to now and it is hard to be convinced that they could work in the future. And even where they do exist, their utility is being increasingly questioned.

56. As a non-aligned non-nuclear State, we do not see any justification in seeking security assurances because, by so doing, we would be undermining the whole basis of non-alignment. Furthermore, countries who accept security assurances would be subjected to greater nuclear destruction in the course of a retaliatory nuclear strike. The concept of security guarantees also runs counter to the principles of resolution 2028 (XX) and especially the principle that a non-proliferation treaty should embody an equitable balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. For, how can one ask nuclear Powers to undertake measures of nuclear disarmament and at the same time expect them to extend security assurances with the same weapons that they are being asked to destroy?

57. My delegation considers that the best kind of security guarantee the nuclear Powers could give would be a pledge by all five nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries as well as against one another. The problem of security guarantees can be solved only by a complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

58. The CHAIRMAN: I now give the floor to the representative of Italy who wishes to make a statement on the draft resolution.

59. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I have asked to take the floor, not to speak on the substance of item 28 which is on the agenda of our Committee, but to make a brief statement in connexion with the draft resolution [A/C.1/L.421] which was introduced in today's meeting by the representative of Finland on behalf of his delegation and nineteen other delegations. I understand another two delegations have joined their names and, therefore, there are twenty-two sponsors.

60. I should like to inform all members of the Committee and to put on record that Italy was considering the possibility of giving its full support to the draft resolution and had earnestly wished to become a co-sponsor. It was our sincere hope that if we were to do so, other delegations might have been encouraged to do the same. Having this aim in view and upon instructions from my Government, I asked, through the good offices of Ambassador Jakobson, for a minor change in the text that is before the Committee.

61. The change practically consisted of two simple modifications of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.421. The first one in paragraph 4 of the preamble was to delete the words "the draft of which is attached to the report of the Eighteen-

Nation Committee on Disarmament". Secondly, in operative paragraph 1, I suggested the deletion of the foot-note making specific reference to document DC/230 and Add.1, annex I.

62. These suggestions, in our view, would have made the draft resolution more in keeping with the present stage of the consideration of the item before us. In other words, my delegation feels that these minor changes in the wording of the draft are fully justified by the fact that annex I to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee report is still under discussion in our Committee, together with other documents.

63. As you, Mr. Chairman, reminded us a few days ago at the opening session of this Committee, it is necessary to "provide every opportunity for every member ... to state his views as fully as he desires, with the hope that all this will lead to a fruitful and meaningful discussion" [1556th meeting, para. 11]. My delegation fully endorses that statement. The aim of my Government was, and still is, to give the best opportunity to all delegations, especially those whose countries are not members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to express their views on the item under consideration. We welcome in fact an exhaustive discussion that should take place in order to increase the number of supporters of the treaty and we believe that this can be done more effectively without anticipating the results of our deliberations.

64. I wish to make the position of my delegation unmistakably clear. Italy is in favour of a treaty on non-proliferation and it is our fervent hope that at the outcome of this session there will be such a treaty open for signature and ratification and adhered to by the widest possible majority of Member States.

65. As I have now indicated the purpose of our suggestions, I have only to add how much we regret that these suggestions have not been accepted and that therefore my delegation is not in a position to join the co-sponsors. My delegation will, of course, express as soon as possible its considered views on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

66. Allow me to conclude these brief remarks by recalling at this stage the well-known and long-standing position of Italy in favour of a prompt and positive solution of this problem which we strongly feel is of paramount importance for world peace and the future of mankind.

67. The CHAIRMAN: I understand that the changes which were read to the Committee by the Ambassador of Italy are not formal amendments; they are addressed to the co-sponsors. I leave it to the co-sponsors to ponder on these changes and inform the Committee of their opinion.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.