



# General Assembly

Seventy-third session

## First Committee

**31<sup>st</sup>** meeting

Thursday, 8 November 2018, 3 p.m.  
New York

Official Records

*Chair:* Mr. Jinga. . . . . (Romania)

*The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.*

### Agenda items 93 to 108 (continued)

#### Action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

**The Chair:** This afternoon the Committee will continue to take action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items 93 to 108. Time permitting, we will then consider the draft provisional programme of work and timetable of the First Committee for 2019, as contained in document A/C.1/73/CRP.5/Rev.1.

The Committee will now turn to the remaining draft proposals listed under cluster 4, "Conventional weapons", in informal paper A/C.1/73/INF.3. I shall first give the floor to delegations wishing to make general statements or introduce draft resolutions under cluster 4, "Conventional weapons". I want to remind delegations once again that statements are limited to five minutes.

I now give the floor to the representative of Afghanistan to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1.

**Mr. Musaddeq** (Afghanistan): Allow me to express my deepest condolences to you, Sir, and your family for your loss.

Afghanistan has the honour of introducing draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1, "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,

Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction". The draft resolution reaffirms the General Assembly's strong commitment to effectively addressing the problem of anti-personnel mines, which continue to maim and take the lives of men, women and children in many settings worldwide, while also undermining the development of communities and societies.

While recognizing the important progress that has been made towards implementing the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the draft resolution also underscores the importance of working for continued and sustained progress in that endeavour in order to deal more efficiently with the problem, including in situations where landmines continue to be used in areas of conflict around the world. In that regard, the draft resolution also emphasizes the importance of ensuring that States continue to focus and act on their adherence to the Convention, as well as remaining steadfast in promoting its universalization and norms.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank all the delegations that took part in the negotiations on the draft resolution in Geneva in a spirit of constructive cooperation. We are especially grateful to the delegations of Austria and Norway, the main sponsors of the draft resolution. We are hopeful and confident that this year's draft resolution will ensure enhanced cooperation among all States and other international stakeholders for the full and effective implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

**The Chair:** The Committee will now hear statements from delegations wishing to explain their

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positions before we take action on the draft resolution listed under cluster 4, "Conventional weapons".

**Mr. Hassan** (Egypt): I am taking the floor to explain my delegation's vote before the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1, on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Egypt will continue to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution. We have expressed our reservations on several occasions about the unbalanced nature of this Convention, which was developed and concluded outside the framework of the United Nations.

Mindful of the humanitarian considerations associated with landmines, Egypt imposed a moratorium on its capacity to produce and export landmines beginning in the 1980s, long before the Convention was concluded. We believe that it does not establish any legal obligation on States to remove the anti-personnel mines that they have placed on the territory of other States, thereby making it almost impossible for many States to meet demining requirements on their own. That is particularly true in the case of Egypt, which is one of the countries that has been worst affected by the problem, with more than 22 million landmines placed on its territory during the Second World War.

**Mr. Alharsha** (Libya) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, Mr. Chair, I would like to express our sincere condolences to you and to welcome you back once again to the First Committee.

I want to explain my delegation's position before the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1, "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction". While Libya is not a party to the Convention, we will vote in favour of the draft resolution. We share the international community's humanitarian concerns regarding the problems of anti-personnel mines, given their horrifying effects, the damage they do to the environment and to development efforts. My country has suffered from those very effects from the mine remnants of various wars from the Second World War to the present day.

The Convention does not make reference to the extent of the damage that countries have had to deal with thanks to explosive remnants of wars on their territories that resulted from occupation or because they became battlefields for other countries in conflict. Nor is there

any mention of the possibility of compelling former colonial Powers to pay reparations for the damage caused by anti-personnel mines that they placed on other countries' territories. We therefore hope that the States parties to the Convention will take our concerns into account and review the draft resolution in order to create a mechanism that can help countries suffering from the consequences of such mines to carry out demining and remove vehicles and equipment remnants of wars for the sake of the environment. That would enable my country to continue to vote in favour of the draft resolution in the future.

**The Chair:** The Committee will now take action under cluster 4, "Conventional weapons", on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Elliott** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53 was submitted by the representative of Afghanistan on 17 October. Subsequently, a revised draft resolution, A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1, was submitted on 2 November. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1.

I will now read out an oral statement with regard to the draft resolution, in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms of paragraph 10 of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General, in accordance with article 12, paragraph 1, of the Convention, to undertake the preparations necessary to convene a fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention and, on behalf of the States parties and in accordance with article 12, paragraph 3, of the Convention, to invite States not parties to the Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations, to attend the Review Conference as observers.

In accordance with article 14 of the Convention, the cost of a fourth Review Conference of the States Parties would be borne by the States parties and States not parties to the Convention participating therein, in accordance

with the United Nations scale of assessment, adjusted appropriately. The preliminary cost estimates for servicing the 2019 Review Conference will be prepared by the Secretariat and submitted for the approval of the States parties at their seventeenth meeting, to be held in Geneva during the week of 26 November.

It is recalled that all activities related to international conventions or treaties that, under their respective legal arrangements, ought to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations, may be undertaken by the Secretariat only when sufficient funding is received in advance from States parties and States not parties participating at the meetings. Accordingly, should the General Assembly adopt draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1, no additional requirements would arise under the programme budget for the biennium 2018-2019.

**The Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles,

Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

None

*Abstaining:*

Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Palau, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

*Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1 was adopted by 154 votes to none, with 17 abstentions.*

**The Chair:** I now call on delegations wishing to make statements in explanation of vote after the voting.

**Ms. Castro Loredó** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Cuban delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction". Cuba fully shares the legitimate humanitarian concerns regarding the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines. Our country is a State party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, including its amended Protocol II, and fully complies with its provisions and restrictions on mine use.

For six decades, Cuba has been subjected to an ongoing policy of hostility and aggression on the part of one military super-Power. Our country has therefore been unable to renounce the use of mines as a way to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity, in line with the right to legitimate self-defence recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. Cuba will continue to support all efforts that, while maintaining a necessary balance between humanitarian issues and national security issues, strive to eliminate the terrible effects of the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines on the civilian populations and economies of many countries. We also join the calls to

all States that are able to do so to provide the financial, technical and humanitarian support needed for mine clearance and for ensuring their victims' social and economic rehabilitation.

**Ms. Bhandari** (India): I am taking the floor to explain India's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1, "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

India abstained in the voting on the draft resolution. We support the vision of a world free of anti-personnel landmines and are committed to their eventual elimination. The availability of militarily effective alternative technologies that can cost-effectively perform the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines will considerably facilitate the goal of completely eliminating such mines. India is a high contracting party to the amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which enshrines an approach that takes into account the legitimate defence requirements of States, especially those with long borders.

India has fulfilled its obligations under the amended Protocol II, which among other things include ending production of non-detectable mines and rendering all of its anti-personnel mines detectable. India is observing a moratorium on the export and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. In accordance with international humanitarian law, we have taken a number of measures to address humanitarian concerns arising from the use of anti-personnel landmines. India remains committed to increased international cooperation and assistance for mine clearance and to the rehabilitation of mine victims, and we are willing to contribute technical assistance and expertise to that end. India participated as an observer in 2014 at the third Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, as well as in the fifteenth and sixteenth meetings of the States parties to the Convention, held in 2016 and 2017.

**Mr. Ghaniei** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am taking the floor to explain my delegation's vote regarding draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1.

Anti-personnel mines have been used irresponsibly during civil wars in various regions of the world and

as a result have claimed numerous innocent lives, particularly of women and children. We welcome every effort to stop that trend. However, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention focuses mainly on humanitarian concerns and does not take adequate account of the legitimate military requirements of many countries, particularly those with long land borders, which include the responsible and limited use of mines to defend their territories. Owing to the difficulties of monitoring extensive sensitive areas from established, permanent guard posts, and of establishing effective warning systems, anti-personnel mines therefore unfortunately continue to be an effective way for those countries to ensure minimum border security. While such defensive devices should be used under strict, established rules in order to protect civilians, more national and international efforts should also be made to explore new alternatives to them. My delegation appreciates the objectives of the draft resolution. However, due to our particular concerns and considerations, we abstained in the voting on it.

**Mr. Tun** (Myanmar): Allow me to express my delegation's sincere condolences to you and your family, Sir, for your loss.

I am taking the floor to explain my delegation's position on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1, "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

In principle, Myanmar supports the provisions of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty. We recognize the initiative taken under the instrument to prevent the indiscriminate use of landmines, which can lead to vulnerability and serious humanitarian impacts. We share the view that it is essential to make an effective, efficient and coordinated contribution to resolving the challenge of removing the anti-personnel mines scattered all over the world and to ensure their destruction.

The Government of Myanmar is trying to end the conflicts that have ravaged the country since its independence in 1948 and to bring peace among myriad ethnic groups. The Government is putting all of its efforts into the peace process and reconciliation, and disarmament measures are part of the peace-process negotiations. In addition, I would like to underline that capacity constraints are still preventing Myanmar from signing the Convention. In the meantime, the



relevant stakeholders in Myanmar are studying it in order to gain a better understanding of it and with the aim of becoming a signatory to it in the future. We therefore abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1 this year.

**Mr. Lee Jang-geun** (Republic of Korea): I would first like to join other colleagues in expressing my sincere condolences to you and your family, Sir.

The Republic of Korea sympathizes with the objectives and purposes of the Ottawa Convention and draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1. Owing to the security situation on the Korean peninsula, however, we are currently not a party to the Convention, and therefore abstained in the voting on the draft resolution. However, that does not mean that we are less concerned about the problems associated with anti-personnel mines, and we are committed to mitigating the suffering caused by their use. In that respect, the Korean Government exercises tight controls over anti-personnel landmines and has been enforcing an indefinite extension of its moratorium on their export since 1997. In addition, the Republic of Korea acceded to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its amended Protocol II, under which we are participating in a range of discussions and activities for ensuring only limited and responsible use. We also joined Protocol V, on explosive remnants of war, and are implementing all of its relevant obligations. Since 1993 the Korean Government has also contributed more than \$10 million for demining and victim assistance through the relevant United Nations programmes, including the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action and the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance, and we will continue to contribute to those international efforts for mine clearance and victim assistance.

Finally, my delegation would like to draw the Committee's attention to recent developments on the Korean peninsula. Based on the agreement reached at the most recent inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang, mines have been removed from the joint security area and are in the process of being removed from a select area within the demilitarized zone, where dozens of soldiers died during the Korean war. My hope is that my delegation will be able to return next year with further progress.

**Mr. Anton** (Germany): As a strong supporter of humanitarian disarmament instruments, Germany

voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/73/L.39, "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions", and A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1, "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction". Both make reference to the number of accessions to the two Conventions. With reference to our explanation of vote of 29 November 2012 (see A/67/PV.44) with respect to General Assembly resolution 67/19, our votes should not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine by Germany.

**Ms. Yeo** (Singapore): On behalf of my delegation, Mr. Chair, I would first like to express my condolences to you and your family and welcome you back to New York.

I am taking the floor to explain my delegation's vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1, "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

Our position on anti-personnel landmines has been clear and transparent. As in previous years, Singapore will continue to support all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines, particularly when they are directed at innocent and defenceless civilians. With that in mind, in May 1996 Singapore declared a two-year moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines without self-neutralizing mechanisms. In February 1998, we expanded it to include all anti-personnel landmines, not just those without self-neutralizing mechanisms, and extended it indefinitely. We also support the work of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention by regularly attending the meetings of States parties to the Convention.

Like several other countries, Singapore firmly believes that States' legitimate security concerns and right to self-defence cannot be disregarded. A blanket ban on all types of anti-personnel landmines could run counter to that. Singapore supports international efforts to resolve humanitarian concerns about anti-personnel landmines, and we will continue to work with members of the international community to reach a durable and truly global solution.

**Mr. Ahmed** (Pakistan): We join other colleagues in expressing our sincere condolences to you for your loss, Mr. Chair.

I am taking the floor to explain my delegation's position on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction", on which we abstained in the voting.

Landmines continue to play a significant role in meeting the defence needs of many States. Given our security compulsions and the need to guard our long borders, which are not protected by any natural barriers, reliance on landmines is an integral part of Pakistan's defence. Pakistan is a party to the amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which regulates the use of landmines in order to protect civilians from their indiscriminate and lethal effects. There are no uncleared mines on Pakistan's territory. We remain committed to ensuring that mines in our military inventory will never become a source of civilian casualties.

Pakistan is one of the countries contributing the largest numbers of troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations. We have successfully undertaken demining operations in various parts of the world and remain committed to providing further assistance to advance global humanitarian demining efforts.

**The Chair:** I thank all delegations for their kind words.

We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote after the voting on cluster 4, "Conventional weapons".

The Committee will now turn to the remaining draft proposals listed under cluster 5, "Other disarmament measures and international security". I shall first give the floor to delegations wishing to make general statements or to introduce draft resolutions or decisions under cluster 5. Delegations are once again kindly reminded that general statements are limited to five minutes.

**Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): I would like to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that the negotiation process on international information security was launched in the United Nations two decades ago thanks to the initiative of the Russian Federation. Today we are proposing to take that process to a new and higher level. The time has come to make the process inclusive, open and genuinely democratic. The practice of agreements that are based on a kind of club should be consigned to the scrap heap of history.

All States, irrespective of their level of technological development, have every right to participate directly in negotiations on international information security within the United Nations and thereby have an influence on decision-making. Every voice is important and should be taken into consideration. That is the only way we will be able to lay the foundations for a fair and equal world order.

We propose to set up an open-ended working group on international information security within the United Nations next year. Anyone who wants to would be entitled to join. The group would be empowered to consider the entire range of issues regarding the implementation of international information security. Particular attention would be paid to developing standards for responsible conduct in the information arena and the applicability of international law, as well as the issue of building the capacity of all developing countries in that area. The open-ended working group would enable every country to make a contribution to the discussion and participate in decision-making. There can be no alternative to that approach in today's world. Other negotiation formats that apparently hold various kinds of additional, parallel negotiations that exclude some States, are merely an attempt by countries of the West to create the illusion of inclusivity. In reality, that is a clear demonstration of the desire of Western countries to crudely filter participants in order to select the opinions they consider worthy and, of course, winnow out those that do not suit them. That kind of discriminatory approach is completely unacceptable.

Unfortunately, a number of delegations have put forward a proposal to set up a traditional group of governmental experts on information security, taking the path of preserving the current negotiation process. They do not want to see its constructive evolution. We want to point out that such a step would enable only a narrow group of countries to make decisions, pushing everyone else aside. The outcome documents of such a group of governmental experts would have the status of expert recommendations — in other words, would express only the opinions of a group of so-called wise men — and not the true position of the entire international community. It would therefore constitute yet another attempt to put off the resolution of long-term problems regarding the provision of international information security.

During the work on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, we showed complete flexibility. We sought to

meet the wishes of a number of delegations halfway by deleting some language taken from regional documents. The draft resolution that we are voting on today contains only a text agreed on within the United Nations and used in the reports of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security and in relevant General Assembly resolutions. It therefore addresses standards that have already been adopted by consensus on States' conduct in the information arena and affirmed in the reports of the Group of Governmental Experts. Unfortunately, our Western partners showed no flexibility at all, even after we took out all the provisions that they contested. We get the impression —

**The Chair:** I must interrupt the representative of the Russian Federation, as he has exceeded the time limit by 20 seconds.

I give the floor to the representative of the United States of America on a point of order.

**Mr. Bravaco** (United States of America): I would first just like to make a point of clarification. We are in the general-statements section of this particular cluster, are we not, Sir?

**The Chair:** Yes, we are.

**Mr. Bravaco** (United States of America): Thank you for that clarification. In my experience, I know what a general statement on the issue of cybersecurity sounds like, and I know what it sounds like when a particular delegation is advocating for its own draft resolution, which is what I just heard. I therefore submit that we should stick to general statements at this point of the meeting and not advocate for one draft resolution or another. That is out of bounds in this part of our statements on this cluster.

**The Chair:** I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation on a point of order.

**Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): I understand my American colleague's concerns, but, as you yourself said, Mr. Chair, this is a time for presenting draft resolutions. Whether our American partners like it or not — and everyone else was fine with it — we were presenting draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1.

**Mr. Kazi** (Bangladesh): I hope you will accept our sincere condolences, Mr. Chair.

Cyberspace has no physical borders, and States' capacities for securing it are far from equal. In an interconnected world, weaker links can cause disruptions for others. There is therefore a need for a pragmatic yet constructive approach to addressing the growing concerns in that regard. Identifying the actual sources of wrongful activity remains a challenge and developing countries should have access to technologies and information to detect such sources.

The United Nations can play a critical role in making the digital world safer. The work of setting norms in information security should continue, building on the work of the previous Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. The process should be made more inclusive and developing countries given a chance to voice their concerns, as is recognized in the Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament. Confidence-building measures should help States to overcome any breach of trust, and States should promote the use of non-offensive means to prevent and counter harmful cyberactivity. The question of rights and freedoms in cyberspace should be duly addressed. The role of the private sector and civil society must also be factored in.

The norms and principles for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace should receive unconditional support. The principles of the Charter of the United Nations and relevant international law should apply to cyberspace. States must remain true to their commitments to refraining from conducting or supporting any harmful cyberactivity. States should also prevent their territory from being used for wrongful acts that are against other nations' interests. Bangladesh takes those commitments seriously and we expect others to do the same. International cooperation in capacity-building for cybersecurity should be given priority, and development partners should consider as part of their internationally agreed commitments. In Bangladesh, we are working to build a complete cybersecurity ecosystem.

We would like to conclude by citing our Prime Minister when she spoke at a side event during the high-level week in September.

"I pledge Bangladesh's support for promoting a culture of cybersecurity at the United Nations and beyond. A United Nations high-level conference on cybersecurity could be an important building block

for that. We must demonstrate our strong political resolve to create a secure, stable, peaceful, inclusive and accessible cyberspace for future generations”.

**The Chair:** I give the floor to the representative of Nigeria to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.41/Rev.1.

**Mr. Ibrahim** (Nigeria): My delegation joins other delegations in expressing our sincere condolences to you and your family, Sir. I hope that you can find the fortitude to bear your irreparable loss.

My delegation is taking the floor to present draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.41/Rev.1, entitled “United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services”. The biannual resolution on the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme was established at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978. Its main objectives include raising greater awareness of the importance of disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and building and enhancing the capacity of officials from Member States, especially those from developing countries, in order to enable them to more effectively participate in disarmament and international security discourse.

The Programme is organized by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and its usefulness has been widely recognized and is highly regarded by Member States. Each year, 20 to 25 young diplomats and Government officials participate in the Programme and undergo a very enriching learning experience. In the 40 years since its inception, the Programme has trained more than 860 Government officials from more than 160 Member States in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, thus contributing to the process of deliberations and negotiations on key disarmament and international security issues. Indeed, many distinguished experts in this room have benefited from this celebrated Programme.

It is also commendable that the composition of participants in the Programme has achieved a good geographical and gender balance. It is particularly worth noting that many developing countries have benefited from participating in the Programme. Special appreciation goes to all Member States and organizations that have consistently supported the Programme over the years, thereby contributing to its success, particularly the European Union and the Governments of China, Germany, Japan, Kazakhstan,

the Republic of Korea and Switzerland, for continuing extensive and highly educational study visits for the Programme in 2017 and 2018.

The unanimous support for the First Committee’s biennial draft resolution on the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme demonstrates the strong support it receives from all Member States. We therefore urge all Member States to continue supporting this laudable Programme.

**Ms. Castro Loreda** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Cuban delegation would like to make a general statement on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”, which was presented by the Russian Federation and which Cuba has traditionally sponsored and supported.

In view of the issue’s significance, the Cuban delegation has traditionally lent its ongoing support, in all relevant forums, to its examination by a General Assembly open-ended working group on information and telecommunications in the area of international security, which would ensure full transparency, inclusiveness and the right to equal participation in discussions and decision-making at every stage. Cuba also supports launching, without further delay, a process for negotiating under the auspices of the United Nations the adoption of a legally binding international instrument that would enable us to respond to the significant legal loopholes that currently exist in the area of cybersecurity and to effectively address the growing challenges and threats that we face in this area, on a basis of multilateral cooperation.

Cuba believes that the only proposal that can adequately address the concerns of the international community in this area and facilitate multilaterally negotiated consensus-based solutions is the Russian Federation’s draft resolution. It establishes a group of international rules, norms and principles for responsible behaviour by States in the use of new technologies and proposes that a United Nations negotiating process begin in 2019, facilitated by an open-ended working group of the General Assembly, in order to continue developing those norms, rules and principles and to promote international cooperation in that regard.

We reiterate the need for urgent action, agreed on within the United Nations, to prevent the covert and



illegal use by individuals, organizations and States of other countries' information systems in order to attack third countries, given their potential for causing international conflict. We also reiterate that information and telecommunications should be used as tools to promote human welfare, knowledge and development, in strict accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. They should be instruments for promoting peace, not war.

**The Chair:** I now call on delegations wishing to explain their vote or position before we take action on the draft resolutions listed under cluster 5, "Other disarmament measures and international security".

**Mr. Charwath** (Austria): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its member States. The candidate countries Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, as well as the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

We recognize the role of the United Nations in furthering discussions on responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. We believe that the United Nations can help to strengthen cooperation and promote additional common understanding on State behaviour in cyberspace. However, EU member States are not in a position to support its current state draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", which was introduced by the Russian Federation on 12 October. We note with regret that the Russian Federation, the traditional sponsor of the information-and-communications-technology draft resolution, has chosen to pursue a different course of action this year with regard to both the process and content of previous First Committee resolutions that until now have enjoyed consensus.

While we note that the draft resolution introduced by the Russian Federation has been revised, we still have serious reservations, given, first, that the text supports the assertion that cyberspace is ungoverned and undermines the universally agreed position that existing international law applies in cyberspace. Secondly, it weakens our joint commitments to agreed norms of responsible State behaviour and opens them up to challenges. And thirdly, it gives undue emphasis to the sovereignty of States, with the inevitable risk of weakening the protection of online freedoms by

increasing States' ability to control access to domestic Internet use and its content.

By referring selectively and without consensus to the recommendations of previous consensus reports of the Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, the draft resolution also prejudices the substantive outcomes of any working group and consultative process. The previous reports of the Groups of Governmental Experts have articulated a consensus-based set of norms and recommendations that the General Assembly has repeatedly endorsed and have called on States to be guided by those recommendations in their use of information and communications technologies.

The EU and its member States believe it is important that we build on that legacy. We believe that another group of governmental experts can add value to advancing the international community's common understanding of how existing international law should be applied in cyberspace. A group with a clear, focused mandate would enable in-depth discussions that could bridge differences in interpretation of the application of existing norms and build a greater understanding of how those norms should be implemented, contributing a much-needed expert input to a broad, all-encompassing discussion in an open-ended working group.

All Member States should be able to contribute to that process, which is why the EU has significantly invested in capacity-building in the areas of cybersecurity and cybercrime, promoting national, regulatory and legal frameworks in conformity with existing international standards. Furthermore, the EU considers the aspect of involving the United Nations membership, as well as other relevant stakeholders, an important element of the mandate of the Group of Governmental Experts. A sixth group should hold regular, open-ended, intersessional consultations with the wider United Nations membership and interested stakeholders. We also recognize the role that an open-ended working group can play in disseminating knowledge, building expertise and fostering understanding of fundamental rules and their application to States' behaviour in cyberspace. The EU and its member States will actively participate in good faith in that regard.

The EU and its member States reaffirm their commitment to improving and strengthening stability in cyberspace. Looking ahead, we must ensure a

coordinated process that will guarantee that we can work and strive towards coherence. We will therefore continue to engage constructively in all United Nations cyber-related discussions, with the aim of facilitating effective and complementary discussions that lead to concrete actions, in order to set the standards for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace.

**Mr. Hassan** (Egypt): I am taking the floor to explain my delegation's vote before the voting on draft resolutions A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 and A/C.1/73/L.37. Egypt intends to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", and against draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, entitled "Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security".

Our position is based on our belief that it is time to make real progress within the United Nations framework in addressing the serious threats we are seeing related to cybersecurity and the malicious use of cybertechnologies as a means of warfare. We believe we must take stock of what has already been achieved in the previous Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. It is time for the United Nations to move forward in a genuinely inclusive and action-oriented manner, instead of moving in circles, since we already know where the real challenges and threats are. Meaningful progress on establishing a reliable regime that is based on agreed rules and norms has been stalled for more than a decade. There have been Groups of Governmental Experts on cybersecurity since 2004 that have already put forward valuable recommendations, and yet efforts to codify those recommendations or use them as a basis for binding rules continue to be strongly resisted.

That counterproductive attitude of resisting the establishment of a rules-based system in vital areas is not confined to cybersecurity. The same behaviour is displayed in several arenas, ranging from outer-space security to nuclear disarmament, including areas such as climate change and the multilateral trading system, in a manner that truly jeopardizes both the rule of law at the international level and multilateral diplomacy.

In addition to highlighting the counterproductive nature of the whole endeavour of draft resolution

A/C.1/73/L.37, we want to emphasize our concern about the resource-intensive requirements of establishing a sixth group of governmental experts on cybersecurity. In that regard, we feel it is important to point out that the delegation of the United States expressed concerns about the resources required to convene a conference on the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, at a time when the United States is presenting a draft resolution proposing the establishment of yet another cybersecurity group of experts that would cost \$1.3 million and would most probably face another failure to adopt recommendations, owing to the continuing divergence of views on fundamental issues.

With the same logic of inverted priorities, the delegation of the United Kingdom, one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, has stated that convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction would be a poor use of United Nations resources. We intend to address those utterly inconsistent positions at length in the Fifth Committee.

**Mr. Bravaco** (United States of America): I would like to deliver an explanation of the United States vote before the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", which we will vote against. For weeks, the United States and many other member States have consistently called for a return to a single-consensus draft resolution that builds on the successes and consensus of recent years. We reiterate that call today. However, Russia has regrettably chosen to depart from a consensus-driven approach, advancing a draft text that continues to contain a number of unacceptable flaws.

First, Russia has continued to include language in its draft text that is broadly unacceptable to many Member States. While we welcomed Russia's belated decision to remove the objectionable language taken from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's code of conduct, some significantly unacceptable language remains. In particular, the language in the draft pertaining to States' internal affairs that is drawn from General Assembly resolution 36/103, of 1981, is not something that the United States can accept. That language, which is pulled from a non-consensus resolution, is not consistent with full respect for freedom of expression and the free flow of information online.

Secondly, Russia's efforts to prejudge the work of the proposed open-ended working group by insisting on imposing a list of norms on Member States in the text of its draft resolution is also unacceptable. Russia's cherry-picking and rewording of texts from past reports of the Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, including in paragraph 1, omit essential elements of the framework for international cyberstability, which will have negative ramifications. Russia has added new language, adapted language from the original reports, split up other texts that went together and combined texts in new ways, as well as conflating language from sections on international law with language on non-binding norms. That can only confuse rather than clarify those issues for Member States. The reports of those groups were balanced and comprehensive products, and selectively quoting specific statements from them in this manner, particularly on non-binding norms, is counterproductive.

Finally, Russia's departure from consensus threatens to create an unnecessary and potentially counterproductive duplication of efforts in the cyber arena within the United Nations system. Such an outcome would only slow and frustrate our work on addressing threats emerging in this field.

In contrast to draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, proposed by the United States, "Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security", mirrors previous Russian-sponsored consensus resolutions on the topic, with a few small but important changes that we hope will make it easier for a new group of governmental experts to reach consensus. Our proposal builds on the success of the productive group process, seeks to advance those negotiations and takes significant steps towards a more inclusive process, including consultative meetings that are open to all Member States, as well as regional consultations.

The United States looks forward to continuing to constructively and pragmatically engage with other Member States in order to advance responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. There are very real challenges that should be addressed, but Russia's draft resolution is not the answer to them, and we therefore intend to vote against it and urge other delegations to do the same.

If I may make a respectful correction to a remark by our colleague from Egypt, the United States draft resolution on cyberspace is in fact far lower in cost, based on the new figures that we saw earlier today, than the projected cost of the Egyptian draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.22/Rev.1, on the conference on the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. I just wanted to note that for the record.

**Mr. Sarukhanyan (Armenia):** I would like to present the position of the delegation of Armenia on the draft resolutions submitted under agenda item 96. Taking into consideration the global importance of issues related to cybersecurity, it would be preferable to have a single consensus draft resolution on the matter that also underlined the importance of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in cyberspace.

The delegation of Armenia expresses its appreciation to the delegation of the Russian Federation for submitting draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", and will vote in favour of it. We recognize the critical role of information and communications technologies in promoting peace, socioeconomic and sustainable development, as well as enhancing cooperation and communication among nations. We would also like to underline that the protection of human rights and freedom of speech in the process of combating the use of information and communications technology for malicious purposes is a high priority for us, and we firmly believe that everyone should have the right to freedom of expression. That right should include the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas, regardless of frontiers, as is enshrined in article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, entitled "Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security", we recognize the significance of enhanced coordination and cooperation among States in addressing misuses of information and communications technology. Armenia is a strong advocate for collective action in combating the criminal use of information and communications technology at the national, regional and international levels. We support the leading role of the United Nations and other international and regional organizations in facilitating concerted efforts

aimed at reinforcing cybersecurity. We also want to underline that international law, in particular the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in their entirety, should become the basis for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. We once again stress the importance of freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek and receive information, regardless of frontiers, as enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is in that understanding that the delegation of Armenia will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37.

**Mr. Ghaniei** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am taking the floor to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, entitled “Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security”.

Over the past 15 years, while the use of information and communications technologies has substantially increased and the percentage of the world’s population with access to the Internet has grown from 5 to 55 per cent, the risks and challenges posed by the malicious use of information and communications technology have rapidly increased to unprecedented levels by comparison with 15 years ago. It is clear that progress in the development of internationally agreed cybersecurity norms and rules for responsible State behaviour is inadequate, and we see a pressing need for the establishment of a truly inclusive multilateral intergovernmental process within the United Nations for the development of international norms and rules on cyberconduct and the codification of such rules into international law.

Despite this situation, draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37 fails to take account of its realities but rather attempts to maintain the practices and processes of 15 years ago, which no longer suit today’s requirements. It is aimed at maintaining the status quo and business as usual, resulting in the continued absence of international norms governing cybersecurity and of any inclusive multilateral mechanism within the United Nations for considering and formulating international norms on information security. In order to maintain the status quo, paragraph 3 of the draft resolution again calls, as it did 15 years ago, for the establishment of a new group of governmental experts whose membership is open only to a select and privileged group of countries. Its mandate is also designed to maintain the status quo. There have been five Groups of Governmental Experts established over the past 15 years, all with the same

mandate and with limited and selected participants. The result is that there has been no progress in the development of cybernorms for responsible State behaviour. That flawed process has led to the current situation. Accordingly, the recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts share consensus with only a limited group of experts who do not represent international law or internationally agreed norms. Cyberspace is a global issue and the discussions and efforts on setting norms for it should be conducted in a global and inclusive process.

Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37 shows that its sponsor, the United States, is not seeking to build or develop internationally legally binding norms and rules in cybersecurity. It wants only to obstruct the creation of an inclusive, multilateral and intergovernmental process within the United Nations that could play a role in setting norms and rules. We do not trust the intentions of the United States, having seen it wage a war against multilateralism, international law and international instruments and institutions and systematically manipulate cyberspace for geopolitical advantage. Iran is a victim of that irresponsible behaviour. The United States developed and used Stuxnet against Iran’s critical infrastructure in 2010. A few days ago, its client, the Israeli regime, also conducted several cyberattacks on critical Iranian infrastructure. The claims of the United States and Israel that they are advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace is a cover for their continued irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace. No one should believe them. For those reasons, Iran will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37.

**Mr. Khaldi** (Algeria) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like to explain my country’s position regarding draft resolutions A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 and A/C.1/73/L.37. My delegation stated its position during the consultations on both draft resolutions. We believe that creating two different mechanisms simultaneously to address the same issue is counterproductive and undermines the current efforts to seek appropriate solutions to the challenges that we are facing related to cyberspace risks, including cyberattacks. We hoped that the Committee would achieve a consensus draft resolution that encompassed aspects of both of those under discussion.

My country is a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, which addresses the same important issue and outlines a more appropriate approach to it. We prefer the creation of open-ended mechanisms that would enable all States to take part in negotiations,



so that all can express their concerns about issues as important as this one. For those reasons, Algeria will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 and abstain in the voting on A/C.1/73/L.37.

**Ms. Castro Loreda** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Cuban delegation will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, “Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security”.

We believe that past Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security have weakened the potential of international law to be applied to the use of new information and communications technology, because of the fact that recently they have been unable to reach consensus on the urgent action that is required to prevent the covert and illegal use by individuals, organizations and States of other nations’ information systems to attack third countries. The group of experts proposed by the draft resolution would duplicate the work of the four previous groups and the open-ended working group proposed by Russia’s draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1. It would also have a severe impact on the regular budget of the United Nations, particularly that allocated to its disarmament programme, as it would meet for three years without guaranteeing concrete results or the equal participation of all Member States on equal terms.

We are also very concerned about the position of the sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37 regarding the work of the Group of Governmental Experts that was established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/237. It seeks to establish an equivalence between the malicious use of information and communications technology and the concept of armed attacks as envisaged in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, with the purpose of justifying the use of force in that regard. Furthermore, it promotes the applicability of the principles of international humanitarian law in the context of information and communications technology, when in practice that would mean accepting the possibility of an armed conflict or military action in cyberspace. We reject such attempts to convert cyberspace into a theatre for military operations and legitimize punitive unilateral acts of force in response to the alleged malicious use of information and communications technology.

As a responsible Member State, Cuba will attend all the relevant forums to condemn and repudiate such

dangerous approaches and to promote the development of international norms that can end the illegitimate use of information and communications technology and telecommunications and enable the establishment of an international cooperative framework for addressing such challenges through consultation and collaboration.

**Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian Federation will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, proposed by the United States.

In essence, the draft resolution is proposing that we take a step backwards in a very restrictive negotiation format. That amounts to an attempt to waste our resources in the extremely narrow and selfish interests of a limited group of Western countries. It represents their unconcealed desire to continue their policy of brutal discrimination and crush any opinion at variance those of the United States. We can hardly agree with their desire to strengthen the right of only a very narrow group of countries to make decisions, while leaving aside the opinions of every other Member State wanting to express them. Our Western partners have demonstrated no flexibility and, judging by everything we have seen, have no intention of doing so, and that is the main reason for the fundamental differences between the positions of the countries of the West and those of every other State Member of the United Nations.

Russia would like to urge all sovereign States to resist the pressure being put on them, decide for themselves what really corresponds to their own interests and freely express their national positions, while, of course, supporting the establishment of an open-ended working group. It is unlikely to be in their interests to blindly follow decrees from others’ capitals. They should make every possible effort to ensure that their own national views are heard and taken into consideration.

**Mr. Horne** (Australia): I am taking the floor to give an explanation of vote before the voting on two draft resolutions, A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 and A/C.1/73/L.37.

Australia will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, which includes selected and fragmented excerpts from the reports of the Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security of 2013 (see A/68/98) and 2015 (see A/70/174). That selective recollection distorts past agreements and undermines their status as consensus

documents. We have just heard that consensus is apparently the reason for the draft resolution, and the approach of the draft is in itself a fairly telling signal to the global community of its vision for regulating cyberspace regarding what can and cannot be accessed, what does and does not constitute freedom in cyberspace and whose voices matter and whose do not.

Australia reaffirms its commitment to acting in accordance with the norms, rules and principles articulated in the cumulative reports of the Groups of Governmental Experts in their entirety, and we call on all countries to do the same. Now more than ever it is in all of our interests to promote responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. The best way to do that is to consolidate and build on the previous consensus reports, driving forward the conversation in an inclusive, transparent and consensus-based manner.

Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 also proposes the establishment of an open-ended working group. Australia welcomes broad participation in those important discussions. However, we believe it would be very difficult to achieve consensus in an open-ended working group, and it is vitally important that we continue to move forward. There is too much at stake to allow those discussions to stagnate. Australia has worked hard with others to foster consensus and agreement on a single, compromise draft resolution or two complementary draft resolutions that build on the existing consensus. We regret that that has not been possible, and for those reasons we will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1.

With respect to draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, “Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security”, the establishment of a new group of governmental experts with a much improved and expanded consultation mechanism would better balance the dual imperatives of inclusivity and progress. In our view, the draft resolution does an effective job of broadening consultation and inviting more people to participate in such consultation as developments in cyberspace continue to advance. We reaffirm our commitment to an international stability framework for cyberspace based on the application of existing international law, agreed voluntary norms of responsible State behaviour and confidence-building measures, supported by coordinated capacity-building programmes. We also reiterate our commitment to advancing inclusive, transparent and consensus-based discussions at the United Nations, in order to

promote peace and stability in cyberspace. We look forward to discussions with all States so as to continue driving forward consensus-based agreements on those important issues. In our view, draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37 does the best job of doing that, which is why we have become a sponsor of it and will vote in its favour.

**Mr. Hallak** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, “Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security”, once again calls for the establishment of a group of governmental experts whose meetings would be exactly like those of the previous groups dedicated to discussing the same issues. We believe that the draft resolution’s main goal is to preserve the status quo and to limit any opportunities for arriving at international recommendations on a very important issue. It is unethical for its sponsors to include certain States, among them the United States, that are well known as violators of cyberspace and some of which have threatened to launch cyberattacks against other States only this year. For those reasons, my delegation will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37.

On the other hand, we want to emphasize that draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”, has taken delegations’ concerns into consideration, particularly with regard to the establishment of an open-ended working group. In our view, that issue has been extensively discussed during the meetings of the Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, and it is therefore high time that we discussed this important and vital issue from the perspectives of security, development and growth in a transparent and open manner. Moreover, the work of the open-ended working group will be based on consensus, and my delegation will therefore vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1.

**Mr. Collard-Wexler** (Canada) (*spoke in French*): At the outset, Mr. Chair, Canada would like to express its condolences to you and your family.

(*spoke in English*)

I am speaking on behalf of Australia, Estonia, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and my own country, Canada, to explain why we cannot support draft

resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”. It is a strange turn of events for our delegations, as we have consistently supported previous versions of the draft resolution, along with the Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security that they have created since 1998, when the first draft resolution on the subject was introduced by the Russian Federation. We welcomed and have adhered to the consensus recommendations by the 2013 and 2015 Groups of Governmental Experts, particularly on the recognition of the applicability of international law in cyberspace and the agreed voluntary norms for State behaviour that are now used as a basis for cooperation around the globe.

This year, unfortunately, the draft resolution has been completely transformed. It no longer seeks to build on the international consensus achieved to date. Instead, it presents selected and incomplete excerpts from the 2013 and 2015 reports of the Groups of Governmental Experts (see A/68/98 and A/70/174) that deliberately distort their meaning and undermine their status as a consensus and normative basis from which to move forward. That dramatic change in approach on an issue on which broad agreement is critical for making progress, and on which consensus was understood to be essential, is profoundly disappointing. While we believe that the basic premise for pursuing work under the draft resolution is flawed and risks destroying hard-won international consensus, we also believe that there is merit in further considering how best to address issues such as capacity-building and confidence-building measures in cyberspace. Right now, we continue to see scope for an expert-led Group that is both representative enough to produce outcomes that all can agree on and nimble enough to do so in a reasonable time frame. We believe that a sixth group of governmental experts, complemented by stronger consultation mechanisms, offers a good compromise that gives all States an opportunity to influence the discussions and have a stake in their successful outcome.

It was our hope that the United States and the Russian Federation would agree on a single draft resolution that could build on the successes of the Group of Governmental Experts process, while enhancing it and responding to our collective desire that it be more inclusive. Unfortunately, it has proved

impossible to agree on one draft resolution. Even a compromise by which the two draft resolutions could create processes that at least complemented each other has eluded us. The result is two draft resolutions and two processes, to the potential detriment of respect for international law and the goal of establishing global norms in cyberspace. Since we believe sincerely that draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 puts both the law and those norms at risk, we have little alternative but to oppose it.

**The Chair:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolutions under cluster 5, “Other disarmament measures and international security”. We will first take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Elliott** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27 was submitted by the representative of the Russian Federation on 12 October. Subsequently, draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 was submitted on 25 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1. Guinea and Kyrgyzstan have now become additional sponsors.

The present oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. It supersedes the statement of programme budget implications contained in A/C.1/73/L.71, submitted previously, in the light of the updated and additional information regarding the resources approved for the biennium 2018-2019.

Under the terms of paragraphs 5 and 6 of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, the General Assembly would decide to convene, beginning in 2019, with a view to making the United Nations negotiation process on security in the use of information and communications technologies more democratic, inclusive and transparent, an open-ended working group acting on a consensus basis to continue, as a priority, to further develop the rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour of States listed in paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, and the ways for their implementation; if necessary, to introduce changes to them or elaborate additional rules of behaviour; to study the possibility of establishing regular institutional dialogue with broad participation, under the auspices of the United

Nations; to continue to study, with a view to promoting common understandings, existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them and how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States, as well as confidence-building measures and capacity-building and the concepts referred to in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution; to submit a report on the results of the study to the General Assembly at its seventy-fifth session; and to provide the possibility of holding, from within voluntary contributions, intersessional consultative meetings with interested parties, namely, the business sector, non-governmental organizations and academia, to share views on the issues within the group's mandate. It also decides that the open-ended working group shall hold its organizational meeting in June 2019 in order to agree on the organizational arrangements connected with the group.

Pursuant to the request contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft resolution, it is envisaged that the following meetings will be held in New York by an open-ended working group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security: a two-day, organizational session in June 2019 consisting of four meetings with interpretation in all six languages; a five-day substantive session in 2019 consisting of 10 meetings with interpretation in all six languages; and two five-day substantive sessions in 2020 consisting of 20 meetings with interpretation in all six languages. They would constitute an addition to the meeting workload for the Department for General Assembly and Conference Management in 2019 and 2020. However, the requirements in 2019 for meeting services in the amount of \$107,800 would be met from within existing resources. The additional requirements for meeting services would arise in 2020 in the amount of \$168,000.

Furthermore, the request for documentation contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft resolution would constitute an addition to the documentation workload of the Department for General Assembly and Conference Management. For the organizational session in 2019, there would be three pre-session documents totalling 14,500 words in all six official languages. For the open-ended working group session in 2019, there would be four pre-session documents totalling 6,000 words, three in-session documents totalling 6,000 words and one post-session document

totalling 6,000 words in the six official languages. For the open-ended working group sessions in 2020, there would be 18 pre-session documents totalling 36,000 words and two post-session documents totalling 18,500 words in the six official languages. However, the resource requirements for documentation services in the amount of \$97,200 in 2019 would be met from within existing resources. The additional requirements for documentation services would arise in the amount of \$175,200 in 2020.

With regard to the intersessional consultative meetings with the interested parties, as contained in paragraph 5, conference services would be provided if sufficient extrabudgetary resources are secured and if capacity allows. In addition, it is estimated that a total non-recurring amount of \$17,300 would be required for 2019 to cover the costs of the services and related travel of a consultant to provide technical and substantive support to the Office for Disarmament Affairs in connection with the preparations for and substantive servicing of the work of the working group, as well as the two-day organizational session in 2019. Those requirements would be met from within existing resources under the programme budget for the biennium 2018-2019. Additional non-recurring consultancy requirements for the Office for Disarmament Affairs in the amount of \$37,600 in support of the work of the working group for 2020 would be considered in the context of the proposed programme budget for 2020.

Accordingly, should the General Assembly adopt draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, no additional requirements would arise under the programme budget for the biennium 2018-2019. Adoption of the draft resolution would result in additional resource requirements in the amount of \$343,200 under section 2, "General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management", and \$37,600 under section 4, "Disarmament", to be included in the proposed programme budget for 2020.

**The Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia,



Chad, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

*Abstaining:*

Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Senegal, Switzerland, Turkey

*Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 was adopted by 109 votes to 45, with 16 abstentions.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, entitled "Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Elliott** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37 was submitted by the representative of the United States of America on 15 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/73/L.37. Guinea has now become an additional sponsor.

At this time, I would like to inform the Committee that a statement on the programme budget implications of the draft resolution has been issued as document A/C.1/73/L.72 and has been placed on the e-deleGATE portal.

**The Chair:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

*Against:*

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe

*Abstaining:*

Algeria, Angola, Belarus, Botswana, Burundi, Cambodia, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Myanmar, Namibia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda

*Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37 was adopted by 139 votes to 11, with 18 abstentions.*

**The Chair:** The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.41/Rev.1, entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Elliott** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.41 was submitted by the representative of Nigeria on 16 October. Subsequently, draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.41/Rev.1 was submitted on 22 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/73/L.41/Rev.1. Guinea and Guinea-Bissau have now become additional sponsors.

**The Chair:** The sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.41/Rev.1 has expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.41/Rev.1 was adopted.*

**The Chair:** I now call on those delegations wishing to speak in explanation of vote after the voting.

**Mr. Perren** (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): I am taking the floor to explain our votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", and A/C.1/73/L.37, entitled "Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security".

Switzerland believes firmly that the United Nations must continue to play a leading role in promoting understanding within the international community on current and potential cyberthreats and cooperative measures to address them. To that end, it is essential to build on the progress that has already been made in order to contribute to, strengthen, universalize and operationalize the 2010, 2013 and 2015 recommendations on this subject.

Switzerland urged an approach that built on the consensus of previous resolutions. A consensus-based draft resolution would have helped the international community to undertake joint efforts aimed at ensuring that cyberspace is covered by international law and remains open, free and stable. We therefore regret that two separate draft resolutions were submitted to the First Committee that differ considerably in their proposed mandates and processes. Deviating from a consensus-based approach leads to a number of risks, including the possible fragmentation of efforts aimed at addressing the challenges that State and non-State actors are facing in the current cybersecurity environment.

Switzerland voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, as it reflects the consensus of resolutions from previous years. We will continue to support efforts to build on the progress that has been achieved so far. Above all, we continue to believe that at this stage further discussions by the experts are needed if we are to make headway in our work on information and communications technology in the context of international peace and security. Establishing a new group of governmental experts operating on a basis of consensus would help States in their efforts to implement previously adopted recommendations, as set out in the reports of 2010, 2013 and 2015 (see A/65/201, A/68/98 and A/70/174), and would identify new areas of agreement. We also welcome the fact that the draft resolution recognizes the benefits that can result from involving the private sector, academia and civil-society organizations and establishing a collaboration mechanism with regional organizations.

We abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1. While we note that the draft resolution has been considerably modified, we still believe that some of its provisions are problematic. In paragraph 1, the references to international norms, rules and principles for the responsible behaviour of States are taken from the 2013 and 2015 consensus reports of the Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments

in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. However, those references are taken out of context, selectively chosen and at times incomplete. In our view, the norms, rules and principles for responsible behaviour identified by the Groups of Governmental Experts can help to reduce cyberthreats only if considered in their entirety. The same applies to paragraph 5.

We can see the added value of an open-ended working group that aims to enhance our understanding of the norms, rules and principles of previous reports of the Groups of Governmental Experts. However, we strongly caution against renegotiating norms, rules and principles on which agreement has already been reached. Introducing changes could jeopardize the gradual progress that was achieved in previous Groups of Governmental Experts. Switzerland will participate in the open-ended working group while bearing that in mind. We also want to express our reservations about the reference to General Assembly resolution 36/103, “Declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention and interference in the internal affairs of States”. That declaration was not adopted by consensus and has never been linked to the issue of information and communications technology within the context of international peace and security.

From now on it will be particularly important to ensure coherence between the processes established by draft resolutions A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 and A/C.1/73/L.37 and to avoid any contradiction and fragmentation between them. Until now, Member States have acted with unity and coherence on the issue of cybersecurity, and it is essential to ensure that that will continue in the future. That is why Switzerland will continue to participate constructively in all discussions related to cybersecurity, with the aim of defining standards for responsible behaviour in cyberspace.

**Mr. Suárez Moreno** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): We would like to express our condolences and solidarity to you for your recent family loss, Mr. Chair.

The delegation of Venezuela attaches particular importance to information and communications technology and its effect on peace and security and the economic and social development of peoples. We are convinced of the need for progress in this area, to the benefit of all countries, in strict compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the

United Nations. While we recognize the contribution of information and communications technology to various areas of international relations, we are nevertheless concerned to see the inappropriate use of such technology in activities that range from stigmatization campaigns aimed at distorting reality in our societies to cyberattacks designed to destabilize States’ sovereignty, economic and social development and political independence. Such challenges cannot be underestimated or minimized and require an inclusive approach to the responsible use of information and communications technology and security that enables the participation of all States, including developing countries, which are generally the most vulnerable to existing threats in this area, in creating principles and norms that affirm the commitment of the international community to the peaceful uses of such technological development, in accordance with the Charter and other relevant instruments.

For those reasons, Venezuela voted against draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, as we believe that its restrictive approach would lead to difficulties, such as maintaining a status quo that does not take into account the importance of making progress in establishing principles and rules in this area as soon as possible. The limited discussion format is also inadequate, since this issue concerns all States, regardless of their technological development, given the impact of information and communications technology on international peace and security. We will therefore promote the creation of an open-ended working group that would be open to all States to participate. We regret that we have been unable to produce a consensus text on the proposals that were submitted for our consideration. We hope that in the near future we will be able to achieve a consensus that reflects the interests of the international community with regard to the challenges it is facing in this area.

**Mr. Ji Haojun** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): At the outset, Mr. Chair, I would like to express my sympathy to you and your family on behalf of the Chinese delegation.

China voted against draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, entitled “Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security”. China has consistently supported the leading role of the United Nations in formulating international rules governing cyberspace. For many years, the process of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments

in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security has played a major role in encouraging consensus and promoting the formulation of international rules on cyberspace. Against the current global backdrop, China deems it necessary to further strengthen the United Nations approach in this regard to make it more open and inclusive. We have also taken note of the fact that some countries voted against draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1., and I do not know whether they will be invited to participate in the group of governmental experts to be established under draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37. Whatever the circumstances, the open-ended working group to be established by draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 will of course be open to all.

**Mr. Kazi** (Bangladesh): Bangladesh voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 and A/C.1/73/L.37, as we see useful provisions and elements in both. There is complementarity between the two draft resolutions and their follow-up should be mutually reinforcing and coherent. We look forward to seeing both follow-up processes utilized as effectively as possible, especially considering the potential implications for resources. The failure to reach consensus on a single draft resolution should be an exception rather than setting a precedent for future work. We would like to remind the Committee that the concerns about information security are shared by all States, not just a few.

**Mr. Nakai** (Japan): At the outset, the delegation of Japan would like to offer its deepest condolences to you and your family, Sir.

I want to provide an explanation of Japan's vote after the voting on draft resolutions A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 and A/C.1/73/L.37. This year we witnessed a very unusual situation in which we were faced with two draft resolutions proposing to establish two different forums for the same issue. Despite a series of consultations and efforts by the relevant countries, it is deeply regrettable that a single consensus draft resolution was ultimately unable to be put forward for adoption.

Japan voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37, introduced by the United States, which aims to establish a group of governmental experts on cybersecurity. In our view, its approach is well balanced, building on the development and the achievements of the past Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information

and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security while also using comprehensive outreach to bring in outside perspectives. Although others have expressed concerns about how the outcomes from the past Groups of Governmental Experts are referred to in draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, Japan has always supported open and inclusive discussions, and it is definitely not our intention to deny an inclusive approach by any expert working group in general terms.

Japan looks forward to working further with others to advance the discussions based on the work of previous Groups of Governmental Experts on cybersecurity, including the application of international law, as well as norms, rules and principles for States' responsible behaviour. At the same time, we believe that those two lines of effort should be merged in a constructive and cooperative way at some point in the future.

**Mr. Khoo** (Singapore): I am taking the floor to explain my delegation's position on the two draft resolutions presented under agenda item 96 — A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security" and A/C.1/73/L.37, entitled "Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security".

Singapore recognizes that threats to an open, secure and peaceful cyberspace are increasingly sophisticated, transboundary and asymmetric in nature. As a small, highly connected State that has been subjected to several cyber incidents in recent times, Singapore is resolutely committed to creating resilient and trusted cyber environments. We therefore commend the Russian Federation and the United States for presenting draft resolutions that offer proposals on the way forward on this important subject. Singapore participated actively in the negotiations on both draft resolutions. We note that both the United States and Russia engaged in consultations and tried to reach agreement on a single consensus draft resolution. However, that proved impossible, which is why we have two draft resolutions before us today. Singapore voted in favour of both draft resolutions today, for three main reasons.

First, we believe that both draft resolutions are meaningful initiatives. We recognize that both parties have taken on board amendments in response to constructive suggestions offered during the course of negotiations. The United States draft resolution will now allow for the establishment of a group of governmental



experts that is more inclusive, consultative and open, while paragraph 1 of Russia's draft resolution no longer contains references to non-consensus language negotiated outside the auspices of the United Nations.

That brings me to my second point. The United Nations, the only universal multilateral forum, has a fundamental role to play in the development of rules, norms and principles for responsible behaviour in cyberspace. The United Nations has accomplished much in that regard, particularly through the Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. While Singapore has never been a member of those groups, we support the work that they have done, including on developing voluntary, non-binding norms. Such work should continue at the United Nations, and both draft resolutions envision that.

Thirdly, our view is that an open-ended working group and a group of governmental experts are not fundamentally incompatible. We are doing ourselves a disservice if we portray this as a forced dichotomy. An open-ended working group will involve all Member States, giving all States an opportunity to participate and have an equal say. It could function as a useful platform, including for promoting common understanding. A smaller group made up of experts on the subject-matter could be useful for more in-depth and technical exchanges aimed at advancing our understanding of complex issues. It is our hope that both groups will be able to work together in a complementary manner.

Our adoption of these two draft resolutions today represents an important opportunity for restarting and re-energizing dialogue and cooperation at the United Nations on an important issue. If we are to succeed in building consensus, it is our responsibility to understand our differences so as to find solutions to bridge the gaps between them. It is equally important to ensure that the major Powers work together in a spirit of consensus and mutual respect and trust. We call on them to show wisdom, flexibility and leadership with a view to preventing the polarization of cyberspace. For its part, Singapore will continue to engage constructively on a matter that is of great importance to all countries of the United Nations.

**Ms. Bhandari** (India): I am taking the floor to explain India's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, "Developments in the field of

information and telecommunications in the context of international security".

India voted in favour of the draft resolution, as we support its general objectives, including the establishment of an open-ended working group. However, we have concerns about inconsistencies in its use of terms and would have preferred the wording "information and communications technology" rather than "information technology", and "security of cyberspace" rather than "cybersecurity and information security". We would have preferred to see references to multi-stakeholders rather than the identification of only a few. We also have concerns about the formulation in paragraph 1 and its reference in paragraph 5. While it should be inspired by the outcomes of previous Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, we believe that the mandate of the open-ended working group should be kept open.

**Mr. Soemirat** (Indonesia): On a personal note, Mr. Chairman, I would like to convey our delegation's deep condolences and sympathy to you and your family for your loss.

We are taking the floor to explain our positions on draft resolutions A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 and A/C.1/73/L.37, which we have just adopted.

From our deliberations, it is clear that there is an urgent need for regulations in this particular area of cybersecurity. The unanimous attention from all delegations to the two draft resolutions, submitted separately by the delegations of Russia and the United States, is clear evidence of that. It is regrettable, however, that the current dynamics in the First Committee are not a fair reflection of our common and collective intention to address the challenges related to the issue of cybersecurity.

Our delegation always considers draft resolutions based on their own content and merit. We note with appreciation the various contributions and recommendations of the previous Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, established by the Secretary-General. The creation of such groups enables experts to conduct intensive and open dialogue on various contentious points related to the issues. In our view, Member States have already benefited from such open exchanges of views among the governmental experts.

At the same time, on principle, Indonesia is a strong proponent of multilateralism and never shies away from discussing contentious issues in open forums, particularly in the format of open-ended working groups created within the United Nations framework. We now believe that the positive mechanisms established through the adoption of those two draft resolutions will be able to complement each other, bearing in mind that both should be appropriately established according to their own individual requirements. Based on that approach, our delegation voted in favour of both draft resolutions. Following the creation of the two entities, delegations must make use of both the open-ended working group and the group of governmental experts so as to benefit all States Members of the United Nations, not just certain countries.

**Mr. Ahmad Tajuddin** (Malaysia): At the outset, Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to convey our sincere condolences to you and your family at this time.

Malaysia is taking the floor to explain its vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", and A/C.1/73/L.37, "Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security". As we expressed during the rounds of informal consultations on the draft resolutions, we hoped that there would be a single draft resolution under this agenda item, with broad support from Member States, as in previous years. Nevertheless, at this juncture, we believe that both draft resolutions will add value to the global discourse on this issue and help move it forward.

With the goal of making tangible progress in this area, Malaysia hopes that both the group of governmental experts and the open-ended working group will complement each other and serve as effective platforms for conducting vital work in a spirit of transparency, inclusivity, pragmatism, collaboration and mutual trust. We therefore voted in favour of both draft resolutions during the current proceedings of the First Committee of the General Assembly at its seventy-third session.

**Mr. Penaranda** (Philippines): The Philippines voted in favour of both draft resolutions — A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", and A/C.1/73/L.37, "Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of

international security". I would like to highlight three points in that regard.

The Philippines actively participated in the deliberations during informal consultations and engagements with the concerned parties and groups. We were hoping for a single draft resolution, but that proved impossible. However, we note that the references in draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 to the code of conduct of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) were deleted and thereby brought the mandates of the group of governmental experts and the open-ended working group closer together. We further noted that the reports of the Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security were recommended by the General Assembly. Our previous main concerns regarding this draft resolution were its paragraph 1 and its language on the SCO code of conduct, which was seen as prejudging the outcomes and policy direction of a future group of governmental experts.

Lastly, we look forward to seeing the United States and Russia and the key parties concerned working together on those parallel processes. They should make the two groups complementary and avoid redundancies as much as possible. The Philippines also looks forward to something more positive and constructive in the future and encourages a depoliticized process.

**Mr. Ovsyanko** (Belarus) (*spoke in Russian*): I would first like to convey our condolences to you and your family, Mr. Chairman, on your sad loss.

I am taking the floor to explain our vote on the draft resolutions before us. The Republic of Belarus considers issues related to the influence of information and communications technology on international peace and security extremely important. It is no secret that the development of modern technologies, along with many other concomitant factors, poses both potential and actual security threats. We have already witnessed a number of precedents in which information and communications technology has been used for harmful purposes. The pernicious effects of the malicious use of information and communications technology have no limits, and these threats are on a global scale. In our view, our joint action in the prevention of threats in the area of information and communications technology should be just as broad and inclusive.

In that connection, we believe that an initiative that consciously sets up a narrow, closed group — almost a club — of experts is insufficiently effective and does not enable an inclusive approach to solving problems in this area. We believe that only a multilateral and broad approach to establishing a group will allow us to respond comprehensively to these emerging threats. For that reason, we sponsored and supported draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, put forward by the Russian Federation, and abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.37.

**The Chair:** We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote after the voting on the items under cluster 5.

The Committee has thus concluded action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under the agenda items allocated to it.

### Programme of work

**The Chair:** Our last order of business is to adopt the draft provisional programme of work and timetable of the First Committee for 2019, as contained in document A/C.1/73/CRP.5/Rev.1, which I believe has been distributed to all delegations.

The draft programme of work before the Committee for 2019 is based on the practices of the Committee in previous years. I would like to draw the Committee's attention, however, to the fact that given the increasing number of speakers over the years, an additional three meetings have been identified, subject to the availability of conference services. The programme of work consists of one organizational meeting — which will take place on Thursday, 3 October 2019 — eight meetings for the general debate, 12 for the thematic discussion segment, one for the joint panel discussion of the First and Fourth Committees on possible challenges to space security and sustainability and, finally, six for the action phase.

I would like to remind all delegations that the First Committee shares its conference facilities and other resources with the Fourth Committee. Consequently, the draft provisional programme of the First Committee for 2019, which we are considering now, has been prepared in consultation with the secretariat of the Fourth Committee. The two Committees will continue to coordinate their work and maintain a sequential pattern for conducting their meetings, in order to maximize shared resources.

In the context of our earlier discussions on the exchange with the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and other high-level officials in the field of arms control and disarmament, and after having consulted with the Bureau of the Committee, I want to inform the Committee that by the end of December, as promised, I intend to present a non-paper with the goal of convening informal consultations of the Committee by the end of January or the beginning of February 2019. Member States are strongly encouraged to submit their inputs to the secretariat, as well as a copy to the Chair's delegation, during the two weeks prior to my convening of the informal consultations. All inputs received by the secretariat will be posted on the e-deleGATE portal for reasons of transparency, as I promised at the beginning of this session (see A/C.1/73/PV.1).

The provisional programme of work under consideration will of course be finalized and issued in its final form before the First Committee starts its substantive work at its next session.

May I take it that the Committee wishes to adopt the draft provisional programme of work and timetable of the First Committee for 2019, as contained in document A/C.1/73/CRP.5/Rev.1?

*It was so decided.*

**The Chair:** The Committee has now concluded its consideration of the last item on its agenda.

### Statement by the Chair

**The Chair:** I would now like to make some additional remarks from the perspective of the Chair. As Chair of the First Committee, Romania has acted as an honest broker, in line with our long-standing adherence to the principles of multilateralism and based on Romania's solid and extensive experience in coordinating the activities of various United Nations bodies. Together, we, the representatives of all States Members of the United Nations, have taken part in five weeks of intensive and engaging debates and actions on a whole range of challenging issues in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.

Trends and developments in the broader international peace and security arena have certainly had an impact on the Committee's work. This year's record number of statements, in all phases of the Committee's work, and the numbers of draft resolutions and decisions, demonstrated once again the importance that States

attach to it. The record numbers of votes conducted in the Committee this year may be an indication that the divides between Member States' positions are widening on many important issues in the fields of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, which should be a concern for us all.

A wide range of crucial issues were addressed in the Committee, ranging from the international community's efforts in the nuclear field to ensuring compliance with legal instruments on other weapons of mass destruction and, in cases of violations, holding the perpetrators accountable; combating illicit small arms and light weapons and ensuring the responsible transfer of arms; debating the uses of outer space; grappling with challenges in the cyberdomain and addressing concerns about regional disarmament and non-proliferation and ways and means to strengthen the United Nations disarmament machinery.

I believe it is worth noting that we have continued to maintain the most basic international objectives and principles, including through broad support for multilateralism in general and in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation in particular, where dialogue, engagement and cooperation are our most essential tools. The Secretary-General's initiative on reinvigorating disarmament by launching his Agenda for Disarmament, which has been widely welcomed and supported, is a crucial element in the efforts to restore disarmament to the core of international peace and security, including human security. In moving forward, we must utilize those important tools to their full potential within the existing multilateral framework, especially the United Nations, and that will certainly be to our common good.

Bearing in mind my own experience of this session, I would like to make some remarks in all humility. Disarmament and international security are in the Committee's hands, and it is Member States' actions that produce the consequences that we must all face. The manner in which members approach the Committee is the manner in which it can assist us all in reaching our common goals. The First Committee is a key instrument for cooperation and our ability to reach common ground, and I believe it should be preserved.

I would therefore like to warmly and gratefully thank our Vice-Chairs, who represent all regional groups, and the secretariat for their support. I commend all of their outstanding professional capacities. It has

been an absolute honour and great privilege to chair the Disarmament and International Security Committee, and to work with all of its members in order to make a contribution, however limited, to our shared goal of a more peaceful, secure and better world.

Finally, I ask members not to forget that there is life after this session of the First Committee has ended.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that this year the Committee finished its work in four weeks and three days, which is one day ahead of the recommended date of 9 November. As the Committee is aware, with the increased number of votes on draft resolutions and decisions this year and the high level of participation in the exchange during all phases of the work of the Committee this session, we were very much behind schedule in terms of the backlog of speakers and the action on draft resolutions and decisions. The Committee therefore convened four additional meetings to make up for the delays and conclude its work in a timely manner.

During the session, 135 delegations made statements within the general debate segment, while an impressive 354 interventions were made during the thematic discussion segment. During the action phase, the Committee adopted 68 draft resolutions and decisions — and would have set a record of 69, had one not been withdrawn — 42 of which were adopted by a recorded vote, with 53 separate votes requested. Twenty-six draft proposals were adopted without a vote, accounting for approximately 17.68 per cent of all the action taken, three times less than last year's figure of 48 per cent adopted without a vote.

Before I adjourn this meeting and close the main part of the seventy-third session of the First Committee, I give the floor to delegations wishing to make final comments at this time.

**Mr. Ji Haojun (China)** (*spoke in Chinese*): The First Committee of the General Assembly at its seventy-third session has successfully concluded its consideration of all the agenda items allocated to it by the General Assembly and has taken the necessary action. The Chinese delegation would like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your successful stewardship of our meetings, and our thanks also go to the Bureau, the Secretariat and the interpreters for all their work.

The current international security landscape is ever more grim and convoluted, and unstable, uncertain and unpredictable factors are on the rise. In the areas of



arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation we are facing severe challenges. It is normal for parties to have different views on different issues, but the key is how to treat and address those differences. Pointing fingers will not solve the problem and will only further complicate the issue, while wasting a lot of conference resources. We believe that the international community should uphold the spirit of multilateralism, strengthen dialogue and cooperation, seek common ground in resolving differences, work together to maintain international peace and security and take forward the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation process in a concerted effort to build a world of lasting peace and universal security.

The Chinese delegation would like to take this opportunity to thank all of our colleagues who are about

to return to their capitals or to Geneva, including those remaining in New York. I wish everyone every success.

**The Chair:** I thank the representative of China for his kind words.

The main part of the seventy-third session of the First Committee is thus concluded. The Committee will reconvene formally sometime next year in order, among other things, to elect its Chair and the other members of the Bureau for the seventy-fourth session.

I would like to conclude by wishing all of those who are leaving a safe trip home, and all of us all the best in our professional and personal lives.

*The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.*