



# General Assembly

Sixty-eighth session

## First Committee

**10**<sup>th</sup> meeting

Thursday, 17 October 2013, 3 p.m.  
New York

Official Records

*Chair:* Mr. Dabbashi ..... (Libya)

*The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.*

### Statement by the President of the General Assembly

**The Chair** (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like to warmly welcome the President of the General Assembly, Mr. John Ashe, who is here today to share some thoughts with us on disarmament and international security issues.

The President of the General Assembly, as the Committee knows, is an accomplished diplomat who has made remarkable contributions to global efforts to advance the multilateral agenda in many critical areas, including the question of disarmament and international peace and security. Undoubtedly, the Committee will recall in that regard his inspiring opening statement to the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament (see A/68/PV.11), held on 26 September. In that statement, the President passionately urged Member States, in the light of the vision of the Millennium Declaration (resolution 55/2), to renew their commitment to a world free of fear and of weapons of mass destruction. His expression of his readiness to provide any support possible in order to help advance the disarmament agenda should further energize our deliberations.

I am very pleased to welcome the President of the General Assembly to today's meeting and invite him to address the First Committee.

**Mr. Ashe** (Antigua and Barbuda), President of the General Assembly: At the outset, let me congratulate you, Mr. Chair, on the exemplary manner in which you have been leading the First Committee in its important

work, which is all the more so in a world fraught with risk to national and personal security. I also wish to acknowledge the Vice-Chairs and the Rapporteur for their contributions to the Chair's efforts. Let me welcome the disarmament experts who have come from various capitals, as well as from Geneva, where the Conference on Disarmament is based. It is my sincere hope that this sixty-eighth session will see significant progress in our common effort to advance the disarmament and international security agenda.

It is appropriate in any endeavour in the world today that from time to time we glance backward or around us to take note of the signs of achievement no less than of our failures. On the positive side, we are pleased to note that this year the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. This is undoubtedly an outstanding recognition of the work of that body and of the experts whose skill and courage on the ground have made a direct and practical contribution to the cause of peace. At the same time, I will not be overly modest in my praise of our United Nations and its First Committee representatives, who in large measure form the source of many of our disarmament ideas.

Many of us will recall with pride the adoption in April of the Arms Trade Treaty, a historic instrument that will regulate the international trade in conventional arms. The Treaty marks an important step towards enhancing transparency and strengthening accountability mechanisms in the legitimate arms trade, and in this way represents a worthy contribution to strengthening peace and security.

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In April and May, we saw a successful second Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which deepened substantive discussions and paved the way for next year's third Preparatory Committee. Also commendable was the successful convening in Geneva of the open-ended working group on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. The Working Group successfully engaged in frank and constructive discussions on ways to advance multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.

Finally, the first-ever High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament (see A/68/PV.11) was held just a few weeks ago, lending new momentum to the important work and initiatives that are already under way.

Those many successes are laudable and noteworthy, and we justly celebrate them. However, we must acknowledge that we continue to struggle in many ways. The revitalization process of the disarmament machinery is making only limited progress, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has still not entered into force. Furthermore, during September's High-level Meeting, a number of delegations indicated continued frustration over the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, which some feel may be detrimental to the success of the 2015 NPT Review Conference and the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

In many regions of the world, including my own, the Caribbean, the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is a clear and present danger. It should consequently come as no surprise that facing this threat — which is considered to be significant to our national and global peace and security — is an enduring preoccupation in many regions. Not only do small arms facilitate a vast spectrum of human rights violations, but they also exacerbate poverty, place heavy burdens on social and health-care services that are already under severe stress, steal the innocence of our young people, inhibit access to social services, and divert already limited resources from efforts to improve human development. Insofar as they are heavily connected to the trade in illegal drugs, they also represent a serious threat to national security and well-being. Given the gravity of this issue and mindful of its impact on both human and economic development, I urge members to continue looking at how to make progress in that area.

At the risk of repetition, please let me revisit another issue which was already mentioned in my statement at the high-level event. As members know, the theme of the sixty-eighth session is “The post-2015 development agenda: setting the stage”, and it will be supported by a number of events focused on issues related to sustainable development. In one way or another, each and every item we discuss in the General Assembly reinforces sustainable development, including the items delegations are discussing in the First Committee. The decisions they make here not only contribute to peace and security, but inevitably have an impact on aspects of the United Nations work.

Let us not forget that where we put our time, resources and energy is an indication of what we truly value. And so when we say we value education, health care, poverty reduction and sustainable development, our actions and choices must likewise offer proof of that. With that in mind, let me recall the truism that resources should be used for economic and social development, not weapons. Access to social goods and services is predicated on the existence of peace and security.

Seen in another light, while I did not say this in my acceptance statement (see A/67/PV.87) or my statement opening the general debate on 24 September (see A/68/PV.5), peace and security form the overarching context for the pursuit of our sustainable development goals. Without such an umbrella, our other pursuits are in vain. The pursuit of the instruments of war and violence do not create peace and most certainly do not engender development.

As delegations approach the thematic discussions on each of the seven clusters of the Committee, I call upon representatives to maintain a constructive and forward-looking atmosphere, with a firm focus on consensus-building. I also urge them to respect the time and resources allocated to the Committee, as that is crucial for the overall success of our sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

Members may rest assured that my entire team and I stand ready to work with them to ensure that their efforts in the Committee reach a successful conclusion and contribute to the global effort aimed at advancing the cause of disarmament and international security at all levels. I also remind them that, in the pursuit of peace, we are following in the most noble tradition of Mahatma Gandhi, who lived a life of peace with all people and nations and taught us that, in his own words,

“peace will not come out of a clash of arms but out of justice lived and done by unarmed nations in the face of odds”.

I wish representatives much success in their deliberations and look forward to their continued progress in making our world safer for all.

**The Chair** (*spoke in Arabic*): On behalf of the Committee, I thank Mr. Ashe for his presence among us today and for his preliminary statement.

### High-level exchange

**The Chair** (*spoke in Arabic*): Before we proceed with our thematic discussions, in keeping with the programme of work adopted at the organizational meeting, we will first have an exchange with the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and with other high-level officials on the current state of affairs in the field of arms control and disarmament and the role of active international organizations with mandates in that field.

I have the pleasure to warmly welcome our panelists today: the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Angela Kane; the Deputy Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Ambassador Grace Asirwatham; the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Jarmo Sareva; the representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Geoffrey Shaw; and the Director of the Legal and External Relations Division of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Mr. Genxin Li.

Before we continue, I would like to take the opportunity to congratulate the leadership and staff of the OPCW on having been awarded the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize. I am sure that all delegations join in celebrating the wonderful award, which demonstrates the importance of the international disarmament agenda.

I will first give panellists the floor to make their statements. Thereafter, we will change to an informal mode, and delegations will have the opportunity to put questions to them.

I would like to begin by inviting the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Angela Kane, to address the Committee.

**Ms. Kane** (High Representative for Disarmament Affairs): Our panel today will consist of an exchange among my colleagues — Ambassador Grace Asirwatham, Mr. Jarmo Sareva, Mr. Geoffrey Shaw and Mr. Genxin Li, who will make their own statements.

In my remarks at last year’s First Committee panel of high-level officials (see A/C.1/67/PV.7), I cited a comment by Salvador de Madariaga, my distant predecessor in the secretariat of the League of Nations. He pointed out that the real challenge of disarmament relates to the degree of organization within the world community. It is interesting because he viewed the term “organization” not as an institution but as a process involving many institutions and even the wider public at large.

The institutions represented on the panel are very active participants in such a process. The goals they pursue are multilateral in nature. The norms they seek to cultivate and strengthen are intended to be truly universal in scope. For precisely those reasons, those institutions, while separate from the United Nations, have established close working relations with the Secretariat. So while there is a division of labour in addressing disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control in the world, there is also very much a spirit of common cause.

We saw that most strikingly this year in the rapid emergence of a collaborative team effort by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations to assist in the implementation of Syria’s responsibilities as a new party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The many complexities of undertaking those functions amid the horrors of a brutal civil war cannot be overstated, yet we are already starting to see some of the fruits of that collaboration. We have already achieved great progress in the transparency of Syria’s chemical-weapons capabilities, and we are putting in place a reliable system for the verification and, finally, destruction of that deadly arsenal. As a result, the global norms against the use or very existence of such weapons have undoubtedly been strengthened. Today, the same number of States have joined the CWC as have joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Unfortunately, progress in the field of disarmament is rarely either steady or evenly distributed. It has, for example, been another disappointing year for the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which once again has not been able to fulfil its role as the world’s single

multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. While it was also unable to adopt a programme of work, the CD did establish an informal working group with a mandate to produce one, and its informal consultations may continue in the 2013-2014 intersessional period. It is encouraging that diplomatic efforts are under way to revive the CD as a unique component in the multilateral disarmament machinery, but it is still not possible to predict their outcome.

Of the institutions represented on the panel, the United Nations has had its longest relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was established when Dag Hammarskjöld was Secretary-General. This year marks the sixtieth anniversary of United States President Eisenhower's "Atoms for peace" speech in the General Assembly (see A/PV.470), which led to the creation of the IAEA in 1957. Through its work in promoting and safeguarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in advancing nuclear science and technology, and in seeking to improve the safety and security of nuclear materials, the Agency has contributed significantly to international peace and security, which is precisely why it and its former Director General were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize. Relations between the United Nations and the IAEA are excellent, including at the working level of our respective secretariats.

The idea of an international organization as a process is also illustrated by the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). While the Treaty has still not yet entered into force, the CTBTO has already made impressive achievements in establishing a robust international system to detect nuclear explosions of virtually any size, virtually anywhere. The expert former Director of the organization's International Data Centre, Mr. Lassina Zerbo, has now become the Commission's Executive Secretary. I am sure that his organization has the support and best wishes of all delegations as it confronts the challenges of bringing the Treaty into force and implementing it globally. I welcome Mr. Genxin Li on his first appearance before the Committee.

To a large extent, the future of each of our organizations will be determined by the professionalism of our work, the information and expertise we possess, and the efficiency and effectiveness of our management — in short, how we function as bureaucracies. Yet that future will also be conditioned

by many unpredictable events and developments. Most importantly, our futures will be determined by the decisions and actions of our member States, which create our mandates, provide available resources and closely monitor the implementation of our work.

The most auspicious environment for our organizations would arise if, in the years ahead, we were to find new and expanding coalitions of States that share a strong common commitment to advancing disarmament goals. The closer the alignment of priorities, policies and practices of States, the stronger will be the foundation and political will to help our organizations to function as they should. The work of the First Committee will provide important indicators of whether we are facing a renaissance of multilateral disarmament or a new dark age of fragmentation and decline. Given the stakes involved, there really is no choice. We must move forward.

**The Chair:** I now give the floor to the Deputy Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

**Ms. Asirwathan** (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons): Allow me first of all to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee, and thank you for giving us the opportunity to participate in today's high-level exchange.

It is a source of immense pride to the staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that their work has been recognized by no less a body than the Nobel Academy. Its decision last week to bestow the Nobel Peace Prize on our organization has cast the spotlight not only on our 16-year record of achievement, but also on multilateral arms-control efforts more broadly. I hope that all of us in the disarmament community can draw inspiration from this award for our ongoing work and the formidable tasks ahead.

In recent weeks, we have witnessed truly momentous developments for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that have created an unprecedented challenge for the work of the OPCW. On 14 September, not long after it was confirmed by the Secretary-General that chemical weapons had been used in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta on 21 August, the Syrian Arab Republic deposited its instrument of accession to the Convention, which entered into force for Syria three days ago, on 14 October. On 27 September, the

Executive Council of the OPCW took a historic decision on the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons, to be completed in the first half of 2014. That decision was reinforced by Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), which was adopted on the same day.

A Joint Mission of the OPCW and the United Nations has been established to oversee this accelerated destruction programme. Our inspectors have started inspection and verification activities based on the disclosure provided by Syria on 19 September and an updated disclosure prepared in cooperation with OPCW experts and submitted to the OPCW on 4 October. The most immediate goal is to render all production facilities and mixing and filling equipment unusable — a process also referred to as “functional destruction” — by 1 November.

As the Committee is aware, yesterday the Secretary-General announced the appointment of Ms. Sigrid Kaag as Special Coordinator for the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission to eliminate the chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The appointment was made in close consultation with the OPCW Director-General. We welcome this appointment and look forward to working with Ms. Kaag on this important Mission.

To date, our Mission has recorded steady progress, assisted by the constructive cooperation of Syrian officials. In accordance with the OPCW Executive Council decision, the Director-General will provide monthly reports to the Executive Council on progress made towards the implementation of the decision and report to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. The OPCW values the crucial support provided by the United Nations in this historic Mission, especially in the areas of security, logistics and field support. Given the ongoing conflict in Syria, the safety and security of our staff are of paramount importance.

The Director General and the Secretary-General are in regular contact on all matters related to the Joint Mission, and I am confident that the well-established cooperation between our two organizations will help bring the Mission to a successful conclusion. I can assure the Committee that our organization is dedicating all of its energy, expertise and resources to meeting this formidable challenge.

Fruitful collaboration between the OPCW and the United Nations has also been witnessed in the United Nations Mission to Investigate Alleged Uses of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. To

date, two teams of OPCW inspectors have participated in that Mission. As I noted earlier, the Mission has reported that chemical weapons were used in Ghouta on 21 August. The Director-General added his voice to international condemnation of that heinous attack. The investigation in Syria continues, and the Head of the Mission, Mr. Sellström, has indicated that he plans to issue a final report to the Secretary-General by the end of this month.

Syria's accession brings the number of States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, following Somalia's accession earlier this year, to 190. Only six States now remain outside the Convention — two that have signed but not ratified and four that have not yet signed. We have consistently called on the six States outside of the Convention to join without delay or precondition. Universal adherence remains a high priority for the OPCW and its member States as a central means for securing the permanence, integrity and effectiveness of the global ban on chemical weapons.

In the 16 years of the operation of the Convention, steady progress has continued to be made in our efforts to destroy the remaining declared chemical-weapons stockpiles. The OPCW has thus far verified the destruction of 58,170 metric tons, amounting to 82 per cent of the total of 71,000 metric tons of chemical-weapons stockpiles that had been declared by States parties. The two major possessor States, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, remain well on track towards achieving their destruction targets.

Three countries that had declared possession of chemical weapons in the past have commendably fulfilled their obligation to destroy their entire stockpile of chemical weapons. To date, all of the 70 declared chemical-weapons production facilities have been inactivated, and nearly 92 per cent of them have been either destroyed or permanently converted to peaceful purposes. These were facilities specifically built to produce chemical weapons.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is a multidimensional instrument. In addition to complete disarmament, its goals include non-proliferation or the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical weapons, the promotion of international cooperation for the peaceful application of chemistry, and the provision of assistance and protection to States parties against chemical weapons. The Convention ensures that the reach of its verification regime extends to the global

chemical industry as a means of preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. This measure helps build confidence and create transparency among the States parties.

There are approximately 5,000 industry facilities around the world that are of interest for the purposes of the Convention's implementation. Those facilities are subject to inspection by the OPCW and, indeed, those producing chemicals deemed most relevant to the Convention are regularly inspected. Thus far, more than 2,500 such inspections have been carried out in 86 States parties.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is tied to science, and the dynamic nature of scientific research and development has a direct impact on our work. We are facing a time of rapid advances in science and technology, such as the growing convergence of biology and chemistry, which could have direct relevance for our efforts to ensure that the Convention remains an effective safeguard against chemical weapons. It is therefore our responsibility to adequately assess and address new developments in science and technology that may affect the implementation of the Convention.

Article XI of the Convention, which is related to economic and technological development, provides for the promotion of international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for peaceful purposes. For that purpose, the OPCW has established a wide range of programmes to create awareness, build capacities and exchange best practices and information, especially in States parties with developing economies.

OPCW programmes in support of broadening international cooperation and assistance, including in the area of assistance and protection against chemical weapons, offer strong incentives to our larger membership to remain engaged in and benefit from participation in the OPCW. In response to concerns regarding the potential misuse of toxic chemicals, we have intensified our assistance and protection programmes to strengthen the development of national capacities to effectively respond to chemical emergencies involving toxic chemicals.

Due to the threat posed by non-State actors and by terrorists in particular, States parties have also expressed an enhanced demand for OPCW activities to promote chemical safety and security. Furthermore, while it is not an anti-terrorism agency, the OPCW is contributing to the global efforts to counter the threat

posed by terrorism. The OPCW has a mechanism, the Open-ended Working Group on Terrorism, that serves as a platform for States parties to exchange views on issues related to counter-terrorism, including by networking with national, regional and international organizations.

Together with universal acceptance of the CWC, it is crucial that all our States parties continue to make steady progress towards comprehensive domestic implementation in the interest of ensuring the effectiveness of the Convention as an international instrument. To that end, the secretariat has developed an approach of country-specific assistance, capacity-building and training initiatives that are tailored to meet the specific needs and requirements of individual countries to draft domestic legislation and achieve full implementation of the Convention. A sound legal framework through legislation and the means to enforce it creates the domestic capacity required to monitor, report on and guide activities involving chemicals along peaceful and productive lines. Our experience has shown that, far from being an imposition, national implementation is to the advantage of the States parties' security and economies.

The Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, also referred to as the Third Review Conference, which met in April 2013 in The Hague, adopted a substantive, forward-looking report, providing us with a road map for years to come. The Conference was a successful and productive event reaffirming the effective multilateral collaboration underpinning the Convention. States parties also reaffirmed their steadfast commitment to the chemical-weapons ban and their resolve to work towards implementing the Review Conference's recommendations.

In conclusion, allow me to place on record that the United Nations has consistently and strongly supported our common mission to achieve a world free of chemical weapons. With both organizations standing side by side in the extraordinary challenge of overseeing the destruction of Syria's chemical arsenal, we are now, more than ever, conscious of the great benefit that comes from our cooperation in seeking to achieve international peace and security.

**The Chair** (*spoke in Arabic*): I now give the floor to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Disarmament Conference.

**Mr. Sareva** (Conference on Disarmament): I have the honour to deliver the statement that Mr. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva and Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, would have delivered to the Committee had he been able to travel to New York. But due to unforeseen developments, he is unable to be here today.

Before delivering his message, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. Chair, on your election. It was exactly 10 years ago that I was sitting in your seat. I know that yours is a very intense and challenging job, but with your qualifications and experience, I am sure that you will succeed with flying colours.

I have the honour to deliver the following message on behalf of the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev:

“While I am not able to join the First Committee in person, I should like, first of all, to thank the Chair and the Bureau for the kind invitation to address the Committee. As I now prepare to leave the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament to take up new responsibilities in my home country, I appreciate this opportunity to thank all Member States for the support extended to me in my role as Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and to share with the Committee my thoughts on the state of affairs in multilateral disarmament.

“The First Committee constitutes one of the key pillars of the United Nations disarmament machinery and of multilateral diplomacy more broadly. The legislative functions of that body have proved to be solid measures and norms for the promotion of disarmament and international security in the service of a better world for all.

“Today, I will focus my statement on the Conference on Disarmament, which is another central pillar of the disarmament machinery. As Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Conference, I continue to firmly believe that that unique body is irreplaceable as the single standing multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. The Conference on Disarmament has a critical part to play in ensuring that the rule of law is mainstreamed in disarmament.

As an example, an important area where the rule of law has been mainstreamed is chemical weapons, where the Conference has successfully negotiated a convention.

“Today, as the tragic case of chemical-weapons use in Syria shows, the rule of law in disarmament is an indispensable foundation for the collective efforts to save humankind from conflict and its deadly effects. I take this opportunity to congratulate the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which has won the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize, on its most valuable and highly respected work in promoting the ban on chemical weapons. The awarding of the Prize is also a reminder to all of us that the importance of disarmament is recognized and disarmament efforts are respected.

“A strengthening of the rule of law in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is urgently needed. Since the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, no legally binding instrument has been negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said last month during the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, it is time for new binding legal commitments to be adopted, and ‘that should begin with revitalizing the disarmament machinery, particularly the Conference on Disarmament’ (*A/68/PV.11, p. 3*).

“While consensus is achieved every year on the Conference on Disarmament agenda and the four core issues — a fissile material cut-off treaty, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and an effective international arrangement to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons — the membership has not yet established the political consensus necessary to launch substantive negotiations on those vital issues. Many members of the First Committee have called upon the Conference on Disarmament time and again to begin negotiations for the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty as a first step in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. I agree that that would be a logical first step.

“When I addressed this Committee last year (see *A/C.1/67/PV.7*), I spoke of my conviction that the dynamics in the Conference on Disarmament can change. This year, there are grounds for

cautious optimism that change can be nurtured. The 2013 session that has just ended has shown intensified efforts of the membership in the search for an end to the protracted deadlock. Four out of six presidencies have formulated draft programmes of work, which, though not adopted, have attested to a renewed vibrancy.

“While all Members of the Conference agree that a balanced and comprehensive programme of work with a negotiating mandate on all substantive agenda items is the goal to attain, some have suggested that a light or simplified programme of work with a discussion mandate be adopted pending political consensus on negotiating processes of the agenda items. Others have drawn attention to the need to review the methods of the work of the Conference. Some also believe that the membership of the Conference should be expanded and that the time has come to overhaul the entire disarmament machinery. Many have called for a fourth special session on disarmament.

“Against that backdrop, in my capacity as Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, I made a number of proposals for a structured and action-oriented process that could lead to more positive changes in the Conference. These include, first, the establishment of an informal working group with a mandate to produce a programme of work that would be robust in substance and progressive over time in its implementation; secondly, the establishment of a subsidiary body, in accordance with article 23 of the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament, to examine and make proposals for the improvement of the working methods of the Conference; and thirdly, the designation of a special coordinator to examine and make proposals on the expansion of the membership of the Conference and on the possible role that civil society might play in its work.

“I am pleased that in August, drawing from one of these proposals, the Conference decided to establish an informal working group to produce a programme of work, and I thank the membership for the trust placed in my suggestion. The informal working group has now begun its work, co-chaired by Ambassador Luis Gallegos of Ecuador and Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia. I believe

that the informal working group will make a valuable complement to the efforts of the President of the Conference. It can be a step in the right direction and help reinforce the President’s work. Importantly, it can help to lay the foundation for a new, shared understanding of how the Conference on Disarmament can resume substantive work.

“I have had the opportunity to emphasize that the programme of work should be made solid by building on the collective will of the membership of the Conference. It also needs to be made comprehensive by drawing from among several, if not all, items on the agenda. The informal working group is a new approach to the business of the Conference on Disarmament and should not become a diversion from substantive work and a reiteration of well-known positions.

“While we work towards the realignment of the political priorities that would allow for negotiations to start in the Conference, the informal working group can produce a programme of work that will create a basis for such negotiations to hit the ground running. It is therefore important that the Group be given the opportunity to continue its work next year. The ongoing intersessional period can be used productively in support of the Conference. In that context, I have encouraged the Co-Chair and the Vice Co-Chair to continue their work after the First Committee’s session, and convene open-ended informal consultations among members and observers of the Conference, with the close involvement of the outgoing and incoming Presidents. I believe that will help to maintain momentum as we approach 2014.

“The 2013 session ended on a note of optimism. The next session, which starts in January 2014, should build on that optimism and allow the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiating mandate. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has stressed, another year of stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament would simply be unacceptable.

“It has been an honour to work with the First Committee in support of our shared goal of disarmament. I am a fervent believer in the enduring value and importance of multilateral disarmament, not least in the area of weapons of mass destruction. It is only through compromise and consensus that we can craft sustainable solutions

and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. This is an opportunity and a responsibility for the international community. We need to take that responsibility seriously in the Conference on Disarmament as well.

“The First Committee can continue to rely on my firm commitment to multilateral disarmament, just as the world relies on our collective commitment to the cause of a more secure world.”

**The Chair** (*spoke in Arabic*): I now give the floor to the representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Jeffrey Shaw.

**Mr. Shaw** (International Atomic Energy Agency): On 8 December, it will be 60 years since President Eisenhower gave his historic “Atoms for peace” speech to the General Assembly (see A/PV.470). He called for the establishment of an international atomic energy agency to put nuclear material to use to “serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind”.

As Director General Amano noted in his statement to the fifty-seventh session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in September, Eisenhower’s vision became a reality when the IAEA was established in 1957. Since then, the Agency has worked to bring the benefits of peaceful nuclear science and technology to all parts of the globe in areas such as electricity generation, agriculture, health, water management and environmental protection. In so doing, the IAEA is making a unique contribution to achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

The IAEA has also worked hard to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In fact, the IAEA is best known for its work verifying that States are in full compliance fully with their non-proliferation obligations and that nuclear materials from civilian nuclear programmes are not diverted to nuclear weapons. To give some perspective, at the end of 2012 over 183,000 significant quantities of nuclear material in some 1,300 facilities around the globe were under IAEA safeguards, one significant quantity being the approximate amount of nuclear material required for a nuclear explosive device. IAEA safeguards are therefore a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

So what is the current state of play of the IAEA safeguards system?

Non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

are required to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, under which we conduct regular inspections of their nuclear material and activities. We also conduct safeguards under different agreements with nuclear-weapon States and non-NPT States. Safeguard agreements are currently in force with 181 States. However, 12 non-nuclear-weapon States have yet to meet their obligations under the NPT and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. For these States, the Agency cannot draw any safeguard conclusions. The Agency urges all those States to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible.

The additional protocol to safeguards agreements greatly enhances the IAEA’s verification capability by giving us expanded access to information and to relevant locations. It enables us to provide credible assurance not only about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Such credible assurances are highly effective tools of international and regional confidence-building. The number of countries with additional protocols in force has been rising steadily and now stands at 121. That is an encouraging development. The Agency encourages all States to bring additional protocols into force as soon as possible.

Safeguards implementation continues to evolve to address new challenges, to take into account experience gained from previous safeguards implementation, to take advantage of new techniques and new technologies, and to do so within the constraints of finite resources. The IAEA has been working to improve the operational effectiveness of its safeguards laboratories near Vienna. That will strengthen our ability to provide an independent and timely analysis of nuclear material and environmental samples.

The IAEA can also play a role in nuclear disarmament by verifying independently, upon request, that nuclear materials from dismantled weapons will not again be used again for military purposes. For example, the Agency stands ready to cooperate in increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament, as recommended by the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

The IAEA supports the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones and helps to implement them. In November 2011, Director General Amano convened

the IAEA Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East. In addition, as requested by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the Agency prepared background documentation for the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

Finally, let me turn to nuclear security. Responsibility for ensuring nuclear security lies with national Governments, but international cooperation is vital. Cooperation has improved in recent years, and the central role of the IAEA in helping countries to strengthen nuclear security has been widely recognized. Put simply, the IAEA helps to minimize the risk of nuclear and other radioactive material falling into the hands of terrorists or of nuclear facilities being subjected to malicious acts. A particular emphasis for the Agency has been on capacity-building, helping States build effective and sustainable national nuclear-security regimes. The Agency has established internationally accepted guidance that is used as a benchmark for nuclear security. The Agency helps countries to apply that guidance through expert peer review missions, specialist training and human resource development programmes.

The number of States participating in the Agency's Incident and Trafficking Database now stands at 125. But between July 2012 and June 2013, States reported 155 incidents to the Database, 14 involving illegal possession of nuclear material or radioactive sources or attempts to sell them. Clearly, while much has been done to improve nuclear security worldwide over the past decade, that is a reminder of the need for all countries to remain vigilant in ensuring that nuclear and other radioactive materials do not fall into the wrong hands.

In July, the Agency convened an International Conference on Nuclear Security to review past achievements and current approaches and to identify priorities for the future. It was the first such Conference at the ministerial level, open to all IAEA member States, and one of the largest conferences ever held by the Agency. Ministers adopted a declaration with a commitment to strengthening nuclear security throughout the world and affirming the IAEA's central role.

Let me conclude. The world has changed enormously in the past 60 years. But the atoms-for-peace mission envisioned in the "Atoms for peace" speech has not

lost its relevance. The Agency continues to help States benefit from peaceful nuclear science and technology. And by exercising credible verification, by promoting effective nuclear security and by helping member States to establish and implement nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Agency is making a tangible contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

**The Chair** (*spoke in Arabic*): I now give the floor to the Director of the Legal and External Relations Division of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

**Mr. Genxin Li** (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization): On behalf of Executive Secretary Mr. Lassina Zerbo, I would like to first congratulate you, Mr. Chair, on your election as Chair of the First Committee at its sixty-eighth session. Allow me to also express my gratitude to High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane for convening this important exchange.

I would like to congratulate the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on being awarded the prestigious Nobel Peace Prize. As stated by Executive Secretary Zerbo, the award is a well-deserved recognition of the capable leadership of the OPCW and the dedicated efforts of its staff to seek the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction.

The First Committee is tasked with the special responsibility of advancing disarmament and strengthening international security. The solutions to the myriad challenges that we face in furthering those objectives will not be easily identified or quickly attained. Yet the complexity of these challenges must not lead to complacency and inaction, lest our global institutions seeking international peace and prosperity wither on the vine.

The basic principles of cooperation and dialogue have always guided the United Nations in seeking solutions to the challenges facing the international security regime. It is through in-depth exchanges among Member States, international and regional organizations, and civil society at large that the Committee must forge agreement on concrete actions to effectively deal with many of those challenges. For that reason, we embrace the format of this high-level exchange and hope that it will be further developed to achieve our shared goals.

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), negotiated between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. Addressing the American public in July 1963 on the recently concluded PTBT, United States President John Kennedy recalled the ancient Chinese proverb that a journey of 1,000 miles must begin with a single step. He said:

“Let us, if we can, step back from the shadows of war and seek out the way of peace. And if that journey is a thousand miles, or even more, let history record that we ... took the first step.”

The conclusion of the PTBT represented the first occasion on which the Cold War adversaries were able to come together and successfully negotiate an agreement with the sole aim of prohibiting nuclear weapon-related activities. That first step, though limited in scope, was a step away from the scourge of war and towards peace and security.

Likewise, the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the General Assembly in 1996 represented a crucial step in the efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate the threats posed by nuclear weapons. Constituting an integral element of the nuclear-disarmament framework, the Treaty and its unprecedented global verification regime demonstrate that multilaterally verifiable arms control is not only possible and effective, but also necessary for advancing international peace and security.

With its non-discriminatory nature and equal obligations of all States, the CTBT is a strong instrument of fair and just multilateralism. Furthermore, the CTBT helps generate trust and build confidence, which are essential for increasing cooperation in the international environment and serve as necessary conditions for enhancing security and stability in the world.

We have achieved great success in building up the Treaty's verification regime over the past decade. With 337 monitoring facilities and 250 communications assets, the International Monitoring System has a truly global reach and is close to 90 per cent complete. We have proven that the Treaty is verifiable through an International Monitoring System that is unique, reliable and efficient. We have built a deterrent that gives States peace of mind, boasting 183 States signatories and 161 ratifications, including the recent ratifications of Iraq and Guinea-Bissau. The CTBT has been

instrumental in consolidating international consensus against nuclear testing.

However, there are still eight annex 2 States that must ratify the Treaty before it can enter into force. While we should acknowledge the great strides that have been made towards that goal, our work is not yet done. Challenges to the non-testing norm persist. In February, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea carried out its third announced nuclear test. Even with a comparatively small estimated yield, the event was detected by 94 International Monitoring System seismic stations and two infrasound stations. In addition, 55 days after that country announced its nuclear tests, xenon-133 and 133m were detected at a noble-gas station in Japan. The detections and their ratios, when combined with atmospheric transport modelling, were consistent with a late release of the gases from the test site in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

While highlighting the urgent need for the early entry into force of the Treaty, the international condemnation of this event underlined the normative strength of the Treaty and its contribution to the efforts to eliminate the threats posed by nuclear weapons. We have also witnessed a revitalization of the global will to legally codify the ban on nuclear testing in recent weeks.

During the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, foreign ministers and high-level representatives of States parties issued an urgent call action on the action on the Treaty's entry into force. The determination of the international community to achieve progress on the Treaty was also demonstrated at the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament (see A/68/PV.11) convened by the Secretary-General.

With the aim of complementing the ongoing efforts to advance the entry into force of the Treaty, a group of eminent persons was established by the Executive Secretary that includes former under-secretaries-general, former secretaries of defence, current and former foreign ministers and ambassadors, parliamentarians, and senior advisers on non-proliferation and international security. The group will leverage the wealth of international experience of its members to promote the Treaty in the remaining annex 2 States.

It is my hope that as we look to the future, the international community will be inspired to build upon

the political momentum created in favour of the CTBT. We have before us a window of opportunity to finally outlaw explosive nuclear testing once and for all.

Yet just as the window has opened, it may also easily swing shut. Those that support the Treaty and its objectives must remain resolute in their determination to achieve progress on the Treaty. States have invested heavily in the Treaty and its verification regime, and adequate steps must be taken to protect this investment so that it continues to pay dividends now and for future generations.

**The Chair** (*spoke in Arabic*): In keeping with the established practice of the Committee, I shall now suspend the formal meeting to give delegations the opportunity to have an interactive discussion with our panellists through an informal question-and-answer session.

*The meeting was suspended at 4.25 p.m. and resumed at 4.40 p.m.*

#### **Agenda items 89 to 107 (continued)**

#### **Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items**

**The Chair** (*spoke in Arabic*): Yesterday, the Committee concluded its general debate on all the disarmament and international security agenda items allocated to it. In the course of the debate, which involved seven meetings, we listened to over 102 statements, demonstrating the high level of importance that Member States continue to attach to some matters of international peace and security.

In accordance with our programme of work and timetable, the Committee will now continue with the second phase of its work, which will run from 17 to 29 October, for a total of 10 meetings. As I noted during our organizational meeting on 4 October, this phase will focus on thematic discussions on specific issues grouped under the following seven agreed clusters: nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, outer space (disarmament aspects), conventional weapons, regional disarmament and security, other disarmament measures and international security, and disarmament machinery.

I remind all delegations that the indicative timetable for this phase of our work, contained in

document A/C.1/68/CRP.2, has been circulated in the Conference Room and has also been uploaded to the First Committee web portal QuickFirst. I believe that all delegations are now familiar with the timetable.

The Secretariat has been informed that a number of delegations require additional time to finalize consultations prior to submitting draft resolutions. I would therefore like to suggest, as an exceptional measure and with the approval of the Committee, that we extend the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions to 7 p.m. this evening, with the understanding that doing so shall not serve as a precedent.

*It was so decided.*

**The Chair** (*spoke in Arabic*): I now open the floor for our structured discussion and the introduction of draft resolutions and decisions under cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons".

As is customary, we have a rolling list of speakers for all the clusters, and I would urge all delegations taking the floor to kindly keep their interventions brief. Let me also remind all delegations that a rolling list implies that they should be prepared to intervene at any time, possibly sooner or later than they had originally planned, to speak. Delegations which are not able to speak by the time we adjourn on any given day will have the opportunity to speak first the next day.

**Mr. Hasan** (Bahrain) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, on behalf of the States members of the Group of Arab States, I would like to reaffirm our confidence in your sound leadership of the First Committee, Sir, and to confirm our full support for your efforts in working towards positive results.

The Group of Arab States associates itself with the statement to be delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement on cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons".

The Arab Group reaffirms its positions on disarmament and international security. We affirm in particular the need to entrench peace, security and stability in the world. That cannot be achieved while nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction continue to exist. There is therefore a need to eliminate such deadly weapons once and for all so as to rid humankind of the dangers they pose and dedicate our great potential to development.

The Arab Group welcomes the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, held

on 26 September (see A/68/PV.11). The Group hopes that the Meeting and the support expressed therein for nuclear disarmament may serve as a launching pad for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In order to accomplish our common goal of nuclear disarmament, the Group reiterates its support for the proposal of the Non-Aligned Movement for the designation of 26 September of every year as the international day for nuclear disarmament.

We call for the negotiation of a comprehensive convention banning the production, use and possession of nuclear weapons and for a high-level conference to be held to review the progress achieved on nuclear disarmament. Arab States remain determined to make a positive contribution to international disarmament efforts. We have participated actively in the various multilateral nuclear-disarmament forums and fulfilled our obligations in that regard. All members of the League of Arab States that are also States Members of the United Nations have joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and placed all their nuclear installations under the International Atomic Energy Agency's comprehensive safeguards system.

The Arab Group considers the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be the cornerstone of the multilateral nuclear-disarmament system and the instrument for achieving international security. The Arab Group reaffirms the need to give equal weight to the three pillars of the Treaty, especially the inalienable right of States to research and develop their own nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as stated in article IV of the Treaty. We affirm that this right is in full accordance with the legal obligations of States pursuant to agreements signed with the IAEA. The Arab Group calls for the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the context of its principled commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as a priority of general disarmament efforts, as set forth by the General Assembly at the first special session devoted to disarmament, in 1978.

The Arab Group notes that the reference framework for the activities of the United Nations disarmament mechanisms is the prerogative of special sessions and can be amended only by a special session devoted to that purpose. The Arab Group supports the position of the Non-Aligned Movement calling for convening a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Member States of the League of Arab States support calls for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world, including in the Middle East. Member States agreed unanimously at the eighth NPT Review Conference of 2010 to hold a conference before the end of 2012 to create a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. They also called for the implementation of the 1995 resolution and the numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly over the years in favour of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, similar to those established in other regions around the world.

The Arab Group expresses its disappointment over the postponement, for flimsy and unrealistic reasons, of the 2012 conference to establish a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and affirm the need to convene the conference as soon as possible, with the participation of all the countries of the region. The Arab Group reaffirms its political will to ensure the success of the conference, and insists that conditions in the Middle East must not be used as an excuse to delay its convening. Member States ask the States that called for the conference and other countries of the region to demonstrate the political will to ensure its convening.

The Arab Group welcomes all efforts and initiatives to support and accelerate the creation of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, including the Egyptian initiative presented to the General Assembly at its current session, calling upon the countries of the Middle East and the five permanent members of the Security Council to deposit official letters with the Secretary-General declaring their support for such a zone.

We also call upon regional States that have not yet joined any conventions on weapons of mass destruction to declare their commitment to joining these instruments and conventions by the end of the year.

**Mr. Khazaei** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am honoured to speak on behalf of the 120 States members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

The movement warmly welcomes the successful convening of and participation of many world leaders in the first ever High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament (see A/68/PV.11), organized last month at the initiative of the Movement. The Non-Aligned Movement reiterates its deep concern

over the greatest threat to peace posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and the doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and NATO that set out rationales for the use or threat of use of such weapons.

NAM strongly calls for the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from such military doctrines. Moreover, threatening non-nuclear-weapon States with nuclear weapons should be ended. The Movement expresses its concern over the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States in effecting the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The world has waited too long for nuclear disarmament. The indefinite positions of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated, and their complete elimination cannot be further delayed.

The nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament. NAM once again renews its strong call on the nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with their long-overdue legal obligations, and make unequivocally efforts to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons without further delay in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner.

As the modernization of nuclear weapons undercuts efforts for their total abolition, the Movement also calls on the nuclear-weapon States to immediately cease their plans to further modernize, upgrade, refurbish or extend the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use. Until that goal is achieved, NAM reaffirms the need for the conclusion of universal, unconditional and legally binding instruments on security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States as a matter of high priority.

NAM strongly calls for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Nuclear Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons which prohibits their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, and use or threat of use, and provides for their destruction.

NAM believes that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation reinforce each other and are essential to strengthening international peace and security. The legitimacy of nuclear non-proliferation measures stems from nuclear disarmament. Pursuing non-proliferation alone while ignoring disarmament is both counterproductive and unsustainable. NAM

emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements.

NAM is of the firm belief that non-proliferation policies should not undermine the inalienable right of States to acquire, have access to, import and export material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. NAM States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) call for the full and non-discriminatory implementation of all the Treaty's provisions and the final documents of its Review Conferences. In that context, during the Treaty's 2015 review process, the NAM States parties are determined to continue to pursue their priorities, particularly nuclear disarmament.

NAM continues its strong support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Pending that establishment, NAM demands that Israel, the only country in the region that has not become a party to the NPT or declared its intention to do so, renounce any possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT without preconditions or further delay and promptly place all its nuclear facilities under the full scope of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Movement also calls for total and complete prohibition of the transfer to Israel of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources and devices, as well as of assisting it in nuclear-related scientific or technological fields.

NAM States parties to the NPT stress the importance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East — which reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence in the Middle East to the Treaty — express their deep concern about the delay in its implementation and urge the three sponsors of the resolution to fulfil their responsibility to take all measures necessary to fully implement it without any further delay.

In that context, NAM States parties to the NPT would like to express their profound disappointment that the conference on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction scheduled to be held in 2012 has not been convened, despite the consensus decision of the 2010 Review Conference. It is also contrary to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. They strongly reject the impediments alleged by the conveners as a reason for not convening the conference as scheduled, and urge them to convene it without further delay in order to

avoid any further possible negative repercussions on the effectiveness and credibility of the NPT, its 2015 review process and the nuclear-disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.

NAM also calls on all nuclear-weapon States to ratify without any reservations or interpretive declarations incompatible with their objective and purpose the protocols related to all treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to respect the denuclearization status of those zones. NAM also stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence — including by all nuclear-weapon States, which, among other things, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament — to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Movement reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty are to be fully realized, continued commitment to nuclear disarmament on the part of all the States signatories, especially nuclear-weapon States, is essential. In that context, the CTBT's ratification by Chad, Guinea-Bissau and Iraq is welcome.

The high-level participation in the recent High-level Meeting of the General Assembly, and the strong support expressed at it for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, once again underscored that nuclear disarmament remains an issue of the highest priority, as recognized at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, and is critical to international peace and security. In order to sustain the positive momentum produced by the High-level Meeting in taking forward the nuclear-disarmament agenda, the Movement is presenting a draft resolution entitled "Follow-up to the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament" (A/C.1.68/L.6), for which it calls for support from every delegation.

In the draft resolution the Movement proposes the following key actions to be taken to further the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons: first, the early commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons for the prohibition of their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; secondly, the designation of 26 September as an international day for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, devoted to furthering the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to raising awareness and educating about the threat posed by such weapons to humankind; and

thirdly, the convening of a high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament in five years, to review progress in that area.

What makes the core elements of the draft resolution unique is their comprehensiveness and inclusiveness. Its proposal for the early commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive nuclear-weapons convention would enable the sole multilateral disarmament negotiations body to resume its substantive role in nuclear disarmament. We hope that all Member States, particularly those that have expressed concerns about the logjam in the disarmament machinery, will be able to support the draft resolution.

With greater political will, and by fulfilling our respective commitments on nuclear disarmament, let us resolutely redouble our efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons as soon as possible.

**Mr. Khalil** (Egypt): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) — Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and my own country, Egypt. The Coalition will once again introduce draft resolution A/C.1/68/L.18, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments". The text of the draft resolution has been circulated to all delegations, and I take this opportunity to speak about its key elements.

The issue of nuclear disarmament has been high on the international agenda since the adoption of its very first resolution by the General Assembly in 1946 (1 (I)). Fifteen years after the NAC Foreign Ministers issued their 18-point declaration entitled "A nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda", and despite the countless efforts and initiatives that have been guided by the objective of achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons, much remains to be done to reach that goal.

As we noted in our statement in the general debate (see A/C.1/68/PV.5), NAC firmly believes that the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. We are committed to a nuclear-weapon-free world and are actively contributing to the achievement of that goal. We continue to work for the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the full implementation of its obligations, in particular nuclear disarmament, including subsequent commitments agreed to at its Review Conferences of

1995, 2000 and 2010. The draft resolution introduced by NAC therefore addresses a number of nuclear-disarmament issues on which progress is essential for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The draft resolution reiterates our deep concern over the potential catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, which should inform all deliberations, decisions and actions related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In this context, it recalls the discussions at the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, hosted by Norway on 4 and 5 March, which was aimed at developing greater awareness and understanding of the catastrophic consequences of their use. It welcomes the announcement by Mexico of its intention to convene a meeting on 13 and 14 February 2014 on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

The draft resolution calls upon nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their commitment under article VI of the NPT, the final document of the 2000 Review Conference and action 5 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference to taking concrete, transparent, verifiable and irreversible steps to further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons — deployed and non-deployed — including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. The draft resolution underlines the importance of the 2010 commitment of nuclear-weapon States to taking all necessary steps to accelerate the fulfilment of their obligations with a view to reporting, in 2014, substantive progress to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference. It underscores the importance of transparency and the agreement by the nuclear-weapon States on a standard reporting format.

It also underlines the recognition by the 2010 Review Conference of the legitimate interests of non-nuclear-weapon States, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in receiving unequivocal and legally binding negative security assurances. The need for nuclear-weapon States to end the development and qualitative improvement of existing and new nuclear weapons is also emphasized.

The draft resolution reiterates our call on nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with the action plan on nuclear disarmament set out in the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, to ensure the irreversible removal of all fissile material designated

by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes. It also calls upon all States to support, within the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the development of appropriate nuclear-disarmament verification capabilities and legally binding verification arrangements, thereby ensuring that such material remains permanently outside military programmes in a verifiable manner.

In underlining the importance of multilateralism, the draft resolution urges all States to work together to overcome obstacles within the international disarmament machinery that are inhibiting efforts to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament.

The draft resolution reaffirms the conviction that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the establishment and maintenance of nuclear-weapon-free zones enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. It calls for further concrete progress towards strengthening all existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, including through the withdrawal of any reservations or interpretative statements and declarations contrary to the object and purpose of the treaties establishing those zones. It welcomes the announcement by Indonesia of its intention to host the third Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in 2015.

The draft resolution emphasizes the need to fully implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, expresses its profound disappointment at the failure to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and calls upon the Secretary-General and the sponsors of the 1995 resolution to convene the conference without any further delay.

The draft resolution also highlights the vital importance of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The draft resolution welcomes the positive developments that have taken place in 2013, including the convening by the Assembly of the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament on 26 September 2013 (see A/68/PV.11), and the convening of an Open-ended working group on taking forward multilateral

nuclear disarmament negotiations. It emphasizes the importance of a constructive and successful preparatory process leading to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, which should contribute to strengthening the Treaty and making progress towards achieving its full implementation and universalization, and monitor the implementation of commitments made and actions agreed at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

It also calls upon all NPT States parties to spare no effort to achieve the universalization of the Treaty. In this regard, it urges India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without condition, and to place all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. It further urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the NPT at an early date.

The draft resolution urges all States to pursue multilateral negotiations in good faith towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, in keeping with the spirit and purpose of resolution 1 (I), of 24 January 1946, and article VI of the NPT.

NAC encourages all Member States to support the draft resolution. We are confident that, as we move towards 2015, all delegations will want to join us in signalling a strong wish to see the full implementation of the disarmament elements of the NPT action plan and to make progress towards the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons.

**The Acting Chair:** I now give the floor to the observer of the European Union.

**Mr. Kos** (European Union): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The following countries align themselves with this statement: the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with its article VI, and an important element in the further development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In view of current proliferation risks, we are convinced that the NPT is more important today than ever. We must strengthen its authority and integrity. We emphasize the importance of universalizing the NPT and call on States that have not yet done so to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and,

pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms and pledge commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament.

The EU reiterates the priority of upholding the NPT. Our objective for the whole NPT review cycle is to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and achieve tangible and realistic progress towards the goals enshrined in the NPT. With a view to attaining this goal, the EU will continue to promote a comprehensive, balanced and substantive implementation of the forward-looking action plan of the outcome document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which is our common road map to the 2015 Review Conference.

Earlier this year, we witnessed the successful convening of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference in Geneva. We express our gratitude to the Chair of the meeting, Ambassador Cornel Feruta of Romania, for his able leadership leading to a successful outcome. We are aware of the challenges ahead, and we stand ready to work with the Chair of the Preparatory Committee at its next session, Ambassador Roman-Moray of Peru.

The EU strongly supports the outcome on the Middle East of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and has made concrete efforts aimed at its implementation. In addition to sponsoring two seminars on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in 2011 and in 2012, we stand ready to further support the process. We regret the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which was scheduled to take place in 2012. The EU continues to fully support the ongoing preparations for a successful conference, and in particular the tireless efforts of its facilitator, Ambassador Laajava of Finland, and his team. We call on all States of the region to urgently and proactively engage with the facilitator and the conveners with the aim of enabling the conference to be convened as soon as possible this year, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region.

We fully support the comprehensive system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime that is indispensable to the implementation of the NPT. Measures contained in the additional protocol form an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system, and comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols,

constitute the current IAEA verification standard. The EU also encourages the evolution of safeguards to a State-level concept applicable to all States. That approach will enable the IAEA to focus its efforts where the risks of proliferation are greatest. We call on all States that have not yet done so to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol with the Agency and put them into force as soon as possible.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is of crucial importance to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and remains a top priority for the European Union. Recent events in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea demonstrate clearly the urgent need for the Treaty's earliest possible entry into force. We reaffirm our strong support for its rapid entry into force, and we will continue to promote it through our diplomatic and financial engagement. Pending its entry into force, we expect all States, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to abide by a moratorium on nuclear test explosions and to refrain from any action contrary to the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty. The European Union once again calls on all States that have not done so, in particular the remaining annex 2 States, to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

The international community continues to be faced with major proliferation challenges by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran and Syria. Those must be addressed in a resolute way. In this context, the EU underlines the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, including in cases of non-compliance.

The EU strongly condemns the third nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 February, which was an outright violation of its international obligations under Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013). The EU deplores the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to choose the ill-advised path of provocation and isolation, in defiance of the international community's united condemnation of its use of ballistic-missile technology on 5 April and 12 December 2012, in direct violation of Security Council resolutions. We remain seriously concerned about the uranium-enrichment programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the ongoing construction of a light-water reactor at the Yongbyon site.

The EU stresses that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is bound by its international obligations, as set out in several Security Council resolutions, and by its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. We urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with them fully, unconditionally and without delay. The EU demands that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes, including its uranium-enrichment programme, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and refrain from any further provocative actions and statements. These activities represent not only a regional but also an international threat to peace and security.

The EU remains deeply concerned about Iran's nuclear programme. The recent report of the IAEA Director General illustrates once again that Iran persists in violating IAEA Board of Governors and Security Council resolutions by, inter alia, continuing to expand significantly its enrichment capacity, continuing to accumulate enriched uranium, and continuing its heavy-water-related activities. At the most recent meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, the EU expressed its deep concern that, due to the continued failure of Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving all outstanding issues, in particular those related to possible military dimensions, the Agency was unable to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities and therefore was not able to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities.

It noted that November 2013 will mark two years since the Director General's annex on possible military dimensions and resolution GOF/2011/69, and will be an important juncture at which to assess progress on substance on this issue and what further action could be needed from the Board should no progress have been made by that point. In this context, we take note of the remarks by the Iranian President related to greater cooperation and hope to see that translated into concrete actions. Our objective remains to achieve a comprehensive, negotiated and long-term settlement that would build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme while respecting Iran's legitimate right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in conformity with the NPT and in compliance with Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions.

The EU fully supports the ongoing efforts of the E3+3 Governments, led by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, to seek a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Following substantive E3+3 discussions with Iran on 15 and 16 October in Geneva, the EU hopes that Iran will seize this diplomatic chance to make progress in nuclear talks aimed at building confidence.

We deeply regret that, despite the resolution of the Board of Governors of the IAEA and the Syrian pledge of May 2011 to the Director General to respond positively and without delay to the Agency's request to resolve all outstanding questions, and in addition to renewed calls by the Director General, Syria has yet to provide the necessary cooperation. The EU calls upon Syria to fully comply with the resolution. We are deeply concerned that the Agency has had to postpone the 2013 physical inventory verification, and we urge Syria to enable the Agency to carry out the verification as soon as possible. The Syrian authorities remain responsible, as required by the Board's resolution, for urgently remedying their non-compliance with their Safeguards Agreement, for cooperating urgently and transparently with the Agency to clarify matters with regard to Dayr Al-Zour and other sites, and to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible.

The EU is very much concerned by the risks caused by the proliferation of missiles that could be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles of increasingly great range and sophisticated technologies. A number of tests of medium- and intermediate-range missiles conducted in recent years outside existing transparency and prenotification schemes and in violation of Security Council resolutions, especially by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran, only deepen our concern.

We attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, in line with the guidelines set out by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1999. The European Union has offered support with regard to the implementation of the Treaty of Pelindaba and the establishment and work of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy. We welcome ongoing in-depth consultations, in accordance with the Disarmament Commission guidelines, on protocols for nuclear-weapon-free zones in South-East and Central

Asia between the nuclear-weapon States and the States of those regions in order to make it possible for nuclear-weapon States to sign them as soon as possible. The EU supports the parallel declarations signed by the nuclear-weapon States with Mongolia in September 2012 on the country's nuclear-weapon-free status.

We remain committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the NPT, and supported the significant steps taken by two European Union member States. We underline the need for concrete progress in nuclear disarmament and arms-control processes, especially through an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, in accordance with article VI of the NPT. We welcome the considerable reductions made thus far, taking into account the special responsibility of the States that possess the largest arsenals.

The EU welcomes the increased transparency shown by some nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two EU member States, on the nuclear weapons they possess and encourages the continued efforts of all nuclear-weapon States in this respect. In the light of the signs of progress, the EU encourages the United States and Russia to implement the New START treaty and to seek further reductions in their nuclear arsenals, including in strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed weapons. We also encourage them to include the topic of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the next round of their bilateral nuclear-arms reductions, while agreeing on the importance of further transparency and confidence-building measures in order to advance the nuclear-disarmament process.

The EU encourages the five nuclear-weapon States to continue their meetings — such as those held in London in 2009, Paris in 2011, Washington, D.C., in 2012, and Geneva in April 2013 — on the implementation of the commitments they made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference on all three pillars of the Treaty, including confidence-building, transparency, verification and discussions on reporting.

The Conference on Disarmament, in accordance with its mandate, has a crucial role to play in negotiating multilateral treaties. Its ongoing stalemate remains deeply troubling. Adopting and implementing a programme of work is more urgent than ever. We express our hope that the efforts of the informal working group established in accordance with document CD/1956/Rev.1 will lead to concrete and tangible results in that regard.

For the European Union, the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein, remain a clear priority. Such a treaty constitutes an urgent necessity in the nuclear disarmament field as a complement to the NPT and the CTBT. All EU member States supported resolution 67/53, entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. We look forward to the meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts established by that resolution, which are to take place in 2014 and 2015.

Last year, two other initiatives were launched in the General Assembly concerning nuclear-disarmament negotiations, including its decision to convene the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament (see A/68/PV.11), which took place in New York last month, and the adoption of resolution 67/56, entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”, which established the open-ended working group. Reiterating again the priority the EU attaches to the NPT process, we stress that all such initiatives and efforts should contribute to the full implementation of the action plan unanimously agreed in 2010 and to a successful Review Conference in 2015.

Strengthening nuclear security is also a long-standing EU priority and remains an important element in facilitating international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Nuclear Security Summits laid important groundwork aimed at strengthening nuclear security, reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism and securing all vulnerable nuclear material in the coming years. Strengthening nuclear security requires continuing efforts, political will and global coordination, and the EU remains committed to those goals. In this context, we fully recognize the leading role the IAEA has played in strengthening the nuclear security framework and highly value the work it has done thus far. We welcome the ministerial declaration adopted in Vienna at the International Conference on Nuclear Security, and we look forward to the follow-up conference in 2016.

**Mrs. García Guiza** (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): My country aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition.

This debate is taking place amid great frustration that, for over 60 years now, the United Nations has not been able to respond to the desire expressed in the first General Assembly resolution (resolution 1 (I)) to achieve nuclear disarmament. While nuclear arsenals have clearly been reduced since the Cold War years, the continued existence of 17,000 nuclear weapons is unjustifiable, given the threat posed by such destructive weapons and the fact that their use would be contrary to international law and constitute a war crime. The speeches delivered by the broad majority of representatives at the High-level Meeting On Nuclear Disarmament, held on 26 September (see A/68/PV.11), reflected the sense of urgency with which Governments are calling for nuclear disarmament in order to achieve a safer world.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and the only treaty in force that addresses the issue of nuclear weapons. We believe that we must continue to strengthen the implementation of its three pillars. While the Treaty has achieved its goals in terms of horizontal non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the negotiations process that led to the Treaty and ensured its indefinite extension in 1995 is being undermined by the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, as enshrined in the yearly resolution sponsored by the New Agenda Coalition.

Nuclear-weapon States should fulfil the commitments and obligations that all NPT Parties have undertaken to implement article VI of the Treaty, conduct multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and move decisively towards the destruction of nuclear arsenals in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. In the light of the contemporary international situation, no country can deny the importance of the negotiations being carried out in the multilateral framework.

The report of the open-ended working group (A/68/514), which met in Geneva this year in accordance with resolution 67/56, lays out the different ways for those negotiations to take place. We encourage the First Committee to consider the report and the working papers submitted for the discussion. We thank the States and international and civil society organizations that participated in the efforts of the working group and enabled it to conduct its work in an open, constructive, inclusive and transparent manner.

The NPT must be universally implemented and applied. In that regard, we reiterate the call on India, Pakistan and Israel to expeditiously and unconditionally accede to the Treaty. We call on those countries whose ratification is indispensable to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to adhere to the Treaty without delay and to complete that necessary step towards nuclear disarmament. That sentiment lies at the heart of the annual resolution submitted by Mexico, Australia and New Zealand on that subject. We hope that the General Assembly will adopt it at this session.

The nuclear test carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in February demonstrated the general repudiation of such actions, which defy the disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

As we seek to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is an intermediate step that demonstrates the strength of the sovereignty of countries that have decided not to base their security on the use of nuclear weapons. Creating new nuclear-weapon-free zones in any region of the world should enjoy the agreement and free will of the parties involved.

Mexico reiterates that the conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East should be convened without delay. Progress towards the establishment of such a zone is essential to strengthening the credibility of the commitments made under the NPT and to foster a climate of cooperation and trust that the region urgently needs.

Mexico, as depositary of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean — the Treaty of Tlatelolco — will introduce this year's triennial draft resolution on strengthening the regime established under that instrument, which we hope will be adopted with the full support of the membership. Over the past three years, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) has achieved a very constructive dynamic with clear goals, a close relationship with other nuclear-weapon-free zones, and a renewed and expanded presence and participation in international forums that address the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco has entered a new phase. It has been nominated for the Gold Future Policy Award by

the World Future Council as a disarmament policy that contributes to achieving peace, sustainable development and human security. In that regard, I wish to pay tribute to the commitment that Ambassador Gioconda Ubeda, Secretary-General of OPANAL, demonstrated during her work at the head of that Agency.

Nuclear weapons should not be used again by any actor or in any circumstance. That is a concept on which all of countries of Latin America and the Caribbean agree and have advocated as the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area. It is also the spirit of the other treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, which cover the majority of the world's States.

If another nuclear weapon were to be detonated, intentionally or accidentally, in addition to the immediate effects and the inevitable loss of innocent human life, the overall impact would be immense and long-lasting. In addition to the human suffering of the survivors, a nuclear explosion would impede the action of the international organizations responsible for providing humanitarian assistance. The impact of radiation on the health of human beings, plants and animals and on the environment, and its impact on climate change and food security would compound the physical devastation of infrastructure. The damage caused to populations, their natural resources, their work and culture makes a nuclear detonation a threat to human security, the development of peoples, and civilization in general.

In March, 127 countries met in Oslo to discuss those matters with international and civil society organizations. That discussion must continue in order to substantiate with technical and scientific data our concern over the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of those weapons of mass destruction. To that end, Mexico will host the second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Nayarit, on 13 and 14 February 2014. We reiterate our invitation to all Members of the United Nations, international organizations and civil society to actively participate in the Nayarit Conference.

The discussion should be the basis for fulfilling all the commitments, obligations and aspirations we have already undertaken on nuclear disarmament. The concern over the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons led to the prohibition of nuclear tests, and must continue to drive efforts to prevent the proliferation of those weapons; it must serve to

revitalize the disarmament machinery and restart multilateral negotiations to advance the development of international law on disarmament.

It is regrettable that the modest progress being made in the Assembly and in other forums is being hampered by challenges and setbacks in the quest for general and complete disarmament, including the arguments posited by some to justify the indefinite possession of weapons of mass destruction and to argue for its value as a deterrent in an international context of deep inequalities and in view of the most heartbreaking human tragedies, given the contrast with the military spending invested in maintaining and modernizing armaments. That terrible reality was eloquently underscored by the Secretary-General by drawing attention to fact that the world over-armed and peace underfunded.

That is why it is a priority and an economic, political, ethical and above all rational imperative to achieve nuclear disarmament. It is time to move from aspirations to actions to conclude that outstanding undertaking of the United Nation without further delay.

**Mr. Rowland** (United Kingdom): I congratulate the Chair and other members of the Bureau on their election and assure them of my delegation's cooperation and support.

The United Kingdom aligns itself with the statement made by observer of the European Union, to which I would like to add the following remarks on a national basis.

The United Kingdom maintains a resolute commitment to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We have seen tangible progress towards that goal. As well as reflecting on the challenges ahead, it is important too that we acknowledge those successes and recognize just how far we have come since the darkest days of the Cold War.

All of us here today need to focus on our shared commitment. We are each prepared to do our part, across each of the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The United Kingdom is determined to support all initiatives that will build an international environment in which no State feels the need to possess nuclear weapons, and where States with nuclear weapons can disarm in a balanced and verifiable manner. It falls to all States to help build that environment by living up to all their

disarmament and non-proliferation commitments made as parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The agreement of the first-ever Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty action plan in 2010, with its elaboration of measures for all of us to take to ensure the implementation of the NPT, was a major achievement. Ensuring that we all focus now on the implementation of that action plan is essential to supporting the full realization of the objectives of the NPT, including a world without nuclear weapons. The universalization of the NPT and related treaties, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, are also fundamental to future disarmament success.

The United Kingdom recognizes that, along with the other nuclear-weapon States, we have particular responsibilities. We have a strong record on nuclear disarmament. British nuclear weapons have, for almost 20 years now, been detargeted and placed on several days' notice to fire. We announced at our 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review that we would reduce the number of operational missiles and warheads on each of our submarines, as well as the number of operationally available warheads and our overall nuclear stockpile. In addition, the United Kingdom has been clear that we would consider using nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO allies.

The United Kingdom signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on the day it opened for signature, was among the first States to ratify it, and has had a voluntary moratorium on testing since 1991, pending the entry into force of the Treaty. We have had a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices since 1995, pending the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. We have demonstrated a high level of transparency, both about the capabilities that we possess and the limited role that they play within United Kingdom defence doctrine. For our part, then, we have done much to make progress towards a world without nuclear weapons.

Unilateral action will get us only so far towards that goal. Having led by example, we want to build the trust and mutual confidence needed among all States to achieve multilateral nuclear disarmament. It is for that reason that the United Kingdom instigated a dialogue among the five permanent members of the Security

Council (P-5) in London in 2009 — to build the mutual understanding needed to help us take forward towards our shared goal of disarmament. Since 2009, the P-5 have held further conferences — in Paris, Washington, D.C., and most recently under the Russian Chair in Geneva. China will host the fifth P-5 conference in Beijing in 2014.

We recognize the need for trust between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, and not just among nuclear-weapon States themselves. It is important that the P-5 be more open with non-nuclear-weapon States about the outcome of those discussions. Our work with Norway on the verification of warhead dismantlement exemplifies the United Kingdom's approach to greater transparency, and is to date a unique move by a P-5 State to carry out such work with a non-nuclear-weapon State.

All NPT States parties need to ensure that the focus is maintained on all aspects of the NPT. Those who call for new disarmament initiatives must show equal or greater energy in preventing Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. They must show greater commitment to increasing the understanding of the danger that nuclear conflict poses in South Asia, and they must seize every opportunity to make progress towards a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

We firmly believe that all new initiatives should contribute to the success of the 2015 NPT Review Conference and the full implementation of the 2010 NPT action plan agreed by the consensus of all 189 NPT States parties. Noting that action 15 of the plan is to begin immediately the negotiation within the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, we welcome the Group of Governmental Experts to be convened by Canada. We hope that the Group's recommendations will help move forward the discussion in the Conference on Disarmament. We urge the constructive participation of all States receiving an invitation.

The United Kingdom is a strong supporter of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which enhance regional and international security. We have had positive discussions with the five central Asian States and our P-5 partners, and are making progress towards signature of the P-5 protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. We hope for

similarly positive discussions with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on outstanding issues concerning the protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and that the P-5 States can sign the protocol as soon as possible.

We are fully committed to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. We take our role as co-convenor seriously and have been working hard with the facilitator to build the necessary consensus between States of the region so that the conference can be held and the process can move forward. We welcome the facilitator's efforts to hold multilateral consultations to agree to the modalities for the conference and hope for strong regional participation at the meeting to be convened by the facilitator in Switzerland later this month.

On peaceful uses, we remain fully committed to the promotion of safe nuclear energy by those who wish to use it, in line with their rights under article IV of the Treaty. The United Kingdom is committed to supporting the expansion of civil nuclear use, while ensuring that neither safety, security nor non-proliferation is compromised, as enshrined in the NPT.

In conclusion, The United Kingdom has unilaterally disarmed, further than any other nuclear-weapon State, to a minimal credible deterrent.

On non-proliferation, all NPT States parties need to renew their shared determination to prevent nuclear proliferation and to ensure that Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot acquire and develop nuclear-weapons technology. We must all actively support nuclear-weapon-free zones, and I reiterate the United Kingdom's commitment to making progress towards establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

We share the frustration about the lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament and remain open to suggestions about how the deadlock can be broken. We also call on all NPT States parties here today to ensure that we work together to realize the whole vision of the NPT. Only through balanced, reciprocal progress across all three pillars of the NPT will we achieve a world truly free of nuclear weapons.

**Mr. Sano** (Japan): The issue of nuclear weapons remains of great importance to the people of Japan. Every August, we reaffirm our strong conviction at the peace memorial ceremonies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki

that the tragedy caused by the use of nuclear weapons must never be repeated. Japan's aim is to continue stressing to the international community the necessity and importance of achieving our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We will continuously pursue practical and progressive efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

In that conviction, Japan will once again submit to the First Committee a draft resolution on nuclear disarmament entitled "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons". The draft resolution, as in previous years, will place emphasis on concrete and practical actions to be taken by the international community towards the total elimination of such weapons. We strongly hope that more States than in previous years will extend their support at this time.

Japan is an active member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), which has worked to reduce nuclear risk, maintain political momentum and devise practical and action-oriented proposals to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Last month, the NPDI convened its seventh meeting with our two newest members, Nigeria and the Philippines, held in New York, where we reviewed our progress and bolstered our future endeavours.

In his speech on nuclear disarmament in Hiroshima in July, our Foreign Minister Kishida advocated three reductions: a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons, and a reduction in incentives for the development and possession of nuclear weapons.

On our journey towards a world free of nuclear weapons, reducing the number of existing nuclear armaments is the first and foremost priority. The action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to honour their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to make further efforts to reduce those weapons. Japan values the steady implementation of the New START treaty and welcomes the proposal made by United States President Barack Obama on 19 June in Berlin to negotiate further reductions of nuclear weapons.

The progressive disarmament efforts of the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals will increase momentum to begin global nuclear-disarmament efforts. Japan urges all nuclear-weapon States to make

disarmament efforts in good faith on a multilateral basis, as required by article VI of the NPT. In this regard, Japan is encouraged by ongoing discussions among the five nuclear-weapon States on their nuclear-disarmament commitments. We look forward to positive and concrete results from their efforts.

Japan places great emphasis on the importance of not only reducing the number of nuclear weapons, but also pursuing qualitative disarmament measures. As stated in the 2010 action plan, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to promptly engage in further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear arsenals. It is a common understanding that the catastrophic humanitarian consequences caused by nuclear weapons must never be seen again. In order to promote nuclear disarmament, the role of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies should be reduced.

In implementing such nuclear-disarmament measures, applying the principles of transparency is essential. Transparency is central to mutual trust and a foundation for a stable global security environment. Two years ago, the NPDI drafted a reporting form, guided by action 21 of the NPT action plan, which we shared with the nuclear-weapon States and submitted, annexed to our working paper on transparency, to the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting. Japan holds the high expectation that the NPDI's input will contribute to an agreement among the nuclear-weapon States to establish a high standard reporting form that will include appropriate reporting intervals.

Pending the completion by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations, the non-State parties to the NPT should not remain inactive. Japan urges those States to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States in a prompt manner and without condition.

It is extremely regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has not made progress on nuclear-disarmament negotiations since 1996, following the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Last year, the General Assembly adopted, at its sixty-seventh session, multiple resolutions on the holding of discussions related to disarmament issues under its own auspices. Based on those resolutions, the open-ended working group on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament

negotiations met successfully in Geneva, and the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament was consequently held in New York (see A/68/PV.11). Additionally, the Group of Governmental Experts on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) will commence its work next year in Geneva. These collective movements demonstrate the international community's intolerance for the protracted impasse in this forum. We stress to all the members of the Conference on Disarmament the need to overcome the present state of affairs as soon as possible.

Japan is convinced that an FMCT is an indispensable stepping stone towards a world without nuclear weapons. It is therefore deeply disappointing that the Conference on Disarmament has for many years failed to start FMCT negotiations, despite the broad support of the international community. We firmly believe that the Group of Governmental Experts will provide new momentum and help the Conference to begin its substantive work. In the meantime, Japan urges all nuclear-weapon States and States possessing nuclear weapons to declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes.

The CTBT is also one of the most important building blocks for nuclear disarmament, and it needs to be brought into force without delay. We are concerned that, 17 years after it was opened for signature, the CTBT has not yet entered into force. Japan has seized every occasion to urge all non-States parties, in particular the remaining eight annex 2 States, to promptly sign and ratify the CTBT, and we intend to pursue such actions. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, it is important for all nuclear-weapon States and States holding nuclear weapons to respect the moratorium on nuclear test explosions.

In accordance with the 1999 Disarmament Commission guidelines, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones plays a significant role in global and regional peace and security. In this regard, Japan calls for the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction as soon as possible. We support the facilitator in his efforts to do so, and call upon all parties in the Middle East to participate in a spirit of genuine and constructive cooperation. Furthermore, Japan hopes that the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone will come into force at an early date.

Maintaining and promoting nuclear non-proliferation is a necessary condition to further advance nuclear disarmament. One of the most effective ways to strengthen the non-proliferation regime is through enhanced and more effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Japan urges all States that have not yet concluded and brought into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and signed the additional protocol to do so as soon as possible.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ongoing nuclear activities, as well as its missile-development programmes, are of grave concern, not only to North-East Asia but to the international community as a whole. Japan condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 February in that context. That nuclear test was a clear violation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions as well as of a series of commitments under the Six-Party Talks. Furthermore, if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea readjusts and restarts its Yongbyon nuclear facilities, as it announced in April that it would, that will be another violation of its obligations and commitments. Japan once again stresses that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, including its uranium enrichment, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately suspend all related activities. Japan strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take concrete actions towards denuclearization and to refrain from any further provocative acts.

In addition, it is also extremely important for Iran to restore international confidence regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear programmes. Japan, while taking note of the recent positive atmosphere concerning the Iranian nuclear question, urges Iran to take concrete action in accordance with the resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council.

Before I conclude my intervention, let me recall that, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan understands by its own experience the inhumane consequences of nuclear-weapon use, and it is therefore our country's mission to pass down the story of the tremendous sufferings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki as historical fact, across borders and generations. For this purpose, Japan has made various efforts to raise awareness of this issue. We believe that the importance of humanitarian aspects of nuclear-weapon use

should be recognized, irrespective of various other approaches to nuclear disarmament. The discussion on humanitarian aspects should therefore be open to such various approaches. Furthermore, as Foreign Minister Kishida stated in his speech in Hiroshima, international nuclear disarmament efforts must be built upon a clear understanding of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, in addition to the recognition of the reality of the increasingly diversifying nuclear risks.

Regarding the joint statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons to be delivered during the First Committee, in view of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, Japan strongly supports the spirit of the statement and endorses it. At the same time, against the backdrop of the increasingly severe security environment our country is facing, we reaffirm the need to continue to employ an appropriate national security policy.

Japan is fully committed to achieving a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons. We intend to continue our efforts to outline realistic and concrete steps for global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and to steadily implement them as a common goal shared by humankind.

**Mrs. Ledesma Hernández** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Although I may be the last speaker for this meeting, I hope that I will be able to finish my statement in the allotted time.

On 26 September, we had a historic opportunity to participate in the first-ever High-level Meeting of the General Assembly On Nuclear Disarmament (see A/68/PV.11), pursuant to a Cuban initiative that was welcomed and supported by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Broad global support for nuclear disarmament and for the total elimination of those weapons was reaffirmed at the High-level Meeting. The Meeting provided an excellent opportunity for exchanging ideas and making progress in the field of nuclear disarmament in order to convey a political message of commitment on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations to a world free of nuclear weapons, and to promote the efforts of the international community to achieve the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear stockpiles.

Numerous proposals were presented at the Meeting, among which we would single out that submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement and the Community of

Latin American and Caribbean States. As a follow-up to the High-level Meeting, NAM will submit a new draft resolution to the First Committee with a view to promoting progress in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. We shall propose, inter alia, declaring 26 September the international day for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The new draft resolution to be submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement will present a new focus with respect to the proposal to urgently begin negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. As a result of the new initiative, it is planned that three items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament — nuclear disarmament, fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States — will be combined. All of this would be enshrined in a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons that would include the prohibition of the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of such weapons and that would also stipulate their elimination.

It is a good-faith initiative that also seeks to put an end to the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that all Member States, and in particular those that have expressed their concern about the ongoing stalemate in the disarmament machinery, will lend their support to the draft resolution. In the same vein, we support the proposal made for the declaration on nuclear disarmament that was agreed upon on 20 August by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in order to work towards the convening of a high-level international conference to identify ways and means to eliminate nuclear weapons in the shortest possible period of time, with the aim of agreeing upon a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific period of time.

More than 67 years ago, the General Assembly issued a call for the elimination of nuclear weapons (resolution 1 (I)), and even though agreement has been reached among Member States on the fact that nuclear disarmament is the highest priority in the sphere of disarmament, there are still some 17,200 nuclear weapons in existence that pose a latent threat to international peace and security. It is unacceptable that certain nuclear-weapon States do not refrain from including their possible use as part of their security doctrine based on so-called nuclear deterrence.

Even worse, they allocate millions of dollars to the development of modernization programmes for their nuclear stockpiles.

Cuba is of the view that the only guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used by States or by anybody else is their absolute elimination and prohibition under strict international controls. We are opposed to the selective focus being promoted by a number of States that give priority to measures addressing non-horizontal proliferation to the detriment of measures to contain vertical proliferation, ignoring the fact that the total elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons are the real objective.

We support the inalienable rights of States to research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. In the same vein, we also believe that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is an urgent and vital contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. We support the prompt establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In that regard, Cuba is concerned by the unjustifiable lack of compliance with the agreement on the convening in 2012 of an international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The convening of that conference is a significant part of the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We call for the conference to be convened as soon as possible and before the close of this year.

Agreements reached between the main nuclear Powers to reduce their strategic offensive nuclear weapons send a positive but insufficient message. The nuclear-weapon States have not fulfilled the commitments they made pursuant to article VI of the NPT to negotiate an international treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons. Cuba believes that the lack of political resolve demonstrated by a number of States, instead of achieving real progress, in particular in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, is the reason for the ongoing stalemate in the disarmament machinery of the United Nations.

Therefore, there is a need to promote and adopt specific steps that will lead to the total elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons in a binding and non-discriminatory, transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Thus, as part of the NPT process,

the Non-Aligned Movement has submitted a proposal that deserves attention, calling as it does for an action plan that establishes a specific timetable for the phased reduction of nuclear weapons until their total elimination and prohibition by 2025 at the latest.

To conclude, I would like to underscore that currently there are proposals circulating in the First Committee that must be addressed. They are aimed at attaining a world free of nuclear weapons, a commitment that we all have to future generations.

**The Acting Chair:** I now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

**Mr. Ri Tong Il** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): My delegation would like to exercise its right of reply in response to the Japanese representative's reference to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in which he once again attempted to attack the Democratic People's Republic of Korea through statements in the First Committee. The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea totally rejects Japan's allegations as misleading to public opinion and to all participants in today's meeting. We would therefore like to once again clarify our position on the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

First, with regard to the nuclear test issue, which I addressed earlier in my regular statement during the exchange with the representatives of the international organizations, I do not need to repeat my country's position.

Secondly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea totally rejects the Security Council resolution referred to by the Japanese representative. It has never, ever recognized the validity of that resolution, which was adopted through the manipulation of the United States in collaboration with the Japanese delegation in the Security Council, which was a rampant, flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and an insult to the dignity of my country and its people.

We launched a satellite. As I said earlier, the United States outer space agency recognized that it was a satellite in orbit, but they referred that launch, which was an exercise of the legitimate right of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a State party to the Outer Space Treaty, to the Security Council. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the only country that

has been referred to the Council for making a peaceful satellite launch, while Japan, which carried out its own launch immediately after our country, was not.

The Security Council highlighted the issue of the satellite launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a threat to peace and security, while remaining silent and taking no action against the Japanese satellite launch. Both the United States and the Security Council remained silent. For that reason, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has never, ever recognized the Council's decision. It was a clear demonstration of double standards and an abuse of the political power given by the United Nations to the United States, a permanent member of the Security Council, for its own political interests and manipulations.

Thirdly, I turn to the abandonment of nuclear weapons by the People's Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In his statement, which I followed carefully, the Japanese representative urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons. I would like to quote what he said:

“[A]s the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan understands by its own experience the inhumane consequences of nuclear weapon use.”

This raises a question. What about the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who have been living under nuclear blackmail for six decades, with the threat looming over their heads of the nuclear weapons introduced into South Korea back in 1957 by the United States? We have been living under nuclear blackmail and threats, so how could the Japanese delegation possibly make such nonsensical remarks? How can they even say that they are the only country that has suffered? The people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been living under an imminent threat to their very existence and survival. The entire Korean nation has been living with the potentially catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons for decades. In response, and faced with constant nuclear blackmail and a threat to our sovereignty by the United States, we have had no other choice but to go nuclear. We will never, ever tolerate nuclear weapons being dropped on our people.

Fourthly, with respect to provocation, Japan is now rising as a grave threat to the peace and security of North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. Japan has never recognized its past crimes. It is becoming a

military Power and a potential nuclear-weapon State, and has all the technical know-how. It is sitting on 40 tons of plutonium and other enrichment materials. It has also admitted that its decision to become a nuclear State will depend only on the political will of the Government. Since Japan is under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, it has no justification to talk about the issue of somebody else's nuclear weapons.

**Mr. Sano** (Japan): In response to allegations made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, I am not going to go into detail because I have already stated Japan's position. Let me make the following four points, very briefly.

First, it is highly inappropriate to compare Japan's activities in outer space to those of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, since Japan has developed its outer space activities strictly for peaceful purposes, in conformity with related treaties on outer space development. Our Constitution strictly limits our space activities to peaceful uses. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a Member of the United Nations, so it should comply fully with the relevant Security Council resolutions prohibiting any kind of nuclear launch using ballistic-missile technology.

Secondly, the nuclear testing and nuclear programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are not only clear violations of Security Council resolutions, which, as a State Member of the United Nations, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should abide by. They are also a grave challenge to the regime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Such provocations are utterly unacceptable, as they undermine the peace and security of the region and of the entire international community.

Thirdly, it is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that has not complied with its commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, agreed upon in the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. Once again, we urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fully comply with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and its commitment under the Joint Statement of the six parties.

Finally, with respect to plutonium, Japan has complied strictly with the NPT regime and its safeguard obligations under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Japan's peaceful uses of nuclear energy have been confirmed by the IAEA. Japan has also regularly reported the amount of its plutonium

holdings, in accordance with IAEA information circular 549.

**Mr. Ri Tong Il** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Once again, the Japanese delegation has made yet another dubious comment to mislead the public.

First, he referred to the issue of Japan's own outer space activities. Japan has both commercial and military satellites. It already has its eyes over outer space, looking down on the whole Asia-Pacific region with more than four spy satellites. Japan is watching over the entire Asia-Pacific region, which includes the Korean peninsula, 24 hours a day. This is the country that is fomenting territorial disputes with China, Russia and Korea. For instance, it has made persistent claims that an island it annexed along the Korean peninsula belongs to Japan, creating a false pretext for a territorial dispute as it bolsters its military power. Japan is importing offensive armaments of every kind from the United States. It has all the sophisticated weapons it needs to reach the entire Asia-Pacific region.

The Japanese still continue to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, which is a symbol of the Second World War criminals. They have never apologized for past crimes. This gives the strong impression that they are seeking another war when the time comes, or even sooner.

Secondly, reference was made to the issue of plutonium and International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. That is not enough. Japan cannot justify its own position. We are talking about more than 40 tons of nuclear-weapons-grade plutonium — enough to make more than 6,000 nuclear weapons. It is not a question of inspection but of the elimination of that plutonium. Once they are sincerely and truly in favour of peace and security in the region, they should show it by taking action to eliminate that plutonium, unless they have an interest in becoming a nuclear Power.

Thirdly, reference was made to the Six-Party Talks. Those Talks were held beginning in 2003 and led to commitments under the Joint Statement. Every party to the Six-Party Talks has commitments. Japan does too. But, regrettably, Japan has never honoured its own commitments. At every meeting of the Six-Party Talks, Japan raised the issue of abduction, which has nothing to do with the agenda of the Six-Party Talks. The Japanese delegation therefore has no justification to talk about the Six-Party Talks.

**Mr. Sano** (Japan): It is not relevant to discuss territorial or island issues, or to go over history again here in the First Committee. Regarding nuclear-related issues, I will not repeat the Japanese position, which I made clear in my previous statement.

*The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.*