



General Assembly

Seventy-first session

First Committee

22nd meeting

Thursday, 27 October 2016, 3 p.m.
New York

Official Records

Chair: Mr. Boukadoum (Algeria)

The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

Agenda items 89 to 105 (continued)

Thematic discussions on specific subjects and the introduction and consideration of draft resolutions and decisions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chair: Today the Committee will first hear the remaining nine speakers under cluster 7, “Disarmament machinery”. Immediately thereafter, in accordance with our programme of work, the Committee will begin the third and final phase of its work, namely, action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items 89 to 105.

Before giving the floor to the first speaker in today’s debate, I once again urge all speakers to kindly observe the time limit of five minutes when speaking in their national capacity. The Committee will continue to use the buzzer to remind delegations when the time limit has been reached. I furthermore wish to appeal to delegations to consider presenting shorter statements and making their full statements available on PaperSmart.

Mr. Azizi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I associate myself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM) (see A/C.1/71/PV.21).

The delicate nature of disarmament issues and their close link to the supreme national security interests of States requires that such issues be considered in a non-discriminatory, transparent, inclusive and

consensus-based process within the multilateral disarmament machinery of the United Nations. For that reason, Iran attaches great importance to multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in the field of disarmament and underscores the vital importance and continued validity of the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery, established by the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

Based on their existing methods of work and rules of procedure, in particular the consensus rule, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) have formulated landmark universal instruments in the past. That proves the relevance of their mandate and the efficiency and effectiveness of their rules of procedure, in particular the consensus rule. In itself, the machinery — that is, its structure and rules of procedure — is totally innocent; calling it ineffective involves nothing more than shifting blame. In our view, the CD is neither a single-issue venue nor is there an alternative to it. Therefore, it should remain the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. We also reaffirm the importance and relevance of the UNDC as the sole specialized deliberative body within the United Nations.

It is an undeniable fact that the major problem of the United Nations disarmament machinery, in particular the CD, is the lack of genuine political will on the part of certain nuclear-weapon States and their advocates who are unwilling to agree on a balanced, comprehensive and priority-based programme of work. Those States wish to use the CD merely for the

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (<http://documents.un.org>).

16-34547 (E)



Accessible document

Please recycle



advancement of their own individual interests. Their double standards, discriminatory policies and selective approaches to the four core issues on the agenda of the CD constitute a living example in that regard. Although there are continuing attempts to mask the political nature of inactivity in the Conference on Disarmament and the CD with technical questions, such as their rules of procedures, what appeared to be procedural problems were in fact political ones.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the existing disarmament machinery, in particular the CD, needs to be fully supported and enhanced. That should be a shared objective and a common responsibility. We place particular emphasis on the need for enhancing the role of the machinery in the area of nuclear disarmament, which is the highest priority of the international community of States. Accordingly, we strongly support the early commencement in the CD of negotiations on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use, and to provide for their irreversible and verifiable destruction. That is the only practical option for putting the nuclear-disarmament process in the right direction. As an active member of the CD, Iran will continue to support a balanced, comprehensive and priority-based programme of work to overcome the current stalemate of that body.

My delegation supports the NAM position on the strict application of the principle of equitable geographical distribution in the composition of the groups of governmental experts in the field of disarmament and international security. We urge the Secretary-General to take concrete actions so as to ensure a more balanced membership of future groups of governmental experts, inter alia by expanding their membership. At the same time, I would like to underline the significant role of the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme in training our diplomats in the disarmament field. Without a doubt, it is a valuable contribution to professionalism in the disarmament forums. We will continue to support the programme.

Once again, my delegation would like to underscore that the disarmament machinery is innocent; therefore, it cannot and should not be blamed. The disarmament machinery stalemate is due to the inability of its Member States to bridge the divide. Indeed, in the absence of genuine political will, even the best-ever disarmament machinery will definitely prove to be

totally ineffective. If certain nuclear-weapon States put aside their inflexible positions, the machinery would prove once again that it still works and works efficiently.

That is why we call upon them to put an end to such a stubborn position. We call upon all States to work collectively to realize our collective interests — peace and security, which is in the DNA of the Organization. Let us utilize the machinery to advance the noble and long-sought objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world. That is our responsibility and the right of the present and future generations of all nations. For our part, we will continue to actively engage in all international efforts to take forward multilateral nuclear-disarmament negotiations. We stand ready to constructively cooperate with all interested States to work in our common interests.

Mr. Herráiz España (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/71/PV.21).

Spain firmly maintains that the contemporary complex challenges of security, disarmament and non-proliferation must be addressed from a multilateral perspective in accordance with the United Nations system. Under that basic principle, the applicable institutions of the multilateral disarmament machinery continue to be indispensable. The First Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) must be strengthened and revitalized in order to make them more effective and coherent.

We are all aware of the need to bring greater added value to our discussions and achieve the desired goal of negotiating disarmament treaties that bolster security and strategic stability. However, Spain believes that the lack of satisfactory results does not necessarily imply the discrediting or rejection of those institutions. In times of crisis and uncertainty such as those we are currently experiencing, forums for debate and exchange, opportunities to promote dialogue and identify the options that are available to us cannot be called into question without running the risk of further exacerbating the difficulties we face in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

It is necessary to strengthen and improve the working dynamics of the First Committee while focusing creatively on our search for alternatives and solutions that are bold enough to respond to the

challenges of today and while avoiding the repeated review of texts that have already been adopted or that enjoy consensus.

The Disarmament Commission also needs to find a means of rationalizing its debates with the aim of addressing them in a more specific manner with more concrete results centred on priority issues. The Conference on Disarmament and its revitalization are undoubtedly one of the greatest challenges we face in this field, and for years we have reiterated our frustration at the paralysis in negotiations. However, despite that difficult situation, we believe it necessary to avoid potential reactions against that institution that would be counterproductive to the necessary stability and balance required to address the delicate matters that concern us.

It is necessary to take decisions following appropriate reflection and discussion that include the points of view of all members, while respecting a consensus rule that nevertheless cannot be interpreted as a possibility of an individual veto. Consensus must be an inclusive practice that caters to all sensitivities of Member States, and not a means of excluding the possibility for an agreement. That would only undermine the negotiating mandate of the Conference.

Throughout this year in the Conference on Disarmament we have seen various proposals for a programme of work that unfortunately did not enjoy consensus. Nevertheless, the very existence of such proposals continues to demonstrate that opportunities for continuing our efforts in that forum do exist.

Spain understands that the drafting of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices continues to be an area where a higher level of technical and political maturity are required in order to be negotiated. This year we had an opportunity for a new proposed programme of work that incorporates the possibility of including previously produced fissile material in a future treaty. We believe that that proposal is progressive and generous and constitutes an excellent example of the creativity and flexibility through which we can all work together in advancing our ambitious and realistic disarmament objectives. In any case, we also have valuable precedents such as the programme of work set out in document CD/1864 and the mandate in document CD/1299, in addition to the recent work of the Group of Governmental Experts. We also support

the draft resolution (A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1) introduced at this session of the First Committee to establish a high-level preparatory committee for upcoming discussions on a future fissile material cut-off treaty.

We understand that the Conference on Disarmament cannot be blamed for disagreements and difficulties in the current complex international security situation, nor can it be victimized in the hurried search for immediate alternatives that would not prove constructive for the nuclear-weapon States. Although the CD must act with an unequivocal mandate for the negotiation of treaties, we cannot reject the value of substantive debates to move towards that objective, however difficult it may seem. Also, we can also try to incorporate new technical issues that are of interest, such as the issues of transparency and verification. It is also necessary to further streamline the working methods of the Conference, without prejudice to the principle of consensus, as well as to reasonably increase its membership and provide for the adequate participation of civil society at the Conference.

We are living in difficult times in which the need for dialogue and exchange is more important than ever. Against the backdrop of that concern, we would like to renew our commitment to the disarmament machinery, a commitment that we want to fulfil with the caution and calm called for by the times as well as with the boldness and critical vision necessary to revise and strengthen the disarmament machinery in order to achieve more effective results.

Ms. Chand (Fiji): Fiji aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/71/PV.21). We would like to add some remarks in our national capacity.

Fiji recognizes the significance of nuclear-proliferation education and its early introduction as vital to a changing mindset towards nuclear disarmament. If we are to achieve our goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, education must be aimed at diverse segments of the population and transcend common barriers such as age, gender or race. That is important in the light of the current state of disarmament negotiations, which suffer from a lack of political will and genuine commitment by States parties.

Fiji is convinced that, with robust advocacy and awareness-raising on the impacts of nuclear weapons, the citizens of the world would generate

informed national opinion, thereby compelling their Governments to revisit State practices and policies favouring nuclear disarmament. In that regard, we would like to extend our appreciation to the Geneva branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, which has been successfully implementing the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship and training diplomats from around the world since its launch by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978.

In the same vein, we would like to commend the three United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament for the role they have played in awareness-raising, capacity-building and advisory services in respect of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Fiji benefited from a regional workshop held in Samoa by the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific on the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as well as practical exercises on the preparation of national reports concerning the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and on the Register of Conventional Arms and on reporting on military expenditures. Those practical exercises helped in building our capacities and established confidence-building measures and transparency. We would urge the Asia-Pacific Regional Centre to continue such substantive and tailored capacity-building programmes.

Fiji reiterates its support for the United Nations disarmament machinery and recognizes the Conference on Disarmament as the legitimate forum for disarmament negotiations. We therefore urge the international community to support the commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, towards their complete elimination. The international community needs to show renewed commitment for pledges already made at the Open-Ended Working Group meeting held in Geneva this year.

Fiji also underscores the need for adequate resourcing of the various disarmament bodies and institutions. Adequate resourcing is vital to the proper functioning of the overall United Nations disarmament machinery and to ensuring tangible outcomes for the benefit of the international community.

In conclusion, we encourage the various bodies and institutions that constitute the United Nations disarmament machinery to continue the good work of advancing peace and security in the world.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.6.

Mr. Kim In-chul (Republic of Korea): I have asked for the floor to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.6, entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament", submitted by the Republic of Korea as the last President of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). As I elaborated on the work of the Conference during my presentation at the panel discussion on Monday, I will confine myself to making a brief introduction of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.6.

The main elements and language of the draft resolution remain more or less the same as in the resolutions of previous years, and necessary technical updates and some adjustments to reflect of the CD this year have been made. Following best practice, the draft resolution went through informal consultations open to all United Nations Members in general. Extensive bilateral consultations were also conducted. I would like to take this opportunity to extend our sincere appreciation to all delegations for their valuable and constructive contributions.

As was the case with resolutions in previous years, the draft resolution reaffirms the CD's role as the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. While appreciating the strong support for that forum, the draft resolution calls upon the Conference to adopt its programme of work at the earliest possible date. It also requests all CD members to cooperate with the Presidents of the Conference.

In conclusion, let me express my sincere hope that the First Committee will be able to adopt the draft resolution on the report of the Conference on Disarmament without a vote, in keeping with tradition.

Mr. Denктаş (Turkey): In view of the security challenges the international community faces today, enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations disarmament machinery should be our shared goal and priority.

To start with the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the problems that hamper progress in the CD are not created by its procedures or internal dynamics.

The CD does not operate in a void. We need to look at the bigger picture and refrain from assessing the CD's work separately from the rest of disarmament efforts. The resumption of substantive work in the CD, with the consent of all its members, will contribute to the strengthening of international efforts for nuclear disarmament. Turkey is convinced that the CD possesses the necessary mandate, rules of procedure and membership to discharge its duties.

This year CD members submitted different draft programmes of work. Although none enjoyed consensus, we take that as a genuine effort to get the CD back to work. As is known, the disarmament machinery has a clear division of tasks among various international forums. Naturally, different bodies have different working methods and memberships. Turkey's priority is to move the CD forward by having it reassume its fundamental task, that is, to negotiate legally binding international treaties.

Another important pillar of the United Nations disarmament machinery, one that has not functioned as desired, is the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC). Regrettably, the UNDC has not been able to submit any substantive recommendations to the General Assembly in the course of the past 15 years, whereas, despite being a deliberative body, it once successfully formulated consensus principles, guidelines and recommendations on a number of subjects. We look forward to seeing the UNDC resume that kind of work soon.

The First Committee remains a significant component of the disarmament machinery. Turkey values the tradition of introducing draft resolutions. Nevertheless, we believe the international community needs to be mindful of not creating a self-imposed maze of duplication through the draft resolutions we develop and act on.

Last but not least, we note that the administrative challenges and institutional crisis in the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) have been overcome. As in previous years, Turkey has made a voluntary contribution to UNIDIR.

In conclusion, it is time to give our best shot to revitalizing the whole disarmament machinery. I would like to reiterate my country's readiness to contribute to the efforts to that end.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of Nepal to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.27.

Mr. Lamsal (Nepal): I take the floor to introduce, under sub-item (f) of agenda item 99, draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.27, entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific".

The sponsors of the draft resolution are Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Maldives, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam and my own country, Nepal. My delegation expresses its sincere gratitude to all the sponsors and to those delegations that will subsequently co-sponsor it.

Nepal strongly believes that the regional approach complements efforts to promote the global disarmament agenda. In the absence of intra-regional confidence, our efforts for peace and disarmament will not gain momentum. Only constant dialogues and exchanges of views would help nurture confidence and create a conducive environment for making further progress in regional peace and disarmament. As this year marks the thirtieth year of the establishment of the Regional Centres, we believe this is an opportune time for the Member States to express their commitment and redouble their efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Regional Centres.

The Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament for Asia and the Pacific has been working to promote regional discussions on important disarmament agenda. Given the importance of the regional efforts and of the agenda, we emphasize that the Kathmandu process should be further strengthened to facilitate dialogue and deliberations on contemporary issues.

As the host country of the Regional Centre, Nepal is committed to lending its full support to an enhanced and constructive role by consolidating the Kathmandu process so that it can contribute to peace and disarmament in the region by building a renewed sense of confidence and understanding. The Government of Nepal extended all possible support for the early resumption of the post-earthquake operations of the Regional Centre in Kathmandu. I am happy to announce that the Government of Nepal will provide nearly \$112,000 towards meeting the cost of the refurbishment of its new office in Kathmandu.

The Regional Centre's programmes are carried out with resources generated from voluntary contributions, which is not sufficient to sustain its activities in mandated areas. I would like to take this opportunity to express Nepal's sincere appreciation to those Member States that have extended their continued support to the Regional Centre, including through voluntary contributions for the programme and activities of the Centre. We are confident that more Member States will lend their support to expand and enrich the Centre's activities in the course of promoting peace and stability in the region and beyond.

In that context, that on behalf of the sponsors, my delegation has the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.27, entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific" before the First Committee, with technical updates on the Centre's work over the past year. We appreciate the continued support from all the delegations for the adoption of the draft resolution by consensus, as in previous years.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of Malaysia to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.42.

Ms. Zanudin (Malaysia): For the twentieth consecutive year, Malaysia has the honour to introduce to the First Committee the draft resolution entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" (A/C.1/71/L.42).

The draft resolution has been sponsored by 55 delegations thus far. On behalf of the sponsors, we extend our collective appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report (A/71/126) in follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons". We wish to also express our gratitude to and thank the Member States that have contributed to the Secretary-General's report by submitting the information requested pursuant to resolution 70/56.

My delegation remains convinced that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the threat or use of nuclear Weapons* constitutes a significant milestone in the global efforts aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As the historic advisory opinion celebrates its twentieth year this year, the 8 July 1996 ruling by the Court remains a resolute decision in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Court's decision

embodies and remains an authoritative legal call to eliminate nuclear weapons. We wish to recall that the unanimous decision — that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control — is reflected in paragraph 1 of the draft resolution.

The International Court of Justice's decision, while being consistent with the obligation of States parties under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), does not confine itself only to State parties to the NPT. Rather, more significant, it exists as a universal declaration of our collective resolve to achieve our aspiration of a world that is free of nuclear weapons.

In addition, paragraph 2, which underlines the obligation of all States to conduct and successfully conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament, is as relevant today as it was two decades ago. We believe that the decision of the International Court of Justice must continue to be followed up with concrete action by all Member States. With a view to achieving the broadest support possible, my delegation has retained the substantive paragraphs in their existing form, and made modifications on the technical updates.

The International Court of Justice's advisory opinion remains a significant contribution to the field of nuclear disarmament. Its humanitarian context gives weight to the moral argument of calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We take note of the evolution in the nature of draft resolutions being introduced this year, which bring to the forefront the humanitarian aspect and the need for the requisite political will and moral courage in being steadfast in achieving the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. That particular point is all the more relevant today, given the growing increase in the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Before concluding, as we enter the action phase on draft resolutions in the First Committee, while co-sponsoring and supporting this draft resolution, Member States must share their conviction that the Court's opinion is an important and positive development in nuclear disarmament using a multilateral process. That conviction must continue to be collectively shared, aspired to and built upon by all of us here, for the greater good of humankind.

Mrs. Pucarinho (Portugal): Portugal fully aligns itself with the statement delivered earlier on this cluster on behalf of the European Union (see A/C.1/71/PV.21). I would just like to add some additional remarks in my national capacity.

Portugal reaffirms its staunch commitment to an effective multilateralism, centred at the United Nations, in the vital domains of disarmament and non-proliferation. The United Nations integrated structure of bodies that are aimed at pursuing multilateral international efforts on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control remain crucial and irreplaceable. The components of the United Nations disarmament machinery, which originated in the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, must be inclusive. That is as true today as it was in 1978:

“Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament Therefore the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, in accordance with its Charter, must be strengthened.” (*resolution S-10/2, para.14*)

The actual and emerging complex security challenges require an effective United Nations disarmament machinery. The First Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) should work in mutually reinforcing ways, in accordance with their respective mandates. In our opinion, it is deeply regrettable that the United Nations disarmament machinery has been unable, for the past decades, to fulfil its respective mandate and to deliver as it should. That long-standing stalemate can be overcome only with the necessary political will to move the United Nations disarmament machinery forward and achieve concrete and tangible results.

It is deplorable that the Conference on Disarmament, despite many efforts, did not succeed in agreeing on its annual programme of work. Procedural aspects, formalities or the complex international situation do not serve as valid excuses for the Conference’s failure to adapt itself to new circumstances and to accomplish even its immediate procedural tasks. While Portugal, as a matter of principle, does not support circumventing existing bodies, those must, however, provide for effective responses to the challenges they are mandated

to effectively address. Regrettably, that has not been the case.

Portugal has a long-standing commitment to effective and inclusive multilateralism and urges the Conference on Disarmament to address the matter of its enlargement in a serious manner. One of the more fundamental United Nations principles — notably, the right of all interested States to become part of all United Nations mechanisms dedicated to global concerns — has been ignored for the past 17 years. For that time, the door has remained closed to the admission of other States, such as mine, that over the years have reaffirmed their interest in becoming full parties to the Conference. As the CD agenda encompasses global concerns, it should be more representative of the United Nations membership. In our opinion, 65 members do not constitute sufficient representation. Modalities for enlarging the CD should be promptly examined. In that regard, Portugal strongly supports the appointment of a special coordinator for continuing consultations on the enlargement of its membership.

With regard to the Disarmament Commission — the crucial United Nations General Assembly deliberative body on disarmament — it is critical to enhance and revitalize its work. Regrettably, we are still waiting for progress on improving its working methods and on ensuring more constructive deliberations.

Portugal supports the immediate commencement of negotiations on a verifiable and non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, following the mandate set out in document CD/1299. In the meantime, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should be observed. We therefore support the draft resolution (A/C.1/71/L.65) submitted by Canada, Germany and the Netherlands on that important issue.

In conclusion, taking concrete steps to preserve the leading role of the United Nations disarmament machinery, including by acting on the enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament, would certainly contribute to addressing the challenges we face and provide fresh impetus to disarmament diplomacy.

The Chair: We have heard the last speaker on the cluster “Disarmament machinery”.

The Committee will now begin its third and final phase of its work, namely, action on all draft resolutions

and decisions submitted under agenda items 89 to 105. I request members to listen very carefully. In that regard, the Committee will be guided by the informal papers issued by the Secretariat that list the draft resolutions and decisions on which action will be taken each day. The informal paper has been circulated today in the Conference Room, and we will first take action on the draft resolutions and decisions under each cluster listed therein. The Secretariat will revise that informal paper on a daily basis in order to update the draft resolutions and decisions that are ready for action at each of our remaining meetings. I have been informed that additional requests for votes have been made since the informal paper was issued. Further information on those requests is available at the Secretariat's desk to the left of the rostrum.

Before we proceed, I propose that we follow the same procedures adopted by the Committee at previous sessions concerning the conduct of business during this action phase. That is to say, the following established four-step process will be observed: first, general statements under each cluster; secondly, explanations of vote before action; thirdly, action on the draft resolutions and decisions; and, fourthly, explanations of vote or position after action. Under each cluster listed for any given day of our last three remaining days, the Committee will first hear general statements. At the same time, delegations will have a final opportunity to introduce draft resolutions or decisions ready for action on that day or at subsequent meetings. I would kindly request that such statements be as brief as possible, since we have already held the general debate.

Next, delegations wishing to explain their positions on any of the draft resolutions or decisions under a given cluster will have an opportunity to do so in a single intervention before the Committee proceeds to take action on those drafts, one after another and without any interruption in between. I would like to remind delegations that, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes, and that statements made on behalf of a group of countries are limited to five minutes. Given that there are no provisions for general statements before the voting, I will ask delegations to limit their general statements to five minutes. The buzzer will be used to keep track of our time management.

Pursuant to rule 128 of the rules of procedure,

“After the Chair has announced the beginning of voting, no representative shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual conduct of the voting.”

In the case of a voting error, delegations wishing to register their original voting intention should not disrupt the voting process to request the correction by taking the floor. They should instead approach the Secretariat to clarify the original voting intention, which will be reflected in the official records.

Once the Committee completes action on all draft resolutions and decisions under a particular cluster listed in the day's informal paper, delegations preferring to explain their positions or votes after action is taken will also have an opportunity to do so. Similar to the consolidated explanations of vote before the voting, delegations are requested to make their explanations in one intervention.

Also in accordance with rule 128 of the rules of procedure, sponsors of draft resolutions and decisions are not permitted to make any statements in explanation of their votes either before or after action is taken. They will, however, be permitted to make general statements at the beginning of the consideration of the drafts under a given cluster.

Delegations seeking recorded votes on any draft resolution or decision are requested to kindly inform the Secretariat of their intention as early as possible and before the day's meeting begins. All delegations wishing to postpone action on any draft that has been submitted are also requested to inform the Secretariat at least one day before action is scheduled to be taken on the draft in question. Nonetheless, I appeal to all delegations to make every effort to refrain from delaying action.

In order to ascertain that every delegation fully understands the process for the action phase, the Secretariat has prepared an information sheet, similar to the one that was circulated in previous years, regarding the ground rules for taking action on draft resolutions and decisions. That document has also been circulated in the room.

With members' full cooperation, I intend to follow the procedure that I have just explained in order to ensure the full and efficient utilization of the remaining time for this final stage of our work.

May I take it that the Committee wishes to proceed accordingly?

It was so decided.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolutions and decisions listed under cluster 1, “Nuclear weapons”, as set out in today’s informal paper, which has been circulated in the Conference Room. Once we complete action on cluster 1, we will proceed to take action on the draft resolutions and decisions listed under cluster 2, “Other weapons of mass destruction”.

In accordance with past practice, if action on the draft resolutions and decisions listed in the informal paper for a particular meeting is not completed, the Committee will first finish action on the remaining drafts in that informal paper before starting action on the next cluster.

I now open the floor for delegations that wish to make either a general statement or to introduce new or revised draft resolutions under cluster 1. I remind all delegations once again that the sponsors of draft resolutions and decisions may make general statements at the beginning of the consideration of drafts under a cluster, but may not make statements in explanation of their vote before or after action is taken. Those statements are limited to five minutes.

I now call on the representative of Canada to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1.

Ms. McCarney (Canada): This year, Canada, Germany and the Netherlands have sponsored a draft resolution (A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1) on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. For our countries, it was very important that the international community as a whole move forward on this issue and that we build upon what we accomplished in previous sessions of the First Committee, including the significant work carried out by the Group of Governmental Experts, whose report (see A/70/81) was presented to the Committee last year.

To continue that progress, the draft resolution creates a process that is both inclusive and concrete. It will establish a high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group with a membership of 25 States operating under the rules and established practices for groups of governmental experts. The group would be mandated to make recommendations on substantial elements of a future treaty. The Chair of the group would convene two informal consultative

meetings open to all States Members of the United Nations. The meetings would enable inclusive and interactive discussions on building on the work of the group of governmental experts and on a future treaty.

Let us be clear: this initiative should not be seen as duplicating the work of the previous Group of Governmental Experts. The formula that we have developed includes the right ingredients to enable substantive progress towards a future treaty. For example, it allows us to further explore some of the areas identified in the report for the Group of Governmental Experts where consensus might be possible. We can also take advantage of the vast experience of the broader community of States Members of the United Nations to delve into other issues that the previous Group of Governmental Experts had insufficient time or capacity to examine. While the draft resolution does not include negotiations on the treaty, it certainly contemplates, over its 24 months of work, an outcome that will facilitate negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

Let us be clear, however, that we are under no illusions. Future negotiations will be lengthy, and they will be difficult. That is the reason to work harder now. We firmly believe that it is possible to make progress through the inclusive processes we have created through this draft resolution. That is not only possible but particularly critical, given the difficult disarmament and non-proliferation environment we currently face. We urge all States to support our draft resolution and to participate actively in the process we have created. We look forward to working with all Member States and finally making this important treaty a reality.

Ms. Guitton (France) (*spoke in French*): I would like to make a general statement on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Our commitment to nuclear disarmament, as reaffirmed in the 15 September statement by the five permanent members of the Security Council, includes efforts to bring about the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as early as possible. The CTBT will constrain the development and improvement of nuclear weapons and end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, thereby providing an effective disarmament and non-proliferation measure. Furthermore, we note that the nuclear-stockpile maintenance and

stewardship programmes are in line with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and CTBT objectives. The entry into force of the CTBT is an essential step towards progressive and tangible nuclear disarmament.

This year, as we mark the twentieth anniversary of the CTBT, the Security Council adopted resolution 2310 (2016), its first-ever CTBT-specific resolution. The resolution calls upon all States to refrain from conducting any nuclear-weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear test, and stresses the need to maintain momentum towards completion of all elements of the Treaty verification regime. Security Council resolution 2310 (2016) sends a strong message of the contribution that the CTBT will make to international peace and security.

We welcome the similar unequivocal commitment to the CTBT that the General Assembly will be able to deliver through the adoption of one of its draft resolutions, which our three countries strongly support. We would like to call on all signatory States to continue to contribute financially and otherwise to the objectives and activities of the Preparatory Commission, an international organization as set forth in the resolution of 19 November 1996.

In conclusion, our countries welcome this decisive initiative, which provides significant political support for banning nuclear-weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, in a century where only one State has ever conducted nuclear tests. Those were unanimously condemned by the international community. Through this draft resolution, all States commit to a shared objective to ensure the entry into force of the CTBT as early as possible, which will substantially enhance international peace and security.

Mr. Benítez Verson (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The First Committee will take action today on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”. It is likely that this will be the most important vote in the First Committee this year. The Cuban delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41 because we believe it is an important step forward towards nuclear disarmament and towards the start of negotiations in 2017 of a legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons, with a view to their elimination.

The international community cannot remain a passive spectator in the face of the grave danger posed

by the existence of nuclear weapons. Maintaining the status quo and postponing the definitive elimination of nuclear weapons is simply not an acceptable option for Cuba. The prohibition of nuclear weapons is entirely justified, for their use or threat of use under any circumstances would constitute a violation of international law and a crime against humanity.

Although a ban on nuclear weapons would be an important step forward, it would still be insufficient. Cuba will continue to firmly call for the adoption, as soon as possible, of a comprehensive convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons within a specified period of time and under strict international verification.

I now turn to draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.64, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”, introduced on behalf of the countries members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons is correctly identified in the text as a priority and urgent objective. As also stated in the draft resolution, Cuba supports the urgent start of negotiations on a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

The draft resolution welcomes the designation of 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons and ensures its continuity. We also welcome the renewed initiative in the draft resolution of convening, no later than 2018, a high-level international United Nations conference on nuclear disarmament in order to review the progress made in that regard.

In conclusion, Cuba firmly supports draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.64 on the grounds that both its approach and the practical actions resulting therefrom constitute an important and effective contribution to efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Lynn (Myanmar): Following your guidance, Mr. Chair, and to speed up “the beginning of the end”, I will be very brief.

Last week, on 17 October (see A/C.1/71/PV.12), I introduced draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.47, entitled “Nuclear disarmament” I will therefore not be repeating today the points I made then.

With their firm conviction and commitment to nuclear disarmament, 48 Member States have so far joined as sponsors of the draft resolution. On behalf of the sponsors, I would like to urge all delegations to

sponsor the draft resolution and to take important and necessary steps towards nuclear disarmament.

The Chair: I now call on the representative of Austria to introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/71/L.23, A/C.1/71/L.24 and A/C.1/71/L.41.

Mr. Kuglitsch (Austria): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”, submitted by Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa and my country, Austria. The draft resolution is sponsored by 57 countries.

Last year’s resolution by the same title (resolution 70/33) convened an Open-ended Working Group in Geneva, inter alia to substantively address concrete effective legal measures, legal prohibitions and norms that would be needed to conclude and to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. The Open-ended Working Group, very ably chaired by His Excellency Ambassador Thani of Thailand, was open to all and concluded with a concrete set of recommendations. Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41 faithfully takes up the Group’s recommendations and proposes to convene a United Nations conference in 2017 to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, with the participation and contribution of international organizations and civil society representatives. We have continuously stressed the point that the conference will be open to all, and the draft resolution reaffirms that by expressly encouraging all Member States to participate.

Furthermore, the conference and the resulting treaty are intended not only to be fully in line with article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but in fact would be a contribution to the concrete realization of that very article. The centrality of the NPT is stressed several times in the draft resolution, which also makes clear that the NPT is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sponsors remain committed to the full realization of all commitments made within the NPT context.

We find ourselves at a crossroads today. We have been presented with new evidence of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, as well as of their associated risks. At the same time, we have seen decades of standstill in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. Not only has there been

hardly any progress in nuclear disarmament in recent years, but, to the contrary, modernization programmes have been decided on, thereby perpetuating upgraded nuclear weapons for decades to come. In our view, a legal instrument that prohibits nuclear weapons will be a solid foundation on which to build additional instruments, leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons in order to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. Draft resolution A/C.171/L.41 allows us to do just that. I therefore call on all delegations to vote in favour of the draft resolution, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”.

Allow me to also use this opportunity to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.23, entitled “Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons”, and draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.24, entitled “Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons”, which Ireland, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa and my own country, Austria, have submitted again this year.

As mentioned in our statement during the debate on the nuclear cluster, the draft resolution on the humanitarian consequences is based entirely on the joint statement on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons as delivered on behalf of 159 countries at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, held in New York. The draft resolution on the humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons is based on the humanitarian pledge supported by 127 countries and includes a call to all the relevant stakeholders to cooperate in efforts to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons, in the light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks. We would invite all delegations to also strongly support those two draft resolutions.

Mr. Yermakov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): It is an honour for me to deliver this statement on behalf of three States — the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the United Kingdom — insofar as this is a joint statement on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The text was drafted in English, so I shall read it aloud in English.

(*spoke in English*)

I have the pleasure to deliver this statement on behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation in our capacity both as co-sponsors of the 1995 Review Conference of the Parties on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(NPT) resolution on the Middle East and as co-conveners of the proposed conference of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, called for by the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document.

We recall the annual draft resolution entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the region of the Middle East”, which is agreed to by the Committee without a vote, and the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone, consistent with paragraphs 60 and 63 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2). We, as a group, reaffirm our commitment to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and to the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

We remain convinced that the convening of an initial conference of the regional States, as called for in the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document, is a worthwhile, valid and achievable goal. We fully recognize our responsibilities under the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which we jointly co-sponsored, and remain prepared to actively support and facilitate renewed regional dialogue with and among regional States on arrangements for a conference.

At the same time, our efforts alone are not sufficient to achieve meaningful progress towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In view of our responsibility to convene a conference involving all States in the region, we will study with a fresh eye both the progress that was made and the issues that prevented the conference from going forward. We encourage regional States to do the same and, in that regard, we welcome the announcement by the League of Arab States to establish a specialized committee of high-level experts to consider the issue.

We hope all regional States will offer concrete ideas on how to move forward to engage in a structured dialogue that is inclusive, balanced, consensus-based and results-oriented, with a view to overcoming the current differences on the way towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In that way, we and the regional States together can make a fresh start in the process.

Mr. Wood (United States of America): As we begin voting today, I would like to take a moment to reiterate

the key aspects of United States policy regarding nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination — a goal we all seek.

In 2009 in Prague, President Obama reaffirmed America’s commitment to seeking the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons — a goal that the President reiterated in his historic visit to Hiroshima earlier this year. To that end, we have steadily decreased the role and number of nuclear weapons in a way that maintains strategic stability and creates the conditions and opportunities for further progress. The work of disarmament continues steadily, without headlines or fanfare. More work needs to be done, but the dramatic results achieved thus far speak louder than any words. We have made significant progress.

We understand that there is now disagreement on the process by which we achieve a nuclear-free world. However, the United States does not accept the premise underlying the call to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons found in draft resolutions A/C.1/71/L.41 and A/C.1/71/L.24. While we respect the views of the proponents, we disagree with the practicality of their approach and are concerned about the negative effects of seeking to ban nuclear weapons without consideration of the overarching international security environment. We understand and share the disappointment of others with the pace of progress. We must continue to support an approach to reductions that builds upon decades of pragmatic steps to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons. In our view, diverting focus from that proven course in favour of a nuclear-weapon ban would be both polarizing and would forsake long-standing principles of credible nuclear disarmament, such as verifiability. That is not a recipe for success when dealing with nuclear weapons.

In addition to the proven approaches to disarmament, the United States is committed to creating new ones that will help it reach its goals. That is why we are proud to partner with others through the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. Effective verification is a key feature of any successful arms-control agreement. The requirements for verification have and will continue to become more demanding as the number of parties increases and the numbers of weapons and the size of the accountable objects decrease. For that reason, we are pleased to co-sponsor Norway’s draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57, on nuclear disarmament verification. We fully support the principles underlying the draft

resolution and look forward to active participation in the group of government experts it would establish.

We are likewise pleased to once again be a sponsor of Japan's draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.26, entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons". In our view, the draft resolution presents a good balance between the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and a recognition of the necessary steps that must be taken to accomplish that goal.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to play a critical role in global security and provides the foundation for our efforts to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. While we recognize that more needs to be done, we do not accept the notion that there is any legal gap in our fulfilment of those undertakings. In crafting the NPT, negotiators recognized that they could not prescribe the modalities for eliminating nuclear weapons, given the need to account for prevailing security conditions. Successive agreements or unilateral steps to reduce nuclear arsenals and reliance on them have proved the wisdom of that approach.

The current challenge to nuclear disarmament is not a lack of legal instruments. The challenges to disarmament are a result of the political, technical and security realities that we presently face. The United States is ready to take additional steps, including bilateral reductions with Russia and a treaty ending the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, some States are currently unwilling to engage in further nuclear reductions, and others are increasing their arsenals. At the same time, violations of international norms and existing agreements are creating a more uncertain security environment and making the conditions for further reductions more difficult to achieve. A ban treaty will do nothing to address those underlying challenges.

In conclusion, the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons will not be easily reached. The challenges that we face cannot be separated from the broader international security environment. We cannot lose sight of the very real successes that we have had and will continue to have. The world's nuclear weapons arsenals did not appear overnight, and they will not be drawn down overnight. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, while we might disagree on process, we all agree on the goal — the peace and security of a world without

nuclear weapons. In that spirit, let us all rededicate ourselves to doing the hard work together to create the conditions to make verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament possible.

The Chair: I now call on the representative of Brazil to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.31 and draft decision A/C.1/71/L.48.

Mr. Sobral Duarte (Brazil): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.31, entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas", put forward by Indonesia, New Zealand, South Africa and my own country, Brazil, aims at reiterating the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones to freeing the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas of the threat of nuclear weapons, as well as the broader objective of global nuclear disarmament. The draft resolution recalls the principles laid out by the Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, as well as the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which reaffirmed the conviction that nuclear-weapon-free zones contribute to the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons.

The draft resolution welcomes cooperation among States parties and signatories to treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, and Mongolia. It also notes with satisfaction that all existent treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones — the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia — are now in force. We also call on all the relevant States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. We furthermore urge all the nuclear-weapon States to withdraw any reservations or interpretative declarations contrary to the object and purpose of the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The draft resolution furthermore welcomes steps taken envisioning the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States concerned, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and encourages efforts to reinforce coordination among nuclear-weapon-free zones. The draft resolution reiterates important and broadly supported principles and objectives of the international

community with regard to the shared goal of eliminating the nuclear threat. The objective dates back 70 years, when the General Assembly's first resolution sought the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons. It is incumbent upon all States to move forward that objective and, beyond the nuclear status quo, to achieve not only a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere, but also a nuclear-weapon-free world. We therefore encourage all Member States to support the draft resolution.

Allow me also to take this opportunity to introduce draft decision A/C.1/71/L.48, entitled "Further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof". The draft decision pertains to the triennial report of the Secretary-General with regard to developments relevant to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. The report, which was requested in paragraph 8 resolution 44/116 O, of 15 December 1989, was supposed to inform the fourth conference of the treaty. Nearly 30 years later, the conference has yet to be convened, since the requirement that at least 10 States parties request it has not been fulfilled. Considering that, and the fact that only 16 States have contributed to the Secretary-General's report since 1992, Brazil, as the main sponsor of the resolution that originally requested it, proposes that the report be submitted again only when the General Assembly so decides. We invite all delegations to support the adoption of the draft decision by consensus.

The Chair: Before the Committee proceeds to take action on the draft resolutions and decisions under cluster 1, we will hear from delegations wishing to explain their position or votes on those drafts.

Ms. Stoeva (Bulgaria): I am speaking on behalf of Finland, Greece, Portugal and my own country, Bulgaria. Last year our delegations abstained in the voting on resolution 70/34. Unfortunately, this year we are not in a position to support draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.64, entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament". The concerns that we expressed then continue to be valid. We believe in a world free of nuclear weapons and consider that disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing goals that should be pursued through successive and gradual steps involving all the nuclear-weapon States in the process.

We would like to stress the fundamental role we attach to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the global nuclear-disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and to its complete implementation. While it is regrettable that the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was not able to achieve consensus in a draft outcome document, our efforts should be aimed at ensuring a successful review cycle commencing in 2017. In that context, we continue to see the convening of another high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament by 2018, as proposed by the draft resolution, as parallel and possibly distracting our focus from the NPT. We appreciate the reference to the NPT in the preambular part of the draft resolution, but the emphasis is on only one of the pillars. In our view, nuclear disarmament is directly linked to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, and therefore NPT obligations should not be approached selectively.

Achieving progress in those commonly shared goals requires the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We agree that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) should start its substantive work as soon as possible, however, we do not see a nuclear-weapon convention as the first priority of the CD. Rather, we should aim at a comprehensive and balanced programme of work, including the CD's four core issues. As agreed at the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the CD would be a single negotiating body in disarmament affairs. It is unclear to us whether the high-level international conference in 2018 would be in contradiction with that consensual decision. We believe in a cooperative and inclusive approach to making real progress on nuclear disarmament.

Finally, we share the concern of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, yet banning nuclear weapons will not guarantee their elimination. Only by recognizing both the security and humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons will we be able to achieve our goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Benítez Verson (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Cuban delegation would like to explain its vote with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.5, entitled "The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation", and draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65/

Rev.1, entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

As on prior occasions, Cuba will abstain in the voting on the draft resolution regarding the Code of Conduct. The Code was negotiated outside of the United Nations with little transparency and without the participation of all interested States. The Code has significant shortcomings and limitations and does not adequately reflect the primary interests of many States. I will mention only five examples in that regard.

First of all, the Code does not address the issue of the peaceful use of missile technology or the need to cooperate in that sphere to further the particular interests of developing countries. Secondly, its focus is limited to horizontal proliferation and does not cover vertical proliferation, including some of its highly relevant aspects, such as missile design, development, tests and deployment. Thirdly, the Code ignores the most serious problem — the continuous existence, development and modernization of nuclear weapons, for which ballistic missiles are but a delivery system. Fourthly, the Code refers to ballistic missiles but does not include other types of relevant missiles. Fifthly, the Code does not make any mention of the assistance and cooperation considerations that must accompany any discussion on the topic of missiles.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65, the Cuban delegation will abstain in the voting. Cuba believes that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty on fissionable material, negotiated in the context of the Conference on Disarmament, would be a welcome step. However, such a treaty would be partial and insufficient if it were not to address existing nuclear stockpiles and did not enumerate the steps towards nuclear disarmament. Under draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65, the substantive review of any possible treaty on fissionable material would take place outside the Conference on Disarmament, in a designated “preparatory group” made up of no more than 25 countries. That format would leave the great majority of States outside the substantive dialogue on that topic. We are concerned about the growing number of such very limited composition groups that are set up pursuant to First Committee draft resolutions to review themes that significantly affect international peace and security. The setting up of groups of experts should be the exception, not the rule. In its stead, in order to discuss themes of that nature, we must promote

transparent and inclusive procedures in the framework of the disarmament bodies and instruments of the United Nations.

Ms. Guitton (France) (*spoke in French*): I speak on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and my own country, France. I would like to explain our vote against draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.23, entitled “Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons”, draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.24, entitled “Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons”, and draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.36, entitled “Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world”.

Many have stated that the use of nuclear weapons could result in devastating humanitarian consequences. We agree, but neither those consequences nor those concerns are new. They are part of the preamble to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the outcome document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978. The key question is: what conclusions can we draw? Those who promote the initiative on the humanitarian effects affirm that the path to nuclear disarmament is through banning the possession and use nuclear weapons, effective immediately, even if the nuclear-weapon States do not abide by such a prohibition. In our view, that is the underlying idea behind those three draft resolutions, in particular draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.24, which clearly calls for a legal instrument to ban such weapons.

We believe that a ban on nuclear weapons could weaken the NPT review process by making consensus impossible, thus creating a much more dangerous world, akin to the situation before the NPT’s entry into force and the near universality of same. At that time, many regions faced the prospect of nuclear proliferation and the uncertainty posed by non-compliance hindering access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The proposed ban treaty does not take into account the necessary security conditions and will not eliminate nuclear weapons. It would run counter to the consensus-based approach that for many decades has enabled the implementation and enforcement of the three pillars of the NPT regime. It would also hurt the cause by widening the gap between parties to the NPT. We will continue to work tirelessly to rid the world of nuclear weapons. We are active in those efforts, as we each affirmed in our respective national statements. If we are to create a world free of nuclear weapons that will

remain that way, disarmament cannot ignore the very specific security concerns we face. We believe that a step-by-step approach is the only way to combine the imperatives of disarmament and the maintenance of global stability. By working together, we can create the conditions where nuclear weapons will no longer be needed.

I also wish to deliver an explanation of vote on behalf of the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations".

As NPT nuclear-weapon States, our three countries reaffirm the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament in general, as referenced in the preamble and provided for in article VI of the NPT. In that regard, our commitment to a more secure world for all and to a world without nuclear weapons remains unshakeable. To that end, we continue to pursue a progressive step-by-step approach to promote stability and international peace and security on the basis of greater undiminished security for all. That proven approach to nuclear disarmament has yielded concrete results. It continues to enhance global security. That is the only realistic path towards the full implementation of article VI of the NPT. We believe that only a consensus-based approach that takes into account the global security context can yield positive results in terms of nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of an international prohibition of nuclear weapons will certainly not bring us closer to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

In that regard, significant achievements have already been made. We emphasize the significant efforts undertaken to cease the nuclear arms race, as called for in article VI of the NPT. We reaffirm our intention never to engage in such an arms race. Global stockpiles of nuclear weapons are presently at the lowest point in nearly half a century due to the concerted sustained efforts of the nuclear-weapon States. All States can contribute to the attainment of that goal by creating the necessary security environment, namely, by alleviating regional tensions, by tackling fully proliferation challenges, by promoting collective security and by making progress in all areas of arms control and disarmament. The NPT and existing machinery, as set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, have demonstrated that that is a robust framework to advance

nuclear disarmament and to provide every opportunity for constructive mutually respectful dialogue.

In that regard, we reaffirm our support and our willingness to explore all possibilities to get the Conference on Disarmament back on track. We shall take into account all previous proposals and agreements, while bearing in mind the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. To that end, we reaffirm the ongoing relevance of all the provisions of the consensus-based Action Plan adopted during the 2010 NPT Review Conference. That remains a critical road map for implementation of all the three pillars of the NPT.

While we respect the views and legitimate concerns of countries supporting resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations", as regards progress on nuclear disarmament, we believe that progress will occur only through a practical approach to disarmament. We do not accept the premise underlying the call to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons in the draft resolution. A prohibition on nuclear weapons in and of itself will not improve international security, it will not strengthen trust and transparency among nuclear-weapon States, nor will it help to address the significant technical and procedural challenges relating to nuclear disarmament verification.

We are dismayed at the fact that the disarmament debate has turned in that direction. We remain open to other channels of discussion, which should, nevertheless, be genuinely inclusive and must be fully anchored in the global security context. We are committed to a world without nuclear weapons, but nuclear disarmament will be achieved only through steady efforts to put in place the necessary conditions, which currently do not exist.

The draft resolution contradicts the consensus-based approach. For decades, that approach has allowed the implementation and strengthening of the NPT regime in its three pillars. That is indispensable to the maintenance of international peace and security. The draft resolution will set back the cause by further deepening the divide among NPT States parties. It will also jeopardize the consensus-based approaches in the NPT review process and will divert attention from practical disarmament measures. For those reasons, our Governments did not take part in the

open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament. Its recommendations, in particular a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, can in no way constitute an acceptable basis for negotiations.

We urge all States to focus their energies on strengthening the three pillars of the NPT, on supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system and existing disarmament machinery and on developing both the political and technical tools and the conditions conducive to disarmament. Our countries have been supporting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We underscore the need to maintain momentum towards completion of all elements of the Treaty verification regime. We also support the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and the promotion of nuclear-disarmament verification. Those are essential steps as we move towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. In that regard, our countries will support draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.28, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”, draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57, entitled “Nuclear disarmament verification”, and draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65, entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

While reaffirming our commitment to continue our individual and collective efforts to advance nuclear disarmament, we will vote against the draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41.

Mr. Robotjazi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I take the floor to explain the positions of my delegation regarding draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.1, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-zone in the region of the Middle East”, which will be adopted today, and also draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.2/Rev.1, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”, which will be adopted tomorrow.

Almost 42 years have passed since Iran first proposed the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in 1974. The annual and consensual adoption by the General Assembly since 1980 of resolutions calling for the establishment of such a zone signifies the particular importance of the realization of that proposal for the international community of States. However, the Israeli regime continues to be the only impediment in the way of realizing such a zone by its stubborn objections to all regional and international efforts for the implementation of that proposal. All

Governments in the Middle East region, except for the Israeli regime, have become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Adherence to the NPT by all parties directly concerned is the most essential requirement for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The NPT States parties have highlighted the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East as a matter of priority in the successive Review Conferences of the Treaty. The adoption by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of a separate resolution on the Middle East as an essential and integral part of the package for the indefinite extension of the Treaty signifies the vital importance of the realization of that goal for the Parties.

In an important step to pursue the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the 2010 NPT Review Conference unanimously decided to convene a conference in 2012 to be attended by all countries of the Middle East and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. That decision was supported overwhelmingly by the international community of States, and significant efforts were exerted for the successful commencement of the conference to be held in Helsinki in late 2012. The Islamic Republic of Iran, including through several rounds of consultations with the Facilitator, expressed its views regarding the issues relating to the organization of that conference, and declared well in advance its readiness to participate therein. Unfortunately, the planned Helsinki conference was not convened owing solely to the refusal of the Israeli regime to attend it. The worst aspect was that the proposal to entrust the Secretary-General with convening the conference no later 1 March 2016, which had been made at the 2015 NPT Review Conference and had been supported by almost all the State parties, was rejected by the United States of America, which led to the failure of the Review Conference. Immediately after the Review Conference, the Israeli Prime Minister thanked United States officials for taking that position, which proved once again that that regime was the only impediment to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in our region.

That also clearly indicates the hypocritical policies of the United States with regard to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, but also

proves that the United States easily disregards the view of almost all parties to the NPT solely to appease the only non-party to the NPT in the Middle East, that is, the Israeli regime. That kind of short-sighted policy will indeed further motivate the Israeli regime to obstinately retain the status quo, to continue to threaten its neighbours and the region and to defy the repeated calls by the international community of States to comply with international principles and norms. It is crystal clear that the aggressive and expansionist policies of the Israeli regime, recent examples of which are its attacks on Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, the Syrian Arab Republic and countries outside the region, and its large arsenals of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as its non-adherence to international law, are the sources of serious threats posed to regional and international peace and security.

That view is shared by the overwhelming majority of Member States. In that regard, it is worth mentioning that at the seventeenth conference of Heads of State or Governments of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Venezuela in September, the 120 participating States expressed

“great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States”,

and condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. They were also of the view that stability could not be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities were maintained, in particular through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region.

Addressing the threat posed by Israel’s nuclear-weapon programme to regional and international peace and security requires meaningful action. The international community of States, in particular the depositary States of the NPT, which are also the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, as well as the European Union, should exert the utmost pressure on Israel to compel it to accede to the NPT and all other international legally binding instruments banning weapons of mass destruction. That indeed is the minimum requirement for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

For its part, the Islamic Republic of Iran, by ratifying all international treaties banning weapons of mass destruction — namely the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention — and by fully implementing their provisions has demonstrated its strong resolve in support of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We remain committed to the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and continue to work with like-minded countries in the region and beyond in appropriate international forums, including the NPT review process, for a united and effective front to promote that goal.

Therefore, as in previous years, we will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.1, which once again demonstrates the strong international support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as well as draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.2/Rev.1, which highlights the concerns of the international community of States regarding the threat of the nuclear-weapon arsenals of the Israeli regime.

Mr. Isnomo (Indonesia): I take the floor to explain Indonesia’s vote on the draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.26, entitled “United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, which Indonesia will vote in favour of. Although Indonesia is supportive of the general spirit of the draft resolution, we would like to share our views on several aspects of the draft resolution.

As an ardent supporter of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Indonesia shares the spirit of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We are of the firm view that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament must be pursued in a balanced manner, without one aspect taking precedence over another. Having studied the draft resolution, we find that it does not place those two important aspects on an equal footing. Another aspect that concerns my delegation has to do with paragraph 14. In our view, paragraph 14 could have been formulated in a clearer manner to provide an unambiguous understanding that a security arrangement referred to in that paragraph was a negative security assurance. That is certainly Indonesia’s interpretation, and therefore we would like to have this interpretation of paragraph 14 recorded by the Secretariat.

In conclusion, Indonesia is fully aware of the gravity of the security situation in the Korean peninsula.

Indonesia is resolute in its conviction that all parties need to refrain from any activities that could exacerbate the already tense security situation in the region. We therefore believe that the draft resolution could have made such a positive call to all parties involved, as well as to call for a lasting solution to the region that must be achieved through dialogue and diplomacy.

Mr. Ruiz Blanco (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): General and complete disarmament, including of course the total elimination of nuclear weapons, is one of the fundamental goals that the international community has yet to achieve. Colombia has consistently emphasized the importance of legal instruments and the international institutional framework in the field of disarmament, and it has defended the need to achieve the universalization of the disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as the fulfilment of each of its three pillars.

In addition, Colombia considers that, in order to avoid seeking alternative ways, it is essential that all the nuclear-weapon States demonstrate greater political will to achieve substantive progress in the implementation of the existing international instruments on the matter, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in particular effective compliance with article VI, on nuclear disarmament, as well as the early entry into force of the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Nevertheless, Colombia believes that any effort to open new pathways ought to be realized in a way that strengthens, or at least does not jeopardize, the progress that has been made in other forums, or the potential these instruments have. In that regard, it is our duty to consolidate the achievements reached, to build new bridges and to work tirelessly to bring divergent positions closer together, without losing sight of the common goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Actions leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons should include the goal of eliminating nuclear arsenals in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner within a multilaterally agreed and defined time frame. That should be done through an inclusive process, based on the promotion of dialogue with the nuclear-weapon countries, in pursuit of the political will needed to achieve the goal of the total elimination of such weapons.

Colombia has participated in the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament

Commission and the Open-ended Working Group on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, while always emphasizing the importance of establishing synergies and complementary processes between the existing institutions in those scenarios, and formulating and adopting initiatives aimed at freeing the world from the threat to humankind represented by the possession and use of such weapons of mass destruction.

Furthermore, Colombia thinks that the negotiations on the draft resolution we will be voting on — resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations” — did not exhaust all options for advancing towards an adoption by consensus, and merely led to a consultations meeting. My delegation will nevertheless vote in favour of the draft resolution, which includes a recommendation on holding a conference in 2017 aimed at negotiating a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, with a view towards their total elimination — keeping in mind that, for Colombia, the process of nuclear disarmament ought to be realized within a multilaterally agreed upon and defined time frame, open to the participation of all Member States, in addition to considering that it is necessary to take into account the call by more than 180 countries to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Mahfouz (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): We would like to express the position of our country with regard to the fourth preambular paragraph of resolution A/C.1/71/L.28, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”.

Our position in that regard has remained unchanged for many decades. The nuclear issue is an utmost priority for Egypt, as we believe that nuclear weapons pose a great danger to international peace and security. That is why we will vote in favour of this draft resolution. However, we will abstain in the voting on the fourth preambular paragraph in order to express our rejection of the reference it makes to Security Council resolution 2310 (2016), as that resolution did not achieve consensus and was not adopted unanimously. We believe that this matter is complicated from the legal standpoint. Indeed, there has been great effort in the Security Council in that regard. We voiced reservations about the resolution, and we regret the fact that the Council adopted it.

First of all, the Security Council is not the proper forum to discuss this matter, which should be addressed in Vienna in the framework of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). And technical matters related to the Treaty are certainly not within the purview of the Security Council — that leads to a regrettable duplication of work.

Secondly, resolution 2310 (2016) has not highlighted the key aspect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), even though it is the fundamental treaty in this context. We cannot merely deal with the symptoms of this matter. We must also delve in depth into the question of the full elimination of these weapons of mass destruction, which are unethical and destructive. We must therefore highlight the importance of the NPT and refer to States that detonate nuclear weapons and thereby jeopardize international peace and security.

This resolution is unjust and unacceptable. The nuclear-weapon States appear to be placed on an equal footing with non-nuclear-weapon States. That is seriously unequal and unfair. We must show that States that possess nuclear weapons have the primary responsibility in this regard. We cannot put them on an equal footing with the non-nuclear-weapon States.

As adopted by the Security Council, the resolution is unsatisfactory insofar as it will have adverse repercussions on the already existing mechanism in Vienna. It could even undermine the efforts undertaken there if the Security Council were to continue to deal with technical issues that are not within its purview.

Finally, this is a very complicated resolution. It includes a reference to verification even though most major Powers do not uphold their responsibilities in terms of verification and many States have failed to ratify the CTBT.

I would also like to explain our position with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.5, entitled “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”.

(spoke in English)

Egypt will abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.5, which is a traditional position by my country in that regard. The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation is a product of export control regimes developed outside the United Nations in a discriminatory manner.

Egypt believes that, in addition to its voluntary, non-verifiable nature, the Code is neither balanced in its approach nor comprehensive in its scope. The Code focuses on the issue of ballistic missiles, while ignoring more advanced means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, such as cruise missiles. Since its adoption, it has failed significantly to develop in a manner that can address the weaknesses and shortcomings I just mentioned.

Furthermore, this draft resolution includes additional language that we believe has the potential to restrict States’ rights to the peaceful uses of outer space.

In conclusion, we will abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.5. We believe that any consideration of the issue of missiles can take place only in the context of the United Nations if it is to enjoy legitimacy, inclusiveness, universality and effectiveness.

Mr. Eloumni (Morocco): Morocco will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1. While we support the negotiation of such a treaty and further substantive discussions in the General Assembly, Morocco would like to place on record the following.

First, negotiations should take place in the Conference on Disarmament. Secondly, negotiations should cover the issue of the existing stocks of fissile materials. Thirdly, the format of a group of governmental experts is useful, but we believe that the time has arrived for the discussions to be open to all Member States. We favour the initial provision included in the draft resolution that provided for open-ended consideration of the issue. We hope that this will be taken into account by Canada as the next step in the dialogue on this issue.

Mr. Garrido (Chile) *(spoke in Spanish)*: Chile will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.28, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”, which was introduced under agenda item 104. Our decision to do so reflects the great importance that Chile attaches to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the urgency we give to its early entry into force. We therefore call on the States listed under annex 2 to the Treaty, whose ratification is essential for its entry into force, to do so as soon as possible and to speed up their processes to sign and ratify it.

Nevertheless, with regard to the fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, Chile wishes to make it clear that it does not support the reference to Security Council resolution 2310 (2016), of 15 September 2016, which pertains to the joint statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by the nuclear-weapon States recognized by the Treaty. Those States claim that their nuclear-stockpile maintenance and management programmes are consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the goals of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. As far as Chile is concerned, that is an incorrect assertion.

Mr. Yermakov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian delegation shares the assessments and conclusions that were expressed in the statement delivered by the representative of France on behalf of that country as well as the United Kingdom and the United States of America with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”. Like our partners in the P5+1, we believe that the initiative to prohibit nuclear weapons is destructive.

First of all, this kind of hasty initiative undermines and erodes the existing mechanism for multilateral initiatives in the area of nuclear disarmament, as well as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Indeed, the NPT, which is the sole effective international Treaty on nuclear disarmament, calls for progress towards full and comprehensive disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. We must not forget the fact that there are no other treaties in this area. If some party were to attempt to move towards a prohibition on nuclear weapons, there would be serious doubts that we would be able to reach a new agreement.

Therefore, let us consider this: the sponsors would propose putting the topic of the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in an alternative international platform and to discuss this highly sensitive matter without the participation of the nuclear-weapon States. The adverse repercussions for the viability and the comprehensive nature of the NPT would be catastrophic. Let us remind those who for some reason wish to close their eyes to this fact that, pursuant to the NPT, five States possess nuclear weapons with absolute legitimacy. All the NPT States parties signed that Treaty and all national Parliaments ratified it.

Now there is a proposal to declare nuclear weapons illegal under some kind of a new mythical

international agreement, in which participation would be very limited. There must be no illusions as to that. As a result, two paralegal regimes would emerge with mutually exclusive provisions. We strongly recommend that, before our colleagues vote on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, they give serious thought to the damage it would do to the NPT, which is the sole effective Treaty that stipulates step-by-step progress towards nuclear disarmament.

Secondly, a hasty adoption of an agreement on prohibition is at odds with the provisions of the consensus-based Action Plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, according to which nuclear disarmament needs to be undertaken in a way that facilitates and promotes international peace, security and stability. The proposal casts aside strategic stability concerns and takes out of the context of nuclear disarmament only one aspect, that of the prohibition of nuclear weapons. If we follow basic logic, then that needs to be subject to consideration at the final stage of building a nuclear-weapon-free world to ensure the irreversibility of the definitive elimination nuclear weapons. We categorically object to the revision of the consensus-based provisions of the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

Thirdly, from a purely practical standpoint, the initiative to prohibit nuclear weapons seems quite dubious. It might make some sense if all the nuclear Powers were willing to participate. As we all know, there is, and will be, no such willingness. In any case, Russia shall certainly not take part in measures that are unrealistic and at odds with previously reached agreements. Without the participation of the nuclear Powers, the conference loses all practical purpose, but it would not be without adverse effects. Moreover, an attempt to compel the nuclear-weapon States to renounce nuclear weapons, without taking into account the strategic realities and legitimate security concerns, will be prejudicial. Not only is that at odds with progress towards a shared goal, but it also leads to polarization and the scattering of positions and outright antagonism among those who hold various views. That was attested to by the ambiguous results of the vote of the Open-ended Working Group, where more than one third of participants either abstained or voted against the hasty convening of talks on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, we respect the views of those advocating the prohibition of nuclear weapons. We

ourselves embrace the noble goal of building a nuclear-weapon-free world. However, the question is how to move towards that goal without undermining strategic stability, without eroding the checks-and-balances system of international relations, without plunging the world into chaos and dangerous unpredictability, without jeopardizing the integrity of the NPT regime and without deepening, even unintentionally, such divisions.

The priority now must not be a prohibition of nuclear weapons, which would be largely a propagandistic step, but rather meaningful joint substantive work to create conditions that would genuinely foster nuclear disarmament. We call on members not to yield to the treacherous temptation to resolve all nuclear-weapon-related problems at a stroke. We need to adhere to tried-and-tested approaches that have already enabled us to reduce global nuclear-weapon stockpiles to less than one fifth of their previous size. Even with the best of intentions, we must not create even greater hurdles to achieving progress in that regard.

The Russian Federation will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41. We call upon all delegations to once again give serious thought to the deadly, destructive repercussions that inevitably will follow if draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41 is adopted. We must not deceive ourselves with unfounded illusions. Instead of useless declarations on prohibition, which are not viable under the current circumstances, we must try to create conditions conducive to a genuine — not a mythical — disarmament based on strengthening the indivisible and equal for all international security and strategic stability. A good example of this is the joint statement by the leaders of Russia and China on strengthening global strategic stability, which was signed in Beijing on 25 June. I call on delegations to join such approaches.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft proposals under cluster 1, one by one. Delegations are reminded that the voting shall not be interrupted except on a point of order in connection with the actual conduct of the voting.

The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.1, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”.

I now give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.1 was introduced by the representative of Egypt at the Committee’s 12th meeting, on 17 October 2016. The sponsor of the draft resolution is listed in document A/C.1/71/L.1.

The Chair: The sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.1 has expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.1 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.5, entitled “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.5 was introduced by the representative of Kazakhstan on 10 October. The sponsors of the the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.5. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi,

Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Abstaining:

Algeria, Bahrain, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.5 was adopted by 166 votes to 1, with 19 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.10, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.10 was introduced by the representative of India at the Committee’s 11th meeting, on 14 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.10. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine,

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Armenia, Belarus, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Marshall Islands, Russian Federation, Serbia, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.10 was adopted by 128 votes to 50, with 8 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.11, entitled “Reducing Nuclear Danger”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.11 was introduced by the representative of India at the 11th meeting, on 14 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.11. The additional sponsors in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee are currently reflected on the screen. Are there any delegations not reflected on the screen that wish to sponsor draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.11? If yes, may we kindly request those delegations to indicate by pressing the speaker button in order for them to be added to the list of sponsors and be duly recorded. There are no additional sponsors at this time.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,

Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, China, Georgia, Japan, Marshall Islands, Russian Federation, Serbia, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.11 was adopted by 127 votes to 49, with 10 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.13, entitled “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.13 was introduced by the representative of Pakistan at the Committee’s 11th meeting, on 14 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.13. The

additional sponsors in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee are currently reflected on the screen.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland,

Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.13 was adopted by 129 votes to none, with 58 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.20, entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.20 was introduced by the representative of Mongolia at the the Committee's 13th meeting, on 17 October 2016. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.20. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee.

The Chair: The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.20 have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.20 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.23, entitled "Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.23 was introduced by the representative of Austria at the Committee's 11th meeting, on 14 October 2016. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.23. In addition, the Marshall Islands, Bahrain, Comoros and the Niger have become sponsors of the draft resolution.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan,

Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Monaco, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.23 was adopted by 143 votes to 16, with 24 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.24, entitled "Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.24 was introduced by the representative of Austria at the Committee's 11th meeting, on 14 October 2016. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.24. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee. In addition, the Marshall Islands, the Niger and Sierra Leone have become sponsors.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the

former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, Georgia, Guyana, India, Japan, Pakistan, Serbia, Vanuatu

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.24 was adopted by 135 votes to 33, with 14 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.26, entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.26 was introduced by the representative of Japan at the Committee's 13th meeting, on 17 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.26. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee. In addition, Jordan has also become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.26.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested. Separate, recorded votes have been requested on operative paragraphs 5, 20 and 27 of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.26. We shall take action on those paragraphs one by one.

We shall first take action on operative paragraph 5.

A recorded vote was taken

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Israel

Abstaining:

Bhutan, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Pakistan

Operative paragraph 5 was retained by 176 votes to 3, with 4 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on operative paragraph 20.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic

of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Russian Federation

Abstaining:

Equatorial Guinea, France, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Namibia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Operative paragraph 20 was retained by 169 votes to 4, with 7 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on operative paragraph 27.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian

Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Argentina, Brazil, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, India, Israel, Namibia, Pakistan

Operative paragraph 27 was retained by 173 votes to none, with 9 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.26, as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait,

Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic

Abstaining:

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, France, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Myanmar, Namibia, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Zimbabwe

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.26, as a whole, was adopted by 167 votes to 4, with 17 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.28, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.28 was introduced by the representative of New Zealand on behalf of Australia and Mexico at the Committee's 10th meeting, on 13 October. The sponsors are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.28. The additional sponsors are listed in the

e-Delegate portal of the First Committee. In addition, the Niger has become a sponsor.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested. Separate, recorded votes have been requested on the fourth and seventh preambular paragraphs of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.28. I shall put those paragraphs to the vote first, one by one.

We shall first take action on the fourth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad

and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua, Syrian Arab Republic

The fourth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.28 was retained by 172 votes to none, with 11 abstentions.

The Chair: I shall now put to the vote the seventh preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro,

Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, India, Israel, Pakistan, Syrian Arab Republic

The seventh preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.28 was retained by 177 to none, with 6 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.28, as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark,

Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Abstaining:

Equatorial Guinea, India, Mauritius, Syrian Arab Republic

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.28, as a whole, was adopted by 183 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.31, entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliot (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.31 was introduced by the representative of Brazil on behalf also of Indonesia, New Zealand and South America, at the Committee's 10th meeting, on 13 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.31. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee. In addition, Nicaragua, Vanuatu and Chile have become sponsors of the draft resolution.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa,

Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Israel

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.31 was adopted by 179 votes to 4, with 1 abstention.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.33, entitled "Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems".

I now give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliot (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.33 was introduced by the representative of Sweden on behalf of the De-Alerting Group at the Committee's 10th meeting, on 13 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.33. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested. A separate, recorded vote has been requested on the eighth preambular paragraph of A/C.1/71/L.33.

We shall take action on the eighth preambular paragraph first.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,

Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel, Lithuania, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The eighth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.33 was retained by 168 votes to none, with 10 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.33, as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Israel, Lithuania, Republic of Korea

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.33, as a whole, was adopted by 174 votes to 4, with 4 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.35, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A.C.1/71/L.35 was introduced by the representative of Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition at the Committee's 10th meeting, on 13 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.35. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee.

The Chair: A separate vote has been requested on operative paragraph 14 of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.35. I shall therefore put this paragraph to the vote now.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,

Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

India, Israel, Pakistan, Russian Federation, United States of America

Abstaining:

Bhutan, France, Republic of Korea, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Operative paragraph 14 of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.35 was retained by 167 votes to 5, with 5 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.35, as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa

Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Andorra, Australia, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, China, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Japan, Luxembourg, Micronesia (Federated States of), Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Ukraine

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.35, as a whole, was adopted by 141 votes to 24, with 20 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.36, entitled "Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.36 was introduced by the representative of South Africa at the Committee's 12th meeting, on 17 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.36. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,

Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Andorra, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Georgia, India, Japan, Liechtenstein, Pakistan, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.36 was adopted by 131 votes to 36, with 17 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations."

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41 was introduced by the representative of Austria earlier at this meeting. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.41. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee. A statement on the programme budget implications of the draft resolution has been issued as document A/C.1/71/L.70.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,

Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Armenia, Belarus, China, Finland, Guyana, India, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Sudan, Switzerland, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41 was adopted by 123 votes to 38, with 16 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.42, entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat of nuclear weapons".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.42 was introduced by the representative of Malaysia earlier at this meeting. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.42. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands,

Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Canada, Croatia, Finland, Georgia, Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Micronesia (Federated States of), Montenegro, Norway, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.42 was adopted by 137 votes to 24, with 22 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.47, entitled "Nuclear disarmament".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.47 was introduced by the representative of Myanmar at the Committee's 12th meeting, on 17 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.47. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee.

The Chair: A separate vote has been requested on operative paragraph 16 of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.47. I shall therefore put that paragraph to the vote first.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,

Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Pakistan, Ukraine

Abstaining:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, Israel, Sudan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Operative paragraph 16 of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.47 was retained by 172 votes to 2, with 5 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on the text of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.47 as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,

Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Cyprus, India, Ireland, Japan, Malta, Mauritius, Montenegro, New Zealand, Pakistan, Palau, San Marino, Serbia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.47 was adopted by 122 votes to 42, with 20 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft decision A/C.1/71/L.48, entitled "Further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention

of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft decision A/C.1/71/L.48 was introduced by the representative of Brazil at the Committee’s 12th meeting, on 17 October. The sponsor of the draft decision is listed in document A/C.1/71/L.48.

The Chair: The sponsor of the draft decision has expressed the wish that the Committee adopt the draft decision without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft decision A/C.1/71/L.48 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.49, entitled “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.49 was introduced by the representative of Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States at the Committee’s 13th meeting, on 17 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.49.

The Chair: The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that the Committee adopt the draft resolution without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.49 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.53, entitled “Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.53 was introduced by the representative of Tajikistan, also on behalf of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, at the Committee’s 20th meeting, on 25 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.53. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee.

The Chair: The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that the Committee adopt the draft

resolution without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.53 was adopted by 137 votes to 24, with 22 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57/Rev.1, entitled “Nuclear disarmament verification”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57/Rev.1 was introduced by the representative of Norway at the Committee’s 13th meeting, on 17 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.57/Rev.1.

I shall now read out an oral statement in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms of paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57/Rev.1, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts of up to 25 participants on the basis of equitable geographic distribution to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, taking into account the report mentioned therein, and which would meet in Geneva in 2018 and 2019 for a total of three sessions of five days each, which corresponds to a total of 30 meetings in 15 days during the biennium 2018-2019.

Those meetings would require interpretation in all six languages and would constitute an addition to the meetings workload for the Department for General Assembly and Conference Management in the biennium 2018-2019. That would entail additional one-time resource requirements for meeting services in the amount of \$201,000 for the biennium 2018-2019. In addition, sound-technician and recording services would be required in support of the meetings, which would entail additional one-time resource requirements in the amount of \$10,400 for the biennium 2018-2019.

Furthermore, the request for documentation set out in paragraph 7 would constitute an addition to the documentation workload for the Department for General Assembly and Conference Management of eight pre-session documents, for a total of 5,000 words, to be issued in all six languages; 25 in-session documents, to be issued in English only; and one post-session document of 10,700 words, to be issued in all

six languages, in the biennium 2018-2019. That would entail additional one-time resource requirements for documentation services in the amount of \$80,300 for the biennium 2018-2019.

In addition, additional resource requirements, including for the travel of experts and the costs of the services of a consultant to provide technical and substantive support to the work of the group of governmental experts, have been estimated at \$415,000.

Accordingly, should the General Assembly adopt draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57/Rev.1, the additional resource requirements that would arise, in the amount of \$706,700 for the biennium 2018-2019, including \$281,300 under section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council Affairs and Conference Management, \$415,000 under section 4, Disarmament, and \$10,400 under section 29 F, Administration, Geneva, would be included in the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2018-2019.

The additional sponsors are listed in the e-Delegate portal of the First Committee. In addition, Germany, Iraq and Greece have also become sponsors.

The Chair: A separate vote has been requested on operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57/Rev.1. I shall therefore put that paragraph to the vote now.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica,

Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Russian Federation

Abstaining:

Israel

Operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57/Rev.1 was retained by 181 votes to 1, with 1 abstention.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57/Rev.1, as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,

Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Israel

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57/Rev.1, as a whole, was adopted by 177 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft decision A/C.1/71/L.59, entitled: "Missiles". I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft decision A/C.1/71/L.59 was introduced by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the Committee's 14th meeting, on 18 October. The sponsors of the draft decision are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.59.

The Chair: The sponsors of the draft decision have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt the draft decision without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft decision A/C.1/71/L.59 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.64, entitled: "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament". I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.64 was introduced by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, at the the Committee's 10th meeting, on 13 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.64.

I now have the honour of reading out the present oral statement in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms of paragraphs 5 and 6 of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.64, the General Assembly would recall its decision to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in that regard, and would stress the need to establish a proprietary committee for the United Nations high-level international conference in New York. Pursuant to the requests set out in paragraph 5 and 6, it is understood that all issues related to the high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament and the preparatory committee, including the date, format, organization and scope, are yet to be determined. Accordingly, in the absence of modalities for the conference and the preparatory committee, it is not possible at the present

time to estimate the potential cost implications of the requirements for meetings and documentation.

Upon the decision on the modalities, format and organization of the conference and the preparatory committee, the Secretary-General would submit the relevant costs of such requirements, in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. Furthermore, the dates of the conference and meetings of the preparatory committee will have to be determined in consultation with the Department for the General Assembly and Conference Management.

Accordingly, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.64 would not give rise to any financial implications under the programme budget.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,

Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Iceland, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.64 was adopted by 143 votes to 28, with 15 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1 was introduced at this meeting by the representative of Canada, also on behalf of Germany and the Netherlands. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1. A statement on the programme budget implications of the draft resolution has been issued as document A/C.1/71/L.71/Rev.1.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Pakistan

Abstaining:

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1 was adopted by 177 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions.

The Chair: I shall now give the floor to those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote or position following the adoption of the draft resolutions and decisions.

Mr. Fu Cong (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The Chinese delegation voted against draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.26, introduced by the delegation of Japan and entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", based on two considerations.

First, with regard to the moratorium mentioned in paragraph 20 of the draft resolution, it has been our consistent position that the moratorium lacks an explicit definition. Therefore, it cannot be effectively verified and is not relevant or practical.

Secondly, on the nuclear explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki mentioned in the draft resolution, it cannot be denied that the explosions in those two cities are historical tragedies. We deeply sympathize with the people there for their suffering. But it is our view that singling out that part of history in the relevant draft resolution is inappropriate. China always stands for a complete prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons, and understands the humanitarian concerns of certain countries. But we hope that the issue will not be used by individual countries to misinterpret or distort history.

On draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations", China has consistently advocated for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and is committed to a defensive nuclear strategy aimed at maintaining nuclear strength at the minimum level necessary for national security. China honours its commitment to refraining from being the first to use nuclear weapons. China is the only nuclear-weapon State that is unconditionally committed to refraining from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. We fully understand the wishes and aspirations of countries towards a nuclear-weapon-free world at an early date.

At the same time, China believes that the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons cannot be done overnight. We have to pursue

it in a step-by-step manner, based on the principles of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all. Therefore, we believe the issue should be addressed under the existing multilateral disarmament mechanisms. Creating parallel mechanisms or turning away from consensus-building principles can only be counterproductive. For those reasons, we abstained in the voting on the draft resolution.

On draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65, entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”, we firmly maintain that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) remains the sole venue appropriate for negotiations on such a treaty. Agreeing on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work in the CD so as to start negotiations in that regard, based on the Shannon mandate, represents the only feasible way forward on the issue.

China is opposed to any attempt to circumvent the CD in order to initiate negotiations or substantive discussions. It is our belief that the draft resolution sends the wrong signal of agreeing to go around the CD to conduct negotiations with just part of the United Nations membership at the General Assembly. China expresses its serious concern on that issue. Due to the reasons I mentioned, the Chinese delegation abstained in the voting on the draft resolution.

Mr. Benítez Verson (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The delegation of Cuba would like to explain its vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.28, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”, and draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57, entitled “Nuclear disarmament verification”.

Cuba rejects any kind of test with nuclear weapons, including those that are carried out by subcritical tests on supercomputers or other sophisticated non-explosive methods. For that reason, as we did this year, we have always voted in favour of the draft resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

However, our vote in favour should not be interpreted as an endorsement of all the elements contained in draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.28. That is the case, *inter alia* — as we also stated last year — with regard to the fourth preambular paragraph, where reference is made to Security Council resolution 2310 (2016). In adopting that resolution, on 23 September, the Council once again overstepped into issues beyond its purview. Through Security Council resolution 2310

(2016), a dangerous and unnecessary duality has been established, while the majority of States that are either signatory or party States of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were arbitrarily excluded from the decision-making process on matters that are intrinsic to the Treaty. For those reasons, Cuba did not support, and abstained in the voting on, the fourth preambular paragraph.

We voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57, entitled “Nuclear disarmament verification”, because we are convinced that, for the nuclear-disarmament process to be effective, it must be carried out under strict international verification. Although the general balance of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57 is positive, the shortfalls and ambiguities cannot be disregarded. The fifth preambular paragraph states that

“significant steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament should promote international stability, peace and security, and be based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all”.

For Cuba, in no way can that principle be used as a pretext to make the existence of nuclear weapons legitimate and indefinitely postpone their ban and elimination.

Furthermore, we consider that it would be premature and unnecessary to establish a group of experts to consider the role of verification in the promotion of nuclear disarmament, as set forth in paragraph 7. Had a separate vote been taken on that paragraph, the delegation of Cuba would not have supported it. We believe that discussions on nuclear-disarmament verification must be carried out with the participation of all interested States.

Ms. Rahamimoff-Honig (Israel): Israel once again joined the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.1, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”, despite our country’s remaining substantive reservations regarding the modalities outlined in the draft resolution. That position reflects Israel’s positive attitude towards a meaningful regional process aimed at the establishment of direct engagement and dialogue towards a more secure and peaceful Middle East free from conflict, wars and all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their delivery means. That is in the same vein as Israel’s participation at a senior officials level in five rounds of consultations under former Finnish Under-Secretary

of State Laajava during 2013 and 2014, as well as our willingness to participate in a sixth round of those consultations.

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.1 is a consensual resolution. In the past, the practice of the authors of the draft resolution was to share it with Israel prior to its submission to the First Committee, in order to facilitate agreement among regional parties. It is unfortunate that such practice ceased many years ago. It raises the question of how a complex security architecture in the region can be agreed upon when even fundamentally consensual draft resolutions cannot be coordinated.

The text of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.1 recognizes the importance of a credible regional security process as an imperative in the achievement of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We fully agree. A credible regional security process is essential in order to address the security concerns of all regional States and the regional challenges we all face, as well as the necessary confidence-building measures. It is a *sine qua non* in the establishment of confidence, mutual understanding and cooperation between regional partners. Seen from a pragmatic and realistic perspective, only once such measures are in place, have taken root and have shown to be durable and conducive can more ambitious undertakings be considered.

A credible process is also closely connected to the widely agreed principle that the eventual establishment of any nuclear-weapon-free-zone or WMD-free-zone must be based on arrangements freely arrived at by all States of the region. That requires regional States to fully commit themselves to open and direct communication channels, genuine engagement and the acknowledgement of the threats and challenges facing the region. They have to recognize all regional States' right to exist and the need to build a spirit of conciliation rather than confrontation. In the final analysis, that is an incremental process, where each building block has to be placed on top of the other, in a stable and sustainable manner.

Unfortunately, the Middle East is sorely lacking in mechanisms that could foster dialogue and enhance greater understanding between regional parties. Currently, there are no processes in the region that could contribute to the building of confidence, the de-escalation of tensions or conflict resolution as a whole. There is no forum in which direct

communication between regional States can address core security issues and encourage the attainment of solutions in a cooperative and forthcoming manner. It is a harsh reality, given the instability and turmoil in the region. Israel believes that only through direct discussions between regional partners, on the broad range of security challenges and based on consensus, can progress be achieved and the vision of a Middle East free of war, conflict and all WMDs can be attained.

I should now like to explain some of Israel's considerations in deciding to abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.26, entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons".

Israel values the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and recognizes its contribution to the non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it is also clear that the NPT is insufficient to fully address the deliberate advancement of clandestine military nuclear programmes by States with little or no regard for the international legal obligations they have undertaken. Nowhere more than the Middle East is that problem most apparent. We therefore regret the calls in draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.26 for the universalization of the NPT, as well as the inclusion in the text of references to decisions undertaken in those forums.

We furthermore regret that the tenth preambular paragraph and paragraph 18 refer to the establishment of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East in the context of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. While Israel supports the establishment of a Middle East free of wars, conflicts and WMDs, such an endeavour must emanate from the States of the region and be based on arrangements freely arrived at by all regional States, not on decisions taken in multilateral forums, especially those in which not all regional States are members.

The principles I have enumerated were clearly recognized by the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which were adopted by consensus. Those are also the experiences and lessons learned from other regions of the world where such zones were established.

Israel voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.28, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", in the light of its long-standing support for the Treaty, which we signed in 1996.

Since the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Israel has actively participated in the development of all elements of the Treaty's verification regime. Israel transmits data from its certified seismic stations to the International Data Centre and actively participates in various relevant activities.

Israel's significant support and involvement in the substantive work of the CTBT Preparatory Commission is consonant with the importance it attributes to the Treaty as well as our recognition of its contribution to enhancing international peace and security. In that vein, Israel co-sponsored Security Council resolution 2310 (2016), adopted this year.

Notwithstanding Israel's favourable attitude towards the Treaty, as outlined earlier, we were unable to support the language of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.28 in its entirety, in particular the seventh preambular paragraph and in paragraph 1.

Preambular paragraph 7 inserts into a draft resolution dealing with the CTBT references from the NPT and its Review Conference. While both treaties are in the nuclear domain, they are different in their subject matter, scope, obligations and membership. In accordance with international law, decisions and resolutions adopted in the context of one forum cannot be injected into the work of the other without the explicit consent of the latter. Therefore, in our view, such a reference has no place in this draft resolution.

With regard to paragraph 1, it should be noted that the completion of the verification regime is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the Treaty, in accordance with the stipulation of article IV, paragraph 1. It also constitutes a major consideration for ratification for Israel. While significant progress has been made in the development of the CTBT verification regime, further efforts are still required. Specifically, additional steps are still needed for the continued build-up and testing of the stations of the International Monitoring System (IMS), the completion of the on-site inspection operational manual, as well as the purchase of equipment and training.

The regional security situation in the Middle East, including adherence to and compliance with the Treaty by States in the region, is another major consideration for ratification for Israel. The Treaty's verification regime needs to be robust to detect non-compliance with its obligations. It must also be immune to abuse,

while also allowing each State signatory to protect its national security interests. While the adequate coverage of the Middle East by the IMS is vital, regrettably three Middle Eastern countries have yet to build or operate national seismic stations, as required by the Treaty, or to transfer data to the International Data Centre.

Another significant consideration for ratification is Israel's equal status in the policymaking organs of the Preparatory Organization. The fact that the Middle East and South Asia regional group, defined in annex I of the Treaty, has been paralysed for nearly 20 years is an inexcusable situation that must be resolved. All States must be allowed to participate in the work of the Treaty on an equal footing in accordance with the principal of sovereign equality. Israel calls upon States in the region to rectify that situation and to convene the Middle East and South Asia regional group, with the aim of enabling its functioning.

On draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices", the ability of such a treaty to address proliferation challenges, including non-compliance by States with their international obligations in the nuclear domain, is yet to be established. That holds especially true for the Middle East, where several States have an exceptionally poor track record of compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. It has been Israel's long-standing position that the notion of a fissile material cut-off treaty is subsumed in the concept of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, the essential prerequisites for which are far from being fulfilled.

Ms. Guitton (France) (*spoke in French*): I have a number of explanations of vote to deliver. I would therefore thank the members of the First Committee for their patience. I will speak in the order in which the draft resolutions were adopted this afternoon, first in my national capacity and then on behalf of a group of countries.

I turn first to draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.26, entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons". The draft resolution places nuclear disarmament in the framework established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the documents adopted by consensus during the NPT Review Conferences in 1995, 2000 and 2010. The text also recalls that efforts

leading to nuclear disarmament can be carried out only on the basis of undiminished security for all in accordance with Security Council resolution 1887 (2009). Moreover, the next two logical and priority steps for nuclear disarmament are mentioned, that is, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the swift launch of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons are mentioned. France notes with satisfaction the introduction of a reference to the work carried out in the framework of the Group of Governmental Experts on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which allowed the final report (see A/70/81) to be adopted by consensus.

However, France notes with concern the development of this text in recent years, which was further accentuated in 2015. My country is fully aware of the grave consequences that could result from the use of nuclear weapons. We have all been aware of those consequences for a long time. Nothing has changed in that regard. Moreover, there is no consensus on the fact that this approach underpins efforts towards nuclear disarmament. It is of the utmost importance for the international community that we all work for the creation of the conditions required for the achievement of the collective goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, when strategic context allows.

I would like to recall that France considers nuclear weapons to be a deterrent aimed solely at the protection of our vital interests. France's strictly defensive deterrence doctrine severely limits the circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be used to extreme circumstances of self-defence consistent with the requirements of the Charter of the United Nations. In any case, nuclear disarmament can move forward only through concrete gradual measures that are fully in line with the security context.

France is concerned about the development of an emotional and divisive approach. Splitting the international community will not help create the conditions required for nuclear disarmament. Similarly, the development of an approach disconnected from the strategic development and aimed at discrediting the nuclear deterrent can only weaken support for the NPT, which remains the essential basis of international security, non-proliferation and continued nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI.

In that regard, I would like to emphasize that my country continues to work on the implementation of the NPT Action Plan adopted by consensus in 2010, which is the last relevant document in that regard. Moreover, France has for many years attached the highest importance to issues of nuclear security. Nuclear security and disarmament are nevertheless two clearly distinct topics, and therefore seeking to create a link between the two would be artificial considering the nature and objectives of these two topics. Above all, such a link would represent the risk of affecting the efficiency of international efforts towards nuclear security at the expense of the whole of the international community.

In a general manner, nuclear security covers all nuclear and radioactive technologies.

Given the developments that the draft resolution has seen this year, including in the form of references to the humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, my country chose to abstain in the voting. France will continue working for a safer world for all and for the creation of the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the terms of the NPT.

I would now like to speak on behalf of the United Kingdom, the United States and France on the subject of a number of draft resolutions.

First, with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.31, entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas", we would like to highlight the importance we attach to the development of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones. Such zones can contribute to regional and global security in a significant manner, as long as they are set up in line with the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission's guidelines. That is to say, they must be freely arrived at by the States of the region concerned and be accompanied by general assurances given by the International Atomic Energy Agency and concluded through consultations with the nuclear-weapon States.

Our three countries therefore continue to believe that it is contradictory to propose a nuclear-weapon-free zone that would largely be composed of the high seas while simultaneously affirming that it would be fully compatible with the applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the rights of passage through maritime space, including those of the United Nations Convention on

the Law of the Sea. We will continue to have questions about this draft resolution as long as the aim is not to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone including the high seas. We do not believe that the ambiguity has been sufficiently dealt with. For that reason, we voted against this draft resolution.

I now speak again on behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom and France on the subject of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.33, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”.

We will continue to disagree with the foundation of the draft resolution, which suggests that the current level of operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems increases the risk of the unintentional or accidental use of such weapons and that lowering the level of alert would lead automatically and in every case to an increase in international security. While the levels of alert can be and have been lowered as a result of improvements in the international security environment, the relationship between the level of alert and security is complex and cannot be reduced to simple formulas.

We reiterate that the operational readiness of our respective nuclear-weapon systems is maintained at a level that conforms to our national security requirements and the obligations that we have with regard to our allies more generally in the current context of global strategic situations. Consequently, we have reduced the operational readiness alert level of our respective forces since the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, our respective nuclear-weapon systems are no longer targeted against any State whatsoever. Those efforts have lessened the usefulness of an additional alert level as a nuclear-disarmament priority. We also recall that our nuclear-weapon systems undergo the most demanding monitoring system in both communications and quality control to prevent their accidental or unintentional use, ensure that such weapons can be used only through the command centre of the national authorities and maximize the decision-making time for the latter.

I would also like to make an explanation of vote on behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom and France on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.35, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”.

The reasons that led us to vote against this draft resolution are partially founded on the same concerns

as those that we expressed concerning the text last year. However, we are concerned that the most recent components and language in the text this year lead us further away from the joint understanding that we should have for a balanced and progressive approach, which continues to be the only realistic path allowing for substantial progress to be made on nuclear armaments while reinforcing international peace and stability. We are concerned more than ever by the emphasis placed on parallel processes. Envisioning new opportunities in the area of nuclear disarmament requires us to take into account all of the various factors that might affect strategic stability at the international level, which would not allow for an approach simply focused on the humanitarian dimension.

Our Governments did not participate in the Open-ended Working Group on nuclear disarmament, whose recommendations pertaining to a prohibition treaty would not constitute an acceptable basis for negotiations. We believe that the growing interest in the debate on nuclear disarmament would be more constructive if it were guided by existing procedures, allowing us to overcome stalemates in a step-by-step pragmatic manner, facilitated by a fissile material cut-off treaty. We must work together and towards an inclusive approach. Effective multilateralism demands an effort on the part of all participants to make specific progress constructively through dialogue and consensus.

I would now like to make the last explanation of vote on behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom and France on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.64, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”.

Our three countries took part in the high-level meeting in good faith and delivered both joint and national statements. Unfortunately, as yet, the draft resolution does not represent the views that we expressed at the time or, in our opinion, the views of a number of other States that also participated. We believe that nuclear terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the failure of certain States to honour their obligations in that regard represent serious threats to international peace and security. We therefore regret that the high-level meeting did not address the threats in a balanced manner, including the issue of nuclear disarmament. Combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the conditions at the international level that will allow us to make step-by-step progress towards the ultimate objective of nuclear disarmament.

The only reference made to the NPT in the draft resolution is insufficient, incidental and unbalanced. Furthermore, we continue to be puzzled by the fact that there is no reference to the 2010 Action Plan. The NPT is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and the basis for nuclear-disarmament efforts. Planning another conference to discuss nuclear disarmament in 2018 is not consistent with the NPT.

The 2010 NPT Action Plan provides the best route for making progress on multilateral nuclear disarmament. We remain concerned that some States appear to be moving away from the consensus reached in 2010. Furthermore, the draft resolution calls for negotiation of an instrument that is not mentioned as such in the 2010 Action Plan. We remain convinced that a practical step-by-step process is the only way to make real progress in our disarmament efforts while upholding global security and stability. There are no shortcuts. In line with such a process, we seek the early commencement and conclusion of the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty and the prompt entry into force of the CTBT. In the NPT Action Plan, all NPT States concurred that a cut-off treaty was the next priority step towards nuclear disarmament in the multilateral context.

I apologize for the length of my statement.

Ms. Dallafior (Switzerland): I will make two explanations of vote, first on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41 and then on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.64.

I would first like to explain why we abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations". In contrast to biological and chemical weapons, nuclear weapons have not been prohibited thus far. We acknowledge the existence of a legal gap and share the view of the sponsors of this draft resolution that further legal instruments will be required to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We are convinced that additional nuclear-disarmament instruments are required before the minimization point in order to move more resolutely towards a world without nuclear weapons. A process to negotiate a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons constitutes one possible avenue among several to take multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations forward.

For some time Switzerland has highlighted the fact that any negotiation process in forging a future treaty would benefit from being supported by as many States as possible, including States whose security strategies rely on nuclear weapons. With a view to ensuring the broadest possible participation, we suggested to the sponsors concrete language pertaining to the importance of achieving general agreement on issues of substance during the negotiations. We regret that this draft resolution does not reflect our position in that regard. Switzerland therefore decided to abstain in the voting.

We take note of the decision by a large majority of Member States to initiate a process to negotiate a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. It will be important to ensure that the forthcoming process and the future instrument have a positive effect on efforts towards a world without nuclear weapons. Both in the lead-up to and during negotiations, it will be important to take into account the following elements. A prohibition treaty should complement and reinforce existing norms and treaties. Any new instrument should be in line with the rights and obligations under the NPT and designed to support the implementation of article VI of the NPT. States engaging in the negotiations and eventually acceding to a prohibition still have a legal obligation to fully implement all provisions of the NPT.

In that context, we underline that the NPT is the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation around which a prohibition treaty has to be articulated. In order to enjoy broad support and increase the added value of any future instrument, both disarmament and broader security policy considerations need to be taken into account during the negotiation process. The parameters of the negotiations should ensure as wide a participation as possible, including by States that have outstanding questions concerning a prohibition treaty. We wish to once again underline, as has been stressed in discussions since the opening of this session of the First Committee, the importance of agreeing upon rules of procedure, that reflect the willingness to strive for general agreement and to make every effort to reach consensus on substantive issues. We intend to actively promote those and other elements in the negotiation process.

Our abstention in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, as well as the considerations that underpin it, is also pertinent with regard to the tenth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.35,

entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”, which refers to the report of the Open-ended Working Group on taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations (see A/71/371), on which Switzerland abstained. In addition, the considerations set forth in this explanation of vote are also relevant in the context of our support for draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.24, entitled “Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons”, a pledge that Switzerland has not signed.

I now turn to our second explanation of vote, with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.64, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”. Switzerland has voted in favour of this draft resolution since it was first introduced. While confirming its positive vote, my delegation would like to emphasize the following elements.

The draft resolution underlines strong support for taking urgent and effective measures to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We consider that to be fully consistent with the NPT, which is the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In that context, we would see value in explicit reference in the draft resolution to NPT outcome documents. Switzerland shares the view that additional legal instruments are required to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. Exchanges at the 2013 high-level meeting and subsequent discussions have highlighted that different approaches are possible to reach this objective, and that the negotiation of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons is not the only option.

In our view, the Conference on Disarmament, as foreseen by the draft resolution, is the appropriate forum to negotiate such a convention. Irrespective of current developments, we hope that the high-level international conference to be convened no later than 2018 will offer an opportunity to take stock of developments and the progress made since the 2013 high-level meeting, as well as to discuss the way forward. In doing so, we should act in an inclusive manner with the objective of uniting the United Nations membership with regard to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament.

Mr. McConville (Australia): Consistent with our vote in 2015, Australia abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.35, entitled “Towards a nuclear-

weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”. We note the reference in this year’s ninth preambular welcoming the Open-ended Working Group established pursuant to resolution 70/33, of 11 December 2015, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”. The draft resolution also welcomes the report (see A/71/371) submitted on its work. We also note paragraph 21, which calls on States to identify, elaborate and negotiate legally binding, effective measures for nuclear disarmament.

Australia was not supportive of all the outcomes of the Open-ended Working Group. In particular, the reference in the agreed recommendation section of the report of the commencement of negotiations of a prohibition treaty in 2017 was problematic for us. However, we strongly support a range of legally binding and non-legally-binding effective measures for progressing nuclear disarmament, which includes making progress towards a fissile material cut-off treaty and striving for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. A number of other practical legal and non-legal effective measures were discussed at the Open-ended Working Group that we consider ready for advancing, including on nuclear disarmament verification.

Mr. Hellgren (Sweden): I take the floor to comment on two draft resolutions. First, I will explain the vote of Sweden on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”. Our delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution. To accurately convey our full view on this matter, we deem it important to put our vote in a broader context.

In a deteriorating security environment, progress on nuclear disarmament is more important and urgent than ever. Still, the deadlock of the recent year remains, as symbolized by the failure of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the fact that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force. Frustration with this lack of progress is widespread, and the Swedish Government shares this disappointment.

Our basic perspective, like so many others, is the humanitarian one. We are supportive of any effective legal measure that would make a difference leading to effective disarmament. At one level, the issue is clear

cut. Our overarching goal is disarmament, leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. That is also the main motivation for our support for the draft resolution. At another level, the issue is highly complex. Will this process be the most efficient way to achieve the goal of full nuclear disarmament? The fact is that we do not know today. But given the stakes involved, we believe we have an obligation to try, mindful of the challenges involved.

We do not subscribe to the notion that there is a legal gap within existing treaty law that has to be filled. The NPT remains the indispensable cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. But a ban treaty could complement and reinforce, rather than replace, current law and treaties, not least as a legal instrument for the implementation of article VI of the NPT. States engaging in the negotiations and eventually acceding to a ban have a responsibility and the legal obligation to remain fully committed to the NPT and to ensure that its implementation is taken forward.

Today's vote constitutes an important and clear stance against what we regard as an increasingly dangerous status quo. Nevertheless, it is only the very beginning of a process. The key part of the process will be the actual negotiations during which the scope of a future treaty will have to be discussed and agreed on. In that regard, disarmament as well as broader security and defence policy considerations will have to be taken into account. Sweden will take part in those negotiations, and we sincerely hope the vast majority of others will also do so. Any treaty's effectiveness, which is the key criteria against which it will be judged, will hinge on the broadest possible adherence. To make that possible, the negotiations should be conducted in a spirit of inclusiveness and bridge-building, including with the nuclear-weapon States.

We remain equally open to other initiatives while pursuing that track. Sweden does not see a ban treaty as the sole available legal option. As the Open-ended Working Group report (see A/71/371) indicated, there is no shortage of ideas. Several of them deserve to be further explored as we move forward.

I would now like make an explanation of vote on behalf of the delegations of Switzerland and Sweden with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.36, entitled "Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world". We both abstained in the voting on the draft resolution.

Last year, when the draft resolution was first introduced, we explained our two countries' position, and that position remains (see A/C.1/70/PV.23). We acknowledge that ethical principles and moral considerations play an important role in the development of international law and that they are often reflected therein, especially in international humanitarian law. The Martens Clause, or the dictates of public conscience that protect civilians and belligerents under principles of international law, is one such example that is also relevant when we discuss the legality of nuclear weapons. We therefore welcome the debate on ethical aspects related to nuclear weapons.

However, our delegations believe that it is unfortunate that the draft resolution mixes international law and ethical principles. It is important to protect international law as a system of legally binding rules and not merely as one of moral imperatives. Otherwise, the system risks being undermined. While ethical and moral obligations play an important role, the strength of international law is that it is a rules-based system that obliges States to act in accordance with its rules and ensures that States are responsible for their violations of those rules. States' actions need to be examined in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, rather than looked at through the lens of moral or ethical obligations.

We look forward to continue discussion on this and other related issues with the sponsors of the draft resolution and other delegations, as well as to the increased involvement of research institutions and civil society in the matter.

Mr. Broilo (Poland): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations", on behalf of the following States: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey.

While we have a shared vision of attaining global zero, it is with regret that we note the significant differences that have emerged on how best to take forward multilateral nuclear-disarmament negotiations. We are concerned that starting a process towards a nuclear-weapon prohibition treaty now without the support of the nuclear-weapon States and a large number

of other countries with specific security interests would be premature. Furthermore, we believe such a measure would be ineffective in eliminating nuclear weapons, have potentially adverse consequences for regional and global security, not advance the implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and negatively impact the NPT review process, which would make a consensus outcome in 2020 all the more difficult.

In our assessment, a prohibition treaty would only engage those States that are already bound by the NPT and would likely mirror existing obligations, without any mechanism to ensure that any new Treaty obligations were being fulfilled. We need all States to work in unison if our goal is to be effective, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament, a goal to which our countries are fully committed. For all the reasons I have just listed, we could not vote in favour of the draft resolution.

Mr. Hannigan (Iceland): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations".

Iceland remains a consistent supporter and advocate of nuclear disarmament. We welcome the dialogue among all States on how best to achieve it, and we participated in the fact-based approach to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear-weapon use. We believe that the only way to safeguard the world from the risk of nuclear detonation is through the elimination of all nuclear weapons. That is why we will support, and have supported, draft resolutions on united action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, we are also clear that nuclear disarmament can be achieved only with the direct involvement of nuclear-weapon States.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its article VI include a clear legal obligation on nuclear disarmament. The upcoming review cycle of the NPT will be a key opportunity for focusing on how to move along the road to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

We share the frustration of many non-nuclear-weapon States that disarmament has progressed far too slowly in recent years. There are concrete steps that can be taken along the road to disarmament. That is why we

are co-sponsors of the draft resolutions on verification (A/C.1/71/L.57/Rev.1) and on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/71/L.33), and why we support the draft resolution on a treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (A/C.1/71/L.65).

Draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41 launches a negotiation process for a binding legal instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons. But it is clear that the nuclear-weapon States are very unlikely to sign up. It will therefore be unable to achieve its key goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Worse, there is a great risk that it will undermine the force of the NPT, which provides clear legal obligations and a clear structure for involving nuclear-weapon States. It would move the focus to a forum where the nuclear-weapon States would not be present and where they would have no legal obligations. We believe that the draft resolution does not bring us closer, but rather farther away from our common ideal of a world without nuclear weapons. For those reasons, Iceland voted against the draft resolution.

Mr. Langeland (Norway): We are at a critical juncture in our work of promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. There is broad agreement on our ultimate objective, that is, the full elimination of nuclear weapons. At the same time, there are divergent views on how to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. We believe that it is more important than ever to find ways to build confidence among countries. It is vital that we facilitate progress in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Genuine progress on disarmament will enhance our collective security.

Norway is deeply committed to that work. Last April, the Norwegian Parliament agreed on a consensus motion that requests the Norwegian Government to actively work for a world free of nuclear arms and to promote the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the driving force for non-proliferation and disarmament, with a view to the balanced, mutual, irreversible and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons and, on those grounds, to take a long-term perspective in working for a legally binding framework to achieve that goal.

We fully understand and sympathize with the impatience of all those who worked on and supported draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41. Progress on nuclear

disarmament has been too slow. And it has been too slow because the nuclear-weapon States have failed to engage wholeheartedly and with genuine determination in this area, despite having committed themselves unequivocally to eliminating their nuclear arsenals.

In our view, a legally binding framework should be based on the balanced, mutual, irreversible and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution, however, calls for legal measures to be put in place first. For that sequence to be effective, all possessor States need to participate, just as they did in the process leading to the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We need to recognize that, in the present circumstances, the nuclear-weapon States are not ready to engage in negotiations on a prohibition of nuclear weapons. Negotiations in which the nuclear-weapon States do not take part will not have any real impact.

We all want nuclear weapons to be eliminated. The devastation they would cause if used, intentionally or not, is totally unacceptable. That was clearly highlighted at the fact-based Oslo Conference on Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, held in 2013. The world should never again experience the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Therefore, we are deeply concerned regarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's continued nuclear testing and continued development of missile technology.

Regrettably, the Open-ended Working Group on nuclear disarmament was unable to reach consensus on its report (see A/71/371) to the General Assembly. Despite that, the deliberations in the Working Group demonstrated a strong commitment to move the nuclear disarmament agenda forward.

We now pledge to intensify our efforts. The elimination of nuclear weapons can be achieved only through concrete and effective measures. That is why Norway has taken an active role and launched several initiatives aimed at promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

We believe further progress can be achieved by developing nuclear disarmament verification tools that build confidence and pave the way for actual disarmament and arms reduction. It is our firm belief that future verification mechanisms should include multilateral components. We must work for the full implementation of the NPT. At the outset of the new NPT review cycle we need to work actively to ensure

that it is focused on substantive issues, with the clear aim of adopting an outcome document that brings our joint disarmament efforts forward. Moreover, we must do so diligently to avoid any further proliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear material.

Let me conclude by reiterating Norway's continued strong commitment to our joint efforts to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

Mr. Biontino (Germany): I have the honour to deliver an explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations".

For the past year, most of the countries assembled here have been engaged in a long and often controversial debate about how to make better progress on nuclear disarmament. Inspired and guided by the overall global zero vision of a world without nuclear weapons, they spared no effort to search for common ground on how to best advance nuclear disarmament. Let me be crystal clear: Germany is at the forefront of global zero and shares entirely the vision of a nuclear-free world.

However, at this point we seem to have reached a decisive stage. A number of countries are calling for intermediate negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. However, that approach seems to be a tempting shortcut, but, unfortunately, a shortcut that will lead nowhere. In other words, we cannot see how such a path can bring us even an inch closer to concrete nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, such an initiative risks carrying us further away from our joint objective. For example, negotiations on a nuclear-weapon-ban treaty without the involvement of the nuclear-weapon States would be ineffective. Such an approach would be divisive and counterproductive to our collective aim. Let us not forget that for nuclear weapons to disappear, the nuclear-weapon States will have to engage in the process. Now the central concern remains the full effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its three pillars, one of which is nuclear disarmament.

An immediate ban on nuclear weapons, without verification mechanisms or restrictions on the production of fissile material, bears the risk of weakening the NPT, which is contrary to the intentions of its proponents. For those reasons and together with our partners, we are advocating for a more concrete and more realistic alternative to a nuclear-weapon-ban treaty. Our progressive step-by-step approach has

identified concrete ways aiming for conditions that would allow for the continuous reduction of nuclear weapons by establishing the confidence and trust needed for such steps. It focuses on many of the elements of the Action Plan agreed to at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. One such element is progress on restricting the production of fissile material. That is a shared priority of the international community. Together with Canada and the Netherlands, we have put forward draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.25, entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”, which is aimed at facilitating renewed efforts on preparing the ground for negotiations on such a treaty. That constitutes a concrete and tangible measure towards nuclear disarmament.

To sum up, we believe that we have compelling reasons to pursue our progressive approach, which is geared towards effective, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament. We ask all our partners that share the commitment to nuclear disarmament to join that effort. We also want to prepare the substantial elements that will need to be discussed at the upcoming NPT review cycle.

Mr. Sano (Japan): I would like to explain Japan’s votes on some of the draft resolutions adopted today.

First, with respect to draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.13, entitled “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”, Japan voted in favour because it is important to deepen substantive discussions on ways to increase the effectiveness of negative security assurances and to seek a common approach on such assurances that are acceptable to all. In our view, however, the draft resolution should not prejudge the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Japan’s priority on the fissile material cut-off treaty in the CD remains unchanged.

Secondly, with regard to draft resolutions A/C.1/71/L.23, entitled “Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons”, A/C.1/71/L.24, entitled “Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons”, and A/C.1/71/L.36, entitled “Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world”, since Japan recognizes the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons based on first-hand experience, we have made various efforts to promote our

draft resolution to raise awareness of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

While Japan’s position is to continuously pursue the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a way that is compatible with our security policy, the draft resolution on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons has always been the basis of our practical and concrete approach towards nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, cooperation and mutual trust among the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States is indispensable in order to advance nuclear disarmament, namely, a recognition of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons should serve as a bridge-builder for unifying the international community.

Japan made its voting decision on each of the three humanitarian draft resolutions according to its basic national position.

Thirdly, with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan has been devoting tireless efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. In order to advance our common goal effectively, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States must work together and take united action based on a clear understanding of the inhumanity of nuclear weapons and also with an objective assessment of the reality of the severe security environment.

From that viewpoint, we have advocated the imperative need to pursue as much common ground as possible so that the different views among the international community converge on how to achieve our common goal. We have therefore repeatedly requested consensus-based decision-making on the draft resolution. However, it is regrettable that our basic position was not taken into account. Japan does not deny the various efforts undertaken, including the pursuit of a legal framework, to attain a world without nuclear weapons. However, we decided on our voting behaviour based on its consistency with our basic national position, which I just mentioned.

As repeatedly stated at the Open-ended Working Group taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in Geneva this year, we are concerned about the fact that this fragmentation of the disarmament community could undermine progress on effective nuclear disarmament. In order to prevent further

divisiveness in the international community, Japan will redouble its efforts to engage in nuclear disarmament through constructive cooperation between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

Fourthly, Japan abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.42, entitled “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons”. Due to the immense destructive power and lethal force of nuclear weapons, Japan believes that their use clearly does not comply with the spirit of humanitarianism that is the philosophical foundation of international law. Nevertheless, the advisory opinion of the Court, as it is set out in this draft resolution, demonstrates the complexity of the issue.

Japan supports the unanimous conclusion of the judges of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, we are convinced that realistic measures are required in order to achieve steady progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. With that in mind, we do not yet consider conditions ripe enough to call on all States to immediately fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations that lead to the early conclusion of the nuclear-weapon convention. Nevertheless, Japan will continue to make maximum efforts to achieve our common goal.

Fifthly, with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.47, we share the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons, which is the focus of the draft resolution. However, in order to steadily implement concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament, Japan attaches great importance to united action by the international community, including the nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, there remains a difference between my country’s view and the approach of the draft resolution.

Lastly, with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1, the early conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is an important building block towards a world free of nuclear weapons and our priority in the CD. Although the CD has long been considered the forum in which to negotiate an FMCT with the engagement of all stakeholders, the majority of the international community is extremely frustrated by the long stalemate in the CD. Japan supports draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1 with an expectation that it will

reignite momentum towards an early commencement of FMCT negotiations. We now understand that the draft resolution will provide another chance for the CD. Should the CD fail to commence negotiations on a treaty through the work of the high-level FMCT expert preparatory group, which is to be established based on the draft resolution, we will have to seriously consider other ways to facilitate the commencement of negotiations. My delegation reiterates its commitment to continue efforts to start negotiations of an FMCT at the earliest possible date.

Mr. Rentola (Finland): I take the floor in explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”.

The discourse on the humanitarian aspect of nuclear weapons addresses concerns for citizens all over the world. We recognize that as long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a risk of catastrophe with immeasurable human and humanitarian costs. Finland is a strong advocate of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the central instrument in nuclear disarmament. We also consider the NPT as a key pillar of the international security architecture and continue to support the effective implementation of the Treaty as a whole.

We must aim for a world free of nuclear weapons. To do that, we need to develop unity of purpose and a broader common understanding of the steps that will lead us to our goal. Finland supports activities that are based on a progressive approach and is in favour of nuclear disarmament that leads to concrete outcomes. For Finland, the participation of the nuclear-weapon States remains key in achieving effective and concrete nuclear disarmament, which is the only way to decrease the number of all types of nuclear weapons in the world and to which the draft resolution will unfortunately not lead us.

Finland’s position on nuclear disarmament is coherent and practical, and is based on the arguments I just mentioned. We therefore decided to abstain in the voting on this draft resolution.

Mr. Yermakov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We would like to speak in explanation of the Russian position in the voting on the Norwegian and Swiss draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.57, entitled “Nuclear disarmament verification”.

At the outset, I would like to note that, beginning in the initial stages of work on the document, we attempted to convey a range of important provisions to its authors.

First, our decades-long experience of verifying American and Russian disarmament treaties teaches us a lesson. That lesson is that verification cannot be considered without taking into account the specific legally binding agreements. Control mechanisms are not some kind of windmill, and they are not just going to work by themselves. Control mechanisms need to be precise, completely calibrated and extremely sensitive to the legal obligations of both sides. They can only be part of a specific legally binding treaty. Without any precise understanding of the scope, aim and other fundamental parameters of a specific treaty — parameters that are developed during the course of very tense negotiations — talking about verification simply does not make any sense. I draw the Committee's attention to the fact that in paragraph 2 the authors essentially recognize that all of our comments are correct. We are therefore very surprised that further on in the text they head off in another and incomprehensible direction.

Secondly, given that negotiations to develop any agreement on control mechanisms for armaments, particularly those regarding the issue of reducing nuclear weapons, are very specific, they can last months and sometimes even years. We would therefore ask the authors a logical question: can a group of governmental experts, over the course of just 15 days of work, achieve any kind of real results? It is clear that there cannot be, or at least it would be very difficult to find, a positive answer to that question. In the draft resolution, even the Conference on Disarmament mandate is formulated in rather a strange way, considering the role of verification in terms of making progress on nuclear disarmament. In other words, we are not talking about the parameters of a possible control mechanism or the forms and methods of work for verification of specific disarmament obligations, but instead about some kind of vague role that verification might allegedly play in making progress towards nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, we still have the strong impression that the co-authors simply do not understand the matter that is at hand in their very own draft resolution. Even more lamentable is the fact that they evidently do not intend to address any of those subtleties.

Thirdly, real disarmament verification measures require very specific technical knowledge of nuclear

devices, their means of delivery and of a lot of other matters. Needless to say, all such information is either secret or top-secret. Furthermore, from the point of view of the potential for the proliferation of nuclear technologies, it is extremely dangerous to divulge such information. And, as we all know, that would be in direct contravention of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We have already brought all the most serious criticisms of this to the attention of the authors of the draft resolution. Surprisingly, we have been left with the impression that they are simply not interested.

Fourthly, the draft resolution is loaded down with a slew of general disarmament topics that duplicate the provisions of existing resolutions and are clearly not appropriate in the context of verification. Phrases such as “the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons” have nothing to do with monitoring compliance with disarmament obligations. The attempt to drag the International Atomic Energy Agency into nuclear-disarmament verification is also exceedingly dangerous. As we all know, that runs directly counter to the Agency's functions.

We categorically reject operative paragraph 1, which has been left unchanged after being borrowed wholesale from the Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, but minus the crucial references to the NPT's article VI, on nuclear-weapon States' unambiguous obligation to entirely eliminate their nuclear arsenals. What we do not understand is whether this is only about the disarmament of the five nuclear-weapon States that are the permanent members of the Security Council, without taking account of the military nuclear potential of States that are not parties to the NPT, or whether it is about using this political document of the General Assembly to bestow on those non-parties the same international status assigned to the permanent five by virtue of their compliance with the NPT. It is deplorable that many other parties to the NPT, not just the authors of the draft resolution, have failed to note that contradiction. We hope it is not done in pursuit of the short-term political objective of garnering as many votes as possible, whatever the cost. The Russian Federation cannot accept an approach that undermines the NPT, and we therefore voted against the inclusion of paragraph 1.

As is clear, we had every reason to vote against the draft resolution in its entirety. However, out of respect for the views of the majority, we have decided to refrain

from that, but during our future work on this together we will try to clarify our basic positions with regard to verification. For Russia, a genuine participant in nuclear disarmament, we can see that those positions are a very distant and unclear prospect to those of our partners who talk a great deal about nuclear disarmament but have no practical relationship to the process at all. We shall see how it all unfolds down the road.

Mr. Van Der Kwast (Netherlands): I would like to explain our position on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations".

The Netherlands abstained in the voting on the draft resolution, which calls for a conference to be held in 2017 to negotiate a legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons. We have consistently stated that we support such an instrument as an element of a nuclear-weapon-free world. We have also stressed, however, that such an instrument should satisfy three conditions. First, it should be verifiable as well as comprehensive. It must not detract from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its article VI, including their inherent chronology. To be effective, it should enjoy the support of nuclear-weapon possessor and non-possessor States alike. Those three conditions were not accommodated in the draft resolution's final text.

The Netherlands will continue its best efforts to bridge the positions of those who support the concept of early negotiations on a ban on nuclear weapons and those who do not. We are willing to engage on any and all ideas and initiatives, and we will always work to ensure that a ban is fully compatible with our obligations as a member of NATO, which is a nuclear alliance. The Netherlands will also continue to focus on effective steps and measures to help us achieve a world without nuclear weapons, in full accordance with all the provisions of the NPT, including article VI, in a step-by-step and verifiable way that promotes international stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

I would also like to make a short statement on draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.64 on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey and my own country, the Netherlands.

We would like to explain our vote against the draft resolution entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament". All of us share the draft resolution's long-term goal of achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons. We all supported the holding of a high-level meeting in 2013 and participated constructively in it, discussing how best to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. At the 2013 meeting, we made various proposals on how to reach that shared goal. We therefore regret the fact that they have not featured in the resolutions on the high-level meeting in the years since. The draft text submitted this year does not address our concerns either. Rather, it highlights a single point of view aired at the high-level meeting, leaving us with no choice but to voice our continuing concerns about the draft resolution once again.

First, the NPT is the foundation of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It is the international legal instrument that sets the framework for achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world. However, draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.64 does not incorporate any clear references to the NPT, thereby failing to acknowledge the Treaty's central role.

Secondly, NPT member States have affirmed by consensus that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons. We must therefore focus on taking steps towards that goal that we can all agree on. However, the proposed aim of the 2018 meeting is unclear and could be interpreted as a vehicle for negotiating more divisive instruments. That must be avoided in the light of the disappointing outcome of the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Also, with an eye to the importance of focusing on the upcoming review cycle, we do not see the need for establishing a preparatory committee to prepare for the 2018 meeting.

Thirdly, while the draft resolution rightly calls for negotiations to start as soon as possible in the Conference on Disarmament, it points to only one core issue. We share the frustration that the draft resolution expresses about the fact that for almost two decades the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to adopt or implement a programme of work. We continue to call for its adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that will enable it to make progress on the four core issues. We are also firmly convinced that starting negotiations on a nuclear-weapon convention

without the participation of the nuclear-weapon States will not advance our shared goal of disarmament.

Finally, we would like to reiterate that the establishment of yet another international day does not truly help to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament.

The Chair: We have heard the last speaker for today in explanation of vote or position.

I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply. May I remind members that, in accordance with General Assembly decision 34/401, statements in exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to five minutes for the second intervention, and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Ri Tong Li (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I am sorry to return to a previous thematic debate. Some countries today referred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the nuclear issue. While listening very carefully to their comments and their positions on the nuclear issue, I had a strong feeling that I needed to clarify the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in particular focusing on what is at the core of the issue — what is at the heart of the nuclear issue with regard to the Korean peninsula.

As is already well known to the world, South Korea today has turned into the biggest and largest nuclear-weapon depot of the United States of America. It has turned into a very dangerous source for nuclear war in the Korean peninsula, steadily impacting, unjustly, the entire world's peace and security. That kind of development has now turned the Korean peninsula into the world's most dangerous hotspot. All this has been created by none other than the United States through its hostile policy and nuclear blackmail, which has been ongoing for the more than six decades. It began with the deployment of the first nuclear weapon in 1957, and the numbers have increased up to today with the deployment of 1,700 nuclear weapons. Nobody can deny that fact. The United States policy has been to neither confirm nor deny it; instead, they remain silent.

Since the very first day the First Committee met for this session, I have stressed this point and the fact that the United States delegation could not answer, clarify or respond, despite the insistence and arguments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This is a fact, proven by its silence against us. Now the United States policy continues unabated. The level of hostility has

been increasing to extremes, which again gives rise to the danger of war — anytime they are ready. For more than six decades, remember, they have been waging nuclear-war exercises. For more than six decades, they cannot not have imagined it against a small country, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The accumulation of more than 1,700 nuclear weapons, plus every year nuclear-war exercises are targeted at regime change — decapitation of the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In the world, no such exercises have targeted the decapitation of leadership; that practice has been only by the United States.

The United States, through its actions, has been increasing the danger of war in the Korean peninsula. There is great potential for another, second, Korean War and another nuclear holocaust, like those in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is simply a question of time to recognize another Korean War, when they are ready. In the face of this very dangerous development in the situation, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must conclude that a nuclear deterrent is the only way to survive, to safeguard, to defend ourselves — the people, the country, the nation, our sovereignty and our dignity. Ours is an absolutely legitimate exercise of the right of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to sovereign self-defence under the Charter of the United Nations. All sovereign States have equal rights and sovereign equality under the Charter of the United Nations. Nobody can reject or deny that fact.

Beginning in 2016, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted two nuclear tests. One was a hydrogen-bomb-explosion test. The most recent was that of a nuclear warhead, to determine if it is practically possible to test the nuclear-weapon delivery means. This serves as a strong illustration of the toughest will of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, demonstrating its readiness to counter-attack whatever provocation with nuclear weapons may be coming in violation of the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which would create the greatest danger to the safety, security and life of the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Now the question is: what is the policy of the United States at this point in time? The United States policy has failed; they lost. Their goal was to denuclearize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but their own military manoeuvres and all their rockets against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea aiming

for a regime change have resulted in compelling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to increase its nuclear-weapon capability, which now has given rise to the status of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a full-fledged nuclear-weapon State.

Despite that fact, they do not recognize the failure of their own policies. Instead of correcting their own mistakes and miscalculations, they are continuing military manoeuvres. While this First Committee meeting on peace and security and disarmament has in process, what they have conducted on the Korean peninsula were military manoeuvres, all targeted at regime change, again openly declaring the decapitation of the leadership as a final target. In addition, they have continued to have a package of sanctions, new sanctions to fabricate in the Security Council, misusing the forum. In misusing the Human Rights Council forum, they are going to create another so-called politicization issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They are using the forums of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council of the world, very sacred ones, for their political purposes, using them as political weapons solely in their own interests of regime change.

The increasing danger coming from the United States, with its nuclear blackmail and hostile policies, will only make the Democratic People's Republic of Korea prepare to increase its nuclear pre-emptive strike capability far ahead of time, in preparation for the expected United States pre-emptive strike. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not Iraq. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not Libya. One thing we wish to remind the United States delegation is that empires come and go. There is a Korean saying that those who enjoy playing with fire burn themselves first and cause their own deaths.

Mr. Wood (United States of America): I am taking the floor to exercise my right of reply.

First, I would like to address the comments made earlier today by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran with regard to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. I believe he made a reference to the United States approach as hypocritical. The United States is not hypocritical in its approach to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In fact, we have been quite consistent in our approach. Let me say very basically that it is very easy to hold a conference if one wants to hold one. But if one wants one that is inclusive — one

that has a chance of succeeding — then one has to have a process that is willing to consider the views and security concerns of all of the players in the region. Efforts to isolate countries and to dismiss their security concerns ensures that the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East will remain just that, a goal.

Turning to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, once again we hear delusional rhetoric coming from the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's hostile rhetoric serves only to reinforce the international community's serious concerns about the regime and its dangerous behaviour on the Korean peninsula. I once again call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to end its nuclear tests, ballistic-missile launches and provocative behaviour and to abide by its international obligations under various Security Council resolutions and under the 2005 Joint Statement. My final point is that the United States does not, and will not, recognize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a nuclear-weapon State.

Ms. Yoon Seong-mee (Republic of Korea): I would like to respond to the remarks made by the delegation of North Korea.

From the discussion we have had so far, it is clear that it is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that is a threat to the countries in the region and to the world's peace and security, and not the other way round. It is also clear that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to violate international norms and obligations, including the Charter of the United Nations. The North Korean delegation must keep in mind the condemnation that so many delegations have expressed in this forum regarding their reckless nuclear policy.

Mr. Ri Tong Li (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): The United States and South Korea have alleged stories full of lies and distortions of reality. The representative of the United States does not understand what is happening on the Korean peninsula. Their military bases, spread out all over South Korea for more than six decades, are full of nuclear weapons. One cannot count the number of United States military bases. Nobody has verified them. Nobody has seen them. They all target the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The threat is in fact coming from the United States nuclear blackmail, which is clearly targeted at regime change in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The United States never hides its ill-intended desire for regime change against the independent, sovereign State of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea — for the simple reason that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not in line with their own policies and that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is independent of the hostile policy of the United States. The United States maintains provocative, invasive policies all over the world.

They have a record of invasions, provocations and massacres throughout the world, most recently in Iraq and Libya. Many people still suffering as refugees, scattered all over the world, all because of the United States. Look at Hiroshima and Nagasaki before 1945. Where did the United States drop nuclear bombs? They dropped them on peaceful, civilian populations. They cannot talk about the threat of somebody else. They should first point their finger at themselves as the most dangerous, cancerous troublemaker.

To the South Korean representative, I again remind her that South Korea does not have any legal or moral grounds. As I said in my first intervention, they turned the entire land of South Korea — against the will of the nation and our fellow countrymen — into the biggest

depot of nuclear weapons of the United States. South Korea went so far as to hand over control of power over its own military forces to the United States. There is no country in the world that has turned sovereignty over its military — the greatest symbol of a country's sovereignty — to another country, in this case the United States.

Mr. Wood (United States of America): I think that the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea needs to get some new talking points. His are pretty stale.

Ms. Yoon Seong-mee (Republic of Korea): I think I have already explained our position on the points raised by the North Korean delegation. He just repeated what he had already said. It almost feels like it is a waste of time to listen to his preposterous, delusional arguments. Those arguments show that the North Korean delegation is misusing this forum for propaganda and North Korea's domestic-policy purposes. I urge them to stop making such delusional arguments. Just stop. Stop abusing our precious time.

The meeting rose at 8.10 p.m.