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Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEMS 29, 30 AND 31

Question of general and complete disarmament (*continued*)

(a) **Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/6951-DC/229; A/C.1/L.411, L.412);**

(b) **Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons (A/6858 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1).**

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/6951-DC/229; A/C.1/L.414)

Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/6951-DC/229)

1. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the first speaker on my list, I should like to remind members of the Committee once again that we must exert every effort to finish the remaining items before the Assembly adjourns. It is understood that the First Committee should finish its work at least two days before the target date for the termination of the Assembly. Bearing this in mind, I hope that members will co-operate with me by speaking in the order in which their names are inscribed on the list of speakers.

2. Moreover, as members may have noticed, so far there are two draft resolutions before the Committee, one contained in document A/C.1/L.411 and the other in documents A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1, which have certain financial implications. It is necessary, therefore, that after the Committee has finalized its action on those two documents, the competent organ of the Assembly be advised of the decisions taken so that they may be able to deal with the financial implications. For this reason, I hope that the members of the Committee will be prepared to vote on those two draft resolutions at our meetings tomorrow. As usual, the Secretary of the Committee will read statements on the financial implications of draft resolutions A/C.1/L.411 and A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1 before the Committee begins to vote.

3. Mr. JAKOBSON (Finland): The interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [A/6951-DC/229] tells us that we must go on waiting for a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also tells us, by implication, that while we are kept waiting we should not disturb the negotiations among the nuclear Powers by engaging in a full-scale debate on this item. It is natural that the report has caused deep disappointment and that, in view of the far-reaching military, political and economic implications of a non-proliferation treaty, many delegations are anxious to have an opportunity to present their views and, if possible, make their influence felt in shaping its terms. My delegation shares the disappointment and impatience with delay, yet we do not see the situation in a wholly negative light. The fact that the two leading nuclear Powers continue to be engaged in a serious effort to complete the draft has in itself great political significance. It confirms their awareness of the awful responsibilities they share and their will to work together for the maintenance of international peace and security. If, by refraining from debate, we can facilitate their task, that is not too great a sacrifice to make.

4. Much of the uneasiness with regard to a non-proliferation treaty appears to stem from the belief that the non-nuclear countries will be made to give up something for nothing; that by abandoning their nuclear option they will be weakening their own security. My Government has consistently taken a different view. In the statement of my delegation at the 1365th meeting of this Committee two years ago it was pointed out that the President of Finland, Urho Kekkonen, when introducing in May 1963 his idea of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, based himself largely on the argument that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would not add effectively to the security of a nation, but would tend rather to increase the risks it faced. This case is persuasively argued in the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the

acquisition and further development of these weapons. The report states that:

“Having nuclear weapons on one’s own territory might bring with it the penalty of becoming a direct target for nuclear attack.” [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 84.]

5. In this connexion, it is worth noting that the distinction often made between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is shown to be largely illusory. On this point the report states that:

“... it is clear enough that the destruction and disruption which would result from so-called tactical nuclear war would hardly differ from the effects of strategic war in the area concerned”. [Ibid., para. 35]

6. A war started with tactical nuclear weapons would rapidly escalate and most probably turn into a full-scale nuclear exchange. Theories about a real limitation of atomic war, restraint with regard to the size and numbers of warheads used, the so-called calculated response, and so on, should thus be regarded with scepticism.

7. The conclusion to be drawn from the report is that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any single country outside those now possessing these weapons would inevitably have far-reaching political implications, not only for that country but also for its neighbours and the entire region concerned. The report rightly points out that the acquisition by any nation of nuclear weapons “could... trigger a change in its international relations” [ibid., para. 84]. That would undoubtedly be true also of the introduction of nuclear weapons into an area where there had not been such weapons before. Any such change in the prevailing nuclear balance would be bound to create increased international tension, instability and uncertainty affecting the entire region and the relationships between all the nations belonging to it. The risk of becoming part of the potential target area in a nuclear war would be shared by the neighbouring countries as well.

8. My Government wholly agrees with the conclusion, as stated in the report, that the solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them, but rather in international agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, prohibiting all nuclear tests, creating nuclear-weapon free zones additional to those of Antarctica and Latin America, and other measures of arms control and disarmament designed to bring about eventually the elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use.

9. The report mentions the need of guarantees for non-nuclear States without discussing their possible nature. In our view we should make here a distinction between the universal significance of a non-proliferation treaty and its varying regional or local implications. By halting the spread of nuclear weapons and thus limiting the risk of nuclear war, the treaty would clearly enhance the security of all nations. At the same time, it must be recognized that, for some non-nuclear countries, the treaty might nevertheless create political problems resulting from a feeling of insecurity. Such consequences of a non-proliferation treaty should, we believe, be considered on a regional rather than

a world-wide basis, for it is hardly conceivable that a universally applicable formula for guarantees could be worked out or would even be desirable.

10. Another section of the Secretary-General’s report which, in our view, deserves the widest possible attention concerns the economic implications of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It is of course generally known that the resources needed for the development and production of nuclear arms and armaments are immense, yet the prevailing popular view has been that an industrialized country, making use of its scientific and technical know-how and its industrial capacity, would be able to create its own nuclear capability without crippling cost and that the decision whether or not to produce nuclear weapons could be based primarily on considerations of military security. The report now makes it clear that the cost of nuclear warheads and their delivery system would be high, not only initially but over a long period of time, and would be likely to increase year by year, while the burden of conventional armaments would not correspondingly be lightened. It is interesting to note that, in the opinion of the experts who have drawn up this report, only six of the potential nuclear Powers could afford to develop even a modest nuclear capability without drawing a major part of their national resources away from constructive activities. Thus, according to the report, the acquisition and maintenance of a nuclear arsenal would impose a major economic and technological burden on the great majority of the countries in the world and, as a consequence, the possession of such an arsenal would result in a reduction, not an increase, in both the national security and the political influence of a country.

11. It is true, as pointed out by the representative of Sweden in her statement on 11 December [1545th meeting], that the conclusions of the report with regard to the economic implications of the acquisition of nuclear weapons are valid only for the independent national production of such weapons. The possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons by purchase from other States is not taken into account. It is all the more important, therefore, to emphasize the significance of the *de facto* agreement now prevailing between the leading nuclear Powers not to transfer nuclear weapons into the control of non-nuclear countries. One of the benefits of a non-proliferation treaty would be to confirm and formalize what today depends only on the actual policy of these nuclear Powers.

12. It is no doubt true, as stated in the Secretary-General’s report, that the general propositions concerning the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons “have been proclaimed so often that their force has all but been lost through repetition” [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 2]. On the intellectual level, we know and recognize the facts, but on the political level we have not yet drawn the necessary conclusions. The nuclear arms race continues and there is a risk of its further intensification. It cannot be slowed down or brought to a halt until the nations recognize, as a basis for political action, the terrible effect of any use of nuclear weapons and the risks inherent in their very existence. It is the task of the United Nations to promote such an understanding. To this end, the Secretary-General’s report makes a most valuable contribution. The fact that the group of highly qualified experts representing major political and geographic areas in the world has been able to come

up with a unanimous report without shunning the controversial issues involved is an encouraging example of what can be achieved through international scientific co-operation. My delegation hopes that this will lead to more study projects of a similar kind, and we whole-heartedly endorse the draft resolution submitted by Canada and a number of other countries expressing our appreciation to the Secretary-General and the consultant experts and recommending that the report be publicized as widely as possible.

13. Mr. CHIMIDDORJ (Mongolia) (*translated from Russian*): In the introduction to his annual report the Secretary-General of the United Nations quite rightly points out that:

“The small measure of success that has been achieved in controlling the arms race, in bringing about the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and in making progress towards general and complete disarmament has led to a growing sense of concern and disquiet regarding both the nuclear and the conventional arms races.” [A/6701/Add.1, para. 18.]

That statement objectively reflects the state of affairs and is a most timely reminder to us of what we should concentrate our attention upon in order to ensure peace on earth.

14. The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic, whose Government considers the struggle to achieve general and complete disarmament to be one of the most important tasks of its foreign policy, has always been strongly in favour of bringing the arms race to a halt as speedily as possible and of adopting effective measures in order to implement the programme of disarmament and thus save mankind from the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

15. In our view, ensuring national and international security through disarmament should be the aim of every country. Only general and complete disarmament under effective international control can serve as a guarantee that the peoples will be able to live in a world free of war, without material destruction and without senseless loss of human life. Only in a disarmed world can man live in conditions of genuine tranquillity and universal and economic progress.

16. It should be noted that although the General Assembly has repeatedly indicated the importance of general and complete disarmament and has approved a number of documents which can serve as a political basis for agreement on radical measures in the field of disarmament, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament, the actual situation is quite different. The negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament have been deadlocked. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, like its predecessors, is far from concluding the tasks which were entrusted to it by the General Assembly and the world community. This may be seen from the interim report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, although that Committee, on the recommendation of the General Assembly, has recently been devoting itself primarily and with some hopeful signs of progress to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

17. In spite of some promising beginnings in the field of limiting nuclear weapons, the intensified armaments race is

continuing at full speed and huge stocks of nuclear weapons are being piled up; this, in turn, inflames an already dangerous situation in the world, in which we see ceaseless acts of international banditry and violence, such as the barbarous aggression of the United States in Viet-Nam, the explosive situation in the Middle East caused by the adventures of Israeli military circles, and the further complication of the situation in Central Europe resulting from the openly revanchist policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. We cannot fail to take note of the fact that such a course of events, engendered by the aggressive designs and machinations of the reactionary forces of imperialism and colonialism, is having an unfavourable effect on the negotiations concerning disarmament.

18. At the same time, the threat of a nuclear war is growing year by year and, however hard it may be to have to realize this, is drawing ever closer to the point where it will be too late to take any effective measures. This is brought out on each page of the report of the Secretary-General on the “Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and on the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of these Weapons”. In this report all the horrors and destruction which the use of nuclear weapons would cause are described in a calm and detached manner. The report gives this most timely warning:

“... the risk of nuclear war remains as long as there are nuclear weapons... The ultimate question for the world to decide in our nuclear age—and this applies both to nuclear and non-nuclear Powers—is what short-term interests it is prepared to sacrifice in exchange for an assurance of survival and security.” [A/6858, paras. 41 and 42.]

19. Fully realizing the danger of a conflict involving the use of nuclear rocket weapons and deeply concerned about the fate of all the peoples of the world, the Soviet Union and other socialist and peace-loving States are exerting ceaseless efforts in the search for ways and means of reducing and stopping the arms race and of bringing the different points of view closer together in negotiations. In these conditions, their efforts are directed primarily to the adoption of measures on nuclear disarmament, for the facts of contemporary life have put this problem in the forefront as the key question in the whole complex of problems related to disarmament.

20. Everyone knows that the socialist States, bearing in mind the fact that the member States of NATO are not prepared to undertake radical measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, have introduced a number of proposals for partial measures in this field. These include the important initiatives of the Soviet Union for the total prohibition of nuclear tests and the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons, the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of those weapons—which the General Assembly has approved at this session—the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and other measures. For its part, the People's Republic of Poland has submitted constructive proposals on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe and on the freezing of nuclear weapons in that region. The Government of the German Democratic Republic, considering it possible and necessary to make progress on the question of

the limitation of the nuclear arms race both on a multilateral basis and a unilateral basis, has expressed its readiness to renounce nuclear weapons if the Federal Republic of Germany accepts a similar obligation.

21. The implementation of those and other constructive proposals would be of great importance in achieving progress in disarmament and in the security of all States.

22. The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic, like many other delegations, welcomed the news of a *rapprochement* among the partners in the negotiations on the drafting of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our delegation believes that all the States Members of the United Nations should contribute, by their action, to the prompt conclusion of such a treaty which, in its turn, would enable the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to deal with other urgent questions, which is what the peoples of all the countries expect of it.

23. Of course in order to break the present deadlock in the disarmament negotiations and achieve other practical measures, the Western Powers must first of all display goodwill and a readiness to meet the sincere desires and efforts of the Socialist States and other peace-loving States. This is an essential prerequisite for the effective functioning of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to enable it to resolve such urgent problems as the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, the elimination of all stock-piles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. It should be clear to all that the solution of such important and complex questions is impossible without a spirit of compromise and a desire to bring the parties closer together in the interests of universal peace and the protection of world civilization from possible destruction.

24. In this connexion, we should like to say what we think about some very mistaken and dangerous views often advanced by the representatives of the West in order to offset the consistent position of the socialist States on the question of disarmament.

25. First, it is unfounded and harmful to say that the implementation of so-called balanced measures of control over disarmament would lead to general and complete disarmament, as if that were the only means of resolving the problem of nuclear weapons. The system of armaments under control means in effect encouragement of the arms race, the maintenance and intensification of an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust in relations between States, and the maintenance of tension. With arms in one's hands it is impossible to imagine that one is disarming. All States must rid themselves of their arms at the same time and forever. It is only in that way that we shall have a guarantee of security for everyone. In the logic of things such should be the approach to general and complete disarmament.

26. The theory of the so-called "deterrent role" of nuclear weapons is also advanced and it is argued that disarmament measures would violate the so-called balance of nuclear deterrence. Thus it would seem that by maintaining nuclear weapons, a nuclear war can be prevented. This absurd attitude is designed to cover up the reluctance to disarm in general and to eliminate nuclear weapons in particular.

27. If the defenders of such arguments continue to approach the question of disarmament in this way, it will not be possible to make progress in negotiations on these questions, which are of vital importance for the whole world, and this dangerous situation will remain—a situation to which the world is seeking a speedy and secure solution.

28. That is why the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic is adding its voice to those of other States that are striving for the adoption of effective and practical measures in the field of general and complete disarmament in the interest of the whole of mankind.

29. Our delegation is constrained to express very clearly its surprise—to put it mildly—that while our Committee, most conscious of its responsibility, is discussing in a very serious manner the questions relating to general and complete disarmament, and particularly the question of nuclear disarmament, there are certain delegations which want to lead the Committee to destroy even what has already been attained by humanity in this field at the price of great sacrifices. In this connexion, we should like to mention the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Malta in document A/C.1/L.411. That draft resolution provided for a review, with the purpose of revision, updating or replacement, of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Whatever the reasons which have prompted the author, or more probably the authors, of that draft resolution to put forward such highly incomprehensible, and I would add, irresponsible, proposals, our Committee cannot possibly adopt such a dangerous course, which would lead not to disarmament, but to a revision of effective measures already adopted in this field and would burden the Eighteen-Nation Committee with some artificially raised questions. Indeed, a year ago, on 5 December 1966, the General Assembly, at its twenty-first session adopted resolution 2162 B (XXI) which called for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the above-mentioned Geneva Protocol, condemned all actions contrary to those objectives, and invited all States to adhere to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

30. Therefore, we might well ask: what do the authors of such an initiative want and what do they want to make of our Committee and of the General Assembly? Why do they want to make progress in the reduction and limitation of armaments and why, instead, are they pushing us back and trying to put new obstacles in the way of disarmament?

31. The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic is definitely opposed to the draft resolution of Malta and it fully supports draft resolution A/C.1/L.412, presented by the delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic, a draft resolution which completely accords with the previously expressed will and resolutions of the General Assembly.

32. Mr. BELOKOLOS (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): All of us understand quite clearly that the disarmament matters we are considering in the First Committee go to make up a large and intricate complex of questions which need strong and combined efforts for their successful solution. Much has already been done in this field, and we are especially glad to have noted

some evidence of promising developments. But in order to achieve the results expected by the peoples of the world from the United Nations in the field of disarmament, we shall still have to labour hard.

33. At the present session of the General Assembly, consideration of disarmament items has been undertaken in a most complex and tense international situation, which is characterized by numerous aggressive acts of the imperialist Powers in various parts of the world and by an ever-faster arms race.

34. In these conditions doubts are often expressed on whether it is appropriate, now that the arms race is developing and in the face of imperialist aggressive acts, to put forward disarmament questions.

35. We do not share this kind of doubt.

36. In the view of the Ukrainian people, and of the peoples of other Socialist States, the struggle for disarmament is not a tactical manoeuvre designed to achieve a specific objective. The fight for disarmament is for us a policy of principle and an inalienable part of our foreign policy—the foreign policy carried out by the Soviet State since its very inception. This policy remains constant today in conditions of greater international tension. What is more, we consider that greater threats of war require greater efforts on the part of the peoples of the world in their struggle for disarmament.

37. The experience of international relations shows that the slightest slackening in this struggle waged by the peace-loving peoples would untie the hands of the most aggressive imperialist circles which strive to increase international tension in order to carry out their designs the more easily; whereas the constant struggle of all peoples for disarmament has the contrary effect and seriously limits the possibilities of manoeuvres on the part of the warmongers.

38. The opponents of disarmament often resort to the well-worn argument that the maintenance of nuclear weapons by both sides contributes to maintaining a balance of force which supposedly strengthens general peace. We have often heard arguments of that kind in this Committee, among others on 20 November 1967 of this year in the statement of the representative of the United States of America. As was quite rightly pointed out by the representative of Yugoslavia on 29 November in this Committee, the balance of forces is nothing else but a balance of terror.

39. We reject arguments of this sort which run counter to the interests of peace on our planet. I should like to remind the United States representative in our Committee of the remarkable words by the late President Kennedy of the United States at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, on 25 September 1961—words imbued with great statesmanlike wisdom. In this statement President Kennedy declared:

“Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation, or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.”¹

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1013th meeting, para. 50.

This is the voice of wisdom, the voice of a man who knew well what a thermonuclear war might lead to and it is most regrettable that the present leaders of the United States and the diplomats representing it in the United Nations are not heeding the wise counsel of their late President.

40. But is there a road leading towards a solution of the disarmament problem? We think that there is. The Soviet Union put forward already several years ago a programme for general and complete disarmament, and in recent years added to it and completed it through well-known new proposals which met many objections on the part of the Western Powers. The implementation of the Soviet programme would enable the world to settle, once and for all, the problem of general and complete disarmament and thus to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

41. What is it that attracts the peace-loving peoples of the world in the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament? What are its advantages as compared with the corresponding United States document? What solution do the Soviet and United States documents provide for the key problem of disarmament, the full elimination of the danger of a thermonuclear war?

42. The draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, under strict effective international control, put forward in March 1962 by the Soviet Union, paves the way, above all, to freeing mankind from the threat of nuclear war and, after that, to doing away with all war on this earth. The mainstay of the Soviet draft treaty²—and nobody can gainsay this—is the prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons, the destruction of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and the cessation of their production. In other words they are measures which would do away with the danger of a nuclear war. And what is especially important, the Soviet draft treaty, from the very beginning of the disarmament process, frees the people of the world from the threat of a rocket and nuclear war weighing over them.

43. What is the attitude of the United States in its approach towards this key aspect of the disarmament problem?

44. As concerns the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons the United States draft treaty³ provides for a progressive staged reduction of the means of delivery by one third at each stage. In practice, this approach does not meet the security requirements of all States, since this reduction in the means of delivery of nuclear weapons by one third at each stage means that at the beginning of the second disarmament stage, nuclear Powers would have at their disposal 70 per cent of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and at the beginning of the last stage 35 per cent of all means of delivery.

45. It is quite obvious that such a figure for the means of delivery at the last stage of the disarmament process would be more than sufficient to unleash a full-scale nuclear war, even at the third stage of disarmament. This is evident if

² *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January-December 1965*, document DC/213/Add.1.

³ *Ibid.*, document DC/214/Add.1.

one takes into account the nuclear arsenal of the United States, which constantly boasts to the whole world of its tremendous superiority in all types of rocket and nuclear weapons. Of course, this is not disarmament but a caricature of disarmament.

46. We are even more apprehensive at studying the approach of the United States towards the question of the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. In reading the United States document, we see that it has no clear-cut provision setting some definite time limit to the process of nuclear disarmament, or stating that the question of nuclear disarmament must be effectively solved. We feel that even if, in accordance with the United States plan, disarmament is some time carried through to the end, the United States will not exclude the possibility of keeping part of these nuclear weapons for international security forces. This idea of the United States not only runs counter to common sense, but also to elementary logic. According to General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI), the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, to principles of international law and to the laws of humanity. How then can provision be made for the right of the Security Council to use nuclear weapons if the world is disarmed?

47. We fully realize that in the state of affairs of the world today tremendous obstacles persist on the path to disarmament. But, large though they may loom, we must not lose hope that negotiations for general and complete disarmament will be crowned with success. This is what the resolution adopted at the last session of the General Assembly [2161 (XXI)] asks us to do. It stresses that:

“... it is imperative to make further efforts to achieve early progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.”

48. Our Committee has also before it the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. As the resolution adopted at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly emphasized:

“... this question is of paramount importance and therefore necessitates serious discussion because of its implications for international peace and security.”

49. The Ukrainian SSR and other socialist States, as well as many other neutral countries, have for a long time insisted on the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from them. The existence of foreign military bases is in blatant contradiction with the main principles and provisions of a number of most important instruments adopted by the United Nations and other important international bodies.

50. The elimination of foreign military bases has been requested by the participants in the Conference of the Heads of African States, convened in May 1963 in Addis Ababa. They stressed, in the most categorical manner, the need to withdraw foreign forces from the continent of Africa and to eliminate foreign military bases. Expressing the will of the overwhelming majority of the globe, in October 1964, forty-seven States participating in the Cairo Conference of non-aligned States came out in favour of the immediate implementation of these measures.

51. The existence of foreign military bases is also incompatible with the General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty [resolution 2131 (XX)] and with the General Assembly resolution on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [2105 (XX)] which requests:

“... the colonial Powers to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones.”

52. These documents convincingly show that the existence of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries is condemned by the overwhelming majority of countries of the world, which firmly demand the elimination of these strong-points used by the imperialists for aggression and interference in the internal affairs of other States.

53. The fact that these bases are used by the imperialists as strong-points from which to launch acts of aggression is confirmed by the situation of these military bases on foreign soil. Such bases belonging to the United States, Great Britain and other countries that are members of aggressive blocs are to be found in the very areas where there exist at present the greatest threats to the peace and security of various peoples. All the world can see how, from the military bases in South Viet-Nam, Thailand, Okinawa and other parts of South-East Asia, the Pacific Ocean and the Far East, the United States of America are perpetrating aggression against the Viet-Nameese people, making ever heavier bombing attacks on the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and carrying out air-raids against some areas of Laos and Cambodia.

54. The military bases of the United States are the most numerous. Their close network extends many thousands of kilometres from the national territory of the United States, around the borders of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. According to information constantly being published in the Press, this system of United States bases includes over 2,000 military installations, of which over 400 are important military bases: rocket-launching pads, airfields of the Strategic Air Force and ports for the United States Navy. And this system of United States military bases is being constantly expanded and modernized. What is very indicative indeed is that in 1943, in the very midst of the Second World War, United States troops were to be found on the territories of thirty-nine countries, whereas at present they are stationed in forty-nine countries, especially on the territories of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

55. The main partners of the United States in NATO, Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, try not to lag behind. Most British bases are to be found in the countries of Asia and the Middle East, with some in other regions as well, where, together with the United States bases, they constitute the spring-boards for aggressive imperialist policies in those parts of the world.

56. The Federal Republic of Germany also is seeking to enmesh the countries of Africa in its tentacles. Thus, in South West Africa the Federal Republic of Germany has

built a station for rocket-tracking and the study of the ionosphere; and proving-grounds for testing modern types of weapons and a military airport are also being constructed there.

57. Sometimes the leaders of the United States and Britain seek to create the impression that their Governments are putting into effect a policy of reduction of military forces abroad. The facts show that, actually, the Western Powers are far from having changed their policy in this regard. The elimination of certain obsolete bases is carried out in the interest of the modernization and the greater effectiveness of the system of bases as a whole. What is more, the system is being expanded and developed all over the globe, and is constantly being extended to new areas. In those cases where the imperialists have actually withdrawn their forces from foreign soil, they have done so under pressure from the local population which has risen against them in a national liberation struggle, after a long and bloody war.

58. The Governments of the United States and some other Western Powers try to justify the building of such military bases and the stationing of their troops on foreign soil by alleging that such bases and troops are abroad with the assent and agreement of the States on the territories on which they are situated. It might be asked with whose agreement the United States maintains troops at Guantánamo, on the territory of the Republic of Cuba. It is a well-known fact that the government of Cuba and the entire Cuban people categorically demand the dismantling of the American military base at Guantánamo, from which the United States carries on its provocations against free Cuba.

59. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, together with all peace-loving States, fully supports the demand of the Republic of Cuba that the United States military base at Guantánamo should be dismantled.

60. The solution of the question of the elimination of military bases on foreign soil and the withdrawal of troops from foreign soil would lighten the struggle of peoples for national independence in the colonial territories still under the colonialist yoke and would make it more difficult for the imperialists to launch wars of aggression against the freedom and independence of countries of Africa and Asia. The colonialist and neo-colonialist policies of the imperialist Powers, which they pursue with the aid of their bases and troops in those countries, would suffer a grievous blow. A great step forward would be taken in consolidating the independence of the young States of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It would help to put an end to the interference of the imperialists in the internal affairs of other States and to complete the historical process of the liquidation of the vestiges of colonial enslavement throughout the world.

61. To reduce the threat of nuclear warfare and to further disarmament, it is imperative, in the interest of international security, that military bases on foreign soil in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and in other parts of the world should be dismantled and that troops stationed on foreign soil should be transferred back inside their own national borders.

62. In conclusion, the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic deems it its duty to state its views on the

draft resolutions before the Committee. We consider that draft resolution A/C.1/L.413 requires careful attention. It is submitted by a large group of States and makes recommendations for the dissemination among wide groups of the population of the recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons. We regard those recommendations as timely and necessary, and we therefore support this draft resolution.

63. Two draft resolutions dealing with chemical and bacteriological weapons of mass destruction have also been submitted to the Committee: the draft submitted by the Maltese delegation [A/C.1/L.411] and the draft submitted by the Hungarian delegation [A/C.1/L.412]. We understand and we share the sincere desire of the Government of Hungary to achieve a situation in which all States would strictly comply with the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This is all the more necessary because the world is at present witnessing the massive use of chemical weapons by the United States imperialists against the heroic people of Viet-Nam. Not only crops and cattle will be destroyed through the use of these barbarous weapons, but also human beings, in particular women, children and old people. Such barbarous acts are unprecedented in history, since in the First World War these substances were used exclusively in the front lines and in the Second World War, when the Geneva Protocol was already in effect, they were used not at all. The only country which shamelessly and openly ignores the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which is recognized by almost sixty States, and the only country that today is using chemical weapons on a large scale is the United States of America.

64. This is why we consider the Hungarian initiative to be highly urgent and necessary. The Hungarian draft resolution also adds to the provisions of resolution 2162 (XXI), adopted at the General Assembly, last session. It contains a new and very important provision which declares that the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons for the purpose of destroying human beings and the means of their existence constitutes a crime against humanity. The Ukrainian delegation fully supports the Hungarian draft resolution.

65. My delegation also listened with great attention yesterday to the informative statement made by the representative of Malta. We consider that in presenting its draft resolution the delegation of Malta was moved by the best possible intentions. Nevertheless, my delegation considers it necessary to voice some criticism.

66. Forty-two years have elapsed since the signing of the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and bacteriological methods of warfare. This international document has withstood the test of time and played a restraining role during the Second World War.

67. This is why we were somewhat surprised by that part of the statement of the representative of Malta in which he said that the Geneva Protocol served propaganda aims and had no practical purpose. If because of "propaganda" the Geneva Protocol prevented the Fascists from using poisonous gases and thus saved the lives of many thousands, then

we are in favour of such propaganda. Let there be more such propaganda documents so that the peoples of the world could feel more secure. But so far we have no other international document which could replace the Geneva Protocol. Furthermore, although we have not yet succeeded in achieving a situation where all countries strictly and rigidly respect the Geneva Protocol, we are now being asked to replace it by another document. We think a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Such proposals can serve only as an argument for those States which have not as yet signed the Geneva Protocol, and who would thus be able to persist in their refusal to sign this international document, which withstood the test of the Second World War.

68. Therefore, we consider that in the present circumstances we must not renounce the Geneva Protocol, the usefulness of which has not yet been exhausted, but must strive for the strict implementation of its provisions by all countries. For these reasons we cannot support the draft resolution presented by Malta.

69. With regard to the draft resolution put forward by seven countries yesterday on the urgent need for the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests [A/C.1/L.414], we should like, with the Chairman's permission, to state our views on this document somewhat later.

70. Mr. KOLO (Nigeria): By the decision of this Committee we are now considering together four disarmament agenda items, namely items 28, 29, 30 and 31. At this point my delegation joins other delegations which have spoken before us to express regret over the delay that has attended the report by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for this year. We are, of course, aware of the reasons for this delay but the expected draft treaty is still not before us and it would seem that events have proved this delay unjustified. As to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee's interim report itself [A/6951-DC/229], dated 7 December, we feel, without in any way derogating from its importance, that it would have been a little bit more helpful if, as in previous years' reports, we had been given some idea about the stage of progress reached in the negotiations. As it is, the report does not provide us with any data whatsoever for either a wider discussion or for an assessment of the progress being made, if any.

71. Nevertheless, my delegation feels we should take this opportunity to pronounce ourselves on some of the wider and more general issues on the non-proliferation aspect of disarmament which we have reason to believe should make us somewhat optimistic of its eventual outcome. Nigeria is a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament where we continue to participate actively in the deliberations of the Committee and therefore, for this reason, we are particularly glad to note in the interim report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that "valuable contributions toward the achievement of a treaty" continue to be made by representatives participating in the work of the Committee. My country is committed to the task of disarmament and this role prompted the remark of our Commissioner for External Affairs, His Excellency Dr. Okoi Arikpo, when he mentioned in his general statement of policy in the plenary

meeting of the General Assembly on 11 October 1967, that:

"The Nigerian delegation rejoices with those who rejoice that the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to harmonize their views regarding certain provisions to be included in the proposed treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. But our joy is sadly tempered by the feeling that the harmonization seems to have been achieved partly at the expense of the non-nuclear Powers since, significantly, both of the drafts put forward by these super-Powers ignore completely the claim by the non-nuclear Powers of a *quid pro quo* for their renunciation of the right to nuclear acquisition or manufacture. As Nigerian spokesmen in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and at previous sessions of the General Assembly have stated time and again, the least that the non-nuclear States can demand is an undertaking, written into the non-proliferation treaty, that a nuclear Power shall not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear signatory."⁴

72. The above excerpt from our Commissioner's statement explains briefly our position regarding the non-proliferation treaty still under negotiation in Geneva. We would also here like to stress once again that it would be most unrealistic to expect non-nuclear Powers to endorse or subscribe to a treaty in which they would be expected to carry all the obligations with no guarantees for either their security or for their economic welfare.

73. We hear about efforts at the negotiating table to agree on inspections and verifications which are the stumbling block to the attainment of a humanly perfect draft treaty. We would however like to believe that the various proposals made to secure a balance of obligations are also under active consideration. We of course realise that it is impossible to express detailed views on the draft treaty at this stage except to express the hope that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will appreciate the need to hasten in its work and to ensure, if only because of the need for world-wide adherence to such a treaty, that it provides for a balanced and equitable obligation for both nuclear and non-nuclear nations.

74. In conclusion, my delegation refers to the very valuable report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons [A/6858 and Corr.1]. We wish to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General first for the initiative taken in proposing the study and secondly for the scrupulous and objective analysis of the subject by the twelve distinguished experts who participated in the production of the report. The report is further proof of what is in store for all mankind should we not halt the further spread of these deadly weapons. There could be no better evidence to illustrate the importance of a treaty on disarmament. It is this consciousness of the importance and urgency of the task before us that has prompted Canada, India, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and ourselves to present a draft resolution on the subject. We have also

⁴ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1586th meeting, para. 138.

joined the other non-nuclear member States of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in sponsoring a draft resolution concerning the urgent need for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. We wish to commend those draft resolutions to the Committee for its support.

75. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): Our debate this year on disarmament questions is limited in scope and depth. This is so primarily because of the nature of the report submitted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [A/6951-DC/229]. That report makes it clear that the Eighteen-Nation Committee has concentrated its major efforts on the elaboration of a non-proliferation treaty, and consequently has not been able to devote sufficient time to consideration of the question of a comprehensive test ban and other questions of general and complete disarmament.

76. My delegation fully appreciates the reasons for this concentration of effort. We were among those who stressed repeatedly the top priority of the question of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. We also suggested that the problem be isolated from other disarmament questions and negotiated as a single item. In agreement with the overwhelming majority of the United Nations membership we emphasized that the emergence of a sixth nuclear Power would inevitably provoke a chain reaction which would totally transform power relationships in the world, and indeed lead to a nuclear free-for-all.

77. Our demand for the early completion of a non-proliferation treaty has been greatly fortified by the findings contained in the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons [A/6858 and Corr.1]. That report makes it clear that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any country in addition to the present nuclear weapon Powers would have far-reaching political implications not only for that country but for its neighbours, and indeed the whole region. As our colleague from Finland, Ambassador Jakobson, stated a short while ago:

"The risk of becoming part of the potential target area in a nuclear war would be shared by the neighbouring countries as well." [Supra, para. 7.]

78. Addressing the 1584th meeting of the General Assembly during the general debate this year, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated:

"Pakistan has welcomed the identical drafts of a non-proliferation treaty submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Union and the United States. It is our fervent hope that the differences on the inspection clause will soon be overcome and that the views of the non-aligned countries relating to the balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear and non-nuclear countries will be accommodated to the greatest practicable extent. Certainly, no Member of the United Nations would wish that, while the non-nuclear States are required to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the nuclear Powers should not even begin the process of nuclear disarmament. At the same time Pakistan would hope that, while striving for the articulation of the principle of balance in responsibilities and obligations, the non-nuclear countries will not make their acceptance of a

non-proliferation treaty conditional or contingent on an agreement between the nuclear Powers on measures of nuclear disarmament. Insistence on such measures in the light of our experience of disarmament negotiations would delay and even prejudice the conclusion of a treaty and defeat the end that all of us seek to achieve—namely, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. "The value of the treaty will largely depend on how soon it is concluded and on the extent of the unqualified adherence that it commands."⁵

79. My delegation fully understands that the delay in finalizing the draft of a non-proliferation treaty is not due to any lack of effort by the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and particularly its two co-Chairmen. Their energetic pursuit of the goal of non-proliferation has earned them a measure of gratitude from the entire world community.

80. Nevertheless, when we consider the working of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the thought expressed by many delegations in this Committee during several previous sessions cannot be suppressed altogether in our minds. It pertains to the representative character of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as the main agency for disarmament negotiations. The Eighteen-Nation Committee was constituted as the negotiating organ for disarmament on the basis of a three-fold division of the world into Western, Socialist and non-aligned countries. We have only to look at present international realities to ask whether the world can be so neatly divided any longer and whether political developments have not rendered that division obsolete.

81. Moreover, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament does not have the benefit of the participation of two nuclear Powers. Nor does it include many non-nuclear States which are militarily significant in the regions to which they belong or are responsible for the defence of large populations. The issues of disarmament are of vital and urgent concern to a large number of States—certainly no less so than they are to the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. At the same time, they do not lend themselves to bilateral negotiations. The Disarmament Commission, as at present constituted, does not meet every year. In these circumstances, the practice of channelling significant proposals regarding disarmament through the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament cannot but produce a degree of frustration among those who do not participate in active negotiations on the subject.

82. The question therefore arises, has not the time arrived when the United Nations needs to take a fresh look at the present disarmament machinery? Developments since the time when the Eighteen-Nation Committee was constituted demand that that machinery be brought into a closer relationship with political realities. Unless that is done we fear that, except for sporadic progress, like the achievement of the partial test-ban Treaty in 1963 and the non-proliferation treaty the achievement of which is now considered likely, disarmament negotiations will continue to present a picture of sterility and stalemate.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1584th meeting, para. 134.

83. The present bleak picture with regard to disarmament is exemplified by the complete lack of progress regarding the cessation of tests in all environments. My delegation cannot but express its concern that the failure to end underground testing not only has permitted the arms race in nuclear weapons to continue but may even undermine the stability of the Moscow test-ban Treaty. At the rate that underground testing is going on, one side or the other may sooner or later achieve a breakthrough in the development of new weapons, which may in turn require the other to neutralize the advantage so gained. Such a contingency is bound to bring the test-ban Treaty under intense strain.

84. In this context, my delegation commends the concrete suggestions made by Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, in her statement yesterday [1547th meeting]. There is urgent need for the question of verification, and particularly that of inspections, to be re-examined in a new light, taking into account recent scientific and technological developments.

85. When one considers the problem of the cessation of tests, as indeed the larger problem of general and complete disarmament, may not one wonder whether the continued exclusion from our deliberations of a major Power is not turning out to be far too costly for all mankind—apart from all other considerations of a political and legal nature?

86. On the subject of general and complete disarmament, we have heard the statements of the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union and the representative of the United States. As I mentioned earlier, this year the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to devote sufficient time to examining the question of general and complete disarmament because of the need to give priority to the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. Nevertheless we cannot but express some regret that, despite the fact that eight years have passed since the Soviet Union put forward its revolutionary proposal for general and complete disarmament, no agreement, even of a partial nature, has yet been achieved. It was our hope that agreement on at least partial measures of disarmament would be reached by the super-Powers during this time and that the savings which would be effected in their military budgets could be diverted, at least in part, to the amelioration of the conditions of life in the developing countries.

87. Ten years ago, an amendment was moved in this Committee to a resolution on disarmament, to the effect that part of the savings that would result from the reduction of armaments should be earmarked for the purposes of developing the underdeveloped countries.⁶ The General Assembly adopted that amendment. However, the promise remains as far from fulfilment as ever.

88. Our observations in this debate would have been unrelievedly pessimistic if we did not have before us two documents of capital importance. The first is the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons [A/6858 and Corr.1]. The other is the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of

Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/6817]. I shall not deal with the substantive aspects at this stage of the debate. It is the view of my delegation that, although by themselves those reports do not record any progress towards disarmament, each opens fresh perspectives for such progress in the near future.

89. As regards the Secretary-General's report, we feel that the Organization is indebted to the Member States whose initiative led to General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XXI). We are also indebted to the consultant experts who devoted their time and energy to the completion of that report and to the Secretary-General himself for his suggestions last year which inspired that effort. It is a fact of no negligible importance that, for the first time, the United Nations has been able independently to weigh and explore the implications of nuclear weapons.

90. It seems to us that the parts of the report which concern the economic and security implications of the acquisition and further development of nuclear weapons will have a significant impact on present-day political and strategic debates. That being so, we are happy to co-sponsor the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1, which recommends the widest dissemination of the contents of that report throughout the world.

91. Commenting on the report, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, remarked how such positive and consequently creative co-operation came naturally to experts. She added:

“That in itself is a fact of which we have as yet not taken full account. It indicates that when the debate unfolds on the level of reason, differences in national outlook do not function as obstacles, however sensitive and controversial the issue.” [1545th meeting, para. 40.]

92. I am reminded here of the suggestion which the delegation of Pakistan made during the eighty-sixth meeting of the Disarmament Commission on 21 May 1965. In our statement at that meeting, my delegation pointed out that one of the major factors responsible for the lack of progress in disarmament was that the United Nations did not have directly at its disposal such independent scientific expertise as would help to resolve controversies on the many complicated technical issues which were, more and more, bound to arise in the field of disarmament. We noted with regret that the United Nations had not even made a beginning towards enlisting the services of that body of the scientific community which was capable of seeing and serving the interests of humanity as they transcend national power interests. We observed that there was a large volume of technical studies available to the world scientific community from which suitable conclusions could be drawn which would furnish a basis for the appraisal of different proposals for disarmament as they came along. We suggested, therefore, that the time might not be far distant when the enlisting of impartial scientific advice in the service of disarmament would become a feasible proposition.

93. My delegation is now happy to see, in the Secretary-General's valuable report, the first example of how the results of the arms race and of the explosions to which that race might lead can be authoritatively and impartially

⁶ *Ibid.* Twelfth Session, Annexes, agenda item 24, document A/3729, para. 18.

estimated for us by experts with unquestioned knowledge of the subject. Even though the facts marshalled in this particular report can be said to have been assimilated in the general public awareness, they still needed to be presented with precision and authority. I say that because there has not been a lack of academicians who, combining a modicum of scientific talent with a total absence of human compassion, have been trying to persuade us that the effects of a thermonuclear war could be made manageable—in other words, that we could live with the bomb. Doubts have thus been sown about the necessity for nuclear disarmament for the survival of the human race. Those doubts have now been finally set aside in a document like the Secretary-General's report.

94. There are other subjects on which authentic advice of this type would be of immense benefit. As an example we have only to remind ourselves of the controversies regarding the necessity for on-site inspections which hampered negotiations on the partial test-ban Treaty and still hamper the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement. Surely if impartial technical knowledge were harnessed in the service of the United Nations, those controversies would lose much of their obstructive character.

95. Here I would refer again to the statement made yesterday by the representative of Sweden. She informed us that, as a result of independent research, using new identification methods, it had been found that those identification methods would permit a control system of underground tests with a sufficient degree of reliability to deter parties to a treaty from committing violations.

96. It has, however, been the contention of some nuclear Powers that such methods are not foolproof. Now, it is precisely in situations such as these that independent scientific expertise, in the service of the United Nations, could relieve us, from utter helplessness and passivity in the face of technological controversies. For these reasons, we sometimes wonder whether it would not be necessary to have an independent disarmament agency at the service of the United Nations which would be staffed by scientific, economic and legal experts of unquestioned calibre. I am not in a position to make a formal proposal to this effect, but I would suggest that this is a thought which needs to be kept in mind in the years to come.

97. As regards the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, my delegation will make its comments during the debate on agenda item 28, which is scheduled later this week. However, a general reference to the question of security assurances is in order here because it illuminates one of the avenues along which we can make some solid progress towards disarmament.

98. May I here quote from the statement of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan at the 1584th meeting of the General Assembly. He stated:

"Last year the General Assembly, in resolution 2153 B (XXI), decided to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States to consider how best their security can be guaranteed . . . Pakistan had made it clear that the proposal was conceived to complement, not

duplicate; to supplement, and not compete with, the work on the non-proliferation treaty of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

"It was in that spirit that the Preparatory Committee established by resolution 2153 B (XXI) decided to await developments in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as long as possible before commencing its task. . . .

"It is apparent from the report of the Preparatory Committee that it has tried its best to ensure that the non-nuclear-weapon States Conference will deliberate essentially on those questions which arise directly from the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty but are outside the scope of the treaty."⁷

99. My delegation considers that the Conference envisaged in this report is necessary for the following reasons.

100. First, the draft non-proliferation treaty under discussion in the Disarmament Committee requires to be supplemented by the provisions of security guarantees to establish a non-proliferation régime. In this context, we should like to take note with appreciation of the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union, and also the United Kingdom, attach great importance to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear States.

101. Second, the approach of the nuclear Powers in the Disarmament Committee, based on the concept of assurances through the existing machinery of the United Nations, needs to be considered by the non-nuclear-weapon States.

102. Third, such consideration can best be given in a forum where the non-nuclear-weapon States can reconcile their differences of approach and can exchange views with the nuclear Powers in regard to the assurances that the latter may be prepared to offer outside the context of alliances.

103. Fourth, there is need to make special preparation and to afford adequate time for the consideration of the subject of security guarantees in order to facilitate a consensus on the nature and the form of guarantees to be provided by the nuclear Powers.

104. Fifth, the interests of the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States require to be harmonized in order to achieve universal adherence to the non-proliferation treaty by the non-nuclear Powers.

105. As my Foreign Minister said in the statement from which I quoted earlier:

"We would hope that the United States and the Soviet Union, and also the other nuclear Powers, would give favourable consideration to the conference of non-nuclear-weapon States as the appropriate forum for the continuation of a substantive and full consideration of the problem of security guarantees."⁸

106. Mr. BURNS (Canada): In my statement today, I should like first to say a few words about the report which

⁷ *Ibid.* Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1584th meeting, para. 135-137.

⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 138.

has been prepared by the Secretary-General on the effects of the use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons [A/6858 and Corr.1], upon which so many other delegations have already commented. The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, the Honourable Paul Martin, has described the report as "an important and constructive contribution to the continuing international discussion on this question". There are a few points in the report which our delegation feels should be emphasized.

107. First of all, the Canadian delegation would like heartily to commend the members of the Secretariat concerned with this report, and also to thank most warmly the experts who participated in compiling it. We think that they have succeeded admirably in the first part of the task which was set before them: to put in clear and unmistakable language, with all the weight of their renown as authorities on the subject, the horrific effects which will be produced by nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons if they are ever used. No one can deny that if the thousands of weapons in the stockpiles are loosed, they will cause horrible, almost inconceivable, death and destruction. But the impact of this knowledge has been softened by much repetition. It is a truth which has regrettably become a platitude, and perhaps a bore. The world would like to ignore it and to forget about it. To offset this dangerous tendency, it would be good if all of us in this Committee at least would read and re-read the first chapters of the Secretary-General's report. It would, I hope, bring us to a realization of the sort of questions we are dealing with. These are questions of the life or death of hundreds upon hundreds of millions of men and women, of the death or crippling of civilization, as we know it. With the continuation of the nuclear arms race, there is no end in sight except nuclear war. If there is shortsighted concentration on supposed national security interests and prestige, and a refusal to agree to any measure which will check or prevent further expansion of the nuclear armaments race, those who refuse are voting for nuclear war—a nuclear war that may be decades away, but which will surely come.

108. I wish to draw attention also to the sections on the economic and security implications of acquiring nuclear weapons, in the light of our hope that we shall have a non-proliferation treaty open for signature before long. The Secretary-General's report points out the many implications and problems involved in the decision to become a nuclear weapon State and argues strongly against further spread of nuclear weapons.

109. There is no doubt that the cost in economic terms would be high; an additional annual expenditure of \$170 million to develop a modest nuclear armament. Yet, even this estimate should be considered on the low side, since, as the report notes, this figure is derived from a comparison of government expenditures on defence, education and health, and such expenditures are subject to different systems of accounting and rates of currency exchange throughout the world. Furthermore, defence expenditures vary from year to year and proportionally from country to country. I believe that we should pay attention not to the bare statistics but to the experts' observations about potential cost. A large number of variable factors indicates that

nuclear weapons cost could be much higher than the annual expenditure of \$170 million quoted. Some of these variables mentioned in the report are: the expected increase in cost in countries lacking highly developed scientific, technical and industrial capability; the probability that possession of unsophisticated nuclear weapons will lead to the demand for more elaborate and costly nuclear weapons; the liability of delivery systems to very large overruns in development costs; and the relatively greater impact of the re-allocation of funds away from peaceful development in developing countries with a relatively low standard of living. It should be noted that the report states that the acquisition of nuclear weapons systems could, under certain circumstances, cost in the vicinity of \$800 million to \$900 million annually for a ten-year period of development of the system, rather than the low figure of \$170 million previously referred to.

110. We think it is evident that the cost of developing nuclear weapons systems will be very high for no matter what country, at whatever level of development. But let us suppose that a country decided that the cost was bearable; would development of nuclear weapons necessarily enhance that nation's security?

111. As for security, the report makes several points which we feel are very significant. The authors observe that it is possible for a country to possess both prestige and security without being a military Power and, similarly, that the possession of nuclear weapons does not necessarily prevent a decline in political influence. Furthermore, even nuclear Powers have not been able to exercise political and economic influence in consistently effective fashion. Nor have States without nuclear weapons been deterred from battle with nuclear Powers. In these instances, the mere possession of nuclear weapons has not contributed to the achievement of national objectives by nuclear Powers.

112. Canada, as a country with a well-developed nuclear industry oriented strictly towards peaceful uses, believes with the authors of the report that the solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in the further spread or elaboration of nuclear weapons. The world now has a choice between two courses: either a continuation of the arms race which in turn enhances insecurity in a continuous spiral; or to begin a process of arms control and disarmament through measures which will enhance international security and the effectiveness of this Organization. It is our belief that this process of arms control and disarmament must start now with a non-proliferation treaty, which must be followed by further measures of arms control or disarmament.

113. The Committee has had before it for some days now draft resolution A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1, which Canada and Poland, together with ten other countries have proposed. The main conclusions of this draft resolution relate to the desire that the Secretary-General, Governments and inter-governmental organizations should give the widest possible publicity to the Secretary-General's report. We hope that all delegations will be able to support that draft resolution.

114. I should also like to mention another very useful initiative which has been taken by the Secretary-General in connexion with disarmament negotiations. This is the

compilation and publication of the book *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965*.⁹ This is a concise history of the disarmament negotiations through those years, and in fact, in spite of the title, the record goes on to 1967. It contains the most important documents of the negotiations, and is altogether a most useful compendium for anyone engaged in discussion of disarmament. I commend it to the attention of all members of this Committee who may not yet have studied it and, on behalf of the Canadian authorities, I should like to thank the Secretary-General for having the book produced.

115. As the interim report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee [A/6951-DC/229] has informed this Committee, not very much time was devoted during the long sessions this year to the subjects of general and complete disarmament, the cessation of nuclear tests and the elimination of foreign bases—all of which we had been requested by resolutions of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly to take under earnest and urgent consideration. But the elaboration of a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons had priority—and rightly so, in the opinion of the Canadian delegation. So, in speaking on the subjects mentioned, none of the delegations of States members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee will have very much to say to the Committee other than what has been said before. But it does seem to the Canadian delegation worthwhile putting on the record of this Committee, once again, our position in regard to the important matters dealt with in resolutions 2162 C (XXI), 2163 (XXI) and 2165 (XXI).

116. One reason for this is that after this Committee or some other appropriate organ of the United Nations has succeeded in completing its consideration of a treaty on non-proliferation—which we hope will be done early in 1968—we must make up our minds as to which measure of disarmament we should devote our energies to. Which measure of disarmament will afford the best chance of realizing further progress? It is common ground, the Canadian delegation thinks, that, as we have just said, a non-proliferation treaty must be followed—and soon—by other measures of disarmament or arms control, which will slow down, if not halt, the arms race, particularly in the sphere of nuclear armaments. Such measures should increase confidence among the nations and so improve the prospects of an eventual agreement on general and complete disarmament.

117. Concerning an eventual agreement on general and complete disarmament, as we have been reminded by several previous speakers, it is now eight years since resolution 1378 (XIV) was adopted, which set this as the goal at which disarmament negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations should aim. Regrettably, in spite of drafts of a treaty by the Soviet Union and a programme by the United States intended to set out the way the nations should move towards disarmament, little advance has been registered. No member of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee has disputed the validity of the goal. That body has been negotiating on general and complete disarmament since it was set up in 1961, when it and the principles under which it should negotiate were blessed by a

resolution of the sixteenth General Assembly. It is not the goal that is at issue, but how to get started, how to take the first steps towards that goal. Resolution 2162 C (XXI),

“Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to pursue new efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures, and in particular on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and on the completion of the test ban treaty so as to cover underground nuclear weapon tests”.

118. The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, in his statement at our 1546th meeting on 11 December, gave the views of his authorities as to why no progress has been made by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee towards agreement on a draft treaty to establish general and complete disarmament. He placed the blame on the United States and its allies. We do not wish to enter into a controversy on that matter. However, we do wish to point out that the essence of the disagreement, what might be called the log-jam in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, is on how the nuclear armaments of the great Powers shall be reduced and finally eliminated. At present, as we have heard, the nuclear armaments race goes on at an ever-dizzier pace. I would say, in spite of the assertions of the delegation of the Soviet Union, that it takes at least two to make a race, and that in the interacting and reacting competition between what are called the super-Powers, neither one can expect to be exempt from blame in view of the fears which this race excites in the world.

119. I should like also to quote what the representative of Sweden said at our 1545th meeting:

“It is not possible, I find, to exclude from a speech on disarmament here in the United Nations a reference to the recent news of further development of nuclear devices for military purposes on the part of both the super-Powers. Contrary to the hope of all humanity, the Governments of the main Powers have not been able to commence discussions even on a mutual restraint in as far as the development and deployment of nuclear missiles and anti-missile missiles is concerned. Both Powers seem to have gone ahead instead with decisions to pour more money into the further refinement and enlargement of their capabilities in regard to strategic nuclear weapons, both in the defensive and the offensive category. This cannot but have a very unfortunate and discouraging psychological effect. Perhaps it is already undercutting the hopes that this generation, which, in the political sphere, is sensing a lessening of the risks of a war between the super-Powers, should also see them entering upon a course of gradual nuclear disarmament. There can be no purpose in hiding the sombre truth that signs point in the opposite, the negative, direction in regard to the nuclear armaments race between them.” [1545th meeting, para. 36].

120. Can this nuclear arms race be halted? In January of this year the United States proposed, through diplomatic channels, that it and the Soviet Union should discuss the stopping by agreement of the production and development of offensive and defensive missiles. It is understood that at

⁹ United Nations publication, Sales No.: 67.1.9.

the time the Soviet Union agreed in principle to hold such talks but since then the matter has rested. Must the nuclear missile arms race go on until all concerned reach agreement on a treaty on general and complete disarmament? We hope it will not be delayed that long. On the other hand, the prospects for general and complete disarmament would be very much brighter if the nuclear-missile arms race could be halted by preliminary agreement between the great nuclear Powers.

121. Turning to another subject high on the list of partial measures which could lead eventually to general and complete disarmament is a treaty suspending all nuclear and thermonuclear tests; in other words, a comprehensive test ban. I should be less than realistic if I said that the prognosis for an early conclusion of such a treaty is good. On the one hand, the representatives of the nuclear Powers in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee have stated that their countries were in favour of arriving at an adequately verified test ban. On the other hand, both the United States and the Soviet Union continue to carry out nuclear tests underground while communist China and France are testing in the atmosphere. The ostensible obstacle to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban is the lack of agreement on what constitutes "adequate verification". As the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, said at the 309th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee this year, and repeated in substance yesterday, the obstacle is simply that

"One side is upholding the thesis that on-site inspections are necessary to ensure that no violations occur; while the other side reiterates that national means of detection and verification are satisfactory and that no on-site inspections should be prescribed".

122. There is, fortunately, a more optimistic side to this problem. Progress is being made and various countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden and, in a modest way, Canada, are carrying out extensive and active research programmes devoted to the improvement of seismological recording and the interpretation of the data so obtained. The result of this research, we hope, will yield completely instrumented verification methods which will be generally acceptable. Research by Canadian science indicates that this era has not yet arrived, but certainly encouraging progress is being made.

123. It is the Canadian position that such research must be continued and that the information so obtained should be shared internationally. Indeed, as I said in a statement at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, such an interchange of information and ideas could well contribute to the spirit of mutual trust and understanding necessary to facilitate agreement on the political aspects of a comprehensive test ban. To this end, Canada has played and continues to play an active role in the projects undertaken until now by the so-called seismic detection club which Sweden originally suggested and which was endorsed in General Assembly resolution 2032 (XX).

124. Closely related to the question of a comprehensive test ban is the continued development and production of ballistic missiles, both offensive and defensive. The development of such weapons virtually by definition involves some nuclear or thermonuclear testing. We are particularly

concerned at this time by the decisions of the Soviet Union and the United States to develop and deploy anti-ballistic missile defences. To our regret, we must say that these decisions announce another expansion of the spiral of the nuclear arms race.

125. It may seem reasonable for any country to take all the steps it considers necessary for its national security—in this case the one step being the installation of the anti-ballistic missiles—but we must remember that, in addition to the expenditure required to provide the desired protection, the protection itself in this case could well upset the balance of deterrence with incalculable results. But the most likely result would be another round in the arms race, involving the further development of both defensive and offensive missiles. And what would this produce? Only wasteful expenditure on a massive scale with little or no added security to the countries engaged in this deadly competition in destructive power.

126. We hope that the nuclear Powers concerned will find it possible to meet and discuss the halting of the arms race in its latest and very discouraging aspect.

127. There is another measure which my Government believes would significantly slow down the nuclear arms race and would also constitute a move towards further disarmament. I refer to the internationally controlled cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the transfer to peaceful purposes of such material which is now being stockpiled for weapons purposes—or the "cut-off and transfer"—as it has come to be called. The history of this proposal, I am sure, is well known to all and so I shall not go into detail about it. It is enough to say that, in our view, the implementation of the cut-off and transfer, following an agreement on non-proliferation, would demonstrate that the nuclear Powers also are willing to carry on the move toward nuclear disarmament. It would also reassure non-nuclear signatories to a non-proliferation treaty which would have forgone the right to possess nuclear weapons. Finally, it would be a step towards carrying out United Nations recommendations on the desirability of reaching agreement on collateral measures of disarmament.

128. The Soviet Union so far has characterized these proposals as "control without disarmament" and has rejected the proposals on the ground that the verification proposed would simply be a cover for the gathering of military intelligence. They say it is not disarmament.

129. The Canadian delegation shares the views of the United States in this matter, as expressed by Mr. Foster at the 256th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee:

"To assert that the cut-off, transfer, and weapons destruction proposal 'has nothing in common with disarmament' amounts to stating that slowing down has nothing to do with stopping."

130. We hope that the Soviet Union will re-examine its objections to this measure, the cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons, which the Canadian delegation sees as an excellent possibility for slowing down the arms race.

131. Finally, I should like to mention briefly item 31, the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

132. As we are all aware, the priorities given the negotiation of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the Disarmament Committee prevented us from discussing this subject in any depth. The Canadian position on this question can, however, be stated in very few words. It is based on two principles: first, the right of sovereign States to conclude defence arrangements involving, if agreeable to the parties concerned, the establishment of military bases on their territories; and second, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other States. Moreover, Canada has always maintained that progress towards general and complete disarmament can best be achieved through balanced, equitable and effectively controlled measures. Proposals that we have seen so far regarding bases do not meet these criteria. They involve a sacrifice in the collective security arrangements of the West without any balancing obligation on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies. In the Canadian view, foreign bases should be and will be eliminated in the process of general disarmament. In fact, we have seen many bases disappear in the past decade, in response to lessening tensions and changes in strategic conditions, and we shall doubtless see many more disappear if international relations improve.

133. I should like to reserve my right to comment on the two draft resolutions concerning the subject of chemical and bacteriological warfare, put forward, respectively, by the representatives of Malta and Hungary.

134. Mr. SHEVCHENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Soviet delegation would like today to express its views on the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

135. This question, which is raised in the draft resolutions submitted by the delegation of Hungary [A/C.1/L.412] and the delegation of Malta [A/C.1/L.411], is of the utmost importance and should be considered by the First Committee with the utmost seriousness and sense of responsibility.

136. At the last session of the General Assembly, it unanimously adopted on 5 December 1966, resolution 2162 B (XXI), which included an appeal for the strict observance by all States of the principles of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, condemned all actions contrary to those objectives, and invited all States to adhere to the Geneva Protocol. More than a year has passed since. What is the situation now with regard to the implementation of that resolution of the Assembly? Unfortunately, we are compelled to note that that important decision of the General Assembly, which reflects the concern felt by all peoples of the world at the peril to mankind threatened by the use of chemical and biological weapons, is not only not complied with, but that certain Powers show not the slightest desire to undertake the measures necessary for implementing that resolution.

137. It should be immediately pointed out that certain States that have not ratified or acceded to the Geneva

Protocol of 1925—and among them, we should first point to the United States, a Power which possesses great potential for the waging of chemical and bacteriological warfare—have not responded in any way to the appeal directly addressed to them by the General Assembly. Is this forgetfulness on their part or open disregard for the opinion of the overwhelming majority of States in the world? In the case of the United States, we think this is deliberate disregard of the Assembly's resolution, a stubborn refusal to adhere to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Such actions and such conduct must surely be condemned.

138. The United States has not only failed to heed the General Assembly's resolution on this important matter but, in violation of the resolution, has pursued its inhumane activities and expanded the use of chemical means of warfare against the Viet-Nameese people.

139. Already several years ago, United States military circles began to use certain chemical substances in Viet-Nam for the purpose of destroying crops and defoliating jungles. At the beginning of 1965 the whole world learned of a new crime committed by the United States interventionists in Viet-Nam: the use by the United States armed forces of poisonous gases against the people of South Viet-Nam. United States helicopters and fighter-bombers, equipped with special devices, began spraying populated areas in South Viet-Nam with chemical-warfare substances affecting the organs of sight the respiratory organs and the gastro-intestinal tract. People living in Viet-Nameese villages, including old men, women and children, fell victims to these gas attacks.

140. The official representatives of the United States declared at that time that the poisonous gases were being used in Viet-Nam with the approval of the State Department and the Department of Defense. A representative of the White House supplemented these statements with the information that the United States Command in the field, for its part, had the right to use its own discretion in deciding whether or not to use such means of warfare.

141. According to figures furnished by the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam, in the course of the year 1965 more than 40,000 persons and thousands of head of cattle suffered from gas and other poisonous substances in Viet-Nam.

142. Further, despite the decision of the General Assembly, the United States continued to commit acts of flagrant lawlessness, relying more and more on the use of poisonous gas and other poisonous substances against the peaceful people of South Viet-Nam and against the patriots fighting in arms for the freedom and independence of their country. In particular, these substances were used for the poisoning of underground shelters, tunnels, quarters used by the military units of the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam, and even hospitals. In scientific publications, for example *Chemical Week* of 28 March 1966, we find the information that for these purposes, irritant poisonous substances are being used, such as chloracetophenone (CN), diphenylamine, and a poisonous phosphoric substance: CS.

143. According to *The New Scientist* of 21 January 1967, the use of chemical substances in Viet-Nam is to be

expanded further in the near future to include destruction of the rice crop, which, as everyone knows, is the staple diet of the Viet-Nameese people. Plans are being reported in particular for the poisoning of from one-third to one-half of the rice crop in the northern part of South Viet-Nam.

144. Even according to official United States information, the United States forces have used in Viet-Nam chemical substances over an area of about half a million acres of jungle and over an area of more than 150,000 acres of cultivated land. According to information furnished by the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam, in 1965 alone 700,000 hectares of fields in Viet-Nam were poisoned.

145. The expenditures by the Pentagon, according to the Press, on herbicides and chemical substances for destroying vegetation, amounted in 1966 to \$10 million; in 1967 the Pentagon's purchases of chemical substances rose to \$32 million; and it is expected that in 1968 this figure will reach \$50 million.

146. The facts contained in official communications issued by the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam, facts confirmed by well-known scientists, and also the large number of mortality cases resulting from the use of poisonous substances by American military forces, irrefutably show that the United States has been waging chemical warfare in Viet-Nam and has by no means confined itself merely to the use of so-called "police gases".

147. Viet-Nam is being transformed more and more into a proving ground used by the United States on an ever-increasing scale for chemical means of mass destruction prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and by other international agreements.

148. The Soviet Government has repeatedly drawn attention of the peoples of the world to this and has indicated that the use of chemical weapons against the people of South Viet-Nam is a most flagrant violation of the universal norms of international law and a flouting of the elementary principles of human morality and humanitarianism. It has stressed that the American aggressors have brought to the land of Viet-Nam the barbarous excesses of colonialism, compounded by the destructive power of contemporary methods. Thus, the United States which, without any military necessity, at one time subjected to atomic bombardment the Japanese people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is now viewing another Asian country as a target for experiments in barbarous methods of mass destruction.

149. Additional light on the refusal of the United States to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is also shed by the fact that the American Press and, indeed, official representatives of the United States make no secret of the fact that the United States is conducting a broadly-based and intensive training campaign in the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. It is significant that in the United States military code it is laid down that the United States is not a participant in any operative treaty prohibiting or limiting the use in war of toxic or non-toxic gases.

150. The matter is presented as if to show that the hands of the American military are free and not tied in any way.

151. However, there are some people in the United States who obviously are indulging in wishful thinking. We should point out that during the Second World War the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain condemned the preparations in Hitler's Germany for chemical warfare, and warned Germany of all the dangerous consequences that would flow from such a step. On 9 June 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated:

"I find repugnant the thought that any country, even our present enemies, could possibly intend to use against men such horrible and inhuman weapons. Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has not used them and I hope that we never will be compelled to use them. I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons, unless they are first used by our enemies."

152. Such are the words of a President of the United States.

153. The warnings of the members of the anti-Hitler coalition played their part and Hitler and his generals did not dare to use such inhuman weapons.

154. Nevertheless, after the Second World War, when a proposal was put before the United States Congress to adopt a resolution concerning this statement by President Roosevelt, the Pentagon opposed the proposal.

155. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was the result of many years of work designed to bring about the prohibition of inhuman chemical and bacteriological weapons. It summarized and confirmed, as is stated in the text of the protocol, as part of universally acknowledged international law those principles which mankind has accepted long before.

156. Basing itself upon the previous development of international law, the Geneva Protocol became a universally acknowledged norm of contemporary international law, equally binding on all Powers—and we should like to stress "all Powers"—including the United States, no matter what interpretation the Pentagon may place upon it.

157. The Soviet Government, in a note addressed to the United States Government on 26 March 1965, indicated that the use against the people of Viet-Nam of poisonous substances evokes universal indignation and condemnation. The United States Government, it was pointed out in this note, should realize what a heavy responsibility it bears for the crimes committed against the Viet-Nameese people and the consequences this would lead to. No State should base its policy and its conduct in international affairs on the idea that it is entitled to do what other Governments are forbidden to do. Surely we can realize the grave dangers that would threaten the world if this principle was not observed and if everyone was able to do what he liked.

158. At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly the Soviet Union categorically supported the initiative of Hungary which led to the adoption of the resolution that marked a positive step forward by the United Nations in the struggle for the prevention of chemical and bacteriological warfare. We similarly welcome and categorically

support the draft resolution presented by Hungary for the consideration of the First Committee in 1967. The Hungarian draft resolution quite rightly lays stress on the most important element, namely, the urgent need for strict and total observance by all States of the principles and norms laid down in the Geneva Protocol. It also notes that the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is a crime against humanity.

159. The Hungarian draft resolution renews the appeal to all States which have not yet done so to adhere to the Geneva Protocol. This is of great practical significance, and it is no coincidence that not only the General Assembly, but world opinion too, and this includes distinguished scientists and specialists, demand that all States, without exception, should become signatories to the Geneva Protocol.

160. The Soviet delegation shares these views, which were expressed in a thoroughly reasoned statement by the representative of Hungary.

161. We have also considered with attention the Maltese draft resolution and the statement made by the representative of Malta, but we must state, with all candour, that if the draft resolution gave rise to serious doubts on our part, the statement by Mr. Pardo has convinced the Soviet delegation even more that the Maltese proposal can do no good, but only harm, and indeed irreparable harm. The Maltese representative endeavoured to convince the members of the First Committee that the Geneva Protocol was hopelessly out of date and could serve only for propaganda purposes. He alleged that it does not contain rational norms imposing effective, internationally legal limitations on the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and so on. He tried to show that the Geneva Protocol is nebulous, unclear and inadequate and that it does not cover all possible means of waging chemical and bacteriological warfare, especially the latest means.

162. We have a question in that connexion. Whom does all this argumentation help, those who are trying to confirm a prohibition, clearly laid down in international law, of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, or those who are looking for loopholes for further intensification of the research and preparation of chemical and bacteriological warfare, who would like to shelve the Geneva Convention, to undermine or abolish it, and act in any way they want to? There is no need to specify who would benefit from a decision that the Geneva Protocol must be replaced, especially if the validity of this treaty was not confirmed, as the Maltese draft resolution proposes.

163. Arguments that the Geneva Protocol is limited in content and does not cover all forms of chemical and bacteriological warfare are very dangerous and inconsistent. The Protocol provides unambiguously for the

“... prohibition of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all”—I stress the word “all”—“other similar liquids, substances and processes.”

164. Thus the Geneva Protocol establishes a prohibition not only of gases but of all chemical liquids, substances and processes—I would stress the word “processes”—all methods of waging bacteriological warfare. Of course, anyone who

wants to can disagree about any kind of formula. We can argue about what biology is, what chemistry is and what should be understood by “substances” or “processes”. We can question everything from the ground up and start by defining what constitutes a chemical or a bacteriological weapon. But does that not really confuse a clear issue and help those who want to bury the Geneva Protocol, which by no means limits itself to banning particular individual ways or means of waging chemical or bacteriological warfare but condemns and bans the use of all means, without any exception?

165. That is why the Soviet delegation objects categorically to the recommendations designed to revise the provisions of the Geneva Protocol on the pretext of bringing it up to date or replacing it by some new treaty. Such a policy of replacement or revision would lead only to the undermining of important and universally recognized legal standards, which serve as a very important and fundamental restraint on chemical and bacteriological warfare.

166. We regret that in his lengthy statement the representative of Malta deemed it appropriate to refer to certain authoritative sources—true he did not make clear exactly what these authoritative sources were—according to which the Soviet Union was accelerating the development of chemical and bacteriological weapons. At the same time he passed over in silence the ample testimony of the very active preparation in the United States of chemical and bacteriological weapons; not to mention the fact that he did not refer at all to the use by United States forces in Viet-Nam of chemical weapons.

167. We consider it necessary to draw the attention of the representative of Malta to the fact that he is not addressing his remarks to the right quarters. It is precisely the Soviet Union which is the most categorical and consistent opponent of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Soviet Union has long since ratified the Geneva Protocol and calls on all other countries to follow its example. It is the Soviet Union which is trying to strengthen, not weaken, the ban laid down in the Geneva Protocol. This can and must be obtained by pressure on those who persist in their refusal to acknowledge the force and significance of that Protocol.

168. The Soviet delegation makes an earnest appeal to all members of the Committee to support the proposal of Hungary. The Soviet delegation calls on all members of the Committee not to permit the elimination of universally acknowledged standards of international law concerning the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and not to allow the decision of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly on this question to be shelved and thus make easier the task of those forces which are making every effort to speed up and intensify without limits the arms race and to use barbarous means of mass destruction. We call upon the delegation of Malta not to insist on its proposal but to join in the common effort to free the peoples of the world from the scourge of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

169. The CHAIRMAN: Before we adjourn, I wish to inform the Committee that Ethiopia, Libya, Mongolia and

Finland have become co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1.

170. I hope that more delegations will be ready to speak at our meeting this afternoon. So far I have only four names on my list and I urge the members of the Committee

who are ready to speak to do so this afternoon so that we may be able to plan our programme in advance for the days we still have at our disposal.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.