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**Chairman:** Mr. Ismail FAHMY,  
(United Arab Republic).

**AGENDA ITEM 96**

**Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition  
of the use of nuclear weapons (*continued*) (A/6834)**

**GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)**

1. Mr. CHIMIDDORJ (Mongolian People's Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The prevention of thermo-nuclear war and the elimination of its threat is something which has been a matter of prime concern to all the peoples of the world ever since the appearance of atomic weapons and their use for the first time by the United States of America against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The tragedy of those two Japanese cities and the subsequent development and perfecting of nuclear weapons have legitimately caused great concern among the peoples and Governments of peace-loving countries for the fate of all mankind and the whole of civilization.

2. The desires and aspirations of the peoples of the world in this matter have once again been expressed by the Soviet Union, which, as early as 1946, proposed the prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic weapons. Since then, there has been a great struggle in the world for the outlawing of nuclear weapons and for their destruction. That was also reflected in the decisions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which, at its sixteenth session, adopted a Declaration which states that "The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;" [*resolution 1653 (XVI)*].

3. The Declaration also says that any State using such weapons "is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization." This Declaration of the General Assembly and the obligation of Member States to fight for peace and security are the basis on which agreement could be reached finally to prohibit all means of waging nuclear war. However, this

has not happened up to now and the world is still not free from the nuclear threat.

4. A most effective way to free the world from the terrible suffering of a rocket and nuclear war would be general and complete disarmament under strict international control. But we all know that no progress has been achieved in this vital matter because the United States of America and some Western Powers do not show any goodwill in negotiations or that they are prepared to take a decisive step towards general and complete disarmament, and refuse to adopt the sincere and constructive proposals of the socialist and other peace-loving States. As a result of this, an atmosphere of mistrust persists in relations between States and the armaments race, including the race in nuclear armaments, goes on.

5. There are already five nuclear Powers in the world. Their arsenals, far from being reduced, are constantly increasing with the addition of ever better types of weapons. Despite the positive significance of the Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in three environments and also the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, no agreement has yet been reached on the prohibition of nuclear tests underground. It must be added that two of the five Powers possessing nuclear weapons continue to carry out nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

6. In the introduction to his annual report the Secretary-General rightly states with justifiable concern:

"The spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries poses an incalculable threat by increasing the mathematical probability of the outbreak of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation or design" [*A/6701/Add.1, para. 18*].

7. In this connexion it should be noted first of all that the frontiers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons no longer correspond to the frontiers of the States that own them. These weapons have already spread all over the world by being placed in military bases and strong points on the territories of other States and dependent islands. Submarines with Polaris missiles on board ply the seas and oceans and often "pay visits" to the ports of various States linked to the United States through military alliances and treaties. Aircraft carrying nuclear bombs fly not only over the territories of certain nuclear Powers but also over the territories of their allies, sowing fear and mistrust, as evidenced by the event near the village of Palomares in Spain which served as a most serious warning.

8. In view of the appearance of nuclear weapons everywhere and of the development of means of delivery, the

concept of the geographical distribution of States loses all meaning, so that all parts of the world and the security of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, are threatened.

9. It is no secret that the revanchist circles of Western Germany, whose expansionist military and political doctrine already presupposes the use of nuclear weapons, are trying to gain access to these weapons by all means at their disposal, including that of military blocs. At the same time the Bonn militarists, according to the world press, taking advantage of the gap in the Paris Agreement of 1954, are creating their own nuclear weapons and delivery systems on foreign soil, especially in co-operation with the Republic of South Africa. The press informs us that within five years at the most Bonn will have nuclear weapons and means of delivering them, over which NATO would have no control.

10. The facts show that the threat of nuclear war has not abated, but on the contrary is increasing and in turn giving rise to tension and instability in international relations, thereby endangering the lives of hundreds of millions of people and the existence of their States in the event of a large world conflict.

11. In the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons, we find a very important and correct conclusion, which reads as follows:

"The solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them. An agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as recommended by the United Nations, freely negotiated and genuinely observed, would therefore be a powerful step in the right direction, as would also an agreement on the reduction of existing nuclear arsenals. Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament." [A/6858, para. 91.]

12. The adoption of positive partial measures in the field of nuclear disarmament is also made necessary by the dangerous world situation today. Some Western Powers have still not abandoned their policies of aggression and colonialism in respect of Socialist countries and young independent States. They have not abandoned their policies of repression of the national liberation movements of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This is why the opponents of peace, national independence and social progress are creating serious hotbeds of tension in various parts of the world. One example is Viet-Nam, where a United States army of more than half a million men is waging a war of aggression to bring to its knees the freedom-loving people of Viet-Nam, which is heroically defending its freedom, independence and unity. Another is the Middle East, where the forces of imperialism, having committed an act of aggression and conquest against various Arab States, are trying to keep the fires of conflict smouldering. Then there is Latin America, where serious acts of provocation fraught with dangerous consequences are being committed, in particular against revolutionary Cuba. And there is Cyprus, where imperialist intrigues are

threatening not only the sovereignty and independence of that State, but also peace and security in that area. There are many examples of such acts of aggression and they are well known to us all.

13. Such a situation in the world urgently requires of the United Nations and all the States of the world that they should take timely and effective measures to reduce tensions and to prevent further military conflicts which could elude the dictates of common sense and man's responsibility and plunge mankind into the abyss of disaster.

14. If we bear in mind that we are living in a nuclear era, when the armed forces of the main groups of States are confronting each other in many parts of the world, then it is easy to realize that the concept of a "local war" has long become obsolete; there is no guarantee that any conflict may not be transformed into a large-scale conflagration with the use of all contemporary weapons.

15. For all these reasons, and because of the consistently peaceful policy of its Government, the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic welcomes and fully supports the initiative of the Soviet Union, which has proposed the examination at the present session of the Assembly of the important question of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and has presented a draft to this effect.

16. As we know, proposals concerning partial measures in the field of disarmament were presented on earlier occasions by the peace-loving States. The idea of agreement on such measures is supported and welcomed by the peace-loving nations, who demand that we should not wait for genuine prospects of general and complete disarmament, but take effective steps that would to some degree or other limit the nuclear armaments race and help to create a sounder international climate.

17. In the opinion of my delegation, the new initiative of the Soviet Union is most appropriate and is imbued with the desire to decrease the danger of nuclear war and to create conditions in which further negotiations on the main problems of today would prove effective.

18. The Mongolian People's Republic, as a non-nuclear State, considers the speedy conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, as proposed by the Soviet Union, to be an important factor which would further strengthen its security, although our security and independence are firmly protected by the unshakable alliance binding us to our true friends.

19. The draft convention which has been proposed is, like the problem that it deals with, perfectly clear in form and substance. Any Government conscious of its responsibility for peace and the security of nations and which does not base its policy on the use of weapons of mass destruction against other States, will find it easy to "give its solemn undertaking to refrain from using nuclear weapons, from threatening to use them, and from inciting other States to use them". The refusal of any State to give such an undertaking would be a legitimate cause for adopting a watchful attitude with regard to its intentions and its

foreign policy aims and would give rise to well-founded doubts concerning the position of that State in the matter of disarmament in general.

20. Refusal to accept the Soviet proposal would be all the more incomprehensible and strange because, in article 2 of the draft convention, the partial character of this step is recognized and parties to the convention "undertake to make every effort to arrive as soon as possible at agreement on the cessation of production and the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons in conformity with a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

21. As this draft presented by the Soviet Union shows, we are dealing here not with some abstract idea or mere good intentions, but with a specific and realistic proposal which, if carried out, would lead to marked progress in slowing down the nuclear armaments race and in achieving the total prohibition and destruction of this type of weapon. This would be a new and significant contribution in the struggle for international peace and the independence of all the peoples of the world.

22. That is why the Mongolian delegation is unable to accept the various completely unfounded reasons and arguments put forward by those who wish to minimize the importance of the Soviet initiative and who express doubts concerning the usefulness of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. That those arguments are groundless has been most clearly established in the statements made by many members of the Committee, as well as in the report of the Secretary-General [*document A/6858*], which was compiled by eminent scientists from various countries on the basis of a scientific analysis of factual material. It is clear that no objections having any basis in fact can be advanced against the solution of this problem, when the protection of the destiny of all mankind is at stake.

23. Now that world public opinion welcomes the proposed narrowing of the gap between the parties in the negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the signing of a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons assumes particular importance, for those two measures, which are complementary, would help to bring the world situation back to normal and would constitute an important contribution towards the elimination of the danger of a rocket and nuclear war.

24. If the United Nations is unable to take a favourable decision on this urgent question, the peoples of the world will feel a real sense of deception and their confidence in the effectiveness of the Organization will be shaken.

25. Bearing in mind those reasons, and the great importance of achieving international peace and the security of nations, the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic and the delegations of socialist countries and of many peace-loving countries are in favour of the prompt conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons on the basis of the initiative taken by the Soviet Union.

26. Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands): The report of the twelve eminent scientists, submitted by the Secretary-General [*A/6858 and Corr.1*] pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XXI), has once again pointed out the almost inconceivable threat to human life and civilization posed by the existing armouries of nuclear weapons. The elimination of that threat is undoubtedly the most vital problem with which mankind is faced. There would seem to be agreement on this basic tenet among the entire membership of the United Nations. However, when we start to discuss the manner in which that final aim can be achieved, differences of opinion arise.

27. We all agree that this objective can be achieved only within the framework of general and complete disarmament. The Members of the United Nations have endorsed a set of basic principles that should govern the process of disarmament. I am, of course, referring to the principles set out in the joint statement of the Soviet Union and the United States of September 1961,<sup>1</sup> known as the Zorin-McCloy declaration. One of those principles is that all steps in the direction of the final goal should be balanced, that is that no step should upset the existing power relationship between the nations concerned.

28. That is the only realistic and therefore the only promising approach to the problems of arms control and disarmament. It would be futile to seek to bring about measures that would not comply with the criterion of balance, because one cannot expect the major Powers to be ready to accept measures which would adversely affect their position in the existing world power structure.

29. As I see it, this is the root of the discord about the item now under discussion: the proposal for a convention prohibiting once and for all the use of nuclear weapons. I fully appreciate the serious concern that has prompted several delegations to support this proposal, and, in particular the sincere motives and unrelenting efforts of the representative of Ethiopia, who has on many occasions pleaded the case for banning the use of nuclear weapons.

30. But my delegation remains convinced that such a ban does not represent a realistic step because it cannot be deemed to be a really balanced step. Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would, in some important areas, heavily favour one side against the other side and thereby upset the existing balance of forces. Moreover, a simple ban on the use of nuclear weapons might be a highly dangerous step. It would probably increase the risk of conventional conflicts in certain areas, not necessarily conflicts initiated by the major nuclear Powers themselves, but none the less conflicts in which those Powers might become involved. And that, in its turn, would increase rather than diminish the risk of nuclear war, the very risk we all seek to avoid.

31. Several speakers who supported the proposal for a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons have drawn an analogy with the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.<sup>2</sup> My delegation does not contest that the formal

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

<sup>2</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

outlawing of weapons of mass destruction of this kind may well have been a major restraining factor against their use during the Second World War. We do not argue here over historical facts. What we beg to question, however, is whether they are being correctly interpreted.

32. The Netherlands Government is a party to the Geneva Protocol and adheres to its principles without any reservations. The question remains, however, as to the validity of the claim that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 ought to be regarded as relevant to the non-use of nuclear weapons. An international agreement of this nature is not a magic formula. Its salutary effects, and the durability thereof, are largely predicated upon the strategic situation and the over-all balance of forces at a given time. And it is precisely on this point, that is, with regard to a realistic appraisal of the military posture, in the present confrontation, that, in our view, the analogy invoked by several speakers is dangerously deceptive.

33. Nuclear arsenals of an increasingly sophisticated nature have become the determining factor in maintaining the military equilibrium. At least for the foreseeable future, the result is a relatively stable strategic balance of deterrence. It is within this existing framework that we should strive to enhance world security by measures of reciprocal arms control, and eventually by general and complete disarmament. The representative of the United States rightly pointed out that the draft convention proposed by the Soviet Union [A/6834] reverses the order of priorities.

34. In other words, security for all is not obtained by solemn expressions of intent, but by practical measures. There may be those who, a few years ago, would have regarded such a proposition as gratuitous, illusory and sterile. But times have changed since the question of the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons was first put before the General Assembly. Fortunately, some encouraging progress has been made, be it in a rather oblique way towards the remote goal we strive to reach. I am thinking, in particular, of the partial test ban Treaty, signed in Moscow in 1963, the Treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space contained in resolution 2222 (XXI) of the General Assembly and the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America [A/C.1/946]. A draft treaty on the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, while long in coming, is—I confidently hope—in the offing.

35. The Treaty of Tlatelolco assumes that the nuclear Powers will decide solemnly to guarantee the non-use of nuclear weapons against signatories who have themselves forsworn the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the question has been raised of affording some sort of credible security guarantee in the context of a non-proliferation treaty.

36. Those are partial steps in the direction of removing the threat posed by nuclear weapons. The definite removal of this threat, however, must be sought, as the twelve scientists put it:

“... through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament” [A/6858, para. 91].

37. In conclusion, I should like to stress once again that we do not differ about the final goal but about the way to reach that goal. For that reason, my delegation will be unable to support the proposal put forward by the representative of the Soviet Union [A/6834].

38. Mr. FAKHREDDINE (Sudan): As the representative of the Sudan, I approach the subject of the prohibition of nuclear weapons with a great deal of hesitation. In 1961, we were co-sponsors of resolution 1653 (XVI), by which the Assembly declared that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and was a direct violation of its Charter, and calling for consultation with Governments to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

39. The events of the intervening years have not encouraged us; and now as we call for support of the present draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union on this matter [A/6834], we are acutely aware of the inadequacy of reason and argument in influencing the position taken by some nuclear Powers. To feel merely that one has done one's duty in appealing for reason against the inexorable logic of the politics of power is indeed poor consolation, but we must make this appeal and we must not lose hope that our advocacy of an attitude of peace may yet be of some value in reversing the trend of the dangerous nuclear confrontation.

40. The first step in engendering this attitude must be a clear understanding of the peril that we are facing—a clear understanding by ordinary people all over the world of the mortal danger leading to an awareness of their responsibility and the responsibility of their leaders. Professor Stonier, an authority on the subject, makes the following statement and I should like to quote it for its clarity of exposition of the dilemma of our generation. He says:

“Nowhere is this truism [that no problem can be solved until it is clearly stated] more applicable than in considering thermonuclear war. Estimates of the effects of nuclear weapons range all the way from the probable destruction of all humanity to the concept that nuclear war differs from conventional warfare only quantitatively and not qualitatively. Each of these assessments has led to different approaches to the problem and to different solutions: If, argues the first side, thermonuclear war is to be prevented at all costs, then any war preparations, including civil-defense precautions, would not only be foolish, they would be clearly immoral. All efforts should be devoted to achieving world peace. If, counters the other side, the threat of thermonuclear war calls for an expansion of defense, and particularly civil defense, then not making every effort to protect the population would be highly irresponsible and clearly immoral.”<sup>3</sup>

41. He concludes that, after careful sifting of all the available information, he arrived at the judgement that thermo-nuclear war is intermediate between the two assessments. Not all the inhabitants of a country subjected to nuclear war would perish, but those who survived—and

<sup>3</sup> Tom Stonier, *Nuclear Disaster* (Cleveland, Meridian Books, 1963), p. 169.

their number may well be substantial—would be struck such a grievous blow that recovery would be impossible.

42. Furthermore, the disasters that would overwhelm the parties to this conflict would be so unprecedented and, to a large degree, unpredictable in terms of preceding wars. And for this reason, Professor Stonier asserts:

“... it would be irresponsible and even immoral to rely on World War II techniques for the protection of populations against the ravages of a nuclear war.”<sup>4</sup>

He goes on to say that:

“It would be much more sensible for us to admit that current offensive military technology is so able to overwhelm any defenses that a new approach is required. This new approach would seek to avoid attack in the first place by recognizing that national security is assured only in a world in which any and all potential enemies are disarmed.”<sup>5</sup>

43. The more recent study reported by the Secretary-General on 10 October 1967 [*A/6858 and Corr.1*] undertaken by a group of twelve scientists and experts at the instance of the General Assembly, lends greater credence to this conclusion. The study is commended by the Secretary-General for its “clear and fair exposition of the problem”, and he expresses the hope that it will positively contribute to the search for ways to bring the arms race to an end. This report warns us in its introduction against the mental lethargy of which we have been guilty in varying degrees since:

“These general propositions, whether set out dispassionately in scientific studies or directed as propaganda, have been proclaimed so often that their force has all but been lost through repetition. But their reality is nonetheless so stark that, unless the facts on which they are based are clearly set out, it will not be possible to realize the peril in which mankind now stands.” [*Ibid.*, para. 2.]

44. The report supports the conclusion that there is no defence system which prevents all nuclear weapons from reaching their target. Thus, expert opinion agrees that adequate defence against nuclear attack is not possible and we are left with only two alternatives for averting disaster: the maintenance of an uneasy peace by the stockpiling and sophistication of nuclear devices, a course of action that has come to be known as the “nuclear deterrent”, or a multilateral decision to destroy existing nuclear weapons and forgo their manufacture under a system of international supervision as a prelude to general and complete disarmament.

45. It is conceivable that the choice is not so simple and that there are practical considerations as well as considerations of national security that would militate against the substitution of a defence system by a mere covenant. But given the uncertain validity of the concept of deterrence, the difficulty of maintaining it indefinitely and the dangers and tensions attendant upon its maintenance, it is difficult to conceive how we can sanctify the deterrent while

censuring the treaty, especially when such a treaty does not detract from the legal rights of any nation or impose any obligations on any one party that are not equally applicable to all, and also when such a treaty sets out the objectives to which we all subscribe and provides the form in which our adherence to these objectives can be proclaimed.

46. I recognize the force and cogency of some of the criticisms directed by the United States representative in his statement of 20 November against a mere declaration of good intentions unsupported by action. In that statement before this Committee the United States representative said:

“But merely wanting to avoid nuclear war—merely seeking an agreement to outlaw it—is not enough.” [*1532nd meeting, para. 54.*]

This is an assessment with which we fully concur. It is not enough merely to want to avoid nuclear war and to try to seek agreement to outlaw it; some other concerted action must follow to which the treaty is only a prelude and a beginning. We cannot agree, however, that instead of trying to seek such an agreement we must: “embark on a course of conduct which decreases the possibility of such a nuclear war ever happening” [*ibid.*].

47. We would say that as well as seeking an agreement to outlaw nuclear war, we must embark on a course of conduct which would remove the possibility of nuclear war. As far as I can judge, the draft convention now before this Committee provides for both the proclamation and the action.

48. The first article states that each party to the Convention gives a solemn undertaking to refrain from using nuclear weapons, from threatening to use them and from inciting other States to use them. That undertaking only gives substance to the Declaration adopted by the United Nations six years ago. The second article deals with agreement on the cessation of production and destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

49. Again it may well be argued that, judging from previous experience, the priorities of these articles may be reversed; but the reversal of the priorities will immediately bring into play the other criticisms advanced by the United States representative against the draft convention. If the conclusion of a convention containing an undertaking to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons came after the destruction of stockpiles, what defence would those States which had destroyed their stockpiles of nuclear weapons have against the threat of nuclear attack from a State which had refused to destroy its arsenal of weapons? Further, nuclear Powers which destroyed their stockpiles would be even more effectively prevented from coming to the aid of a State which did not possess nuclear weapons or had decided to destroy them, when such a State fell victim to nuclear attack. It seems, therefore, that there is nothing to be gained by a reversal of the priorities of the two articles in the draft convention, or even by scrapping the first article altogether while retaining the second, and not merely retaining it but acting upon it. For the logic of this type of argument seems to indicate that whatever we do, States refusing to sign the convention or assume its obligations would master the world.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

50. We do not accept this logic because the eventuality it assumes is not likely to arise. It must be noted that it is basic to this proposed convention that all nuclear Powers would adhere to it, and that as a result of this adherence all nuclear Powers would seek an agreement on the cessation of production and destruction of their stockpiles. It is certainly unrealistic to imagine that countries X and Y would consider themselves bound by a treaty to forgo the use of nuclear weapons and destroy their stockpiles of such weapons while country Z refused to sign the treaty and continued to stock and develop its nuclear weapons. It is evident, therefore, that the conclusion of a convention to outlaw nuclear weapons would not solve the problem immediately. We need good faith and goodwill and the co-operative effort of all concerned to translate its provisions into reality. And yet we are convinced that its conclusion would provide the framework for such action, for which good faith and goodwill are necessary prerequisites, otherwise we should have no guarantee for peace except the maintenance of mutual deterrence.

51. The whole philosophy of deterrence rests on the argument that a State is deterred from aggression by the realization that the adversary possesses the capability to retaliate in force and inflict unsustainable damage.

52. This argument, as is well known, does not preclude miscalculation or the unpredictable failures of the machines or their masters. Further, this argument rests less on the rationality of man than on his instinct for survival. Both have proved poor guides for the prediction of human action, but man's instinct for survival has proved even less reliable, especially when individuals have been convinced that they are making some kind of sacrifice, that they die in order that their country or their faith or the ideology they believe in may live. However, the danger of an atomic war erupting as a result of madness or miscalculation or lust for conquest is outweighed by the distinct possibility of a "limited war" escalating into a major war from which both sides feel unable to disengage. Nuclear deterrence here is poor defence, as a situation involving two or more nuclear Powers could be envisaged in which tactical nuclear weapons would be used to achieve a limited objective or to secure an otherwise unrealizable advantage. The damage that even such "tactical weapons" could inflict is so extensive that an enemy possessing strategic nuclear weapons or the means to obtain them would not be restrained from using them.

53. Further, the defence of mutual deterrence can be effective only as long as the nuclear Powers maintain the present state of precarious equilibrium. Thus every new technological advance represents a new threat until the balance is restored, soon to be upset again.

54. In the words of the report of the Secretary-General:

"The reciprocal technological development and sophistication of nuclear warheads and their associated weapons systems which thus results constitute a spiralling nuclear arms race. Short of mutual agreement, it is a race which has no end, and one which leads not to a uniform state of security but, as has been said, to phases of major insecurity which alternate with periods in which relative security seems assured. The pace of this race cannot be expected to slow down until concrete steps are taken

which lead to disarmament and which promote the security of all nations." [A/6858, para. 80.]

55. We maintain that one such step was the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons in resolution 1653 (XVI). That Declaration acknowledged in its preamble the inescapable responsibility of the United Nations under its Charter to do its utmost in order to spare mankind the suffering and destruction which would result from the use of nuclear weapons.

56. The Declaration went on further to state that the use of such weapons in war is criminal since such a war would be directed against mankind in general. The convention now proposed by the Soviet Union is the next logical step in this direction since it reiterates the awareness of the responsibility of the United Nations for delivering mankind from the menace of nuclear war and, confirming the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in 1961, proceeds to set out in simple and unambiguous terms the steps to be taken to give effect to this Declaration.

57. The delegation of the Sudan applauds this initiative by the Soviet Union and declares that it has every confidence in its good faith and intentions.

58. We have no doubt that adherence by all States to this convention will facilitate the subsequent step of concluding an agreement on the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons. We do not lose by proclaiming our good intentions solemnly to undertake to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons, since we have already declared that the use of such weapons is a crime against humanity. We gain immeasurably by creating an atmosphere of trust and confidence in place of fear.

59. Mr. MILLER (New Zealand): The New Zealand delegation has studied with close attention the statements made by other delegations in this debate, especially those of the two nuclear super-Powers which carry much of the responsibility for solving the problem of disarmament.

60. We have also examined the terms of the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, proposed by the Government of the Soviet Union [A/6834] and explained in this Committee on 20 November [1532nd meeting] by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union.

61. We have no doubt that the sponsors of the item we are now discussing are as anxious as the rest of us to see the world relieved, once and for all, of the threat of nuclear war.

62. The Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons [A/6858 and Corr.1], to which frequent reference has already been made here, is a sombre and compelling document. It serves to remind us, if we need any reminding, that disarmament is still the most urgent item on mankind's agenda. Surely none of us is without a full sense of that urgency. This being so, my delegation would not agree that those who find difficulty with the approach taken by the sponsors of the present item are to be considered as any less determined than they are themselves to make real progress towards disarmament.

63. Where my delegation would, however, disagree with the sponsors of the present item is in the view that a convention of the kind suggested would be an effective means of bringing closer to realization the objective we all have in common. For its part, my delegation does not think it would. In fact, we think it would have the negative effect—which, I am sure is not its sponsors' intention—of diverting attention from the central need to work towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

64. We have to start with present realities. These include the existence of nuclear weapons as an integral part of military systems and alliances based on the doctrines of deterrence and strategic balance. What we have to work for are agreements on practical and enforceable measures to eliminate nuclear weapons from national arsenals, progressively with non-nuclear weapons, in a properly phased and balanced programme. In the New Zealand belief, a step-by-step approach is the most realistic way of moving ahead. We attach particular importance to the need to conclude a non-proliferation treaty. As the Chairman of the New Zealand delegation observed in the statement he made at the 1588th plenary meeting on 12 October, the New Zealand Government regards the completion of that treaty as the most important step that can be taken towards disarmament at the present juncture. When it is completed, we hope that the way will then be clear to seek agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and measures to limit the arsenals of the nuclear weapon States.

65. The proposal for a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons does not, in our submission, meet the tests of practicability and realism to which all partial and collateral measures of disarmament must be subject. It may have the merit of simplicity but, as we see it, it also has the fatal demerit of being ineffectual.

66. One representative speaking in this debate has observed that the Soviet proposal does not require any control. As I understand him, he regards this feature of the convention as being an argument in its favour. It seems to my delegation, however, that the question of effective control and adequate safeguards is of central significance in any consideration of what should be done in the field of nuclear weapons. Arrangements which rest on unenforceable undertakings can, we think, do nothing to diminish the nuclear threat or to lessen international tensions. They may seem to offer us a means of doing so, but in substance they take us no further ahead.

67. In this regard, my delegation endorses what was said by the representative of the United States when he spoke on 20 November, as follows:

"In the present balance which now maintains the peace, we cannot afford either deception or unreality. The emphasis must be on credibility of intentions and capabilities; each major nuclear Power must have no doubt as to precisely where the others stand." [1532nd meeting, para. 63.]

68. My delegation retains the conviction that the only sound basis of progress in this issue is to concentrate on trying to reduce, and ultimately to eliminate, nuclear

weapons within the framework of general and complete disarmament.

69. Mr. QUARM (Ghana): I wish, first of all, to extend to the Soviet delegation our deep appreciation of their initiative in bringing before this Committee the proposal for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons [A/6834].

70. We are aware of resolution 1378 (XIV), adopted unanimously by the General Assembly, on general and complete disarmament. We are equally aware of the endeavours of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to carry out the purpose contained in that General Assembly resolution, but no one can say that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has made much progress worth recounting in the field of general and complete disarmament. Presumably it is for this reason that, in recent years, its main attention has been devoted to the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

71. There is probably no country today which does not support general and complete disarmament. But if, as experience has shown, the present climate in international affairs, charged with the suspicions of Governments and the calculations of the requirements of national security, makes this basic goal of general and complete disarmament impossible to achieve, prudence and our own self-interest would require that we examine other methods that may be open to mankind in order to arrive ultimately at the same goal.

72. My delegation feels strongly that the only way we can make any significant progress in achieving this goal is by searching for limited practical objectives and arrangements which could be agreed internationally, without the necessity for any collateral agreements; ultimately, such arrangements would still fit into and advance the establishment of a framework in which we could all achieve general and complete disarmament.

73. The search for limited practical objectives in disarmament is therefore engaging the serious attention of us all. There are numerous examples in recent experience to justify such a course of action: for instance, we have been able to conclude a nuclear weapons test-ban Treaty which limits such testing under water, in outer space and in the atmosphere. Although the banning of the testing of nuclear weapons under ground has not yet been achieved, everybody who has the subject of disarmament at heart has welcomed this breakthrough in limiting nuclear arms testing, however partial and limited it may be.

74. We also have the Treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space which, though partial in scope, is yet contributory to the hope of further achievements in this area. Further, everybody knows that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva is in the final stages of concluding a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is also a partial and limited achievement, because it will neither eliminate the nuclear club nor abolish completely the stockpile of nuclear weapons possessed by nuclear Powers, though this is one of the objectives of general and complete disarmament. However, all States are convinced that the principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a gain by mankind in the field of disarmament.

75. Similarly, regarding the creation of nuclear-free zones, we have the noble example of the Latin American Treaty on denuclearization. We all recognize the imperfection of the Treaty and its inapplicability to the whole world, but at least we equally recognize the imaginative and constructive beginning which it gives to other areas thinking of denuclearizing themselves. We therefore have several examples of this piecemeal, step-by-step approach to the problem, especially in the field of general and complete disarmament.

76. The idea of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons has therefore to be seen in the light in which these other limited achievements have been acclaimed. Why do we lay such emphasis on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons? To answer this question we have to look only at the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the use of nuclear weapons, which states:

"There is one inescapable and basic fact. It is that the nuclear armouries which are in being already contain large megaton weapons every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered. Were such weapons ever to be used in numbers, hundreds of millions of people might be killed, and civilization as we know it, as well as organized community life, would inevitably come to an end in the countries involved in the conflict. Many of those who survived the immediate destruction as well as others in countries outside the area of conflict, would be exposed to widely-spreading radio-active contamination, and would suffer from long-term effects of irradiation and transmit, to their offspring, a genetic burden which would become manifest in the disabilities of later generations."  
[A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 1.]

77. It is because of the highly destructive effects of nuclear war vis-à-vis conventional war, both for the present and future, that we must all bend our efforts to outlawing the use of nuclear weapons. But, of course, such outlawing of nuclear weapons will not have full meaning unless it is linked with the destruction of the nuclear weapons themselves. Yet to achieve even such an agreement, based on self-restraint and the moral compunction of the Powers concerned, would itself be an advance in the right direction towards the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear stockpiles. The knowledge that these weapons would not be used would itself have a restraining effect on the existing nuclear Powers which would refrain from further acquisition of nuclear weapons and on non-nuclear countries aspiring to be nuclear Powers which would refrain from the useless and expensive effort of becoming nuclear Powers.

78. We do not think at this moment it is worth our while going into detailed comment on the Soviet draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, but we do say that there should be at least a general recognition and acceptance of the idea that such a convention is necessary and useful. This would be a logical culmination of the General Assembly's resolution 1653 (XVI), the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, by which the Assembly has declared the use of such weapons contrary to the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

79. Those States which have different ideas on how the convention should be worded, how it should operate and what it should seek to achieve can then bend their efforts in a mutual undertaking under the auspices of the United Nations and try to fashion a draft convention or to submit their own draft for consideration by this Committee.

80. Let me state here that the reservations made by the representative of the United States on the various paragraphs of the Soviet text are well taken by my delegation and should be resolved in a general consideration of a draft or drafts seeking as their objective the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

81. We do not, however, accept the argument that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons will, by itself, raise any false hopes or adversely affect the national security of certain countries because it would prevent their using nuclear weapons as deterrents. Of course, one could very well envisage a situation in which a nuclear Power which does not sign such a convention might hold the other nuclear Powers to ransom and, indirectly, the whole of mankind. But this is where the United Nations as a whole, exercising the collective conscience of the world and its moral force, can demand and possibly achieve the universal agreement of all nuclear Powers to such a convention.

82. For this reason, we state again what we have stated on previous occasions in different contexts—that it is in the interests of world peace and disarmament that China be brought into the ambit of the United Nations. For if China and, for that matter, any other nuclear Power outside the United Nations structure should refuse to adhere to such a convention, then the convention will have only limited effect—but this limited effect would be better than none at all, because at least it would be known that those nuclear Powers which have adhered to the convention would not use such weapons against themselves or other States.

83. I shall conclude by emphasizing that, in the view of my delegation, no argument can justify the opposition of any country, nuclear or non-nuclear, to a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

84. It has been said that even anti-ballistic missiles are not enough to shield any country from substantial nuclear damage, should a nuclear war be launched. As is stated in the Secretary-General's report:

"The basic facts about the nuclear bomb and its use are harsh and terrifying for civilization; they have become lost in a mass of theoretical verbiage. It has been claimed that the world has learned to live with the bomb; it is also said there is no need for it to drift unnecessarily into the position that it is prepared to die for it. The ultimate question for the world to decide in our nuclear age—and this applies both to nuclear and non-nuclear Powers—is what short-term interests it is prepared to sacrifice in exchange for an assurance of survival and security."  
[A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 42.]

I would stress the last sentence of the above quotation. It is the hope of my delegation that we shall all make the sacrifice.

85. We welcome wholeheartedly the proposal of the Soviet Union for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and would urge other delegations to do the same. We express our hope that the necessary machinery will be set up by suitable draft resolutions which we can support.

86. Mr. FAULKNER (Canada): The memorandum submitted by the Soviet Union [A/6834] states that, because of the accumulation of large stocks of nuclear weapons in the world and the complicated international situation, the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is an "important and urgent" matter.

87. The Canadian delegation has long been convinced that arms control and disarmament is one of the major tasks confronting the United Nations. The possible further spread of nuclear weapons alarms Canadians, which is why the Canadian delegation is willing to support measures which offer effective means for nuclear weapons control. As has been frequently pointed out, it is the sense of insecurity on the part of nations which gives rise to the arms race. Yet it is the arms race in turn which further heightens the sense of insecurity among nations. This leads to the dangerous spiral of an ever greater commitment to newer and more sophisticated weapons as part of a programme of self-defence. This costly and dangerous trend will not be stopped—not even significantly curtailed—by a declaration prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Security of a lasting character must be sought, firstly, through precise measures to control and limit nuclear weapons, as well as other types of armaments, and, secondly, through agreed measures of disarmament leading to the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons as part of a phased, controlled programme of general disarmament.

88. As was pointed out by the Canadian representative in the debate on a similar item in this Committee six years ago, the Canadian delegation has every sympathy with the views of those delegations which have, over the years, supported resolutions whose aim was to put an end to the possibility of nuclear weapons of mass destruction being used in time of war. We agree with their sentiments and respect their concern that the peoples of the world should not be subject to the death and destruction which the use of such weapons would cause. That is an aim which all Canadians profoundly share. While agreeing that the question is important, we have differed with supporters of those resolutions, not on the goal to be attained, but rather on the best and most effective means to be used in achieving that goal.

89. The Soviet Union states that the adoption of a clear decision by the General Assembly in favour of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons will serve peace and relax international tension. For our part, we seriously question the value of such a convention. The Canadian delegation certainly favours the cause of peace and the relaxation of international tension, and nuclear arms control. We do not believe, however, that a declaratory prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons is the most effective way of securing world peace. Such an agreement, if accepted, would leave untouched the present large stocks of nuclear weapons maintained by the military nuclear Powers and would not represent a step towards the

reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons or towards disarmament. On various occasions in the past, Soviet representatives have rejected Western proposals on the grounds that they did not constitute progress towards disarmament. But history shows that declaratory measures, such as the Briand-Kellogg Pact,<sup>6</sup> have been conspicuously unsuccessful in preventing war. In the long-term, peace and security are more surely secured through agreements on nuclear arms control, such as the partial test-ban Treaty and the outer space Treaty, which can be effectively verified by the parties to them. An essential feature of all such measures is the willing support of the two most powerful nuclear countries in the world today—the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

90. Over the years the Canadian Government has sought to strengthen peace and to diminish international tension by specific and practical measures, rather than through declarations. For instance, we believe that increasing reliance should be placed on international forces coupled with disarmament, rather than upon national armed forces, which tend to place increasing economic burdens on those who have to contribute to them, as well as to increase international tensions. It is for that reason that Canada has stressed the importance of United Nations activities in the field of peace-keeping, as witnessed in Canadian contributions in the Congo, the Middle East and Cyprus. It is also for that reason that Canada, through active participation in disarmament negotiations, has been helping to find a way out of the vicious circle of the arms race.

91. Throughout such negotiations we have consistently maintained that the best and, indeed, the only practicable way of ensuring that nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons will never be used lies in comprehensive but gradual and phased disarmament, subject at each step to effective international supervision and verification. Under a broad programme for general disarmament, nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons could be controlled and reduced in conjunction with other forms of armaments in a way which would not result in military advantage to one State or group of States. There must, of course, be parallel steps in reducing international tension and resolving international disputes, with a corresponding development of international institutions to maintain peace and security. In the view of the Canadian delegation, a declaratory measure such as the one proposed by the Soviet Union would merely serve to enhance the illusion, rather than the substance, of genuine peace and security throughout the world. In this forum we must deal in terms of meaningful, realistic and workable proposals to reduce and eliminate the danger of nuclear war. In the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America [A/C.1/946] we have already considered such a proposal while the negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty in Geneva also hold out hope for positive progress.

92. Mr. GHORBAL (United Arab Republic): "The risk of nuclear war remains as long as there are nuclear weapons." [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 41.] These were the exact words used in the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons. In fact, every day that

<sup>6</sup> General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, signed at Paris on 27 August 1928.

passes means new weapons of mass destruction are being produced. This evil side of the development of science and technology poses a real nightmare to our aspirations for a future of peace and security. On the other hand, we follow with interest and satisfaction the efforts that many countries exert to put a stop to the arms race. Unfortunately, we are still far away from the realization of this noble goal of disarmament. All peace-loving States welcome with great appreciation any initiative in this direction. Likewise, and in the same spirit of real appreciation, the delegation of the United Arab Republic joins today with others who have taken the floor so far to welcome the initiative of the delegation of the Soviet Union in introducing to the deliberations of this Committee the item entitled "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" [A/6834].

93. This subject has received some consideration in the past in this Committee and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. However, we believe that it still needs, and indeed deserves, every serious consideration.

94. It has become crystal clear that nuclear armaments and also disarmament are no longer the concern of those Powers possessing such weapons; this matter is by now impressing itself firmly on the minds of all peoples and Governments. The dangers of the use of these weapons are not and never can be limited. I hardly need to go through complex scientific data to prove this. It is sufficient to quote a few passages and paragraphs from the report of our Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons.

95. In the introduction to the report, we read:

"There is one inescapable and basic fact. It is that the nuclear armouries which are in being already contain large megaton weapons every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered. Were such weapons ever to be used in numbers, hundreds of millions of people might be killed, and civilization as we know it, as well as organized community life, would inevitably come to an end in the countries involved in the conflict. Many of those who survived the immediate destruction as well as others in countries outside the area of conflict, would be exposed to widely spreading radio-active contamination, and would suffer from long-term effects of irradiation and transmit, to their offspring, a genetic burden which would become manifest in the disabilities of later generations." [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 2.]

96. My colleague from Ghana has just referred to this particular paragraph in his very illuminating statement this morning.

97. Again, later in the same report, we have:

"The effects of all-out nuclear war, regardless of where it started, could not be confined to the Powers engaged in that war. They themselves would have to suffer the immediate kind of destruction and the immediate and more enduring lethal fall-out whose effects have already been described. But neighbouring countries, and even countries in parts of the world remote from the actual

conflict, could soon become exposed to the hazards of radio-active fall-out precipitated at great distances from the explosion, after moving through the atmosphere as a vast cloud. Thus, at least within the same hemisphere, an enduring radio-active hazard could exist for distant as well as close human populations, through the ingestion of foods derived from contaminated vegetation, and the external irradiation due to fall-out particles deposited on the ground." [Ibid., para. 40.]

This, to say the least, is ample proof and quite sufficient justification for all of us here to have a genuine concern with regard to the achievement of successful measures for nuclear disarmament—the prohibition of the use of such weapons obviously ranks high among these measures.

98. In the light of the fact that, in a nuclear war, all the countries and peoples of the world are potential victims, regardless of where that war starts, and indeed regardless of the limited nature of a particular nuclear military action, the delegation of the United Arab Republic as is the case with other delegations in this Committee, will never fail to extend every possible assistance and make whatever contribution is required to facilitate the achievements of tangible results in the field of general and complete disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament.

99. It has become an acknowledged fact that this ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament cannot be realized in one stroke. It has been established as well that steps taken in that direction are usually universally appreciated. The world has with great joy witnessed some very significant achievements like the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty, the Treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space and the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America [A/C.1/946]. Still, we are far from the realization of the aspired goal. More positive and concrete results are needed, and badly so. Efforts are now being undertaken in Geneva for the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. We earnestly await the results. In this regard we feel it necessary to be somewhat more patient in order to achieve an effective treaty with balanced obligations, free from loop-holes, which would facilitate the work of this Assembly, rather than to have an instrument which will require deep scrutiny and further studies.

100. In all the steps already undertaken and those which are drawing closer to their final conclusion, there is one feature—or rather a common denominator—namely the partial or piecemeal undertaking. Nevertheless, we welcome such steps and further hope that other measures will soon be added to the ones already concluded.

101. If all these measures could be achieved and respected, it will be easier to embark upon the more positive steps we need, that is to say, the reduction and final destruction of all stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction as well as the undertaking to forgo their production. In our view these are all interrelated matters in the complex and intricate process of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

102. In this spirit, we welcome discussion of the item now on our agenda. We consider it worthy of every serious consideration. In this connexion we are not starting from

zero. The lofty principles of the Charter of the United Nations denouncing war as a means of settling disputes, together with the records of discussions on this particular issue here and in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee have prepared the ground. Moreover, we have resolution 1653 (XVI), whereby the Assembly made abundantly clear its rejection of the use of nuclear weapons.

103. Resolution 1653 (XVI) states that:

“The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”

It also states:

“The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is a war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in general.”

Furthermore, it states:

“Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations . . .”

104. This resolution describes very clearly the use of these weapons as “a crime against mankind and civilization”. In the preamble the Assembly expresses the belief that the use of these weapons is a direct negation of the high ideals and objectives which the United Nations has been established to achieve.

105. However, having said all this, it is very important for us not to lose sight of the practical realities of life. In saying so, we wish to associate ourselves with the statement made this morning by the representative of the Sudan. It would, in our view, be unrealistic to consider the mere conclusion of such a convention the magic formula by which the world is assured eternal security against nuclear attacks or the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. In this there is a great deal of weight in the view of the United States representative when he warns against creating a false sense of security.

106. I believe that more important than the mere conclusion of the treaty is the real intention of the nuclear Powers. For no convention, no guarantee, is worth the efforts deployed in drawing it up, let alone the lives of the millions with whom it deals, if intentions are not clear and sincere and obligations freely undertaken do not become binding. Our own experience in the field of declarations of

guarantees vis-à-vis our area have, for the past seventeen years, given us reason to take this attitude.

107. Speaking of the world at large, the experience of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 is another proof of what we mean. The representative of Canada has just made a similar reference. The Second World War proved that the mere undertaking by nations to outlaw war was not enough. Their adherence to the principle of refraining from using war as an instrument of national policy remained mere written words. The events from 1936 onwards proved that real intentions, power politics and appeasement rendered these commitments worthless.

108. It is thus against this background that we deem it necessary to be assured about the real intentions and determination of the nuclear Powers to render such a convention, if concluded—and we hope that it will be concluded—an effective, forceful and implemented policy.

109. This brings me to the point raised by the representative of Ethiopia on Friday last, 24 November. He stated:

“At the same time, we cannot but be aware that such an important convention must have the backing of all States and more particularly of those States among our Members which are nuclear Powers.” [*1535th meeting, para. 56.*]

110. In this, as in other parts of his statement, most valuable and constructive as it is, the representative of Ethiopia expressed the views of the United Arab Republic, for no positive result could come out unless this convention is adhered to and backed by all States, and more particularly the nuclear Powers. I shall add, not only those within the present membership of the United Nations, but also those which are not as yet Members.

111. One final word. The atmosphere accompanying the consideration of this item has been a positive one assuring serious consideration. The tone set from the start and the reactions that follow have been most welcome. We salute this development and we share in it. We believe it to be a happy augury for dealing with all the disarmament issues. Let us make use of this momentum, necessary and dear as it is to all without distinction. For its part—as I am sure is the case with other small developing nations—the United Arab Republic will spare no effort in actively participating to make the world safe, secure and prosperous in our day and in the future that lies ahead.

*The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.*