



# General Assembly

Seventy-fourth session

## First Committee

**25**<sup>th</sup> meeting

Wednesday, 6 November 2019, 3 p.m.

New York

Official Records

*Chair:* Mr. Llorentty Solíz . . . . . (Bolivia (Plurinational State of))

*In the absence of the Chair, Mr. Horne (Australia),  
Vice-Chair, took the Chair.*

*The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.*

### Agenda items 89 to 105 (continued)

#### Action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

**The Acting Chair:** We will begin by hearing from the remaining delegations that requested the floor to speak in explanation of vote after the voting on the items under cluster 4, “Conventional weapons”, as contained in informal paper No.2/Rev.1. Thereafter, the Committee will take up the proposals contained in informal paper No.3/Rev.1, which has been circulated to delegations electronically. Information on additional requests for votes that may have been made since the issuance of informal paper No.3/Rev.1 will be posted on the southern wall of the conference room, to the left of the podium.

**Mr. Ye Minn Thein (Myanmar):** I take the floor to explain Myanmar’s position on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.46, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”, and draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.45, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”.

In principle, Myanmar supports the provisions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine

Ban Treaty. We recognize the initiatives taken under those instruments to deter the indiscriminate use of landmines and cluster munitions, which lead to terrible humanitarian consequences. We share the view that it is important to contribute, in an effective, efficient and coordinated manner, to resolving the challenges of removing anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions placed throughout the world and to ensure their destruction. As a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country in favour of sustaining peace and harmony, tolerance and mutual understanding among individuals and communities are essential for ending decades-long internal armed conflict and for building a new democratic federal union, with sustainable social and economic development in Myanmar.

Disarmament-related measures are part of the peace process. Moreover, at present, relevant Government departments work together with concerned stakeholders, including international non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations, to provide awareness-raising and victims assistance and conduct mine- and unexploded-ordnance-clearance activities.

In addition, I would like to underline that capacity constraints are a major challenge, to some extent, preventing Myanmar’s ability to joining the Conventions at this stage. Nevertheless, relevant stakeholders in Myanmar are currently studying those instruments for a better understanding of them, with the aim of eventually joining the Conventions. Therefore, Myanmar abstained in the voting on both draft resolutions — A/C.1/74/L.45 and A/C.1/74/L.46.

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**Mr. Leopoldino** (Brazil): Our delegation asked for the floor to explain its position on draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.25 and A/C.1/74/L.46.

Brazil voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.25, entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty” (ATT). However, we abstained in the voting on operative paragraph 9, due to the reference made therein to synergies between the ATT and the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Brazil is a party to the ATT and a consistent supporter of the Programme of Action. However, we believe that the use of the term “synergies” is inadequate in the light of, among other factors, the differences between the two instruments in relation to their legal nature and scope.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.46, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”, Brazil has supported efforts to address cluster munitions within the United Nations, in particular the discussions related to the adoption of a protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). We actively participated in the negotiations within the framework of the Group of Governmental Experts on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, whose objective was the adoption of a legally binding instrument that would lead to the gradual banning of cluster munitions. However, Brazil did not participate in the Oslo process. In our view, the establishment of a negotiating process outside of the CCW was neither consistent with the objective of strengthening the Convention nor with the goal of promoting the adoption of balanced, effective and non-discriminatory arms control instruments. Brazil considers that there are serious loopholes in the Oslo Convention. For instance, it allows the use of cluster munitions equipped with technologically sophisticated mechanisms for an indefinite period of time. Such mechanisms are present only in those munitions manufactured in a small number of countries with more advanced defence industries. The effectiveness of the Convention is also undermined by article 21, known as the interoperability clause.

Brazil has never used cluster munitions and is a State party to all CCW Protocols, including Protocol V, on explosive remnants of war. As such, Brazil is committed to ensuring that any possible use of cluster munitions is in line with its obligations under applicable international humanitarian law.

**Mr. Moreno** (Israel): I would like to exercise my right to deliver an explanation of vote after the voting on operative paragraph 9 of the draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.25, entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”, and on the seventh preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.43, entitled “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects”.

As Israel stated at the third Review Conference of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, we do not consider the Programme of Action to be the right venue for addressing the issue of ammunition. Since another venue was already chosen for it — the Group of Governmental Experts in 2020 — we voted against the relevant paragraphs in the outcome document. Therefore, we cannot support language that endorses all outcome documents of the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action.

**Mr. Bravaco** (United States of America): My delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.46, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”. The United States is not a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The United States also does not accept that the Convention represents an emerging norm or prohibition in customary international law on the use of cluster munitions in armed conflict.

It strongly remains the view of the United States that, when used in accordance with international humanitarian law, cluster munitions provide an effective and necessary capability to engage area targets, including mass formations of enemy forces, and can produce less collateral damage than high-explosive unitary weapons alone. Trying to minimize collateral damage during military operations is an integral part of implementing international humanitarian law. Having the right mix of weapons and tactics for a given situation is a very practical and important matter for professional military forces that must decide how best to accomplish the mission at hand, while respecting international obligations.

Although cluster munitions remain an integral part of United States force capabilities, the United States is committed to reducing the potential for unintended harm to civilians and civilian objects, caused by either the misuse of cluster munitions or the use of cluster

munitions that generate an inordinate amount of unexploded ordnance. The cluster munitions policy of the United States Department of Defense is an essential part of the efforts of the United States to achieve those important objectives.

I would also like to issue an explanation of vote after the voting on draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.43, entitled “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects”, and A/C.1/74/L.25, entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”. This explanation of vote applies to draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.43 and A/C.1/74/L.25.

The United States has repeated at very meeting related to the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects for the past 18 years that the issue of ammunition is outside the scope of the Programme of Action. In fact, the inclusion of ammunition did not achieve consensus in 2001, and the United States voted against the inclusion of ammunition in the outcome document of the third Review Conference in June 2018.

We strongly and unequivocally oppose the inclusion of ammunition language in the final outcome document of the third Review Conference. As such, we cannot accept language in this venue that characterizes the outcome of the Review Conference as a success, when consensus on two paragraphs with regard to a highly controversial issue clearly was not achieved.

**Mr. Lim Tong Hai** (Singapore): I take the floor to explain my delegation’s votes in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.45, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”, and A/C.1/74/L.46, “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”, which were adopted yesterday (see A/C.1/74/PV.24).

Singapore has traditionally voted in favour of the draft resolution on the implementation of the Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines. Our position has been clear and consistent. Singapore supports all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines. In May 1996, Singapore declared a two-year moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines without self-neutralizing mechanisms. Singapore expanded the moratorium in February 1998 to include all manner of anti-personnel landmines, not just those without self-

neutralizing mechanisms. In addition, the moratorium was extended indefinitely.

Singapore also voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.46, on the implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as we support initiatives against the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions, especially when directed at innocent civilians. It was for that reason that Singapore declared an indefinite moratorium on the export of cluster munitions in November 2008.

Singapore supports the work of the two Conventions I mentioned by regularly attending the meetings of the States parties to those Conventions. At the same time, as a small State, Singapore firmly believes that the legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defence of any State cannot be disregarded. A blanket ban on all types of cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines may therefore be counter-productive.

Singapore supports international efforts to resolve the humanitarian concerns about anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions. We will continue to work with members of the international community towards a durable and truly global solution.

**Mr. Baek Yong Jin** (Republic of Korea): My delegation would like to refer to draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.45 and A/C.1/74/L.46.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.45, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”, my Government supports the objectives and purposes of the Ottawa Convention and of the draft resolution. However, due to the security situation on the Korean peninsula, we are currently not a party to the Convention, and therefore abstained in the voting on the draft resolution. That does not mean that we are any less concerned about the problems associated with anti-personnel mines. We are committed to mitigating the suffering caused by their use. In that respect, the Korean Government exercises tight control over anti-personnel landmines and has enforced an indefinite moratorium on their export since 1997.

In addition, the Republic of Korea is a party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II, under which we participate in a range of discussions and activities to ensure only limited and responsible use. We also joined Protocol V, on explosive remnants of war, and are implementing

all the relevant obligations. The Korean Government has also contributed more than \$40 million since 1993 to relevant United Nations programmes for demining and victim assistance, including the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action and the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance. The Republic of Korea will continue to contribute to international efforts for mine clearance and victim assistance.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.46, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”, the Government of the Republic of Korea fully shares the concerns of the international community about the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions and supports its efforts to address the humanitarian problems arising from their use. However, due to the security situation on the Korean peninsula, my Government is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Therefore, my Government abstained in the voting on that draft resolution. My delegation would like to share with Member States that the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Korea adopted a directive on cluster munitions in 2008, according to which only cluster munitions that are equipped with self-deactivation devices and have a fatal rate of less than 1 per cent can be included in acquisition plans. The directive also recommends developing alternative weapons systems to replace cluster munitions in the long term. While it is regrettable that we are unable to support the draft resolution at the moment, the Republic of Korea will continue its constructive efforts to mitigate the humanitarian issues associated with the use of cluster munitions.

Finally, my delegation would like to draw the Committee’s attention to the confidence-building measures taken on the Korean peninsula since the Pyongyang Joint Declaration was agreed last year. A number of country actions under way include demining operations along the demilitarized zone of the Korean peninsula. I hope such efforts will eventually have a positive spillover effect on other areas of conventional weapons. My also hope that my delegation will be able to attend next year’s session of the First Committee with further progress.

**Ms. Mac Loughlin** (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): The delegation of Argentina abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.46, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”. The Republic of Argentina does not possess

the prohibited munitions and continues advocating for the full prohibition, without exception, of such weapons, or for a meaningful reduction in the number of such weapons, without discrimination.

As everyone knows, to date the Republic of Argentina has not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Argentina actively participated in the entire negotiating process with the goal of adopting an international instrument for the full prohibition of such weapons that would meet high humanitarian standards. However, in our country’s view, the text adopted was not sufficiently ambitious and, more specifically, its articles 2 and 21 are viewed as being at variance with the goal of full prohibition and the principle of non-discrimination. That has not changed. However, given that our delegation seeks to promote full prohibition, in line with our national policy, my country participates as an observer State in the meetings of States parties to the Convention.

**Ms. Lal** (India): I requested the floor to explain my delegation’s votes on the following draft resolutions.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.25, entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”, India has established strong and effective national export controls with respect to the export of defence items. India subscribes to the objectives of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and our export control system meets those objectives. As part of our commitment to international transparency measures, India submits an annual report under the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms for the same categories of conventional arms that are regulated under the ATT. Our commitment is also reflected in India’s participation in the Wassenaar Arrangement. India continues to keep the ATT under review from the perspective of our defence, security and foreign policy interests. We therefore abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.25.

India abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.45, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”. India supports the vision of a world free of anti-personnel landmines and is committed to their eventual elimination. The availability of effective military and alternative technologies that are cost-effective and can perform the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines will considerably

facilitate the goal of the complete elimination of anti-personnel mines.

India is a high-contracting party to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which enshrines the approach of taking into account the legitimate defence requirements of States, especially those with long borders. India has fulfilled its obligations under Amended Protocol II, including, inter alia, stopping the production of non-detectable mines, as well as rendering all our anti-personnel mines detectable. India observes a moratorium on the export and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. We have taken a number of measures to address humanitarian concerns arising from the use of anti-personnel landmines, in accordance with international humanitarian law. India remains committed to increased international cooperation and assistance for mine clearance, as well as the rehabilitation of mine victims. We are also willing to contribute technical assistance and expertise to that end. India also participates regularly as an observer at the Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personal Mines and Their Destruction.

**Ms. Kritikou** (Cyprus): I take the floor to explain our abstention in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.46, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”.

Cyprus attaches great importance to the application of restrictions and prohibitions of weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. In that regard, Cyprus is a State party to all protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Furthermore, our national policy and legislation are in full compliance with European Union standards and regulations. Cyprus signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2009. Relevant legislation for its verification was forwarded to Parliament in 2011. However, the ratification process is still ongoing, due to considerations related to the abnormal security situation on the island. We remain hopeful that those issues will be resolved, which would then enable us to ratify the Convention and vote in favour of it in future.

**Mr. Ahmed** (Pakistan): I would like to offer an explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.45, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”.

Pakistan abstained in the voting on the draft resolution. Landmines continue to play a significant role in meeting the defence needs of many States. Given our security considerations and the need to guard long borders, which are not protected by any natural obstacle, reliance on landmines is an integral part of Pakistan’s defence.

Pakistan is a party to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which regulates the use of landmines to protect civilians from their indiscriminate and lethal effects. There are no uncleared mines on Pakistan’s territory. We remain committed to ensuring that mines in our military inventory never become a source of civilian casualties. Pakistan is one of the largest troop contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations. We have been successfully undertaking demining operations in various parts of the world. We are committed to providing further assistance to advance global humanitarian demining efforts.

**Mr. Hallak** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): My country, Syria, underlines its willingness to participate in any international effort undertaken in good faith to achieve the goal of establishing an international society free of the threat or use of power. We would like to note that draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.30, entitled “Transparency in armaments”, is not balanced.

With regard to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, it is not comprehensive and does not include developments in conventional weapons. It also does not take into consideration the special situation in the Middle East, where the Arab-Israeli conflict is still ongoing because Israel continues to occupy Arab territories while refusing to implement relevant Security Council resolutions. In addition, it continues to be supplied by major Powers with all kinds of weapons of mass destruction and the latest and most destructive conventional weapons. Moreover, Israel has the capability to locally manufacture and stockpile various advanced weapons, foremost among them nuclear weapons. That is why my country’s delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.30.

Syria has been at the forefront of the States Members of the United Nations seeking continuously to decrease the trade in conventional weapons given the threats posed by such illicit trade to international

peace and security. A case in point is my country's suffering caused by acts of bloodshed perpetrated by terrorist groups that are illicitly supplied with all kinds of conventional and non-conventional weapons, ammunition and military equipment by States that are known to everyone. The irony is that most of those States are parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

My country's delegation worked actively to arrive at a good ATT, not just a treaty that would be used to bring pressure to bear on other States, similar to what happened with other instruments. Syria never opposed the Treaty. Had it been concluded on the basis of consensus, it would have been an important achievement for the international community. However, regrettably, as it stands, the Treaty serves to ensure the interests of certain States at the expense of the security and concerns of a large group of Member States. In its current form, the ATT is not consensus-based and does not take into consideration the positions and opinions of many States, including Syria. In that regard, I will mention some of the points that were overlooked by the Treaty.

There is no reference in the Treaty to foreign occupation. The Treaty also does not make explicit reference to the absolute threat of exporting weapons to illegitimate armed groups and terrorist groups, particularly in the light of the suffering of my country and many countries in the world from this phenomenon, which constitutes major threat to international peace and security. The provisions of the Treaty disregard as well the reference to the crime of aggression as defined and agreed upon internationally.

The most prominent challenge to the ATT is the fact that some States parties to the Treaty supply weapons, materiel and ammunition to armed groups included on the Security Council's lists of terrorist groups. Those States parties violate the Treaty by selling weapons through their agents.

Those are some of the reasons that made my country abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.30. My country's delegation emphasizes its reservation about all paragraphs referring to the ATT in current or future draft resolutions and decisions consensually adopted by the First Committee.

In conclusion, with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.43, entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects", my delegation voted in favour of the paragraphs that were adopted by

a vote at the third international conference to review the progress achieved in the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Our vote in favour of those paragraphs is based on our conviction about the importance of this topic and on our consideration for our brothers and sisters in Africa and the Caribbean, despite my country's reservations about some of the new topics that were included in the document.

**Mr. Fiallo Karolys** (Ecuador) (*spoke in Spanish*): I take the floor to explain Ecuador's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.25 yesterday (see A/C.1/74/PV.24).

Several years ago, Ecuador voted in favour of draft resolutions that convened the process that led to the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty and actively participated in its negotiations. Regrettably, the text that was finally submitted for consideration by the General Assembly in April 2013 included shortcomings, such as the imbalance between the rights and responsibilities of exporting and importing countries; the importance of the fundamental principles of international law and its standing in treaties; the lack of an explicit ban on the transfer to non-authorized non-State actors; the lack of specific references to the crime of aggression and the fact that certain articles can be used in a subjective manner and based on double standards. That led to Ecuador's abstention in the voting to adopt the Arms Trade Treaty. For that very reason, Ecuador abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.25, including its operative paragraphs 4 and 9.

Ecuador also abstained in the voting on the sixteenth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.27, the seventh preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.30 and the twenty-second preambular paragraph of A/C.1/74/L.43. In any case, Ecuador joined the consensus in adopting draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.43 and voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.27, A/C.1/74/L.30 and A/C.1/74/L.46 because we fully support them.

Lastly, my delegation is currently examining the Arms Trade Treaty and observing how it is being implemented, as well as the conclusions reached at its conferences of States parties in order to identify whether or not the problems in its text persist when the instrument is implemented.

**The Acting Chair:** We have heard from the last speaker in explanation of vote after the voting on items under cluster 4, “Conventional weapons”.

The Committee will now turn to informal paper No.3/Rev.1, beginning with cluster 5, “Other disarmament measures and international security”. I would like to inform the Committee that, at the request of the sponsoring delegations, action on draft decision A/C.1/74/L.57/Rev.1 has been postponed to a later stage of the Committee’s work.

I will first give the floor to delegations wishing to make general statements or to introduce new or revised draft resolutions or draft decisions under cluster 5. Statements are limited to five minutes.

I give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.48.

**Mr. Baek Yong Jin** (Republic of Korea): I have the honour to briefly take the floor to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.48, entitled “Youth, disarmament and non-proliferation”. This new biennial draft resolution aims to empower, engage and educate youth in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. My delegation believes that young people, who are more innovative and forward-looking, would make valuable contributions in reviving the disarmament machinery by providing fresh views and ideas. Moreover, the empowerment of youth in this field is meaningful not only for securing diversity but also for nurturing young experts, who will lead our collective efforts in future. It is based upon the belief that, for the first time in the First Committee, the Republic of Korea introduces a new draft resolution on youth, in the hope of bringing young people to the attention of the First Committee and to encourage Member States to seek concrete measures to empower, engage and educate youth. It is my sincere hope that the draft resolution could also create new, positive momentum for the advancement of disarmament discussions, which have remained at a standstill for quite some time.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all Member States that have co-sponsored and shown support for the draft resolution. I encourage others that have not yet done so to do the same. There are 80 sponsors at this stage. We hope that the draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

**The Acting Chair:** I now give the floor to the representative of the United States to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49.

**Mr. Bravaco** (United States of America): I take the floor to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49, entitled “Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security”. The United States remains committed to encouraging consensus on cybersecurity in the First Committee. This year, given that two new processes have just begun, we believe that our efforts should focus on the ongoing substantive work of the Open-ended Working Group and the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, and not on a contentious negotiation process in the First Committee.

We are dedicated to working constructively in both the Group of Governmental Experts and the Open-ended Working Group, as we have on cyberissues in the First Committee for the past two decades. For draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49, in order to show our commitment to international consensus, we used previously agreed language as the basis and incorporated the requested amendments made by Member States. We are disappointed that the Russian Federation has refused to do the same but, instead, has chosen to drive a wedge through the international community, while speaking about its desire for consensus.

Talk is cheap. We and the international community call on Russia to take actions that support consensus, especially in such a crucial area. While we believe it is necessary this year to have two draft resolutions to reflect that two processes have started, each with its own mandate and timeline, we see no legitimate reason for the international community to not pursue complementary consensus cyber draft resolutions in the First Committee. Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace is central to building international peace and security. We are introducing A/C.1/74/L.49 with the goal of welcoming new activities of the United Nations, in particular the Group of Governmental Experts and Open-ended Working Group, which can advance responsible State behaviour in cyberspace.

We thank the 46 Member States that have co-sponsored our draft resolution and respectfully ask for the support of all States Members of the United Nations. These issues are critical to all of us. It is

important that the international community respond with one voice and vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49.

**Ms. Sánchez Rodríguez** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The delegation of Cuba would like to make a general statement on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50, entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”, which Cuba co-sponsors and traditionally supports.

Cuba supports the draft resolution and welcomes the start of negotiations in the Open-ended Working Group. We call on Member States to vote in favour of the draft resolution as a demonstration of support for the very important efforts of the Working Group, without any interference or predetermination of the outcome of its work. The draft resolution reflects concerns about capacity-building in the area of information and communications technology for military purposes and their possible use in future conflicts. We acknowledge the key role of the United Nations in promoting dialogue among its Member States in order to reach a common understanding on security with regard to the use of information and communications technology and to international regulations on the activities of States in that sphere.

Our country has consistently promoted the crucial issue of information and communications technology in the context of international security and would like to see it addressed in an open, transparent and inclusive forum that ensures the equal participation of all States in discussions and decision-making. For Cuba, the right way to address the concerns of the international community about the issue and to reach consensus-based multilaterally negotiated solutions is through the Open-ended Working Group. Cuba has also supported the launch of negotiations, without further delay, within the framework of the United Nations to adopt a legally binding international instrument that will enable us to provide effective responses to the major legal gaps in the area of cybersecurity and to effectively address, through multilateral cooperation, mounting threats and challenges.

**The Acting Chair:** Before to Committee proceeds to take action on the draft resolutions and draft decisions in cluster 5, we will hear from delegations wishing to explain their positions on those drafts.

**Mr. Cleobury** (United Kingdom): I would like to deliver the following explanation of position on behalf of France and the United Kingdom.

We join the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.29, entitled “Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control”. We wish to make clear that France and the United Kingdom operate under stringent domestic environmental impact regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. We see no direct connection, as stated in the draft resolution, between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control.

Climate change is among the most serious challenges facing our world. It poses a threat to the environment, global security and economic prosperity. In that respect, the United Kingdom and France are strongly committed to the fight against climate change. In that regard, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change constitute our common road maps to transform our economies and energy models. We reaffirm our attachment to the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement, as well our determination to intensify our efforts to live up to our ambitions and responsibilities towards future generations.

I would also like to deliver an explanation of position on behalf of the United Kingdom and France on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.35, “Relationship between disarmament and development”. France and the United Kingdom will join the consensus on the draft resolution. We support the effective practical linkages between disarmament issues and development policy, in particular in the field of conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

We believe that is necessary to make our position clear on other aspects of the text. The notion of a symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development appears questionable to us, as the conditions conducive to effective arms control and disarmament are not necessarily dependent on development only, as seen with the growing military expenditure of some developing countries. There is no automatic link between the two, but rather a complex relationship that that notion does not accurately capture. Moreover, the idea according to which military

expenditure directly diverts funding from development requirements would need to be nuanced, as defence investments are also necessary to deliver the peace and security that facilitate development, including through legitimate military operations, peacekeeping and an improved response to natural disasters — for example, airborne and maritime equipment.

*Ms. Mudallali (Lebanon), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.*

Finally, we consider that the report (see A/59/119) of the Group of Governmental Experts did not give sufficient credit to universal bilateral and multilateral actions in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

**Mr. Laukkanen (Finland):** I have the honour to speak on behalf of the member States of the European Union (EU). Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this statement.

After careful consideration, we have decided to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.56, “Strengthening and developing the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements”. In that context, we would like to make the following remarks.

We are staunch supporters of the rules-based global order, with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core. Upholding the integrity of that system is indispensable for maintaining international peace and security.

We are deeply concerned about the current tensions afflicting the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. We must endeavour decrease tensions, restore dialogue and trust, explore further transparency and confidence-building measures and move from confrontation to cooperation, if we are to solve global and regional security challenges. It is important that all parties, including the main sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.56 — the Russian Federation — contribute constructively to improving the strategic context and preserving and further advancing treaties and agreements for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation to enhance global security. In that regard, we reiterate our call on all States, including the main sponsor of the draft resolution, to consider joining conventional arms conventions and treaties,

without delay, such as the Arms Trade Treaty and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

We are gravely concerned about the continued non-compliance by some States with their international obligations in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. The viability and effectiveness of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements require that they be fully complied with and enforced. The international community must ensure accountability, end impunity for violations and uphold global norms. That is why the European Union has strongly supported the establishment of an international attribution mechanism to identify and hold accountable the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons. That is why autonomous EU sanctions have been adopted against the use of chemical weapons, but also against nuclear proliferation and other violations of international law, notably the use of force against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of other States. Detailed explanations of our positions on those matters were made in our statements during thematic debates on “Other weapons of mass destruction” and “Regional disarmament and security”. We regret that those aspects of compliance have not been included in the text by the main sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.56.

When addressing the issue of compliance, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty is a case in point. We made our views clear in that regard during the general debate and the debate on nuclear weapons. Given the heightened tensions, we must be careful not to embark on the path of a new arms race that would offset the significant reductions achieved after the end of the Cold War. We have also stressed the highest importance we attach to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and an early and active dialogue on its future post-2021, as well as on other arms control arrangements. All European countries have benefited from the conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and in particular the commitments in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Vienna document of 2011 and the Treaty on Open Skies. We underline the importance of fully implementing those instruments, as well as best practices contained in other OSCE documents.

We are dismayed by the repeated attempts by a few States to challenge the authority and integrity of international organizations such as the Organization

for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), including in debates in the First Committee. There is no doubt that the Director-General and the Technical Secretariat are fulfilling their duties in the service of the international community in a professional, objective and impartial manner. We recall the use of the veto by Russia against the extension of the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism in that regard. We also recall the cyberattack that targeted the offices of the OPCW, carried out by the Russian military intelligence service, following the attack in Salisbury. Once again, we underline the serious concerns about the attempt to undermine the OPCW. We expect all States to reaffirm their strong political support for the work of those important organizations, as well as for other relevant treaties and conventions.

We express our utmost concern about the financial crisis facing a number of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements. The continued failure of some States parties to comply with their financial obligations puts the functioning of those vital instruments at risk and hampers further progress. We recall that assessed contributions constitute an integral part of States parties' obligations under international treaties and agreements. Once again, we urge those States parties that have not yet done so to pay their contributions in full and on time and settle their outstanding arrears without further delay.

We emphasize that gender equality and the empowerment of women are an important cross-cutting priority for the EU, and that the women and peace and security agenda continues to feature prominently in EU external action. Women must be fully involved, through active and equal participation, including in leadership in non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. We are encouraged that relevant gender considerations have been included in an increasing number of First Committee draft resolutions this year, while regretting that the main sponsor of resolution A/C.1/74/L.56 did not accept amendments in that regard. The EU will maintain gender issues high on the agenda of the United Nations, while also bearing in mind the Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament and the upcoming twentieth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 (2020).

The EU will continue to provide significant political and financial support to multilateral institutions to uphold and strengthen key international treaties and agreements, while promoting universal adherence

thereto and helping to build capacities in partner countries for effective treaty implementation. Even if the rules-based international system is confronted with multiple challenges, the EU will remain a strong, consistent and reliable partner of the United Nations. We call on all States Members of the United Nations to demonstrate their support for multilateral cooperation in these critical times, not only in words but through actions.

**Ms. Delaroche** (France) (*spoke in French*): My delegation has the honour to speak on behalf the United States of America, the United Kingdom and my own country, France. I would like to explain our position on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.15, entitled "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament".

We support that draft text because we believe it is useful to highlight the benefits and challenges of development in science and technology in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. The draft resolution rightfully underscores the need to remain informed about the most recent scientific and technological developments and to regulate the transfer of sensitive technologies for peaceful uses in order to address the risk of proliferation by States or non-State actors. The issue is regularly discussed in several forums, such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Conference on Disarmament.

We would like to underscore that the rights referenced in the fifth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution are those noted in specific provisions of a small number of treaties, such as those I have already mentioned, such as the CWC, the BWC, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As the fifth preambular paragraph clearly states, States must exercise those rights in accordance with their international obligations, including their obligations under those three Treaties. As States parties to those treaties, the United Kingdom, the United States and France will comply with their respective international obligations and expect all other States to do the same. It should be added that none of the three treaties recognizes a right to technologies or a right to sensitive materials.

**Mr. Horne** (Australia): I take the floor to explain Australia's position on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, entitled "Developments in the

field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”.

Australia is committed to successful outcomes in both the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. While the two groups share a common objective, they were established under separate resolutions. They have independent mandates, separate budgets and different timelines. It is therefore procedurally appropriate to take action on separate cyberspace draft resolutions this year. Our desire, overwhelmingly shared and echoed by others, was for both draft resolutions to be adopted by consensus. We engaged actively and constructively in the pursuit of that objective, and we share the disappointment expressed by others that the climate is not yet conducive to a return to that consensus.

We co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1, as it reflects a great text and welcomes both the OEWG and the GGE. It is sensible, balanced and consensus-oriented. We believe that it appropriately reflects the common interests and objectives of all Member States.

With respect to draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, we conducted outreach and made representations in New York, Moscow and Canberra to request simple changes to the fourth, tenth and twelfth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 1. All of those suggestions were offered with the intention of bringing the draft resolution back into line with agreed language. We are perplexed and disappointed that those consensus-based changes that would have increased the likelihood of wider support were rejected. Australia does not agree with the non-consensus-based language. Therefore, with deep regret, we cannot support that draft resolution. However, while we voted against the equivalent draft resolution last year, we will abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1 this year. We emphasize that our decision to move to an abstention should in no way be seen as an endorsement of a text that cannot foster consensus. Our decision to abstain is a symbolic demonstration to the Committee and Member States of our commitment to the substantive work of both the OEWG and the GGE and our desire for both of the bodies to succeed.

Going forward in the substantive discussions, Australia urges all countries to focus on what we can do to bring us all back together. It is Australia's

view that what ultimately unites us on cyberspace and international security will be stronger than what appears to divide us. The threats posed to international peace and security by the irresponsible use of information and communications technology by States are real and growing. It is in the interests of all Member States that we preserve and promote a peaceful and stable cyberspace. We all have shared interests in driving global economic growth, protecting national security and promoting international stability.

Australia will continue to engage in good faith with all Member States in the shared effort to return the agenda to consensus and to deliver meaningful and complementary outcomes in both the OEWG and the GGE.

**Mr. Belousov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian Federation would like to explain its position on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1, entitled “Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security”.

From the very start of the current session of the First Committee, we have advocated the return to consensus on the topic of international information security at the United Nations, based on adopting a single draft resolution acceptable to all. We believe that that is the only logical way to turn the discussion on this topic, which is important for international security, towards consensus. We have repeatedly proposed that we and the United States draft the text together. The United States has refused that option. Instead, just as last year, the United States has put forward a separate document on the same agenda item. Regrettably, we are again witnessing a deliberate repetition of last year's precedent, which undermines the unity of the international community on issues of international information security at the United Nations.

Our draft resolution is aimed at strengthening and developing the United Nations negotiation process on the topic. We are convinced that that process must be considered as a whole in order to pursue the same peaceful and constructive objectives in the information space. Even more important, this process should be consistent and continuous. The American document is based on a completely different line of logic — that of dividing the international community into two tracks, with a specific expiration date. At the same time, the Open-ended Working Group and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in

the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security are accorded the same rights. However, the Working Group has already conducted two successful meetings, whereas the GGE will start its work only in December. To speak now about how successful its work will be is premature.

In addition, we do not understand the excessive focus by the initiative of the United States on the GGE format, in which only 25 experts participate in their personal capacity. A pseudo-compromise was offered to Russia. We are supposed to accept all amendments made to our draft resolution by the United States and support the American document. What do those amendments really imply? For example, it was proposed that we delete a sentence about the fact that the General Assembly is concerned about an increase in cybercapacity for military purposes. It was also proposed that we include in the text of our draft resolution language that would, although in a veiled but obvious way, suggest the legitimization of the use of information and communications technology for offensive military objectives.

Russia — which as a State, strives, not only in word but indeed, to strengthen international security — cannot accept such proposals, or a proposal that, in essence, devalues the role of the United Nations negotiation process on international information security. We strongly believe that a genuine consensus on the topic is possible in the General Assembly only on the basis of one common document, drafted with a peaceful, constructive and balanced approach. That approach has received a positive response from the majority of States. That approach is also reflected in the Russian text of the draft resolution. We call on the States Members of the United Nations that are interested in restoring a genuine consensus on international information security to support the draft resolution submitted by Russia and to adopt a fair and objective decision with respect to the draft text submitted by the United States, as contained in document A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1.

**The Acting Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.15, entitled “Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Elliott** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.15 was submitted by the representative of India on 11 October. The sponsors of

the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/74/L.15. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee.

**The Acting Chair:** The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.15 was adopted.*

**The Acting Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.29, entitled “Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Elliott** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.29 was submitted by the representative of Indonesia on 15 October on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/74/L.29.

**The Acting Chair:** The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.29 was adopted.*

**The Acting Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.32, entitled “Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Elliott** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.32 was submitted on 15 October by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/74/L.32.

**The Acting Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,

Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

*Abstaining:*

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tonga, Turkey, Ukraine

*Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.32 was adopted by 124 votes to 4, with 52 abstentions.*

**The Acting Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.35, entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Elliott** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.35 was submitted by the representative of Indonesia on 8 October on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/74/L.35.

**The Acting Chair:** The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.35 was adopted.*

**The Acting Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.48, entitled "Youth, disarmament and non-proliferation".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Elliott** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.48 was submitted by the representative of the Republic of Korea on 17 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/74/L.48. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee. Bangladesh, the Gambia, India and Timor-Leste have also become sponsors.

**The Acting Chair:** A separate vote has been requested on the eighth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.48.

I shall put that paragraph to the vote now.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic,

Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

None

*Abstaining:*

Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic

*The eighth preambular paragraph was retained by 175 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

**The Acting Chair:** The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.48, as a whole, was adopted.*

**The Acting Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49/

Rev.1, entitled "Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Elliott** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49 was submitted by the representative of the United States of America on 17 October. Subsequently, a revised draft resolution, A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1, was submitted on 31 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee. Malawi has also become a sponsor.

**The Acting Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands,

South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

*Against:*

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

*Abstaining:*

Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Myanmar, Palau

*Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1 was adopted by 161 votes to 10, with 8 abstentions.*

**The Acting Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Elliott** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50 was submitted by the representative of the Russian Federation on 17 October. Subsequently, a revised draft resolution, A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, was submitted on 30 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee. Nicaragua and Zimbabwe have also become sponsors.

**The Acting Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic

Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

Canada, Georgia, Israel, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

*Abstaining:*

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey

*Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1 was adopted by 124 votes to 6, with 48 abstentions.*

[Subsequently, the delegation of Turkmenistan informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

**The Acting Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.51,

entitled “Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Elliott** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.51 was submitted by the representatives of Germany and Romania on 17 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/74/L.51. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee.

The present oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms, respectively, of paragraphs 7 (g), (h) and (i) of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.51, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General, within available resources,

“[t]o promote international and regional or subregional symposiums and training seminars and to support the development of an online training course by the Secretariat, with the financial and technical support of interested States, with a view to explaining the purpose of the standardized reporting system and facilitating the secure online filing of the reports;

“[t]o report on experiences gained during such symposiums and training seminars;

and

“[t]o provide, upon request, technical assistance to Member States lacking the capacity to report data and to encourage Member States to voluntarily provide bilateral assistance to other Member States”.

The requirements for the implementation of the request set out in paragraph 7 (g) would be carried out with resources provided under section 4, “Disarmament”, of the proposed programme budget for 2020 and by extra-budgetary resources provided by interested Member States.

The report requested in paragraph 7 (h) would be part of the annual report of the Secretary-General entitled “Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures,” for which documentation requirements have been included in the proposed programme budget for 2020.

The implementation of the activities envisaged in paragraph 7 (i) would be carried out with extra-budgetary resources provided by interested Member States.

Accordingly, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.51 would not give rise to any programme budget implications under the proposed programme budget for 2020.

The attention of the Committee is also drawn to the provisions of section VI of resolution 45/248 B, of 21 December 1990, and subsequent resolutions, the latest of which is resolution 73/279 A, of 22 December 2018, in which the Assembly reaffirmed that the Fifth Committee is the appropriate Main Committee of the General Assembly entrusted with responsibilities for administrative and budgetary matters and reaffirmed the role of the Fifth Committee in carrying out a thorough analysis and approving human and financial resources and policies, with a view to ensuring the full, effective and efficient implementation of all mandated programmes and activities and the implementation of policies in that regard.

**The Acting Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives,

Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

None

*Abstaining:*

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Palau

*Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.51 was adopted by 176 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

**The Acting Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.56/Rev.1, entitled "Strengthening and developing the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Elliott** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.56 was submitted by the representative of the Russian Federation on 17 October. Subsequently, a revised draft resolution, A/C.1/74/L.56/Rev.1, was submitted on 30 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/74/L.56/Rev.1. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee.

**The Acting Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

None

*Abstaining:*

Colombia, Georgia, Palau, Sudan, Ukraine

*Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.56/Rev.1 was adopted by 174 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.*

[Subsequently, the delegation of the Sudan informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

**The Acting Chair:** I shall now call on those delegations wishing to explain their vote or position after the voting.

**Mr. Bravaco** (United States of America): I take the floor to deliver several explanations of vote after the voting.

The first is related to draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.56/Rev.1, on behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and my own country, the United States of America. We voted in favour because of our deep commitment to the principles contained in the draft resolution. Yet we cannot leave unsaid the fact that Russia's sponsorship of the draft resolution stands in sharp contrast to its history of violating those principles, in spirit and deed. Meaningful arms control decreases the chances of misperception and miscalculation by helping to manage strategic competition among States. But we should be mindful of the fact that progress in arms control is not an end in itself and depends on the security environment and the participation of willing partners. The value of any agreement is derived from treaty partners that comply with their obligations and avoid actions that result in mistrust and miscalculation.

In the arms-control sphere, Moscow continues to violate its obligations, undermining the trust that States can place in Russia as a treaty partner, including with respect to treaties that have served global security interests for years. In a clear violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Russia used a Novichok nerve agent in Salisbury, United Kingdom, in March 2018. That attack ultimately left one innocent woman dead and four more individuals fighting for their lives and endangered countless others. Russia also undertook a hostile cyberoperation against the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in an attempt to undermine the institution established to uphold the CWC. Despite sustained efforts to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons, today's deteriorated

international security environment is impeding nuclear-disarmament efforts.

Russia has taken actions over the past several years that have deepened the deficit of trust with Russia. Russia is upgrading and diversifying its nuclear-weapon capabilities, and its total nuclear stockpile is likely to grow over the next decade. Russia also is pursuing novel nuclear-delivery systems that create a strategic challenge for the United States and are difficult to manage under the current arms-control agreements. In March 2018, the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Putin, unveiled several of those systems, which include an intercontinental-range nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable underwater drone, a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed intercontinental-range cruise missile, and an air-launched ballistic missile.

The value of any agreement is derived from treaty partners maintaining compliance with their obligations and avoiding actions that result in mistrust and miscalculation. Unfortunately, Russia's repeated failures to uphold its obligations have created a trust deficit that challenges our ability to make progress in arms control. Done correctly, arms control can help manage and stabilize strategic relationships and promote greater transparency and predictability. We invite the Russian Federation to live up to the principles contained in draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.56/Rev.1 and practise what it preaches.

Turning now to draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, I would like to deliver an explanation of vote after the voting on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. Our primary objective for 2019 in the First Committee on cyberissues has been consensus. We hope to avoid a contentious negotiation on those issues this year because we believe that our efforts should be focused on the ongoing substantive work of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) and Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. We are taking a constructive approach in both the Group of Governmental Experts and the Open-ended Working Group. Our goal for both venues is to universalize the recommendations contained in the three successive GGE reports (see A/65/201, A/68/98 and A/70/174), which were all welcomed by consensus by the General Assembly.

The Open-ended Working Group and the GGE are two distinct but related processes, each with its own mandate, timeline and budget. Therefore, we believe it is procedurally appropriate for the First Committee to have two distinct but complementary draft resolutions on the issue of cyber this year for the purpose of welcoming the start of work on each of those processes. Unlike draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, the cyber resolution submitted by the United States, A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1, which was just adopted by an overwhelming majority — and we thank all delegations for their support — was written with the goal of achieving consensus this year. It was revised to incorporate the views and suggestions of other Member States to that end.

We have been clear on our desire to achieve two consensus cyber resolutions in the First Committee this year so that we can take a significant step forward to overcome the voting outcomes of last year's text. In addition, we have indicated a willingness to instead consider procedural decisions that would have simply reflected the start of the two processes and kept the topic on the agenda of the First Committee for next year. However, the Russian Federation has shown no interest in working towards international consensus.

From the beginning of this year's session, we indicated a willingness to work with Russia on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, in an effort to achieve consensus on the text. While we generally supported the sentiment of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1 to welcome the Open-ended Working Group and encourage it to work together with the Group of Governmental Experts, we are concerned about the fact that some of the language goes beyond that of the OEWG or is otherwise controversial or undefined.

We have been transparent about our proposed edits to A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, which were quite moderate. Russia refused to consider any of them. Russia's inflexible position is causing a fight and driving a wedge between Member States in a year where we easily could have gone back to consensus on cyber issues in the Committee, and that is truly unfortunate. Because of these issues, we voted against draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1. Nonetheless, we remain committed to playing a constructive role in the Open-ended Working Group but have grown concerned that perhaps a few States do not share the same objective of bringing progress on cyber issues in the Committee.

Finally, we would like to deliver an explanation of position on draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.29, entitled "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control", and A/C.1/74/L.35, entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development". The United States did not participate in action on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.29. The United States operates under strict domestic environmental impact regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. We see no direct connection, as stated in the draft resolution, between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control and do not consider it a matter germane to the First Committee.

We also did not participate in action on the consensus adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.35. My Government believes that disarmament and development are two distinct issues. Accordingly, we do not consider ourselves bound by the final document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which was adopted in September 1987.

**Mr. Nasir** (Malaysia): I take the floor to explain Malaysia's votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1 and A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1.

Malaysia voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1, entitled "Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security", and draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security". We believe that both draft resolutions carry value in moving forward the global discourse in this area, under the agenda item 93, on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.

With the goal of making tangible progress in this field, Malaysia believes that the relevant Group of Governmental Experts and the Open-ended Working Group complement each other. Both Groups serve as effective platforms for conducting vital work in the spirit of transparency, inclusiveness, pragmatism, collaboration and mutual trust. On this note, Malaysia reaffirms the need for multilateral cooperation in charting the way forward in the domain of cybersecurity. It is imperative for all parties to find common ground in

addressing an area of great concern to the international community as a whole.

Moving forward, it is hoped that the Committee will come together on the issue of cybersecurity with broad support from Member States, as in previous years. Nonetheless, we could build on these two draft resolutions, which have been adopted by the Committee, with Member States continuing constructive deliberations in future.

**Ms. Jáquez Huacuja** (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): The delegation of Mexico voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.56/Rev.1, entitled “Strengthening and developing the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements”. We thank Russia for proposing the text.

We support the main call of the draft resolution to comply with the various disarmament treaties and agreements in a comprehensive manner and without conditions. Nevertheless, my delegation would like to place on record that Mexico disassociates itself from operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution, as the assertion that multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation instruments are based on consensus or are, by nature, consensus-based is neither accurate nor true. On the contrary, each treaty and forum has its own dynamics and regulations, and the so-called consensus rule is not the common denominator. We must reiterate that consensus is always desirable when seeking to reach an agreement, but it should not be on a par with unanimity or used as a veto or to justify paralysis in the various forums.

**Mr. Moreno** (Israel): I would like to exercise my right to explain my delegation’s vote after the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.

Israel voted against draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1 for several substantive reasons and would like to emphasize the following points for the record. Israel believes that the discussions of the Open-ended Working Group should support, and not duplicate or impair, other efforts, including those undertaken within the United Nations and, in particular, by the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. Furthermore, the 2015 report of that Group (see A/70/174) reflects an agreement to promote common understanding through discussions

on certain voluntary non-binding norms that should be developed as complementary recommendations for consideration by States. They are, and should continue to be, understood as subordinate to international law.

Israel also believes that it is essential to maintain that agreed upon approach and language and to refrain from adding new non-agreed elements, such as referring to the process as negotiations, which is done in several paragraphs of the draft resolution. Unfortunately, the text of the draft resolution exceeds its mandate in that regard.

**Mr. Li Nan** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): China voted against draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1, and we would like to briefly explain our position.

China has consistently supported the United Nations in playing the central role in upholding cybersecurity and establishing international rules governing cyberspace. We engage in a constructive and in-depth manner in the cybersecurity process, within the framework of the United Nations. In recent years, the United Nations has numerous times established groups of governmental experts on information security and reached important consensus, which is extensively welcomed by the international community, as it is an active contribution to international rule-making when it comes to cyberspace.

This year the United Nations initiated the two processes of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. The OEWG has already met with success, in the form of the establishment of the first intergovernmental process on the issue of cybersecurity within the framework of the United Nations, with the broad participation of all Member States. It is also the first time that the broad United Nations membership, in particular the developing countries, have expressed their views on cyberspace, hence its special significance. However, a certain country has continued its practice from last year of creating competition between the two draft resolutions on information security, which is not good for upholding the international community’s consensus on information security.

China takes note of the revisions brought to the final text of the draft resolution. However, we have to point out that it is not only the language that merits revision: more important, the political attitude of treating the

two processes differently must be revisited. We call on the relevant country to join China and the vast majority of countries in jointly promoting complementarity and mutual reinforcement between the two processes, so as to ensure progress on both fronts.

**Mr. Cleobury** (United Kingdom): I make this statement on behalf of the United Kingdom and Canada to explain our vote against draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”.

We welcome the important work started in September this year at the first substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) and look forward to the first meeting of the sixth Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, in December. We had hoped to avoid a contentious First Committee discussion this year, as we believe our efforts should be focused on our ongoing substantive work. We continue to take a positive and pragmatic approach to both processes, while building on the recommendations of previous consensus GGE reports, which have all been welcomed by the General Assembly. We are committed to a successful outcome in both.

We are at the start of two processes with aligned, but distinct, mandates, authorized by two separate resolutions with different timelines for completion. For that reason, it is procedurally appropriate that there are again two draft resolutions this year. However, we also recognize the crucial challenge of ensuring that the dual processes remain well-aligned and, for that reason, we wanted to be able to support both draft resolutions and for them to be adopted by consensus, without the need for a vote. To that end, we engaged substantively on both draft resolutions over the past few months, aiming to find common ground and building on text that has previously been approved by consensus by the First Committee and by the General Assembly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1 contains only text that has been previously agreed and, for that reason, we co-sponsored and voted in favour of it. The draft resolution welcomes both the OEWG and the GGE. We have engaged constructively on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, proposing amendments in line with consensus language that would have enabled us to support it. It is disappointing that none of those

amendments was made. The introduction of language that goes beyond the mandate for the OEWG, prejudices discussions or is otherwise controversial or undefined cannot be considered a genuine step towards consensus.

We previously noted that the choices we make together as a 193-strong General Assembly will help shape the development of cyberspace and the nature of peace and security in the twenty-first century. We have a collective commitment to maintaining international peace and security and to promoting and respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. We firmly believe that communication is the path to consensus. The more we listen, the more we learn. The United Kingdom and Canada are willing to listen and learn, but so must others.

That we did not reach true consensus on this occasion is profoundly disappointing. But both our countries remain committed to productive complementary processes. Given our reservations with the non-consensus-based language in those paragraphs, it is therefore with great regret that we had to vote against draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1. This vote reflects our opposition to that language in the draft resolution and not to the OEWG process itself. Our dual-track processes must and will succeed where all sides engage in good faith and build on the constructive engagement and positive atmosphere of our first OEWG to return this agenda to consensus.

**Mr. Khan** (Pakistan): We joined the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.15, entitled “Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament”. However, I would like to explain our delegation’s position on the rights with regard to the development, production, transfer and use of technologies for peaceful purposes, as contained in the fifth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution.

Science and technology have been recognized as critical enablers for the Sustainable Development Goals. Accordingly, it is every country’s inalienable and inherent right to develop, utilize and acquire technologies for socioeconomic development and to overcome the challenges of climate change, disease, water, energy and food security. Proliferation concerns should not become a pretext for denying dual-use technologies, especially in instances where recipient States stand ready to provide non-diversion assurances. Such denials are often based on political grounds, with non-proliferation only a secondary consideration. It

is important that the right of access to technologies for socioeconomic development should be ensured on a non-discriminatory basis. We consider those international agreements to which we are party, as well as international obligations that respective countries have undertaken, to be relevant.

**Mr. Leopoldino** (Brazil): My delegation has requested the floor to explain its vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.15, A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1 and A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1.

Brazil co-sponsored and supported draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.15, entitled “Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament”, as a reflection of its active participation in all discussions on the impact of developments in science and technology on international security and disarmament. In the past year Brazil actively participated in formal discussions, with a view to including in the draft resolution a reference to the right of States to develop, produce or otherwise acquire, retain, transfer or use technologies for peaceful purposes, in accordance with international obligations.

In recognition of the efforts by the delegation of India, as the main sponsor, to maintain consensus on the draft resolution, my delegation accepted the formulation contained in the fifth preambular paragraph of the resolution adopted in 2017 (resolution 72/28). Although not ideal, we believe that the formulation in question contributes to a more balanced approach with regard to the issues covered by the resolution. In this respect, our delegation recalls that the right of States to develop, produce, transfer and use technologies for peaceful purposes is explicitly and unequivocally recognized in article X of the Biological Weapons Convention, articles VI and X of the Chemical Weapons Convention, article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the twenty-first preambular paragraph of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. With regard to the fourth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.15, our delegation notes that the reference to the need to regulate the transfer of technologies for peaceful purposes to address the risk of proliferation by States or non-State actors refers to the specific provisions of relevant international obligations to which each State is bound.

Turning now to draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1 and A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, my delegation has requested the floor to explain its favourable vote on

each. Brazil deeply regrets that the First Committee has again had to vote on two competing draft resolutions on the issue. Our delegation participated in all informal consultations held by the authors of both draft resolutions and consistently called for dialogue and open engagement between them, with a view to either unifying the two texts or amending them in order to allow their approval by consensus. Since none of these options came to fruition, and as a sign of our unequivocal commitment to both dialogue processes currently under way, namely, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security and the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG), Brazil voted in favour of the two draft resolutions.

Despite the impossibility of reaching consensus in this context, we are encouraged by the fact that the authors amended their proposals so as to ensure that both draft resolutions included positive references to the GGE and the OEWG on an equal footing. Going forward, it is crucial that, within both the GGE and OEWG, all participants exercise the utmost flexibility and constructiveness, with a view to ensuring the adoption of reports and recommendations by consensus and their endorsement by the General Assembly. In addition, we hope that as the work of both Group progresses, the First Committee will resume its practice of adopting a single draft resolution on the issue of information and communications technology and international security. We therefore urge the authors of the two draft resolutions to undertake all efforts in that regard at the next session.

**Mr. Callis Giragossian** (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): Chile would like to explain its vote after the voting on the draft resolutions related to cybersecurity, namely, A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1 and A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, given that my country is a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1, entitled “Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security”. In that regard, Chile understands that two processes complement each other and strengthen the multilateral cybersecurity structure. For that reason, my country voted in favour of both draft resolutions.

**Mr. Grigoryan** (Armenia): I take the floor to explain the position of the delegation of Armenia on the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/74/L.32, A/C.1/74/L.33 and A/C.1/74/L.35, with regard to

the reference to the eighteenth Midterm Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), held in Baku from 3 to 6 April 2018.

We regret to mention that paragraph 577 of the final document of the Meeting runs counter to the long-established approach of the international community and contains biased and one-sided formulations that distort the essence of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and the principles of its peaceful settlement. The wording in the final document on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict also falls short of upholding the principles at the heart of the Movement, in particular the right of people to self-determination. In that regard, Armenia urges the member States of the Non-Aligned Movement to respect the negotiations and act in line with the spirit, logic and course of the peace process, based on the norms and principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act, including the equal rights and the self-determination of peoples, as one of the key principles for the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. We also urge them to reject any attempts by one member State in particular to misuse the Non-Aligned Movement platform by misrepresenting and distorting the Nagorno Karabakh peace process.

In the light of the foregoing, the delegation of Armenia would like to register its reservations about all paragraphs of First Committee draft resolutions containing a reference to the NAM Midterm Ministerial Meeting, held in Baku. Accordingly, Armenia disassociates itself from those paragraphs.

**Mr. Laukkanen** (Finland): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the member States of the European Union (EU) on draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1, "Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security", and A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security".

The candidate countries the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Norway, also members of the European Economic Area, and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this statement.

Given our reservations about the non-consensus-based language in the draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, it is with great regret that the member States of

the European Union are not in a position to support the draft resolution. We welcome the resumption of United Nations discussions on cyber issues in 2019 and reaffirm our commitment to working both within the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security and the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) in a complementary and coordinated manner to promote and further build on the cumulative achievements of previous GGEs.

We welcome the work done so far in the framework of the OEWG, which offers a valuable platform for exchanging positions and fostering a stronger common understanding on how to face threats and promote responsible State behaviour with regard to cyber issues. We also welcome GGE consultations with the States Members of the United Nations, as well as with other stakeholders, notably through regional organizations, such as the African Union, the European Union, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. We look forward to discussions within the framework of those two processes — the GGE consultations and OEWG multi-stakeholder consultations — and further engagement with non-governmental organizations, the private sector, civil society, the technical community and academia in December.

We had hoped to avoid a contentious First Committee discussion this year, as we believe our efforts should be focused on our ongoing substantive work. The EU would have given priority to a coherent consensus-based approach that reaffirms consensus-based views, including the work of previous First Committee draft resolutions that have usually enjoyed consensus, in order to avoid undermining ongoing discussions.

We agree on the importance of reaffirming consensus-based views articulated in previous GGE reports and related draft resolutions. We recall that, during the OEWG, it was widely shared that we would not be starting from scratch. We regret the fact that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1 have chosen to include language that, in the past, has not enjoyed consensus within the framework of the First Committee, despite the invitation by many States to return to consensus-based language.

On several occasions we reaffirmed our readiness to discuss the draft resolution in order to reach a

consensus. We deplore the current situation. We are disappointed about the outcome but welcome all endeavours within the United Nations community to work in both processes in a complementary manner and with a constructive approach, without prejudging the outcome of consensus-based discussions of the OEWG and the GGE. It is along those lines that we engaged constructively on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, with the sponsor proposing minor amendments in line with consensus language that would have enabled us to support it, certainly now that we have two ongoing processes. It is disappointing that none of those minor amendments were incorporated into the final draft.

In conclusion, the EU and its member States look forward to continuing their constructive engagement in GGE and OEWG discussions, with a view to promoting an open, free, stable and secure cyberspace in which human rights, fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and international law are fully respected and upheld. The EU and its member States welcome draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1 and A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1, just as they support the GGE and the OEWG. The EU will work with all States Members of the United Nations to conclude United Nations discussions that plot the path towards consensus in the First Committee.

**Ms. Skerten** (New Zealand): I take the floor to explain New Zealand's position on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1.

It is New Zealand's hope that all delegations here have a shared goal — that of ensuring a peaceful, stable online environment. The best way to make progress towards that objective is to work in a spirit of compromise and cooperation. Accordingly, New Zealand had expected to see consensus on this year's cyber draft resolutions. It is regrettable that that did not prove possible and that the amendments that would have secured such a desirable outcome were not accepted.

We had hoped that the draft resolution before the First Committee would have built on the constructive, positive discussions evident at the session of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) held in September. However, as it is, draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/ Rev.1 retains language of sufficient concern to us that we had to abstain in the voting. The text does not focus on the common ground we all share, and which we would like to see developed further for our collective benefit.

For our part, New Zealand will certainly continue to work positively as an active OEWG member to

deliver concrete practical outcomes to support stability in cyberspace. Although we are not a member of the process of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, we are confident that it, too, will be focused on achieving meaningful outcomes, building on the good work already completed by previous GGEs. We look forward to working in the spirit of constructive cooperation with all partners through the OEWG process and in our engagements with the GGE membership.

**Mr. Takamizawa** (Japan): I would like to explain my delegation's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/ Rev.1, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", in whose voting Japan abstained. Two cyber-related draft resolutions — A/C.1/74/L.49/ Rev.1 and A/C.1/74/L.50/ Rev.1 — were introduced in the First Committee. Japan genuinely wanted to see both of them adopted by consensus through further revisions and discussions in a complementary manner.

However, draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/ Rev.1 contains certain language we cannot support. It is regrettable that the proposed revisions and amendments by several States to change non-consensus language to consensus language were not incorporated in the draft resolution. Therefore, Japan was obliged to abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/ Rev.1.

Japan will continue to participate in the processes related to the Open-ended Working Group and the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security in a constructive manner and hopes that positive interaction — I repeat, positive interaction — will be sought in cybersecurity discussions at the United Nations.

**Mr. Masmеjean** (Switzerland): I take the floor to explain our vote on several draft resolutions.

Let me start by explaining our vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1 and A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1. We voted in favour of both draft resolutions. Our position is informed by positive developments since the adoption of the two competing draft resolutions on the issue of information and communications technology (ICT) in 2018, which initiated two distinct processes. In particular, we welcome the constructive first substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG). We hope that the session has set a trend that will prevail

throughout the work of the OEWG and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. We are also encouraged by the fact that both draft resolutions welcome both processes.

Our position is also informed by the fact that Switzerland takes an active role in both the OEWG and the GGE. Through our vote, we would like to underscore the importance of both processes working to ensure coherence and reaching a successful outcome. While we voted in favour of both draft resolutions, we would like to underline the following points.

We are convinced of the importance of the First Committee returning to consensus. We regret that was not possible this year. We voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49/ Rev.1, as it mirrors previous texts and relies essentially on long-standing consensus language. While we also voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1, we believe that it could have benefited from greater support — even if it had not been adopted by consensus — had it relied more closely on agreed language and faithfully reflected the consensus outcomes of past GGEs. We regret that was not possible and that corresponding changes were not made, notably with regard to the tenth and twelfth preambular paragraphs. The absence of a reference to the reports of the GGEs of 2013 and 2015 (see A/68/98 and A/70/174, respectively), adopted by consensus in the General Assembly, is to the detriment of the draft resolution. In particular, we would have liked to see confirmation that the existing body of international law applies to the activities of States in cyberspace.

In our view, the promotion of a strong international legal order in cyberspace is essential for preventing conflict and sustaining peace in cyberspace, as well as for ensuring stability and accountability. Going forward, we hope that we will be able to build on the positive developments that have materialized over the past year and that the Committee will be in a position to return to consensus on the issue of ICT. We will continue to support efforts to this effect, as well as efforts to ensure that both the OEWG and the GGE have a positive outcome.

*(spoke in French)*

I shall now explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.56, entitled “Strengthening and developing the system of arms control, disarmament and

non-proliferation treaties and agreements”. We voted in favour of the draft resolution because we believe that the rules-based international order is essential to preserving peace and international security. We fully share the concerns expressed in the draft resolution with regard to the impact on international security of weakened standards and agreements in the areas arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. While the draft resolution could pave the way for our renewed commitment to, and broadest support for, current norms, instruments and regimes, we must underscore that we see a marked contrast between the provisions on the draft resolution and several recent actions and developments. In particular, Switzerland deplores the fact that the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty could not be preserved. The development of new cruise missiles, which has raised questions with regard to compliance with that instrument and led to its abrogation, indicates the worrisome trend towards disengagement, indeed scant regard, with respect to a number of vital international rules, agreements and norms.

The violation of the long-standing ban on chemical weapons, in particular in the light of their repeated use in Syria, is another major concern. It is our view that objecting to a mechanism to identify the origin of the chemical weapons used in Syria, as well as the parties responsible for that, is at odds with the main provisions of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.56.

Lastly, we expect that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.56 and all Member States demonstrate the necessary commitment in order to uphold existing norms, ease tensions and preserve a rules-based international order.

**Ms. Sánchez Rodríguez (Cuba)** *(spoke in Spanish)*: We take the floor to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49/ Rev.1. The delegation of Cuba voted against the draft resolution on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security. It is our view that the main author of the text should have demonstrated flexibility and presented us with a text that was drafted jointly with the Russian Federation, which would enable us to re-establish consensus on the issue.

As we stated in informal consultations, there is no need for a draft resolution on the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of

International Security, inasmuch as it has not begun its substantive work, which has again led us to polarization on the issue. We are opposed to parallel draft resolutions that compete against each other and seek to divide the international community.

Although revisions were made to the draft resolution, its treatment of the Open-ended Working Group is not balanced. The Working Group is the appropriate forum and, unquestionably, the one best suited to address the issue in a transparent, inclusive, multilateral, democratic and open-ended way, with the full and equal participation of all Member States. We reiterate that the Groups of Experts working on the issue have exhausted discussions on the applicability of international law in the use of new information and telecommunications technology (ICT) without reaching a consensus on the urgent measures needed to prevent the covert or illegal use by individuals, organizations and States of the information systems of other nations to attack third countries.

We are therefore very concerned about the posture of the main author of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1, which promotes responsible State behaviour in cyberspace while developing cyberoffensive operations and capacities in cyberspace and a military doctrine that authorizes the use of offensive cybernetic weapons and the possibility of carrying out cyberattacks to deter its adversaries. We do not support any equivalence established between what is considered the malicious use of ICT and the concept of an armed attack that seeks to legitimize the alleged applicability of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. We reject all attempts to change cyberspace into a theatre in which military operations are conducted or to legitimize, in that context, punitive, unilateral force in response to the alleged malicious use of ICT. We must promote the peaceful uses of ICT and cooperation and dialogue among all States to address the challenges in that area. In our view, draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.49/Rev.1 does not meet those objectives.

**The Acting Chair:** We have heard from the last speaker in explanation of vote after the voting on cluster 5, “Other disarmament measures and international security”.

The Committee will now turn to cluster 6, “Regional disarmament and security”.

First, I shall give the floor to those delegations wishing to make either a general statement or to

introduce new or revised drafts under cluster 6. Statements are limited to five minutes.

I give the floor to the observer of the European Union.

**Ms. Vlădulescu (European Union):** I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The candidate countries Turkey, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania; the country of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina; as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.9, entitled “Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region”, the EU would like to state the following points.

We take note of paragraph 5, which has again been included in order to maintain consensus on this important draft resolution, and which calls upon all States of the Mediterranean region that have not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments in force related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, thereby creating the conditions necessary for strengthening peace and cooperation in the region.

We would like to underline that the proposed reference to legal instruments in force does not imply a change to our long-standing position in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which regrettably has not yet entered into force. Promoting the universalization and early entry into force of the CTBT are among the EU’s top priorities. All 28 EU member States have ratified the Treaty and remain strongly committed to pursuing the achievement of its objectives. The EU has also continued to provide significant financial support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities.

The EU reiterates its call on all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or delay. In particular, we address this call to the remaining eight annex 2 States, whose ratification is essential for the Treaty’s entry into force. We welcome the most recent ratification, by Zimbabwe, increasing the number of ratifications to 168 States.

Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call upon all States to maintain moratoriums on nuclear-

weapon test explosions and other nuclear explosions and to refrain from any actions that would undermine the Treaty's objective and purpose. In that regard, we call upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to maintain its declared suspension of nuclear-weapons testing and to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay.

Nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions represent a serious threat to international peace and security and undermine the global non-proliferation regime. It is important that all State signatories adhere to the objectives of the Treaty. Nonetheless, the absence of the CTBT's entry into force prevents the use of on-site inspections, an important verification tool. Only the entry into force of the Treaty will outlaw nuclear-weapon test explosions, or any other nuclear explosions, in a verifiable way. We will therefore continue to use every opportunity to advocate the Treaty's ratification and universalization, including during this session of the First Committee.

**The Acting Chair:** I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.9.

**Mr. Khaldi (Algeria):** As in previous years, I am delighted to formally introduce draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.9, entitled "Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region", submitted by Algeria, after a technical rollover.

Given Algeria's principled commitment towards achieving disarmament and strengthening security both regionally and globally, the primary objective of the draft resolution is to contribute to the various efforts aimed at ensuring that the Mediterranean region is peaceful and stable, by intensifying dialogue and consultations among the countries of the region, with a view to resolving existing problems and further developing regional cooperation.

Not only does the draft resolution address the issue of disarmament via stronger cooperation in the fields of combating terrorism in all its forms, tackling international crimes and combating illicit arms transfers and drug production, it also addresses the improvement of the political, socioeconomic and human rights situation in the countries of the region, based on ownership through national efforts and homogeneous regional actions. The draft resolution, which was adopted by consensus since its inception in 1983 until 2018, with continuous and strong support from the countries of the region and beyond, remains in line

with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to which we, Member States, have all adhered. In that regard, I wish to commend and thank those Member States whose regularly participation has enriched the Secretary-General's report on the issue (A/74/97) by sharing their national perspectives and contributions on the security of the Mediterranean region.

Last year's votes on the draft resolution, notably on operative paragraphs 2 and 5, as well as on the draft resolution as a whole, were an unfortunate setback, which we tried remedy through exchange and dialogue so as to explain that, ultimately, the draft resolution calls on the countries of the region to be willing to engage in collective efforts related to disarmament and, more broadly, peace. In that respect, my delegation expresses its hope that the draft resolution will receive the traditional unanimous support it has always enjoyed in the First Committee. We therefore call on everyone to vote in favour of those paragraphs and on the draft resolution as a whole.

**The Acting Chair:** I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan to introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/74/L.5, A/C.1/74/L.8 and A/C.1/74/L.7.

**Mr. Ahmed (Pakistan):** I would like to introduce Pakistan's three draft resolutions under cluster 6, namely, "Regional disarmament" (A/C.1/74/L.5), "Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context" (A/C.1/74/L.8), and "Conventional arms control at regional and subregional levels" (A/C.1/74/L.7).

Pakistan feels privileged to have spearheaded initiatives on regional disarmament, conventional arms control and confidence-building measures at the United Nations for several years now, and we have received wide support for those initiatives and draft resolutions. The General Assembly has long recognized that international peace and security are dependent on stability at the regional and subregional levels. In view of that inextricable relationship, the Charter of the United Nations acknowledges the value of regional arrangements to ensuring global peace and security.

In the post-Cold War era most threats to peace and security arise mainly among States located in the same region or subregion. International efforts towards disarmament and arms control are therefore reinforced and complemented by regional approaches to that end. The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted

to disarmament (resolution S-10/2), the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the First Committee's draft resolutions have repeatedly reaffirmed the need for the simultaneous pursuit of regional and global approaches, including agreements, in the area of disarmament and arms limitations. The international community has endorsed, through those mechanisms and normative frameworks, two well-recognized and tested tools, namely, conventional arms control and confidence-building measures, in particular at the regional and subregional levels.

We regret to note that an additional vote has been called this year on the seventh preambular paragraph of the draft resolution entitled, "Conventional arms control at regional and subregional levels", contained

in document A/C.1/74/L.7. The preambular paragraph simply notes the proposals for conventional arms control made in various regions. We would like to encourage all delegations to vote in favour of the seventh preambular paragraph, operative paragraph 2 and the draft resolution as a whole.

**The Acting Chair:** Given the time left and the provisions of rule 128 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly that no representative shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual conduct of the voting, the Committee will proceed with the voting on the draft proposals contained in cluster 6 at 3 p.m. tomorrow.

*The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.*