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Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 96

Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (*continued*) (A/6834)

GENERAL DEBATE (*concluded*)

1. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines): The First Committee has had a useful and constructive debate on agenda item 96, "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons". In expressing their views on a subject which has been before the United Nations since 1946, previous speakers have given further proof of the fact that the obstacles on the road to general and complete disarmament are many and difficult. Although the debate so far has elicited little if anything that is new, it has served a useful purpose in focusing anew the attention of the Committee on the basic issues upon which serious disagreement continues to exist. Thus we know exactly the nature and magnitude of the problems before us as well as the directions in which we could move towards a solution.

2. Basic to our present discussion is the historic Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, contained in resolution 1653 (XVI) adopted by the General Assembly on 24 November 1961. The Philippines voted in favour of that resolution in the belief that it represented a dramatic first step towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the nations. At the same time, at the 1193rd meeting of this Committee, the Philippine delegation, recognizing certain deficiencies in the text of the Declaration, expressed confidence that those deficiencies would be remedied at a special conference called to prepare a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. We also made it clear that such a prohibition should be subject to effective international control and inspection.

3. Our position, then, has been that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons must be achieved through a

convention negotiated and concluded at a special conference called for that purpose. That position remains unchanged. We trust, therefore, that the forthcoming World Disarmament Conference, to be convened in accordance with resolution 2164 (XXI) of the General Assembly, adopted on 5 December 1966, will give serious consideration to the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. In the meantime, it is our view that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should give earnest consideration to this question and discuss the draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union [A/6834]. We have the feeling that the First Committee may not be the best forum for a fruitful discussion of the draft convention and we would agree with other delegations which have suggested that the Eighteen-Nation Committee may be a more appropriate and effective venue for dealing with the problem.

4. I have referred to the fact that my delegation, in voting for resolution 1653 (XVI), shared the general concern at the need for effective international control and inspection in order to ensure compliance with the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes. Nothing that has happened since, whether in international politics or in nuclear technology, can be considered to have detracted from the validity of the principle that it would be impractical and unwise to deal with the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons outside the context of general and complete disarmament. As we all know, those weapons have loomed largest in disarmament negotiations over the last two decades, and the question of proscribing them cannot be detached from the over-all framework of such negotiations. Since a system of strict and effective international control and inspection is an essential element of general and complete disarmament, such a system cannot, therefore, be dissociated from any proposal for the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

5. One could wish that those fearful weapons of mass destruction could be made to disappear from the arsenals of the Powers through the magical effect of a signature on a piece of paper, but such a hope would be an empty illusion fraught with irremediable tragedy for all mankind. We would therefore prefer the slower, less spectacular perhaps, but certainly surer method of proceeding by stages whereby nuclear weapons would be limited, reduced and finally eliminated from national arsenals under a system of controls and inspection which would build up mutual confidence from one step to the next.

6. My country is one that has known the ravages of a cruel war that was fought with so-called conventional weapons. We know that a war fought with nuclear weapons would

result in human suffering and material destruction of a kind and degree for which even our bitter experience has not prepared us. We agree, therefore, that nuclear weapons must be prohibited, but prohibited in reality and in fact, not merely in terms of a signature on a piece of paper.

7. In the realities of the present international situation, therefore, we are unconvinced that a simple declaration or pledge not to use nuclear weapons would prevent nuclear war. Too many of us have seen war resulting from broken promises and dishonoured signatures to believe otherwise. Only a stage-by-stage limitation, reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, verified at every stage, could lead to the prevention of nuclear war.

8. It is on the basis of this belief that we would urge the nuclear Powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, to exert their utmost efforts in coming to terms on the problem of limiting, reducing and finally eliminating nuclear weapons.

9. We should like to express our appreciation to the Soviet Union for its initiative in submitting the draft of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In particular, we welcome the provision concerning the cessation of the production and the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons in conformity with a treaty of general disarmament under effective international control. For only when that is done—that is, only after nuclear weapons are no longer being produced and all existing stockpiles have been destroyed—can we truly believe that the danger of nuclear war has been banished from the earth.

10. We share the sentiment expressed by the representative of the United Arab Republic when, in his statement of 28 November last [1537th meeting], he said that the atmosphere accompanying the consideration of this item in our Committee has been of a positive character and that this is a happy augury for the consideration of all other disarmament questions. We agree with him that we should not lose the momentum thus created by our present discussions, and that we should move on towards more meaningful effort and achievement.

11. The representative of Ethiopia said at the 1535th meeting of our Committee, that the anxious desire for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is shared by all mankind and that there is only a question of the timing of such an agreement and the context within which it should be reached. With this we agree, but then we would hasten to add that the best time for such an agreement is tomorrow rather than the day after tomorrow, or better still, today rather than tomorrow.

12. Mr. RAOUF (Iraq): Three years after the holocaust of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and when the horrors of nuclear war and its inevitable effects on the survivors and even on their progenies became visibly clear to the rest of mankind, the French writer, Albert Camus, labelled the twentieth century as “the century of fear”. I cannot think of a more pertinent label than this to describe this age of ours and man's condition in it.

13. For more than two decades we have been living under the ever present cloud of fear, as human ingenuity not only

has failed to allay our fear but, on the contrary, has helped to aggravate it. An increasing number of States have come to possess the nuclear weapons of mass destruction, and there has also been a continued increase in the number of devices and means of global annihilation and mutilation. No tangible steps have been taken during these two decades to dispel our fear, and human genius that was so successful in perfecting the weapons of destruction failed in the very field where it could prove itself human, and that is in the renunciation of nuclear warfare and the liquidation of its weapons. We have been asked instead to place our hopes in a balance of terror; in other words, we have been asked to encourage one side or another, at one time or another, to perfect its nuclear weapons and to make their infliction on others more effective.

14. It was pointed out to us, as recently as yesterday, that “gas was not used in the Second World War because there would have been retaliation in kind” [1539th meeting, para. 99]. In other words, we were simply asked to endorse the policy of mutual retaliation with regard to the nuclear weapons “until they have been eliminated”. But how could they be eliminated? To maintain a policy of a balance of terror would certainly not lead to their elimination. On the contrary, it would mean their development and perfection, as the pendulum would never then stand stationary at any given moment. This point of view, regrettably, undermines the essence of General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI), and negates its validity as complementary to the various preceding international declarations and conventions which endeavoured to prohibit the use of weapons of mass destruction, or weapons that cause “unnecessary human suffering”.

15. Our alarm at this attitude is considerably increased when we connect it with the recent report published in *The Observer*, the London weekly, on 26 November 1967, under the heading “US at work on germ warfare” and I quote this news item in its entirety:

“More than 700 scientific and medical graduates are engaged in germ warfare research at a United States biological research station at Camp Detrick, Maryland, according to a Harvard physician, Dr. Victor Sidel.

“Dr. Sidel told a conference of doctors and political scientists in London yesterday that among civil institutions engaged in germ war research on military contracts in the United States were the University of Pennsylvania, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and an organization called the Traveller's Research Corporation of Hartford, Connecticut. There was also, he said, an installation employing 1,400 people in Arkansas, and a proving ground ‘larger than the whole State of Rhode Island’ for field tests with animals in Utah.”

16. The purpose of that research is not quite clear in the news item and therefore we cannot prejudge it unless, of course, we have the full text of Dr. Sidel's statement. But it seems inevitable to us to conclude that, at best, that research is aimed at maintaining a balance of terror in germ warfare also, and against another Power or Powers, unknown to us, but engaged in similar research with malevolent intent. And if it is axiomatic that similar conditions lead to similar results, then it is really valid to expect that the United Nations is going to be asked, a few years hence, to endorse a policy of a balance of terror and mutual

retaliation in the field of germ warfare. Where would that lead us?

17. With this and other pertinent facts in mind, particularly those mentioned in the Secretary-General's report [A/6858 and Corr.1], we cannot but welcome any attempt aimed at the ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapons and the liquidation of existing nuclear stockpiles. We consider the proposal of the Soviet Union for the conclusion of a convention to prohibit nuclear weapons [A/6834] as a healthy step in that direction that must be followed, and by others, within the framework of general and complete disarmament.

18. Ours is a small country trying to develop itself to the best of the capabilities of its people. We do not aspire to be a nuclear Power or to be a party to any controversy in that connexion. But when the fate of humanity is at stake, and with the ever present fear of nuclear warfare, and finally, with the alarming reports about the capability of a certain aggressive country in the Middle East to develop nuclear warheads within two months of its decision to do so, we cannot but endorse every effort to create more denuclearized zones in the world and every attempt towards global denuclearization. We shall support any draft resolution aimed at those objectives.

19. Mr. DEJAMMET (France) (*translated from French*): The number and the consistently high quality of the statements made in this debate, which everyone agrees has been conducted in a measured and dignified manner, make lengthy explanations unnecessary and prompt us to be brief.

20. The French Government has already frequently had occasion to make known its views on the problems we are discussing. It sympathizes with those who are quite understandably concerned about the importance and urgency of solving them, and it does not reject out of hand the principle of provisions such as are contained in the convention [A/6834]. These provisions could have their value at a particular stage in nuclear disarmament and in a more general context. But in our view it is neither realistic nor desirable to embark on the road to disarmament by means of provisions which, while of essential importance for the security and self-defence of States, by their very nature do not admit of effective control and safeguards. In the troubled world we live in, it is to be feared that moral prohibitions, solemnly proclaimed but not controllable, may leave an aftermath of mistrust and even increase it.

21. According to the view frequently expressed by the French delegation, it is through genuine disarmament measures, with effective controls and safeguards for their application, that disarmament—meaning primarily and essentially nuclear disarmament—should be undertaken as a matter of the utmost urgency.

22. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The discussion on the item on the conclusion of a convention of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, included in the agenda of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly on the initiative of the Soviet Union, is approaching its end. In our view, the discussion was lively, full of substance, and

consequently most interesting, and it has considerably benefited all of us.

23. We note with satisfaction that the great majority of delegations which took part in the debate supported the need to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

24. The Soviet delegation would like to express its gratitude to all those delegations which spoke with great warmth of the Soviet initiative and had kind words to say about the Soviet Union in connexion with this initiative. We consider that the discussion has shown that most delegations which spoke in the debate approved not only the idea that an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons should be concluded, but also the main ideas put forward by the Soviet delegation in its introductory statement. We said then that, in our view, the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would to some extent weaken the threat of a nuclear war, and that idea was expressed in many other statements here. We spoke at the time of our conviction that the conclusion of such a convention could contribute to limiting the armaments race, particularly the nuclear armaments race. This idea has also been echoed in the statements of many other delegations. The Soviet delegation stated that the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would be a definite step forward and would make it considerably easier, as would other measures, to achieve an agreement in future on general and complete disarmament. That idea too, was expressed in the statements of many representatives.

25. Finally, the Soviet delegation expressed its opinion that both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers would stand to gain, as compared with the present situation, from the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We note with satisfaction that this idea too was supported by many delegations.

26. Most of those who spoke agree that the state of affairs in the world requires a speedy solution of the problem of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. A number of delegations supported outright the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons presented to the General Assembly by the Government of the USSR [A/6834].

27. All this is, in our opinion, a happy portent for future progress in this important question, the solution of which, we are convinced, is of interest to all nations.

28. At the same time, some delegations put forward various arguments against our proposal. We carefully listened to the statements of the representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and some other States among their allies. We feel bound to say that we did not think their arguments that our proposal was untimely or unrealistic carried conviction.

29. The Soviet delegation would like at this point to analyse those arguments briefly. There are three main arguments put forward by the opponents of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

30. The first argument can be expressed as follows: the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of

nuclear weapons would be useless and even harmful from the point of view of the need to ensure the security of States. We feel bound to ask: what States would find that their security was not served by the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons? Non-nuclear States? Why? Would it not be to their advantage to cease being possible targets for possible nuclear strikes?

31. The statements made by the representatives of the non-nuclear Powers in the First Committee did not bear out that point of view, put forward by the United States and some of its allies. Indeed, all the socialist and non-nuclear countries which spoke here, all non-aligned countries, whether African or Asian or from other parts of the world, came out in favour of the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Among the non-nuclear States, only those that were allies of the United States were against the proposal, and that did not apply to all of them. Thus, it seems that non-nuclear socialist and non-aligned countries agree with the idea of concluding a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. They see advantages for themselves in the solution of this question and only some non-nuclear allies of the United States adhere to a different view, and they are in the minority.

32. Let us delve further into the argument that the convention would be useless or even dangerous. Could it be that it would be useless or even harmful for nuclear Powers?

33. The Soviet Union is a nuclear Power and, being a nuclear Power, we consider that it would be in the interest of all nuclear Powers to conclude such a convention. May we remind you that the Soviet Union is not the only nuclear Power holding that view. But it is a fact that the United States and the United Kingdom consider that the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons is not in their interests. Why? We have given some thought to the considerations put forward by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom on the subject. If we were to summarize their arguments to prove that the convention would not be in their interests or in the interests of their allies, we might say that that position is based on the concept of deterrence. They advance the point of view that in the nuclear age, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the only guarantee of the only possibility that those weapons will not be used is precisely the fact that they can be used. This is the concept of mutual fear. In a simplified way this is what it amounts to: if both sides possess nuclear weapons, then most probably neither side will decide to use them. What is more, these States consider that the convention for the prohibition of nuclear weapons would to some extent restrict their ability to rely on a mutual deterrent.

34. We think that this is unacceptable if the interests of peace are borne in mind.

35. First of all, mutual deterrence is no true guarantee of peace. On the contrary, it produces a very precarious situation which can lead at any moment to disaster as is convincingly set out in the report of the Secretary-General on the possible effects of the use of nuclear weapons.

36. Secondly, this reliance on the concept of mutual deterrence by means of nuclear weapons seems to us to

reveal a very one-sided approach to weapons as the only real instrument for the development of international relations. It is a sort of military, technological approach to world history, a great-nuclear-Power approach, if I may use that expression. To base oneself on this concept means that all development in the world depends on arms and those possessing them. That is a point of view which we do not share. We recognize of course the great role of military power in international relations today. Mr. Brezhnev, the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, recently declared at ceremonies commemorating the anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution: "We recognize that the power of the Soviet Socialist State was and is the main bastion of peace in the world, the main obstacle in the path of the imperialist warmongers." But when we speak of the power of our State, we do not mean only our military power, but the power of our social and State system, the strength of our socialist way of life, and many other factors. Generally speaking we consider that the course of world events and the degree and scope of the successes in the struggle against the dangers of war are not determined by weapons alone. There are also important social, national, political and legal factors which we think it is wrong not to take into account, by reducing the whole matter to mutual fear, to the opposition of the weapons of one side to the weapons of the other.

37. The social factor is the influence of social advancement, resulting from the process of the social liberation of mankind on the world balance of power.

38. The national factor is the birth of many new, independent States that want peace and contribute to the cause of peace despite the fact that they do not possess nuclear weapons. These States indeed make a useful contribution to the consolidation of peace even though they have no nuclear weapons and are therefore not a part of the mutual-deterrence system.

39. They are not mere lookers-on or pawns in world history, as might be thought if the whole matter were reduced to terms of deterrence. They participate in world history; they are equal Members of the United Nations.

40. The political factor that plays an important role in the fight for the consolidation of peace and against war depends on the state of forces and the way they line up on important international questions such as the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression in the Middle East, the termination of American aggression in Viet-Nam, the question of European security, and many other international problems.

41. Finally, there are the legal factors, represented by the whole system of international treaties and rules of international law. Every one of these legal instruments represents a victory for the forces of peace and has special importance in the prevention of a new world war. Thanks to the efforts of a very large number of States of all the continents, Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America, the number of such instruments is constantly increasing. And this is a welcome fact. This is progress. We consider that the interaction of all these factors is what determines the correlation of world forces, including of course, the factor

of armaments, but everything must not be related to that factor.

42. When the delegations opposing the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons speak of mutual deterrence as the main and even the sole factor for peace today, one can sense in their statements the philosophy of the military-industrial groups. It was against their influence on policy that, not so long ago, a warning was uttered by an ex-President of the United States.

43. This influence of the military-industrial groups must be overcome, so that progress may be made in reducing the threat of nuclear war. And in submitting for consideration by the General Assembly a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union addressed and again addresses, an appeal to the Government of the United States and to the Governments of those allies of the United States that support its position to overcome the influence of the military-industrial groups, to take a broader view of the world, to view it as it is, with its many different and interacting elements. Then it will be easier for them to move on towards the solution of a problem which is of concern to all: the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

44. Thirdly, if we must speak of mutual deterrence, may I point out that, even if a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons were concluded, so-called "mutual deterrence" would not disappear; it would still remain. Nuclear weapons would not disappear with the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of such weapons. Thus the possibility of a counter-blow, on which the whole concept of mutual deterrence is based, remains, as long as general and complete disarmament is not achieved.

45. In this connexion we cannot agree with the representatives of the United States and Italy, who yesterday stated that during the Second World War no use was made of chemical and bacteriological weapons, not because of the existence of the Geneva Protocol, but because there existed the possibility of reprisal with the same weapons.

46. But, the same applies in the case of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, one Geneva Protocol or one convention does not by itself settle everything; but they represent a step forward, each in its own domain, and they are useful.

47. Thus if the United States delegation and the delegations of some of its allies say that the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would somehow weaken mutual deterrence, it would seem that by "mutual deterrence" they mean something different. They seem to have in mind not merely a balance of forces in the military and technological sense with the implied ability of either side to deal a counter-blow, but the possibility of being able to use nuclear weapons first.

48. It is this attitude that we described in one of the previous statements of the Soviet delegation as the "Hiroshima-Nagasaki complex".

49. Yes, the United States did use nuclear weapons once, and ever since then it would appear that the possibility of

using them again is something that they simply cannot renounce. I have in mind the possibility of using them against non-nuclear States. Nuclear weapons were used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki against Japan, a non-nuclear State both then and now.

50. It is this clinging to the possibility of using nuclear weapons at some time against a non-nuclear State—the Hiroshima-Nagasaki complex—that seems to be the second element, which, together with the influence of the military-industrial groups, determines the position of the United States when it speaks of its inability to accept a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

51. We would ask the United States to overcome that complex too. If it succeeds in overcoming it, if it succeeds in solving this question for itself by deciding never to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear State, then it will reach the same position as that taken by the majority of States at the present time and will agree to the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. With the eyes of the whole world upon it, it is bound to do so.

52. That, then, is our position on the first argument according to which the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would supposedly be useless or even dangerous. We have shown that this argument is unconvincing.

53. The second argument put forward by certain delegations, a minority of them, is that the conclusion of such a convention would be unrealistic, since it would not be respected in any case. This nihilistic approach is disproved by the fact that there are many international agreements in the world today, which are based above all on moral and political considerations and which are observed.

54. Almost all these agreements were concluded when the States concerned decided that it would be advisable to do so, and having concluded them, they observe them.

55. If we consider that a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would be unrealistic, then almost any international agreement is unrealistic. Of course, history knows of cases where international treaties were violated, but history shows and the peoples of the world know that this always leads to dangerous consequences. However this fact in itself cannot be taken as an argument against the conclusion of new international agreements and against efforts made to ensure that they are respected. Let us take the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which was recently signed and which has just come into force. Will that Treaty be carried out? We hope so, and we believe that everyone hopes it will be carried out. But there can, of course, be no 100 per cent guarantee in advance that it will be. Such is the nature of international treaties. They derive their force from the fact that they are supported by the peoples. We do not doubt that a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would enjoy the widest possible support by the peoples of all countries and continents.

56. Of course, one could adopt such a nihilistic approach on legal aspects, but what would remain of the United

Nations then? What would remain of the system of world relations in general? We appeal to the United States to adopt a more positive attitude in this question of the value of treaties, since nihilism is not the wisest counsellor in international relations. We think this would be in everybody's interest.

57. Finally, there is a third argument against the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

58. Some representatives have said that what should be concluded is not a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, but a treaty on general and complete disarmament, which would be far preferable, would be the right course to follow, and would be in the interests of all. Of course, it would be far better to conclude right now a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and the Soviet Union is in favour of it. The Soviet Union has initiated a proposal and prepared a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, but, as we all know, no progress has been made in that direction.

59. May I remind the Committee that at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly in 1961, and I would also like to remind the Canadian representative, General Burns, of this, the Canadian delegation voted against a declaration prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, giving as its reason that there was agreement on principles of general and complete disarmament, the so-called McCloy-Zorin¹ principles and that the road was open to a speedy solution of the question of general and complete disarmament. The Canadian delegation said at the time that there would consequently be no point in adopting such a relatively limited declaration as a declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We expressed at the time our doubts as to whether this approach of the delegation of Canada was well founded, and the facts have borne us out. Six years have passed, the negotiations on general and complete disarmament have not moved forward significantly, and there is now no real prospect that such progress will soon be made. This is regrettable, but that is how matters stand, and that being so, the choice we have to make is not between a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Our choice at this moment is between the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of the present state of affairs. But in making this choice, we must needs realize that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons will facilitate progress in the field of general and complete disarmament, although, of course, this would be only one step, not the last step, in the solution of the problem. The peoples of the world have many such steps to take, and every one of those steps taken will be part of a hard struggle, but each such step must be taken, otherwise we shall not attain general and complete disarmament. We shall not reach that goal if we oppose partial measures such as the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons to the whole programme of general and complete disarmament. In practice they are not

contradictory. As events have shown, every such measure is important in itself; it is a step forward on the road which, as we all hope, will lead to general and complete disarmament.

60. Thus, not one of the arguments of those who do not support the proposal to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is really sound. They are each refuted and lack conviction, for they are not consonant with the true requirements of life. This has, in fact, been said here by many delegations.

61. To conclude my statement, may I say that the Soviet delegation wishes once again to express its satisfaction that on this question of the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a useful discussion that was full of substance, developed in this Committee, and we hope that it will be crowned by the adoption of an effective and forward-looking resolution.

62. I should like to assure the Chairman that such a draft resolution will be presented in the shortest possible time.

63. The CHAIRMAN: I now call upon the representative of the United States, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

64. Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I have asked to be allowed to exercise my right of reply in order to deal with just one portion of my Soviet colleague's observations. Many of them dealt with points that have been discussed, not excessively, but in proper detail during the course of this discussion, and I do not want to plough over old ground. However, for the first time in the discussion, the notion of a military industrial complex has been introduced, apparently with the thought that somehow it is only that military industrial complex, which is said to exist, that prevents the United States from agreeing with others on this item. I am as aware as anyone in this room of the speech made by a former President of the United States warning us against permitting such a complex to exist or to have any impact on political thought in this country; but I think the record speaks for itself in this regard.

65. If the remarks about a military industrial complex have any relevance in this context, I assume they mean that there is somehow a military industrial complex that has a vested interest in the continued production of the bombs and the continued production of means of their delivery. If that were the case, it would be surprising indeed that it is the United States which has proposed the complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The United States has proposed that, if we cannot agree on a complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, we might agree on a plant by plant shut-down. It is the United States which has proposed that we should freeze the level of offensive and defensive strategic delivery systems and, as recently as last September, the Secretary of Defense of the United States reiterated our willingness to enter into safeguard agreements first to limit and later to reduce the level of both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces. Those are proposals made by the United States to stop the production of those weapons and to reduce their

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.*

levels. Those are not proposals made by a country which has a so-called military industrial complex which is interested in continuing production of such systems. We have made those proposals: it is our Soviet colleagues who have rejected them.

66. From this, some might think that I should be justified in pointing the argument of the military industrial complex back at my good friend. I am not doing so. I assume that our friends in the Soviet Union would rather spend the money they are spending on armaments on something else. So would we.

Organization of work

67. The CHAIRMAN: With the statement of the representative of the United States the Committee has concluded the general debate on item 96. I have scheduled one meeting on Monday and another on Tuesday, both in the afternoon, in the hope that by then the draft resolution on item 96 will be ready and will have been circulated and that representatives will have had time to consult their Governments. I hope that on Monday afternoon the members of the Committee who wish to explain their votes will be able

to do so, and later on it might be possible to vote on the draft, if it has been presented to the Committee.

68. Moreover, the working groups which were entrusted with the task of preparing a draft on the item relating to the sea-bed and ocean floor are meeting continuously and some progress has been made. If that progress continues, I hope that by Tuesday or Wednesday their draft will be ready for submission to the Committee for possible action.

69. That will take us to the end of next week at least, and the Committee must take a final decision on the remaining items on its agenda in the light of any action, or even inaction, in Geneva. I have concluded my statement with this reminder because I believe that neither the Chairman nor the members of this Committee, and certainly not the General Assembly, can sit indefinitely waiting for whatever may come from Geneva. I think everybody should realize that we all have other business to attend to. I hope that the members of the Committee will discuss and think about the situation until we reconvene next week.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.