



General Assembly

Sixty-eighth session

First Committee

22nd meeting

Thursday, 31 October 2013, 3 p.m.
New York

Official Records

Chair: Mr. Dabbashi (Libya)

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

Agenda items 89 to 107 (continued)

Action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chair (*spoke in Arabic*): In accordance with our programme of work, the First Committee will begin this afternoon the third and final phase of its work, namely, taking action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items 89 to 107. The Committee will be guided in that regard by informal papers to be issued by the Secretariat that contain the draft resolutions and decisions on which action will be taken each day. As Committee members will recall, the first informal paper was circulated yesterday, and we will first take action on the drafts listed under each cluster listed therein. As I also noted yesterday, the Secretariat will revise the informal paper on a daily basis in order to update the drafts that are ready for action at each of our remaining meetings.

Before we proceed, I would like to share with the Committee some thoughts on how best to conduct the action phase of our work and, in that regard, I propose that we follow the procedures adopted by the Committee at previous sessions. Accordingly, we will use the established four-step process of making general statements under each cluster, followed by explanations of vote before action, voting and explanations of vote after action.

Before action on each cluster, the Committee will hear general statements or comments on the drafts listed under that cluster. At the same time, delegations will have a final opportunity to introduce draft resolutions belonging to that cluster, and I would kindly request that speakers be as brief as possible when doing so. Delegations wishing to explain their positions before action will have the opportunity to do so in a consolidated statement on all draft resolutions and decisions relating to a particular cluster before the Committee proceeds to take action on those drafts one after the other and without any interruption in between.

All delegations are requested to make every effort to avoid interrupting the Committee's deliberations once voting starts. Delegations wishing to change their votes should not disrupt the voting process to request the change. They should instead approach the Secretariat to request the required correction, usually by obtaining and filling out a form reflecting the change in the official records.

Once the Committee completes action on all draft resolutions and decisions contained in a particular cluster, delegations wishing to explain their positions or votes after the voting will have the opportunity to do so. Similar to the consolidated explanations of vote before the voting, delegations are requested to provide consolidated explanations of their positions after the voting on the respective draft resolutions of the given cluster on which action was completed.

I would also like to stress that, in accordance with the rules of procedure, sponsors of draft resolutions are

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not permitted to make any statements in explanation of vote either before or after action is taken. They will, however, be permitted to make general statements only at the beginning of the consideration of the drafts under a given cluster.

In order to avoid any misunderstandings, I strongly urge delegations seeking recorded votes on any draft resolution to kindly inform the Secretariat of their intention as early as possible and before the Committee starts taking action on the cluster in question.

All delegations wishing to postpone action on any draft are also requested to inform the Secretariat well in advance — at least one day before action is scheduled to be taken on the draft in question. Nonetheless, I appeal to all delegations to make every effort to refrain from resorting to a deferment of action.

In order to ascertain that every delegation fully understands the process for the action phase, the Secretariat has prepared an information sheet, similar to that which has been circulated in previous years, regarding the ground rules for taking action on draft resolutions, which will be circulated in the room. I would ask all delegations to please ensure that they obtain a copy from the Secretariat.

With the full cooperation of members, I intend to strictly follow the procedure that I have just explained in order to ensure the full and efficient utilization of the remaining time and conference resources available to the Committee for this final stage of its work.

May I take it that the Committee wishes to proceed accordingly?

There being no objection, it was so decided.

The Chair (*spoke in Arabic*): The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolutions and decisions listed in informal paper 1, beginning with cluster 1, “Nuclear weapons”.

I would like to inform the Committee that, at the request of the sponsoring delegations, action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.28, contained in cluster 4, has been postponed to a later stage of the Committee’s work.

I shall now give the floor to those delegations that wish to make either a general statement or to introduce new or revised draft resolutions under cluster 1, “Nuclear weapons”.

Mrs. Ledesma Hernández (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Cuba has co-sponsored a number of draft resolutions in the cluster on which we are taking action today, namely, A/C.1/68/L.21, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons”; A/C.1/68/L.49, entitled “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”; and A/C.1/68/L.20, entitled “Reducing nuclear dangers”.

The existence of some 17,000 nuclear weapons worldwide underscores the need to immediately start negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on the prompt conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-weapons convention on the prohibition of the development, testing, production, stockpiling, loan, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction. We reaffirm that the security assurances received to date have been ineffective. Until we achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, there is a need for an international legally binding instrument whereby nuclear-weapon States provide universal and unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of those weapons. Moreover, we believe that the policy of nuclear deterrence must be set aside as part of an unsustainable and unacceptable military doctrine.

Cuba reaffirms the need to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world as a significant contribution by States and a tangible step towards the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. My delegation therefore supports the draft resolutions to be introduced under this cluster today. We reaffirm our strong support for the early establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and believe the lack of compliance with the agreement on the convening of the 2012 international conference on that topic to be of concern and unacceptable. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East will contribute significantly to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament and will be a fundamental step in ensuring the success of the peace process in that region.

Mr. Kim Jin Song (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea): I would like to make a brief statement. The delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea expresses deep concern over draft decision A/C.1/68/L.35, entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”, since it contains provisions for

the pursuit of negotiations outside the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which is the only multilateral negotiating body and appropriate forum for the consideration of disarmament issues. Any attempt to take the negotiations away from the CD would undermine the authority and confidence of that body. If there is a dissenting issue, more effort should be devoted towards a compromise consensus, which is the rule for decision-making, Canada, as a sponsor of the draft decision, has a record of behaving irresponsibly since it boycotted the CD when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held the presidency.

The major problem facing the CD is the lack of political will on the part of some countries to deal with all core issues. The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea notes the shortcomings in the structure of the CD's working methods and will therefore abstain in the voting.

Mr. Toro-Carnevali (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation fully supports all draft resolutions submitted under cluster 1. I wish to underscore draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.1, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

In that connection, we regret that the agreement to convene the 2012 international conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was not fulfilled. We reiterate that the convening of that conference is a significant component of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We therefore urge the parties to convene the conference as soon as possible.

The agreements reached on that occasion will make a significant contribution to attaining the objective of nuclear disarmament and are also a key step in the Middle East peace process. We also wish to highlight the importance of the draft resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, and in that regard we urge the nuclear-weapon State in the Middle East to abide by the provisions of the relevant resolutions adopted by the conferences of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and therefore to accede to that legal instrument in order to ensure that their nuclear sites come under the IAEA safeguards

agreement and thus contribute to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The Chair (*spoke in Arabic*): I now call on those delegations wishing to explain their vote before the voting.

Mr. Propper (Israel): Every year we question the motivation of the authors behind the draft resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" and of the States that vote in favour of it. We cannot help wondering whether the distance between New York and the Middle East has stretched unnaturally to such an extent that their vision has been irreparably blurred.

There is no argument about the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Israel has continually and consistently pointed to that danger. With four out of five widely acknowledged cases of gross non-compliance with the obligations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) taking place in the Middle East, that would seem to require no great cognitive powers. All those cases constitute a fundamental challenge to Israel's security and cast a dark shadow over the prospects of embarking on a meaningful regional security process. They also demonstrate the cynical way in which some States in the region treat the international commitment in the nuclear domain, while they and others exploit the multilateral arena and the automatic majority that exists against Israel. In that context, we wonder whether the current turmoil and processes of transformation under way in the region will shed light on the full extent of the real proliferation risk in the region.

Israel expected that under the topic of the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, the international community would look closely at the cases of Iran and Syria. Those are two regional States that are under ongoing investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to their clandestine activities in contravention of their NPT obligations. It cannot be overemphasized that those countries have been the subject of numerous resolutions of both the Security Council and the IAEA's Board of Governors. At a minimum, Israel would expect a call for compliance on the part of all States in the region with the relevant international non-proliferation obligations. Lamentably, today's draft resolution chooses to ignore the relevant IAEA and Security Council resolutions, as

well as the evidence contained in the IAEA's reports on Iran and Syria's gross violations.

Adopting such an ill-motivated and unbalanced draft resolution (A/C.1/68/L.2), which aims to single out Israel in a biased manner, will not serve the greater objective of curbing proliferation in the Middle East; nor will it contribute to the role and standing of this body in advancing peace and security in the region. Similarly, it will not be consistent with the responsible behaviour expected of the States of the region, as well as the international community at large, if it is to reflect a true interest in regional security. In the light of what we have said, we call on delegations not to play into the hands of those who wish to divert attention from the real problems of the Middle East and urge them to vote against this draft resolution. In doing so, they will distance themselves from attempts aimed at hampering the international community's efforts to cope effectively with nuclear proliferation in the region.

Mr. Eberhardt (United States of America): My delegation will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.2 on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The United States believes that this year once again the draft resolution fails to meet the fundamental tests of fairness and balance. It confines itself to expressions of concern about the activities of a single country, omitting any reference to serious nuclear proliferation concerns in the region. The most glaring omission continues to be the lack of any reference to Iran's violations of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the relevant Security Council resolutions, as well as its failure to cooperate fully and transparently with the IAEA.

Despite our vote against the draft resolution, I would like to reiterate the United States' long-standing position in support of universal adherence to the NPT and to the goal of establishing a zone in the Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction. That is an achievable goal, provided that peace and security in the region and States' full compliance with their non-proliferation undertakings can be assured. I would also like to highlight our readiness to work with others to build the confidence necessary to ensure the success of a regional conference to discuss a zone in the Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction. That will require that the States concerned engage directly in order to reach consensus on relevant aspects of such

a conference. A good start was made recently, and we hope there will be agreement on proceeding to a conference as soon as possible.

I also wish to note that the pursuit of resolutions such as this one, year after year, does nothing to improve confidence in the region or prospects for a conference. We find that regrettable and call on the sponsors to take a more constructive approach in United Nations forums such as the First Committee.

Mr. Seifi Pargou (Islamic Republic of Iran): I would like to explain the position of my delegation regarding the draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (A/C.1/68/L.1).

As is well known, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was proposed by Iran in 1974. Since then, the General Assembly has uninterruptedly adopted resolutions endorsing that proposal. Through such resolutions, the Assembly has recognized that establishing that zone would greatly enhance regional and international peace and security. Likewise, in the historic Final Document of its first special session on disarmament, the Assembly reaffirmed that

"Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards." (*S-10/2, p.8, paragraph 63 (d)*)

However, it is a source of grave concern that despite repeated calls by the international community, particularly the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Review Conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as successive summits and ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Israeli regime has not acceded to the NPT. Consequently, no progress has been made so far in establishing such a zone in the Middle East. The Israeli regime's possession of a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, a clandestine nuclear weapons programme and unsafeguarded nuclear facilities are

the only obstacles to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that volatile region.

Therefore, in order to pave the way for the establishment of such a zone, as a first step, Israel should eliminate all its nuclear weapons, accede as a non-nuclear-weapon party to the NPT with any further delay or precondition and place all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. I should stress in that regard that the full and prompt implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the 2010 NPT decision to hold a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East are clear commitments undertaken in particular by the sponsors of that resolution. Neglecting that commitment can only embolden Israel to continue to remain a source of threat and instability by flouting the aspirations of the international community. The failure to convene the 2012 conference, due only to Israel's objection, is the product of long-standing inaction with regard to those commitments.

That unwelcome development seriously challenged the integrity and credibility of the non-proliferation regime and the consensus agreements of successive NPT Review Conferences. At the same time, expressions of deep concern over that issue and strong calls for an early convening of the conference voiced by an overwhelming majority of political groups, States and civil society during the Second Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the IAEA General Conference, the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly, the general debate of the General Assembly, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Article XIV conference, and here in the First Committee made it crystal-clear that the establishment of such a zone enjoys continued strong international support.

In order to avoid any further negative consequences of delay in the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the provisions of the 2010 NPT Review Conference action plan relating to the Middle East, the conveners of the conference must exert utmost pressure on the Israeli regime to participate in the conference without preconditions.

Iran was among the first countries to announce its readiness to participate in the 2012 conference. We will continue that policy. However, while we expect the conference to be more than a mere gathering of countries in the region, I stress that an agreed plan of action and timetable for the universalization of the NPT

in the Middle East should be the highest priority at that conference.

Mr. Hashmi (Pakistan): I am taking the floor to explain our position before the voting on the draft decision contained in document A/C.1/68/L.35 on the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).

Pakistan wishes to recall its views expressed in the First Committee last year that the establishment of a group of governmental experts on the FMCT is an ill-advised move. We continue to believe that such a group would add no value to the deliberations on the FMCT. However, it would undermine the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the sole multilateral negotiating forum. We remain convinced that the mandate, aims and working methods of the group of governmental experts can be better accomplished in a more representative body like the Conference on Disarmament. Changing the format or venue cannot alter the underlying reasons for the stalemate. It is ironic that, in an age of fiscal constraints, valuable funds are being diverted to the group of governmental experts even though the CD exists to consider the issue.

The assertions that the FMCT is ripe or constitutes a priority are flawed. The majority of States Members of the United Nations as reflected in the position of the 120-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) have repeatedly emphasized that nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority for the international community. Moreover, nuclear disarmament has in fact become overripe, considering that it has been on the CD's agenda for over three decades. The adoption of the draft NAM resolution calling for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the CD on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention (A/C.1/68/L.6) will make clear what constitutes the only priority for the international community.

In line with our consistent position that we will not be a party to any move that undercuts the CD's authority and mandate, Pakistan has decided not to join the group of governmental experts on the FMCT. In so doing, we have pursued a policy of principle and consistency. Moreover, a group of governmental experts on the FMCT without the participation of all those countries with the capability of producing fissile material would be stillborn.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, Pakistan will vote against the draft decision.

Mr. Špokauskas (Lithuania): I speak today on behalf of the States members of the European Union (EU) on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.2, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland, Serbia, Albania, Norway and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this statement.

We intend to vote in favour of the draft resolution. The EU strongly supports the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in particular the provisions pertaining to the Middle East, and has made concrete efforts aimed at its implementation. In addition to sponsoring two seminars on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in 2011 and 2012, we stand ready to further support the process.

We regret the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East that was scheduled to take place in 2012. The EU continues to fully support the ongoing preparations for a successful conference, in particular the tireless efforts of its Facilitator, Ambassador Laajava of Finland, and his team. We call on all States in the region to urgently and proactively engage with the Facilitator and the conveners with the aim of enabling the conference to be convened as soon as possible on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between the States of the region.

We call on all States of the region that have not done so to accede to the NPT and to the Conventions on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons as well as to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

We regret that the draft resolution is not sufficiently comprehensive in that it does not address all the nuclear-proliferation challenges in the region in a resolute way. In that regard, Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes, which violate several Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and its serious non-compliance with its safeguards agreement and continued non-cooperation with the IAEA are of particular concern.

The EU remains deeply concerned about Iran’s nuclear programme. The recent report by the IAEA Director General illustrates once again that Iran

persists in violating IAEA Board of Governors and Security Council resolutions by, inter alia, continuing to expand significantly its enrichment capacity, to accumulate enriched uranium and to pursue its heavy-water activities.

At the latest meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, the EU expressed its deep concern that, due to the continued failure of Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues, in particular those related to the possible military dimensions, the Agency was unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, and therefore was not able to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was for use in peaceful activities. It noted that November would mark two years since the Director General published his annex on possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and since the Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2011/69, and that it will mark an important juncture for assessing progress on the substance of the issue and what further action the Board could take should no progress have been made by that point.

We take note of the joint statement of the IAEA and Iran of 29 October and look forward to a swift implementation of practical measures with a view to a resolution of all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme, including the possible military dimensions. Our objective remains to achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement that would build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, while respecting Iran’s legitimate right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in conformity with the NPT and in compliance with resolutions of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors.

The EU fully supports the ongoing efforts of the E3+3 Governments, led by the High Representative, to seek a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Following substantive E3+3 discussions with Iran on 15 and 16 October in Geneva, the EU hopes that Iran will seize the opportunity to make progress in nuclear talks aimed at building confidence.

We deeply regret that, despite the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors and the Syrian pledge of May 2011 to the Director General to respond positively and without delay to the Agency’s request to resolve all outstanding questions, as well as renewed calls by the Director General, Syria has yet to provide the necessary

cooperation. The EU calls upon Syria to fully comply with the resolution.

We are deeply concerned that the Agency has had to postpone the 2013 physical inventory verification and urges Syria to enable the Agency to carry out that verification as soon as possible. The Syrian authorities remain responsible, as required by the Board's resolution, for urgently remedying their non-compliance with their Safeguards Agreement and for cooperating urgently and transparently with the Agency to clarify matters with regard to Dair Alzour and the other sites and to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.1, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.1 was introduced by the representative of Egypt at the Committee's 14th meeting, on 22 October. The sponsor is named in document A/C.1/68/L.1.

The Chair: The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.1 have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.1 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.2 was introduced by the representative of Egypt, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States, at the Committee's 14th meeting, on 22 October. The sponsor is named in document A/C.1/68/L.2. The observer State of Palestine has also sponsored the draft resolution, as indicated in A/C.1/68/CRP.4/Rev.2.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested on the draft resolution as a whole. Separate, recorded votes have been requested on the fifth and sixth preambular

paragraphs of draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.2. We shall first take action on the fifth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

India, Israel

Abstaining:

Bhutan, Pakistan, Rwanda, South Sudan

The fifth preambular paragraph was retained by 160 votes to 2, with 4 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on the sixth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela

(Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

India, Israel

Abstaining:

Bhutan, Pakistan, Rwanda, South Sudan

The sixth preambular paragraph was retained by 163 votes to 2, with 4 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.2 as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic

of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Canada, Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), Palau, United States of America

Abstaining:

Australia, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, India, Panama, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.2, as a whole, was adopted by 158 votes to 5, with 9 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft decision A/C.1/68/L.8, entitled "Missiles".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft decision A/C.1/68/L.8 was introduced by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the 18th meeting of the Committee, on 28 October. The sponsors of the draft decision are listed in document A/C.1/68/L.8.

The Chairman: The sponsors of the draft decision have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft decision A/C.1/68/L.8 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.11, entitled "Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.11 was introduced by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the 14th meeting, on 22 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/68/C.1/L.11 and A/68/C.1/CRP.4/Rev.2.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested. Separate, recorded votes have been requested on

the sixth and ninth preambular paragraphs of draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.11. The Committee shall now take action on the sixth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Canada, Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), Palau, United States of America

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa,

San Marino, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The sixth preambular paragraph was retained by 116 votes to 5, with 49 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on the ninth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Canada, France, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,

Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The ninth preambular paragraph was retained by 115 votes to 5, with 46 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.11 as a whole.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,

Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Armenia, China, India, Pakistan, Rwanda, Samoa, Sierra Leone

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.11, as a whole, was adopted by 113 votes to 52, with 7 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.18, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.18 was introduced by the representative of Egypt at the Committee’s 10th meeting, on 17 October. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/68/L.18 and A/C.1/68/CRP.4/Rev.2. In addition, Papua New Guinea has become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested. Separate, recorded votes have been requested on operative paragraphs 9 and 11. The Committee will first take action on operative paragraph 9.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,

Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India, Israel, Pakistan, United States of America

Abstaining:

Bhutan, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Operative paragraph 9 was retained by 161 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on operative paragraph 11.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican

Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Israel, Russian Federation, United States of America

Abstaining:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, India, Pakistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Operative paragraph 11 was retained by 164 votes to 3, with 5 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.18 as a whole.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia,

Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Bhutan, China, Micronesia (Federated States of), Pakistan, Palau

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.18, as a whole, was adopted by 165 votes to 7, with 5 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.20, entitled "Reducing nuclear danger".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.20 was introduced by the representative of India at the Committee's 13th meeting, on 21 October. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/68/L.20 and A/C.1/68/CRP.4/Rev.2. In addition, Zambia has become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco,

Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, China, Georgia, Japan, Marshall Islands, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Serbia, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.20 was adopted by 117 votes to 49, with 11 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.21, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.21 was introduced by the representative of India at the Committee's 13th meeting, on 21 October. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/68/L.21 and A/C.1/68/CRP.4/Rev.2. In addition, the following countries have become sponsors of the draft resolution: Papua New Guinea and Zambia.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,

Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Japan, Marshall Islands, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Serbia, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.21 was adopted by 119 votes to 49, with 9 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft decision A/C.1.68/L.35, entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft decision A/C.1.68/L.35 was submitted by the delegation of Canada. The sponsor of the draft decision is listed in document A/C.1/68/L.35.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia,

Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Pakistan

Abstaining:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Israel, Syrian Arab Republic, Zimbabwe

Draft decision A/C.1/68/L.35 was adopted by 172 votes to 1, with 5 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.46, entitled “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.46 was introduced by the representative of Nigeria on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States, at the Committee’s 13th meeting, on 21 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/68/L.46 and A/C.1/68/CRP.4/Rev.2.

The Chair: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that it be adopted without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.46 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.48, entitled “Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.48 was introduced by the representative of Nigeria on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States, at the Committee’s 13th meeting, on 21 October. The sponsor of the draft resolution is listed in document A/C.1/68/L.48.

The Chair: The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that it be adopted without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.48 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.49, entitled “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.49 was introduced by the representative of Pakistan at the Committee’s 11th meeting, on 18 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/68/L.49 and A/C.1/CRP.4/Rev.2.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.49 was adopted by 120 votes to none, with 58 abstentions.

The Chair (*spoke in Arabic*): I now call on those representatives wishing to speak in explanation of vote or position after the voting.

Mr. Hashmi (Pakistan): For the sake of brevity, I will try to abridge my delegation's position on three draft resolutions: A/C.1/68/L.2, A/C.1/68/L.11 and A/C.1/68/L.18.

First, concerning A/C.1/68/L.2, Pakistan continues to support the primary purpose and focus of the draft resolution. However, we believe that references to the recommendations and conclusions emanating from various Review Conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are lopsided. In that context, we are disappointed by the continuing but unrealistic goal for Pakistan to join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Pakistan is a nuclear-weapon State, and there is no question of our joining the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. In view of those considerations, we therefore voted in favour of the draft text as a whole, while abstaining in the voting on the fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs.

With respect to draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.18, my delegation abstained in the voting on the draft resolution because, as a non-party to the NPT, we neither subscribe to nor are bound by the conclusions and decisions of that Treaty, including those relating to universality. Notwithstanding our position on the draft resolution, Pakistan supports nuclear disarmament.

As concerns draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.18, the Pakistani delegation is in agreement with several aspects of the draft resolution. However, we are disappointed by the ritualistic and unrealistic assertion in paragraph 9, calling on Pakistan to unconditionally accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. We also cannot accept references to NPT Review Conferences and their recommendations in the text, due to our known position on the Treaty.

My delegation therefore abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole; voted against paragraph 9; and abstained in the voting on paragraph 11.

Mr. Aljowaily (Egypt): I wish to provide the following explanation of vote on draft decision

A/C.1/68/L.35, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". Egypt has always considered a treaty on fissile material as an important step towards achieving nuclear disarmament. That can be clearly seen in the inclusion of step 3 in the New Agenda Coalition-sponsored language on the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Step 3 called on the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear-weapon devices, "taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives".

Draft decision A/C.1/68/L.35 refers to resolution 67/53 of 3 December 2012 on this matter. Egypt maintains that resolution 67/53 did not adequately meet the basic requisites to clearly include stockpiles of past production of fissile material for military use in any potential treaty on fissile material. Resolution 67/53 lacked operative language clearly referring to the potential treaty having to contribute to achieving general and complete nuclear disarmament.

Meanwhile, we welcome the creation of the group of governmental experts mandated to

"make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" (*resolution 67/53, para. 3*).

We are keen to contribute substantively to its deliberations, with a view to ensuring that any potential fissile material treaty would take into consideration both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Egypt will continue to seek within the CD the early adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that would deal not only with a fissile material treaty, but also with all core issues on the agenda of the Conference.

Mr. Al-Taie (Iraq) (*spoke in Arabic*): Iraq would like to explain its vote in favour of draft decision A/C.1/68/L.35, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". My delegation's position rests on my Government's belief in the importance of achieving a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally

and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear-weapon devices, and in the need to deal with the related stockpiles in a way that will support the international community's efforts to completely eliminate nuclear weapons and thereby free the world from the disastrous threat they pose.

Mr. Varma (India): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". India abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole, and voted against its fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs, as we believe that the focus of the draft resolution should be limited to the region it intends to address.

India's position on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is well known. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codified the prevailing customary international law, provides that States are bound by a treaty based on the principle of free consent. The call to those States remaining outside of the NPT to accede to it and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of their nuclear activities is at variance with that principle and does not reflect current realities.

Let me also explain India's position on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.18, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments". India remains committed to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We are concerned about the threat to humankind posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use or threat of use.

India also shares the view that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing. We continue to support a time-bound programme for global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. We voted against draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.18 as a whole and its paragraph 9, since India cannot accept the call to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State. In urging India to accede to the NPT promptly and without conditions, the draft resolution negates the rules of customary international law as enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that a State's acceptance, ratification or accession to a treaty is based on the principle of free consent.

India's position on the NPT is well known. There is no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Nuclear weapons are an integral part of India's national security and will remain so pending global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

Although India supports the commencement of fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), in accordance with the 1999 guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the mandate contained therein, we abstained in the voting on paragraph 11 of the draft resolution, since it refers to the NPT action plan 2010.

With reference to draft decision A/C.1/68/L.35, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices", it has been India's consistent decision that without prejudice to the priority we attach to nuclear disarmament, we support the negotiation in the CD of a non-discriminatory and internationally verifiable treaty banning the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

India submitted its views on an FMCT for the report of the Secretary-General, as called for in resolution 67/53. As my country stated last year, at the time of the adoption of resolution 67/53, the work of the group of governmental experts amounts to neither pre-negotiations nor negotiations on an FMCT, which should take place in the CD on the basis of the agreed mandate. India supports the CD as the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and we hope that its States members will redouble efforts to enable the Conference to commence substantive work at an early date.

With reference to draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.46, entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty", India respects the sovereign choice of non-nuclear-weapon States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. That principle is consistent with the provisions of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the 1999 guidelines of the UNDC.

India enjoys friendly and mutually beneficial relations with countries of the African continent. India shares and supports African aspirations to enhancing the region's well-being and security. We respect the

sovereign choice of States parties to the Pelindaba Treaty and welcome the successful entry into force thereof. As a nuclear-weapon State, India conveys its unambiguous assurance that it will respect the status of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Mr. Sano (Japan): Japan voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.49, entitled “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”, since we deeply believe that discussions on ways to strengthen effective negative security assurances are essential in the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons. However, the draft resolution should not prejudge the discussions in the Conference on Disarmament. We strongly hope that the Conference on Disarmament will advance its substantive work on the negotiations of an fissile material cut-off treaty and discussion of other important issues.

Ms. Crowley (New Zealand): New Zealand voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.2, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”. Consistent with our belief in the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, New Zealand is a strong and long-standing supporter of the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

New Zealand wishes, however, to place on record our concern regarding the absence in the draft resolution of any reference to other States in the Middle East that present significant nuclear proliferation concerns. We hope that this lack of balance will be addressed in future years.

We are committed to the realization of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as mandated by the States parties to the NPT in 1995 and reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. New Zealand regrets that it has not yet been possible to convene the conference on that issue, which will be very important for the ongoing health and well-being of the NPT regime. We nevertheless commend the strenuous efforts to bring about that conference, not least by Finland’s Ambassador Laajava, and hope that it can be convened shortly.

Mr. Kim Ju Song (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea): The delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea voted against draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.18, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear

disarmament commitments”, because the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea believes that paragraph 10 still fails to meet the criteria for fairness and balance by singling out the commitments of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea alone to achieving the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would like to place on record its understanding, or rather the understanding of all six parties concerned, which was enshrined in the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, that each party has an equal share of obligation to be fulfilled, and that all parties agree to take coordinated steps to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in line with the principle of commitment for commitment, action for action.

The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the inviolable aim of the policy of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, does not mean unilateral nuclear dismantlement on the part of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It is the process of making the peninsula a nuclear-free zone on the basis of completely removing the substantial nuclear threats posed to the peninsula from outside, based on the principle of simultaneous action. Action for action remains a basic principle for finding a solution to the nuclear issue on the peninsula, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will therefore not move first, unilaterally.

The United States, however, has defined the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as an enemy and refused to recognize its sovereignty. It continues to step up its hostile moves against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, with the ultimate goal of overthrowing the political system. This year, United States troops joined with South Koreans in carrying out large-scale military exercises, even introducing three means of nuclear attack against our country. As long as the United States persists in its hostile policy, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will further bolster its nuclear deterrence to cope with that, and it will not be bound to anything in doing so.

The delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea voting against this draft resolution must not be seen as casting a shadow on its readiness to work with others to achieve nuclear disarmament and global denuclearization. We made our position clear earlier — the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea aligns itself with the Non-Aligned Movement’s

principled position on nuclear disarmament, which remains the highest priority.

Mr. Propper (Israel): I would like to present our explanation of position on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.1, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”.

Israel has once again joined the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.1, notwithstanding our ongoing substantive reservation regarding the draft resolution’s modalities. We have done so because Israel remains committed to a vision of a Middle East developing eventually into a zone free of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic missiles. Nonetheless, Israel has always maintained that this issue, like all other regional security-related issues, can be realistically addressed only within the regional context.

Israel’s perspective and policy in the field of regional security and arms control have always been based on a pragmatic and realistic approach. They are rooted in its belief that all the security concerns of regional members should be taken into account and addressed within the regional context. The disturbing realities in the Middle East mandate a practical step-by-step approach, bearing in mind the goal of achieving peaceful relations and reconciliation among all the States of the region. That process is inherently an incremental one. It can realistically begin only with a modest arrangement of confidence- and security-building measures in order to build the stable infrastructure and trust necessary to more ambitious security undertakings.

Regrettably, at present no regional dialogue exists in the Middle East, and there is no forum to develop confidence-building measures and defuse tensions. The Middle East countries have no regional forum in which all can directly communicate with each other and have a dialogue on core issues that affect their security.

The region of the Middle East is undergoing historic and significant transformational change. The current turmoil in our neighbouring countries provide a clear example of how fragile and unstable the region is today. In this context, it should be recalled that in the Middle East, unlike other regions of the world where nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established, there is a continuing threat against the very existence of one State in the region. Countries of the region, such as Iran, that threaten to wipe Israel off the map and terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hizbullah that do not

accept Israel’s right to exist and continuously engage in the massive acquisition of rockets and missiles still pose an established threat. Any regional security dialogue has to focus on tangible threats such as rockets and missiles, which are a vital aspect of any regional disarmament.

Despite the current situation, Israel positively engaged in the European Union seminars on confidence-building measures in July 2011 and November 2012, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency forum on experience of possible relevance to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in November 2011. Israel also conducted a meeting with the Under-Secretary of State of Finland, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, to discuss issues related to regional security, participated in multilateral consultations in Vienna in August, and has recently participated positively in a consultation in Lyons, France.

Israel believes that the only way to build confidence and trust among the States of the Middle East is through direct regional dialogue based on a consensus between all parties involved.

In terms of our explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.35, the inherent utility of a fissile material cut-off treaty in addressing the current growing proliferation challenges, including non-compliance by States with international obligations in the nuclear domain, is far from proven. This holds especially true for the Middle East, where several States have an exceptionally poor track record of compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. It has been Israel’s long-standing position that the idea of a fissile material cut-off treaty is subsumed in the concept of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, the essential prerequisites for which are far from being fulfilled.

Mr. Simon-Michel (France) (*spoke in French*): I would like to make a statement in explanation of vote on behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom and my own country, France, on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.18, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”.

This is not a new text. The reasons we have not supported it in the past are still the same. We approve of numerous elements of the resolution, particularly those that reflect the language of the action plan laid out in

the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nevertheless, we voted against the draft resolution because a number of elements continue to distance us from our shared understanding and introduce new concepts that were never part of the action plan of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

We regret that the draft resolution does not afford balanced treatment of the three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear power. We are therefore disappointed that the draft resolution focuses almost exclusively on nuclear disarmament. We would also have liked to see greater emphasis on the importance of all nuclear-weapon States — and not just the NPT nuclear-weapon States — undertaking activities consistent with the shared goal of making a safer and more secure world. That in no way confers special status on those countries but rather reflects a global, worldwide approach to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful and necessary uses.

The changes in the draft text distance us even further from the action plan and the consensus approach that supported and strengthened the NPT. We regret that the notion of a step-by-step approach has almost disappeared. The new emphasis on parallel processes does not improve the text. We believe that the increasing energy expended on the nuclear disarmament debate would be put to better use if it focused on existing processes, contributing by tackling obstacles and making progress through a pragmatic, step-by-step approach. The process led by the permanent five members of the Security Council, including its conferences, the last of which was organized by Russia in Geneva in April, goes unacknowledged. Finally, we are disappointed that the important work undertaken by Ambassador Laajava in fulfilling his mandate has not been recognized by the sponsors of the resolution.

Ms. Anderson (Canada): Canada takes the floor to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.2, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”, due to the fact that once again this year the draft resolution unfairly singles out Israel while failing to address serious non-compliance issues of States of the region that are already party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Canada has taken this position here and on similar resolutions

in other forums, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Canada finds the draft resolution to be deficient in that it ignores Iran and Syria’s non-cooperation with the IAEA. We are deeply concerned, for example, that Iran has failed to comply with multiple Security Council resolutions. It has ignored Security Council obligations and the efforts of the international community to arrive at an equitable and lasting solution that would assuage the international community’s concerns about Iran’s intentions. In the case of Syria, that country has had ample opportunity to cooperate effectively with the Agency in resolving the issue, but has refused to do so. For those reasons, Canada voted against this year’s draft resolution on the risk of proliferation in the Middle East.

Mr. Neto (Brazil): I am taking the floor to explain Brazil’s vote on two draft resolutions: A/C.1/68/L.20, on reducing nuclear danger, and A/C.1/68/L.21, on a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

The Brazilian delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.20, entitled “Reducing nuclear danger”, because we believe that nuclear doctrines must be reviewed, as is called for in paragraph 1, in order to reduce the risks of the unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. It is our view, however, that the most serious threat to humankind and the survival of civilization, as well as to international peace and security, derives not just from the use but from the very existence of nuclear weapons. Thus, the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used is to totally eliminate them.

In that context, measures such as de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear weapons, while relevant, cannot substitute for multilateral agreements conducive to the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. In that regard, we should recall the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article 6 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The Brazilian delegation also voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.21, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons”. In spite of Brazil’s well-known position on the importance of eliminating nuclear weapons rather than merely prohibiting their use, we reiterate that the very existence

of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to humankind and to international peace and security. We also recall that paragraph 81 of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference notes proposals by the Secretary-General to consider negotiations on a nuclear-weapons convention or an agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments backed by a strong system of verification. The Final Document also notes that the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process should be pursued within an agreed legal framework, which a majority of State parties, including Brazil, believe should include specific timelines.

Mr. Masmajan (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): I shall now proceed to explain Switzerland's vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/68/L.2 and A/C.1/68/L.21.

This year Switzerland again voted in favour of the draft resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" (A/C.1/68/L.2). The draft resolution promotes the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in the Middle East, a goal to which Switzerland fully subscribes. We welcomed the concrete measures adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT aimed at establishing a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and we continue to support the efforts of the Finnish facilitator to ensure the convening of a conference on that subject in Helsinki as soon as possible. This is a crucial undertaking for the Middle East and for the NPT regime.

Regarding the substance of the draft resolution, Switzerland notes that its operative paragraphs refer to only one aspect of the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and single out one State in the region. The recent use of chemical weapons in Syria demonstrates the urgency of addressing the global objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. By voting in favour of the draft resolution, Switzerland has underscored the importance that we attach to the full implementation of the commitments derived from the NPT imposed on all States of the region that are party to that instrument.

In that context, the full cooperation of those States with the relevant international bodies in the sphere of combating nuclear proliferation, starting with the International Atomic Energy Agency, is essential. We hope that the negotiation process between Iran and the E3+3 Governments, relaunched on 15 and 16 October at the Geneva Conference, will allow for further progress

to be achieved on the Iranian nuclear dossier. In order to implement the draft resolution and to attain the goal of preventing the risk of nuclear proliferation to the utmost extent, States must take into account the current context and all developments affecting the full range of countries in the region.

(*spoke in English*)

I now would like to explain Switzerland's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.21, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons". Switzerland has not supported the draft resolution, thus maintaining its position of previous years regarding the text. Our position is explained in particular by the absence in the draft resolution of any reference to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Switzerland remains of the view that a resolution that aims at prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should contain an appropriate reference to the pertinence and viability of the international non-proliferation regime.

We reiterate that any use of nuclear weapons, be it intentional or accidental, would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Preventing the further use of nuclear weapons therefore remains a key challenge for the international community. In the absence of a legally binding instrument in that field, all States possessing nuclear weapons are encouraged to take practical measures to make the use of nuclear weapons less probable, including by refraining from further building up nuclear arsenals and by diminishing the role of nuclear weapons.

Switzerland remains ready to continue the dialogue with the authors of the draft resolution with a view to develop the text so that it can generate broader support.

Mr. Woolcott (Australia): I take the floor to explain my delegation's abstention in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

Australia is committed to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. As a strong supporter of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), we will continue to promote those objectives in all relevant international forums. Our strong advocacy for the universalization of the NPT and the universal application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, including the additional protocol, is a matter of record.

Australia has long been a supporter of effectively verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zones, freely arrived at by Member States, and we have consistently supported the General Assembly resolutions calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Australia attaches the greatest importance to the implementation of the consensus outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, and supports the practical steps endorsed by the Review Conference towards the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

Australia has clearly expressed its support for the efforts made by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava and the depositary States, in consultation with the States of the Middle East region, for the convening of that conference without delay. Australia has long and consistently held the view that all States of the region should adhere to the NPT and that their nuclear facilities should therefore be subject to IAEA inspections. However, a draft resolution entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”, which refers to only one country and makes no reference to current deepening nuclear proliferation risks elsewhere in the Middle East region, is in our view unbalanced. We therefore, regretfully, abstained once again.

Ms. González-Román (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): Spain wishes to explain its vote on the draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.46, entitled “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”. The entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa in 2009, has made a significant contribution to strengthening international peace and security, which is of particular importance for all African countries. Therefore, Spain has always unequivocally expressed its support for the objectives of the Treaty of Pelindaba and welcomed its entry into force.

Spain maintains a close relationship with African countries and has made significant efforts, through the Africa-related plans of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, to promote the sustainable development of all African countries. Spain also stands ready to make the efforts necessary to ensure that the States parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba acquire sufficient capacity to ensure effective compliance with the Treaty in the respective territories.

However, after having closely studied the invitation issued to Spain to become a party to Protocol III of the Treaty of Pelindaba, my Government — in consultation with Parliament, taking into consideration the guidelines adopted by consensus in the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and in keeping with consensual rules and agreements freely reached between the countries of the region concerned — has decided not to sign, a decision of which the designated Treaty depositary has been duly notified. In that regard, I would simply like to highlight the following two issues.

First, the Treaty of Pelindaba contains no provision, obligation, guarantee or safeguard in the sphere of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation that Spain has not already adopted for the entirety of its national territory. As a result of our participation in various international organizations, Spain is bound by a series of commitments and safeguards in the context of the European Atomic Energy Community and the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which go significantly beyond those found in the Treaty of Pelindaba and with which we fully comply.

Secondly, all Spanish territory is nuclear-weapon-free and has been since 1976. The prohibition of the introduction, stockpiling or installation of nuclear weapons throughout Spanish territory was reiterated by our Parliament when Spain joined NATO, in 1981 and was adopted by a consultative referendum held in March 1986. Accordingly, Spain has already adopted all the measures necessary to ensure that the Treaty of Pelindaba applies fully to our national territory.

Spain has joined the consensus on this text since it was first introduced in 1997. However, Spain does not feel that it can associate itself with the consensus on paragraph 5. Therefore, we have worked with other delegations in order to seek more balanced wording that would be acceptable to all parties. We trust that discussions on the draft resolution will lead to satisfactory results during future sessions.

Mr. Seifi Pargou (Islamic Republic of Iran): I would like to explain the position of my delegation regarding the two draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/68/L.2 and A/C.1/68/L.18.

First, I would like to explain the position of my delegation regarding the draft resolution entitled

“The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East” (A/C.1/68/L.2). As in previous years, we voted in favour of the draft resolution, which deals with the most important aspect of security in the Middle East, namely, the threat posed by the nuclear-weapon arsenals of the Israeli regime. The aggressive and expansionist policies of that regime, its large stockpiles of nuclear and other sophisticated weapons, and its non-adherence to international law, norms and principles are the only source of threat to peace and security in the Middle East and beyond, and the only obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that volatile region. Indeed, peace and security cannot be achieved in the Middle East so long as such an irresponsible regime possesses a massive nuclear arsenal; continues to threaten the region and beyond; remains outside treaties banning the use of weapons of mass destruction, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); continues to pursue an underground nuclear-weapons programmes; and defies the repeated calls of the international community to comply with international norms and principles.

Against that backdrop and in order to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the international community has no choice but to exert maximum pressure on the Israeli regime to eliminate all its nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State without further delays and exceptions, and place all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is ironic that countries such as the United States, Canada or members of the European Union have kept dead silent on the clandestine nuclear-weapon programmes and unsafeguarded nuclear installations of the Zionist regime, while making baseless allegations against the exclusively peaceful and safeguarded nuclear programmes of my country. We categorically reject all such allegations.

However, the rationale behind those hypocritical statements is clear. By making such absurd allegations, they try to divert the attention of Member States from the danger of Israel’s nuclear arsenals, its clandestine nuclear programme, its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, its record of non-adherence to international instruments against weapons of mass destruction, and its non-compliance with its obligations under international law. All of us recall that through the consensually adopted Outcome Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, all 189 States parties, including all the main supporters of the

Israeli regime, unanimously called on Israel by name to accede to the NPT without conditions and to place all its nuclear activities under international safeguards. This, too, indicates that, in the view of the international community, there is no source of insecurity and instability in the Middle East and beyond other than the Israeli regime.

I would like to explain the position of my delegation regarding draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.18, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”. We joined in the consensus adoption of the draft resolution. Nevertheless, we would like to place on record that it is acceptable to us inasmuch as its content is in line with the Outcome Document of the Review Conference. Moreover, with regard to references made to the meeting of nuclear-weapon States, as well as the implementation of certain bilateral agreements between two nuclear-weapon States, we would like to stress that a reduction in deployment and operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in or the total elimination of nuclear weapons. At the same time, we call on parties to that agreement, in accordance with their nuclear-disarmament obligations, to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and international accountability to such reductions, and to further reduce their stockpiles of nuclear warheads and delivery systems.

The Chair (*spoke in Arabic*): We have heard the last speaker in explanation of the vote after the voting on cluster 1.

The Committee shall now take action on draft resolutions under cluster 2, “Other weapons of mass destruction”.

(*spoke in English*)

We will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.10, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.10 was introduced by the representative of Hungary at the 16th meeting of the Committee, on 24 October. The sponsor of the draft resolution is named in document A/C.1/68/L.10. In addition, with your permission, Sir, I should like to

read out an oral statement concerning the budgetary implications of the draft resolution.

In connection with draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.10, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction”, I wish to put on record the following statement on financial implications on behalf of the Secretary-General.

By operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General

“[t]o continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention, to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the review conferences and to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be required for the meetings of experts and the meetings of States parties during the 2012-2015 intersessional process”.

The Secretary-General wishes to draw the attention of Member States to the fact that the States parties to the Convention, at their Seventh Review Conference of December 2011, approved a cost estimate prepared by the Secretariat for servicing the meetings of experts and the meetings of States parties of the 2012-2015 intersessional programme. It is recalled that all activities related to international conventions or treaties that, under their respective legal arrangements, are to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations, may be undertaken by the Secretariat only when sufficient funding is received in advance from States parties to the Convention. Accordingly, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.10 would not give rise to any financial implications under the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015.

The Chair: The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.10 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.23, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the First Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.23 was introduced by the representative of India at the 13th meeting, on 21 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/68/L.23 and A/C.1/68/CRP.4/Rev.2. In addition, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea and Zambia have become sponsors of the draft resolution.

The Chair: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.23 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.32, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.32 was introduced by the representative of Poland at the 16th meeting, on 24 October. The sponsor of the draft resolution is named in document A/C.1/68/L.32.

The Chair: The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.32 was adopted.

The Chair: I now give the floor to delegations that wish to explain their positions on the draft resolutions just adopted.

Mr. Varma (India): Although we joined the consensus on A/C.1/68/L.32, which is the traditional text on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, we wish to make the following statement for the record.

We believe that the draft resolution does not reflect fully the balance of points that were included in the consensus final report of the third special session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This point was made clear to the sponsor of the draft resolution. We believe that the consultations that were conducted could have been more comprehensive. We also call upon the sponsor of the draft resolution to

conduct more comprehensive consultations next year so that the draft resolution reflects the views of all Member States and the consensual nature of the text can be protected both in letter and in spirit.

Mr. Ibrahim (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): I shall be speaking on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.32, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”. At the outset, I would like to thank the delegation of Poland for its efforts in drafting the text. My delegation would like to make the following remarks in that regard.

First, the draft resolution addresses the question of the Syrian Arab Republic explicitly and on a selective basis. In its fourth preambular paragraph, reference is made to a specific incident that was partly covered in the report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, but there is no mention of the fact that the Commission is continuing its work in order to examine all incidents covered in the agreement signed between the Government of Syria and the United Nations. We continue to wait for the Commission’s final and comprehensive report.

Secondly, the sixth preambular paragraph makes reference to Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). The Syrian Arab Republic objects to that reference. The resolution cited does not exclusively address the issue of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, but has other political aspects that have no place in the text of a technical draft resolution such as A/C.1/68/L.32.

Thirdly, the text is selective and includes some paragraphs from the outcome document of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, without taking into account the notes made by a number of Member States on this matter, including the Syrian Arab Republic.

For all of these reasons, my delegation dissociates itself from the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.32.

Mrs. Ledesma Hernández (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): As on previous occasions, Cuba joined the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.32, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”. This year, however, we have done so in a specific context.

We must frankly say that the Cuban delegation is not fully satisfied with the way in which that important document was drafted or with its content. The draft text would have been more balanced if the proposed amendments put forward by a number of delegations, including that of Cuba, has been duly taken into account during the consultations. We regret that the draft resolution does not reflect the successful results of the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The report of the Conference, adopted by consensus, is a balanced document that reflects a clear position on all important matters addressed in the Convention.

International cooperation was one of the most discussed issues at the Review Conference. The language of the final document on that issue established the necessary conditions for an in-depth discussion on the plan of action to ensure the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article XI proposed by China and States parties to the Convention that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The draft resolution just adopted could have adequately reflected the agreement on international cooperation at that Conference, it being a high-priority issue for developing countries and one of the main incentives for those countries to comply with the Convention. However, we agreed a text on the basis of some selected arguments in the final document of the Third Review Conference. Resolutions adopted in the General Assembly should reflect the legitimate interests and concerns of all States parties.

My delegation is of the view that no effort should be spared. We should therefore have held further consultations. We hope that the authors of the draft resolution will take such considerations into account in the preparation of and deliberation on the draft resolution on that topic at the next session of the General Assembly. It would help greatly if we could begin early discussions in The Hague, headquarters of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Mr. Hashmi (Pakistan): My delegation wishes to explain its position on two draft resolutions under this cluster.

On draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.32, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of

Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”, Pakistan considers the draft text an important and consensus resolution. We share the concerns expressed by other delegations during the informal consultations on the overall balance of the draft text. We regret the fact that the support expressed for the inclusion of a particular paragraph on the promotion of the peaceful uses of chemistry was not taken on board, thereby making the draft text a little lopsided. We hope that such a practice is avoided in the years ahead in order to preserve the consensus nature of the draft resolution.

On draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.23, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, my delegation shares the concerns that terrorists and non-State actors may potentially acquire and use weapons and materials that would cause mass destruction. We therefore continue to support the objectives of the draft resolution, although we believe that there is room to improve the draft text by conveying a more objective reflection of the reality.

The fear of the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their materials by terrorists and non-State actors need to be evaluated and viewed in perspective. Terrorist organizations and non-State actors are more likely to acquire and use chemical weapons and biological weapons materials and capabilities. The acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by terrorists and non-State actors are much less likely. The international community, however, must not lower its guard to prevent the possibility of the development and use of dirty bombs. Increased international cooperation, including the initiation of negotiations on a radiological weapons convention, should be given serious consideration. We find the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the Nuclear Security Summit process and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism useful processes in that regard. Addressing those concerns, however, should not become an excuse for pursuing a policy of discrimination against selected countries.

With regard to denying terrorists the means to acquire, possess and use WMDs, States have enacted and enforced export-control measures, national physical protection and other related actions to prevent WMD technology from falling into the hands of terrorists. International assistance and capacity-building continue to be important areas of tension.

To lend greater legitimacy to international efforts in that area, interim measures, such as the adoption of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), which were designed to fill the gap in international law, need to be taken up by a more inclusive and representative United Nations forum. We agree with the widely held view that the best guarantee against the threat of the possible use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons lies in their elimination.

The faithful implementation of existing treaty regimes, such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, can effectively address most of those threats. An early disarmament of chemical stocks would enhance the confidence level against the likelihood of their acquisition and use by terrorists. However, as long as the process of chemical weapons disarmament proceeds at a slow pace and huge quantities of chemical weapons exist, the possibility of their falling into terrorist hands will remain as well.

The control of biological weapons should be of more concern, in particular to the industrially advanced States due to their extensive use of biological agents. The Biological Weapons Convention should therefore be strengthened, including by possibly concluding the verification protocol, which has been negotiated for more than eight years. The revival of that process would fully serve the goal of promoting international peace and security and address the concerns expressed, for example, in the draft resolution.

In our view, a comprehensive strategy must be evolved to prevent the possibility of terrorists gaining access to WMDs. It must include depriving terrorist organizations of their operational and organizational capabilities; strengthening the relevant existing multilateral regimes; negotiating a universal treaty to fill the gaps in current international instruments; augmenting the capacity of States to implement global treaty obligations; and addressing the root causes of terrorism.

A distinction must be maintained between counterterrorism and non-proliferation. The draft resolution quite appropriately mentions the Final Document of the sixteenth Non-Aligned Movement Conference of Heads of State or Government (see A/67/506) as having expressed itself on the issue on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. We would

like to remind the Committee that, in the context of the issue of terrorism, the Document also stresses the need to address the causes that sometimes lead to terrorism — causes that lie in suppression, injustice and deprivation.

Mr. Seifi Pargou (Islamic Republic of Iran): I wish to explain the position of my delegation of draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.23, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”.

As one of the main victims of terrorist acts, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always supported measures to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations on a non-discriminatory basis. In pursuit of that principled position, my country has supported this draft resolution since its introduction in the First Committee.

However, the draft resolutions proposed this year and in the past two years contain a reference to the so-called Nuclear Security Summits, a closed selective gathering for a selective approach towards nuclear security based on the assumption that the possession of nuclear weapons by a few countries should be continued and that the only major problem is how to secure the weapons and needed material for the production of such weapons.

A thorough review of the documents of these gatherings indicates that they contain not a single word about nuclear disarmament or the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which is the only absolute guarantee against the threat posed to regional and international peace and security by nuclear weapons. Furthermore, this is an inappropriate approach, whereby certain countries discuss some significant issues outside the framework of the United Nations and ask the United Nations to endorse their decisions in order to legitimate them.

In our view, nuclear security is an important issue that needs to be addressed within the relevant multilateral organizations in an open, comprehensive and transparent manner, with the equal participation of all States. Therefore, such a discriminatory approach is totally unacceptable to us. Despite our full sympathy with the thrust of the draft resolution, the reference to the gathering in the current draft obliged my delegation, while joining the consensus, to disassociate itself from the paragraph contained therein on the so-called Nuclear Security Summits.

The Chair (*spoke in Arabic*): We have heard the last speaker in explanation of position on the draft resolutions in cluster 2.

The Committee will now proceed to consider draft resolutions under cluster 3. I shall now open the floor to delegations wishing to make a general statement on cluster 3.

Mrs. Ledesma Hernández (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Within this thematic cluster, Cuba is a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.41, entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, which is under consideration today, as well as of A/C.1/68/L.40, entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”, which will be considered in the coming days.

With respect to the theme under review, Cuba acknowledges the shared interest of all humankind in exploring outer space for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of scientific and economic development. In that context, we reaffirm the right of all countries to the use and exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes. We believe that an arms race in outer space would involve grave danger for international peace and security. Cuba therefore believes it important and necessary to continue to develop international transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space.

Cuba considers the two draft resolutions to be an important contribution to efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space because they contain specific provisions such as requirements for prior notice, verification and follow-up to achieve greater transparency in outer space activities. At the same time, Cuba believes that the Disarmament Commission should play the leading role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. We hope that, as they did in previous years, Member States will adopt the proposed amendments.

The Chair: We will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.41, entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.41, entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, was introduced by the representative of Sri Lanka at the 18th meeting, on 28 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in the document A/C.1/68/L.41 and

A/C.1/68/CRP.4/Rev.2. The following countries have become co-sponsors of the draft resolution: Belarus, China, Iraq, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic

of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Israel, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.41 was adopted by 175 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

The Chair (*spoke in Arabic*): The Committee has thus concluded its consideration of draft resolutions under cluster 3.

The Committee will now proceed to consider draft resolutions under cluster 4. I call on those delegations wishing to make general statements on cluster 4.

Ms. Ganslandt (European Union): I have the honour to make the following general statement on behalf of the European Union with regard to a number of relevant resolutions under cluster 4. The following countries also subscribe to this statement: Albania, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Gabon, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mexico, Montenegro, Norway, Palau, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turkey.

All countries subscribing to this statement join in consensus on these draft resolutions. However, we would like to stress some particularly relevant aspects in their context.

Over the course of recent weeks, we have joined many others in stating the importance that we attach to the landmark Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). It is the outcome of a constructive, comprehensive and inclusive seven-year process, which has been supported by a geographically diverse range of States. We have supported it from the outset by promoting its principles widely and actively. The ATT establishes robust and effective common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and provides a new multilateral framework for transparency and accountability in that trade. It also helps to prevent arms from being transferred irresponsibly and illegally.

In April, 154 States voted in favour of the adoption of the ATT, and 114 States have already signed it. When effectively and widely implemented, the ATT will contribute to more responsible and transparent international arms transfers and help eradicate illicit trading. By signing and ratifying the Treaty, States can sustain the international momentum generated by the ATT. All countries subscribing to this statement are signatories to the Treaty, and national ratification procedures are either complete or under way.

We are aware of the challenges the new Treaty is facing, among others securing an early entry into force, ensuring effective implementation and working towards universalization. We are ready to contribute actively to addressing them and to work towards the rapid entry into force of the Treaty and its full implementation. We wish, therefore, to express our hope that in our future deliberations, the successful outcome of the ATT will be more forcefully reflected in relevant resolutions than has been the case this year.

We also wish to underscore the importance of the first-ever Security Council resolution dedicated exclusively to the issue of small arms and light weapons — resolution 2117 (2013), adopted on 26 September. Small arms and light weapons are the most frequently used in armed conflicts, and millions of civilians continue to fall victim to those weapons. Resolution 2117 (2013) gives us the chance to renew and strengthen international efforts to tackle the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons, to help secure peace and stability and to reduce human suffering. The Arms Trade Treaty is also recognized as a key part of that resolution.

Finally, both the Arms Trade Treaty and resolution 2117 (2013), in their respective ways, recognize that illicit or poorly regulated transfers fuel armed conflicts and have a wide range of negative human rights, humanitarian, development and socioeconomic consequences, in particular on the security of civilians in armed conflict, including the disproportionate impact on violence perpetrated against women and girls, on exacerbating sexual and gender-based violence, and on the recruitment and use of children by parties to armed conflict, in violation of applicable international law.

We welcome these encouraging signs of increased humanitarian and, in particular, gender awareness in disarmament and arms control. We regret, however, that those significant developments are missing in the

text of resolutions dealing with the specific issue of small arms and light weapons.

Mr. Van der Kwast (Netherlands): On behalf of the Netherlands and 66 sponsors, I would like to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.30, entitled “Transparency in armaments”. With this year’s text, we have changed the sequence of the draft resolution from every two to every three years, and with that change we have brought it more in line with the sequence of the work of the group of governmental experts on transparency in armaments.

Furthermore, we include a text to welcome the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty and have incorporated the recommendations of the group of governmental experts, as highlighted in the 2013 report of the Secretary-General (S/2013/503). We held formal consultations on the draft text, and we have tried to accommodate in the text as many of the comments that were made during the meeting.

Ms. Crowley (New Zealand): New Zealand is pleased to join the consensus on a number of cluster 4 draft resolutions, which touch upon the biggest breakthrough on conventional weapons this year, namely, the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

New Zealand was an active contributor to the intensive multi-year, cross-regional effort that led to the successful conclusion of the ATT. Although consensus proved elusive, we were pleased to see the final text of the Treaty adopted by the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly — a confirmation, if one was needed, of the importance and appeal of the Treaty. We are thrilled to have been among the first of the now 114 States to have signed the ATT, which has been lauded by almost every delegation during the work of the Committee as the crowning achievement of recent disarmament efforts. Of course, it is not enough to have agreed the Treaty, and New Zealand intends to continue playing an active role in its entry into force and implementation.

New Zealand sees the Treaty as a significant and necessary step forward in the global struggle to curb the illicit trade in conventional weapons. The ATT will move us closer towards our shared goal of mitigating the serious security and humanitarian consequences of that trade, particularly through its coverage of small arms and light weapons, a point emphasized in a number of draft resolutions before us today.

In the light of the important content of those draft resolutions, New Zealand appreciates the efforts of the core sponsors to achieve consensus, which we are of course pleased to join. Given the significance of the ATT and the nearuniversal support it enjoys among the United Nations membership, we hope that future such draft resolutions will be able to incorporate stronger references to the success of the Treaty.

The Chair (*spoke in Arabic*): I now call on representatives who wish to explain their vote or position before the voting on draft resolutions under cluster 4.

Mr. Fares (Libya) (*spoke in Arabic*): I wish to explain Libya's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.3, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction". Libya is not a member of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, and the interim Government is unable at present to consider the possibility of signing the Convention or acceding to it.

Nevertheless, Libya shares the international community's humanitarian concerns with respect to anti-personnel landmines, due to the humanitarian tragedies and environmental damage they cause and the obstacle they pose to development. Libya has had a problem with landmines and unexploded remnants of war since the Second World War, but it has been exacerbated by the tens of thousands of mines sown throughout Libya by Al-Qadhafi's forces.

The United Nations and several non-governmental organizations are assisting the relevant authorities in Libya in removing the landmines and in clearing out arms warehouses that were destroyed after the dictatorship was overthrown. In that regard, Libya would like to express its thanks and appreciation to countries and civil society organizations that have offered technical assistance and financial aid to ensure the removal of landmines planted by the dictatorship and to rehabilitate the victims that have been injured by them. We hope that we will receive more aid so that the mines will be permanently removed.

For those humanitarian considerations, Libya will for the first time change its usual manner of voting on the draft resolution entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,

Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction". Rather than abstain, we will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.3.

Mr. El Oumni (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): I am speaking in explanation of vote before the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.3, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

Morocco, which actively contributed to the preparatory process for the Ottawa Convention, has decided to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.3, as it has done since 2004, in order to reiterate its support for the eminently humanitarian objectives of the Convention, in particularly that of protecting civilians from unacceptable damage caused by anti-personnel mines. Similarly, the ratification by Morocco in March 2002 of the Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the regular submission since 2003 of a national report of the implementation of the provisions of that Protocol reflect Morocco's support for the universal impetus towards the elimination of anti-personnel mines.

To that end, Morocco applies the provisions of the Ottawa Convention in the field of demining, destruction of stockpiles, outreach and training and assistance to the victims of anti-personnel mines. In that regard, we would highlight the following three elements: first, the remarkable demining efforts made by the Royal Armed Forces, which have allowed for the recuperation and destruction of thousands of anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines and unexploded devices; secondly, the Moroccan authorities' efforts to provide care to victims and address their needs for medical, social and economic rehabilitation; and thirdly, the support of Morocco to countries in the region in field of demining as well as the continued dialogue with non-governmental organizations with a view to pursuing the goals of the Convention.

Since 2006, the Kingdom of Morocco has voluntarily submitted a report pursuant to article 7 of the Ottawa Convention. In that spirit, Morocco also regularly attends the meetings of States parties and the Review Conferences of the Convention. Morocco's accession to the Ottawa Convention is a strategic goal

linked to security imperatives with regard to respect for its territorial integrity.

Mr. Yermakov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian delegation is taking the floor with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.30, entitled “Transparency in armaments”.

Unlike previous years, Russia will be compelled to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution on transparency in armaments, the main reason being that the reference to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in the preamble is not in line with the draft’s overall context. The reference to the number of signatures and ratifications of the Arms Trade Treaty has nothing to do with improving transparency in the field of conventional weapons. Moreover, what is particularly questionable is the argument that the entry into force of that instrument will lead to greater to transparency in armaments.

A simple reading of the relevant articles will show that the Treaty provides for exchanges of information only between States parties. A disclosure of and free access statistics on transfers on the part of the international community is not stipulated by the Treaty. In addition, the Treaty includes exemptions that allow States to refrain from providing information.

We have no doubt that many Governments make use of those rights, which raises the question as to what kind of increased transparency the authors of the draft resolution are talking about. All suggestions were outlined in informal consultations, not just by representatives of the Russian Federation but also by a number of other States. We also proposed possible compromises. However, judging by the final version of A/C.1/68/L.30 before us, the authors seem to have ignored the attempts to adjust the text. In those circumstances, we cannot support draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.30 as it stands.

Mr. Farghal (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): It is well known that, like Libya, we have a major problem with

landmines. Therefore, I would like to explain our vote on the draft resolution pertaining to landmines (A/C.1/68/L.3).

(*spoke in English*)

I am taking the floor to explain Egypt’s abstention in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.3. Egypt will abstain in the voting on the draft resolution on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction due to the particularly imbalanced nature of that instrument, which was developed and concluded outside the framework of the United Nations.

Egypt has imposed a moratorium on the production and export of landmines since 1980, long before the conclusion of the Ottawa Convention. Egypt considers that the Convention lacks the necessary balance between humanitarian concerns related to the production and use of anti-personnel landmines and their legitimate military use in border protection, particularly in countries with long borders.

The Convention does not impose any legal responsibility on States to remove anti-personnel mines they have in place in the territories of others, making it almost impossible for many States to meet their sustainable development requirements. That is particularly true in the case of Egypt, which still suffers from millions of anti-personnel mines placed in its territory by warring States during the Second World War. That concern is exacerbated by the weakness of the provisions for international cooperation under the Convention, which are still very limited and highly dependent on the will of donor States.

The Ottawa Convention’s lack of universality reflects the lack of international consensus on those provisions, due in part to its finalization outside the United Nations. That reminds us that it is imperative to conclude arms control and disarmament agreements within the context of the United Nations — and not outside that framework.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.