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**Chairman:** Mr. Ismail FAHMY  
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 28

**Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*):**

**(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/7072 and Add.1-DC/230 and Add.1, A/7080)**

1. The CHAIRMAN: Members of the First Committee may recall that on 19 December 1967, at its 1640th meeting, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of this Committee, called upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue its work and to submit to the Assembly a full report on the negotiations regarding a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

2. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament met almost continuously and, after laborious and extensive work, was able to submit the required report which is now before this Committee.<sup>1</sup>

3. Now, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2346 A (XXII), we are meeting here to consider the full report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and its annexes. I am sure that all representatives agree with me, that the draft treaty on non-proliferation,<sup>2</sup> together with the draft resolution on security assurances<sup>3</sup> can be considered, without any exaggeration, to be the most important document on which the United Nations has been called upon to act since the very inception of this world Organization.

4. Its importance stems from the fact that it deals with a weapon so dreadful and dangerous that any regulation which prevents its spread is a major step towards freeing humanity from a scourge which, since its creation, has aroused fear and terror unprecedented in history. It is true that the draft treaty does not completely abolish or

prohibit the use of that weapon, but it is equally true that it prevents its proliferation and, as such, constitutes in itself a positive element in furthering additional agreements on the long road of disarmament and, in particular, in attaining the most immediate and cherished goal, namely, the final prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

5. It is not for me to go into detail and elaborate on the horrors of nuclear weapons. This was clearly demonstrated in the report published by the United Nations in accordance with its resolution 2162 A (XXI) of 5 December 1966, dealing with the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons. In that report the eminent scientists who contributed to its preparation said the following:

“There is one inescapable and basic fact. It is that the nuclear armouries which are in being already contain large megaton weapons every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered.” [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 1.]

6. Bearing this in mind, together with other basic facts relating to the after effects of any nuclear war in so far as radioactive contamination and the long-term effects of irradiation and other genetic effects are concerned, it is imperative that the United Nations and every State bend every effort towards the gradual prohibition of the use and existence of this dreadful inhuman weapon.

7. The twelve prominent scientists from twelve different countries agreed in their conclusion, that:

“An agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as recommended by the United Nations, freely negotiated and genuinely observed, would therefore be a powerful step in the right direction, as would also an agreement on the reduction of existing nuclear arsenals.” [Ibid., para. 91.]

Furthermore, they said:

“Non-nuclear weapon countries, as well as those which possess nuclear weapons, need to work in concert, creating conditions in which there should be free access to materials, equipment and information for achieving all the peaceful benefits of atomic energy, and for promoting international security.” [Ibid., para. 93.]

At the end of their conclusion they stated:

“International agreement against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreements on measures of arms control and disarmament will promote the security of all countries. The United Nations has the overriding

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., annex I.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., annex II.

responsibility in this field. The more effective it becomes in action, the more powerful its authority, the greater becomes the assurance for man's future. And the longer the world waits, the more nuclear arsenals grow, the greater and more difficult becomes the eventual task." [Ibid., para. 94.]

8. All this demonstrates beyond any doubt that our task is unique. It is unique in so far as its impact on future developments is concerned. It is unique in the sense that we will be making history by taking the first step in undermining and, we hope, in liquidating the existing nuclear arsenals.

9. Having this in mind, I believe that we all agree with the Secretary-General, who said in his introduction to the annual report on the work of the Organization from 16 June 1966 to 15 June 1967, that he regards "the successful conclusion of a treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as an indispensable first step towards further progress on disarmament" [A/6701/Add.1, para. 14]. He continued:

"... it is difficult to conceive of any agreement in the foreseeable future on any other measure of disarmament if it is not possible to reach agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons." [Ibid.]

10. In singling out all these important elements, it is not my intention to disclose anything new; rather, my purpose is to put into focus the magnitude of the issues involved and the responsibilities which emanate from the subject matter under discussion. It is a topic which needs careful, serious, unemotional discussion and statesmanship. All this I expect from the Committee and its distinguished members in the hope that the treaty, if it is finally readied, will be open for signature by sovereign States in accordance with their own decisions freely taken.

11. Because of all this I will allow enough time and provide every opportunity for every member of this Committee to state his views as fully as he desires, with the hope that all this will lead to a fruitful and meaningful discussion. On the other hand, I expect that the members of the Committee will extend the same courtesy and act in a manner that will not prevent others from exercising their right of expression.

12. It is, therefore, not my intention to stifle the discussion; indeed I assure you all of a full debate in the hope that the Committee will make the right decision. In reciprocity I expect from you the co-operation which you have always shown me, and I, as always, will be at your disposal, individually or collectively, to exchange views on the best possible way of acting harmoniously.

13. In concluding, I need not remind the Committee that the peoples of the world are watching our deliberations and are certainly looking for a positive result to crown our acts.

14. I now call on the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs to make a statement on behalf of the Secretary-General.

15. Mr. NESTERENKO (Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs): Mr. Chairman, the

Secretary-General has instructed me to read out the following statement on his behalf:

"Ever since the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 1665 (XVI), on 4 December 1961, the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons has been one of the most important goals of the United Nations. The General Assembly has repeatedly called for the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a matter of urgent priority. During the intervening years, very great efforts have been made to achieve a generally acceptable treaty.

"It is hardly necessary for me to stress in this forum the grave dangers that will confront the nations and peoples of the world if the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not halted. If these dread weapons were to spread, it might set off a 'chain reaction' of proliferation with dire consequences for the security of all States, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear.

"As the distinguished representatives know, I have long regarded disarmament as the most important problem facing mankind. The report requested of me by the General Assembly on the effects and implications of nuclear weapons, which was prepared and agreed upon unanimously by a panel of international experts, sets forth very clearly and very starkly the threat of nuclear weapons. Among other things, it points to the high probability

"that any further increase in the number of nuclear weapons States or any further elaboration of existing nuclear arsenals would lead to greater tension and greater instability in the world at large" [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 82].

"In the introduction to my annual report to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly I stated:

"I regard the successful conclusion of a treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as an indispensable first step towards further progress on disarmament. In fact it is difficult to conceive of any agreement in the foreseeable future on any other measure of disarmament if it is not possible to reach agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons." [A/6701/Add.1, para. 14.]

"The presentation, on 11 March 1968 to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America of a jointly-agreed draft text of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, was an event which marked the culmination of years of efforts towards reconciliation to achieve a mutually acceptable compromise. I am sure that the fact of this compromise agreement by these great Powers will be welcomed as an important landmark in the field of disarmament. The Members of the General Assembly will, of course, understand that I am not commenting on the provisions of the draft treaty, which is a matter for them to consider, but am expressing my appreciation to the Co-Chairmen of that Conference for their success in having produced an agreed draft treaty, and to all members of the Conference for their perseverance and their most valuable contributions to the work on non-proliferation.

"All the Members of the United Nations now have an opportunity to express their views and opinions on the

draft treaty which has been submitted in the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I realize that there are some serious questions, including those concerning security assurances, which will require thorough consideration during the resumed session. In approaching those questions, the members of the First Committee will, I am confident, discharge their responsibilities with full consciousness of their interests and their obligations and those of the world community.

"I should like to express the hope that all outstanding issues will soon be resolved, so that an agreed treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will come into force at the earliest possible date. Thus the way will be open to achievement of the cessation of the nuclear arms race, to the dedication of nuclear energy exclusively to the benefit, not to the destruction, of mankind, and to general and complete disarmament.

"I extend to all of you my most earnest wishes for success in your work."

16. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): This is indeed an important moment in the history of the United Nations. We are now about to consider what may prove to be one of the most significant and hopeful steps toward world peace that we have ever taken together: the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

17. This draft treaty has been negotiated in response to repeated and overwhelming mandates of the General Assembly. It will serve three major purposes: first, it is designed to assure that control over nuclear weapons, with their catastrophic power of destruction, shall spread no further among the nations of the earth; second, it is designed to facilitate the way for all nations, particularly those in the early stages of economic development, to share in the peaceful blessings of nuclear energy, without arousing fear lest that energy be diverted to nuclear weapons; and third, it is designed to establish a new and solemn treaty obligation, especially upon the nuclear-weapon Powers, to press forward the search for nuclear disarmament, and thereby to create a much more favourable atmosphere in which to progress toward our long-sought goal of general and complete disarmament.

18. This treaty will do more than any treaty of our time to push back the fearful shadow of nuclear destruction. It will brighten the hopes of all nations, great and small, for a more peaceful world. I do not ask that these assertions be accepted uncritically by any delegation. The United States, as a major participant in the negotiations, is convinced that the substantial new obligations which we shall assume as a party to this treaty are far outweighed by the degree to which it will serve our national security and our national interests. We fully expect that every sovereign State represented here, in deciding its own attitude, will measure the treaty by the same yardstick: its own enlightened national interest and its national security. And we expect that the draft treaty will pass the test of such a measurement, for the purposes it serves are common to the entire world: purposes of peace, with which the fundamental interests of every nation and people are deeply in harmony.

19. As this process of measurement and evaluation proceeds during the present debate, many points will undoubtedly be raised concerning the detailed provisions of

the draft treaty, whose text is contained in the report that lies before us. Other points will likewise be raised concerning the related matter of security assurances, which is also treated in the same report.

20. In this opening statement I shall concentrate on certain broad questions which are important to us all, and particularly important to the non-nuclear-weapon States which make up the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world. These questions are as follows: first, does this treaty sufficiently reflect the participation and the ideas of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States? ; second, will this treaty increase the security of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States? ; third, will this treaty promote the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the developing nations? ; fourth, will this treaty help bring nearer an end to the nuclear arms race, and actual nuclear disarmament, by the nuclear-weapon States, and will it help achieve general disarmament? ; fifth, does this treaty, in all its provisions, and in its historical setting, contribute to a fair balance of obligations and benefits as between the nuclear and non-nuclear States? ; sixth, finally, will the interests of all nations be best served by prompt action on the treaty at this resumed session of the General Assembly?

21. In this statement I shall present in brief form the considered answers of my Government to these important questions. I start with the first one: does this treaty sufficiently reflect the participation and the ideas of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States? The answer is "Yes".

22. In tracing the origin of this treaty, the first point to recall is that the General Assembly itself gave us our first mandate for a non-proliferation treaty more than six years ago, in resolution 1665 (XVI), proposed by Ireland, and adopted unanimously on 4 December 1961.

23. In that same year, by resolution 1722 (XVI), the Assembly also endorsed the creation of a new negotiating forum for disarmament, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, comprising not only the then nuclear-weapon Powers and certain of their allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but also eight nations which are not in these alliances, which do not possess nuclear weapons, and which represent every region of the world. That representative Committee, meeting in Geneva, became the main negotiating forum for disarmament measures, including the present treaty.

24. In 1964, after the successful conclusion of the limited nuclear test ban Treaty, signed in Moscow in 1963, non-proliferation became a principal subject of discussion in the Disarmament Committee. Despite wide differences of view among the nuclear-weapon Powers, the negotiators were encouraged to press on with this project by the widespread concern which a great many non-nuclear nations expressed over the danger of the further spread of nuclear weapons. That concern was manifested, for example, in the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization for African Unity on 21 July 1964, which reads in part as follows:

*"We African Heads of State and Government, . . .*

*..."*

"1. *Solemnly declare* that we are ready to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or control atomic weapons;

"2. *Appeal* to all peace-loving nations to accept the same undertaking;

"3. *Appeal* to all the nuclear Powers to respect this declaration and conform to it".<sup>4</sup>

25. The same concern was further manifested in the Declaration of the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, issued in Cairo on 10 October 1964, which reads in part as follows:

"The Conference requests the Great Powers to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those States which do not at present possess them. It underlines the great danger in the dissemination of nuclear weapons and urges all States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to conclude non-dissemination agreements and to agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation of the existing stock-piles of nuclear weapons."<sup>5</sup>

26. Then, on 15 June 1965, the same concern was voiced by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, at its 102nd meeting, when it recommended, by a vote of 83 to 1, that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee "accord special priority" to a non-proliferation treaty.<sup>6</sup>

27. When the General Assembly met in the fall of 1965, the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee offered a resolution calling on the Committee to meet as early as possible to negotiate a non-proliferation treaty. It also set forth five basic principles to guide the negotiations:

(a) The treaty should be void of any loopholes for the direct or indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form;

(b) It should embody an acceptable balance of obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;

(c) It should be a step towards disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament;

(d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure its effectiveness;

(e) It should not adversely affect the right of States to join in establishing nuclear-free zones.

28. This important General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) was adopted on 19 November 1965 by a vote of 93 to none. My Government voted for it, and our representatives in Geneva have kept its principles in mind throughout these two and a half years of negotiation. We believe that the draft treaty fully embodies those principles.

29. Again, in 1966 and 1967, the Assembly addressed itself to this subject in resolutions adopted with virtual unanimity. Most recently, on 19 December last, resolution 2346 A (XXII) reaffirmed "that it is imperative to make further efforts to conclude such a treaty at the earliest possible date". For this purpose the resolution called on the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee "urgently to continue its work" and to report to the Assembly not later than 15 March, so that the Assembly could meet in resumed session to give further consideration to this important question.

30. That time-table was met. Six weeks ago, the Disarmament Committee submitted a full report on the negotiations regarding a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, together with the pertinent documents and records.<sup>7</sup>

31. The report contains the text of a complete draft treaty<sup>8</sup> jointly submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union as co-Chairmen of the Committee. This treaty text incorporates a number of views and proposals made by various members of the Committee. The report also includes the specific proposals made by various delegations to amend the text, as well as a list of the verbatim records setting forth the views of various delegations, indicating the extent to which they support or remain at variance with the text presented. Finally, the report includes an important related proposal on security assurances,<sup>9</sup> sponsored by the Committee's nuclear-weapon participants. It is to consider that report, *inter alia*, that the Assembly has now resumed its twenty-second session.

32. Thus it is clear that, from its very beginning, this treaty project has corresponded to the repeated, virtually unanimous, and increasingly urgent resolutions of the General Assembly, in which the non-nuclear States are of course in the overwhelming majority.

33. It is equally significant that the non-nuclear States have played a prominent part throughout the actual negotiation of this treaty. This is particularly true of the "non-aligned eight" members of the Committee, whose ideas have at many points strengthened the treaty draft and ensured its proper balance of obligations and benefits. This is not to say that all of the suggestions those members made have been incorporated in the treaty text. Indeed, all participants, including the nuclear weapon States, had to modify some of their concepts as the negotiations developed. The very important changes from the text submitted 24 August last by the United States and the Soviet Union,<sup>10</sup> to the extensively revised text of 18 January,<sup>11</sup> and finally to the text of 11 March which is now before us, demonstrate that this is a compromise text to which all participants, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, made their contributions. In addition, many non-nuclear nations not members of the Committee were able to make important contributions to the present text as a result of intensive consultations by the nuclear Powers.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, annex I.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, annex II.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, annex IV, Sects. 6 and 8.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, annex IV, Sects. 7 and 9.

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

<sup>5</sup> Document A/5763, Sect. VII.

<sup>6</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965*, document DC/225.

34. Let there be no mistake: The non-proliferation treaty, in the form in which it lies before us in this Committee today, is not a creation of the United States. It is not a creation of the Soviet Union. It is not a creation of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is the creation of all nations, large and small, which share the knowledge and the determination that man can and must and will control these cosmic forces which he has unleashed.

35. I turn now to the second question: will this treaty increase the security of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States? The answer is yes. The main provisions of the treaty bearing on this question are articles I, II and III. The first two articles, taken together, are designed to lock the door to nuclear-weapon proliferation from both sides. To this end, article I prescribes for each nuclear-weapon party, and article II for each non-nuclear-weapon party, certain corresponding prohibitions.

36. First, article I forbids each nuclear-weapon party to transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them, directly or indirectly, to any recipient whatsoever, whether that recipient be a party to the treaty or not.

37. Article II locks the same door from the other side by forbidding each non-nuclear-weapon party to receive the transfer of nuclear weapons, or of control over them, directly or indirectly, from any transferor whatsoever, whether that transferor be a party to the treaty or not.

38. Second, article I forbids each nuclear-weapon party to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State, whether a party to the treaty or not, to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over them; and article II, conversely, forbids non-nuclear-weapon parties to manufacture or otherwise acquire these weapons or to seek or receive any assistance in doing so.

39. Finally, all that articles I and II forbid as regards nuclear weapons, they likewise forbid as regards other nuclear explosive devices. This provision is necessary and essential because every nuclear explosive device contains the same nuclear components as a nuclear weapon. I shall return to this point in discussing article V.

40. These prohibitions are so comprehensive that, in the judgement of my Government, they fully meet the criterion established by the General Assembly in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 1965, that:

“The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.”

41. Having thus locked the door to nuclear-weapon proliferation from both sides, the treaty then proceeds, in article III, to make sure that that door will stay locked. It does this by prescribing international safeguards which have but one function: to verify the treaty obligation that nuclear material shall not be diverted to nuclear weapons; and these safeguards are to be governed by agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which already operates an extensive safeguards system covering peaceful nuclear activities in over

twenty-five countries and is in an excellent position to adapt that system to the requirements of this treaty.

42. Those are the essential provisions of this treaty in regard to the security of the parties. There are other provisions which are also important to this major goal—notably, article VII, which gives explicit recognition to the concept of nuclear-free zones in which the Latin American States have given the world such an important lead in the Treaty recently concluded.

43. My Government believes that this strict and reliable ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons will enhance the security of nations, and especially of non-nuclear-weapon States. Let me now submit to the judgement of the members of this Committee the essential reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion.

44. The reasoning is quite simple and in my view, incontrovertible. He who acquires nuclear weapons does not thereby gain any lasting security, because the situation which enables him to acquire them also enables his neighbour—perhaps his unfriendly neighbour—to acquire them also. In this way all the points of friction and hostility among nations, large and small, could, one after another, be escalated to the nuclear level. Thus, at enormous expense, the community of nations would purchase the most dangerous insecurity in human history.

45. No one knows these truths better than my country, which was the first to develop these awesome weapons. They were born in an age of global war—a tragic age on which, with the establishment of the United Nations, we hope and pray that man has turned his back for ever. It is not—I repeat: it is not—a privilege to be a nuclear-weapon Power. It is a heavy burden—one which my country has sought for twenty-two years to lay down in safety, by agreement with the other Powers that also carry it; and, as I shall show later in this statement, we believe this treaty will help us greatly to move in that direction—a direction which would be welcomed by the whole community of nations.

46. It would be idle to pretend that the non-proliferation treaty will in itself confer perfect security on any nation. But it will make all of us more secure than we would be in the absence of such a treaty.

47. If any non-nuclear Power still cherishes the theory that the option of some day “going nuclear” somehow gives it additional security, I suggest that that Power should consider the sobering report which our Secretary-General submitted last fall to the General Assembly on the “Effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons”. That report of our Secretary-General makes eloquently clear, among other things, that the spread of nuclear weapons to still more States “would lead to greater tension and greater instability in the world at large” [*A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 82*] and that these weapons require a very large and continuous technological and economic investment. And this, on behalf of my Government, I can verify with the greatest certainty.

48. The Secretary-General also stated as follows:

“It is hardly likely that a non-nuclear-weapons country, living in a state of hostility with a neighbour, could start



to furnish itself with a nuclear arsenal without either driving its neighbour to do the same or to seek protection in some form or other, explicit or implicit, from an existing nuclear weapons Power or Powers." [Ibid., para. 86.]

49. Finally, I wish to refer to one other aspect of this matter: the security implications of the relation between non-nuclear and nuclear-Powers. The United States fully appreciates the desires of the many non-nuclear-weapon States that appropriate measures be taken to safeguard their security in conjunction with their adherence to the non-proliferation treaty. This is a difficult and complicated problem. It is one to which the three nuclear-weapon participants in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have given their most earnest attention, and, as a result, they have proposed a solution which we believe to be of major importance. This solution takes the form of a draft resolution on security assurances, to be sponsored in the Security Council by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.<sup>12</sup>

50. The matter of security assurances is too important a subject for me to discuss definitively in this statement today. I do wish to emphasize, however, that, in the view of the United States, aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear State would create a qualitatively new situation—a situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Later in the course of this debate, my delegation expects to set forth in more detail the position of the United States on this highly important subject.

51. I now turn to the third question: will this treaty promote the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the developing nations? The answer is yes. This aspect of the treaty is covered in articles IV and V, which reached their present form chiefly as a result of the efforts of several of the non-nuclear and non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In addition, the safeguards provisions in article III have a most important and constructive bearing on this aspect of the treaty, as I shall show in a moment.

52. Perhaps the most significant provision of article IV is contained in paragraph 2, which lays a specific, positive obligation on parties to the treaty that are in a position to do so to contribute to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, especially in the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon parties—among which are notably the developing nations. The promotion of such peaceful applications was one of the major considerations underlying our proposal, fifteen years ago, to establish the International Atomic Energy Agency. We are very glad and pleased to see this obligation embodied in this multilateral treaty. We are well aware of what its implementation can mean for the building of new industries, the lighting of cities, the manufacture of chemical fertilizers, the desalting of sea water, and many other aspects of economic development requiring large inputs of energy.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., annex II.

53. On behalf of the United States and with the full authority of my Government, I pledge in this open forum and before this important Committee of the Assembly unreservedly that, in keeping with the letter and spirit of this treaty provision, we will appropriately and equitably share our knowledge and experience, acquired at great cost, concerning all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with the parties to the treaty, particularly the non-nuclear parties. This is not only a promise; when this treaty takes effect it will become an obligation under a treaty which, when approved by our Congress and President, will be, under our Constitution, a part of the supreme law of the land.

54. However, the importance of this treaty to the peaceful uses of the atom is by no means confined to article IV. Many people do not realize that there is an extremely practical reason why, when we close the door to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we thereby also help to open wider the door to the benign use of the atom throughout the world—particularly as a source of peaceful power.

55. The reason for this is rooted in a basic fact of nuclear reactor technology. It has been established that before the end of this century nuclear power stations may be supplying as much as half of the world's fast-growing requirements for electrical energy. But these same power stations would produce as a by-product plutonium, which can be used in nuclear weapons. And it has been further estimated that long before the end of the century—by 1985, in fact, a date close at hand—the world's peaceful nuclear power stations alone will be turning out as a by-product enough plutonium for the production of twenty nuclear bombs every day.

56. Faced with this awesome prospect, we have only three choices. First, we could allow this production of plutonium, with its terrible potential for destruction, to grow unchecked and unsafeguarded in nuclear power stations throughout the world. This is clearly an unacceptable choice to people everywhere.

57. Second, we could decide that the non-nuclear-weapon States of the world, despite their fast-growing energy needs, must do without the benefits of this extremely promising energy source, nuclear power—simply because we lack an agreed means of safeguarding that power for peace. This too is an unacceptable choice—indeed, it is unthinkable.

58. And third, we can agree on safeguards that will help ensure against the diversion of nuclear materials into nuclear weapons, yet will not impede the growth of peaceful nuclear power among nations that desire it for their development. On the contrary, it will create the very atmosphere of confidence that is so essential to that beneficial growth. This is precisely the course of action embodied in article III.

59. I have gone into this point at some length because there has been, in some quarters, an understandable concern lest the safeguards become an actual obstacle to peaceful nuclear development. As a matter of fact, paragraph 3 of article III directly meets this concern by stipulating that the safeguards shall not hamper peaceful

development. As proof of my country's confidence in this provision, the President of the United States announced last 2 December that, when safeguards are applied under the treaty, the United States—above and beyond what the treaty will require of us as a nuclear-weapon Power—will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States except those with direct national security significance.

60. Moreover, for the reasons I have given, we believe the safeguards will prove to be a greater spur to the spread of nuclear power. We look forward to the day when the International Atomic Energy Agency not only will serve as the responsible agency for safeguards under this treaty but will also, while performing that function, make a vital contribution to the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology.

61. Turning to article V, we come to an aspect of peaceful nuclear technology which is still in the development stage: namely, peaceful nuclear explosions. This technique promises one day to yield valuable results in recovering oil, gas and minerals from low-grade or otherwise inaccessible deposits in the earth, and also for large-scale excavations. The problem, however, is how to make these benefits available to all parties without defeating the treaty's main purpose of non-proliferation—since there is no essential difference between the technology of peaceful nuclear explosive devices and that of nuclear weapons.

62. Article V solves this problem by requiring that benefits from this technology shall be made available to the non-nuclear-weapon parties without discrimination, through appropriate international procedures, and at the lowest possible charge—excluding any charge for the very costly process of research and development.

63. My country has a large and expensive research and development programme in the field of peaceful nuclear explosions. Again, on behalf of my Government and with its full authority, I state categorically to this Committee that the United States will share with the parties to the treaty, in conformity with article V, the benefits of this programme. Insofar as the United States is concerned, when this treaty goes into effect this obligation too will become, under our Constitution, the supreme law of the land.

64. No country outside the United States, under this commitment, will be asked to pay one cent more for this service than our own nationals. Moreover, all indications are that, when this technology is perfected there will be no scarcity of explosive devices and therefore, that it will be possible for all requests to be handled, without raising problems of priority.

65. Let me add that, whether such services are provided through multilateral or bilateral channels, the United States intends—in order to ensure compliance with articles I and II of the treaty—that they shall be provided under appropriate international observation.

66. This entire subject of “programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” is on the agenda of the scheduled Conference of Non-Nuclear States, which will convene this coming August. On 18 December last I gave in this very Committee a categorical assurance that the United States

would support that conference. I reaffirm that assurance in the same categorical terms.

67. Without prejudging any decision of that conference, in my view it could perform a useful service, among others, by giving consideration to the question of the best means of putting articles IV and V of the treaty into effect so as to meet the needs of the non-nuclear-weapon States which are the beneficiaries of them.

68. I turn to the fourth question: will this treaty help bring nearer an end to the nuclear arms race, and actual nuclear disarmament, by the nuclear-weapon States, and will it help achieve general disarmament? Again the answer is yes. Once again, it was chiefly at the initiative of the non-nuclear States that this problem was directly addressed in the operative section of the treaty by the insertion of article VI. In that article all parties “undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith” on these further measures. This is an obligation which, obviously, falls most directly on the nuclear-weapon States.

69. Ideally, in a more nearly perfect world, we might have tried to include in this treaty even stronger provisions—even perhaps an actual agreed programme—for ending the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament. But it was generally realized in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee that, if we were to attempt to achieve agreement on all aspects of disarmament at this time, the negotiating difficulties would be insurmountable and we should end by achieving nothing.

70. However, this treaty text contains, in article VI, the strongest and most meaningful undertaking that could be agreed upon. Moreover, the language of this article indicates a practical order of priorities—which was seconded in the statement read on behalf of the Secretary-General—headed by “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date” and proceeding next to “nuclear disarmament” and finally to “general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” as the ultimate goal.

71. Let me point out that further force is imparted to article VI by the provision in article VIII for periodic review of the treaty at intervals of five years, to determine whether the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty are being realized. My country believes that the permanent viability of this treaty will depend in large measure on our success in the further negotiations contemplated in article VI.

72. The commitment of article VI should go far to dispel any lingering fear that when the non-proliferation treaty is concluded the nuclear-weapon parties to it will relax their efforts in the arms control field. On the contrary, the treaty itself requires them to intensify these efforts. The conclusion of it will do more than any other step now in prospect to brighten the atmosphere surrounding all our arms control and disarmament negotiations. Conversely, its failure would seriously discourage and complicate those negotiations—especially if the number of nuclear-weapon Powers should increase still further.

73. Following the conclusion of this treaty, my Government will, in the spirit of article VI and also of the relevant

declarations in the preamble, pursue further disarmament negotiations with redoubled zeal and hope and with promptness; and we anticipate that the same attitude will be shown by others.

74. A. President Johnson told Congress last February, in discussing the significance of this pledge:

"No nation is more aware of the perils in the increasingly expert destructiveness of our time than the United States. I believe the Soviet Union shares this awareness.

"This is why we have jointly pledged our nations to negotiate towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

"This is why the United States urgently desires to begin discussions with the Soviet Union about the buildup of offensive and defensive missiles on both sides. . . .

"Our hopes that talks will soon begin reside in our conviction that the same mutual interest reflected in earlier agreements is present here—a mutual interest in stopping the rapid accumulation and refinement of these munitions.

"The obligations of the non-proliferation treaty will reinforce our will to bring an end to the nuclear arms race. The world will judge us by our performance."<sup>13</sup>

75. I should now like to deal with the fifth question: does this treaty in all its provisions, and in its historical setting, contribute to a fair balance of obligations and benefits as between nuclear and non-nuclear States? The answer again is yes. This question is sometimes asked in a way which seems to assume that the right of a State to possess and further develop nuclear weapons is something greatly to be prized, and that the giving up of that right or any part of it is a great loss. As I have already indicated, in view of the burdensome, perilous and almost self-defeating character of the arms race, and the very tenuous security that nuclear weapons confer, this is at best a dubious premise. But for the sake of argument let me for the moment grant it, and see whether even on that basis the obligations and benefits of this treaty are in or out of balance.

76. The major obligation which this treaty will impose on the non-nuclear-weapon States is, of course, not to acquire nuclear weapons. A second obligation is to accept the safeguards procedures in article III:

77. Against those obligations by the non-nuclear Powers, the nuclear Powers will assume—or have already assumed by virtue of treaties already in force—the following obligations: first, not to carry out test explosions of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in the oceans or in outer space; second, not to place nuclear weapons in orbit around the earth, or on the moon or any other celestial body, or anywhere else in outer space, or in Antarctica.

78. Those obligations are already in force. Under the non-proliferation treaty the nuclear-weapon Powers will assume several further obligations, lengthening the list as follows: third, not to transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them, to any recipient whatsoever—this is a most substantial restraint in both strategic and political terms,

and in connexion with the sovereignty of the nuclear weapon States; fourth, to contribute to the peaceful nuclear development of non-nuclear-weapon States; fifth, to provide peaceful nuclear explosion services at prices far below their true cost; sixth, to pursue negotiations to divest themselves of large arsenals of existing and potential nuclear and other armaments.

79. Such is the balance of obligations. But we should also bear in mind—indeed, it cannot be emphasized too strongly—that the benefits of articles IV and V, on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including peaceful nuclear explosive devices, will flow primarily to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

80. I have listed these items in order to show that, even if we were to look on the negotiation of this treaty as some sort of adversary proceeding, with no element of common interest but only a balancing of opposing interests, then the balance in this text would not necessarily or obviously be in favour of the nuclear-weapon Powers. In fact, it would be to the contrary.

81. But that is not the way in which my country views this treaty. To be sure, the interests of all Powers are not identical, and where they differ some equitable balance must indeed be found; and we believe it has been. But, in a larger sense, the balance of opposing interests in this great enterprise is of quite minor importance when it is placed beside the overriding common interest of all nations in the sheer survival of the human race. Make no mistake, members of this Committee: sheer human survival is the elemental common interest that imperatively requires us all to work together to bring the nuclear arms race under control. This treaty is a great step in that vital effort. If we are to go forward toward the goal of general and complete disarmament, this step must be taken and taken now; and we can only take it together. Our common interest in doing this outbalances all other considerations.

82. I come now to the sixth and final question: Will the interests of all nations be best served by prompt action on the treaty at this resumed session of the General Assembly? Again my answer is yes, definitely yes. Time is not on our side. As we at the United Nations well know, this is a dangerous world with many points of international tension and conflict. Many nations possess the technical expertise necessary to develop nuclear weapons—and in a world without treaty restraints and safeguards they may soon be tempted to do so—notwithstanding the extraordinary drain on their resources which this effort would impose.

83. There is a further reason which impels us urgently to endorse this treaty at this very session. At this moment this troubled world needs above all to be reassured that *détente* rather than discord, will be the prevailing atmosphere in world affairs, in order that other points of conflict may be resolved by the preferred Charter means of negotiated peaceful settlements. The endorsement of this treaty now will be a major contribution to this *détente* and will improve the atmosphere for peaceful settlement of other conflicts, the resolution of which brooks no delay.

84. Time indeed is not on our side. Every addition to the number of nuclear-weapon Powers will multiply once again the difficulties of stopping this step-by-step proliferation.

<sup>13</sup> *United States Congressional Record*, 12 February 1968, p. H1038.



The longer we wait, the more difficult our task will become—until perhaps a day arrives when it will have become impossible.

85. We must master our fate—or fate will master us.

86. My country is deeply convinced that this treaty will accomplish its great purposes—if we act in time. The immediate necessity is that we should take the next step—the endorsement of the treaty by the General Assembly at this session. In this resumed session, as I said at the beginning of my statement, we stand at an historic point of decision. From this point, we survey not merely the immediate subject matter of this treaty but a much wider vista, embracing the long struggle of modern man to conquer the demon of fratricidal war among the nations of the earth. It is a point at which we cannot stand still, for events will not permit us to stand still. From this point we must move either forward or back.

87. If we insist upon a perfect treaty—each Member with its different ideas of perfection—then we shall be unable to move forward, for there is no perfection in this world. If after careful deliberation we insist that the last grain of uncertainty be removed, then we shall be unable to move forward, for there is no complete certainty in this world.

88. We are at a moment when all of us, united by our common interest in peace and sheer human survival, must together summon the courage to take this long stride forward. We must always remember the excellent advice given by the greatest of British poets, a poet who is the property of all mankind:

*There is a tide in the affairs of men,  
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;  
Omitted, all the voyage of their life  
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.*

Fellow representatives, this fateful tide is at the flood now. Let us take it now while we have the opportunity. It may never recur.

89. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): For a number of years now the attention of the General Assembly, of the States Members of the United Nations, and of the world's peoples has been riveted on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

90. The General Assembly has termed this question urgent and pressing and has stressed in its resolutions its enormous importance as regards the maintenance of world peace. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has given this question highest priority in its work. The socialist States, many of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and those States of North America and Europe whose Governments evaluate soberly the dangerous consequences of any further spread of nuclear weapons, have joined their efforts with a view to finding a solution to this question quickly, before it is too late.

91. The relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in 1961, 1965, 1966 and 1967 represent important landmarks on the way to a solution of the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Progress in

negotiations on this question was furthered by the appeal of the Cairo Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries to refrain from policies that might further the spread of nuclear weapons and to conclude an international agreement to that effect, and also by the resolution of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Countries solemnly proclaiming the readiness of the African countries to undertake, under an international convention concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, not to produce or acquire control over nuclear weapons.

92. The Soviet Union and other socialist States have repeatedly stated that they are resolved to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and have been active in that regard. In a declaration published quite recently—9 March 1968—at Sofia, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Soviet Union, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have urged an early solution of the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and appealed to all other countries to make their contribution towards such a solution and thereby towards strengthening world peace.

93. Numerous national and international public organizations—parliaments, trade unions, peace organizations, and the Pugwash movement of scientists—have called for effective measures to be taken to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

94. If we sum up the statements, comments and declarations of representatives of Governments and of the political and public circles of various countries in favour of the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—if we make an attempt to generalize the views of many people on this subject—we can say that all those who cherish peace and progress see in such a treaty protection against new threats, new dangers, which would inevitably have the most adverse effects on national life and which would arise if the problem of non-proliferation were not solved.

95. There are several basic facts because of which the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not merely an important problem but one whose solution must not be postponed. One of these facts is that even now a number of States which do not yet have nuclear weapons are rapidly approaching a level of industrial, scientific and technical development at which they will be able to produce weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, unless this process is halted here and now, nuclear weapons will spread irresistibly, as though in a chain reaction. And the Governments of those States which are now pursuing or have recently pursued aggressive policies are the ones most eager to enter the nuclear arms race. There are such States in Europe, and also in other parts of the world. Unless we stop the further spread of nuclear weapons, they will be the first to lay their hands on it.

96. The possible consequences of such a development hardly call for a detailed exposition. They are exhaustively described in the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the implications of the acquisition and further development of these weapons [A/6858]. Excerpts from this report were cited today by

our Chairman, by the Secretary-General in his note, and by the United States representative in his statement. No one could remain indifferent to the principal conclusion of this report, which was prepared by the most prominent scientists of many countries—the conclusion that the further spread of nuclear weapons could be a source of incalculable disasters for mankind. Using the precise language of figures, the Secretary-General's report also indicates what enormous expenditures the non-nuclear States would have to assume if they were to decide to produce their own nuclear weapons, thereby clearly jeopardizing their economic development plans.

97. The question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is thus central to the hopes of the peoples that in the world of tomorrow the threat of nuclear war will have diminished rather than grown and that the arms race, which imposes so heavy a burden on working people, will first have been limited and then stopped.

98. The negotiations on the preparation of the draft treaty were complicated and lengthy and not always smooth.<sup>14</sup> That preparation entailed a definition of very serious commitments by States, involving their most sensitive interests, among them the interests of their security. Consequently, every provision of the draft treaty required very close consideration, meditation and evaluation. Taking part in the negotiations, moreover, were representatives of States with different social systems and different foreign policies, States whose positions on many international questions do not coincide and at times diverge widely. Naturally, all this made the negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons extraordinarily complex. It must be added that during the entire course of these negotiations certain elements—everyone here knows who they are, for the USSR government has more than once exposed their plans and their activities—made incessant attempts to influence the course of the work, to make it more difficult to attain agreement, and to complicate the situation.

99. And now these negotiations have been completed. Having overcome all the difficulties it faced, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has carried out the General Assembly's instructions; the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been elaborated. This draft is the result of the collective efforts of many countries; it is a sort of fusion of opinions and wishes, considerations and specific proposals, put forward in the course of the negotiations by different States, some nuclear and some non-nuclear, some members of various alliances and some unaligned, States from different parts of the world, different continents.

100. Naturally, the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, having so broad a base, contains a number of compromises. But these compromises have not been attained at the expense of the essence, of matters of vital importance. Despite the complexity and variety of questions which had to be settled during the preparation of the draft treaty, this draft is clear as to content and precise as to formulation, and it deals comprehensively with all aspects of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

<sup>14</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex I.*

101. The first and, in our view, the most important feature of the draft treaty is that it closes all access to nuclear weapons to those who do not now have them, preventing them from obtaining weapons of mass destruction in any manner, directly or indirectly.

102. The provision in article I of the draft Treaty to the effect that each nuclear-weapon State party to this treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, signifies that the nuclear Powers solemnly promise not to transfer nuclear weapons to anyone whatsoever, or to facilitate possession of nuclear weapons by any one whatsoever, whether single non-nuclear States or groups of States.

103. In article II of the draft treaty the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to this treaty, for their part, undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

104. This particular requirement—that all loopholes allowing for the spread of nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly and in any form must be closed—was made a primary requirement by the General Assembly three years ago, when it formulated guiding lines for negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This requirement has been met.

105. Obviously, methods of control of the observance of their obligations by the parties to the treaty had an important place in the solution of the non-proliferation problem. The General Assembly also said that the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must contain acceptable and practical provisions to insure the treaty's effectiveness. The draft treaty prepared by the Eighteen-Nation Committee meets this requirement as well. Article III provides that control for the purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the non-nuclear-weapon States shall be effected by the International Atomic Energy Agency, that highly representative and authoritative international organization for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, under whose auspices outstanding specialists from different countries have worked out a scientific system of safeguards. The entire experience accumulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency in applying the safeguards system for nearly 120 nuclear installations in twenty-nine countries will now be used to control the observance of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

106. This is a trustworthy system of control, one which can be relied on both for effectiveness and for meeting the point specifically made in article III of the draft treaty, that

it must in no way impair the sovereignty of the States which shall place their peaceful atomic installations under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Agency's Statute provides that the Agency must conduct its activities with strict observance of the sovereign rights of States. That means that the control will be carried out for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment by parties to the treaty of their obligations concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but will never entail any interference in their domestic affairs, including their peaceful activities in the field of atomic energy. In addition, the preamble of the treaty, in accordance with the wishes of a number of non-nuclear-weapon States which took part in the negotiations, specifically expresses support for the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to effect verification as far as possible by using automatic means of control corresponding to the present level of technology and science.

107. There is one other aspect which is of great importance to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. What will the conclusion of a corresponding international treaty mean? Will it be an isolated measure to limit the arms race, one single measure to be followed by no others? Or will it be a stage in the process of stopping the arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons? Or, better still, will it be a component of a broad complex of disarmament measures? The General Assembly has clearly stated that in its view, the non-proliferation treaty should be a step in the direction of general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. I should like to comment on this point.

108. No one would deny that it would be best to settle, at one and the same time, all disarmament questions—non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, cessation of manufacture of nuclear weapons, destruction of existing stockpiles, and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union would be prepared for such a decision. More than that, it is prepared to accept general and complete disarmament without delay. A few years ago, the USSR Government submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for consideration a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

109. However, our long experience of the consideration of disarmament questions in the General Assembly, in the United Nations Disarmament Commission and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament teaches us that the idea of a comprehensive solution of nuclear disarmament problems should not be allowed to stand in the way of reaching agreement on separate partial measures. Attempts to link the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with other measures to curtail the nuclear arms race and effect disarmament might only result in an impasse, in a situation in which neither the question of non-proliferation nor disarmament questions would be resolved.

110. Consequently, it would be wisest now to do that which is now feasible—conclude a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a separate measure to limit the nuclear arms race, but not stop there.

111. The conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would not terminate, but urgently and

in a spirit of good faith continue, something that has already been begun and has given results beneficial for all. The 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water has to some extent limited opportunities for further development of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in Outer Space has prevented nuclear weapons from being placed in orbit in the atmosphere and outer space and from being placed on the moon and other celestial bodies. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be the next and even more important step towards limiting the nuclear arms race. The next, but not the last. The conclusion of such a treaty must help to bring about more favourable conditions for a further effort to stop the arms race and carry out effective measures to prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons.

112. Precisely this approach, both realistic and far-sighted, is to be found in the draft treaty whose article VI directly and categorically commits the parties to the treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

113. That is a significant and important step. The commitments assumed by the States parties to the treaty will make it incumbent upon them, and above all upon the nuclear Powers, to take definite practical action. On the instructions of the USSR Government, my delegation declares from this rostrum that the USSR, which, ever since nuclear weapons made their appearance, has been consistently advocating their prohibition and elimination, is ready for such action. The Soviet Union is ready to pursue in good faith negotiations on a wide range of disarmament questions, seeking constructive agreement on them, as it has done during the negotiations on banning nuclear weapons tests, refraining from launching nuclear weapons into orbit, and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

114. What course should now be pursued in disarmament negotiations? The Soviet Union sees a number of possible courses which could prove fruitful, on condition, naturally, that the other parties to the negotiations will also pursue them. Pride of place belongs, we believe, to the conclusion of an international convention banning the use of nuclear weapons. This question has long been ripe for solution. In September 1967, as everyone remembers, the USSR Government submitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session a draft convention on the subject [A/6834] which, according to the General Assembly's decision, is now being studied by all States Members of the United Nations. We are convinced that it would be in the interest of strengthening world peace and further reducing the threat of nuclear war to conclude an international convention banning the use of nuclear weapons shortly after a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been signed.

115. The Soviet Union is ready to enter into negotiations concerning other measures, including cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, reduction of stockpiles of such weapons, and subsequent complete prohibition and elimination of such weapons under appropriate inter-

national control; limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons; prohibition of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond national borders; limitation of areas open to nuclear submarines; ban of underground nuclear testing; prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons; elimination of military bases in foreign territory; and institution in an appropriate form of a régime for the sea bed and ocean floor ensuring their uses for peaceful purposes only. As heretofore, the Soviet Union is ready actively to collaborate in the execution of practical measures of regional disarmament, including the creation of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world.

116. Realization of these and other measures for the limitation and cessation of the arms race would produce a situation in which general and complete disarmament, i.e., the demobilization of all armed forces and the destruction of all weapons owned by States, would no longer be a remote although an attractive goal, but a practical and topical matter which could at last be attacked in a practical way.

117. My delegation appeals to all the parties to the forthcoming negotiations to show good faith in attempting to reach agreement and conclude new and constructive treaties on measures to curtail and stop the arms race. We believe that the Eighteen-Nation Committee must, as soon as possible, and with the maximum of endeavour, resume its work on and achieve prompt progress towards, a solution of the disarmament problem.

118. The conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will open up new prospects not only for disarmament negotiations, but for developing international collaboration in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, a development that should result in unprecedented progress. In accordance with the wishes of the non-nuclear States, wishes which my country understands and shares, the draft treaty in its article IV on the one hand, guarantees the inalienable right of all the parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technical information in this field, while on the other hand, it obligates the nuclear Powers to co-operate in contributing to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially with countries which do not possess nuclear weapons.

119. We believe that a good premise is thus created for new broad programmes of collaboration between nuclear and non-nuclear States in the uses of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Consequently, the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will also be a treaty spreading the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the greatest possible number of States.

120. We attach particular importance to the fact that this would make possible such peaceful uses of nuclear energy as nuclear explosions in carrying out large engineering projects—building canals and tunnels, uncovering mineral deposits, etc. Even today, when the techniques for using nuclear energy for such purposes are only being worked out by the nuclear Powers, one can say with confidence that in the future such work will acquire great importance for the

economic progress of countries. It is obvious that it is the right of every State to reserve for itself the possibility of using nuclear explosions for the purposes of economic development.

121. Recognition of this inalienable right was taken as a starting point in the negotiations when the parties considered the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. We all know, however, that this is not a simple question. From the point of view of purpose, a nuclear explosion carried out while perfecting a new warhead for an intercontinental missile and a nuclear explosion in building a large irrigation canal are not, of course, the same thing. But from the technological point of view there is no difference between the nuclear explosive devices used in nuclear weapons and similar devices used for peaceful purposes. That means that States which carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are at the same time States possessing nuclear weapons.

122. Since such a development would be diametrically opposed to the very essence of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and would provide convenient loopholes for those who might decide to manufacture their own nuclear weapons on the pretext that they were making nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, a solution had to be found which would offer a real opportunity to non-nuclear States to use nuclear explosions for economic development without dealing a blow to the aim of the non-proliferation treaty. Many efforts were required to find a solution for this intricate question, and in the end that was achieved.

123. The draft treaty provides for setting up a system for international collaboration for the peaceful application of nuclear explosions and states specifically that such collaboration—whether bilateral or through an appropriate international organ—shall not be discriminatory. There is also a provision to the effect that the charge for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. We find this provision both practical and beneficial—both because it gives non-nuclear-weapon States access to explosive devices for peaceful purposes and because those States will be offered such devices at a considerable financial advantage to them.

124. As the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is solved, the question of strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States arises. To a large extent, that question is resolved by the treaty itself, since the treaty prevents any further spread of nuclear weapons. The more non-nuclear-weapon States sign the non-proliferation treaty, the greater will be their assurance that nuclear weapons will never be used by any parties to a conflict among States, whether in Asia, Africa, Latin America, or elsewhere. They simply will not have nuclear weapons.

125. Nevertheless, in the course of the negotiations some non-nuclear States drew attention to yet another factor affecting their security in the conditions that would obtain after the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty. The point they raised is the need to safeguard the non-nuclear-weapon States which sign the non-proliferation treaty from the threat of a nuclear attack by one of the countries already possessing nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, which attached due importance to the matter, submitted to



the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament proposals for what it deems to be the best way to solve this problem.

126. In the end it was agreed that supplementary measures to strengthen the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be taken separately from the treaty. They would take the form of a special Security Council resolution, the draft of which has been agreed to by three nuclear Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom.<sup>15</sup> In that resolution the Security Council would state that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

127. If and when the Security Council adopts this resolution, the Soviet Union intends to make a special declaration to the effect that any State which commits aggression with nuclear weapons or threatens such aggression should know that its actions will be effectively repulsed by means of the measures that must be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress aggression or avert the threat of aggression. As far as we know, two other permanent members of the Security Council—the United States and the United Kingdom—intend to make similar declarations.

128. Such a resolution by the Security Council, in conjunction with analogous special declarations by three nuclear permanent members of the Council, will be a new and vital element guaranteeing the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, as it will be a step unprecedented in the history of the United Nations.

129. I should like to comment briefly on the forthcoming Conference of non-nuclear-weapon States. In December 1967 my delegation voted for General Assembly resolution 2346 B (XXII) setting the time for the Conference. We still support that resolution, in the anticipation that the Conference, which is to be held in August-September, will, like the non-proliferation treaty, aim at closing up all the possible loopholes through which nuclear weapons might spread over the world, helping to ensure that all nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes and for the progress of mankind, and seeing that active efforts are made to achieve agreement among States regarding specific disarmament measures. I am confident that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty will make an excellent starting point for the work of the Conference.

130. Now that the Eighteen-Nation Committee has completed its preparation of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the question is frequently asked whether this treaty is more advantageous to the nuclear or the non-nuclear Powers. Sometimes this question may be asked without any ulterior motive; but in some cases it is clearly prompted by the desire to set the non-nuclear-weapon States and the States possessing nuclear weapons apart from each other and thereby create an unhealthy atmosphere and hamper the conclusion of the

treaty. If we approach the question calmly and dispassionately, we cannot but recognize that conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would, in many respects, be of advantage both to the nuclear and the non-nuclear States, to the peoples of all lands, and to mankind as a whole.

131. For example, whose interests would be served by one effect of the treaty which is to avert any increase in the threat of nuclear war? Plainly, the interests of all peoples, all States, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons. Whose interests would be served by the lessening of international tension and strengthening of international trust which would result from the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty? Obviously, the interests of all those States which are dedicated to the maintenance of a lasting peace. Who is more interested in concluding a non-proliferation treaty and thereby taking a long step towards limiting the arms race and giving new impetus to disarmament negotiations—the nuclear or the non-nuclear States? In our opinion, the two groups are equally interested.

132. Summing up, it may be said that the conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will give the non-nuclear countries certain substantial advantages which they do not enjoy now and will not enjoy unless the treaty is concluded. These include greater opportunities for using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and greater national security than they now have.

133. All these features are in full accord with the General Assembly's appeal to the effect that the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should reflect an acceptable balance of the mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers.

134. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is advantageous to all States. It does not merely meet the needs of certain individual countries or separate groups of countries united by geographical, social, military or political bonds—it is needed by all mankind.

135. Now, who would not find the non-proliferation treaty to his advantage? Who will lose if and when it is concluded? Only those who are eager to lay their hands on nuclear weapons to carry out their mad plans of aggression; only those who rely on nuclear weapons as a means of blackmailing and bringing pressure to bear on their neighbours, who stake their future on an increase in international tension, exacerbation of relations among States, and realization of their insane revanchist dreams.

136. But all other peoples have no such opportunistic aims. They need peace, they need tranquillity to solve the economic and social problems facing them, to carry out radical innovations which will change the face of our planet in the coming decades and will blaze the path to a happy future. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will further these lofty purposes.

137. The USSR delegation urges the delegations of all States Members of the United Nations to approve the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, annex II.