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Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEMS 28, 29, 30 AND 31

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons:

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/6951-DC/229; A/C.1/955; A/C.1/L.416);

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Question of general and complete disarmament (*continued*):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/6951-DC/229; A/C.1/955; A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1, L.412 and Add.1, L.415 and L.417);

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons (A/6858 and Corr.1; A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-3)

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/6951-DC/229; A/C.1/955; A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1-2)

Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/6951-DC/229; A/C.1/955)

1. The CHAIRMAN: As previously agreed, from today the Committee will take up the four items relating to disarmament—items 28, 29, 30 and 31—concurrently. It is understood that all representatives are free in their statements to comment on any or all of these items at a time.

2. For the information of the Committee, Belgium has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-3.

3. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*translated from French*): In its interim report to the General Assembly [A/6951-DC/229], the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament reported that it had not been able to devote sufficient time to general and complete disarmament, since it had concentrated its major efforts on the elaboration of a non-proliferation treaty.

4. The evolution of negotiations on general and complete disarmament, which began with resolution 1378 (XIV) adopted in November 1959 at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, consists of promises, hopes, discouragement and setbacks in the search for a solution. In spite of the difficulties in the way of the efforts to reach an agreement or treaty on general and complete disarmament, the international community has witnessed renewed efforts and a determination to overcome all obstacles which has generated new faith in the ability of man to solve the difficult and serious problem created by the development of the community.

5. One expression of that faith is without any doubt the resumption of the disarmament talks during the sessions of the United Nations. Another is the very existence of the United Nations.

6. At the same time, we are gratified to note in the interim report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee that "the Committee has concentrated its major effort on the elaboration of a non-proliferation treaty." It would be useful if the Eighteen-Nation Committee could continue its work with a view to negotiating a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Apparently it intends to submit a full report, including all relevant documents, as soon as possible. This fresh development brings a new ray of hope that general and complete disarmament may be approached via a significant side issue; but this is not, of course, general and complete disarmament itself.

7. From time immemorial, man has tried to get rid of armaments as a means of waging and conducting wars, in the hope that even in times of dispute and misunderstanding, the point will be reached where countries will find themselves unable to wage war. They will be forced to solve their problems by means of negotiations and to seek political solutions without resorting to armed conflict.

8. But with the invention and use of nuclear weapons a new dimension has been added to the already appalling destructive force of modern conventional weapons. It would be hard to find a more apt expression of the danger which confronts the modern world and mankind as a whole than that in the report of the Secretary-General on the Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons [A/6858]. What the world might expect from a conflict in which nuclear weapons were used is described in paragraph 19 of the report as follows:

“Against this background of death, injury, destruction and fire, one can see the whole life of a great city being completely disrupted by the explosion of a single megaton bomb. As an organized unit, capable of contributing to a war effort, it would cease to have any meaning. The survivors in different parts of the city would either be in a state of shocked immobility or would be wandering about trying to find some place better than the one where they happened to be when the bomb went off, searching for food, for better shelter, for relatives, for help of any kind. The problems confronting the community would be immeasurably greater than any experience of the Second World War.”

9. The conclusion to be drawn from the points made in the report is that everything that is needed must be done to make a third world war, in which nuclear weapons would inevitably be used, utterly impossible.

10. The value of the report lies also in its denunciation of attempts to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons for so-called tactical purposes. Paragraph 35 reads:

“... it is clear enough that the destruction and disruption which would result from so-called tactical nuclear war would hardly differ from the effects of strategic war in the area concerned.”

11. What is perhaps not sufficiently brought out in the report, which does not deal with purely strategic and tactical military matters and the war psychosis that erupts at the moment when the escalation of “tactical” nuclear weapons is envisaged, is that at that juncture the situation on the battlefield would no longer be in the hands of statesmen but in those of military strategists. In some countries—as witness the example of the escalation of the war of aggression by the United States in Viet-Nam—these military strategists might decide in favour of almost instantaneous strategic escalation.

12. Bearing in mind the military bases already installed on foreign soil which would unquestionably be used, and hence, like the countries where they are located, would become targets in any nuclear exchange, it is hard even to imagine the catastrophe that would overtake all mankind.

13. I wish to emphasize here that the military bases set up by certain countries across the world create greater tension and mistrust both among nations generally and between the countries where the bases are installed. The foreign military bases scattered over the territories of various countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute a danger for those countries and also for the whole of the region where they are located.

14. In these circumstances it is important for the local populations that such foreign military bases should be liquidated. This is a vital factor in the peaceful development of international relations. Failing the elimination of the military bases scattered over the different continents it is scarcely conceivable that if a catastrophe occurred in one particular part of the world it would not immediately engulf the whole world.

15. The theories propounded by certain military circles concerning the so-called “clean” atom bomb will not change the situation. According to the Secretary-General’s report

“... if ‘clean’ weapons were available for battlefield use it is difficult to believe that similar chaos would not ultimately be produced.” [Ibid., para. 36.]

16. The Secretary-General’s report is manifestly important and timely at a moment when the efforts of the socialist and uncommitted nations, both in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and outside, to produce a treaty on general and complete disarmament are meeting with stubborn resistance on the part of the United States and some of its allies. Hence the delegation of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria unreservedly supports the draft resolution submitted by Poland and other countries recommending to all Governments the wide distribution of the report and its publication in their respective languages, as appropriate, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents [A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-3].

17. We feel that once public opinion and the man-in-the-street become aware of the potential danger inherent in the use of nuclear weapons, they will do their utmost to persuade both their own and certain other Governments to bow to the demand of world public opinion for general and complete disarmament, and in particular and in the first instance, the elimination of nuclear weapons.

18. In these circumstances it is not difficult to understand why the Government of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, reflecting the unanimous will of the Bulgarian people to fashion a better life through the socialist structure, is anxious to contribute as far as it is able to any constructive proposals for practical measures in the field of disarmament. In the view of my Government, a programme of general and complete disarmament must include first and foremost the immediate and unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons, an end to their production, and the destruction of all existing stockpiles under strict international control and within definite time-limits.

19. On this premise, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria gave its full support to the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union on 23 September 1960 at the fifteenth session of the General

Assembly.¹ We consider that instrument still as valid and vital as ever, and capable of serving as a basis for discussion of this question, as has frequently been stressed.

20. The suggested amendments and changes to the original draft, including that concerning the so-called “nuclear umbrella”, were intended to meet half-way certain objections made by the Western countries, in particular the United States. It will be recalled that the idea of the “nuclear umbrella” is to maintain minimum stocks of nuclear weapons, intercontinental missiles, ground-to-air and anti-rocket missiles, until the disarmament process is completed.

21. But the United States does not seem to be interested in achieving disarmament for the time being. There could be no more eloquent evidence of this than the aggressive policy of the United States in international affairs, its most striking manifestation being the war against the people of Viet-Nam and the simultaneous swelling of the United States war budget. Thus disarmament problems are the last thing that United States plans are concerned with today. This conclusion is eloquently confirmed in the following passage from Mr. Jerome Wiesner’s article in *Look*, which I have already quoted:

“The blocks to disarmament are political and psychological, not technical. Unfortunately, disarmament has no effective political support, no vested interests backing it, and no power base in the Government bureaucracy or in the Congress.”

22. Thus it is high time to go on from discussions to actual deeds in the field of disarmament. The interim report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament says that negotiations are under way for a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as I have already mentioned. This would no doubt be a decided step towards creating conditions and an atmosphere conducive to the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

23. The question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was not taken up here pursuant to the promise made in the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to submit a report on proliferation as soon as possible over the signatures of the two co-Chairmen. Since it is a matter of urgency that the United Nations should take up the question, the delegation of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria is joining with many other delegations—Austria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Colombia and others—to submit a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.416] in which the General Assembly, taking into account the fact that the Eighteen-Nation Committee is continuing its work with a view to negotiating a non-proliferation treaty and intends to submit a full report to the General Assembly as soon as possible, calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue its work and to submit to the Assembly on or before 15 March 1968 a full report on the negotiations regarding a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, together with the pertinent documents and records.

Mr. Tchernouchtchenko (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 67 (A/4505)

24. The draft resolution therefore recommends that upon the receipt of that report together with the pertinent documents and records, appropriate consultations should be initiated on the settling of an early date after 15 March for the resumption of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, to consider the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

25. We believe that the twenty-second session will thus have an important role to play; it will be able to make a contribution to a very important measure which could mark the beginning of the process of general and complete disarmament.

26. We feel that it would also be appropriate for the United Nations itself—without thereby allowing its attention to be diverted from measures for the elimination of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, which continue to represent the gravest threat to mankind—to examine feasible measures designed to eliminate the danger of weapons of mass destruction. This is in fact the objective sought in resolution 2162 B (XXI) which calls for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and invites all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol.

27. We can only regret that in spite of this resolution certain States—and above all the United States of America—are violating the Geneva Protocol. For that reason we consider that it would be appropriate for the General Assembly once again to confirm that instrument and to call for its strict observance; and therefore my delegation gives its full support to the draft resolution submitted by Hungary [A/C.1/L.412].

28. We also have before us another draft resolution on the same problem, submitted by the delegation of Malta. The object here is the direct opposite, namely the revision, up-dating or replacement of the Geneva Protocol [A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1].

29. From the first paragraph of the preamble, this text awakens serious doubts in my delegation by asserting that the use of some of the chemical and biological weapons which have been or are being developed may constitute a great threat to mankind. This would imply that there are other weapons of the same kind that are acceptable.

30. We see no point whatever in re-examining the Geneva Protocol. On the contrary, every effort should now be directed towards strengthening it and making it universal in scope. Revision of the Geneva Protocol would be tantamount to offering those States that refuse to accede to it or violate it the possibility of continuing to violate it and use every means of preventing a similar protocol from being concluded.

31. This being so, we consider that if the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Malta were adopted, it would merely have a destructive effect on the work of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly and on the world situation generally. Hence we shall not only vote against the draft, but we shall challenge it and appeal to all

countries to take a stand against it as positively endangering peace and likely to open the door to the use of poisonous, asphyxiating or other gases by the very fact of its being submitted here, especially if it is adopted—which we trust will not be the case.

32. Among the measures that would have had a favourable effect on the nuclear arms race is the suspension of underground nuclear tests. Such a measure would undoubtedly seem likely to place a serious obstacle in the way of the subsequent development of nuclear weapons, or at any rate to raise doubts as to their effectiveness in the minds of those who produce them and especially those who carry out laboratory tests with nuclear weapons.

33. More than once, the socialist countries on the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have expressed their desire to reach agreement on the banning of underground tests through the use of national means of seismic control for the supervision and observance of such an agreement. It is our belief, and that of the international scientific community, that these means are sufficient to detect and identify underground seismic effects for the purposes of a convention on the banning of underground nuclear-weapon tests.

34. The problem of banning underground nuclear experiments is ripe for solving once and for all. World public opinion demands the solution of the problem.

35. With regard to the detection and identification of underground tests, the general view is that the use of national observation posts and the national interpretation of data are sufficient. In this connexion, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Government appreciate the efforts of the Government of Sweden in calling for a "detection club" whose purpose, according to its advocates, would be to provide national authorities with the greatest possible amount of data and to organize official co-operation in the field on a voluntary basis.

36. Here again, we have to note with regret that the main obstacle to agreement is the insistence of the Western Powers, and above all the United States, on on-the-site inspections, which are called for only to sabotage the solution of the problem. The reason for this stubborn insistence on these conditions is obviously the desire of certain circles in the United States to be free to continue underground nuclear tests with the aim of reassuring themselves that the new types of weapons designed by them and their nuclear scientists are of such destructive power as to be able to serve their warlike designs.

37. The Bulgarian delegation will take its stand on the different draft resolutions submitted to the First Committee during the current session and will cast its vote with all these points in mind. We nevertheless may wish to make a further statement if we consider it necessary.

38. Mr. NABWERA (Kenya): As Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, I have the honour to introduce the report of that Committee [A/6817]. The Preparatory Committee was established under General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI). In accordance with this resolution the

Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States was to be held not later than July 1968 to consider, among other things, (a) how the security of non-nuclear weapon States could best be assured; (b) how non-nuclear weapon States could co-operate among themselves so as to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and (c) how nuclear devices or energy could be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

39. I am sure all the delegates have had an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the report of the Preparatory Committee and therefore, I do not wish to take too much of the Committee's time in offering an explanation. The Preparatory Committee held ten meetings in all and I am pleased to say that the Committee was able to adopt all its decisions unanimously. The Committee discussed, among other things, the question how best to associate nuclear-weapon Powers with the work of the Conference, the agenda of the Conference, the venue and the time for the Conference, and the rules of procedure for the Conference.

40. I should like to make special mention of two important decisions which the Committee took. The first is the provisional agenda of the Conference [A/6817, annex I]. Much discussion centred on this item and great care was taken to avoid duplicating or competing with the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Secondly, a decision was taken on the venue and the date of the Conference [A/6817, paras. 25-27].

41. The Committee was bound by resolution 2153 B (XXI), to which I have already referred, which specifically said that the Conference was to be held not later than July 1968. After considering the various issues involved, including the availability of Secretariat services, the Committee recommended that the Conference should be held in Geneva from 11 March to 10 April 1968.

42. In conclusion, I should like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the Preparatory Committee for their kind co-operation, in particular the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur. I should also like to express my thanks to the Secretariat for the valuable assistance which was rendered towards the success of the work of the Preparatory Committee.

43. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): Among the items that this Committee has before it for consideration is the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States [A/6817], which has just now been introduced by its Chairman, Ambassador Nabwera of Kenya. This Committee was established in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI) of 17 November 1966.

44. As delegates will recall, in that resolution the General Assembly decided to convene a Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, to meet not later than 8 July 1968, to consider the following and other related questions:

(a) How can the security of non-nuclear States best be assured?

(b) How many non-nuclear Powers co-operate among themselves in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons?

(c) How can nuclear devices be used for exclusively peaceful purposes?

45. To this end, the General Assembly requested the President to set up a preparatory committee to make appropriate arrangements for convening the Conference and to consider the question of association of nuclear States with its work. In the view of my delegation, the Preparatory Committee under the leadership of its Chairman, Ambassador Nabwera of Kenya, has produced a comprehensive report and faithfully discharged the task assigned to it. Before I offer my delegation's views on the specific recommendations set forth in the report, may I briefly recapitulate the reasons which led to the decision of the General Assembly to convene a conference of non-nuclear weapon States. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan had proposed, in his general policy statement at the 1423rd meeting of the General Assembly, on 29 September last year, that a conference of non-nuclear weapon States should be convened to consider the question of security of these States from nuclear attack or threat of attack, the co-operation necessary among the non-nuclear weapon States to prevent proliferation and also the problem of the use of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. The idea behind this proposal was fully discussed in this Committee at the last session, based on the urgency of a non-proliferation treaty. It also stemmed from a realization that there were many questions which needed to be answered if the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons was to be effectively prevented.

46. The first question raises issues about the nature of the guarantees to be given by the nuclear weapon States and the form of those guarantees. It also raises issues about the procedures for invoking the guarantees and the machinery to implement them. The second question included matters pertaining to the supervision and international co-operation both among non-nuclear weapon States themselves and between them and the nuclear weapon States, which would be necessary to prevent any diversion of the use of nuclear energy to military purposes.

47. It had become clear that these questions would be outside the scope of the non-proliferation treaty. My delegation was at pains to point out in the last session of the General Assembly that the objective of the world community was not merely a non-proliferation treaty, which might not command the adherence of all the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, but a near universal non-proliferation régime. That was the objective.

48. The validity of such a concept could not be questioned by anyone. What, however, were its connotations? First of all, it connoted that the role of the non-nuclear-weapon countries could not be confined to waiting for the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, such as that being discussed by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, and then acceding to it. Adherence to that treaty would not render unnecessary complementary arrangements to promote the object of that treaty and to solidify it in a structure of international co-operation.

49. Not only the Member States which supported the idea of a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States gave expression to this thought. There was a wider range of Members which conceded that, in the existing state of disarmament negotiations, the non-proliferation treaty by itself would

not be the complete answer to the threat of spread of nuclear weapons. It was widely felt that the political will of the international community needed to be mobilized towards the solution of the problems of security of non-nuclear-weapon States and of safeguards for the non-diversion of nuclear energy to military purposes.

50. Addressing himself to the non-nuclear-weapon countries, the representative of Malaysia said at the 1448th meeting of this Committee last year: "Let us take counsel among ourselves to meet these problems." He thus summed up the *raison d'être* of the Conference.

51. I may quote here from the statement made by my delegation at the 1442nd meeting of this Committee:

"... let me make it clear that the conception of this conference is nothing more and nothing less than this: that we, the non-nuclear countries, have a common interest in, first, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; second, safeguarding our security; and, third, enabling ourselves to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. That we have a common interest demands that we evolve a common standpoint. Our very status as non-nuclear countries brings us all together, whether we are large or small, near-nuclear or technologically under-developed, whether we are in Europe or in Asia, in Africa or in Latin America."²

52. My delegation was gratified that this concept won wide support in this Committee. The draft resolution submitted by Pakistan³ was subsequently co-sponsored by Jamaica, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Somalia, and a broad range of non-nuclear countries signified their whole-hearted approval of it.

53. At the same time, we noticed that some misgivings, fear and doubt were felt in certain quarters about the proposal to convene the conference. My delegation had no wish then, and I have no wish now, not to pay due regard to them.

54. First, there was the misgiving that the proposed conference might interfere with negotiations in progress on a non-proliferation treaty. We made it clear that we did not conceive this effort to be competitive to that of the two super-Powers in their bilateral negotiations or to that of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. We also said that, if succeeded in hammering out solutions to the problems which remain unresolved, we would only strengthen the hands of the super-Powers in removing obstacles to a non-proliferation régime. Our efforts would therefore be supplementary to theirs.

55. Second, there was the fear that the proposed conference might divide the non-nuclear from the nuclear Powers. Again we made it clear that it was an integral part of the plan that, after the non-nuclear-weapon countries had harmonized their own viewpoints on the entire problem, they would of necessity exchange views with the nuclear-

² This statement was made at the 1442nd meeting of the First Committee, the official record of which is published in summary form.

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 26, document A/6509, para. 5.

weapon Powers. Therefore, we believe this fear was groundless. It was further allayed by the co-sponsors of the draft resolution to convene a conference when they accepted amendments submitted by the delegation of Kuwait,⁴ which, besides fixing July 1968 as the date by which the conference should be convened, proposed that the question of association of nuclear-weapon States with the work of the conference should be considered by the Preparatory Committee. The acceptance of these amendments was an earnest of the good faith of the sponsors of the draft resolution to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon countries.

Mr. Fahmy, Chairman, resumed the Chair.

56. Third, there was doubt regarding the proposed composition of the conference. We were told that it would be unwieldy. Some even went so far as to suggest that it would be no use assembling all the non-nuclear Powers, some of which are so technologically backward as to have no understanding of the problems involved. We could not accept that argument. We were, and we remain, convinced that the division between the so-called near-nuclear and the non-nuclear countries is artificial and temporary and that all countries, large or small, rich or poor, have an equal stake in a non-proliferation régime.

57. Finally, we were told that a non-proliferation treaty was around the corner and, therefore our proposal was not timely. We did not share the optimism of those who expected that the treaty would be concluded early in 1967. Nevertheless, we said that if a treaty was concluded before the conference assembled, the conference would be complementary to its purpose, but that if a treaty was not agreed upon beforehand, the conference would surely provide a powerful impetus for its early conclusion.

58. That the true motivation of this proposal was recognized in this Committee is evident from the fact that six members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee including one nuclear Power, voted for the draft resolution last year. There were some other members of this Committee who, while abstaining, took care to explain that they would not rule out the possibility of precisely such a conference as the one proposed being needed to reinforce the efforts to establish a non-proliferation régime.

59. In dwelling at some length on the evolution and progress of this idea I have not tried to inflict a historical exposition on this Committee. The doubts expressed about the proposal last year may have been removed but the clarifications given are as pertinent today as they were before.

60. If further clarification is needed, let it be furnished by the picture that will emerge after the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. It is accepted that such a treaty will be in essence only an interim measure, a prelude to the ultimate goal which is that of the total destruction of nuclear weapons. But we all know that though the ultimate objective is not to be forgotten, there is no immediate prospect of its being realized. Now, in a world where five States possess nuclear weapons, and the other nearly 120

renounce the right of acquiring them, the two issues of the protection from nuclear threat or attack of these 120 or so and their access to nuclear energy, will inevitably be thrown into sharp relief. The first of these issues will gain in urgency if some non-nuclear-weapon Powers, instead of acceding to the treaty, insist on retaining a nuclear option. This, by itself, will discourage adherence to the treaty by other non-nuclear Powers.

61. This is not merely a matter of reciprocity or of the balance of rights and obligations. There is a compelling practical reason why those willing to renounce nuclear weapons must be protected against the use or threat of nuclear weapons. This is because the non-proliferation treaty, if it is to fulfil its aim, must come near to universality in regard to adherence. The provision of adequate guarantees would contribute greatly to the consummation of such a result.

62. It is for these reasons that the proposal made during the last session for the convening of a conference of non-nuclear weapon countries has become even more valid now than it was then.

63. With reference to the report of the Preparatory Committee [A/6817], the Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 10 October 1967 [1584th meeting] that this report makes it clear that the proposed conference will complement, not duplicate, supplement, not compete with, the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the non-proliferation treaty. Indeed, the Preparatory Committee awaited developments in the Eighteen-Nation Committee as long as possible, as our Chairman stated just a few minutes ago, before commencing its task.

64. The report of the Preparatory Committee was adopted only after two identical drafts of the non-proliferation treaty had been submitted on 24 August to the Disarmament Committee. The provisional agenda for the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States [A/6817, annex I] reflects the thought that the Preparatory Committee has given to ensuring that the Conference will deliberate essentially on those questions which are outside the scope of the non-proliferation treaty, though arising directly from it. This point was also underlined by the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee in his intervention earlier.

65. In regard to the agenda of the Conference, the Preparatory Committee has spelled out the issues that might be considered under the three broad formulations in resolution 2153 B (XXI). On the question of assuring the security of non-nuclear weapon States, the Conference would be able to discuss the subject of security guarantees through treaties and unilateral declarations, and the procedures for invoking them. Among the ways of preventing proliferation by co-operation among non-nuclear weapon countries, the idea of reciprocal inspection in addition to international inspection also finds a place. Furthermore, the submission of periodic reports to an international agency by countries rendering technical assistance in the nuclear field to non-nuclear weapon countries would provide the information necessary to ensure against proliferation through such assistance. Under the third broad category of questions mentioned in resolution 2153 B (XXI), the Con-

⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 8.

ference would be able to consider the question of ensuring, in the context of non-proliferation, ways to promote the fullest possible peaceful application of atomic energy, including peaceful explosions of nuclear devices.

66. The situation, as it now obtains, continues to point to the inexorable logic of the interrelationship of the three sets of questions, namely, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, security guarantees and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, it is quite clear that the non-proliferation treaty is likely to be confined to the first, namely, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

67. In regard to security guarantees, the consensus of the nuclear Powers in the Disarmament Committee appears to be to provide for assurances in another form. What, therefore, could be more necessary than to call for a discussion of the question of protection of non-nuclear Powers against nuclear attack or threat in the form of a special conference?

68. It may be asked: cannot security assurances be discussed in the forum of the General Assembly or in a subsidiary organ—namely, the Disarmament Commission?

69. The subject, however, is one of such transcendent importance to all States without exception, and so bristles with a host of questions of a political, constitutional and psychological nature that it demands a special forum for its being examined in depth.

70. The General Assembly is now required to take a decision on the recommendations in the report of the Preparatory Committee.

71. The first recommendation concerns the time of holding the Conference, namely, 11 March to 10 April 1968. This recommendation follows from the fact that the General Assembly decided to convene the Conference not later than July 1968. In the original version of the draft resolution, the holding of the Conference was envisaged a year earlier. However, in deference to the views of the nuclear Powers and some other member States of the Disarmament Committee, the sponsors of resolution 2153 B (XXI) accepted an amendment presented by the delegation of Kuwait to convene the Conference a year later.

72. The question before us is whether the General Assembly should adopt a resolution accepting the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to convene the Conference from 11 March to 10 April next year in Geneva. This recommendation was based on the fact, as pointed out in paragraph 27 of the report of the Preparatory Committee that the Secretariat, after consulting the United Nations Office in Geneva, informed the Committee that, taking into account the schedule of other United Nations Conferences planned for the first part of 1968, the only suitable time for holding the Conference in Geneva was from 11 March to 10 April 1968.

73. When the sponsors of resolution 2153 B (XXI) agreed to move back the timing of the convening of the Conference from July 1967 to July 1968, they had been led to expect that the non-proliferation treaty would be con-

cluded by the end of 1967. However, as the interim report of the Disarmament Committee [A/6951-DC/229] states despite intensive consideration of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the substantial progress that has been made, a final draft has not yet been achieved.

74. The situation facing the General Assembly is that the nuclear Powers in the Disarmament Committee consider they should be given more time to reach agreement on a non-proliferation treaty. It would appear they are confident of being able to reach accord among themselves by 15 March, and would therefore prefer that discussions on security guarantees and other subjects on the agenda of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should not take place before the final draft of the treaty is presented to the General Assembly. On the other hand, there is great weight behind the view that the Conference should be held in March-April, as recommended by the Preparatory Committee.

75. Several delegations, including my own, are at present engaged in extensive consultations to try, if possible, to bridge the gulf. We wish to avoid any unnecessary conflict of views or interests. Any objective connected with disarmament cannot be promoted except with goodwill.

76. I shall end my statement at this point. My delegation reserves its right to intervene again.

77. Mr. LAI (Malaysia): The report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons [A/6858 and Corr.1] reads like a horror story; and what is even more terrifying is that it is not science fiction, but an account based on cold scientific facts. It tells of how the whole human race can be so easily wiped off the surface of this earth with the arsenals of nuclear weapons existing today and that unless something is done, and done soon, to control this mad arms race, the chances for man to be destroyed and consumed by monsters he has created are not too remote.

78. We congratulate the Secretary-General and the group of consultants for the report. We would certainly recommend that the report be given the widest publicity, especially when, in this "hip" generation of ours, people tend to be somewhat blasé about the risks of nuclear war.

79. The report draws a number of important conclusions; but permit me to refer to four of them which strike me as particularly relevant in our present discussion.

(1) The experts unanimously tell us that there is no difference—although some countries would have us believe otherwise—between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.

(2) At the present stage of the situation, the development, or further development, of nuclear weapons does not ensure security. Indeed, if anything, it tends to generate insecurity.

(3) The cost of acquiring, manufacturing, or further developing nuclear weapons is so great that the resources thus wasted would be better utilized to improve the standard of living of people everywhere.

(4) The best security that the world can have is to rid itself completely of nuclear weapons.

80. Malaysia has no pretensions to be a threshold Power, much less a nuclear one. It would therefore be no sacrifice on its part readily to agree to forswear nuclear weapons or explosives. But, at the same time, we are not insensitive to the concern of many non-nuclear-weapon States—in particular, the threshold Powers—that there should be a balance of obligation, and that they should not be the only ones asked to make the sacrifices.

81. It seems reasonable to us, therefore, that the nuclear Powers should, at the very least, make an undertaking to begin to disarm—for example, by a cut-off in the production of fissionable material, or by a decrease in the production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles—as a first step towards the reduction of stockpiles.

82. We all agree that a non-proliferation treaty is not an end in itself, but only one of several steps that should lead towards general and complete disarmament. Logically, therefore, a non-proliferation treaty should be viewed in the context of general and complete disarmament.

83. My delegation was very impressed by the statement of the representative of Sweden, particularly when she referred to the possibility at the present moment of accurately monitoring underground nuclear explosions with the use of highly sensitive teleseismic instruments which have recently been developed. We would also urge that the question of verification and inspection be thoroughly re-examined so that this important problem, which seems to be hindering the conclusion of a total test-ban treaty, may be removed.

84. It was the hope of many of us that the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty would soon lead to a complete test-ban treaty; that would have been a logical step forward. We are, therefore, naturally disappointed that no such thing has happened; and, viewed in the light of non-proliferation, the present continued tests and the development of antiballistic missiles do not reflect the kind of behaviour that would—to quote the representative of the United States—“inspire . . . confidence and trust” [1547th meeting, para. 77]. One might even pause and wonder if the billions of dollars presently spent by some countries on the nuclear arms race actually add significantly to their security. What—to use the now popular expression—is the “cost effectiveness” of that expenditure, in view of the urgent need today to improve the living conditions of people, especially in the developing world?

85. We are encouraged by the news that reached us a few days ago of the successful “Gasbuggy” test. To us, the uninitiated, that points to the immense potential of peaceful programmes from nuclear explosives.

86. In this regard, my delegation believes that the determination as to when such programmes are feasible and economical should be made by an independent body of experts, if it is finally agreed that the non-proliferation treaty should also cover non-military nuclear explosives. This is part of the problem concerning the access to nuclear knowledge and technology on the part of countries

deprived of the opportunity to develop non-military devices. My delegation is sympathetic to this feeling, since knowledge should never be denied to anyone.

87. But, at the same time, we find difficulty in knowing where to draw the line, since we are told—and have no reason to doubt—that there is no difference in technology between military and non-military explosives. If it is possible to separate knowledge on peaceful programmes from technological knowledge of production facilities for nuclear devices, then the former could perhaps be made accessible to non-nuclear-weapon States by allowing the scientists of those States to work alongside scientists of nuclear Powers in laboratories engaged in work on peaceful nuclear programmes.

88. At the last session of the General Assembly, the Malaysian delegation supported resolution 2153 B (XXI) calling for a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States. We supported it, convinced as we were of the importance of the non-nuclear-weapon States to take counsel among themselves on three matters in the context of non-proliferation—namely: (1) how can their security be best assured; (2) how may they co-operate among themselves to prevent nuclear proliferation; and (3) how can nuclear devices be used exclusively for peaceful purposes?

89. When it adopted that resolution the General Assembly decided that a conference should be held not later than July 1968. The decision having been made, it is not the intention of my delegation, nor, I hope, of the other delegations, to reopen the issue as to whether the conference should be held. The Committee is now asked to consider the report of the Preparatory Committee and, more particularly, the recommendations contained therein.

90. I should like, if I may, to take this opportunity to say a few words on the proposed conference and what we hope it may achieve, particularly on the question of security guarantees in the context of non-proliferation.

91. It would be unrealistic on our part, of course, not to take into consideration the activities, closely related to this problem, of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We meet here today with the advantage of knowing what the draft non-proliferation treaty jointly tabled by the United States of America and the USSR does not contain. It must be admitted by all here that whatever the final draft may be it will not contain provisions to cover the important question of security. We are, all the same, very encouraged by this important development, imperfect though the present draft is, and we earnestly hope that an acceptable draft will soon become a reality.

92. That the question of security in the context of non-proliferation is of paramount importance, is without doubt. One needs to read only the various statements made here, in Geneva, and those made by the various world leaders, to realize this. The question is as important as it is imprecise and complicated. Ideas are not lacking on the kind of security arrangements that will most satisfy non-nuclear-weapon States who are being asked to undertake not to manufacture, control or acquire nuclear weapons in any way. Should or could their security be guaranteed? Guaranteed by whom? By all the nuclear

Powers, or some of the nuclear Powers? Should it be embodied in a formal treaty or would they be satisfied with formal declarations made jointly or severally by the nuclear Powers? Or should it be within the framework of the United Nations? A guarantee against what? Nuclear blackmail? Is it a commitment not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States? Is it a commitment to protect or defend non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons? Which are the States whose security is to be guaranteed? All States, or only non-nuclear-weapon States? And finally, how can security guarantees be made credible?

93. I have listed the above questions, which are by no means exhaustive, merely to indicate the richness of ideas that exist and that have been expressed some time or other by States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. The time is therefore ripe, we think, for us to discuss that and I submit that there is one way—short of exchanging postcards—and only one way in which we can exchange our views so that some general agreement can be reached, and that is by holding a conference.

94. The Preparatory Committee has made a number of recommendations, all of which are acceptable to my delegation. As regards the date of the proposed conference, March and April 1968 was recommended, firstly, because the Committee was bound by resolution 2153 (XXI) that the conference should be held not later than July 1968, and secondly, on the advice of the United Nations Secretariat that, in view of that resolution and the other meetings of the United Nations already scheduled, March and April was the only suitable date for Geneva.

95. In conclusion, may I be permitted to thank the members of the Preparatory Committee and of the United Nations Secretariat for their co-operation. I am particularly grateful to the Secretariat for their unstinted assistance to me as Rapporteur of the Preparatory Committee.

96. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the next speaker I should like to consult the Committee about our programme and the procedure which we should follow in the remaining few days, if not hours, that we have before we terminate this session.

97. I have on the list this morning approximately twenty speakers and, in the light of the experience of this morning, if we continue like this it will be practically impossible to finish before 19 December—especially also in view of the slow progress in the informal consultations about some of the drafts already circulated.

98. As you all know, after we finish the general debate I expect, as usual, that representatives will wish to explain their votes and perhaps make the same statements again so that we may have forty speakers before voting, followed by the voting process, and some delegations perhaps will wish to speak after the voting. This chain reaction, I am afraid, will not help us finish our work at the proper time. That is why I seek your advice on certain specific subjects which, if we agree, I believe may help us to proceed more speedily.

99. First, I should like to know how many speakers will take part in the debate so that I can plan our programme.

That is why I propose, with your agreement, to close the list of speakers in the general debate at 1 p.m. As I have said already, up to the present I have eighteen speakers and I hope that by 1 p.m. I will be in a position to know exactly how many speakers there are on the list so far as the general debate is concerned.

100. Secondly, if the list of speakers is a long one we can either continue, like yesterday, until 8 p.m. or we could have a night meeting tonight. That is the first proposal.

101. The second one is that I hope representatives, if they wish to speak again to explain their votes and make statements, will agree, at the proper time, that these statements should be limited to five minutes. However, if no representative wants to explain his vote then there is no necessity for that time-limit and we can proceed to the voting as quickly as possible.

102. My intention is, if members of the Committee, and especially the co-sponsors, as a result of their informal consultations are not ready, and in order to avoid at the last moment an open confrontation on some of the draft resolutions before us, tentatively to allow more time for consultations and cancel our meetings for Saturday in the hope that the Committee will agree definitely that on Monday we come only to vote on the draft resolutions which will be at that time ready for action by the Committee.

103. I shall make a further statement at the end of our meetings today in the light of whatever progress has been made in the informal negotiations on at least some of the draft resolutions.

104. Mr. MAKONNEN (Ethiopia): Before I proceed to make certain general observations on the items which are now being jointly considered by the Committee, I should like, in the name of the Ethiopian delegation, to pay our highest tribute to Secretary-General U Thant and the panel of distinguished scientists who assisted him in preparing the report requested of him by resolution 2162 A (XXI) of the General Assembly [*A/6858 and Corr.1*].

105. The quality and content of the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons has been so highly praised and commended for its significance and timeliness by numerous representatives who have spoken before me in this Committee that I am reluctant to dwell at length on my delegation's profound appreciation of the report. Nevertheless, even after so many representatives—among them, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal—have amply brought forth, with characteristic lucidity of argument and clarity of thought the persuasive force of the report, I may yet have occasion to refer to this document as I proceed with my remarks, although at the risk of being repetitious.

106. Throughout the years, when the question of general and complete disarmament and its related subjects were discussed in this Committee and other organs of the United Nations, the Ethiopian delegation endeavoured to approach the issues with the open-mindedness and sober realism which, I am sure, we all believe that they deserve.

107. Conscious of the vastness and complexity of the entire disarmament issue, we have consistently supported all proposals, and at other times advocated certain measures, which we strongly believed would bring us one step closer to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and inspection.

108. On the other hand, because of our deep anxiety and concern over the lack of steady progress along the arduous, and often tortuous, path towards the final goal of unarmed security in a peaceful world, we have not failed to raise our voice, sometimes along with others, with regard to the urgency of taking certain interim collateral measures. It was because of these basic convictions that the Ethiopian delegation initiated a proposal aimed at the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons for the purposes of war. My Government was, of course, gratified when, subsequently, the General Assembly adopted a declaration of principles [1653 (XVI)] which, in substance, incorporated some of our ideas. Nor should I conceal our further gratification at the recent adoption of the resolution pertaining to the convening of a conference on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

109. It is against this background of our convictions, preoccupations, and at times anguish, that I should like to make some brief observations on the item now being discussed by the First Committee.

110. Almost all of the representatives who have spoken in the Committee heretofore, in particular the representatives of Poland and Sweden, have expressed their deep concern at the lack of progress in negotiations which would lead to the achievement of general and complete disarmament in our time. We fully share in this justified concern and in the sense of frustration so aptly expressed by the representative of Sweden in her statement on Tuesday, 12 December [1547th meeting].

111. The disarmament effort extending over a period of two decades looms behind us as one continuous dark episode in the annals of the endeavours of the United Nations, relieved only by the highlights of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and the Treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space concluded last year [resolution 2222 (XXI)]. And although the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has been in continuous session throughout this current year, we all know only too well that its time has been consumed exclusively by the consideration of a non-proliferation treaty—which we consider to be all too important, but which must be regarded as only one part of the general disarmament process.

112. In view of the urgency, indeed the imperative necessity, of taking bold steps in disarmament matters, and in view of the avowed interest of all nations represented here to see general and complete disarmament achieved within the shortest possible time, it often becomes difficult to understand with sufficient conviction why in fact not even an appreciable number of collateral measures have been agreed upon to facilitate the achievement of the final goal of disarmament, which represent perhaps the most profound yearning of mankind today.

113. The plea of existing tensions and mistrust between nations, especially those few States armed to the teeth with

the most sophisticated weapons in the whole history of civilization, the so-called theory of the balance of terror, as a deterrent from world conflict, although sometimes real and genuine, tend to be rather dangerously self-defeating and inadequate, if only because the sequence of cause and effect is neither clear-cut nor containable in water-tight compartments. I think that the conclusion in the Secretary-General's report is quite revealing and pertinent in this regard when it states:

“Since the sense of insecurity on the part of nations is the cause of the arms race, which in turn enhances that very insecurity, and in so far as nuclear armaments are the end of a spectrum which begins with conventional weapons, the problem of reversing the trend of a rapidly worsening world situation calls for a basic reappraisal of all interrelated factors.” [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 91.]

114. If one were to accept the thesis that the security of nations is not necessarily enhanced because the concept of deterrence itself has its own peculiar characteristic of stretching, as it were, to limitless heights, the situation in which the super-Powers find themselves appears to be somewhat curious and ironic. May I once again have recourse to the Secretary-General's report to underscore my point in this context? In simple and precise language we are told:

“The effort to maintain a state of nuclear deterrence has demanded the expenditure of vast resources and, paradoxically, far from increasing the sense of security, has at times engendered a sense of insecurity. The opposing sides have taken, and continue to take, major steps to assure themselves that their nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles are proof against whatever counter-measures might be undertaken by the other side.” [Ibid., para. 80.]

And so the upward spiralling of the armaments race, especially of nuclear armaments, continues without end.

115. When we recall that the annals of the United Nations are replete with solemn pronouncements of the ardent desire of nations, big and small, to disarm the stark reality that in fact nothing substantial has to date been achieved in the field of disarmament, is certainly not a record of which any of us can be proud.

116. As the representative of Poland has so aptly remarked, could it be that, after decades of probing and prodding, we are still gripped by this unhappy situation simply because of the lack “of the existence of the will to disarm”? [1545th meeting, para. 6.] I make no pretension to a singular wisdom to offer a satisfactory answer to such a basic question.

117. But of one thing my delegation is quite convinced: we have an abundance of unfinished business to complete, not on the basis of the rigid positions of the past, but with a fresh and flexible approach which can lead to some progress in disarmament matters. The first step in this direction would be, in our view, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement.

118. The case for the urgency of a comprehensive test-ban agreement was perhaps most eloquently presented by Mrs. Myrdal of the Swedish delegation. We commend the

statement made last Tuesday in this Committee by the Swedish representative for the unique contribution which the Swedish Government and its representatives have made in this particular field of disarmament. It is indeed the ardent hope of my delegation that the representatives of the principal nuclear weapon Powers will give careful consideration to the Swedish proposals with a view to initiating early negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban agreement.

119. Now that scientific knowledge with regard to seismic detection devices has considerably advanced in recent years, my delegation feels strongly that it is high time that the super-Powers see their way to finding the necessary mutual accommodation, on the number of on-the-spot inspections, which have heretofore been the stumbling-block to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement. I say that because my delegation is convinced that the conclusion of such an agreement, though not an end in itself, will go a long way to curtail the mad race in nuclear weaponry and at the same time prove a catalyst in making progress in other disarmament measures.

120. Pending the coming into force of a comprehensive test-ban agreement, my delegation would appeal once again to the Powers to undertake a moratorium on test explosions for a specified period of time, as may be mutually agreed upon. Such a step will, I submit, be in the right direction and is bound to facilitate agreement on other limited disarmament measures such as the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty.

121. The importance that my Government attaches to the speedy conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty can scarcely be over-emphasized. In this connexion, while we warmly welcome the identical draft treaty separately submitted by the Soviet Union and by the United States, I must confess that we are not altogether happy about the silence of the draft text on a variety of important elements, including the machinery of control, guarantees for non-nuclear weapon States and the clear commitment by the nuclear weapon Powers to halt, reduce and finally to eliminate existing nuclear weapons in their arsenals. We are firmly of the conviction that the inclusion of those elements as mandatory clauses of the treaty will considerably contribute to its effectiveness.

122. When we appeal the case of an acceptable and mutual balance of responsibilities and obligations, as well as the balance of benefits and risks inherent in a non-proliferation treaty, let it not be thought that as a non-nuclear nation we are obsessed by the weird idea that the sole beneficiaries under such a treaty would be the nuclear weapon Powers alone. I am compelled to state this, because it has at times been cogently suggested that the non-nuclear weapon States have been blocking the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty in the misguided belief that such a treaty would only perpetrate the monopoly of the select membership in the nuclear club. Such indeed is not the case. But the vast majority of nations which cannot take shelter in the dubious safety of nuclear deterrence have real and genuine fears and anxieties which must be effectively overcome. If, as has been argued in the past, a security guarantee, a clear commitment to reduce and a recognition of the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear States to share in the benefits

of the peaceful uses of atomic energy cannot all be incorporated in the main articles of a non-proliferation treaty, then let us recognize them as areas in which separate agreement or agreements must be speedily explored and concluded. As has already been pointed out by the representative of Sweden, we fail to see why negotiations on such partial disarmament measures cannot be conducted parallel with and complementary to a non-proliferation treaty. Since experience has shown that we are no nearer now to achieving general and complete disarmament than the very first day when the burning issue was broached, the importance of persevering in narrowing down the gap through the conclusion of an agreement on an array of collateral disarmament measures is so self-evident as to preclude any serious controversy.

123. When, at the 1547th meeting of the First Committee, the representative of Malta, our colleague Mr. Pardo, raised yet another aspect of the disarmament problem, that is, the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons, it was with keen interest that my delegation followed his brilliant statement, and I seize this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to the representative of Malta for his useful contribution to our debates.

124. We have, of course, no hesitation in agreeing on the immediate danger to which mankind is exposed as a result of the development and greater sophistication of chemical, biological and radiological weapons in recent years. My own nation having been the victim of the cruder type of chemical weapons, I certainly have no illusions about the gravity of the problem.

125. Yet, from the experience of our membership of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and having due regard to the fact that, after one year of almost continuous session, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to furnish anything other than a meagre interim report, I cannot help wondering whether burdening the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament with yet another disarmament problem will not further impede its efforts. It seems to us that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is already seized with sufficient problems demanding urgent solution. In the circumstances, it would seem to us useful to explore other venues, such as a panel of scientific experts to broach this particular problem.

126. Finally, I should like to make a brief reference to the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/6817], which was entrusted with the task of making appropriate arrangements for convening a conference of non-nuclear weapons States in conformity with resolution 2153 B (XXI) of the General Assembly.

127. I have already referred to the legitimate concern of the non-nuclear-weapon States earlier in my remarks. So long as these States remain exposed to the possibility of nuclear threat or attack, so long as they choose to forswear the acquisition and/or manufacture of nuclear energy without a commensurate provision that they are not, by so doing, relinquishing the right to benefit from the peaceful uses of atomic energy, so long will continue their legitimate concern for national security and potentially abundant economic benefit.

128. In this connexion, it seems to me that there is some misunderstanding concerning the scope and purpose of the proposed conference. As far as my own delegation is concerned, the conference was never conceived either to supplant or compete with the gallant efforts of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Rather, the conference is intended to serve primarily as a forum of consultation amongst non-nuclear weapons States with a view to collectively ensuring their legitimate interests of national security and economic well-being and to facilitate general agreement on disarmament. As such, whatever positive results the conference may achieve must surely be regarded as complementary to the efforts of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, especially in respect to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty.

129. For this reason, and in view of the fact that, pursuant to resolution 2153 B (XXI), the proposed conference has to meet at some convenient time during the course of next year, my delegation wishes to underline the necessity for an appropriate decision before the current session of the General Assembly adjourns.

130. As I conclude my broad observations on the problems of general and complete disarmament, I bear in mind the few remarks you made before I commenced my speech and I do not intend to intervene again to explain the vote of my delegation on the different resolutions. All the same, I mean to seize this opportunity to invite the attention of the Committee to the draft resolutions and give my views and thus finish with the business of intervention once and for all.

131. I invite the attention of the Committee to the two draft resolutions co-sponsored by a number of delegations including my own. We co-sponsored the draft resolution which appears in document A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-3 because, as I had occasion to mention earlier in my remarks, we believe that the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/6858 and Corr.1 is such a worthy and useful source of information on the grave situation facing us today as to merit the attention of the widest possible public throughout the world. Since all members of the Committee have lauded the importance of this particular document, my delegation has every reason to believe that the draft resolution under reference will be adopted unanimously.

132. The second draft resolution which we are happy to co-sponsor has been distributed as document A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1-2. In its operative paragraphs, this draft resolution, *inter alia*: "urges all States which have not done so to adhere without further delay to the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water" and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments. In view of the importance we attach to the strengthening of the partial test-ban Treaty by having it made comprehensive, it is the earnest hope of my delegation that this draft resolution will also win the widest possible support.

133. As a result of the delay in our receiving the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the time which has been allocated to the discussion of disarmament issues is indeed unusually short. For this reason alone, I do

not propose to burden the Committee with explanations of vote later on in our deliberations. My delegation will cast its vote on these and other draft resolutions solely on the merits and as its conscience dictates.

134. Mr. HSUEH (China) (*translated from Chinese*): This year, the First Committee is evidently much handicapped in its examination of the disarmament questions on the agenda. For the first time since its establishment, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has failed to submit a substantive report in time for consideration by the First Committee. Without such a report, it appears to be difficult to keep our discussion in focus and to make concrete progress in our work.

135. I have said this not as a complaint about the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, but rather as a compliment to that body of experts, to whose advice we always attach great importance. My delegation is fully aware of the concentrated efforts which that Committee has been making in reaching agreement on a non-proliferation treaty. We only want to add our voice to what has already been said here and say that the result of these efforts is being awaited hopefully and with great expectations.

136. In the present debate, my delegation will not restate its general views on the various items relating to disarmament, which have been made clear before. There is indeed no need to say again how urgent and important is the achievement of general and complete disarmament on the basis of the principles endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 1722 (XVI), or how necessary and desirable it is to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We have debated these questions thoroughly. We can only urge that practical and effective measures be worked out with a greater sense of urgency to achieve our agreed purposes in these fields through the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament or other appropriate channels. My delegation will, therefore, support any proposals to that effect.

137. My delegation welcomes the initiative of the delegation of Malta in seeking the modernization of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. It is certainly high time to take a fresh look at a post-First World War treaty which has been in existence for more than forty years. During this period, the rapid development of science and technology must have applied to the manufacture and uses of these categories of weapons as in the case of other categories. I do not see any reason why a review of an old treaty in the light of these circumstances should be feared or objected to. My delegation will support the draft resolution sponsored by Malta, requesting the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Secretary-General respectively to make studies of related problems and report to the General Assembly.

138. With regard to the question of elimination of foreign bases in the countries of various regions, which was debated last year and referred to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, my delegation finds another debate this year unnecessary and wasteful. It merely confirms the belief that the item was initially sponsored in an attempt to seek a forum for propaganda purposes. In particular, this belief is

underlined by the repetition in this debate of the false allegation, which was refuted last year, about the existence of foreign military bases in Taiwan province of my country.

139. I now turn to two important documents relating to disarmament that are before us. The first is the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons [*A/6858 and Corr.1*]. It is one of the most valuable documents ever issued by the United Nations. Its highly informative and educative value cannot be over-emphasized.

140. The Secretary-General's report puts into clear focus the general knowledge of the horrors of a nuclear war. It points out the crippling economic burden which the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems imposes upon the people. It also demonstrates not only the futility of seeking security through the acquisition of nuclear weapons but also the dangerous consequences thereof. All in all, the report confirms the wisdom of the policy of those non-nuclear weapon States which are determined not to acquire nuclear weapons and will have a sobering effect on those others which may be considering, for one reason or another, the acquisition of such weapons.

141. From this report it may also be concluded that to set off a few nuclear explosions, by forcing people to go without pants, and to subsist on a starvation diet, is one thing, but that to become a nuclear Power with even a modest but significant nuclear armament is quite another. It is therefore necessary to look more deeply into the available resources, the existing economic and industrial bases and the training facilities for skilled workers and scientists that are behind a few nuclear explosions before we get the daylights scared out of us by such explosions. So far as the Chinese mainland is concerned, those few explosions have only intensified the sufferings and hardships of the people and further strengthened their determination to regain freedom through the widespread anti-communist campaign now under way.

142. My delegation therefore warmly supports the proposal made by Canada and seventeen other countries for publicizing the Secretary-General's report and recommending its distribution in all countries in different languages [*A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-3*]. We feel sure that wide dissemination of the report will help create a healthy atmosphere conducive to nuclear disarmament and the avoidance of a nuclear war. My delegation has been waiting to read the report in the Chinese language since the issuance of its English text last month. I should like to take this opportunity to urge the Secretariat to make the Chinese text available with the shortest possible delay.

143. The other important document before us is the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [*A/6817*]. The Preparatory Committee has faithfully carried out its work. In addition to the draft rules of procedure for the Conference, the Committee has drawn up a provisional agenda listing four important questions of substance. Preparatory studies have also been made on two of these questions, in the form of papers submitted by the Rapporteur of the Committee and

appended to the report. The papers contain all relevant material, collated and analysed systematically, on the question of security guarantees and on the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, both in the context of non-proliferation measures. My delegation would like to pay a tribute to the author of the papers for his contribution to the study of these questions.

144. Of course, this Committee is not now called upon to discuss these questions in substance. We have discussed them and expressed general views on them on previous occasions. It is desirable for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to go further and consider them in depth, but how we can best achieve this purpose requires careful consideration.

145. Take, for example, the question of security guarantees in the context of non-proliferation measures. This is a question vital to the interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States which are to forgo any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Many delegations, including my own, have put forward their views on this question. Some favour the idea of a "nuclear umbrella"; others lay emphasis on the role of the United Nations in such undertakings. These views are summarized in a convenient form in one of the papers appended to the report of the Preparatory Committee. However, one fails to find from these views, valuable as they are, proposals of concrete measures which lend themselves to adoption and implementation. It seems necessary to take one further step.

146. I feel a little doubtful whether the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States can advance this work much better than this Committee. The Conference will perhaps have a slightly larger membership than this Committee so far as the non-nuclear-weapon States are concerned. According to the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee, the Conference will meet for a period of about a month. I find it difficult to visualize how a Conference of such a large membership can produce concrete results from a discussion of such complex and interrelated problems in so short a time without some further preparatory work. After all, this Committee has to depend heavily on the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in working out solutions to disarmament problems.

147. I wonder whether it would not be desirable to request the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament also to do some preparatory work for the Conference on the questions covered by the report of the Preparatory Committee. The Eighteen-Nation Committee, which is a more compact body attended by experts, has been studying for some time these and other questions relating to non-proliferation and it can surely make a useful contribution to the work of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. We must not forget that the Eighteen-Nation Committee is not a nuclear club but that non-nuclear-weapon States are also well represented there. In this connexion, one cannot help wondering sometimes whether, in the matter of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, there is a real and well-defined division of interests between the non-nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear-weapon States.

148. This brings me to the question of the date of the Conference. In its report the Preparatory Committee

recommends that the Conference be convened in March 1968. If the General Assembly accepts that recommendation there will be less than three months in which to make all the preparations for the Conference. This appears to be a little on the short side. At the same time, it seems difficult for the General Assembly now to fix another date that may be considered more propitious taking all factors into account. Would it, therefore, not be better for the General Assembly to leave the question of the date open at present? The General Assembly may be in a better position to make the decision when the time comes for it to consider the full report which the Eighteen-Nation Committee has promised to submit as soon as possible.

149. Let me make it perfectly clear that I do not for one single moment suggest the reversal or revision of the decision made by the General Assembly in resolution 2153 B (XXI) on the convening of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. But surely the important point is not just to convene the Conference but to make certain that the work of the Conference will be successful and fruitful. This is the only purpose that prompts me to bring this matter to the attention of this Committee.

150. Mr. MILLER (New Zealand): Mr Chairman, as you have so judiciously pointed out, the Committee is pressed for time and therefore I shall not speak at length. I shall confine myself to some of the points of special interest to my delegation arising from the resolutions we have been discussing.

151. One of those resolutions, that contained in document A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-3, deals with the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons. The distinguished representative of Poland has aptly described this report as "simple in language, precise in fact and telling in its conclusions" [1545th meeting, para. 21]. The New Zealand delegation is glad to join in the Committee's expression of gratitude to the Secretary-General and the group of eminent men who assisted him in preparing this document. We warmly endorse the proposal that it be given wide publicity through the United Nations Office of Public Information and by Governments and international bodies. We could not look for advice more authoritative than that we have been given in this report, which is the more valuable because it has not avoided plain statements and honest judgements on controversial questions. Nor could it be more timely, because it tells us why there must be no slackening of effort in the negotiations still in progress in Geneva to draft a non-proliferation treaty. The facts are made clear and so is the conclusion: the path to national security is "certainly not to be found in the further spread and elaboration of nuclear weapons" [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 94]. At a time when, as we hope, agreement on the treaty is in sight, this report should be a spur to final action.

152. In the introduction to his own annual report, the Secretary-General has described the successful conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty as an indispensable first step towards further progress on disarmament:

"In fact it is difficult to conceive of any agreement in the foreseeable future on any other measure of disarma-

ment if it is not possible to reach agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons." [A/6701/Add.1, para. 14.]

153. The Secretary-General's view is fully borne out by the twelve expert consultants and is one which the New Zealand Government unreservedly endorses. This is not the time or place to discuss in detail the labours of the Disarmament Committee on this issue. We would not wish to say anything or propose anything here which might make the course of the Geneva negotiations more difficult, or reduce the possibility of the treaty's winning the acceptance of all countries. We can only receive the bald, but by no means discouraging, "status" report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and renew our hope that it will soon be able to tell us that it has succeeded in its work. We have had an interim report; and this to some extent has had to be an interim debate.

154. In this regard, my delegation thinks that the draft resolution introduced by Austria and fifteen other delegations [A/C.1/L.416] adequately meets the requirements of the present situation. It does two things which in our view should be done: it underlines the urgency we all attach to the completion of a treaty, and it prepares the way for the full consideration the Assembly must obviously give to the outcome of the Disarmament Committee's negotiations. We shall vote in favour of that draft.

155. The treaty has, of course, yet to be completed. When it is completed and accepted by all the States whose signature is needed to make it fully effective, the world will have been relieved of a very real nightmare. But when this is achieved it will become all the more necessary to go on from there. In a very real sense, the treaty is conditional on further progress towards nuclear disarmament, even if its terms do not make this explicit. At the same time, the treaty is the condition for further progress. I believe that it is widely and rightly accepted that a non-proliferation treaty is not to be regarded as a step in isolation but one which must be conceived, and executed, as part of a continuous process. It will assume its full significance only if it is followed, at not too great an interval of time, by other positive undertakings.

156. Some of these have been suggested by the twelve experts; I would refer here to the Secretary-General's report, which says in part:

"A comprehensive test ban treaty, prohibiting the underground testing of nuclear devices, would also contribute to the objectives of non-proliferation and would clearly help to slow down the nuclear arms race. So would effective measures safeguarding the security of non-nuclear countries." [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 92.]

157. My delegation is on record with the view, which I would repeat now, that a comprehensive test ban is a logical corollary of an agreement on non-proliferation. We believe that it should take first priority on the Disarmament Committee's admittedly overcrowded agenda. My delegation therefore welcomes the draft resolution A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1-2, sponsored by a large number of countries and introduced in a thoughtful statement made earlier this week by the representative of Sweden [1547th meeting]. The present situation is indeed far from good: two of the five

nuclear Powers are testing in the atmosphere and two of the remaining three are testing underground.

158. New Zealand associates itself firmly with the expression of regret in the preamble of the draft resolution which notes that all States have not yet adhered to the 1963 test-ban Treaty. We think it right that the States that have not done so should be urged to adhere to the Treaty without further delay. This aspect of the problem is of continuing concern to New Zealand, not least because one of the Powers still testing in the air is doing so in New Zealand's part of the world—in the South West Pacific. We have protested against this activity and have repeated our hope that it will be quickly ended. We know from direct experience that the recent tests in the Pacific have been conducted with full regard for the need to avoid health hazards from fall-out. But this has not affected New Zealand's strong desire to see an early end to the tests as well as all other atmospheric tests.

159. The series of tests that accompany the emergence of communist China as a nuclear Power must also be a cause of concern for the countries of Asia and the Pacific. Indeed, the actions and attitudes of communist China and the political purposes it has proclaimed in developing its nuclear weaponry cast a shadow far beyond the borders of its own region. They give sombre emphasis to the fact that agreements designed to take us well along the road to general disarmament may have little meaning if they are not universally applied.

160. As I have said, my delegation remains convinced that an end to nuclear tests in all environments would be a major step forward. It would be an important barrier to proliferation. It would help to slow down the arms race, with the fatal compulsion that that race exerts on the super-Powers to refine and expand their nuclear armouries; and it is long overdue anyway.

161. It seems to us that we should have accomplished much if we succeed in halting the spread of nuclear weapons and ending all nuclear tests. But even that would be only a first beginning, for the reality of great and growing armaments, nuclear and non-nuclear, will remain. If I may refer again to the report of the Secretary-General and the twelve wise men: "... the situation remains far from stable. Even the world-wide concern about proliferation, which the major Powers clearly share has not as yet led to any measures of nuclear disarmament" [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 84]. What must be sought with a greater sense of urgency are measures which would halt and turn back the nuclear arms race. What we all want to see is agreement on practical steps towards real disarmament. We have noted what has been said about some of these practical steps by the representative of one of the super-Powers. In the statement he made on 12 December [1547th meeting], the representative of the United States referred to three such measures: a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes; the transfer to peaceful uses of nuclear material through the observed destruction of nuclear weapons; and a reduction of strategic offensive and defensive systems. We have also noted what he said about the differences of approach that have prevented these proposals from being more vigorously pursued. If they are to be pursued to a constructive conclusion, it is obvious

that both the major nuclear Powers, not merely one of them, should be willing to consider them seriously and in good faith.

162. We know they raise complex problems and will need lengthy and patient negotiation. But in this whole perplexing issue it seems to us that there are no dramatic possibilities. Where so much is at stake, progress can only be slow and understanding hard to find. Although we may be able to take no giant strides out of the dangers that surround us, it is clear that there are steps which we can take, and take now, to diminish those dangers.

163. Mr. NSANZE (Burundi) (*translated from French*): Mr. Chairman, when I said at the opening meeting of this session of the General Assembly [1494th meeting] that we could expect positive results from the First Committee under your Chairmanship, I was reckoning on the fact that your wide experience and abilities would enable us to carry out our task successfully. As today we speak for the first time on the subject of peace, the delegation of Burundi is gratified and happy to note the masterly skill with which, assisted by the other officers, you have directed the work of this Committee. My delegation feels that there could be no better opportunity to tackle this world problem than at a time when the Committee is under the guidance of a Chairman like yourself. As we are all aware, you have lived through the evils of war, not in the abstract, but as a personal experience, since political scheming has on several occasions made your gallant country a victim of wars that have led to the decimation of populations and the annexation of territory.

164. General and complete disarmament has today become an imperious need. It is logical to assume that the peak of the nuclear age is not the moment to achieve total and immediate disarmament. The day is not yet close when the sun will set on a world from which nuclear weapons have disappeared; but it is reasonable and realistic to propose reducing to a minimum the number of reasons why men feel they have to go to war, for even if it is not possible to establish mathematically in advance a time-table covering the whole disarmament process, it is nevertheless true that disarmament will have to be carried out in stages.

165. The process of gradual disengagement is in our opinion extremely urgent, at any rate its primary stage, which would be the first milestone along the road towards general disarmament with a view to avoiding an atomic holocaust.

166. In order of priority, the first step to be taken would be to put a brake on armaments; that should be the initial objective of any disarmament programme, the final objective being complete world disarmament.

167. Unfortunately, we are faced with the distressing spectacle of a world misled by pious proclamations of disarmament while the deeds speak in terms of armaments. It is this gulf between words and deeds that threatens to reduce our planet to ashes. The situation has worsened overnight, with lip service being paid to disarmament while nations are arming to the teeth.

168. Entrenched political positions on the part of States are the commonest source of strife and bloodshed in

history. An objective glance over the past centuries reveals that the intransigence and political sophistry of Governments are the main causes of the wars which have racked the human race.

169. The spectacle of the steadily growing nuclear stock-piles forces us to the conclusion that human beings have an instinctive organic itch to wage war.

170. In a book entitled *L'Art de la Politique*, Gaston Bouthoul describes at length the triumph of impulse, antiquated notions and egoism over rational behaviour:

"Our scientific progress", he states, "is at the service of our political backwardness more than government red tape. For it would appear, at least up to now, that whatever ideologies they profess, Governments are incapable of imagining any solution to their traditional rivalries but war. As in the Middle Ages each Government finds justification and consolation in the contention that its arms are for the defence of peace. Everyone regards his own weapons as defensive and those of others as offensive, and is convinced that any war he wages will be a just war.

"Our civilization, like so many others before it, may perish because of this dangerous sophistry, which is all the more dangerous because it is sincerely held. For we must not forget that all civilizations have perished through war."

171. The 300 or so wars that have sundered mankind and destroyed people and property over the course of six centuries, from the Battle of Crécy in 1346, which ushered in the era of gunpowder, to Hiroshima, the first victim of means of mass destruction, corroborate Bouthoul's thesis.

172. It is not enough to be lulled into imagining that nuclear technology will be confined to the new laws of strategy and politics which atomic weapons impose upon mankind. What is to be feared above all is the destruction, out of all proportion to the issue at stake, that a nuclear war would involve. The mere thought of the possible extent of the havoc should induce the possessors of nuclear weapons to halt the proliferation of such weapons.

173. The fearsome potentiality of the absolute weapon, in space and in time, makes the immediate suspension of nuclear tests imperative.

174. The Secretary-General's report dated 10 October [A/6858] highlights the terrifying danger to which mankind is exposed by the nuclear frenzy of today.

175. The tremendous importance attached by Burundi to world peace has led us to give a great deal of thought to the possibility of preserving the earth from the total destruction which daily threatens it. The world is already dotted with nuclear arsenals, where gigantic weapons have a power of destruction, calculated in megatons, that is enough to make any reasonable man's head spin.

176. One example among many might be cited: the test explosion of 1 March 1954, which in less than a second liberated as much energy as all the explosions of the Second World War.

177. United Nations experts, scientists studying the nature and properties of the new weapons in scientific laboratories, and eminent military specialists, are unanimous in condemning the idea of using these weapons. The reflection that one day the human race, benighted for all its splendid achievements, will be swallowed up in a nuclear abyss, is appalling to all who are anxious for the survival of mankind. General de Gaulle furnishes a stirring testimony of this in his memoirs:

"I must say that the emergence of these diabolical devices troubles me deeply. I had, of course, long been aware that the Americans were working on irresistible explosives using atomic fission. But the fact that it does not come as a surprise does not lessen my feeling of despair at seeing devices produced that may cause man to destroy the human race."⁵

178. But can the political aims of the great Powers be measured against the incalculable and irreparable damage which would result from a thermonuclear holocaust? Will States possessing nuclear supremacy opt in favour of weapons that could wipe out the whole world, themselves included, rather than abandon devices capable of causing such a catastrophe?

179. We must discard the illusion of peace through fear or deterrence.

180. The main concern of the Republic of Burundi and its Government, namely to help as far as we can to build a world characterized by lasting peace, has prompted us to try to discover the major common causes of war.

181. Karl von Clausewitz defined the notion of war as a political instrument as follows:

"War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means."⁶

182. In addition to political designs, the advocates of violence do not hesitate to claim that might is right. Hegel's thesis is a striking illustration of the principle, and "*Macht geht über Recht*" ("might is right") was the military creed that glorified brute force in the not-too-distant past. The Hegelian thesis that history is the development of the idea, over a space of time, and above all that strength which prevails is the symbol of right, since it represents the idea of the rational, has been followed—though perhaps under another guise—by warmongers ancient and modern.

183. Among the followers of Hegel was Nietzsche, the author of *Beyond Good and Evil*, for whom the intensive cultivation of vital energy became the mainspring of all morality.

184. The question now is whether the architects of the present-day nuclear structure are to be placed in the category of those who hold that only the superior being, because of his military mastery, enjoys all rights including that of destroying other races and the whole of mankind.

⁵ *Mémoires de Guerre, Le Salut*, Paris, Librairie Plon, 1959, p. 227.

⁶ *On War*, vol. I, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1940, p. 13.

185. The eternal apologia of violence, with all the trappings of national pride, will not forever be capable of limiting annihilation to the strategic and political fields alone.

186. Freud, faced with this human aggressiveness, warns the warmongers that disregard of aggressive impulses can lead not only to war but to the end of civilization.

187. Indeed, everything seems to indicate that the principal artisans of thermonuclear weapons are so blind that they are not aware of the striking contrast between the tangible reality of armaments, the actual, unbridled pursuit of the absolute weapon, and the unreality of disarmament. It is another military expert who says this.

188. If we look soberly at the facts, the Powers that possess these weapons pretend that they want to disarm in order to gain enough time to build up their stockpiles without let or hindrance. In the meantime, one of them will declare itself in favour of total and immediate disarmament, which is hardly realistic, while the other will insist on total prior control, which is equally unrealistic.

189. Today, in the face of the wide range of nuclear devices, a broad sector of public opinion tends to acquiesce in their ultimate use and regards them as establishing a balance of fear between two antagonistic and more or less equal forces. According to this view, the balance of forces now rests on the monopoly of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the leaders of these two blocs. Those who think thus try to keep the role of the absolute weapon within the sphere of the diplomacy of deterrence, which holds that the mutual fear engendered by the constant improvement in weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery will in the long run make it impossible for those possessing them to use them for military purposes.

190. For some time to come, of course, the architects of the nuclear edifice will remain enmeshed in the strategic web they have woven, with no alternative but to forswear the use of force in their mutual relations for fear of unleashing a catastrophe of which they would be the first victim.

191. However, although we cannot argue with absolute certainty, we must challenge the validity and the effectiveness of this balance of forces. How precarious the balance is can be visualized if we take the gloomy hypothesis—which cannot be ruled out—of a catastrophe happening accidentally as a result of a miscalculation on the part of a leader or a technician.

192. Or again, the time might come when one of the possessors of nuclear weapons inspired too much fear in the other. If that should happen, one of the two, the one afraid or the one inspiring the fear, might be tempted to snatch the offensive, to press the button, and a horror of incalculable proportions would be unleashed in a split second. At that instant, the violence pent up until then would explode. The balance of fear would be obliterated in the outburst, and a huge tidal wave would submerge everything.

193. Let us hope, indeed let us ensure, that the strategy of the nuclear age remains in the political realm. But the only adequate and reassuring solution lies and will continue to lie in the demilitarization and denuclearization of the opposing blocs, in other words, in comprehensive, universal disarmament which will safeguard mankind from the nuclear threat that hangs constantly over its head.

194. Furthermore, cold realism based on the experience of earlier centuries and the knowledge of what the interests of the protagonists really are, demonstrates indubitably that mistrust and disquiet will persist on both sides and stimulate the desire to resort to a show of strength and to violence until such time as mutual misunderstanding, economic rivalry and racial fanaticism, which contain the seeds of war, have been stamped out.

195. There is a crying need in the Third World to eliminate foreign bases. Since Burundi became independent over five years ago, it has held back from any military commitment, but our young Republic cannot remain indifferent or insensitive to the fate of a large number of countries of the Third World, which have seen the flouting of their national sovereignty become the order of the day.

196. Having succeeded in defending our independence on all fronts, and having made our country the model of good neighbour policy, it would be inexcusable for the Republic of Burundi to forsake the cause of other States whose sovereignty is today, under various guises, willy-nilly in foreign hands.

197. As a tireless champion of peace and a country closely linked to the Third World by a common destiny, Burundi feels itself called to the colours along with countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America to fight for the total triumph, once and for all, of their rights and their freedom.

198. The Republic of Burundi has declared its irrevocable and unswerving opposition to the installation of military bases in African, Asian and Latin American countries for a variety of reasons.

199. First of all, a country whose national territory is occupied by foreign armed forces enjoys only a mutilated and certainly only a nominal independence.

200. Secondly, the existence of these bases necessarily and inevitably implies a derogation from the norms of the policy of non-alignment. This policy, soundly conceived and intelligently applied, has brought the Government of Burundi the esteem and friendship of its immediate neighbours and its more remote well-wishers and admirers.

201. Our steadfast advocacy of unqualified national sovereignty for all countries and our unswerving devotion to strict political neutrality justify my Government's firm determination to condemn unequivocally, and strenuously to oppose, the enslavement of nations by any military domination from outside.

202. The attitude of the Republic I have the honour to represent is explained by the fact that foreign bases involve major drawbacks, and in virtually every instance bring along with them grave dangers for the host country.

203. Insofar as it constitutes interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries, the establishment of foreign bases flagrantly violates the fundamental principles on which all State jurisdiction is based. But apart from interfering in the domestic jurisdiction of States, these practices infringe General Assembly resolutions 2131 (XX) and 2225 (XXI) of 21 December 1965 and 9 December 1966, which categorically denounce foreign military interference in matters coming exclusively within the national jurisdiction of States.

204. At times, those who install foreign bases have used the blanket pretext of military pacts freely concluded between the partners.

205. No doubt this is a legal argument apparently in their favour and exonerating them from any charge. But it raises a very pertinent question. If the terms of the military pacts or treaties were freely accepted by the parties concerned, what were the attendant circumstances?

206. Suppose the weaker party were to refuse to accept the terms proposed by the more powerful partner, could the latter guarantee that there would not be a coup d'état against the recalcitrant leader and that his Government would not quickly find itself faced with economic strangulation and depression as a result of the thwarting of the master's action by his pupil?

207. For this reason my delegation steadfastly maintains that there is no proper legal validity to these bogus military pacts.

208. There are other reasons also, less apparent but frequent, why Governments may be forced to sign military treaties under pressure.

209. Such cases occur where Governments use their propaganda machinery to try to persuade young States that they need the backing of foreign troops on their territory to protect themselves from attacks by their neighbours. Imaginary invasions by adjacent countries are invented lock, stock and barrel with the definite though disguised object of inducing a reluctant Government to call in forces from outside.

210. A head of State or Government caught in such a stranglehold and subjected to such overwhelming pressure is rendered helpless to resist the tempting offers made, ostensibly so as to thwart and outwit the designs against him and his country.

211. My delegation is therefore convinced that a programme of general and complete disarmament can only be effective if it embodies the elimination of military bases on any territory other than that to which the troops belong.

212. Quite apart from the fact that such bases are the aftermath of colonialism, they are frequently the source of bloody conflict between brotherly neighbour countries. What causes military competition between young nations if not the presence of foreign bases in one or more rival States? When a country discovers that one of its neighbours is supplied and provided for by a great Power, its natural reaction is to look round itself for a protector ready

and willing to help it to restore the balance and perhaps to gain military superiority over its enemies.

213. It is in the true interest of mankind to declare and scrupulously to respect atomic neutrality on the ground and in the air in respect of Africa, Asia and Latin America, as manifested in their determination to prohibit test explosions, the construction of launching pads and the stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

214. The three continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America would have nothing to gain by courting the dubious honour of becoming a prey to constant fear. Anyway, nuclear weapons are an extravagant luxury which the countries of our economically still backward world cannot afford.

215. The primary, legitimate concern of the three continents which have not yet come of age industrially and economically is to attain the same dignity and material self-sufficiency as those possessing the absolute weapon, and not to climb on to the thermonuclear bandwagon.

216. If we can keep our lands free of launching pads, strategic air fields, and nuclear stockpiles or industries, these continents of ours will have done a great deal to help to bring about disarmament.

217. Demilitarization and denuclearization of the Third World must continue to be the watchword of our continents.

218. A conference of non-nuclear-weapon States would be a real contribution to disarmament.

219. My delegation is in favour of convening a conference of countries not possessing nuclear weapons. If some countries still claim and possess a monopoly over the nuclear arsenal, it would be wrong to leave it to their discretion to suspend or pursue their activities at will.

220. The other countries of the world likewise have the right to take part in steering the destinies of the human race to which they belong. This truth found an ardent advocate seven years ago in George Kennan, who argued that we are not the exclusive owners of the globe. We are only some of its many inhabitants. We are not entitled, on the pretext of self-defence, to cause or to risk causing its destruction, nor even to poison its atmosphere with our nuclear testing. Our own security is only a secondary matter in relation to the problems that face all mankind, a fact which we tend at times to overlook.

221. An international meeting for the purpose of seeking ways and means of bringing about disarmament would be less concerned with the individual interests of the participants than with the cause of mankind itself, in other words including the Powers possessing thermonuclear energy. The essential aim of such a meeting would be best defined as the organization of a nuclear club for peace, working to safeguard and immunize the as yet uncontaminated countries against nuclear contagion.

222. Without wishing to impugn the motives of any Member State, any attempt to block so healthy a move

would, in the opinion of the delegation of Burundi, be tantamount to a lamentable determination to obstruct genuine efforts to prevent a nuclear catastrophe of incalculable dimensions.

223. The United Nations has for years worked indefatigably for the suspension of nuclear tests and progressive disarmament. Its appeal, repeated time after time, has remained a dead letter; the States concerned have turned a deaf ear to it.

224. The many meetings held at Geneva by the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and the sessions of the General Assembly in New York, have concentrated on the problem of disarmament by the process of elimination. But the joint efforts by these two bodies have done little to curb the headlong arms race of our time. Thus, since this approach has failed, surely it would be in the interests of all to try another procedure, that of disarmament by prevention and exclusion?

225. The process of disarmament by prevention and exclusion would mean striving vigorously to nip in the bud any attempt to contaminate the countries as yet uncontaminated through the manufacture of nuclear weapons. With this in mind, and viewed from this standpoint, a conference of non-nuclear weapon Powers would undeniably be useful. Looked at in this way, the proposed conference would not only have the blessing of the nuclear Powers, ensnared in their mutual mistrust and suspicion, but it would also be calculated to enlist their wide and effective co-operation. In other words, the guiding principle I would like to see applied to this project is the solidarity and coalition of the non-nuclear-weapon States against total war whose consequences would result in a hecatomb of immeasurable proportions.

226. The disappointment caused by the unwillingness of certain Powers to pay heed to the world's opposition to the possession of thermonuclear weapons makes the convening of this conference for the establishment of the nuclear peace club a necessity. When all is said and done, even if the super-Powers are at daggers drawn by reason of their ideological differences, they nevertheless have one supreme interest in common. It is a demonstrable fact that they are neither willing nor able to rule the world together; but it is equally true that, in so far as they are vulnerable to each other, they have no intention of indulging in mutual destruction.

227. Once that is established, the conclusion to be drawn is that this political-strategic position is no consolation for other nations, which are more likely to suffer considerably than to benefit from delaying tactics in convening this meeting of countries outside the atomic club.

228. Such is the gloomy outlook, and it calls urgently for the convening of a conference to bring together all the members of the non-nuclear club and at the same time to administer a shot in the arm to the nuclear-weapon States, on the principle of the Latin tag *contraria contrariis curantur*—opposites are cured with opposites.

229. This initiative is both our right and our duty, for like the States armed to the teeth, we too claim our funda-

mental right to survival and security. If in defence of these rights we cannot have recourse to the weapons which would dig the grave of the world, it is our bounden duty to prevent such an appalling prospect by holding peaceful talks, on a footing of *de facto* and *de jure* equality among all the participants.

230. The task of the nuclear age should be that of building world peace. The monumental powerlessness of States to disarm is in strange contrast to their stupefying ability to arm.

231. The gist of the chapter of the Secretary-General's report on the economic effects of nuclear warfare produces impressive evidence of the damage done to the world's economy by the madcap arms race in which great rivals are pitted one against the other.

232. It is a hard and bitter fact that the improvement, development and expansion of nuclear weapons absorbs immense sums of money. The astronomical budgets earmarked for armament programmes represents an incalculable loss of funds that could otherwise be used to raise nations and peoples to the peak of economic and technical prosperity in keeping with the needs of twentieth century industrial technology and the demands of our time.

233. Why then should not every effort be made to curb this blood-letting of the international economy, profoundly affected as it is by the vast sums spent on the forging of the thermonuclear brand?

234. Edward Le Ghait expresses this same question in his own way:⁷

"When it comes to manufacturing more arms, any and all risks are permitted; but we are not allowed a single one if it is a question of disarmament. The interests related to the manufacture of armaments have become so vast, so all-powerful and widespread that only a disarmament programme that is crystal clear and formulated with impeccable consistency stands any chance against them."

235. The material and human resources mobilized for the manufacture of these weapons are beyond belief.

236. The paralysis and powerlessness of Governments to shake themselves free and open up the way to peace-making seems to correspond to the fourth phase of the ineluctable law of the process of war, or what the sociologists call collective, instantaneous annihilation. Arnold Toynbee expresses this disquiet characteristically in terms which corroborate our view in stating that when the increase in human efficiency reaches such a pitch that war comes to mobilize a decisive proportion of resources and energies for military purposes, war becomes a fatal cancer unless society succeeds in excising it.

237. It is monstrous and unthinkable that on the very eve of conquering the cosmos, the solar system, the distant galaxies and perhaps even the secret of life itself, man should be guilty of stubbornly refusing to eliminate war, which like Saturn devouring his own children, will not spare

⁷ *No Carte Blanche to Capricorn*, New York, Brookfield House, p. 91.

either the fruits of human intelligence or those of economic and industrial development.

238. My Government is most anxious that this same human intelligence which has reached the peak of its genius in modern science and technology should come to regard disarmament as an imperious need, and put an end to the wholesale dehumanization of the human spirit and the universal lowering of moral values which pervades the whole world.

239. In illustration of the monumental guilt which will inevitably lie on those who incur responsibility for a nuclear cataclysm by their reluctance to destroy the atomic

bases and remove the causes of war, regardless of specious justifications, I beg the indulgence of this august and solemn Assembly in closing my statement with a quotation from the second Psalm: "*Et nunc reges, intelligite; erudimini qui judicatis terram*"—"Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings: be instructed, ye judges of the earth".

240. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that both you yourself and the Committee will pardon the unusual length of my statement; but I felt it was called for by the vital importance of peace to the world.

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.