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First Committee

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Official Records

Chair: Mr. Santos Maraver(Spain)

The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

Agenda items 94 to 110 (continued)

Action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): This morning the Committee will continue to take action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items 94 to 110. We will be guided by the same procedure that I explained at our meeting yesterday (see A/C.1/75/PV.11).

We will begin by hearing the remaining delegations that requested the floor in explanation of vote on cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons", as contained in informal paper A/C.1/75/INF/1/Rev.4. Altogether, there are 21 delegations waiting to take the floor in that regard.

Thereafter, the Committee will take up the draft resolutions and decisions under clusters 2 and 3, contained in informal paper A/C.1/75/INF/1/Rev.4, before proceeding with its consideration of informal paper A/C.1/75/INF/2, which has been distributed to delegations electronically.

I now call on the remaining delegations wishing to explain their position after the vote. I would like to remind delegations that statements are limited to 3 minutes and that explanations of vote presented in written form by 10 November will be included in the compendium to be issued as an official document of the Committee.

Mr. Knight (United States of America): I am taking the floor to explain the decision of the United States to vote against draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.58, on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The principles behind the CTBT are sound and reflect the broad consensus of the international community on non-proliferation and disarmament. However, the United States cannot support a resolution calling for the Treaty's entry into force in its current form. Even if the Treaty were in force, it would constrain the actions of responsible States such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France. At the same time, malign actors such as Russia and China, both serial violators of other treaties related to weapons of mass destruction, could potentially violate the CTBT without detection by secretly conducting nuclear explosive tests. Such clandestine nuclear-testing activity could help Russia improve its nuclear-weapon designs and capabilities and provide support to China's secretive effort to at least double its nuclear-weapon arsenal over the next few years.

As set forth in the annual compliance report of the United States, Russia has conducted nuclear-weapon experiments that have created nuclear yield. Moreover, as the international community reacted with horror to the disaster related to the destabilizing and environmentally calamitous Skyfall nuclear-powered cruise missile in August 2019, Russia abandoned the principles of transparency in the wake of that disaster when its nearby International Monitoring System stations stopped transmitting data to the International Data Centre. Additionally, China's conduct also raises concerns regarding its adherence to the zero-yield

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standard adhered to by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in their respective nuclear weapons testing moratoriums.

Unfortunately, draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.58 fails to call out Russia and China's non-transparent and irresponsible nuclear-testing activities. We would encourage others to seek clarification from Russia and China on what those activities entail, precisely how each of them defines the scope of its nuclear explosive testing moratorium and specifically whether each country's moratorium prohibits all supercritical nuclear tests and experiments. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review of the United States emphasizes that although the United States will not become a party to the CTBT, it will continue to support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, as well as the International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre. In addition, our Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms that the United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless it is necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of its nuclear arsenal, and calls on all States possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing. I will note that the United States continues to abide by the zero-yield nuclear-testing moratorium it has observed since conducting its last nuclear explosive test in 1992.

Mr. Mohd Nasir (Malaysia): Malaysia lauds Japan for its engagement and extensive outreach in preparing draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, entitled "Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons". It covers many important issues pertaining to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Japan's efforts to establish common ground among Member States on such critical topics must be commended.

Malaysia's principled position on this matter is very clear. The total elimination of nuclear weapons, together with assurances that they will never be produced again, is the only absolute guarantee against the catastrophic humanitarian consequences arising from their use. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been the cornerstone of the global nuclear-disarmament and nuclear-non-proliferation regime. That universal understanding should be better reflected in the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. We are deeply concerned about the deletion of the term "implementing" from the fourth preambular paragraph, which is a major departure from the agreed language honouring past commitments reached at

previous Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995, 2000 and 2010. It is unfortunate that the ninth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 3 (d) of the draft resolution shy away from explicitly calling on annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without further delay. In our view, those two paragraphs do not place appropriate emphasis on the imperative of bringing the Treaty into force.

Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution suggests that the goal of totally eliminating nuclear weapons is predicated on the easing of international tensions and the strengthening of trust among States. That misconception goes against the letter and spirit of the NPT. Regarding operative paragraph 3 (b), we believe that the NPT recognizes only two categories of States — nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States. For the resolution to use the NPT context and gradually recognize another category of States — non-nuclear-possessor States — is therefore quite concerning.

For the reason already stated, Malaysia abstained from voting on the second, fourth and ninth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraphs 3 (b) and (d) of the resolution. However, the divergent views among Member States should not discourage us from continuing to engage in dialogue. Once again, we hope that Japan will continue to facilitate the discussion with all Member States on this important topic moving forward.

Ms. Jáquez Huacuja (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): Mexico understands and shares Japan's motivation for submitting draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71. We believe in the importance of seeking unity and joint actions in order to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and maintain peace through effective multilateralism and the supremacy of international law, especially in the preparations for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

It is imperative to promote the strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime by implementing all the obligations and commitments set forth in the Treaty without conditions. Furthermore, the work of building bridges between the nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States is based on agreements forged within the framework of the NPT. Assessing the effectiveness of such agreements, as well as negotiating new understandings, is the responsibility

of the parties to the NPT, not of the First Committee of the General Assembly.

Mexico reiterates its concern that the language in several paragraphs of this draft resolution reinterprets, weakens and in some cases ignores previous agreements entered into by the parties to the NPT, especially the obligations and provisions contained in article VI of the Treaty and the actions for which the nuclear-weapon States have a particular responsibility. We are also concerned about the fact that the resolution contains references to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that do not correspond to the language agreed on in other resolutions and documents, including the resolution on this issue of which Mexico is a co-author. Finally, we reiterate that the adoption of this resolution does not represent any precedent or imply a change in multilateral obligations and commitments on nuclear disarmament. In that regard, Mexico reserves the right to present its own position at the NPT Review Conference. We are very willing to continue our dialogue with the authors of this draft resolution and on this topic. Mexico and Japan have collaborated very closely on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament issues and will continue to do so.

Mr. Roethlin (Austria): I am taking the floor to explain Austria's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, "Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons".

In our explanation of vote on the same resolution last year (see A/C.1/74/PV.23), we ended with an appeal for ensuring that this year's resolution could regain some balance and chart truly joint courses of action agreeable to all Member States. We are disappointed that those hopes were not fulfilled and regret that some parts of the draft resolution have been weakened further. Consequently, Austria was again not in a position to vote in favour of the draft resolution. We remain deeply worried about attempts to replace established consensus language with new formulations that backtrack on existing commitments agreed on during past Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or that add new conditions to them. We are very concerned about the potential negative impact of this changed language on the integrity of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the NPT review process. Austria wishes to put it on record that the NPT and the outcome documents of previous Review Conferences remain integrally valid.

Elements of the text of the draft resolution are unfortunately incompatible with the wording of existing commitments and decisions of previous Review Conferences. Regrettably, while the importance of those agreements is mentioned in the fourth preambular paragraph, the importance of implementing those agreements was omitted. We remain fully committed to past agreed steps but are strongly concerned about the possibility that a failure to implement them undermines the NPT review process. As we do not support the notion that the implementation of agreements is not important, we had to vote against the fourth preambular paragraph.

The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons form the very underpinning of nuclear disarmament. We voted in favour of the nineteenth preambular paragraph in order to see that fundamental issue reflected in the text. However, we regret that this paragraph departs from NPT acquis on which language agreed by the NPT States parties still stands.

We would have preferred that operative paragraph 3(b) clarify that risk reduction measures cannot be a substitute for complete nuclear disarmament. Additionally, the paragraph introduces a selective list of risk reduction measures while leaving out more substantive measures, such as de-alerting. Consequently, Austria had to abstain on this paragraph. In operative paragraph 3(d), we regret that the already weak language on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which Austria voted against last year, has been further compromised. We therefore voted against operative paragraph 3(d) once again, as well as the ninth preambular paragraph, which in similar fashion diverts attention from the signing and ratification of the CTBT and its speedy entry into force. Overall, we regret that the draft resolution follows the narrative that the total elimination of nuclear weapons can occur only after confidence and trust have been rebuilt. On the contrary, disarmament measures are particularly needed when tensions are high. That belief guided our abstention in the vote on the twelfth preambular paragraph.

In conclusion, I want to once again express our esteem for the draft resolution's main sponsor, Japan, for its successful quest in the past to act as a uniting force. We hope that future iterations will regain greater balance and act as a true bridge-builders for joint courses of action.

Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): As one of the States present at the creation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Russia is committed to its universalization. We ratified the Treaty in 2000 and have always supported it. We believe that the fact that after almost a quarter of a century of its existence the CTBT has not entered into force is the responsibility of the eight States listed in annex 2 of the Treaty that have either not signed it or ratified it, or both.

Based on our general position, we voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.58, on the CTBT. We nevertheless feel obliged to point out that this year's text is significantly worse than previous versions. We have some serious criticism of the work of its authors. The changes they have made mean that the draft is no longer balanced. For example, operative paragraph 5, which is devoted to the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula, does not mention that Pyongyang has introduced a moratorium on nuclear tests. The preamble of the draft resolution also omits any mention of Security Council resolution 2310 (2016), which was supported by all the nuclear possessor States, and which calls directly for the Treaty's entry into force as soon as possible. We believe this trend to the vitiation of the draft resolution's content is very dangerous and we will insist that next year the authors take our comments into consideration.

Mr. Moreno (Israel): I would like to explain Israel's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.6, entitled "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons".

Israel once again voted against this draft resolution. We did not participate in the negotiations on the Treaty and in the past few years have voted against resolutions of the First Committee and the General Assembly pertaining to that process. Our deep reservations about this initiative are based on both substantive and procedural considerations.

On the substantive side, Israel is concerned about arms-control and disarmament processes that fail to give due regard to security and stability contexts when drafting disarmament measures. Such endeavours may result in arrangements and agreements that hinder rather than reinforce disarmament processes and global and regional security.

On the procedural side, Israel firmly believes that such negotiations should be undertaken in the appropriate forums under appropriate rules of

procedure that do not undermine the inclusiveness of the process. It should be emphasized that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons does not create, contribute to the development of or indicate the existence of customary international law related to the Treaty's subject or content. Moreover, it does not reflect legal norms applying to States that are not parties to the Treaty or in any way alter existing rights or obligations of States that have not joined it. The Treaty's entry into force is relevant only to countries that have signed or ratified it. Israel is therefore not bound by it in any way.

Mr. Khan (Pakistan): I have taken the floor to explain my delegation's vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/75/L.36, A/C.1/75/L.55, A/C.1/75/L.58 and A/C.1/75/L.71, which the Committee took action on yesterday (see A/C.1/75/PV.11).

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.55, our delegation once again voted in favour of it as a whole. However, we were compelled to abstain on its sixth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 2, which make reference to a divisive and non-universal initiative. Our position on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has already been explained. Pakistan is committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world through the conclusion of a universal, verifiable, non-discriminatory and comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons in the Conference on Disarmament that is consistent with the universally agreed principles enshrined in the final document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (A/S-10/2).

Pakistan has consistently supported draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.58. We participated constructively in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and voted in favour of its adoption by the General Assembly in 1996. We have since voted in favour of the annual CTBT resolution both in the Committee and the Assembly. Pakistan is not bound by any provisions emanating from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or its Review Conferences, including as stated in the seventh preambular paragraph, or from any other instrument to which Pakistan is not a party. In line with our consistent support for the objectives and purposes of the Treaty, we once again voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, while abstaining on its seventh preambular paragraph.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, Pakistan appreciates Japan's efforts to forge consensus on advancing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. However, we cannot support the universalization of the NPT, a highly unrealistic and impractical objective. Pakistan is not party to the NPT and is therefore not bound by its provisions, nor do we subscribe to the conclusions and recommendations of its various Review Conferences. We remain concerned about the fact that a draft resolution seeking joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons continues to rely on divisive approaches that do not enjoy consensus. In view of those considerations, my delegation was obliged to abstain in the voting on the resolution as a whole, while voting against its second and eighth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 3.

Finally, regarding draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.36, while Pakistan has supported the resolution on a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in the past, last year we decided to abstain. Pakistan continues to support international arms-control and disarmament initiatives that are equitable and non-discriminatory. We have consistently supported all initiatives drawing attention to the risk of conventional conflict escalating to the nuclear level.

However, progress on such initiatives cannot be divorced from the security challenges that can trigger such conflicts. The sponsor of this draft resolution, which claims to promote the norms of non-use of nuclear weapons, has recently issued threats of nuclear use against a neighbour. It has pursued the continued expansion and modernization of its conventional and nuclear arsenals, increasing the readiness of its nuclear forces by taking steps such as the canisterization of missiles, the introduction of destabilizing weapon systems and the adoption of offensive force postures. Pakistan has always maintained that declaratory commitments and doctrines are not verifiable. The recent actions of the State in question, which have created extreme volatility in our region, confirm that its declarations are not credible in any way and are meant to mislead the international community. Given the wide gap between the lead sponsor's practices and declared policies, it was difficult for my delegation to support this resolution.

Mr. Masmеjean (Switzerland): I have a number of brief explanations of vote regarding the cluster on nuclear weapons.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", which we voted in favour of, Switzerland would like to put it on record that our last year's explanation of vote (see A/C.1/74/PV.23) remains valid. This explanation of vote underlines in particular our regret that the draft resolution refers to only one dimension of the nuclear-proliferation risk in the region and continues to single out one State.

Concerning draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.6, entitled "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons", on which Switzerland abstained, we would like to refer to last year's explanation of vote, which explains our position on the Treaty and remains fully valid. The elements outlined in that explanation of vote also explain our vote on certain separate votes related to the Treaty in other resolutions.

As for draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.54, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", which we voted in favour of, we recall our last year's explanation of vote, which articulates our position on the resolution as a whole and on some of its paragraphs.

On draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.17, entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament", on which we abstained, we would like to put on record that last year's explanation of vote also remains valid.

Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, entitled "Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons", we refer to the joint explanation of vote to be given by Canada on behalf of a number of States, including Switzerland. In our national capacity, we would like to indicate that Switzerland abstained in the voting on the resolution as a whole, as well as on the fourth, ninth and twelfth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraphs 3(d) and 5, because the language they contained raises a number of fundamental questions. As we laid out in our national explanation of vote last year, we will oppose any attempt to reinterpret, reverse or rewrite agreed outcomes on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We stand ready to continue working closely with the sponsors of the draft resolution with a view to striking a balance between diverse considerations and garnering support from nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

Mr. Situmorang (Indonesia): Indonesia would like to take this opportunity to explain its position on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, entitled “Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons”.

Indonesia appreciates Japan’s continuing efforts to develop this important draft resolution with the aim of contributing to the realization of a world without nuclear weapons as a common goal for the international community. We have lent our support to the endeavour in previous years in order to pave the way for substantial progress and concrete actions towards the implementation of the commitments agreed at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), especially those under its article VI. This year we were unable to support the draft resolution as a whole and had to abstain in the voting on preambular paragraphs 4, 9 and 12 and operative paragraphs 1, 3(d), 3(e) and 5. The draft reinterprets already agreed commitments, including on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which not only takes us further from achieving progress but also entails setbacks as we approach the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons next year. For Indonesia, implementing the agreed commitments is an obligation, not an option. We cannot accept any conditionalities on our disarmament endeavours or any more obstacles to their achievement. We reaffirm that the elimination of nuclear weapons will contribute to easing international tensions and fostering trust among nations.

The draft should also address some key developments and elements that are important to achieving the common goal, such as the process to establish a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, negative security assurances and concrete action on the universalization of the NPT. Indonesia stands ready to continue discussing those concerns with Japan and all other Member States in future deliberations on this important resolution.

Mrs. Nadeau (Canada): I am taking the floor on behalf of Belgium, Chile, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and my own country, Canada, to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, “Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons”.

We appreciate Japan’s efforts to find common ground in the lead-up to the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As we mark the 75 years that have passed since nuclear weapons were last used in conflict, we must all redouble our efforts to advance nuclear disarmament. We appreciate that this draft resolution identifies a number of important areas where progress can be made, including the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and men in all aspects of nuclear disarmament and the key role of nuclear disarmament verification in ensuring compliance with disarmament commitments. We are also pleased that the draft resolution acknowledges the need to start negotiations around a fissile material cut-off treaty and the value of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education, and that it calls for effective measures to reduce nuclear risk.

Despite these positive elements, we were unable to support this year’s text because it does not reflect a number of well-understood principles that we believe are essential to achieving the agreed nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). First, as we approach the tenth NPT Review Conference, we believe it is necessary to continue to emphasize the importance of implementing past NPT commitments agreed by the States parties at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. Secondly, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a fundamental expectation for those committed to the NPT and the CTBT. We see no reason to equivocate in calling on annex 2 States to sign and ratify the treaty as soon as possible. Thirdly, we cannot dilute calls for the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of the nuclear-weapon and ballistic-missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in accordance with Security Council resolutions. For these reasons, we have abstained on the resolution as a whole and have voted no or abstained on several paragraphs.

Ms. Quintero Correa (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation wanted to take the floor to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, entitled “Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons”.

Colombia is firmly committed to disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. In our view, no General Assembly resolution has the legal status or force to modify the

provisions of binding instruments. The draft resolution therefore cannot be interpreted or applied in such a way as to undermine the legal obligations established in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or the commitments agreed on at NPT Review Conferences, whose purpose is to assess how the Treaty is applied to ensure that its preamble and provisions are being implemented. Colombia supported the resolution on this topic in 2019 and did so again this year because we believe in the goal of general and complete disarmament and the quest for steps that can be taken immediately in order to make progress towards that goal.

Mr. Le Floe'h (France) (*spoke in French*): France would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, submitted by Japan. We commend the efforts to build bridges in the area of nuclear disarmament, especially in the lead-up to the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We voted in favour of this resolution last year. However, this year we abstained for the following reasons.

The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a long-standing priority of France and the European Union. It is not an option but rather an indispensable step towards a definitive ban on nuclear testing. Yet the ninth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 3(d) of the draft resolution present the signature and ratification of the CTBT as one option among others.

France supports the call for the extension of the New START Treaty in the twelfth preambular paragraph. France attaches great importance to transparency in the field of nuclear disarmament. We have an exemplary record in that regard and are ready to participate in discussions that would bring together the five nuclear-weapon States. However, the bilateral Russian-American treaties are rooted in the history of the Cold War. The United States and the Russian Federation have arsenals that are out of all proportion to those of other nuclear-weapon States. The language in the twelfth preambular paragraph ignores that reality.

With regard to the nineteenth preambular paragraph, the language about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons is not new. It has been common knowledge for a long time. It is regrettable that this topic was used as the basis for the campaign leading to the Treaty on the Prohibition

of Nuclear Weapons, on which France has had the opportunity to reiterate its position, notably yesterday through the voice of the permanent five members of the Security Council.

On operative paragraph 3(c), we would like to remind the Committee that any negotiation on a fissile material cut-off treaty should be based on document CD/1299 and the mandate it contains.

Finally, we deplore the eroding of the internationally agreed language on the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of the nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the seventeenth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 5. The persistence of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes warrants maintaining pressure and a strong position on this issue.

For all of these reasons, France is of the view that draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71 strays from the laudable and ambitious objective it was intended to embody, that of bringing views on nuclear disarmament closer together and building consensus around balanced language capable of paving the way for common ground at the Review Conference. As a result, France abstained in the voting this year but remains interested in continuing to work closely with Japan on subsequent drafts of this important First Committee resolution.

Mr. Kim In Chol (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): My delegation is taking the floor to offer an explanation of our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.54, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments". We abstained in the voting because the resolution strikes an unbalanced chord. We aspire to a nuclear-free world and support the initiative of creating and expanding nuclear-free zones around the world. However, to our great concern, the military pressure and nuclear blackmail aimed at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continue unabated. This year alone, even amid the coronavirus disease pandemic, undisguised acts of hostility that breach the peace, such as provocative joint military exercises and the introduction of modern military hardware from outside, continued in the southern half of the Korean peninsula.

In the current circumstances, the main guarantee of security and development is strong self-defence capabilities. The failure to ensure peace and security on

the Korean peninsula is due to the growing number of hostile acts committed against a sovereign nation, not to a lack of dialogue. Naturally, a favourable environment should be created if any dialogue is to be held. Peace does not just happen merely because one party wishes it, nor can it be granted by the other party. In today's world, where high-handedness, backed by strength, is rampant, genuine peace can be safeguarded only when one possesses the absolute strength to prevent war oneself. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains strongly committed to guaranteeing its sovereignty and security and safeguarding forever the safety, peace and future of its State and people, backed by powerful self-defence capabilities.

Mr. Brady (Ireland): I have asked for the floor to explain our votes on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, "Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons", sponsored by Japan.

Ireland welcomes the dialogue and strong engagement by the main sponsor in preparing the draft resolution, as well as the inclusion of language on the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men, as one of the essential factors for the promotion and attainment of sustainable peace and security. However, Ireland was not able to vote in favour of it because certain elements reinterpret a number of important outcomes and undertakings relating to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Ireland cannot accept any implication that conditionality applies to disarmament obligations. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization are key priorities for us. In our view, the changes to the language in this year's draft resolution have moved the emphasis further away from the entry into force of the CTBT.

Overall, with due regard to the bridge-building efforts by the main sponsor, Ireland regrets that some language potentially undermines the entry into force of the CTBT and previous commitments entered into under the NPT. That will not advance efforts to find common ground as we prepare for the rescheduled Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Mr. Horne (Australia): I am taking the floor to explain my delegation's position after the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, entitled "Joint courses of

action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons".

We thank Japan for leading the resolution again and appreciate the difficulty it faces in finding common ground on this issue. We regret that the language on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is significantly weaker this year in comparison to last year's resolution. We have accordingly abstained in the voting on the ninth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 3(d).

Australia is a strong supporter of the CTBT and co-leads the annual CTBT resolution with Mexico and New Zealand. We thank Member States for their continued support. Our role as co-Chair of the Friends of the CTBT is well known, as was our role in bringing the CTBT to the General Assembly in 1996, triggering its opening for signature. While we were unable to support these two paragraphs, we maintained our support for the draft resolution as a whole.

Mr. Dandy (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): My country's delegation voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/75/L.1, "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", and A/C.1/75/L.2, "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". The Syrian Arab Republic believes that the latter is vitally important to peace and security in our region and the world, and we also believe wholeheartedly in the need to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

After its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1969, the Syrian Arab Republic was among the first countries to call for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, especially nuclear weapons. My country launched an initiative to achieve that noble goal through a draft resolution submitted to the Security Council at the end of 2003 that was aimed at ridding our region of all weapons of mass destruction through collective global supervision under the auspices of the United Nations, which would also have strengthened the role of multilateral international conventions on disarmament. However, at the time the United States delegation threatened to use the veto against the draft resolution, which has since remained in the Security Council in blue.

Although a majority of Member States have urged Israel to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon party, we all believe that Israel will not accede to it

as long as the United States and other countries continue to protect Israel's nuclear programme and its military's biological and chemical programmes. They also help to enhance and develop those programmes, besides protecting Israel's refusal to implement non-proliferation resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the International Atomic Energy Agency. That was clearly demonstrated to all when the United States and Britain, both of which are nuclear-weapon States and depositaries of the NPT, brought about the failure of the 2015 Review Conference. Israel was thus encouraged to continue to defy the will of the international community and refuse to accede to the NPT or any other convention banning weapons of mass destruction.

My country's delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.58, "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", because we emphasize that such an important and sensitive Treaty should never ignore the legitimate concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States. Yet it does not provide those States with any guarantees concerning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them and it does not explicitly note the illegitimacy of using or threatening to use nuclear weapons. Nor does the Treaty call explicitly for the universalization of the NPT. Syria therefore views the substantial loopholes in the Treaty with great concern, since Israel alone possesses nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Mr. Fiallo Karolys (Ecuador) (*spoke in Spanish*): I am taking the floor to explain my delegation's vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/75/L.36 and A/C.1/75/L.71 under cluster I on "Nuclear weapons".

Ecuador voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.36, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons", because the seventh preambular paragraph recognizes that a legally binding prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons does not run counter but rather contributes to international efforts aimed at achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world. However, I would like to put on record that in Ecuador's view, the real way forward to achieve that objective is through the universalization of the existing Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which will enter into force once the fiftieth ratification instrument has been deposited. The Treaty already contains an express prohibition of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and is open for accession to all States.

Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, "Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons", Ecuador sincerely shares the objective stated in the draft resolution's first preambular paragraph of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. However, in a world where such weapons exist, it is essential to prohibit and eliminate them in order to achieve that objective. Unfortunately, the absence of a reference to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons makes the draft resolution an unambitious tool. The text modifies consensus language arrived at in nuclear-disarmament forums by reinterpreting or limiting it, and could undermine the integrity of fundamental instruments by shifting from a paradigm of elimination to one of conditionality. Ultimately, it moves away from the universal and is limited to the regional. For all of those reasons, Ecuador abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole and on most of the paragraphs that were submitted to a separate vote, specifically the second, fourth, eighth, ninth, twelfth, seventeenth and nineteenth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraphs 1 and 3(b), (c), (d) and (e).

Finally, Ecuador has repeatedly expressed how urgent it is to ensure the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty's entry into force. In that connection, even though we are speaking in explanation of vote after the voting, I would simply like to point out, since my delegation did not take the floor in the debate that preceded the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.58, on the "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", in order to support the Chair's request that we complete the work of the Committee more quickly, that Ecuador was able to become a sponsor of the draft resolution thanks to the flexibility shown by the main sponsors in withdrawing the reference to Security Council resolution 2310 (2016).

Mr. Leite Novaes (Brazil): My delegation wishes to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, entitled "Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons".

At the outset, we would like to commend Japan for drawing attention to this important issue by submitting the draft resolution. While Brazil shares Japan's overarching goal, as set out in the draft resolution, of a world without nuclear weapons, my delegation has deep concerns about some elements of its language. Furthermore, we are of the view that such language is hardly conducive to promoting common understanding

in this area. In concrete terms, some elements of the draft appear to reinterpret or limit the obligations and commitments deriving from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its review process.

In the fourth preambular paragraph, the deletion of the term “implementation” in reference to the nuclear disarmament commitments adopted at the NPT Review Conferences of 1995, 2000 and 2010 represents a considerable weakening of the wording in the resolution adopted last year (resolution 74/63).

Regarding operative paragraph 1, Brazil believes that the language it contains suggests that achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, which is a legally binding obligation derived from article VI of the NPT, is contingent on easing international tensions and strengthening trust among States. Not only is this language not in line with the obligations of all States parties to the NPT under article VI and the commitments undertaken during the NPT review process, it is also at odds with its own fifteenth preambular paragraph, which recognizes that nuclear disarmament and the enhancing of international security are mutually reinforcing.

With regard to operative paragraph 3(d), its language weakens the call for States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and elevates the importance of moratoriums on nuclear tests. While such moratoriums are an important interim measure, they are by no means a substitute for the Treaty’s entry into force, which is as urgent today as it was when the Treaty was adopted.

Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.39, although Brazil has not adhered to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, my delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution. We did so because we acknowledge and respect the fact that a significant number of States have already subscribed to the Code as a practical step against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Moreover, Brazil shares the view that regional and international efforts to comprehensively prevent and curb the proliferation of ballistic-missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction are an important contribution to international peace and security. Brazil believes that the ability to build an effective and equitable international order depends essentially on building a solid international legal framework based on binding commitments. We

therefore expect that an initiative such as the Hague Code of Conduct could evolve and converge towards the negotiation of a legal instrument of universal reach, establishing clear obligations and rights for all States.

Ms. Mac Loughlin (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): Argentina abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.6, on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Argentina has a clear, permanent and unwavering commitment to disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in this case nuclear weapons. That is demonstrated by our membership in and active permanent support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and for our regional instrument for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

In that spirit, we participated in the negotiating process in the United Nations that led to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on 7 July 2017. Argentina has continued its analysis and evaluation of that text, which includes an assessment of the Treaty’s impact on the non-proliferation regime embodied in the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a broad sense. Naturally, since we have not yet signed the Treaty, we abstained in the voting on a text that makes a strong call for its signing and ratification. In today’s circumstances, Argentina believes that it is essential to sustain and strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation regime whose centrepiece is the NPT. It is with that in mind that Argentina will preside over the next Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

By the same token, the universalization and speedy entry into force of the CTBT remain tasks that deserve to be a top priority for the international community. The TPNW, and any other future instrument, should strengthen the NPT and avoid duplicating or creating parallel regimes on provisions that have already been consolidated and firmly accepted in the framework of the NPT, particularly with regard to verification and the nuclear safeguards regime administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Argentina will always be firmly in favour of nuclear disarmament, which is an objective shared by all and an unequivocal commitment reaffirmed by all the States parties to the NPT.

Argentina voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71 and fully shares the spirit and purpose of the draft resolution. However, we would like to note our preference for maintaining the original language of the fourth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 3(d) as an unwavering commitment to our undertakings in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Mr. Alnahdi (Saudi Arabia) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to reiterate my delegation's support to you, Mr. Chair, for managing the work of the First Committee in this session, which has been quite brief and comprehensive considering the restrictions imposed due to the coronavirus disease pandemic.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, entitled "Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons", my country abstained in the voting on it because it took no note of a cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament regime, the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East pursuant to the indefinite extension package agreed to at the 1995 Extension and Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the outcomes of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. Our delegation therefore believes that this draft resolution is not comprehensive, as was originally envisaged. We look forward to working with the friendly countries that will be sponsoring the draft resolution in future sessions with a view to tackling the issue.

Mr. Mabhongo (South Africa): South Africa is of the view that draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, "Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons", has the potential to have a negative impact on the consensus commitments previously agreed on at the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as efforts to achieve a speedy entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In particular, the wording "unequivocal undertaking" is missing from the draft. South Africa has always maintained that the Review Conference outcomes of 1995, 2000 and 2010 should not be reinterpreted in a manner that is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Furthermore, we have consistently encouraged the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones in all areas where they do not yet exist. The inclusion of certain phrases in the draft opens the way to excluding some areas. Nuclear disarmament

implies that the whole world should ultimately become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The draft resolution by and large introduces preconditions for the implementation of already agreed decisions. For these reasons, South Africa abstained in the voting on it.

Mr. Syrymbet (Kazakhstan): The delegation of Kazakhstan voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71, entitled "Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons" and submitted by Japan, notwithstanding the fact that several of our proposals were not reflected in it. It has already been acknowledged that the substance of the draft resolution lacks concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament. While it makes reference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), my delegation is of the view that it does not focus adequately on the specific implications of article VI of the Treaty, which calls for nuclear disarmament. The draft resolution would carry more weight and impact if nuclear disarmament featured more prominently.

Furthermore, we firmly believe that there are two equally vital dimensions to nuclear weapons — their actual use and their testing. The latter can have equally, or even more, devastating consequences over a prolonged period, and history has shown that there has been nuclear testing in many regions of the globe. My delegation therefore strongly believes that the draft resolution should also call for greater efforts to be made to raise awareness of the realities and impact of nuclear-weapon testing. If we are to achieve that end, it is critical to ensure that those who have suffered as victims of nuclear-weapon testing not only transmit their experience to future generations but are also seen at the forefront of bans on such testing. My delegation would like to reiterate that those views have been voiced several times in Geneva, New York and our own capital, so it is somewhat disappointing that they have not been taken into consideration. We hope that Japan will take these and other related proposals into account next year and that we can collectively implement the NPT's mandate in full.

Mr. Izquierdo Ortiz de Zárate (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): Spain would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.10, entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty".

The entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba in 2009 was an important contribution to strengthening international peace and security, and of particular

significance for all African countries. For that reason, Spain has always unequivocally expressed its support for the Treaty's objectives and welcomed its entry into force. Having carefully studied the invitation to Spain to become a party to Protocol III of the Treaty, my Government decided not to sign it, after consulting with our Parliament, and taking into consideration the guidelines adopted by consensus in the Disarmament Commission in 1999 on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones under arrangements freely arrived at among the countries of the region concerned, a decision that was communicated at the time to the depositary of the Treaty. In that regard, I would like to highlight two points.

First, the Treaty of Pelindaba does not contain any provision, obligation, guarantee or safeguard in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that Spain has not already adopted for its entire national territory. By virtue of its membership in various international organizations, Spain has agreed to a series of obligations and safeguards under the European Atomic Energy Community and the safeguards agreement, supplemented by its additional protocol, that it has signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which go beyond those contained in the Treaty of Pelindaba and with which Spain complies.

Secondly, Spain's entire territory has been denuclearized militarily since 1976. The prohibition on introducing, installing or storing nuclear weapons anywhere on Spanish territory was re-emphasized by Parliament when Spain joined NATO in 1981 and was approved in a consultative referendum in March 1986. Consequently, Spain has already taken all the necessary measures to ensure that the contents of the Treaty of Pelindaba are applied throughout its national territory.

Spain has joined the consensus on this First Committee resolution since it was first submitted in 1997. However, the Spanish delegation does not consider itself associated with the consensus on operative paragraph 5. Accordingly, it has been working with other delegations to find more balanced wording that is acceptable to all parties and hopes that the discussions on this draft resolution can produce satisfactory results at future sessions. The full version of this statement will be included in the compendium.

The Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): We have heard from the last speaker in explanation of vote on cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons".

The Committee will now take up the draft resolutions and decisions under cluster 2, "Other weapons of mass destruction", contained in document A/C.1/75/INF/1/Rev.4.

I shall now give the floor to delegations wishing either to make general statements or to introduce new or revised drafts under cluster 2, and I would like to remind speakers that these statements are limited to three minutes. Once again, I also appeal to delegations to consider submitting a written statement.

I give the floor to the representative of Poland to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29.

Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I am taking the floor to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29, on "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction".

Since it was first adopted, the resolution has greatly contributed to international peace and security and to enhancing the chemical non-proliferation regime based on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and its implementing body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Regrettably, the resolution's consensual character has been undermined in recent years by the increasingly polarized positions on the subject. This year we are working in a context that is more demanding than ever, in which we are seeing the continued confirmed use of chemical weapons. Even in recent months, the bedrock of the CWC, which is the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, has been fundamentally challenged, calling into question the Convention's integrity and the OPCW's credibility. In that context, we have to defend the Convention and reinforce our key message to all who use chemical weapons that we will not tolerate such unacceptable acts and that those responsible will be held to account. Poland strongly believes that in the current situation it is crucial to ensure that the international community conveys a strong message of support for the implementation of every pillar of the CWC and the efforts of the OPCW's Director-General and Technical Secretariat.

The draft resolution refers to such critical issues as universality, progress in destroying declared chemical-weapon stockpiles, national implementation, verification, the risk posed by the threat of use of chemical weapons by non-State actors, including terrorists, and international cooperation. While

retaining the text's structure and balance, this year we have succeeded in enhancing some provisions in that regard. The draft resolution must not be silent on the key challenges to the Convention. It comments on the use of a toxic chemical as a weapon against Alexei Navalny, with reference to the OPCW technical report on the case. It also refers to the implementation of the 2018 decision of the Conference of States Parties to the CWC in addressing the threat of chemical-weapon use, as well as the worrisome conclusions of the first report of the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team and the actions taken in that regard by the OPCW Executive Council in July.

Building a common understanding on these issues proved to be extremely challenging. Poland has done its utmost to address them in a balanced and adequate manner, taking into account the work of the OPCW and various, sometimes very divergent, suggestions made during the consultations. The end product before the Committee is the result of an open, inclusive and transparent process. I want to express our gratitude to all delegations, in Geneva and The Hague as well as New York, for contributing to the discussion in the unique circumstances caused by the coronavirus disease pandemic. I would like to conclude with a strong call to all Member States in this room to take a positive stance on the draft resolution.

The Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1.

Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Our position on the issues of disarmament and the non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons will be laid out in detail in the compendium.

I would like to discuss our key initiative in this area during the seventy-fifth session. We have submitted a draft resolution entitled "Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons" (A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1). It is meant to affirm the fundamental character of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) with regard to the investigation of cases of the alleged use of chemical or biological weapons and to update the principles and procedures of the Secretary-General's Mechanism, which have not been updated since their adoption through resolution 45/57, of 1990. They have clearly become obsolete and do not reflect current

realities in the area of chemical and biological security, whether from a technical, political or diplomatic standpoint. Furthermore, the document does not regulate the coordination between the Secretary-General and Member States in the preparation and conduct of investigations or outline the basic parameters that would enable an incident to be classified as involving the deliberate use of chemical or biological weapons, which results in inaccuracies in preparing reports on the results of investigations.

In accordance with the understandings reflected in the outcome documents of the 2006, 2011 and 2016 BWC Review Conferences, it is essential to state unequivocally that the use of biological weapons is effectively banned under article I of the BWC and that where necessary the updated principles and procedures of the Secretary-General's Mechanism should consider the possibility of enabling the Security Council to request that the Secretary-General conduct an investigation into cases of the alleged use of such weapons.

The draft resolution recommends that Member States assess the effectiveness of the Secretary-General's Mechanism and its implementation of the guiding principles and procedures contained in appendix I to the Secretary-General's 1989 report (A/44/561), examine the Mechanism's practical role for States parties to the CWC and BWC, identify the provisions of the guiding principles and procedures that might need updating and share their ideas and proposals for any changes needed to that end. The adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1, which takes into account the considerations of other Member States, would launch important collaborative efforts that will enable us to strengthen and improve the Secretary-General's Mechanism. We call on Member States to support it.

The Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): There are no other delegations wishing to make general statements, and therefore before the Committee proceeds to take action on the draft resolutions and decisions under cluster 2, I will give the floor to Member States wishing to speak in explanation of vote or position before voting or adoption.

Mrs. Castro Loreda (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The delegation of Cuba would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29, "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

We reiterate Cuba’s full commitment to the effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the Convention. Cuba does not possess, nor does it intend to possess, chemical weapons. We categorically reject the use of such weapons and call for the complete, irreversible and verified destruction of all categories of chemical weapons. While Cuba shares the overall objective of this draft resolution and is fully committed to the Convention, we unfortunately will not be able to support the resolution this year either. Cuba will again abstain in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole and on the sixth preambular paragraph and will vote against operative paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 17. We should point out that this is the only text that the Committee has for considering the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and it is therefore essential that we continue working to restore the draft resolution’s traditional balance and return to the practice of adopting it by consensus.

With regard to operative paragraphs 2 and 3, we consider it impermissible to single out a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention for using such weapons without an independent, impartial, thorough and corroborative investigation by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) based on credible evidence and samples taken in the field in full compliance with the Convention.

Concerning operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 17, we believe that issues that do not enjoy consensus in the OPCW and have not been endorsed by the Security Council should not be transferred to the Committee’s discussions. The First Committee is not mandated to support or take action on the results of reports submitted to the Security Council that are not supported by thorough investigations on the ground.

The decision adopted at the fourth special session of the Conference of States Parties to the CWC in 2018 was not supported by all its States parties. It goes beyond the prerogatives granted to the OPCW Technical Secretariat in the letter of the Convention and attempts to modify the Organization’s technical mandate. We reject the creation of hasty, non-consensus mechanisms that do not take into account the views of States parties and that set very negative precedents against States parties. The draft resolution continues to ignore the cooperation that the Syrian Government has shown in

destroying all of its chemical weapons and production facilities despite the complex security situation facing the country. The outstanding technical issues with Syria’s declaration should be resolved within the framework of the OPCW without politicized or biased approaches and in line with established procedures. We must overcome the confrontation and politicization undermining the spirit of cooperation in dealing with the issue of chemical weapons.

Mr. Asokan (India): I am taking the floor to explain our position on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29.

India has always supported this resolution, given how important we consider the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and all its provisions are in addressing concerns about the alleged use of chemical weapons, and we will support it this year as well. India has always maintained that any use of chemical weapons shows complete disregard for the welfare of humankind and is reprehensible and contrary to the provisions of the CWC and accepted international norms. India is against the use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anybody under any circumstances. The perpetrators of such abhorrent acts must be held accountable. India attaches great importance to upholding the integrity of the CWC and avoiding any politicization of the issues. As for any allegations of use and consequent measures in that regard, we believe that the provisions and procedures laid down in the Convention should be strictly adhered to by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and that concerns should be addressed on a basis of cooperation among all the parties concerned.

This resolution has traditionally enjoyed consensus support. However, it is regrettable that the consensus has been negatively affected by the inclusion of some contentious issues in the operative section of the draft resolution. We hope that this will change for the better in the future.

Mr. Knight (United States of America): I am taking the floor to provide an explanation of vote before the vote on A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1, on the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

Like almost every Member State represented in this room, the United States greatly values the preservation of the integrity and independence of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for investigating alleged uses of chemical, biological or toxin weapons. That is why my

Government can only view Russia's efforts to pursue this draft resolution as deeply regrettable. From the beginning, it has been clear that Russia's intention is not to strengthen the Mechanism but to undermine it — and by extension the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons — whether by trying to place the Mechanism under the authority of the Security Council, where Moscow could veto any investigation, or by casting doubt on its guidelines and procedures by pushing an unnecessary and wasteful review process that would seize responsibilities long ago assigned to the Secretary-General and place them in an overtly political framework designed to end in gridlock.

Fortunately, delegations from all regions refused to accept Russia's blatant attack on this vital tool for enhancing international peace and security by persistently raising questions and concerns, so that many, though not all, of the damaging elements in this draft resolution were removed or rendered ineffective. Nevertheless, the draft resolution remains deeply flawed. It continues to send a confusing message about the proposed role of the Security Council. Even after the conclusion of formal consultations, the Russian delegation added deeply troubling language to operative paragraph 4 that clearly implies that any State party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) wishing to report the possible use of biological weapons to the Secretary-General must go through the Security Council. That would of course be contrary to the very purpose of the Mechanism, which is to enable any Member State to seek an investigation. There has never been a requirement for the Security Council to approve an investigation by the Mechanism and there never ought to be.

Then there is Russia's addition of deliberately divisive language calling for a resumption of negotiations on a BWC verification protocol in the eighth preambular paragraph. The United States understands and respects that Governments hold different views about the merits and viability of the BWC verification protocol, but this language has no place in this draft resolution. Russia incorporated the text, which is not relevant to the Mechanism, knowing that it would make consensus on the draft resolution impossible. Furthermore, it is the prerogative of BWC States parties, not the General Assembly, to act on the Convention. Indeed, the language ignores many other constructive ideas and proposals put forward by

BWC States parties that have a far greater chance of achieving consensus.

For those reasons, the United States will vote against this draft resolution, and we strongly encourage other delegations that value the maintenance of a strong, independent Mechanism to do likewise.

Mr. Balouji (Iran): I am taking the floor to explain my delegation's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29, on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

It is essential to preserve the CWC's effectiveness and its implementing institution, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and this draft resolution is indeed expected to serve that purpose. However, it is unfortunately being used for political ends rather than to contribute to the CWC's implementation. It is being used to highlight controversial issues and deepen divisions among States parties rather than moving them towards consensus. It contributes to further confrontation and polarization among States parties rather than uniting them around the main objectives of the CWC. The Islamic Republic of Iran condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. However, it is not acceptable to condemn a State party to the Convention that has cooperated with the OPCW in destroying its chemical stockpiles in as short a time as possible, because that condemnation is based on unproven assumptions and unsubstantiated claims.

My delegation will vote against this draft resolution, as a number of its paragraphs are highly politicized. In an effort to revive the previous consensus on the resolution, Iran and a group of countries offered constructive suggestions based on the language agreed by the CWC and OPCW. Unfortunately, as in previous years, none of them are reflected in the draft resolution.

Mrs. Jakob (Germany): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the member States of the European Union (EU). The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this explanation of vote.

I am taking the floor to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1, entitled "Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons". We are not in

a position to support it. The EU member States fully support the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) as key pillars of the international rules-based system, as well as the Secretary-General's Mechanism as a key component of the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. The EU also stands fully behind the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

We noted with concern the Russian Federation's proposal for a resolution calling for a review of the guidelines and procedures of the Secretary-General's Mechanism. It must be emphasized that the Mechanism is an independent instrument separate from the BWC, with a different mandate and different membership. The Secretary-General decides, per agreed guidelines and procedures, whether to launch an investigation. Separate approval from the Security Council is not needed. The independence of the Mechanism is a crucial guarantee to Member States that if they request an investigation into the alleged use of chemical or biological weapons, the launch of the investigation cannot be blocked by another Member State for political motives. That independence should not be called into question, even indirectly.

The Mechanism is based on the mandate given to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly and endorsed by the Security Council. Yet operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft resolution under discussion constitute a very clear and specific threat to the Mechanism's independence. When read together, they fundamentally change the way that the Mechanism functions by subordinating it to the Security Council. It is not acceptable to require that any report of the alleged use of biological weapons brought to the attention of the Secretary-General by any State party to the BWC be exclusively considered and addressed in the framework of the BWC — in other words, require that it be submitted to the Security Council, which would request the Secretary-General to launch an investigation if it deemed it necessary.

The EU considers this draft resolution to be politically motivated and counterproductive. We cannot support a draft resolution that seeks to undermine the independence of the Secretary-General's Mechanism by weakening the mandate given to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly and endorsed in Security Council resolution 620 (1988).

The Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like to inform the Committee that the interpreters have requested that we allow them a little more time in order to enable them to do their work correctly.

Mr. Hassan (Egypt): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29.

Egypt actively participated in the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention and has always strongly supported its objectives in line with our firm stance against all weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). We also continue to actively support and contribute to the international efforts aiming at preventing non-State actors from acquiring WMDs, including through the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

Despite the shortcomings of this resolution, my delegation has voted in favour of its previous versions for several years, in a reiteration of Egypt's principled position in support of the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and firm condemnation of any use of such weapons by any party and under any circumstances. However, we are once again not in a position to support the current draft, at a time when many of its main proponents continue to refrain from supporting any effort towards nuclear disarmament, including the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. States that themselves depend directly or indirectly on nuclear deterrence, and that strongly resist any genuine effort to eliminate such weapons based on arguments related to so-called strategic stability or the international security environment, are simply not in a position to preach about the elimination of other WMDs. We stress that human values and moral standards are indivisible and that the security of some States is not more important than that of others.

Moreover, while we continue to condemn in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons by any party, under any circumstances, my delegation is once again not in a position to make an informed decision in support of the several paragraphs that the recent versions of this resolution contain on country-specific incidents and the work and investigations of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Finally, we want to reiterate that serious efforts to implement the General Assembly's 1995 resolution 50/66, on the establishment of a zone free of WMDs in the Middle East, could have saved the region and the

world from the horrors of the incidents involving the actual use of chemical weapons that the region has seen in recent years.

Mr. Masmajan (Switzerland): I am taking the floor on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom and my own country, Switzerland, to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1, entitled “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”. Our countries will vote against the resolution as a whole, as well as separately against operative paragraphs 3, 4, 8 and 9. We will abstain in or vote against the eighth preambular paragraph.

Our delegations are concerned about the erosion of key disarmament instruments in recent years. We believe that this draft resolution could contribute to that trend and in effect weaken the Secretary-General’s Mechanism. The Mechanism is the only internationally agreed means of investigating allegations of the use of biological weapons and serves a valuable function in the area of chemical weapons, where it supports the important work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in its General Assembly mandated instrument, which is functional and has proven its value, for example in the context of the mission to Syria in 2013. The Mechanism is technical and non-political in nature and was designed to meet those requirements. The draft resolution would not achieve its stated aim of strengthening the Mechanism but would in fact be counterproductive, as it risks calling into question the Mechanism’s very nature and the careful balance on which it is built.

The draft resolution’s operative paragraphs 3, 4, 8 and 9 are particularly problematic. Paragraphs 3 and 4 call into question the Mechanism’s independence, fundamentally modifying its mode of operation by subordinating it to the Security Council. These paragraphs require that any report on the alleged use of biological weapons brought to the attention of the Secretary-General by a State party to the Biological Weapons Convention be considered exclusively within the framework of the Convention, which means that they must be submitted to the Security Council. These paragraphs overturn General Assembly resolution 42/37 C, which established the Mechanism, and contradict agreed guidelines and procedures providing that it is up to the Secretary-General to decide whether to launch an investigation. Separate Security Council approval is not required. In addition, operative paragraphs 8 and

9 undermine the Mechanism’s proper functioning and thus its legitimacy. They also call into question the established process for updating the guidelines and procedures. More broadly, they modify the principle of independence on which the Mechanism rests and risk politicizing it. All in all, the Mechanism is a valuable tool whose independence must be protected and not diminished. For those reasons our delegations do not support this draft resolution.

Mrs. Nadeau (Canada) (*spoke in French*): I am taking the floor to explain Canada’s vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1, “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”.

The draft resolution is based on the false premise that the rules and procedures of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism are in need of review and have never been revised. In fact, the Secretary-General’s Mechanism was reviewed in 2006 pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/288, and the appendices to document A/44/561 were updated in 2007 because only that section was deemed to be in need of revision at the time.

(*spoke in English*)

The draft resolution suggests that there is scope for Security Council oversight of the Secretary-General’s application of the Mechanism. In fact, the Mechanism is completely autonomous, and the Secretary-General does not require a Security Council request or authorization to initiate an investigation. We are concerned about the possibility that as a result of this draft resolution’s misinterpretation of the functioning of the Mechanism, an unjustified expansion of the remit of the Security Council is being proposed, which in effect would interfere in the Secretary-General’s direction of the Mechanism, including when to review its procedures and regulations. The Mechanism offers a critical means for investigating possible uses of chemical or biological weapons. It has worked well, for example in the case of the investigation into the use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus in 2013, and it must be allowed to continue to function independently. For those reasons, we will vote against the draft resolution.

Mr. Lynch (New Zealand): It is with regret that New Zealand is obliged to vote against draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1, “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”, as well as its separate paragraph votes.

New Zealand remains a strong supporter of the Secretary-General's Mechanism and the essential complement it provides to the Chemical Weapons Convention and especially to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). A negative vote on this draft resolution does not reflect any shift in our position on the Mechanism but rather our concern that it is being politicized as part of an effort to undermine the existing international framework governing chemical weapons. Nor does our negative vote, including on the eighth preambular paragraph, signal any shift in New Zealand's ongoing support for the addition of verification measures to the BWC. We recognize that investigations into allegations of the use of biological and toxin weapons are not analogous to those relating to chemical weapons, given the absence of an investigative or verification body within the BWC. It is in this area that the Mechanism's effective operation is particularly important. We do not feel that any of the operative paragraphs bearing on the Mechanism are helpful in that regard.

New Zealand is also concerned about the fact that the draft resolution puts undue emphasis on the role of the Security Council in responding to allegations of the potential use of biological and toxin weapons. It is unclear to us why, in a resolution purportedly focused on the Secretary-General's Mechanism, the text focuses instead on the standing invitation issued to the Security Council by States parties to the BWC. The Mechanism must remain a tool that can be utilized by any Member State of the General Assembly. New Zealand opposes any suggestion that this important means of investigating a possible breach of international law could become a tool of the Security Council or caught up in efforts to politicize it.

Mr. Dandy (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): I requested the floor in order to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29.

The Syrian Arab Republic condemns in the strongest terms any use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, by any party, under any circumstances or anywhere. We emphasize that Syria has never used and will never use chemical weapons because we do not possess them in the first place. We joined the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013 and have fulfilled our obligations resulting from that accession despite the difficult situation that the country currently finds itself in and the enormous challenges posed by acts of terrorism, occupation, aggression,

theft and plunder. We want to point out that in June 2014 Sigrid Kaag, then Special Coordinator of the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations, stated in her report to the Security Council (see S/2014/444) that the Syrian Arab Republic had fulfilled all its obligations and that all of its stockpiles of these weapons were eliminated on vessels of the United States and others. That was also stressed by the OPCW, which directly supervised the elimination of those stockpiles.

Syria is continuing to cooperate with the OPCW Technical Secretariat and Declaration Assessment Team in order to settle the outstanding issues, which have been discussed at length. However, despite that cooperation, Syria has been a constant political target of Western countries, which have promoted illegitimate mechanisms such as the Investigation and Identification Team, established in violation of the law and the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and through the United States Administration's introduction of a draft resolution in the Security Council aimed at imposing lies by exerting pressure and launching threats, once again exposing the double standards that that Administration applies.

Syria has sent more than 200 letters to the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee, providing accurate information about terrorist groups possessing toxic chemical materials that have been used against civilians and the military supported by known Governments, States and their intelligence services. Syria will therefore vote against this draft resolution, because it is politicized and insincere.

The Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote or position before the voting. We will now proceed to take action on the draft resolutions and decisions under cluster 2, "Other weapons of mass destruction".

(*spoke in English*)

The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.18, entitled "Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.18 was submitted on 5 October by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the

States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/75/L.18.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Central African Republic, Israel, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.18 was adopted by 179 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29 was submitted on 7 October by the representative of Poland. The sponsor of the draft resolution is listed in document A/C.1/75/L.29.

The Chair: Separate, recorded votes have been requested on the sixth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 17.

I shall first put to the vote the sixth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,

Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Belarus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Zimbabwe

Abstaining:

Algeria, Armenia, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Cuba, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Namibia, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

The sixth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29 was retained by 132 votes to 7, with 26 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Bangladesh informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.]

The Chair: I shall next put to the vote operative paragraph 2.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,

Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zambia

Against:

Armenia, Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Dominica, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe

Abstaining:

Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen

Operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29 was retained by 95 votes to 15, with 55 abstentions.

The Chair: I shall next put to the vote operative paragraph 3.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain,

Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Dominica, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe

Abstaining:

Algeria, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Burundi, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Myanmar, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

Operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29 was retained by 114 votes to 12, with 34 abstentions.

The Chair: I shall next put to the vote operative paragraph 4.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen

Against:

Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zambia, Zimbabwe

Abstaining:

Algeria, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Burundi, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Eritrea, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Myanmar, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

Operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29 was retained by 115 votes to 11, with 34 abstentions.

The Chair: I shall next put to the vote operative paragraph 5.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen

Against:

Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Abstaining:

Algeria, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq,

Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uzbekistan

Operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29 was retained by 114 votes to 16, with 31 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Bangladesh informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.]

The Chair: I shall next put to the vote operative paragraph 17.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen

Against:

Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of),

Myanmar, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zambia, Zimbabwe

Abstaining:

Algeria, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

Operative paragraph 17 of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29 was retained by 111 votes to 12, with 38 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Bangladesh informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.]

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29, as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia,

Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Cambodia, China, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe

Abstaining:

Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Burundi, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Eritrea, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Myanmar, Rwanda, Samoa, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Uganda, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29, as a whole, was adopted by 146 votes to 8, with 26 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.35, entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.35 was submitted by the representative of India on 9 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/75/L.35. Kiribati, Madagascar, Malawi and Zambia have also become sponsors.

The Chair: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.35 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.52, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.52 was submitted by the representative of Hungary on 13 October. The sponsor of the draft resolution is listed in document A/C.1/75/L.52.

The Chair: The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.52 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1, entitled “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65 was submitted on 15 October by the representative of the Russian Federation. Subsequently, a revised draft resolution was submitted on 22 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1.

The Chair: Separate, recorded votes have been requested on the eighth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 3, 4, 8 and 9.

I shall first put to the vote the eighth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Burundi, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines,

Russian Federation, Samoa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Belize, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Eswatini, Fiji, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

The eighth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1 was rejected by 43 votes to 38, with 67 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Samoa informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.]

The Chair: I shall next put to the vote operative paragraph 3.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malawi, Mozambique,

Myanmar, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Samoa, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belize, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eswatini, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Yemen

Operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1 was rejected by 55 votes to 28, with 65 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Indonesia informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour; the delegation of Samoa that it had intended to abstain.]

The Chair: I shall next put to the vote operative paragraph 4.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malawi, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Samoa, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eswatini, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Yemen

Operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1 was rejected by 60 votes to 30, with 59 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Indonesia informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour; the delegation of Samoa that it had intended to abstain.]

The Chair: I shall next put to the vote operative paragraph 8.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eswatini, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and

Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Yemen

Operative paragraph 8 of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1 was rejected by 60 votes to 29, with 58 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Malaysia informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

The Chair: I shall next put to the vote operative paragraph 9.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eswatini, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal,

Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Yemen

Operative paragraph 9 of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1 was rejected by 58 votes to 32, with 56 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1 as a whole, as amended. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malawi, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tonga, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,

Ecuador, Egypt, Eswatini, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Yemen

Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1, as a whole, as amended, was rejected by 63 votes to 31, with 67 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.68, entitled "Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.68 was submitted on 15 October by the representatives of France and Germany. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/75/L.68. Mali has also become a sponsor.

The Chair: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.68 was adopted.

The Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): I now call on delegations wishing to explain their vote or position after the voting. I would like to remind the Committee that these statements are limited to three minutes.

Mr. Mohd Nasir (Malaysia): Malaysia voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29, on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as a whole, while abstaining on operative paragraphs 2, 3, 5 and 17 of the text.

Malaysia condemns in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances. The use of such weapons is abhorrent and a flagrant violation of international law and the Chemical Weapons Convention in particular. Those responsible for deploying such weapons must be held accountable. Malaysia is committed to the full,

effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the CWC. The CWC's compliance and verification provisions are significant achievements of multilateral disarmament negotiations.

Malaysia supports the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as the sole organization mandated to undertake investigations of the use of chemical weapons. Malaysia is of the view that all parties concerned should cooperate with the OPCW to ensure the impartial and thorough investigation of any incidents. Malaysia takes note of the decision adopted at the special session of the Conference of States Parties on 27 June 2013 to empower the OPCW through an attribution mandate. However, it is imperative that every decision and action within the OPCW be taken in accordance with the provisions of the CWC and the parameters it lays out. Malaysia therefore reiterates the importance of protecting the OPCW, a respected technical organization, from extraneous influences in the conduct of its work. On that basis, Malaysia abstained in the voting on operative paragraphs 2, 3, 5 and 17 of the draft resolution, while voting in favour of the text as a whole.

Mr. Asokan (India): We acknowledge the Russian Federation's efforts in submitting draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1.

India, as a State party, attaches enormous importance to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and all their provisions. India has maintained that any alleged use of chemical or biological weapons should be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the CWC and BWC. The CWC has a comprehensive verification regime and detailed provisions to deal with any alleged use of chemical weapons. As for the BWC, India has called for the negotiation of a comprehensive, legally binding protocol providing for an effective, universal and non-discriminatory verification mechanism. India has always supported upholding the integrity of those Conventions and dealing with specific instances according to their provisions. We have underlined that any amendments to their provisions should be carried out in keeping with the process duly laid out in them.

India was constrained to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution, as we believe that matters

relating to the alleged use of chemical or biological weapons should be addressed within the framework of the respective Conventions, which the CWC already provides for. We reiterate our call for negotiating a verification protocol for the BWC, which in our view is the only way to strengthen the norm and verification process against the use of biological weapons.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.52, India attaches high importance to the BWC as the first global and non-discriminatory disarmament convention prohibiting an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. We emphasize that the financial stability of the Convention is essential to its full and effective implementation and urge all States parties to make their annual assessed contributions in full and on time.

Concerning the BWC's Working Capital Fund, India maintains that such funds should be established through assessed contributions from States parties, not voluntary contributions. A similar fund has been established for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, using assessed contributions. Furthermore, our view is that the BWC's budget should be supported through contributions from States parties, not non-State entities. We look forward to the review of the decision on the establishment of the Working Capital Fund at the ninth BWC Review Conference, scheduled to take place next year.

Ms. Jáquez Huacuja (Mexico) (spoke in Spanish): We are grateful to the Russian Federation for the multiple consultations on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1 and its willingness to amend the draft several times. However, we regret that neither the draft's scope or its possible implications for various forums and processes, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in Geneva, or the relationship between the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the event of an investigation of the use of such inhumane weapons, was made fully clear.

Mexico wishes to reiterate that we condemn in the strictest terms the use of chemical or biological weapons by any actor in any circumstances. We remain committed to the implementation and universalization of the Conventions on chemical and biological weapons, and especially to strengthening the latter through a verification protocol, to the work of the OPCW and to

the independence and effectiveness of the Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigating the use of such weapons.

Mr. Balouji (Iran): We support and voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1, which contains among other things specific positive paragraphs condemning any use of toxic chemicals, biological agents or toxins as weapons, urging all States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention to fully comply with all their obligations as a matter of priority, and last but not least, encouraging Member States to assess the effectiveness of the Secretary-General's Mechanism while taking into account the relevant provisions of the Conventions.

In the meantime, the world has consistently witnessed the Security Council and the Secretariat being abused by the United States and Western countries. We abstained in the voting on operative paragraph 3 because from our point of view, involving the Security Council in the Secretary-General's reports on the possible use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons could jeopardize the necessary independence and impartiality of the Secretary-General's Mechanism. Furthermore, as long as the Secretary-General's Mechanism remains very dependent on the financial contributions of some Western countries, and as long as the United States continues to assert its influence over the functioning of the Secretariat and makes every attempt to instrumentalize the Security Council and the Secretariat in order to realize its destructive policies, it is hard to believe that the Mechanism can remain independent and impartial. It is our belief that the BWC envisages a scenario in which Member States decide how to handle any Convention-related issues, and it would therefore not be appropriate to utilize the Secretary-General's Mechanism.

On A/C.1/75/L.68, our position, as expressed in the past, remains valid.

Mr. Knight (United States of America): I am delivering an explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29, "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction", on behalf of Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,

Malta, Montenegro, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and my own country, the United States. Due to the time limitations, I will be brief, but we will submit the full version of our statement in writing.

Our countries voted in favour of this draft resolution, as we believe it reflects the objectives and goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and in particular reinforces the aim in its preamble, which is to "exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons". Despite the continued use of chemical weapons by some, in contravention of international norms, it is the many who have associated their countries with this statement who remain steadfast in defending and preserving the Convention and holding accountable those who defy it. The draft resolution rightly highlights the extraordinary work done by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) rather than undermining it, while others sow disinformation about the Organization's mandate and manoeuvre to weaken its framework. We remain fully confident in the OPCW's well-established investigative expertise, techniques and analysis, and express our deepest appreciation to the brave women and men of the OPCW for their dedication and professionalism in investigating chemical-weapon attacks in Syria and their efforts to assist other States parties when called on to do so.

This draft resolution rightly highlights the grave concerns about the use of chemical weapons in Syria, Malaysia, Iraq and the United Kingdom and, most recently, the poisoning in Russia of the Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny. In the simplest terms, the Al-Assad regime must cease the use of chemical weapons, provide a complete and accurate declaration and verifiably eliminate the entirety of its chemical-weapon programme in accordance with the CWC and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Similarly, we call on Russia to provide a full accounting of the poisoning of Mr. Navalny with a Novichok agent on Russian territory.

Such disrespect for international norms and agreements undermines global objectives in the areas of international security, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. Any effort to ignore such serious issues or claim that they are too controversial even to include in a draft resolution is irresponsible and undermines the work that we have advanced to date. We

must continue to collectively condemn in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons by any State or non-State actor and to hold all who would use such weapons accountable. In that regard, we commend the commitments made by participating States of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons and invite others to join.

Mr. Khaldi (Algeria): My delegation has asked for the floor to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1, entitled “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”. My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, along with its separate paragraphs, in view of its objective of further strengthening the Secretary-General’s Mechanism, which is an important element in our efforts to protect humankind from chemical and biological warfare.

Based on our unwavering commitment to realizing international disarmament objectives, and as a State party to the main international instruments concerning weapons of mass destruction, Algeria remains strongly committed to joining collective international efforts to preserve and reinforce in a balanced and comprehensive manner the technical guidelines and procedures laid out in appendix 1 of document A/44/561. In that regard, we reiterate the importance of strengthening the current international legal framework, including the Biological Weapons Convention, by resuming multilateral negotiations to conclude a non-discriminatory, legally binding instrument on verification. However, Algeria wishes to stress its attachment to the independent nature of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism and to the list provided by Member States of qualified experts whose services could be made available at short notice to undertake such investigations and laboratories that could contribute to that end.

Mr. Yakut (Turkey): I am taking the floor to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”. My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution, including the paragraphs put to a separate vote, based on Turkey’s principled position on and firm support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which plays an essential role in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

Turkey reiterates that the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and in any circumstances is a crime against humanity. We condemn in the strongest terms the incidents of the use of chemical weapons that have re-emerged in various parts of the world. The case of Syria remains particularly worrisome in that regard. The updates in the current draft resolution effectively capture the latest evidence of the Syrian regime’s non-compliance with its obligations under the CWC. The reference to the Investigation and Identification Team report of 8 April 2020 is particularly important, as it is the latest in a sequence of scientific studies that establish the Syrian regime’s culpability in the use of chemical weapons against its own population in Ltamenah in March 2017. We also welcome the reference in the draft resolution to the important decision of 9 July 2020 of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), on addressing Syria’s possession and use of chemical weapons, which was a crucial step forward in addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. In that context, we want to express our grave concern about the Syrian regime’s failure to implement the decision, as was also noted in the report of the OPCW’s Director-General dated 14 October 2020. Turkey looks forward to further measures, particularly at the next session of the Conference of States Parties, to address the failure of the Syrian regime to declare and destroy all of its chemical weapons and chemical-weapon production facilities in a fully verifiable manner.

However, we would like to see stronger wording in the draft resolution that specifically condemns those who have used chemical weapons, particularly the Syrian regime, which is responsible for repeatedly using chemical weapons against its own people, as has been well documented. Similarly, the draft resolution would be better equipped if it referred to the ongoing cooperation between the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, which would have significantly encouraged the ongoing efforts to combat impunity for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Finally, the resolution should also urge the Syrian regime to cooperate with the various OPCW entities, especially the Investigation and Identification Team.

We would like to take this opportunity to commend the OPCW Technical Secretariat for its impartial and objective stance, as well as its professionalism in

investigating chemical-weapon attacks in Syria and other places. Its endeavours are invaluable in ensuring accountability and combat impunity. In that context, we are deeply concerned about the ongoing efforts to discredit the OPCW and its staff based on political motives. Turkey will continue to support all steps taken by the international community, and first and foremost the United Nations and OPCW, to ensure full accountability in Syria.

Mr. Leite Novaes (Brazil): Our delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.52, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction” (BWC).

As in previous years, Brazil joined the consensus on this important draft resolution, submitted by Hungary. However, as Brazil understands that some provisions of the text, particularly operative paragraph 12, may give rise to different interpretations, we reserve the right to explain our position. Brazil understands the Working Capital Fund as being an interim measure. The possibility of its extension, as well as the rules governing its operation, should be reviewed at the Ninth Review Conference of the BWC, as recognized by the General Assembly in resolution 74/79. The same understanding applies to paragraph 23 of the final document of the 2019 Meeting of States Parties, which is only partially reproduced in operative paragraph 12 of the draft resolution.

Ms. Mac Loughlin (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): Argentina abstained in the voting on draft A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1 because we consider that any decision that could affect the Secretary-General’s Mechanism should be based on the broadest possible political agreement and should preserve the Mechanism’s full independence. Furthermore, as far as biological weapons are concerned, it is advisable to wait for the Review Conference to be held next year, thus avoiding duplication of discussion scenarios.

Argentina has an unequivocal commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation policies. As a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, Argentina calls for compliance with their provisions. We recognize the need for cooperation between the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations in the event of an investigation of alleged use

when it involves a country not party to the Convention or when the alleged use of such weapons takes place in a territory not controlled by a State party to the Convention. Pursuant to the mandate given by the General Assembly and the Security Council, that enabled the Secretary-General to establish a mission in March 2013 to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria whose final report was submitted in December of that year.

With regard to biological weapons, and in the absence of a verification mechanism for investigations under the Biological Weapons Convention, the Secretary-General’s Mechanism represents an essential tool for action in cases of the alleged use of such weapons. In that regard, Argentina believes it is vital to improve the Convention’s relevance by strengthening mechanisms to monitor compliance and implementation, while maintaining States parties’ legitimate right to pursue industrial, technological and scientific advances for peaceful purposes as well as promoting the periodic updating of the Convention’s recommendations based on advances in science and technology. With the Review Conference coming up in 2021, it will be essential to discuss those issues in depth.

Finally, it should be noted that based on the lessons learned in establishing the investigation mission to Syria, in 2016 the Secretary-General’s Mechanism rolled out a whole series of training courses for experts on the roster in Europe, Oceania and at United Nations Headquarters, and in 2019 in Europe and Asia. Members of the European Union have also contributed by preparing their laboratories to provide assistance to the Mechanism where needed. In February 2020, the Office for Disarmament Affairs expressed interest in promoting the Secretary-General’s Mechanism in Latin America in 2020, all of which reflects the intention to continually update and raise awareness of the Mechanism.

Mrs. Wang (Singapore): I am taking the floor to explain my delegation’s vote against draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1, entitled “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”.

Singapore is party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention and supports mechanisms for preventing the use of such weapons and investigating instances where the Conventions may have been breached. However, the

seriousness and complexity of the issue requires careful consideration by Member States. We regret that there was no time to have a full debate on ways to strengthen the Secretary-General's Mechanism, particularly in matters of international law and accountability. We should be careful not to rush to judgment. Further, Singapore notes that the Secretary-General's Mechanism was mandated by the General Assembly in resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987 and subsequently endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 620 (1988). We are not comfortable with language that might suggest a change to the respective prerogatives of the General Assembly and its Member States.

Singapore reiterates its full commitment to the international framework for addressing alleged uses of chemical and biological weapons. We will continue to support resolutions and initiatives that contribute to enhancing the effectiveness, independence and accountability of such mechanisms.

Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian delegation voted against draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29, submitted by Poland, regarding the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

In the past few years we have repeatedly advocated for restoring the previously consensus nature of the resolution on the Chemical Weapons Convention. We have emphasized that it is unacceptable to use it to demonize certain States and Governments and promote ideas harmful to the integrity of the CWC and the credibility of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, our efforts have always hit a wall of misunderstanding. Like many other States, the Russian Federation considers the decision of the fourth special session of the Conference of States Parties to the CWC that enabled the Technical Secretariat to exceed its remit in establishing the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) to be illegitimate. There can be no question that this innovation runs counter to the OPCW and undermines the exclusive prerogatives of the Security Council.

And time has proved us right. There can now be no doubt that the policies of Western States in this area are undermining the CWC and worsening the division in the OPCW. The United States and Euro-Atlantic allies have to all intents and purposes turned a specialized technical international entity into a tool for achieving their own geopolitical interests. The results of those

politicized approaches became evident in the first IIT report, which does not stand up to criticism with regard to its methodology or fact collection. That was followed by a decision that they knew was impossible for Syria to implement at the ninety-fourth session of the OPCW Executive Council. The Russian Federation cannot recognize the legitimacy of that report or the decisions of the OPCW based on it.

The addition to the draft resolution submitted by Poland of a paragraph referencing the incident with the Russian blogger Navalny is yet another illustration of the fact that this resolution has completely lost its original meaning and has become a tool for the West to translate its sanctions into aspirations. All actions by the West generally with regard to the Navalny situation lead us to the clear conclusion that this is yet another ill-intentioned provocation similar to the one that Britain launched against Russia based on the Skripal case. The model is very clear. The accusers first suggest that Russia's use of chemicals is "highly likely", in defiance of the facts, logic and common sense, after which they pretend that everything has already been demonstrated and we have to prove our own innocence.

However, in both the Skripal and Navalny cases, the Western countries have refused outright to cooperate with Russia or respond substantively to our requests for legal assistance. They invent excuses to conceal from us and the international community important information that they claim demonstrates that crimes have been committed. I would like to point out that during the general political discussion we asked Germany a number of specific questions regarding Alexei Navalny and requesting clarification. We received no response. Instead of a direct and honest answer, we are seeing accusations against Russia once again surreptitiously introduced into General Assembly draft resolutions. We see no reason to vote for this politicized document, which distorts reality.

Ms. Estrada Girón (Guatemala): The delegation of Guatemala would like to explain its vote against draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1, on the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

Guatemala supports the Secretary-General's Mechanism and believes that it is any Member State's right to bring to the Secretary-General's attention reports of possible uses of chemical, biological or toxin weapons that might constitute violations of the Geneva Protocol

or other relevant rules of customary international law. Guatemala also supports the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and all its bodies. We therefore voted against the draft resolution because we disagree with the language as presented and with the modalities outlined for reforming the Mechanism. Guatemala reaffirms its position against the use or threat of use of any weapon of mass destruction regardless of where, how or by whom it is carried out.

Mr. Dandy (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): The fallacious, hypocritical statement by the representative of the Turkish regime was full of strange accusations, allegations and lies against my country's Government. As usual, the Turkish regime is making a hopeless attempt to cover up its violations of international resolutions and accuse other countries of misdeeds. The Turkish regime violates all its international obligations, especially in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism.

We all know that the Turkish regime is deploying nuclear weapons on its territory, in gross violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is also violating the Chemical Weapons Convention and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) by providing toxic chemicals to the terrorist organizations Da'esh and the Al-Nusra Front, together with other affiliated terrorist groups. It allows terrorist organizations to test toxic chemical materials on its territory, especially in the city of Gaziantep. It transports terrorists to Syria and provides them with arms, equipment, ammunition and information. My delegation therefore requests that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism and the Security Council reveal the results of the investigations that we requested pertaining to the sarin that was found with 12 terrorists and seized on Turkish territory.

Mr. Fiallo Karolys (Ecuador) (*spoke in Spanish*): Ecuador is a firm supporter of the universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the full implementation of its provisions. I should point out that my country signed the Convention on 14 January 1993, that is, on the second day after it opened for signature. My country has never possessed chemical weapons and has repeatedly condemned their use by anyone, anywhere. For that reason, we voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.29, "Implementation of

the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction", as a sign of our continued adherence and support to that instrument. We would prefer, however, that the resolution not pre-emptively address issues until they have been dealt with in the appropriate setting, so as not to weaken the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons or the implementation of the Convention.

Turning now to draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1, entitled "Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons", Ecuador's vote in favour of the eighth preambular paragraph is exclusively based on our consistent position in support of strengthening verification mechanisms and measures. With regard to the Biological Weapons Convention, we continue to support working towards a legally binding instrument such as a protocol in order to establish an effective verification mechanism for that Convention. However, Ecuador abstained in the voting on operative paragraphs 3, 4, 8 and 9 and on the draft resolution as a whole, because we believe that they could potentially undermine the existing architecture rather than improve it. Ecuador will continue to defend, clearly and unequivocally, the full independence of the Secretary-General's Mechanism, in accordance with the mandate conferred on it by the General Assembly in resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987 and endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 620 (1988).

The Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote on cluster 2. I now call on those delegations that have requested to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Regrettably, today we once again heard the delegation of the United States make unfounded claims that Russia has violated the moratorium on nuclear tests. Yet in making those claims, the Americans themselves admit that they do not know either the number of those violations or any actual facts about them. I would like to underscore that we have done nothing that would violate our unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests or our ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Unlike the United States, we ratified the CTBT 20 years ago and have been voluntarily implementing it even though it has not entered into force, partly due to sabotage on the part of the United States. That is why accusations such as we heard today

are nothing more than an extremely unconvincing attempt to lay the blame at someone else's door. Everything suggests that our United States colleagues throw out such insinuations in order to distract attention from the CTBT. By refusing to ratify the Treaty, the United States has left the test-ban regime on the brink of collapse and lost the right to make any claims or accusations around the issue.

It is hard to shake the feeling that we are being prepared for a scenario where the voluntary moratorium currently still in force in the United States will be abandoned. We believe that is a very real possibility. We need only recall the similar disinformation campaign that the United States conducted during its unilateral exit from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. In that context, I would like to remind the Committee of the recent issuance by the United States of doctrinal documents and announcements of its plans to improve and expand its nuclear arsenal. Given that the United States is still the only State to have used nuclear weapons against a civilian population, 75 years ago, we believe that this is a real threat to humankind.

Mr. Yakut (Turkey): I am taking the floor to exercise my delegation's right of reply regarding the baseless allegations made against my country by the representative of the Syrian regime.

Turkey rejects the representative's delusional statement in its entirety. It is unacceptable that the Syrian regime, which long ago lost its legitimacy, continues to misuse the First Committee to distort facts. This is a desperate attempt to divert attention from the enormous destruction and human suffering that the regime has caused in Syria. The Syrian regime is responsible for the death, mutilation, abduction, starvation and enforced disappearance of millions of Syrians. Its crimes against humanity, violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes have been documented in countless United Nations reports. This is a regime that has brazenly used chemical weapons and repeatedly tortured its own people, in blatant breach of its obligations based on international agreements and conventions to which it is party. The regime is therefore not in a position to lecture anyone on counter-terrorism efforts or compliance with international law. Turkey has been at the forefront of the efforts to fight Da'esh and other terrorist organizations.

The Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): We have heard the last speaker in right of reply under cluster 2, "Other

weapons of mass destruction". The Committee will now take up the draft resolutions and decisions under cluster 3, "Outer space (Disarmament aspects)", contained in document A/C.1/75/INF/2.

I will now call on delegations wishing to either make a general statement or introduce new or revised drafts under cluster 3, and I would like to remind speakers that these statements are limited to 3 minutes. Once again, I appeal to delegations to consider submitting a written statement.

Mr. Wu Jianjun (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The First Committee is about to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.62, entitled "No first placement of weapons in outer space". It is shocking that separate votes have been requested on the fifth, ninth and eleventh preambular paragraphs.

The fifth preambular paragraph refers to the concept of a community of a shared future for humankind. What is wrong with that? The coronavirus disease pandemic has shown that all countries are indeed interdependent and part of one community. No country can isolate itself and defeat the virus on its own. Climate change tells us that the international community has a shared future, and no group can escape or be exempted. Outer-space security teaches us that humankind has to deal with all kinds of threats and challenges and that no one can sit idly by in the face of them. The concept of a community of a shared future for humankind has received wide support from the international community, and its inclusion in a draft resolution on outer space is appropriate and pertinent. Are those who question this concept trying to deny the fact that we live in a community where we depend on one another and have a shared future?

The ninth and eleventh preambular paragraphs refer to the draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space and on the use or threat of use of force against outer-space objects proposed by China and Russia and to the political statements on no first placement of weapons in outer space. What is wrong with that? Negotiations for a treaty on preventing an arms race in outer space are in the interests of all parties. The fact that some countries are committing to refraining from being the first to place weapons in outer space sets a very good example and represents an important contribution by Member States to safeguarding the global strategic balance and stability and to promoting international arms control

and disarmament. It is inconceivable that there are countries that would even try to challenge such just acts. They are simply calling black white. We cannot help wondering if this is a roundabout way of telling us that they actually want to be the first to place weapons and trigger an arms race in outer space.

A certain country is obsessed with opposing any proposals China makes and even claims that it will push back against all of China's initiatives. That will only create confrontation and division in the United Nations. That country's irresponsible and reckless requests for separate votes on specific paragraphs only delay the First Committee's meetings and obstruct the multilateral disarmament process. I call on all Member States to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.62 and its fifth, ninth and eleventh preambular paragraphs in order to express support for preventing an arms race in outer space and for unity, fairness, justice and multilateralism.

Mrs. Castro Loredo (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The threat of an arms race in outer space and the continued development and refinement of space weaponry threaten the ability of peoples, particularly in smaller countries, to realize their aspirations to benefit from the potential of space technologies for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Cuba advocates for the legitimate right of all States to access outer space on equal terms and without discrimination.

We are therefore very concerned about the use of space technologies — including the large existing network of spy satellites, which in addition to being incompatible with peace and development is saturating the geostationary orbit with a large amount of space debris — to the detriment of the security of nations. We are also alarmed about the declaration by the United States that space is an arena for war and by its creation of a Space Force. We must be in time to prevent the militarization of outer space, and we therefore need to strengthen the existing legal regime to prevent an arms race in outer space. That is why Cuba supports the adoption of a legally binding treaty for the prevention and prohibition of the placement of weapons in outer space and deplores the fact that one State has blocked consensus on adopting the final report of the Group of Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which submits recommendations on the substantive elements of a legally binding instrument for the prevention and prohibition of such an arms race.

The Cuban delegation is a sponsor of and supports draft resolutions A/C.1/75/L.3, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"; A/C.1/75/L.63, "Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space"; A/C.1/75/L.62, "No first placement of weapons in outer space"; and A/C.1/75/L.66, "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities". We urge Member States to vote in favour of those draft resolutions and all the paragraphs on which separate votes have been requested.

Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Space is humankind's common heritage, and its future will depend in large part on how we manage our achievements in the development of near-Earth space. Together with its like-minded partners, Russia seeks to prevent an arms race in outer space. In the past few years we have put forward a range of initiatives aimed at achieving that, chief among them Russia and China's draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer-space objects. Unfortunately, thanks to the refusal of the United States and others to demonstrate the necessary political will and reach a compromise for the sake of strengthening international security, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to begin substantive work on the document.

The issue of further practical steps to prevent an arms race in outer space is crucial. We greatly value the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, although it was unable to adopt a final report owing to the opposition of the United States, and we nonetheless believe that this topic should remain on the First Committee's agenda. We will submit a draft procedural decision on the matter and urge everyone to support it.

We have also prepared two drafts for what have already become traditional resolutions, on no first placement of weapons in outer space and on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer-space activities, which have undergone only technical changes to last year's versions. The goal of the first of these, draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.62, is to mobilize the international community in support of a multilateral political commitment, proposed by Russia as long ago as 2004, to refraining from the first placement of weapons in outer space, without prejudice to the national interests of any country. Unfortunately, our assumptions that Western countries

are opposed in every possible way to any agreements on the non-placement of arms in space have once again been proved right. Today, for the first time in the history of the discussion of our resolution, it is those preambular paragraphs that have been put to a separate vote, including, for an entirely invented and artificial reason, the fifth, on a “community of a shared future for humankind”. We wholeheartedly share the view expressed by our Chinese colleagues. It is a provocative step that has nothing to do with either the prevention of an arms race in outer space or the text of the draft resolution itself.

Our second draft resolution (A/C.1/75/L.66) seeks to encourage further discussion on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer-space activities, which are an essential part of our work on the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer-space objects.

These are popular, well-known initiatives in the General Assembly, which has adopted them by an overwhelming majority year after year. We hope that this year will again see broad support and sponsorship for our draft resolutions, which would be a demonstration of the international community’s unity and its commitment to preventing outer space from becoming an arena for armed action. Our position on disarmament aspects in outer space will be detailed in the compendium.

I would also like to ask you, Mr. Chair, to once again give me the floor before we begin the voting on these drafts, to invoke rule 121 of the General Assembly’s rules of procedure with regard to the United Kingdom’s draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.45/Rev.1.

The Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): I have taken note of the request of the representative of the Russian Federation.

Mr. Reyes Hernández (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): Venezuela is taking the floor to make a general statement under cluster 3, on outer space, specifically with regard to the following draft resolutions, of which my delegation is a sponsor: A/C.1/75/L.3, A/C.1/75/L.62, A/C.1/75/L.63 and A/C.1/75/L.66.

In Venezuela’s view, outer space represents a common heritage of humankind and equitable access to it by all nations must therefore be guaranteed. Venezuela

rejects militaristic approaches to outer space and is very concerned about some Powers’ open intention to turn it into a theatre of war. Venezuela considers it essential to reinforce all existing international commitments aimed at preventing an arms race in space and its weaponization by strengthening a shared vision among the international community, using agreed language, without ambiguous terminology, based on respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. That is why Venezuela has become a sponsor of these draft resolutions.

Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.3, entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, emphasizes the importance of making progress in formulating legally binding instruments to prevent the weaponization of space.

Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.62, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”, is an important part of preventing the placement of weapons in outer space until we can draft an appropriate treaty. Venezuela considers the updated 2014 version of China and Russia’s initiative for a draft treaty on this topic as an important starting point for continuing negotiations towards a legally binding international instrument.

Draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.66, entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”, encourages States, on a voluntary basis, to further consider and explain the transparency and confidence-building measures in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities.

Lastly, Venezuela regrets the pernicious tendency to sow division among the members of the Organization and to undermine internationally recognized concepts by requesting separate votes on paragraphs with a view to favouring individual aspirations over the collective interests of the international community. We invite members to renew their commitment to this important issue by voting in favour of the aforementioned draft resolutions as well as their individual paragraphs.

Mr. Hassan (Egypt): It is regrettable that all the proposals under this cluster are being put to a vote, including a genuinely balanced attempt, in the form of draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.3, submitted by Egypt and Sri Lanka and supported by a large number of Member States, which is aimed at bridging gaps and addressing threats that are fully recognized by all

Member States. The situation clearly indicates that some States intend to turn outer space into another possible theatre of military conflict and the arena for an arms race that could have catastrophic consequences. Given the fragility and volatility of the outer-space environment, we believe that it is now more necessary than ever for the United Nations to clearly express its resolve to address the alarming security threats to such a strategic domain, which has a direct impact on almost all aspects of life. We hope that the spirit of consensus will be restored and that the international efforts aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space will gain the necessary momentum and lead to negotiations on legally binding instruments.

Mr. Howell (United Kingdom): I am taking the floor to respond to Russia's request to invoke rule 121 of the General Assembly's rules of procedure with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.45/Rev.1, presented by the United Kingdom, "Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours".

In 1978, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament decided that the First Committee should deal with questions of disarmament and related international security questions. The Assembly has included an item on the prevention of an arms race in outer space on the agenda allocated to the First Committee since 1982. Draft resolution

A/C.1/75/L.45/Rev.1 contends that further developing and implementing norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours in outer space is an essential and urgent component of preventing an arms race in outer space and promoting international security. The draft resolution seeks to include weapons on Earth, as well as in space, that threaten space systems. We therefore see no grounds for the motion that the Committee is not competent to consider draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.45/Rev.1. We urge Member States to vote against this unwarranted motion in order to enable the Committee to proceed to take action on A/C.1/75/L.45/Rev.1.

The Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): We have exhausted the time available to us this morning.

I would like to remind delegations that the deadline for submitting explanations of vote in written form for inclusion in the compendium is 10 November.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Friday, 6 November, at 10 a.m. sharp, in the combined conference rooms 1, 2 and 3. The Secretariat will circulate the seating charts of the conference rooms in advance for the information of delegations. The Committee will resume explanations of vote under cluster 3, "Outer space (disarmament aspects)", prior to taking action on related draft resolutions.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.