



# General Assembly

Sixty-ninth session

## First Committee

**13**<sup>th</sup> meeting

Tuesday, 21 October 2014, 10 a.m.

New York

Official Records

Chair: Mr. Rattray ..... (Jamaica)

*The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.*

### Agenda items 87 to 104 (continued)

#### Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items

**The Chair:** We will begin by hearing the remaining speakers for the “Nuclear weapons” cluster. As time is now of the essence, let me again urge all delegations to kindly observe the time limit of five minutes when speaking in the national capacity, and seven minutes for statements on behalf of several delegations.

I call on the representative of Ireland to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.21.

**Mr. O’Reilly** (Ireland): On behalf of Austria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Slovenia and Switzerland, I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.21, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”.

The draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to forward his report on the views expressed by Member States, in accordance with last year’s resolution, to the Conference on Disarmament and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It puts the topic of taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament on the agenda of the General Assembly at its seventieth session, when the Assembly will have the opportunity to take stock of the efforts in the year ahead related to multilateral

nuclear disarmament negotiations and to consider its options.

Ireland aligns itself fully with the statement delivered by the representative of Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (see A/C.1/69/PV.11). Ireland also associates itself with the 155 signatories of the statement affirming that nuclear weapons cannot, under any circumstances, be used again, which was delivered by the head of the New Zealand delegation yesterday (ibid.). I will add only the following in a national capacity.

Since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was indefinitely extended in 1995, the record on implementing disarmament obligations would seem to be as follows. The 13 practical steps of 2000 remain almost completely unimplemented; the 2005 Review Conference did not achieve any agreed outcome; and the extent to which the 2010 Conference may next year be judged a success has been put into doubt — to put it mildly — by the fact that a number of nuclear-weapon States have informed us that they have reached their minimum level of nuclear deterrence and cannot disarm further. Some are engaged in nuclear weapon modernization and replacement programmes with time frames extending several decades into the future. That seems distinctly at odds with the commitments given in the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan, and with repeated assurances of commitment to achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons.

The 2010 Action plan expires in six months time and it cannot, in our judgment, be simply rolled over as if nothing has happened. If next year’s Review Conference

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fails at any significant level, it will be the latest episode in an abysmal record of underachievement and underperformance on multilateral nuclear disarmament since the decision was taken to extend the NPT 20 years ago. How many failures can a Treaty be expected to withstand?

Even one of the key elements in the package of agreements to extend the NPT — the 1995 resolution on the Middle East — remains unimplemented. That is despite the subsequent reaffirmations of the resolution in 2000 and 2010, despite the agreement on practical next steps reached in 2010 — which Ireland is very pleased to have helped broker — and despite the unstinting efforts of Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of the State of Finland to take forward those next steps, efforts which Ireland fully supports and commends.

We have welcomed and do welcome bilateral reductions in nuclear arsenals as and when they do occur, even if those are insufficient in our view. However, it is not correct to say, as is sometimes asserted, that the significant reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons since the height of the Cold War is evidence that article VI is being implemented, in spirit if not to the letter. That is, of course, not accurate. Article VI does not call for reductions; it calls for an effective multilateral framework for the achievement of an end to the nuclear arms race at an early date and for nuclear disarmament. Only nuclear-weapon States can disarm, but it is for all States to pursue disarmament. Until we put in place the framework, we all stand accused of failing to implement our NPT obligations. What we have instead is what might be called a placeholder for disarmament, effectively telling us to insert effective measures for nuclear disarmament here.

No disarmament treaty can possibly function effectively on those terms. Could the Chemical Weapons Convention ever have arrived at a point where it has all but eliminated an entire category of vicious, inhumane weapons if it had not set out a framework of clearly defined prohibitions and obligations, a functioning verification system and multilateral decision-making organs to oversee the process of disarmament? Could the recent destruction of Syrian chemical weapons have been dealt with so resolutely, decisively and quickly if article I of the Chemical Weapons Convention had contained nothing more than a request for States to pursue negotiations in good faith towards effective measures for chemical weapons destruction? We believe not.

That raises an even more troubling question. Does our apparent willingness to go along with a status quo that does not envisage nuclear weapons disarmament in the near, medium or even long term while at the same time we utterly and correctly reject chemical weapons in some way suggest that collectively we view nuclear weapons as somehow more necessary or legitimate or justifiable than chemical weapons or, for that matter, biological weapons?

This is most certainly not Ireland's position. Previously, let us recall, several States wielded chemical weapons, presumably as their ultimate credible deterrent. That does not make chemical weapons any more respectable today, tomorrow or, indeed, yesterday. They are now rightly held up as an object of revulsion as illegitimate weapons of war. So why are not nuclear weapons? Is retaining the capacity to kill civilians on a large scale by incineration and radiation more respectable than killing them by nerve agents? There is no logic to that argument.

The recent reframing of the debate around nuclear weapons on terms that give due prominence to the humanitarian impacts of those devices has provided new clarity in the collective international thinking about what they mean for all of us. The Cold War may have gone away, but we now know that the risks associated with the weapons themselves have not gone away, that the lack of adequate international response capacity to cope with their effects — as documented by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in its research publication entitled "An Illusion of Safety" — has not gone away, and that the horrendous consequences of any detonation have not gone away either.

In fact, the risks and consequences are greater than we realize. The risks associated with nuclear weapons — about which new research has emerged, particularly in the United Kingdom and the United States — put front and centre the duty of all Governments of care to their citizens, which duty in turn exists alongside their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. States are entitled to take prudent steps to reduce and remove those risks; they are in fact both duty-bound and, we would suggest, Treaty-bound to do so by complying with obligations under article VI.

We warmly commend and express appreciation to Austria for hosting, in Vienna, a third conference to enable States to examine further the humanitarian

impacts of nuclear weapons. That conference will be the first humanitarian impact conference to take place within the European Union. Ireland will of course attend and play an active role, just as we encourage all States to accept the open and inclusive invitation.

The question is sometimes put: What is the true motivation or hidden agenda behind the humanitarian consequences initiative? The answer, as far as Ireland is concerned, is quite simple. Our support for the humanitarian initiative is solely and exclusively aimed at promoting fulfilment of the obligations freely entered into under article VI of the NPT and at further reinforcing the norm against proliferation.

The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs recently referred to the emerging clarity in international thinking about nuclear disarmament as a “swerve”. It is a good description of the shift in direction and pace that we have witnessed within the present NPT review cycle. The swerve has been a long time coming, but as years of neglect have left the NPT trundling towards a cliff, it is perhaps a good thing that we are swerving. The nuclear-weapon States are not yet part of the swerve, and we regret that. They have so far decided not to engage with recent initiatives that hold potential for new thinking and new progress towards nuclear disarmament, but we strongly hope that they will move to reassess the balance of risk associated with nuclear weapons.

Earlier this year, the New Agenda Coalition presented a paper to the NPT Preparatory Committee setting out options on a non-prescriptive basis for a framework of effective measures and building on an earlier paper presented by Egypt to the Open-ended Working Group on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in August 2013. Each option must be discussed and tested fully for its suitability as a potential framework of effective measures to achieve nuclear disarmament, as required by article VI. We are very grateful to our New Agenda Coalition partner, New Zealand, for arranging a conference last Friday, at which Ms. Treasa Dunworth presented an analysis of those options from an international legal perspective, which we believe adds greatly to the discourse on the matter.

Civil society, which has again taken such a leading role in bringing fresh thinking to this discussion, should be invited to become actively involved in all related discussions, including in the Conference on

Disarmament, where until now insufficient attention has been paid to its valuable contribution. At the same time, we need and would value the engagement of the nuclear-weapon States in a process that they are already obliged to pursue in good faith, along with the rest of us, from the moment they signed and ratified the NPT. We all assumed that obligation voluntarily and it is time now, almost half a century later, to act upon it.

**The Chair:** I call on the representative of Egypt to introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/69/L.1 and A/C.1/69/L.2.

**Mr. Aboulatta** (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation is honoured to speak on behalf of the States members of the Group of Arab States on the subject of nuclear weapons as part of the work of the First Committee.

We support the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/69/PV.11).

The Arab Group believes that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the main pillar of the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime. We need to deal with the three pillars of the Treaty on an equal footing, including the inalienable right of all countries to develop, study, research and acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, in line with article IV of the Treaty. We reiterate that this right should be fully consistent with legal obligations, in line with the agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Arab Group again calls for the implementation of resolution 68/32, in particular concerning the call to adopt a convention prohibiting the possession, development, acquisition, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, and for the holding of a high-level conference by 2018 at the latest to achieve nuclear disarmament. That conference would be the first of its kind at the United Nations and should lead to a phase in which we can achieve the expected results. The Arab Group has invested a lot to that end, in particular by playing an active role in all multilateral nuclear disarmament forums.

All Arab States that are United Nations Member States have signed the NPT and subjected all their nuclear facilities to the IAEA safeguards regime. Moreover, all Arab States without exception support the statement made by the representative New Zealand

regarding the catastrophic humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (see A/C.1/69/PV.11).

Unfortunately, that exemplary commitment of the Arab countries to nuclear disarmament and the multilateral international regime and their practical initiatives to achieve its noble goals have not been met in the Middle East region by good will on the part of Israel, which continues to be the only State in the region that has yet to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. It has not placed its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime, a fact that is eroding international peace and security and threatening nuclear safety and security. Israel continues to fail to honour the pertinent international resolutions, including the action plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

The right to security is inalienable and supercedes the stumbling block that Israel seeks to place before us. Israel cannot reverse the course of history to rid itself of nuclear weapons, which have catastrophic humanitarian effects. We stress the need to realize the inalienable and just right to achieve peace and security in the world.

Making the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone is a collective responsibility that we shoulder. However, given the unjustifiable and futile delays in the holding of the conference on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the parties calling for that conference should be urged to indeed hold it. Such a conference should be discussed at the 2015 Review Conference. All Member States must shoulder their responsibility to implement the pledges they have made. The international community should also communicate with non-governmental organizations, parliamentarians, academic and research facilities and civil society to show its commitment and rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons.

The Arab States call for the universalization of the NPT, especially as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not entered into force. A fissile material cut-off treaty must also be negotiated, in addition to the international community's commitment to universal nuclear disarmament. That would involve a treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons in line with the call of the Non-Aligned Movement. The international community agrees on those principles, and that should be reflected in all negotiations on the 2015 NPT Review Conference in order to assess the implementation of the 2010 action

plan and to adopt more far-reaching goals, with a specific timetable and concrete measures, in order to completely eliminate all nuclear weapons.

It is time to get down to serious business. Our work has been delayed for 40 years, but we are meeting today so that the Middle East can be free of nuclear weapons. We need to redouble our efforts to achieve the goals we are pursuing, in other words, creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and at the global level as well.

The First Committee is collectively responsible for the creation of such a zone, and that is why it is my honour to present draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.1 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which we hope will be adopted without a vote.

The risk of nuclear weapons in the Middle East has been unanimously decried by the international community. The draft resolution has had some technical modifications made to it, and we have submitted a joint report, presented by Iraq, expressing our commitment to implementing the draft resolution. The opinions expressed by the Arab States will, we hope, be included in the general report in the future. We call on everyone to submit their own reports to the Secretariat, in line with the obligations they have undertaken.

The League of Arab States is submitting draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.2, on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, in order to welcome the Action plan on the Middle East that was agreed by the 2010 NPT Review Conference and to reaffirm the importance of Israel's adherence to the NPT and submission of its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime. That should be done in order to achieve the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, so that Israel does not produce, test, stockpile or use nuclear weapons, rids itself of nuclear weapons, and signs an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement. That is a very important measure for building confidence among States in the region and a huge step towards achieving peace in the region. We hope that the international community will continue to support resolution 68/32.

We are confident that the Chair's efforts will lead to the attainment of nuclear disarmament and international peace and security.

**Mr. Ceylan** (Turkey): Allow me to begin by reaffirming Turkey's unwavering commitment

to seeking a safer world and to that end creating conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. Turkey strongly encourages and supports all practical steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. With this understanding, Turkey associates itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Japan on behalf of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) yesterday (A/C.1/69/PV.12) and wishes to make the following remarks in its national capacity.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the basis for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The NPT regime is established on the basis of a grand bargain, with disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use being its three equal pillars. Commitment to the fulfilment of the respective legal and political obligations contained in the three pillars of the NPT by its State parties, nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, shall be reaffirmed and upheld.

As to nuclear disarmament, the primary responsibility lies with the nuclear-weapon States. Special attention also needs to be given to the nuclear-weapon States outside the NPT regime. Turkey supports the calls for systematic, progressive, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament and encourages all States that process nuclear weapons to take further practical steps in that direction. We also urge those countries remaining outside the NPT to immediately and unconditionally accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

An incremental approach through building-blocks is a productive way to attain nuclear disarmament. One important confidence-building measure in this context is the establishment of zones free of weapons of mass destruction. Turkey supports the establishment of internationally recognized and effectively verifiable zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction wherever feasible. In this respect, we welcome the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia by five nuclear-weapon States, providing legally binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a party to the underlying Treaty. We encourage full ratification of the treaties and protocols for the five regional zones.

As for the Middle East, Turkey's sheer pleasure after the 2010 Review Conference turned into utter

disappointment when the announcement was made for the postponement of the 2012 Middle East conference. It is Turkey's sincere expectation that the conference will take place at the earliest convenient time, since this initiative could prove to be the only — and thus important — confidence-building measure in the Middle East at this critical stage. It is also a significant stimulus to the NPT review process.

Transparency stands out as a significant vector of disarmament. We welcome in this respect the report submitted by the nuclear-weapon States to the NPT Review Conference and invite them to consider measures to ensure further transparency without compromising security.

The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests constitutes another important building-block towards both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We stress the centrality of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in achieving those objectives. Moratoriums are certainly important confidence-building instruments, yet for an important issue like nuclear testing, legally binding treaties are indispensable. The importance of the Treaty is all the more visible following the nuclear tests undertaken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The international community has spent enough time waiting for the CTBT to enter into force. We once again encourage all States, especially annex 2 States, to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

We would like to briefly touch upon the role of the Conference on Disarmament, which has its own virtues. It is our firm belief that starting negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty will be another significant building-block, paving the way for parallel advances in the other core agenda items of the Conference, namely, the nuclear disarmament negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Unfortunately, the word "stalemate" has long been associated with that forum. At one time it successfully negotiated treaties, but today the Conference is in dire straits that require a collective effort to rectify its loss of direction. The Conference needs to be revitalized so that it can resume substantive work and start negotiating, as its mandate requires. We have addressed this issue in further detail in the context of the thematic discussion on disarmament machinery. On this occasion, we would just like to underline our firm conviction that the Conference possesses the mandate, membership and rules of procedure to discharge its

functions and that the stalemate does not emanate from procedural matters.

Last but not least, we would like to welcome the statements delivered earlier by the representatives of New Zealand and Australia on behalf of groups of countries on the humanitarian impact and consequences of nuclear weapons (see A/C.1./69/PV.11). We are pleased to observe the growing awareness about the catastrophic consequences of the possible use of nuclear weapons, which is a serious concern for all of our countries. That issue was a primary focus of the NPDI countries during our eighth Ministerial Meeting, held in Hiroshima last April. On this important topic, we refer to the points underlined in the Hiroshima statement adopted by the Ministers at the end of the Meeting. Having supported and actively participated in the Oslo and Nayarit conferences, we are looking forward to making further contributions at the upcoming conference in Vienna in December.

**Mr. Luque Márquez** (Ecuador) (*spoke in Spanish*): First, I would like to state that Ecuador associates itself with the statements made by the representative of Suriname on behalf of the Union of South American Nations and by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/69/PV.11).

The Constitution of Ecuador, proclaiming my country as a zone of peace, unequivocally condemns the development and use of weapons of mass destruction, as we believe that the use or threat of use constitutes a crime against humanity and against nature. This ongoing proclamation of the Ecuadorian foreign policy had its specific expression, with the active participation of Ecuador, in the creation by the Treaty of Tlatelolco of the first densely populated area free of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. In order to ensure the nuclear-free status of the region, we reiterate our call on nuclear-weapon States to rescind their unilateral interpretative declarations in the Protocols of this agreement.

For my country, the expansion and increase in the number of nuclear-weapon-free zones represent an important step towards the total elimination of these weapons, which makes them a subject of particular relevance to this Committee, in the light of the request made by the Secretary General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in his speech during the general debate (A/C.1/69/PV.9) that a panel on nuclear-weapon-free

zones should be included in future sessions of the First Committee.

Unfortunately, a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East has not yet taken place. We call on the organizers to convene such a conference at the earliest possible date. Likewise, we reiterate our call for the only State in the region which has not yet done so to renounce its possession of nuclear weapons and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and place itself under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had three objectives: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting the peaceful development of nuclear power for those that want it, and obligating nuclear-weapon States to undertake good faith negotiations aimed nuclear disarmament. We, the non-nuclear-weapon States, have done our part in not proliferating these weapons; the nuclear-weapon States have done little or nothing to give up their own. That is why we support the proposal to sit down with the utmost urgency to begin negotiations on a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, possession, acquisition, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, nuclear-weapon States should offer, through a legally binding, multilateral mechanism, a series of guarantees to never use nuclear weapons against those States that do not possess them. The mechanisms for agreeing to such a universal treaty exist. What is missing is the political will of nuclear-weapon States to begin those negotiations.

We note that during the past year the various initiatives of the international community and the peoples of the world demonstrate that the priority they attach to nuclear disarmament continues with equal or greater resolve than before. We should mention in that regard the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Nayarit, Mexico; the informal meeting of the General Assembly on 26 September to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; and the Third Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in Vienna in December, for which we predict the participation of the greatest number of States, including nuclear-weapon States.

The horror of such weapons, the consequences of which were witnessed by all of humankind in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ought to compel all States to say, "Enough — never again". Their use has been declared illegal by the International Court of Justice, on the strength of which their mere possession and the threat of their use is also illegal. We therefore cannot wait to take a step leading to the next step. Let us have the audacity to take at once all steps necessary to reach the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

**The Chair:** We are not off to a particularly good start this morning. As I had mentioned at the outset, we have 19 speakers remaining under the nuclear weapons cluster. We have heard just four this morning, so we have 15 remaining, and then we have 58 speakers to get through for the conventional weapons cluster. We have one more meeting scheduled for conventional weapons; so once again I am appealing for the Committee's cooperation with respect to its management of time. I know that members have the ability to abide by the strictures that have been set out, and I hope to see some improvement as we carry on.

**Mr. Quinn** (Australia): Heeding your call for brevity, Mr. Chair, my remarks are a shortened version of a longer text, which will be posted on the PaperSmart website.

At the outset, let me say that Australia is committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, pursued in an effective, pragmatic way. For Australia, reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons in the world is not only an international obligation under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); it is also a key requirement for making the world a safer place. Reducing the size of nuclear arsenals is in all our security interests.

The overall decline in the number of warheads — mostly on the part of the United States and Russia through the New START reductions — is a welcome development, but Russia and the United States still account for approximately 93 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons. While France and the United Kingdom have unilaterally reduced the size of their arsenals, there remain other States that are developing and deploying new nuclear warheads. That is very worrying.

Australia and fellow members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative have consistently argued that transparency about nuclear arsenals and developments

in nuclear weaponry is critical for building confidence and setting baselines from which progress on nuclear reductions can be measured. Transparency also helps the non-nuclear-weapon States feel confident that they can monitor effectively the progress in the reductions of arsenals. For those reasons, we encourage all the five permanent members of the Security Council to be bold and more open about the size of their nuclear arsenals and to show that they are making genuine and sincere efforts to reduce the size of these arsenals.

We regard the reports presented by the nuclear-weapon States at the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT in May as a significant first step, and encourage the nuclear-weapon States to present even more transparent and detailed reports on the size of their nuclear arsenals and the efforts they are taking to reduce them. We must also think about ways to include the non-NPT nuclear-armed States in global moves towards greater nuclear transparency. For example, India and Pakistan could also submit regular reports on efforts they could take to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals and to build greater trust between them to enable that.

Another key concern is that some States are developing new, smaller, battlefield-deployable nuclear weapons. The use of tactical nuclear weapons in a conflict would very likely escalate and could lead to a full-scale nuclear exchange, which would be devastating not only for the States concerned, but also for the rest of the world.

Australia welcomes the renewed focus on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. It is in recognition of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons that Australia has been so active in promoting effective disarmament and non-proliferation over many years. That is also why we must continue to work tirelessly on the issue. But Australia has also consistently argued that we need to address the security dimensions of why States possess nuclear weapons. We also need to work building-block by building-block, step by step, in order to strengthen the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime and make progress towards disarmament, and we need to engage the nuclear-weapon States in that process.

We are collectively following a long, hard road, and there are no shortcuts to achieving our goal of eventual nuclear disarmament. The steps we have already embarked upon are the best and most promising means of achieving our goals. These goals include the

entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and beginning negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Australia is pleased to participate in and welcomes the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on the FMCT process. We look forward to the Group's recommendation on the elements of such a treaty.

The convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction also continues to be a priority. Australia strongly supports the establishment of such a zone as an important way to address regional concerns and to fulfil a key recommendation of the 2010 NPT action plan.

Australia also shares the concerns of the international community about the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme. We therefore welcome the ongoing discussions between Iran and the P5+1, and the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency under the Framework for Cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

We also call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development programmes. Those activities pose a threat to regional and international peace and security and are in defiance of Security Council resolutions and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's other international obligations.

In conclusion, let me reaffirm that Australia attaches great importance to the First Committee. It is a forum where we can harness positive developments and build support for practical and concrete steps to strengthen efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Only through such efforts will we achieve the shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

**The Chair:** I call on the representative of Peru to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.25.

**Ms. Peña** (Peru): At the outset, Peru would like to associate itself with the statements delivered on this topic by the delegations of Costa Rica and Indonesia on behalf of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (see A/C.1/69/PV.8) and the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/69/PV.11), respectively.

It is an honour for my delegation, in its capacity as the Chair of The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, to introduce draft resolution

A/C.1/69/L.25 on this subject, which is presented for the consideration of the General Assembly every two years. The draft resolution is the result of a consensus among the delegations that participated in the thirteenth Regular Meeting of Subscribing States to The Hague Code of Conduct, held in Vienna on 28 and 29 May. At that Meeting, delegations reaffirmed the importance of the Code of Conduct as an instrument to build unique multilateral trust and transparency in efforts to counter the proliferation of ballistic missiles and highlighted the role of the Code of Conduct in strengthening existing national and international security and disarmament mechanisms and the objectives and mechanisms of non-proliferation.

The draft resolution is based on resolution 67/42, which was adopted by a recorded vote in 2012, and reflects the most recent developments in the area. It welcomes the 137 States that have so far subscribed to the Code of Conduct; underscores the importance of making further efforts, both regionally and internationally, towards achieving universalization; and calls upon States that have not yet subscribed to the Code of Conduct to do so, *inter alia*.

My country assumed the chairmanship of the Code of Conduct for 2014-2015 based on the principles underlying its foreign policy and that continue our region's tradition of promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. Furthermore, Peru believes that the proliferation of missiles remains an international concern and a threat to regional and global security. That is why the objectives of our chairmanship are to achieve full and complete implementation of the Code in all its aspects and to strengthen awareness-raising to promote universalization of the Code of Conduct.

In that light, in July Peru, together with the European Union and the Foundation for Strategic Research, organized a regional seminar in Lima to increase awareness of the Code of Conduct among non-subscribing States and to discuss current and future trends and challenges in the field of ballistic missile proliferation and space-launch technologies. The countries of the region were broadly represented at the seminar. Similarly, my country welcomes the subscription to the Code of Conduct of three brotherly regional countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica and Saint Kitts and Nevis.

Peru requests the sponsorship of those countries that have subscribed to the Code and the favourable vote of all countries in adopting the draft resolution.

**Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We have already heard many interesting statements under the “nuclear weapons” cluster. Indeed, there has always been a broad spectrum of opinions. That is the value of this forum, which reveals the entire spectrum of opinions on such important issues.

In our opinion, one fact that can be welcomed by all as a unifying positive factor is that a majority of States give pride of place to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For our part and to begin with, I will touch on one quite symbolic matter.

In May 2015, the next NPT Review Conference will take place. The whole world will mark the seventieth anniversary of the victory over the brown-shirted plague of Nazism. I wish in particular to highlight — for those who are starting to forget — that our country paid for that great victory, on behalf of the whole of humankind, with the lives of 30 million of its citizens. Therefore Russia, probably unlike any other State, highly values the genuine concept of peace, nuclear disarmament and stability, based on the principles of indivisible security for all States, bar none, respect for national interests and upholding the standards of international law.

Russia fully shares the aspiration of the peoples of the world to the noble goal of freeing the planet of nuclear weapons. Russia has already forged an unprecedented path. Over the past 25 years, Russia has reduced its nuclear arsenal by almost 90 per cent to its minimal sufficient level, and maintains its nuclear weapons exclusively on its own national territory, in full safety and security.

We well recall the “who” and the “how” of the start of the nuclear arms race, and we do not intend to repeat the mistakes of the past. Currently in the field of nuclear disarmament, the priority is the full-fledged implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Russia and the United States have unprecedented experience in reaching agreements — even when facing the most critical situations — and have carried out major reciprocal reductions of strategic arsenals. Russia and the United States — not only in word, but also in practice — have implemented and continue to observe their commitments under the first part of article VI of the NPT, which indicates, as will be recalled by all of those here present, that each of the parties to the Treaty “undertakes to pursue negotiations ... on effective

measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”.

But any disarmament arrangement involves a highly complex system of reciprocal inter-State compromises. Therefore, under no circumstances should we forget the second part of article VI of the Treaty, whereby each party to the Treaty pledges to pursue negotiations “on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” I repeat — general and complete disarmament. However, the problem of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, is the responsibility of every State without exception, and moving towards the noble goal of general and complete disarmament is something that we can only do together, as in pulling something together through common efforts.

Undermining the existing disarmament arrangements under the NPT would have serious consequences for all. It must not be forgotten that no other multilateral, legally binding arrangement exists in the domain of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, Russia respects the opinions of a number of States that have decided to discuss the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. We have absolutely nothing against such discussions; the problem is simply that they draw attention away from the need to address practical tasks in the field of genuine nuclear disarmament.

It is now time for the process of nuclear disarmament to include all States that possess military nuclear capabilities. Nuclear disarmament is one element in strengthening global security. That is why, with respect to further appropriate dialogue on issues of nuclear disarmament, we will all need to jointly address such problems as unilateral and unlimited deployment of the United States anti-ballistic missile system, the unwillingness of certain countries to renounce the deployment of weapons in outer space, the unwillingness of some countries to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the development of the well-known project on rapid strategic strike weapons, and all the conventional weapons that exacerbate internal instability.

Furthermore, we underline our efforts to promote the draft resolution on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space and call upon our partners not to break the consensus on that fundamental issue. There are no weapons in space, and it is very important that we eliminate once and for all the very possibility

of their appearing in space. If we had been able to ban nuclear weapons in 1945, we would not now be experiencing these enormous difficulties in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Moreover, in the context of the dialogue on nuclear disarmament issues, in particular when we have heard musings on this theme by all European countries, it is absolutely odious to see the military nuclear bloc of NATO moving ever closer to Russia's borders. It is no secret that joint nuclear sharing missions are being developed within NATO, while the non-nuclear members of the Alliance are receiving nuclear weapons on their territories and their armies and air forces are involved in training to launch nuclear strikes against Russian territory. All this seems absurd, but it is really happening in our world today. It would therefore be insane to assume that Russia would suddenly shut its eyes to these ever-increasing threats to its national security.

For us, the nuclear disarmament road map is the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, adopted by consensus. To ensure the success of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, we should focus on effectively analysing the results of the implementation of all the provisions adopted in 2010 action plan. At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, we will be ready to consider any constructive proposals to bolster the NPT regime.

We are convinced that any attempt to undermine the NPT review process or to launch some alternative dialogue on nuclear disarmament without taking into account the opinions of the nuclear Powers is doomed to failure. Addressing the matter without the main players will not work. We need a full-fledged comprehensive dialogue among all stakeholders. Such a forum for dialogue is available to us through the NPT review process and the First Committee, as well as the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the Disarmament Commission.

Russia, in close cooperation with all interested States, is actively working in all of these forums. We are also closely coordinating our approach in the context of the five nuclear States; the BRICS countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. It is important now for all of us to set aside our differences and seek closer cooperation in order to bring our common efforts together in the interest of reaching a unifying noble goal — creating a world free of nuclear weapons. Allow

me to stress that it is the creation — and not just the declaration — of a world free of nuclear weapons. We must work together fastidiously towards that goal.

**The Chair:** I am going to assert my prerogative as Chair to share with the First Committee my assessment of how we have traditionally organized these meetings. I do not feel that the current structure that is being utilized for First Committee meetings is something that serves members well. As long as we continue to have this level of interest shown in particular clusters, such as the nuclear cluster and the disarmament cluster — which is fully understood by the Chair — and as long as we have lengthy speakers' lists, as we have had since we have begun the thematic discussions, I do not feel that this structure that has been employed is working for members.

I will have an opportunity at the end of the session to hold informal consultations with the Committee to look at the working methods, and I intend to do so. This is something that, as members know, the General Assembly has called upon us to do. Resolution 68/307, of 10 September 2014, is the most recent resolution on this matter, and it was accompanied by an information note on working methods prepared by the Secretariat.

In terms of the consultations that I have already had with respect to working methods, I know that some amount of conservatism exists within the membership when suggestions are made to do something that some delegations may feel is too much of a radical departure from business as usual. However, I believe that we are facing a structural problem. It is not compatible with representatives' interests, and I will have an opportunity to discuss it with the Committee. I am sounding the note of caution right now because when we have an opportunity to discuss this in an informal setting, I hope people will remember what is happening in the Committee this morning and what has prevailed since we began the thematic segment. The same difficulties that I was told of in advance, despite the best efforts of the Chair, are what is playing out here.

I just want representatives to bear that in mind. I know I am encroaching on the time that I am talking about and prevailing maybe on the patience of representatives, but I thought that it needed to be said.

**Mr. Anh Young-jip (Republic of Korea):** Nuclear disarmament is inarguably crucial in reducing the risk of the accidental or intentional use of nuclear weapons and pursuing our ultimate goal of a world without

nuclear weapons. For the past several years, we have witnessed significant progress in the reduction of nuclear arsenals and have achieved a drastic decrease from their Cold War peak. As we set our sight on next year's Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), further efforts should be made to build upon the progress so far. In particular, given the wide gap between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States on how to achieve this shared goal, we need to take a practical and realistic approach, moving away from all-or-nothing thinking.

My delegation takes note of the significant progress in the reduction of nuclear arsenals, in particular through the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. The ongoing efforts to enhance transparency and build confidence through the convening of the conference of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5) appear to have a positive effect. We take note of their report submitted in a common standard format to the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT and look forward to a P5 nuclear terms glossary, which will lay the foundation for multilateral nuclear disarmament and verification.

Notwithstanding the significant efforts put forward thus far, there remains much to be done towards realizing complete nuclear disarmament. Next spring, countries from around the world will convene here in New York again for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike should redouble their efforts to narrow differences and build confidence.

It is imperative to further facilitate the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). We welcome China's international monitoring system data transmission to the International Data Centre, as well as the recent discussions by the P5 CTBT experts on ways to collaborate in strengthening the CTBT monitoring mechanism. The Republic of Korea joins others in calling on the remaining eight annex 2 States to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

Starting negotiations on the treaty banning the production of fissile material (FMCT) is another urgent and long overdue task. We support the commencement of negotiations on the FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament as a matter of priority. We hope that the

in-depth and constructive discussions within the Group of Governmental Experts will provide a substantive basis for future FMCT negotiations.

Countering the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-State actors has become an urgent task. The Republic of Korea attaches great importance to continued efforts in denying terrorist access not only to nuclear weapons but also to related materials and technology. As Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the Republic of Korea hosted a high-level Security Council open debate on May 7 (S/PV.7169). As an outcome document, a presidential statement — which included key elements on future strategy, enhancing the 1540 Committee's assistance mechanism and fostering greater synergy among all stakeholders — was adopted by consensus (S/PRST/2014/7). In addition, my Government is hosting in Seoul a regional workshop on promoting the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) on October 27 and 28, in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

Through the Nuclear Security Summit process, more than 200 commitments for practical actions to improve nuclear security have been made and implemented. As the host of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, my Government has been strongly committed to strengthening nuclear security and safety capacity. In particular, President Park Geun-hye proposed taking a holistic approach that promotes synergy among nuclear security, nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Such a holistic approach will give impetus to ongoing efforts in nuclear disarmament as well.

The nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to pose a grave threat to peace and security in the region and beyond and seriously undermine the integrity and credibility of the global non-proliferation regime. In defiance of the international community's repeated demands to abandon all its nuclear devices and existing nuclear programmes, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to threaten to bolster its nuclear capability. As other delegations have already pointed out, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has restarted operation of its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and is threatening to conduct a new form of nuclear test. Furthermore, it has engaged in seven rounds of ballistic missile launches since February.

All these actions constitute flagrant violations of relevant Security Council resolutions. These resolutions clearly provide that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot be allowed to have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the NPT under any circumstances. Nuclear weapons cannot be a strategic asset for ensuring security and development; rather, they should be a crippling liability. If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea wishes to pursue a path of economic prosperity, it will have to make a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear weapons programme.

Along these lines, my delegation urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to refrain from any further provocative acts, fulfil without delay all of its obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions, abandon all nuclear weapons programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and comply with its commitments in the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks.

**Mr. Taalas** (Finland): I would like to congratulate you, Mr. Chair, and assure you of our full cooperation. Further, Sir, I would like express our full support for your efforts to re-energize this sometimes sclerotic debate.

I associate myself fully with the statement made by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/69/PV.11). I would like to add the following remarks in my national capacity.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its three pillars constitute the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation and arms control regime. We attach great importance to the outcome of 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT and are committed to its full implementation as we advance towards the 2015 Review Conference. Working towards a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is a responsibility of all nations. The humanitarian initiative adds pressure to step up the efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament. It reflects the genuine concerns of citizens all over the world that as long as those weapons exist there is a real threat of a terrible catastrophe.

To achieve progress in nuclear disarmament, we do need a stronger sense of urgency. We welcome the fact that over 150 countries have joined the statement presented by the representative of New Zealand, and 15 countries have signed up to the statement initiated by Australia. We also need real consensus-building.

Eliminating nuclear weapons is possible only through substantive and constructive engagement with those States that possess nuclear weapons. That is why we see merit in both of the aforementioned statements and decided to join both of them. They complement each other. It should be possible to find more common ground. Our decision to join both statements underlines the need for a broad and inclusive consensus in taking this vitally important issue further.

We remain committed to commencing negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. We are pleased to provide our expertise for the proceedings of the Group of Governmental Experts. We are hopeful that the Group's work will lay the ground for future negotiations.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its near universal moratorium on nuclear weapon tests are of great importance. However, they cannot be a substitute for a legally binding global ban on testing. We reiterate our call on all States that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so.

While the implementation of the New START agreement is ongoing, we encourage the Russian Federation and the United States to seek further reductions, including in their tactical nuclear arsenals. Tactical weapons are not under any binding and verifiable international treaty. Their reduction and elimination would strengthen security in Europe as well as globally.

Security is built on joint efforts and cooperation as well as on adherence to our existing commitments. The violation of the Budapest Memorandum by the Russian Federation is a serious challenge in this respect. Upholding commitments and norms is vital for international security and mutual trust.

Since the previous session of the First Committee, some important developments have taken place in the preparations for convening of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The facilitator and the conveners of the Helsinki conference, together with States of the Middle East region, have held five informal meetings in Switzerland. Some progress on the arrangements of the conference has been made. Continuing determined consultations among the States of the region, willingness to seek solutions acceptable to all and political will are now required. Finland, as

the host Government, remains prepared to host the conference at short notice.

We strongly support the ongoing efforts to seek a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. I would also like to reiterate our long-standing concern about the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the challenge it poses to the international non-proliferation regime.

Finland attaches great importance to combating nuclear terrorism and preventing the risk of nuclear and other radioactive material falling into the hands of terrorists. In June 2015 we will host the next plenary of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. We warmly welcome new partners to join this initiative and participate in the plenary in Helsinki.

**Mr. Herráiz España** (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): First of all, I would like to associate myself with the statement made by the observer of the European Union and its member States, which we fully endorse (see A/C.1/69/PV.11).

Spain wishes to reiterate once again its commitment to the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, which is the ultimate goal of a process being developed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime. We emphasize the importance of its necessary universalization and the fundamental relevance of each of the three pillars of the Treaty, with balanced and complementary application thereof. Spain believes that all States should engage constructively and actively in finding effective and practical measures to help achieve the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Therefore, we must work to implement the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

With regard to disarmament, this joint effort should be carried out in a realistic manner, involving in particular nuclear-weapon States so that they assume disarmament commitments, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, and agree on other transparency measures. There has been less progress than was hoped, as this issue touches closely on the sensitive topic of States' sovereignty and national interests. However, we must continue to work to create a framework of trust in which we can achieve concrete commitments. In any case, we believe that we must be careful with maximalist approaches that may seem appealing but

could turn out to be counterproductive if they do not have the participation of all stakeholders in this area.

Spain is aware of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, as reflected in the final document of the 2010 Review Conference, and has been closely following the various initiatives undertaken at the international level in recent years, such as the Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo and Nayarit, Mexico. Therefore, Spain is looking forward to the conference on this issue that will be held in Vienna in December and hopes that its outcome will serve to strengthen the NPT in view of the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

I want to express our concern about regional proliferation crises.

With regard to Iran, Spain supports the initiatives to achieve a diplomatic solution, which are being undertaken by Iran, the E3+3 group and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Spain believes that the negotiation process is a unique opportunity that should be taken advantage of, and a special effort should be made to reach an agreement before the deadline of 24 November.

With regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Spain condemned the third nuclear test carried out by this country in February 2013, as it was a clear violation of its international obligations as expressed in various Security Council resolutions. Spain calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear and ballistic programmes completely and in a verifiable manner.

Spain attaches great importance to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and resolutely supports the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction as soon as possible. We appreciate the efforts being made by the facilitator of the conference, Ambassador Laajava, and ask all relevant actors to continue with this effort. Spain also welcomes its own signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia in May 2014.

Spain expresses its support for the development by countries of nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes in a responsible and transparent manner, in accordance with the NPT and in strict compliance with their international commitments. In this context,

we emphasize the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency as guarantor of the verification of the Treaty in the fields of non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Spain advocates the universalization of the IAEA safeguards regime, supplemented by the additional protocol, as an international standard for verification and transparency.

Spain believes that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is another important instrument. A strong political push is needed to accelerate its entry into force and achieve the complete development of its verification mechanisms. We therefore call on States that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty, and in particular the annex 2 States, to do so as soon as possible in order to allow its urgent entry into force. Similarly, Spain continues to show its strong support for beginning the work towards the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty within the context of the Conference on Disarmament.

Finally, for my country, making progress in the fight against asymmetric nuclear weapons is a top priority in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of non-State actors for terrorist purposes. This effort should be a common goal for the international community and lead all States to adopt effective national measures to strengthen the physical security of their installations and nuclear materials.

I would like to highlight the importance of complying with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which we consider a key instrument in the current international institutional architecture in this area. Spain has collaborated with other countries in the fight against asymmetric nuclear proliferation and in the prevention of nuclear terrorism. We will continue to work actively and develop collaborative projects effectively in multilateral, regional and bilateral frameworks. We must continue the momentum spurred by outstanding initiatives in this area, such as the process of the Nuclear Security Summits, whose most recent Summit was held in The Hague in March, the ongoing work within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the export control regimes for dual-use material, among others.

The NPT Review Conference will be convened in New York in May 2015. We hope that all States will make a cooperative effort to address all these issues and achieve real progress on the basis of what was agreed in 2010. The effort will be worth it, as the security and

international prosperity of future generations are at stake.

**Ms. Benhabouche** (Algeria): I am pleased to take the floor today to express the views of Algeria with regard to the issue of nuclear weapons.

My delegation associates itself with the statements delivered by the representatives of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States (see A/C.1/69/PV.11) and by the representative of Egypt on behalf of the Group of Arab States (see A/C.1/69/PV.10).

Algeria reaffirms that nuclear disarmament remains its highest priority and expresses its serious concern over the danger to humankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use or threat of use. Algeria calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with their legal obligations to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons without further delay. In this regard, we reiterate the importance of the application by the nuclear-weapons States of the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability in all measures related to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations. The fulfilment of those obligations should not be made conditional on confidence-building measures or other disarmament efforts.

Convinced that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use, Algeria supports the road map proposed by the Non-Aligned Movement during the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament held in 2013. It is reflected in General Assembly resolution 68/32, which calls mainly for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, which prohibits their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, and use or threat of use, and provides for their destruction.

My delegation would also like to seize this opportunity to reiterate the commitment of Algeria to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and to stress the need to universalize this Treaty, which is the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, and to ensure compliance with each of its three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Any selective approach to the

NPT is likely to drain this instrument of its substance. The balance among the three pillars — disarmament, non-proliferation and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — must be preserved. The three pillars have equal importance. Algeria underlines that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation should be parallel to simultaneous efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament. We emphasize that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements.

A majority of States have chosen to use atomic energy for exclusively civilian purposes, in accordance with article IV of the NPT. Indeed, nuclear energy represents for many developing countries a strategic choice for their economic development and energy security needs. Accordingly, my delegation reaffirms the legitimate right to carry out research on, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the non-proliferation regime.

Algeria is concerned with the lack of progress in the full implementation of the 13 measures of the Treaty's article VI disarmament obligations, agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and endorsed again in the action plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Algeria calls on all States parties to the NPT to firmly renew their commitments during the forthcoming ninth NPT Review Conference, to be held in spring 2015.

Algeria considers the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones to be an important measure towards achieving nuclear disarmament and the nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The example of the Pelindaba Treaty and other existing nuclear-weapon-free zones should also be followed in the Middle East. Algeria expresses its disappointment that the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, due to have been held in 2012, has not yet been convened. As an integral part of the 2010 NPT Review Conference action plan, the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East is required. Therefore, my delegation expresses its deep concern over the delay in the implementation of the 1995 resolution, which remains valid until its objectives are achieved.

My delegation wishes to stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty in order to allow its entry into force. The achievement of such objective will contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. My delegation encourages, in this regard, all annex 2 States to sign and ratify this Treaty.

My delegation welcomes the convening of the Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. Algeria associates itself with the joint statement delivered to the First Committee by the representative of New Zealand, on behalf of a group of States, on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons (see A/C.1/69/PV.11).

Finally, Algeria is fully committed to the objectives of non-proliferation and to the efforts of the international community aimed at preventing terrorists and other non-State actors from acquiring the nuclear materials necessary for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or acquiring other radioactive material.

**Ms. Mandeel** (Bahrain) (*spoke in Arabic*): Since this is the first time my delegation is taking the floor during this session of the First Committee, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. Chair, on your assumption of the chairmanship of our Committee. We are sure that thanks to your ability, skills and wisdom, you will be able to lead us to a successful outcome of our work. We would also like to congratulate the members of the Bureau and pay tribute to your predecessor, the representative of Libya, for his able and wise stewardship of the Committee at its last session.

We align ourselves with the statement delivered by the representative of Egypt on behalf of the Group of Arab States (see A/C.1/69/PV.10) and the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/69/PV.11).

The Kingdom of Bahrain reaffirms its continued support for the dismantling of all weapons of mass destruction, as well as its commitment to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, so as to ensure peace and stability in the world. Indeed, peace, security and stability require the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the cooperation of Member States to end their production and prevent their proliferation so as to achieve their total elimination. Obviously, the United Nations plays a fundamental role in that regard, in particular in the area of disarmament and in ensuring international security, as it allows us

to engage in discussions on the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

We reaffirm the importance of holding a conference as soon as possible on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, since the 2012 conference was postponed.

The Kingdom of Bahrain looks forward to an increased exchange of nuclear knowledge and technology among countries to further the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. We also look forward to the postponed conference on the Middle East region.

We support the efforts of the P5+1 to arrive at an agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran on its nuclear programme, in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the national security agreement, so as to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear technology, a legitimate and natural right of States. Israel must accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and place its installations under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

Since the creation of the United Nations and the establishment of the First Committee, the General Assembly has made a commitment to and exerted greater efforts for the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. However, further efforts are necessary to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We are concerned about the possibility of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups. We hope that a joint agreement can be reached between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States and States affected by the use of nuclear weapons, in accordance with international obligations and relevant Security Council resolutions.

Lastly, we reaffirm our commitment to existing international instruments and Security Council resolutions aimed at strengthening the nuclear security regime.

**Mr. Kim Ju Song** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): At the outset, my delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/69/PV.11).

Nuclear disarmament plays an important role in building a peaceful world. It is clear that the international community desires comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament. The posture of some nuclear-weapon States denying and delaying nuclear disarmament runs counter to the international desire for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The main reason for the long-standing lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament is the adherence of some of the nuclear-weapon States to a one-sided policy of non-proliferation while denying nuclear disarmament. The double standard of some nuclear-weapon States regarding the nuclear issue clearly demonstrates the real purpose of the non-proliferation regime, which is so loudly demanded by those States, and that is to misuse the non-proliferation instruments for the purpose of attacking sovereign countries.

Using the excuse of non-proliferation, those countries persistently cling to a hostile policy and manoeuvres aimed at overthrowing the regimes of countries that are out of favour. The nuclear Power with the largest nuclear stockpile has chosen particular countries as targets of nuclear strikes and is therefore improving the quality of its nuclear weapons by carrying out its nuclear strike plans. The nuclear modernization pursued by those nuclear Powers, together with the establishment of a worldwide missile defence system, is entering a dangerous stage of unrestrained pre-emptive nuclear attacks. The world's top nuclear Power in particular is constantly carrying out nuclear blackmail by conducting nuclear war exercises against a Member State, with the excuse of conducting military exercises on an annual basis, ignoring the unanimous call of the international community.

The First Committee must give priority to promoting nuclear disarmament negotiations aimed at the total elimination of nuclear weapons. My delegation believes that it is essential for us to ratify, as soon as possible, a comprehensive international convention banning nuclear blackmail and calling for the total destruction of nuclear weapons. The pursuit of a modest nuclear disarmament, without trying to change the aggressive nuclear doctrine and just reducing some warheads, will only be interpreted as an attempt to fool the non-nuclear-weapon States. The current pressing issue for the nuclear-weapon States is to fulfil concrete steps, such as putting an end to their nuclear blackmails, suspending all efforts to modernize nuclear weapons, withdrawing all deployed nuclear weapons on foreign

soil, including the nuclear umbrella, and eliminating nuclear war exercises against sovereign States.

The total elimination of nuclear weapons and the denuclearization of the world are both desired by the international community and consistent with the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea supports all efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As in the past, we will continue to actively contribute to the world's efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

In conclusion, in regard to the continued attempts of the Japanese, South Koreans and some others, we want to underscore to Japan that in the recent Stockholm agreement, the responsibilities of both parties are clearly stated, and it is important for both parties to fulfil their responsibilities. The implementation of the agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Japan will depend on the attitude of Japan.

If Japan and South Korea are so truly concerned about our nuclear deterrence, then such a demand must be made to the United States, which is mainly responsible for pushing us to possess nuclear weapons. Instead of copying and pasting the hostile policy of the United States towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea without any sense of national dignity or spirit of independence, Japan and South Korea should act on their own. The subject of the implementation of the nuclear deterrence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not one on which South Korea may say this or that. It is a matter for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States resulting from the hostile United States policy and its new threat towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

**Mr. Jerman** (Slovenia): At the outset, allow me to align my statement with that given by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/69/PV.11). I would like to add two points in my national capacity on the thematic debate related to nuclear weapons.

Slovenia is a staunch supporter of effective multilateralism. We share the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. In our view, a world without nuclear weapons should be not merely a vision, but rather the concrete goal and final objective of our efforts. In that context, we commend United States President Obama for his vision as presented in several statements.

During the debate yesterday and today, we have heard many good points, mainly on nuclear disarmament

and non-proliferation, including on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, notably on the State-level concept — which we support, of course — the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists, and issues related to non-compliance, as in the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We share many of these concerns, but in the interests of time we should like to limit ourselves to just three issues.

First, Slovenia believes that the NPT should remain a framework for our efforts on our way to a world without nuclear weapons. We reaffirm our full support for efforts to make the Treaty universal and for all three pillars of the Treaty. The NPT is a cornerstone of the international non-proliferation disarmament regime. Slovenia looks forward to the next NPT Review Conference and believes that a positive outcome is feasible. We welcome the fact that the agenda for the Review Conference has been agreed, and we hope that the Chair of the Review Conference will be identified soon and that we will gather the necessary political will to achieve a substantive outcome of the Conference.

Slovenia also fully supports the efforts of Ambassador Laajava of Finland and his team to prepare the conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

Secondly, we continue to believe that the negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should be the first priority of the international community in the field of nuclear disarmament. We call upon all members of the Conference to start negotiations on the FMCT as soon as possible. We hope that the Group of Governmental Experts, which met for the first time in March in Geneva, will facilitate the commencement of negotiations on this important verifiable treaty, which shall complement the NPT and the CTBT.

Thirdly, we must touch upon the recent initiative on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. We thank Norway and Mexico for hosting the first two conferences on that matter, and we welcome the fact-based discussion on the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons, which broadened our understanding of that phenomenon. Slovenia has followed the debate with interest since the first conference in Oslo, and looks forward to a productive and inclusive discussion

at the next conference, which will take place in Vienna in early December.

**Mr. Ja'afari** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): I thank you, Mr. Chair, for your excellent handling of the work of the First Committee at this session.

I take this opportunity to endorse the statement made by the representative Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/69/PV.11).

My delegation stresses that ridding the world of nuclear weapons in a comprehensive manner is the only guarantee for the non-use of these weapons or the threat of their use — hence the importance of the relationship between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The two components of our process are of vital importance to maintaining international peace and security.

The outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with regard to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, in line with the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, requires that the international community work towards achieving that goal and exert pressure on Israel to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

Like all the other States in the region, Israel should place all its nuclear facilities and activities under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime, pursuant to Security Council resolution 487 (1981); IAEA resolution GC(53)RES/17, adopted by the Agency's 53rd General Conference, in 2009; and other pertinent resolutions with a view to maintaining international peace and security and to enshrining the principle of nuclear non-proliferation.

It is clear to everyone that Israel, given the protection it is afforded by those who protect it from any accountability, is not a member of the treaties or conventions governing weapons of mass destruction and non-proliferation, whether chemical or biological, not to mention the NPT. As we all know, the Israeli nuclear programme emerged in the 1950s with the help of France. In the 1960s, France gave Israel a uranium-production reactor and provided intermediate-range missiles and the nuclear weapons to be installed on them. Other European States and other Western

States contributed effectively to the Israeli nuclear programme. Over 50 years have passed, and the Israeli nuclear programme openly continues in terms of nuclear weapons development and testing. The Israelis are threatening to use those nuclear weapons against certain Islamic and Arab countries.

Over 50 years have passed, yet some countries continue to refuse to see their military nuclear programme as the sole nuclear danger in the Middle East. Over 50 years have passed, yet Israel continues to embrace its nuclear ambiguity policy, in line with the Israeli-American agreement that dates back to former United States President Johnson. Over 50 years have passed, yet the international community has continued to turn a blind eye to the building of capacities to develop uranium in the Israeli Dimona nuclear reactor, which has allowed Israel to produce more than 840 kilos of uranium to be used for military purposes, or more than 200 nuclear warheads.

That nuclear ambiguity has allowed certain international Powers, some of which hold permanent seats on the Security Council, to simply ignore the words of the Israeli engineer Mordechai Vanunu, who worked at the Dimona nuclear reactor and in 1996 published an article on the Israeli nuclear programme in the British newspaper, *The Sunday Times*. Vanunu is not the only individual to have explicitly stated that Israel possessed a sophisticated nuclear programme. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, in an interview with a German television channel on 11 December 2006, spoke of Israel possessing nuclear weapons. Such public and clear statements reveal the existence of the Israeli nuclear programme.

However, none of that has been enough to prompt the States that claim to uphold the universality of the NPT to demand that Israel do away with its nuclear programme, which is a threat to the security of our region, its peoples and the entire world. Those hypocritical States point the finger at other States in the Middle East, resort to false and baseless accusations, and practice double standards in dealing with our region. In reality, there is only one standard that those States follow, and that is to oppose anything that threatens Israel and to thwart anything that embarrasses it.

Most countries of the world would like a conference to be held on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and they want that conference's work to

be successful. It was meant to be held at the end of 2012 in Helsinki. However, at the IAEA General Conference in September 2012, Israel stated that it would not take part in the conference, thereby preventing it from being held. My country stresses the need to hold the conference before the end of 2014 and certainly before the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

My country affirms the inalienable right of every NPT State party, as enshrined in article IV, to acquire and develop nuclear technology and use it for peaceful purposes, in cooperation with the IAEA. The Agency should honour its functions by facilitating cooperation between States in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, some countries continue to interpret the text of the Treaty in a way that undermines that right and or limits its realization.

We believe that the use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, is immoral, unacceptable and reprehensible and that there is a need to create a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. On the basis of those beliefs, and to prove to the entire world that Syria is opposed to the use of chemical weapons, we acceded to the 1992 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and we have honoured our commitments stemming from our accession. We carried out, with great success, the tasks incumbent on us despite our difficult security circumstances. We pledged to fully implement the Convention within the framework of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Syria took such measures in order to implement the elements necessary to create a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. That sends a clear message to Israel and to its allies that its policy of nuclear ambiguity, which is now known to all, must not be used as a pretext to prevent nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

**Mr. Chekkori** (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): In deference to your request, Mr. Chair, I shall deliver a condensed version of my delegation's statement.

My delegation associates itself with the statements made on behalf of the Group of African States (see A/C.1/69/PV.10) and the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/69/PV.11), and would like to highlight the following in our national capacity.

Collective security requires the renunciation of proliferation and a commitment to disarmament. Failing that, the risk of terrorist groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction is not hypothetical. We continue to believe that nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction do not guarantee security or effective stability at the regional and international levels. Rather, security for all lies in dialogue, mutual respect and the development of economic partnerships that promote effective and sustainable human development.

The irreversible consequences of the use of nuclear weapons for the environment and human life challenge us to undertake serious efforts towards banning such weapons. Nuclear weapons are the only weapons of mass destruction not under a standard universal ban. Morocco welcomes the conference process on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and will continue to participate in it. We hope that the Vienna conference will give new impetus to that process so that it can provide real added value to efforts aimed at achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

It is also for that reason that Morocco supported the statement made by New Zealand on behalf of a growing number of countries on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons (see A/C.1/69/PV.11).

It is our duty to do everything possible to achieve the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which remains the cornerstone of the global regime for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty adopted an action plan containing 22 measures to achieve comprehensive and verifiable nuclear disarmament. The implementation of the action plan and all of the commitments undertaken is of paramount importance. We regret the lack of substantial progress in the implementation of measures agreed in 2010. We believe that despite the efforts undertaken, we are far from the start of a disarmament process for a world without nuclear weapons.

The measures recommended in the decisions adopted at the review conferences are contracts, and full compliance with them will allow us to move forward together towards achieving the objectives of the NPT. Efforts should be enhanced in order to ensure the success of the current NPT review process. The simple reaffirmation of the principles and commitments already made would not be a real

success. The conference in May 2015 should instead be an opportunity to achieve a breakthrough in advocating effective measures, including in terms of disarmament.

The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996 and the declaration of moratoriums on nuclear testing reflected the international community's growing awareness of the need to end such tests and prepare the ground for general and complete disarmament by putting an end to the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. However, the achievement of that goal remains dependent on the entry into force of the Treaty and its concomitant universalization to make the ban on nuclear testing irreversible, transparent and verifiable.

The Treaty's ratification by the nuclear Powers is crucial to achieving that goal. Its universality would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and aid in the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons. Morocco is encouraged by the new ratifications and hopes that this momentum will produce the necessary effect in other countries listed in annex 2, so that they will finally ratify the Treaty.

Morocco is deeply convinced that the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons depends on the efficiency of the United Nations disarmament mechanisms, in particular the Conference on Disarmament. The effectiveness of those mechanisms remains dependent on the political will of States and the honouring of the obligations and commitments they have undertaken.

I would like to conclude by reiterating that the effectiveness of international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties require an effective implementation of all their provisions in a fair and inclusive manner.

**Mr. Mwinyi** (United Republic of Tanzania): My delegation aligns itself with the statements made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of African States (see A/C.1/69/PV.11), delivered by the representatives of Indonesia and Nigeria, respectively.

As indicated in its statement during the general debate on nuclear weapons and international security (see A/C.1/69/PV.5), the United Republic of Tanzania is in full support of nuclear disarmament. We believe that the only assurance against the use of nuclear weapons is their total and complete eradication.

The United Republic of Tanzania is highly committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and emphasizes the need for its balanced and fair implementation. For achieving the purpose of the Treaty, we stress the vital role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the creation of an environment conducive to cooperation on nuclear issues. We therefore call on the Agency to ensure that education on nuclear technology is given equally to all member States, in good faith without discrimination, and urge countries with nuclear arsenals to comply with the NPT provisions.

My delegation commends the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Those initiatives are a valuable contribution to international peace and security. In that regard, the United Republic of Tanzania supports the call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

For a long time, non-nuclear States have voiced their concern and called for assurances by the nuclear States that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation regrets that there is reluctance on the part of nuclear-weapon States to offer such assurances. It is in that regard that the United Republic of Tanzania calls on nuclear-weapon States to honour their obligation and conclude a legally binding agreement.

The United Republic of Tanzania remains committed to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We also call on all States to adhere to the three main pillars of the NPT. In fulfilling that challenge, we can save the world from the danger of another nuclear catastrophe.

**Mr. Soakai** (Palau): As this is the first time that Palau has taken the floor, allow me to begin by congratulating the Chair on his appointment as Chair of the First Committee, and to assure him of the full support of my delegation for a successful outcome.

Palau aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Fiji (see A/C.1/69/PV.12) on behalf of the Pacific small island developing States and wishes to add the following remarks in our national capacity.

Palau is proud to have a Constitution forbidding the emplacement of nuclear weapons on our territory. We fully support all efforts aimed at achieving the total, universal prohibition and elimination of nuclear

weapons. Like other Pacific States, we have a particular interest in advancing nuclear disarmament, as our region has experienced at first hand the devastating impact of more than 300 nuclear test explosions carried out over the course of five decades by the United States, France and the United Kingdom. We stand in solidarity with the Republic of the Marshall Islands — a nation heavily affected by those tests — in its legal proceedings before the International Court of Justice aimed at compelling the nuclear-armed States to fulfil their legal obligation to disarm.

As the recent Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Norway and Mexico, starkly demonstrated, we must redouble our efforts to prohibit and eliminate these ultimate weapons of terror and mass destruction. We commend the Norwegian and Mexican Governments for their leadership in that initiative and look forward to participating constructively at the third Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in Austria this year.

Palau firmly believes that the time has come for a new diplomatic process to negotiate a legally binding instrument that prohibits not only the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also their production, deployment, transfer and stockpiling. By banning nuclear weapons, we would devalue and stigmatize them, which is a necessary first step towards their complete elimination. As the chair of the Conference in Mexico remarked, the prohibition of certain weapons typically precedes their elimination.

A treaty banning nuclear weapons would put nuclear weapons on the same legal footing as chemical and biological weapons, which have been comprehensively prohibited. A nuclear-weapons-ban treaty would be an effective measure towards the fulfilment of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which Palau is a party.

Negotiations on a ban treaty should begin even if the nuclear-armed States refuse to participate. Establishing a clear legal prohibition on nuclear weapons without the nuclear-armed States involved would still have a powerful normative effect and very tangible benefits and would represent a significant step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. The treaty would compel all States to reject any role for nuclear weapons in their military doctrines. It would forbid States from stationing an ally's nuclear weapons on their soil, as five European

States currently do. It would prohibit investments in companies that manufacture nuclear weapons.

Palau supports a negotiating process that is open to all States and able to be blocked by none. For that reason, we feel that the Conference on Disarmament is not a suitable forum for the negotiations. We call for a process similar to those that resulted in the adoption of the Ottawa Convention on Landmines and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

It is of vital importance that we also work to address the root causes of the existence of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, including the need for power over others, desire to annihilate others and unwillingness to work for peace.

Let me conclude by reiterating Palau's readiness and determination to join a diplomatic process aimed at negotiating a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons once and for all. That process should begin in time for the seventieth anniversaries of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which will be marked in August 2015.

**Ms. Sehayek-Soroka** (Israel): I will try to be brief. Israel's policy in the nuclear domain has always been one of responsibility and restraint and consonant with the underlying goals and principles of non-proliferation, including those expressed in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Unfortunately, as has been clearly demonstrated in the Middle East in recent years, the NPT does not provide a guarantee that those non-proliferation principles will be implemented and adhered to, nor does it address the unique security challenges of our region. The Treaty has certainly not prevented substantial violations of its obligations by several Middle Eastern Member States and has not sufficiently remedied those violations once they have been discovered. Indeed, the failure of the 2010 NPT Review Conference action plan to address Iran's nuclear file is a clear case in point.

It should be emphasized that NPT adherence is not a goal in itself, and that the critical importance is for the Treaty to be respected by those countries that have joined it. Calls for universal adherence to the NPT must be judged against the Middle East's region-specific characteristics, in particular the fact that the vast majority of members of the Arab Group continues to refuse to recognize Israel as a sovereign State. For example, when Syria acceded to the NPT, it stated

specifically that its accession does not imply recognition of Israel and therefore no obligation towards it.

In that context, it is clear that Israel must give due consideration to the fact that four out of five cases of violation of the NPT took place in the Middle East, namely, in Iraq, Libya, Iran and Syria. The fifth case of the Treaty's gross violation, namely the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, was heavily involved in nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation to the Middle East with the above-mentioned countries.

Israel's approach and policy in the field of regional security and arms control have always been pragmatic and realistic. They are rooted in its belief that all the security concerns of regional members should be taken into account and realistically addressed within the regional context. Israel's long-term vision and goals for regional security and arms control in the Middle East underline lasting, peaceful relations, reconciliation, good-neighbourliness, open borders and trust among the regional parties as key milestones en route to the eventual establishment of a mutually verifiable zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. International experience has shown that such a zone can emanate only from within a region, through direct negotiations and consensus-building. The Middle East, with all its complexities, can certainly be no exception.

The disturbing realities in the Middle East mandate a practical, step-by-step approach, bearing in mind the goal of achieving peaceful relations and reconciliation among all the States in the region. That process is inherently an incremental one. It can begin only with modest arrangements for confidence- and security-building measures, in order to build the necessary trust for more ambitious cooperative security undertakings.

Regrettably, at present no regional security dialogue exists in the Middle East, nor is there a forum to develop confidence-building measures and defuse tensions. In the mid-1990s, the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security briefly served that purpose. It is clear, however, that no majority vote on one-sided resolutions in international forums can serve as a substitute for direct, comprehensive regional security dialogue and cooperation.

Israel, for its part, has respectfully and repeatedly expressed its commitment to sincere and open dialogue with its neighbouring countries on all issues related to regional security. Accordingly, Israel participated, at a

senior and authoritative diplomatic level, in five rounds of multilateral consultations that were convened by Finnish Under-Secretary of State Laajava in Switzerland and attended by many regional parties. Iran and Syria chose to avoid those consultations altogether.

While Israel demonstrated its sincere commitment to the process of direct dialogue and confidence-building in the region, our Arab neighbours are, unfortunately, committed to divisive resolutions in this Committee, such as the one entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", which seeks to embarrass Israel and single it out. A similar draft resolution entitled "Israeli nuclear capabilities", submitted by the Group of Arab States to the International Atomic Energy Agency, was clearly rejected by the General Conference of that Agency at its fifty-eighth session, only a few weeks ago.

Voting against those resolutions is a vote for tolerance and dialogue. Israel regrets the Arab Group's decision to choose a path of confrontation rather than one of conciliation, which only serves shortsighted political interests. That resolution hampers the prospects for a better security environment in the Middle East.

Despite the negative Arab attitude, Israel remains committed to engaging directly with its Arab neighbours, as it has done in past years, by participating in multilateral consultations. We have agreed to participate in a further round of consultations proposed by Finnish Under-Secretary of State Laajava, and we call upon our neighbours to commit to direct dialogue based on the principle of consensus. That form of engagement will remain a critical factor in breaking the deadlock that the Arab Group has now created.

**The Chair:** We have heard from the last speaker on the nuclear weapons cluster.

Before proceeding to the next cluster, I shall now call on those who have requested the floor to exercise the right of reply. In that connection, I would like to remind all delegations that their first statement is limited to 10 minutes and their second statement to 5 minutes.

**Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We have been forced to speak in exercise of our right of reply so as not to create the impression that the barefaced accusations levelled against Russia could in any way contain an ounce of truth.

First of all, the issue of commitments made under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum has been raised with regard to security guarantees for Ukraine following its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). I would advise those who have decided to adopt that line of thinking to familiarize themselves with the text of that document. A key provision of the Memorandum is on so-called negative assurances — in other words, the commitment to not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State. I am sure that no one in their right mind would go so far as to claim that such a commitment has been violated.

Secondly, on Crimea, Ukraine's loss of its territorial integrity was a result not of foreign interference, but rather of an internal political crisis in Ukraine itself. Those can in no way be conflated with the Budapest Memorandum. Nor should we forget that in Budapest, at the same time as the Memorandum was adopted, a joint statement was also adopted by the leaders of Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Ukraine in which they confirmed the significance of commitments within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe that were designed to combat the growth of aggressive nationalism and chauvinism. It is those commitments that Ukraine violated. It has also long abetted the growth of extremely aggressive ultranationalism. Even the European Parliament, on 13 December 2012, went so far as to adopt a special resolution on the situation in Ukraine that stressed, *inter alia*, that the racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic nature of a number of political parties in Ukraine was contradictory to the fundamental values and principles of the European Union.

After the armed anti-constitutional coup and violent overthrow of the lawfully elected President of Ukraine, it was those specific forces who came to power in Kyiv in February 2014. With their ultranationalism, they effectively shattered the unity of Ukraine and literally drove a whole region out of alignment. As a result, on 16 March, during a nationwide referendum throughout Crimea that took place in the presence of international observers, 97 per cent of voters voted in favour of Crimea's independence from Ukraine and to return to the Russian Federation. In 1994, in Budapest, Russia naturally did not commit in any way to coercing any part of Ukraine to remain in its composition without the will of the local population. The provisions of the

Budapest Memorandum, as we know, did not extend to circumstances that arose as a consequence of internal political or socioeconomic processes. As to the empty talk about some sort of aggression, I recall that Crimea's reunification with Russia through a direct national referendum took place without a shot being fired.

Taken altogether, this has created grave anxiety that the current authorities in Kyiv, along with their sponsors in the European Union and the United States, have learned no lessons from what has happened. For some reason, when during the Government coup they killed representatives of law and order and seized and burned Government offices in Kyiv, they termed it a struggle for democracy. And later, when the peaceful people of south-eastern Ukraine stood up to defend their rights and their families' safety from the ultranationalists taking power in Kyiv, they were immediately called separatists, even terrorists.

Rather than engage in a dialogue with the population in south-eastern Ukraine for the sake of preserving the country's unity and resolving an internal political crisis, the new Kyiv authorities have attacked the civilian populations with their regular armed forces, including, shockingly, aircraft, tanks, heavy artillery, multiple rocket launchers and ballistic missiles. The Ukrainian military have stunned the civilian population of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions with the cruelty of their actions. The massacre of civilians — women, children, the elderly, people with disabilities — has gone on for six months. Everywhere there has been violence and looting, and civilian infrastructure — hospitals, maternity homes, schools, nursery schools and homes for the elderly — has been systematically destroyed. In some places, every living thing has simply been burned to the ground. And all of that is going on right now, in the twenty-first century, on the territory of a very large and potentially resource-rich European State, being forcibly brought under the control of NATO and the European Union.

It is notable that all of these war crimes against humanity, and what amounts to genocide of the population in south-eastern Ukraine, are still being carefully covered up in the so-called Western democratic countries and in many cases even described as not falling within the purview of international humanitarian law. It seems that the vaccine against the brown plague of Nazism developed during the Second World War is losing its effectiveness in a number of countries. It is a great pity that this entire Nazi

nightmare is spilling over onto us here in the forum of the First Committee.

One thing in particular should be understood. For the United States and the European Union, the people who supported the anti-Government coup in Kyiv are simply bargaining chips in their geopolitical strategy, while Ukraine is a State very dear to Russia — part of our home, our culture and our history; a place where people live with very close family ties to Russia. That must never be forgotten, and we must always remember that Ukraine is very close to Russia's heart. I apologize for taking up so much time in my reply.

**Mr. Anh Young-jip** (Republic of Korea): My delegation cannot accept the assertion by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that his country's pursuit of a nuclear deterrent is against the United States rather than the Republic of Korea. How many times has the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made threats to the Republic of Korea to fire on it or use a nuclear device at any time? It is self-contradictory on the part of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to say completely different things in different places.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should not use the transparent annual defensive joint exercises of the Republic of Korea and the United States as a pretext for its continued provocations. It has carried out three nuclear tests and four long-range ballistic missile tests, and this year it continued those provocations by conducting multiple short- and intermediate-range ballistic missile launches. The facts speak for themselves. It is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that has not only created but also escalated the tensions in the region.

**Mr. Sano** (Japan): I would briefly like to exercise Japan's right of reply to the statement made by our colleague from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Without going into detail, the Government of Japan, together with the international community, would like once again to urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fully comply with all of its international commitments and obligations relating to the issues under discussion.

**Mr. Kim Ju Song** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): In taking this opportunity to exercise my right of reply, I would just like to share some information that directly illustrates the very dangerous situation

that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the entire Korean nation live with.

According to a memoir published by former United States Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta, on 7 October 2011 he informed the South Korean authorities of the intention of the United States to use nukes in cases of contingency on the Korean peninsula. He made it public that in 2010, when he was the Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, he received a report from the then commander of the United States forces in South Korea that a war scenario against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea included a programme for using nukes.

That is just another piece of evidence of the grave nuclear threat posed by the United States to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The information revealed proved the policy of nuclear blackmail of the United States towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which has lasted for decades, and the gravity of its ever-escalating moves to launch a nuclear war against my country. The United States, through its policy of nuclear blackmail against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, has posed a nuclear threat to it since the 1950s. Many scenarios for a nuclear attack have been disclosed during that period, including the 1953 Operations Plan A-53 and the recent Operations Plan A022-02.

The thuggish nuclear threat of the United States directed at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been put into practice. That is one more fact showing that reality proves that the nuclear blackmail of the United States, aimed at aggression and domination, has entered a phase of practical strikes that goes beyond the level of threats. The validity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's line of simultaneous bolstering of nukes and pushing for economic construction is being proved with each passing day. I would also just like to call on the representative of South Korea to think carefully about what is worthy of his nation and what shames it.

**Mr. Anh Young-jip** (Republic of Korea): I will not refute the baseless accusations of my colleagues from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I would also like to remind them that the entire international community supports the relevant Security Council resolutions, and that the joint statement of 19 September 2005 clearly states that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is obliged to abandon all its nuclear

weapons and existing nuclear-weapon programmes, including its uranium-enrichment programme. North Korea cannot gain anything by developing its nuclear programme and continuing its acts of provocation and destabilization.

**Mr. Kim Ju Song** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I would like to clarify once again that we have never recognized any of the so-called resolutions that the South Korean representative stakes so much on.

Once again, the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula is the product of the United States hostile policy and nuclear blackmail towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As long as the United States maintains its hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it will be hard to expect peace and security in the Korean peninsula and the larger region or a solution to the nuclear issue there. The evolution of the situation on the Korean peninsula is being pushed in the direction opposite of denuclearization by the intentional actions of the United States and South Korea, both of which should be held fully responsible for any consequences thereof.

I have one last word for the representative of South Korea. South Korea must not worry about our nuclear deterrence but should be extremely concerned about the United States nuclear presence on its own soil, which could put the whole Korean peninsula at risk of a catastrophic nuclear disaster. I would thus like to refer to an old Korean proverb with which I am sure the representative of South Korea is familiar: in this case, the pot is calling the kettle black.

**The Chair:** We have heard the last speaker on nuclear weapons.

We shall now proceed with the speakers on the list under the cluster "Conventional weapons", where, as noted before, we have a total of 58 speakers for the two meetings allocated to this item. In accordance with our programme of work and timetable, we should conclude our consideration of this cluster tomorrow. We can achieve this goal only if we work together to make the time limits for statements effective — five minutes for statements in the national capacity and seven minutes when speaking on behalf of several delegations.

**Mr. Isnomo** (Indonesia): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) on the topic of conventional weapons.

NAM reaffirms the sovereign right of States to acquire, manufacture, export, import and retain conventional arms and their parts and components for their self-defence and security needs. NAM expresses concern about unilateral coercive measures and emphasizes that no undue restriction should be placed on the transfer of such arms.

NAM remains deeply concerned over a wide range of security, humanitarian and socioeconomic consequences arising from the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons. In this regard, the Movement notes with satisfaction the successful convening of the fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

NAM calls on all States, in particular the major producing States, to ensure that the supply of arms and light weapons is limited only to Governments or to entities duly authorized by them. NAM also underlines the need for a balanced, full and effective implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument, and in this regard stresses the key importance of international cooperation and assistance.

NAM recognizes the significant imbalance in the production, possession and trade in conventional weapons between the industrialized and non-aligned countries and calls for a significant reduction in the production, possession and trade of conventional weapons by industrialized States with a view to enhancing international and regional peace and security.

NAM notes the adoption by vote of the General Assembly of the Arms Trade Treaty (resolution 67/234 B) on 2 April 2013. The Movement also notes that the Treaty, which opened for signature on 3 June 2013, aims at regulating trade in conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons. In anticipation of the entry into force of the Treaty, NAM calls for its balanced, transparent and objective implementation, in strict accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the inherent right of each State to security and to individual or collective self-defence. The Movement also underscores that its implementation should in no way affect the sovereign right of States to acquire, manufacture, export, import and retain

conventional arms and their parts and components for their self-defence and security needs.

NAM continues to deplore the use, in contravention of international humanitarian law, of anti-personnel mines in conflict situations with the intention of maiming, killing or terrorizing innocent civilians. NAM also calls upon all States in the position to do so to provide the necessary financial, technical and humanitarian assistance to landmine clearance operations and the social and economic rehabilitation of victims and to ensure full access of affected countries to material, equipment, technology and financial resources for mine clearance.

NAM States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction reiterate their commitment to the full implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan, and invite those States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to the Convention.

NAM States parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and to its Protocols, encourage States to become parties to the Convention and its Protocols.

Recognizing the adverse humanitarian impact of the use of cluster munitions, NAM also expresses solidarity with the cluster munitions-affected countries and calls for providing the necessary financial, technical and humanitarian assistance to unexploded cluster munitions clearance operations.

Regarding the explosive remnants of the Second World War, particularly landmines, which continue to cause human and material damage and obstruct development plans in some non-aligned countries, NAM calls on all States primarily responsible for laying these mines and leaving explosives outside their territories to cooperate with the affected countries and provide mine action support, including information exchange, maps indicating the locations of mines and explosives, technical assistance for mine clearance, defrayal of the costs of clearance and compensation for any losses caused by mines laid.

In conclusion, NAM stresses the importance of the reduction of military expenditures, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level

of armaments, and urges all States to devote resources made available from such reduction to economic and social development, in particular in the fight against poverty.

**The Chair:** I call on the representative of Mali to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.4.

**Mr. Traoré (Mali)** (*spoke in French*): We take the floor to introduce, on behalf of the States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the draft resolution entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them" (A/C.1/69/L.4).

As I am taking the floor for the first time, Sir, I would like in my national capacity to make some opening observations, first to express to you and the other officers our congratulations upon your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee, then to fully support the statements made by representatives of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Indonesia, on behalf of the African Group and the Non-Aligned Movement, respectively, on all issues relating to disarmament and international security listed in the agenda of our work.

Next, my delegation wishes to reiterate the need to strengthen multilateralism in order to move forward in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation. Indeed, we regret the erosion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament, particularly the prolonged paralysis we have seen the Disarmament Commission. Despite that alarming situation, the delegation of Mali would like to point out and celebrate some recent successes, for example, the entry into force later this year of the Arms Trade Treaty and the adoption by consensus of the outcome document of the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which was held in June. Similarly, the delegation of Mali welcomes the holding next December of the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, following the Conferences held in Oslo in 2013 and in Nayarit, Mexico in 2014.

The foregoing were the opening remarks I wanted to make in my national capacity.

This year again we take the floor to speak on behalf of the 15 States members of ECOWAS: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, the Niger, Nigeria,

Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and my country, Mali, to introduce the annual draft resolution entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them". The following States are also sponsors: Algeria, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, the Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Morocco, Norway, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey.

The illicit trade in and circulation of small arms continue to stoke the fire in many conflicts, exacerbate violence, contribute to the displacement of civilians, violate the principles and rules of international law and humanitarian law, and feed terrorism and organized crime. Light weapons and small arms are the most commonly used weapons in most recent armed conflicts, as illustrated by the current crises in the Central African Republic, Libya, Iraq and Syria, or my country, Mali.

Preventing the proliferation of light weapons and small arms and eliminating their illicit trade can be effective only if conducted with synergy, through consultation and cooperation. That is why this year Mali, on behalf of the States of ECOWAS, is introducing the draft resolution whose title I have just read. It is closely linked to the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. It seeks to consolidate good governance and stability in the West African region and to improve regional security by strengthening ongoing initiatives and regional efforts to reduce the proliferation and illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons.

In its substance, the draft resolution calls in particular on the international community, on the one hand, to provide technical and financial support to strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations to fight the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and to collect them, and, on the other hand, to support the implementation of the ECOWAS Convention that entered into force on 29 September 2009.

I am pleased in that respect to welcome the significant support provided by the European Union (EU) to ECOWAS in the fight against the illicit

proliferation of small arms and small arms. In addition to its previous efforts, the European Union, through the official launch of a project called "EU Support to ECOWAS Regional Peace, Security and Stability Mandate", has donated €5.56 million to ECOWAS for the fight against the illicit proliferation and circulation of small arms and light weapons. Launched last 16 September in Abuja, the project, during its three-year term, will see to the establishment of a pilot programme for the collection of weapons in two groups covering six countries: northern Niger, Mali, Nigeria and the countries of the Mano River Union, mainly western Côte d'Ivoire, the forested region of Guinea, eastern Liberia and northern Sierra Leone.

Beyond the West African subregion, we believe that the draft resolution that we are introducing reflects the desire of many countries in Africa and elsewhere to find a solution to the issue of small arms and light weapons. We thank the States that each year associate themselves with the States of ECOWAS by sponsoring the draft resolution, and we remind the Committee that the list remains open for the signature of those who want to join us.

**Mr. Talbot** (Guyana): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the 14 States members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). As I am taking the floor for the first time in this Committee, allow me to warmly congratulate you, Sir, and the other members of the Bureau on your election and assure you of our confidence and full support.

The unregulated trade in conventional arms and the accompanying illicit trade in these weapons continue to cause irreparable harm and suffering to millions of people throughout the world. The unchecked flow of arms helps to fuel conflict, crime and armed violence as well as the wanton violation of international human rights and humanitarian law.

The transcontinental scope of these flows imposes the need for a coordinated and holistic approach at a global level in order to effectively address its multiple dimensions. Such an approach requires the commitment of all States, with the assistance of other international and regional partners. For the States members of the Caribbean Community, the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in particular poses a major threat to the security, stability and development of our region.

CARICOM therefore welcomes the imminent entry into force of the historic Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This

development is an important signal of the international community's commitment to effectively regulating the flow of conventional arms. With the inclusion of small arms and light weapons in the scope of the ATT, the Treaty is expected to make a significant difference to the safety and security of the people of the Caribbean and to the fight against transnational crime in the region and beyond.

CARICOM is proud of the leading role that the region played in the negotiation and subsequent adoption of the ATT. To date, nine of our member States have ratified the Treaty, while all 14 have signed. As a further testament to our commitment to the implementation of the ATT, one of our sister States, Trinidad and Tobago, has offered to host the ATT secretariat in Port-of-Spain. This offer has the unequivocal endorsement of the entire Caribbean Community. CARICOM also supports the wish of Mexico to host the First Conference of States Parties, in 2015. It is our expectation that the Conference will establish the necessary foundation for the effective implementation of the Treaty.

The successful conclusion of the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States on the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, held in June, reaffirmed the international community's commitment to a comprehensive approach to promoting the prevention, reduction and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons at all levels. CARICOM welcomes the adoption by consensus of the outcome document, which we believe largely meets the objectives sought at the meeting. The outcome contains useful measures to build the capacity of States to ensure effective practical implementation of the Programme of Action. We particularly welcome the focus on promoting the role of women in implementation, including in stockpile management.

CARICOM recognizes that implementation of the Programme of Action remains uneven within and across regions. We call for strengthened international cooperation and assistance in order to reinforce national and regional efforts to ensure effective and broad implementation of the Programme of Action. CARICOM pledges its support for the one week open-ended meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts scheduled for 2015. Moreover, we support the exploration of ways in which implementation of the ATT and the Programme of Action can be mutually complementary.

CARICOM member States have established the requisite mechanisms to support a coordinated regional approach in the fight against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Such mechanisms include the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), which is mandated to give effect to the regional crime and security agenda. IMPACS also maintains the CARICOM intelligence-sharing network and has had a lead role in the development of the Regional Integrated Ballistic Information Network to assist in the tracing of firearms.

The CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy, adopted at the twenty-fourth Intersessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads and Government, in February 2013, identifies illegal guns as among the tier 1 threats facing the region. The Strategy recognizes that the key to the solution of this problem is a marked reduction in the availability of illegal guns and ammunition and further notes that the region can achieve meaningful results only by working with key strategic partners, in particular the States where the guns are sourced.

Against backdrop of strong political commitment, CARICOM member States have also made strides in implementing the highest international standards for the management, storage and safe disposal of small arms and light weapons. We are grateful for the significant support received from the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Organization of American States and our bilateral partners. We remain committed to continuing our collective efforts in this regard.

CARICOM welcomes the adoption of Maputo+15 and the Action plan 2014-2019 at the Third Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. We urge the full implementation of that Convention. CARICOM continues to support the aims of the Convention on Cluster Munitions to end the indiscriminate effects of such weapons, particularly on civilian populations. We applaud Belize's recent accession to the Convention. We also welcome the establishment of Central America as a cluster-munition-free zone during the fifth Meeting of States Parties, held in San Jose in September.

In conclusion, CARICOM reiterates its willingness to work with all Member States in a constructive

manner on all efforts to tackle the challenges faced as a result of illicit small arms and light weapons and to eradicate their trade.

**Mr. Raafenberg** (Suriname): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the States members of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).

The States members of UNASUR recognize the contribution and qualitative difference made by the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects to providing a comprehensive and multidimensional response to the problems arising from such illicit activities. Nevertheless, we remain concerned about the effects of the illicit production, transfer and circulation of firearms and ammunition, and their uncontrolled spread in the hands of civilians, which, in many regions, have various consequences and pose a challenge to the sustainable development of our societies. We also reiterate our concern at the close link that exists between the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and organized crime.

The effective implementation of the Programme of Action is a matter of high and urgent priority for UNASUR. We consider it important to continue promoting the consolidation of international cooperation and assistance and national capacity-building. Their cross-cutting and multidimensional nature makes them essential tools for the effective implementation of the measures recommended in the Programme of Action.

While we recognize the contribution made by the Programme of Action, UNASUR States wish to reiterate that reference to the issue of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects must necessarily include ammunition and explosives. We therefore consider that one of the remaining challenges for the implementation of the Programme of Action is the comprehensive consideration of the issue. UNASUR States consider ammunition, including explosives, to be an integral part of small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, we have reiterated that the non-legally binding nature of the Programme of Action is an obstacle to its effective implementation.

The States members of UNASUR believe that the central role of the Programme of Action in the field of small arms and light weapons makes it necessary to have a close and continued follow-up of its implementation by the international community. In that regard, UNASUR member States welcome the positive outcome achieved

at the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States, held in New York from 16 to 20 June, through the consensual adoption of the final document. In our view, the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States constituted an excellent opportunity to deepen our discussions on international cooperation and assistance, and on marking, record-keeping and tracing in the framework of the International Tracing Instrument.

Taking into account the primary responsibility of States in the prevention, combat and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects across borders, in the framework of MERCOSUR, a Working Group on Fire Arms and Ammunition of Member and Associated States of MERCOSUR was established in 2001 with the aim of sharing national experiences, working on the harmonization of national legislation to control firearms and ammunitions, and coordinating policies in this area. This forum of exchange has become a useful tool for the coordination of the positions of member and associated States. Further to this agenda item, States members of UNASUR continue to express their support to Colombia, South Africa and Japan for their annual initiative to introduce the draft resolution entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects".

Along the same lines, member States of UNASUR underscore the need to address the issues related to the unregulated trade in conventional arms and its diversion to the illicit market. In April 2013, the Arms Trade Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly (resolution 67/234 B). UNASUR expects that that first legally binding instrument on the arms trade can contribute to providing an effective response to the serious consequences that the illicit and unregulated trade and trafficking in arms pose for many people and States, in particular through the diversion of arms to unauthorized non-State actors or users, often linked to transnational organized crime and drug trafficking.

It is expected that this Treaty will contribute to the prevention of armed conflict, armed violence and violations of international law, including international human rights instruments and international humanitarian law. At the same time, in anticipation of the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty on 24 December, UNASUR calls for the Treaty to be implemented in a balanced, transparent and objective manner that respects the sovereign right of all States to

guarantee their self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The States members of UNASUR reiterate their support for the efforts of the international community to regulate cluster munitions, with the purpose of significantly reducing the humanitarian, social and economic consequences of the use of such weapons on civilians, in accordance with international humanitarian law. Likewise, UNASUR member States reaffirm the need to eliminate anti-personnel mines. In that regard, they highlight the efforts, as well as the results, in the field of demining and victims assistance of anti-personnel mines in the region, which have been possible because of the existing cooperation among our countries, as in the case of joint demining of Peru and Ecuador, by Peru and Chile. We also highlight the international assistance for demining given by countries of the region, such as the assistance given by Brazil in South and Central America.

The States members of UNASUR attach utmost importance to the consideration of international cooperation and assistance in the framework of the Ottawa Convention. In that regard, they welcome the documents adopted at the Third Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, held in Maputo from 23 to 27 June 2014, and consider that the Maputo Plan of Action and the Maputo+15 Declaration provide a road map for States that will strengthen the mechanisms for implementing and operating the Convention.

Finally, by their declaration in December 2012 of South America as a zone of peace, the Heads of State and Government of UNASUR affirmed their resolve to undertake actions with a view to establishing South America as a zone free of anti-personnel landmines and to continue to negotiate a protocol on peace, security and cooperation within the framework of the South American Defence Council.

The full text of this statement will be posted on PaperSmart for delegations' reference.

**The Acting Chair:** I now give the floor to the observer of the European Union.

**Mr. Kos** (European Union): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland and Serbia; the

country of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina; as well as the Republic of Moldova, align themselves with this statement.

The EU warmly welcomes the forthcoming official entry into force, in December, of the landmark Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). It is the outcome of a comprehensive and inclusive process for which the international community can take full ownership. We all stand to gain much from it. The ATT will contribute significantly to international peace and security by establishing robust and effective common international standards for the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms, making it more responsible and transparent and reducing the illicit trade in arms. It represents a major success of effective multilateralism. We warmly welcome the signatures and ratifications so far deposited from all regions and call on all States that have not yet done so to become signatories and parties to the Treaty. All EU member States are signatories of the Treaty and 23 have ratified it so far. The remaining ratifications are expected shortly. EU member States have thus made a significant contribution to the global effort to reach the threshold of the 50 ratifications needed for the Treaty's entry into force.

We are grateful to the Government of Mexico for holding a first round of informal consultations, making good progress on the elements necessary to a successful preparatory process for the First Conference of States Parties to the Treaty. We believe the Conference's success will be very important to maintaining political momentum and ensuring the Treaty's effective implementation. We look forward to the second round of informal consultations, to be held in Berlin next month. Beyond the Treaty's entry into force, its effective implementation and universalization will be essential to its success and relevance. In recognition of that, the EU has adopted an ambitious and tangible implementation support programme for third countries, with an overall funding of €6.4 million.

Next, we wish to underscore the importance of Security Council resolution 2117 (2013) — the Council's first-ever dedicated exclusively to the issue of small arms and light weapons. Both the ATT and resolution 2117 (2013) recognize that illicit and poorly regulated transfers fuel armed conflicts and have a wide range of negative human-rights, humanitarian, development and socioeconomic consequences, particularly for the security of civilians in armed conflict, including in

areas such as violence against women and girls and the exacerbation of sexual and gender-based violence and its devastating consequences on children.

The EU continues to consider the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons a key universal tool for responding to the challenges posed by the illicit trade in and excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons at national, regional and global levels. The EU also remains strongly committed to implementation of the International Tracing Instrument.

We welcome the adoption of the outcome document of the Fifth Biannual Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action. We are pleased to note that the document reflects a number of EU priorities, such as stockpile management, cooperation on tracing, the importance of developing common technical standards and guidelines in those areas, and references to women's participation and Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and to the devastating consequences of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons on children. We also particularly welcome the Fifth Biennial Meeting's tasking the 2015 open-ended meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts with considering the implications of recent developments in technologies related to small arms and light weapons.

The EU will also continue to call for, among other things, the inclusion of ammunition as part of a comprehensive approach to control small arms and light weapons; the further development and use of databases and technologies, such as iArms and iTrace, aimed at compiling information and facilitating its exchange in relation to tracing results and illicit trade in general; and further consideration of synergies and complementarity with the ATT that would support the Treaty's effective implementation. In that regard, a number of EU member States have made national contributions. We are pleased to announce that we are hosting a side event on iTrace on Thursday, 23 October.

The European Union is united in pursuing the objectives of the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, with all 28 EU member States being States parties. The EU and its member States reaffirmed their political commitment to and support for the Convention most recently in June. The successful Third Review Conference of the Convention, held in Maputo, agreed

on concrete plans and a realistic set of activities for ensuring further progress in the next phase of the Convention's implementation. The States parties to the Convention reaffirmed their commitment to never using anti-personnel mines under any circumstances. In that context, the EU appeals to all States and non-State actors to refrain from their use. In particular, we are deeply concerned about allegations of the use of anti-personnel mines by States parties.

We are committed to promoting the universalization of the Convention and to providing resources to fund mine action, including clearance, as well as concrete and sustainable assistance to anti-personnel mine survivors and their families and communities. Since 2010 the EU and its member States have contributed more than €500 million to projects in the mine-action area in its wider sense, in heavily affected countries and areas of the world. Those significant contributions are paving the way for reconstruction and economic and social development.

The European Union has consistently supported international efforts addressing the humanitarian, socioeconomic and security impact of conventional weapons and halting their indiscriminate use. Respect for the relevant international law is crucial to ensuring the protection of civilians in armed conflict. We support the humanitarian goal of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. We are deeply concerned about reports of the alleged use of cluster munitions against the civilian population in Syria, and we call on all concerned to refrain from such use. We are also deeply concerned about worrying reports from South Sudan and Ukraine. We take note of the San José progress report, and we think the first review conference, to be held in Croatia next year, will give States parties the opportunity to further assess progress and address the remaining challenges with regard to implementation of their commitments.

With a view to strengthening international humanitarian law, the EU remains firmly committed to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Protocols, which provide a unique forum for gathering diplomatic, legal and military expertise and addressing emerging issues. We believe that those instruments also constitute an effective means for responding flexibly to future developments in the field of weapons technology and, above all, represent an essential area of international humanitarian law. The EU considers universalization of the CCW and its

Protocols a very important issue. We also stress the importance of compliance with the provisions of the Convention and its annexed Protocols.

We welcome the constructive discussions that occurred during the informal meeting of experts on the technical, ethical, legal, operational and military aspects of lethal autonomous weapons systems, held in Geneva earlier this year. Those exchanges helped to lay the ground for a better common understanding of the issue, with a view to possible further discussions. We look forward to the next meeting of the high contracting

parties, in November, for further consideration of the issue.

Where possible, we support the development of synergies as applicable. We also wish to highlight the strong linkage with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which provides a wider framework for comprehensively addressing the needs of survivors, realizing their political, social and economic rights and ensuring respect for their inherent dignity.

*The meeting rose at 1 p.m.*