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First Committee

11th meeting

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Official Records

Chair: Mr. Percaya (Indonesia)

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

Agenda items 86 to 102 (continued)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items

The Chair: This afternoon the Committee will aim to conclude its deliberations on cluster 1, “Nuclear weapons”, by hearing the remaining speakers on the rolling list on this cluster who were not able to take the floor when we ran out of time yesterday.

Before giving the floor to the first speaker, I again encourage delegations when taking the floor to speak within a reasonable period of time.

Mr. Proaño (Ecuador) (*spoke in Spanish*): I should like to begin by saying that my delegation supports the statements made by the representatives of Peru on behalf of the Union of South American Nations and of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/67/PV.9).

During the First Committee’s general debate, Ecuador referred to the fact that its Constitution recognizes the rights of nature, whereby nature ceases to be an object and becomes a subject. By recognizing these rights, we close the circle of the holistic and complementary relationship between these rights and the rights of human beings.

Under this innovative approach, Ecuador condemns the very existence of weapons of mass destruction

on the face of the Earth and considers that their use or the threat of their use constitutes a crime against nature and humankind. My delegation also referred to its strict compliance, together with other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with its international commitments and obligations regarding nuclear non-proliferation. Nonetheless, we expressed our disappointment that we have seen no reciprocity from the nuclear-weapon States as regards nuclear disarmament, taking into account the fact that more than 40 years have elapsed since the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this context, my delegation wonders whether our wait for reciprocity is to be a matter of years, decades or centuries, since there is no sign whatsoever in this direction on the horizon.

Mr. Aquino (Peru), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.

There are a number of reasons for the need to emphasize the subject of nuclear disarmament, including humanitarian, legal, political and common-sense factors. First, there are humanitarian reasons why the international community has condemned the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons because of their atrocious effects, which transcend borders and generations and do not discriminate between civilian and military targets. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a crime against nature and humankind, and a violation of international law, international humanitarian law, and the very Charter of the United Nations. That is why the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their prohibition and total destruction.

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Secondly, and complementary to what I have just said, nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT claim national security as justification for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although we all know the dangers that this poses to life and the very survival of millions of communities and innocent persons, as well as to future generations and the existence, preservation and regeneration of nature's lifecycles, structure, functions and evolving processes. In other words, we are facing an attempt to preserve the security of a few at the cost of the security of our entire world.

Thirdly, there are also legal reasons for this assertion, such as compliance with article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which calls upon States to conduct negotiations in good faith on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. These obligations must be honoured in order to preserve the integrity and legitimacy of this international instrument. In this context, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in this regard must also always be borne in mind. More than 30 years have passed since the entry into force of the NPT, and we are still waiting.

In this connection, we have precedents in the Conventions on chemical and on biological weapons, in the context of making progress towards the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction. This factor requires us to reject the reasons for excluding nuclear weapons from the process of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Fourthly, there are also political and legal reasons of a regional nature to support this thinking. The nuclear-weapon-free zone of Latin America and the Caribbean, to which my country is a party, has not yet fully benefited from the denuclearization that its nature and objectives require, because of the existence of interpretative declarations by nuclear-weapon States that disregard the political will of the Latin American and Caribbean States to live free of nuclear weapons and to advocate their prohibition and complete destruction. In the same connection, my delegation aspires to the prompt establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and in regions such as North America, Europe and South Asia.

Fifthly, together with the aforementioned and because the international community still has a vivid recollection of the time when these weapons were used to the horror and repudiation of all, the international

community has condemned these actions just as it condemns the existence of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have no legitimacy. Therefore, it is high time for States and the United Nations to deal with this subject once and for all, in compliance with international commitments and obligations of a legal nature and also on human, humanitarian and common-sense grounds.

Mr. Moktefi (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): First, I associate myself with the statements made by the representatives of Iran on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/67/PV.2) and of Egypt on behalf of the Group of Arab States (see A/C.1/67/PV.9).

I take this opportunity to express Algeria's views regarding some issues related to nuclear weapons. First, I should say that nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority for Algeria. In this connection, we wish to express our deep concern over the threat posed to humankind by existing nuclear arsenals. That is why we consider progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to be essential to strengthening international peace and security.

Algeria reaffirms the importance of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. Algeria calls upon nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with their legal obligations to totally eliminate their nuclear weapons. In this regard, we reiterate the importance of the application by the nuclear-weapon States of the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability in all measures related to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations. The fulfilment of these obligations should not be made conditional on confidence-building measures or other disarmament efforts. Indeed, the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, Algeria reaffirms the need for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances. All non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this context, Algeria strongly supports the call for convening an international conference at the earliest possible date with the objective of reaching an agreement on a phased programme for the complete

elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention.

I should like to reiterate Algeria's commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and stress the need to universalize the Treaty, which is the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Any selective approach to the NPT terms of reference is likely to empty that instrument of its substance. The balance between the three pillars — disarmament, non-proliferation and the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy — must be fully preserved. The three pillars have equal importance.

Algeria also stresses that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation should run parallel to simultaneous efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament. We also emphasize that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Of course, all States parties to the NPT are required to meet their obligations under the Treaty. In this regard, it must be recalled that nuclear-weapon States in particular have to comply fully with their obligations.

Algeria is seriously concerned over the lack of progress towards the full implementation of the 13 practical steps for the Treaty's article VI disarmament obligations agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT and endorsed again in the action plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). A majority of States have chosen to use atomic energy for their civilian applications in accordance with article IV of the NPT. Indeed, for many developing countries, nuclear energy represents a strategic choice for their economic development and energy security needs. Accordingly, Algeria reaffirms the inalienable and legitimate right of all NPT States parties to the development, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the non-proliferation regime.

Algeria underlines the mandate, authority and central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the area of nuclear security. All multilateral norms, guidelines or rules in nuclear security should be pursued within the framework of the IAEA. Algeria also reaffirms the central role of the IAEA in nuclear safety, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards.

While welcoming the convening in Vienna of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Algeria calls on all States parties to the NPT to fully implement the action plan adopted by consensus at the eighth NPT Review Conference in May 2010.

As an integral part of the 2010 NPT Review Conference action plan, the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East is also necessary. We therefore express our deep concern over the delay in the implementation of the 1995 resolution, which remains valid until its objectives are fully achieved.

Algeria maintains its strong support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and looks forward to the convening in Helsinki of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. My delegation urges the Secretary-General and the three sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in consultation with the States of the region, to make every effort to convene the 2012 conference, and stresses the importance of the participation in that Conference of all States of the region. We welcome the statement made by the Secretary-General on 11 October, reaffirming his strong support for the facilitator of the 2012 conference, Mr. Jaakko Laajava, as well as his strong commitment to convening the conference.

My delegation considers the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones to be an important step towards achieving global nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Thus, the entry into force on 15 July 2009 of the Treaty of Pelindaba, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, represents an important contribution to strengthening international peace and security. Algeria calls on the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the relevant protocols of the Treaty of Pelindaba.

Algeria wishes to emphasize the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The achievement of that objective will contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. We regret that, 16 years after being opened for signature, the CTBT has not yet entered into force. Algeria associates itself in this regard with the joint ministerial statement of the ministerial meeting held on 27 September, encouraging all annex 2 States to ratify the Treaty.

Finally, Algeria is fully committed to the objectives of non-proliferation and to the efforts of the international community to prevent terrorists and other non-State actors from acquiring nuclear materials necessary for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or acquiring other radioactive material. To express its full commitment to these objectives, Algeria took part in the Seoul Nuclear Summit in March and in the high-level meeting on countering nuclear terrorism, convened last month in New York.

Mr. Hashmi (Pakistan): Let me begin by associating myself with the statement made by the representative of Iran on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/67/PV.2).

The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the horrors of nuclear weapons. The global response to those atrocities emerged in the form of the very first resolution adopted by the General Assembly against nuclear weapons (resolution 1 (I)). Since then, the international community has grappled with the aim of eliminating the use of these weapons, which are inhumane, immoral and indiscriminate. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons have increased both horizontally and vertically. They are seen as the ultimate weapons and therefore the ultimate guarantor of security. Therefore, the search for security is the main driving force for the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. For some, power and prestige are also contributory factors.

The Final Document (resolution S-10/2) of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-1) was the first and only global effort of the international community to agree by consensus on the elimination of nuclear weapons. The international community recognized that this goal must be achieved by ensuring equal security for all States. It also called for a compact that included a step-by-step approach to ensuring non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, along with simultaneous efforts to promote nuclear disarmament.

Unfortunately, however, the major nuclear-weapon States have focused mainly on arms control and non-proliferation, ignoring genuine nuclear disarmament. Their effort has been aimed at concluding international agreements in areas where their security would not be compromised, such as by eliminating biological and chemical weapons or through the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Now, some of the major Powers are promoting a fissile material cut-

off treaty after producing so much fissile material that they do not need any more. But no effort has been made to eliminate nuclear weapons or to pursue genuine nuclear disarmament.

Despite high-sounding and moralistic assertions, the fact is that nuclear weapons remain integral to the strategic doctrines of military alliances. Nuclear weapons also provide extended deterrence to non-nuclear-weapon States that are members of military alliances. As such, these States indirectly and implicitly encourage the possession or even use of nuclear weapons as part of the strategic doctrines of their alliances. Pakistan is realistic and recognizes that nuclear disarmament will not happen overnight or even in a lifetime. But the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons must start now. It has been too long since SSOD-I for us to give practical shape to obligations adopted by consensus.

We must strive to evolve a rules-based, equitable and non-discriminatory international order that must pursue a comprehensive disarmament agenda. That agenda should build upon existing achievements, include measures to address the security concerns of States, and carry forward strategic and conventional weapons limitation and reductions. The unilateral and bilateral measures undertaken by some have been partial and insufficient and cannot substitute implementation of multilateral disarmament obligations.

The international non-proliferation regime should be strengthened through policies that are equitable, criteria-based and non-discriminatory. There should be no exceptionalism or preferential treatment driven by motivations of power and profit. There should be an end to the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Extending nuclear deterrence to alliance partners itself amounts to horizontal proliferation. Negative security assurances should be extended to non-nuclear-weapon States. These assurances are cost free and do not undermine the security of nuclear-weapon States.

Instead of taking half measures, disowning obligations to disarm and advocating a treaty banning only the future production of fissile material—which is not even a non-proliferation measure—there should also be a reduction of existing fissile material stocks, which would be a genuine step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Along with these steps, the international community should immediately start

negotiations on a convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.

Efforts are long overdue to craft a renewed consensus on nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Without underestimating the potential challenges of evolving a re-energized global consensus, efforts need to be redoubled for a world genuinely without nuclear weapons. Pakistan reiterates the long-standing call of the 120 members of the Non-Aligned Movement to convene a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in order to revive a global consensus that ensures the elimination of nuclear weapons while meeting the security concerns of all States.

Mr. De Vega (Philippines): The Philippines aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/67/PV.9).

The Philippines is concerned at the lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The road to a nuclear-weapon-free world remains long and perilous, and it is imperative that we move forward by building on the momentum we have achieved in the past couple of years. The Philippine Constitution states our policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in our territory. It is a policy that we also actively advocate for other territories, given the presence of millions of Filipinos in areas where nuclear weapons exist.

In the United Nations, the Philippines continues strongly to support efforts to keep the twin issues of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation on the agenda. We have supported the annual resolution on the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*. We have also helped efforts to criminalize nuclear weapons.

In the negotiations in the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, the Philippines vigorously pushed for the inclusion of nuclear weapons in the list of prohibited weapons. But more than two years on from the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), we should be taking stock of what we have so far achieved towards fulfilling our obligations under the conclusions and recommendations for follow-up action of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)).

For the nuclear-weapon States, it is imperative that we see progress in actions 3, 5 and 21. The Philippines calls on the nuclear-weapon States to set specific timelines for the destruction of their nuclear weapons and delivery systems, in a verifiable and irreversible manner. We look forward to seeing clear progress in how the nuclear-weapon States are meeting their obligations through a publicly accessible repository to be set up by the Secretary-General.

The Philippines welcomes the five nuclear-weapon States (P-5) process and hopes to see concrete measures for the total elimination of nuclear weapons result from these meetings. As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Philippines also urges the five nuclear-weapon States to soon sign the Protocol of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. We believe that further consultations will pave the way for a resolution of the outstanding issues expressed by the nuclear-weapon States.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference also tackled head on the difficult and complex issue of the Middle East and weapons of mass destruction. The Philippines is hopeful that a conference this year on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to be held under the auspices of the Secretary-General and attended by all States of the Middle East, will be convened in December. As the Philippines has repeatedly stressed, the creation of the zone is long overdue and the conference will be an important first step in starting the process towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East.

The Philippines expresses concern over the danger posed by tactical nuclear weapons, which, given their small size, could fall into the hands of non-State actors. Future discussions for the 2015 NPT Review Conference must therefore include the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. The Philippines is also concerned over the credible threat of nuclear terrorism, and underscores the importance of supporting the existing legal framework on nuclear security by all United Nations Member States.

The Philippines calls for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the earliest possible time. Much remains to be done to achieve the Treaty's universality. We again laud Indonesia for its recent ratification of the CTBT, and we continue to urge the remaining eight annex 2 States to ratify the Treaty.

The Philippines has consistently called for discussions on the enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament if it is to continue negotiating on behalf of the global community. We call for the appointment of a special rapporteur to review the issue of membership.

In closing, the Philippines believes that the best way to achieve our goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world is through a nuclear weapons convention that declares nuclear weapons, their use and their possession to be illegal. The Philippines is ready to support efforts for the creation of a convention that establishes a definitive time frame for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mrs. Aitimova (Kazakhstan): Despite encouraging developments in the disarmament process over the past two years, the situation has not changed dramatically. The nuclear arms race has not been reversed, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has not been more effective in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and new de facto nuclear States have emerged. The stagnation in nuclear disarmament continues, which, in our opinion, is due to a crisis of confidence in the international community.

The May 2012 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT indicated the intensive efforts needed to demonstrate some degree of success before the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev, addressing the General Assembly in 2011 (see A/66/PV.11), underlined the need to universalize and strengthen the NPT and for increased international control by the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over compliance by all States with their non-proliferation obligations. There also needs to be a halt to the modernization and upgrading of nuclear weapons, or the acquisition of new ones, in order to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

The importance of strengthening monitoring to prevent all possibilities of nuclear terrorism cannot be overemphasized, as indicated by the high-level meeting on countering nuclear terrorism convened by the Secretary-General last month. One effective measure to advance the non-proliferation regime would be the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank under the auspices and surveillance of the IAEA, which my Government is ready to host on our territory after completion of supervision.

In addition, the President believes that having a universal declaration of a nuclear-weapon-free world would reaffirm the determination of all States to move step by step towards concluding a convention against nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan therefore joins with others to accelerate the momentum for such a convention, as proposed by the Secretary-General in his five-point plan and as one of the key recommendations of the 2010 NPT Review Conference outcome document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)).

The Global Forum on Nuclear Disarmament which met in Astana from 27 to 29 August, together with the Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, unanimously endorsed this proposal. The draft declaration, with the accompanying resolution, has been circulated to Member States. We hope to have a positive response to the ongoing consultations during the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

Kazakhstan supports the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a voluntary moratorium on testing by the nuclear club, but that is not enough. My country cooperates with the CTBT Organization in enhancing the international monitoring system by developing and refining its own five national cutting-edge, 24-hour tracking stations as part of the global effort. With the support of the Government of Norway, an international training centre has been set up for data experts from the Central Asian countries.

Kazakhstan expresses concern about the lack of progress over the past 16 years in the substantive work of the Conference on Disarmament, and regrets that it is no longer in the vanguard of the disarmament process. It is imperative to begin work on the adoption of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for military purposes, as well as on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the use of force or threat of force against outer space objects.

Kazakhstan, together with other Central Asian States constituting the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, plays a crucial role in preventing the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear materials, thus combating nuclear terrorism.

When speaking to the General Assembly in 2011, our Head of State called for the drafting of an international, legally binding instrument on security assurances by nuclear Powers to non-nuclear-weapon States because, in his view, the NPT had been ineffective in this regard.

We underscore the region's commitment to completing the process of institutionalizing the Treaty and are ready for a constructive dialogue with the nuclear five for the early signing of the Protocol on negative assurances with interpretative statements. Obtaining such guarantees will be clear evidence of the interest of the five permanent members of the Security Council in a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The Government of Kazakhstan fully endorses the long-standing proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Recent developments seem to have derailed its prospects. Nonetheless, every effort must be made to hold the Helsinki conference in December, and my country stands ready to work for its success.

During its chairmanship of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2010, Kazakhstan worked towards the future of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security, in keeping with international norms. In 2011 and 2012, Kazakhstan, as Chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, focused on the Middle East conference as one of its priorities.

This year, the third International Day against Nuclear Tests was observed on 29 August to help raise awareness globally, and the World Leadership Forum was held in New York on 26 September at the Foreign Policy Association. We are pleased to inform members that the Nuclear Discussion Forum — a joint initiative of Kazakhstan and the EastWest Institute — will continue its deliberations.

In conclusion, we hope that the work of the First Committee this year, reinforced by strong multilateral political commitment, cooperation and action, will make strides towards global peace, security and stability.

Mr. Kelly (Ireland): My delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union, the statement delivered by the representative of Sweden on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, and that delivered by the representative of Switzerland on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (see A/C.1/67/PV.9). We would like to add the following remarks.

Two and a half years have passed since the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreed by consensus a comprehensive package of outcomes

across the Treaty's three pillars and in connection with the Middle East. At the same time, we are now two and a half years away from the next Review Conference, when NPT States parties will again decide how best to take forward the matter of fully implementing the Treaty. At this halfway point, I will focus my statement on three issues that Ireland believes will require attention during the remainder of the 2015 review cycle.

The first of these is confidence-building. We know that the failure of the nuclear-weapon States over several decades to achieve sufficient progress towards the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals has led some States to claim that the NPT is inherently discriminatory and that it creates classes of haves and have-nots. While we do not subscribe to this claim, we believe that if we do not make significant progress on disarmament, and soon, this perception of discrimination will exert increasing and perhaps intolerable pressure upon the Treaty's non-proliferation imperatives.

We are deeply concerned by the challenge presented to the objectives of the NPT by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We also believe that Iran must answer the many legitimate questions of the international community about the precise nature of its nuclear programme. We remain concerned that three States — India, Israel and Pakistan — choose to remain entirely outside the overwhelming global consensus on NPT adherence. To convince these States and others that the NPT offers the blueprint for a world free of nuclear weapons, we must demonstrate our collective resolve and determination to achieve complete disarmament at the earliest possible opportunity.

The NPT did not create haves and have-nots. Rather it created categories of "will-disarm" and "will-forgo". The will -forgos have kept their side of the bargain and we believe that progress in kind from the will-disarms is overdue.

Ireland does not accept that any of the NPT's three pillars has an inherent claim to priority, or that more progress is required on the Treaty's non-proliferation agenda before progress can be achieved on its disarmament agenda. We have consistently maintained that disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing, but frankly speaking, there has not been enough progress on disarmament.

The overwhelming majority of NPT States parties took the decision to forswear nuclear weapons four decades ago. They did so in the reasonable expectation

that the nuclear-weapon States would work with deliberate speed to eliminate their arsenals within the temporary time and space that the Treaty gives to them for that purpose. We are still waiting. Failure to make progress on disarmament is damaging the Treaty and, as the present review cycle proceeds, Ireland will therefore join those NPT States parties — and we believe they are very many in number — that will look increasingly to the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate that they are serious about fulfilling their Treaty commitments to disarm.

We will also remain staunch in our support for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We believe that the ratification of that Treaty by all nuclear-capable States that have not yet done so would represent an important confidence-building gesture along the road to complete disarmament.

The second issue that Ireland would prioritize within the 2015 NPT review cycle is transparency. The 2010 action plan committed the five nuclear-weapon States to report on the implementation of their undertakings under action 5 to the third session of the Preparatory Committee in 2014 so that the 2015 Review Conference could then “take stock and consider the next steps” (*NPT/CONF.2010/50 Vol. I, p.21*). We would welcome substantive interim progress reports by the nuclear-weapon States between now and 2014. That would build confidence and would enable the wider NPT membership to prepare a follow-on set of actions for the 2015 Review Conference.

Thirdly, I should like to mention briefly an old discussion that re-emerged anew at this year’s NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna. It concerns the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament. A generation has grown up since the end of the Cold War and, while the tensions of the Cold-War period have long since dissipated, we still face the threat to humankind that existed half a century ago. That was acknowledged at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which expressed its

“deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons” (*ibid., para. 80*).

As far back as 1955, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons were considered by people who actually knew what it meant. “The general public” they

wrote, “and even many man in positions of authority, have not realized what would be involved in a war with nuclear bombs”. They noted that while no one knew exactly how widely lethal radioactive particles might be diffused if one bomb was exploded, “the best authorities are unanimous in saying that a war with H-bombs might possibly put an end to the human race”.

These were not the words of politicians, diplomats, military men or activists pursuing an agenda. They were the words of academics and scientists specializing in related fields who understood, perhaps better than anyone on this planet at the time, the uniquely destructive power of atomic energy harnessed for military purposes — men like Albert Einstein and Linus Pauling, Joseph Rotblat and Bertrand Russell, to name but a few. Their conclusions are as valid today as they were 60 years ago.

This sobering assessment reminds us why we need renewed urgency in the disarmament of nuclear weapons. It reminds us why we need to close off any attempts to promote the proliferation of these wretched weapons or to achieve the means to do so. And that is why we demand of any State seeking access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes full details of its nuclear programme through the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system.

We believe that a discussion on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament will serve as a useful reminder that this is no abstract debate about treaty implementation. A breach in the NPT could have catastrophic consequences for humankind for generations to come. For this reason, my delegation wishes to see the humanitarian theme developed as the present NPT review cycle progresses.

Ireland remains as intolerant of nuclear weapons as ever. In a debate in our national Parliament this summer, the long-standing cross-party support for nuclear disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons was again reaffirmed. Ireland is especially protective of the NPT, which remains the world’s only bulwark against the danger of nuclear weapons, and we will continue to speak out in its defence on any occasion and to all interlocutors. Our hope is that one day the NPT will not have a disarmament agenda — that is to say, that it will not need one. That day, unfortunately, seems a long way off, and for that reason my delegation will be pressing for an ambitious outcome to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

Ms. Urruela Arenales (Guatemala) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, our delegation associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/67/PV.9). From our national perspective, we would like to add some of our own pertinent thinking in this regard.

Guatemala is committed to general and complete nuclear disarmament. Our country does not possess and has no intention of acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. We are a State party to all international instruments related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation because we are convinced that nuclear disarmament is the only intelligent path towards a more secure world. Nothing would be a better contribution to reducing the risk of the proliferation and use of such weapons than their total elimination, and we would therefore support any initiative to that end.

Nuclear disarmament must remain a high priority for the international community. Guatemala considers the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to be the cornerstone of the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime. As a State party, we advocate its universality and full adherence to all its provisions. I stress that this is a legal obligation and that all its member States must show clear evidence of their commitment to the letter and spirit of that international legal instrument.

We believe that the three pillars of the NPT — nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — are closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing. In this regard, we welcome the holding of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May, and hope that the nuclear-weapon States will participate constructively and decisively in future sessions in order to achieve concrete results in 2015.

Guatemala reiterates once again its disappointment at the current stagnation prevailing in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). This year once again, the CD concluded its work without adopting an agenda that would have enabled its members to begin substantive negotiations. We will remain flexible in discussing measures that could help to revitalize the CD. Nonetheless, we must state clearly that such measures must be part of an overall commitment to considering the entire disarmament machinery.

Guatemala is a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which is celebrating its forty-fifth anniversary. The Treaty established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone on the planet and was an inspiration for the creation of others. Having achieved a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, we are also trying to ensure that it will not run the risk of a nuclear threat. That is why we stress the importance of moving forward in the negotiation of a treaty on negative security assurances, and appeal to the nuclear-weapon States to withdraw their reservations to the Treaty's protocols.

Guatemala reiterates its call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East on an urgent basis, in accordance with the resolution on the Middle East that was adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, calling for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. We regret the fact that, 17 years after the adoption of the resolution, one central pillar of the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely has not yet been implemented. That is why we emphasize the decision to hold the conference in 2012 for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We encourage all States of the region to participate in the conference.

In the meantime, it is vital to strengthen actions to promote nuclear disarmament. That will require above all an expression of clear political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States and a range of concrete, time-bound and verifiable actions allowing us to move beyond rhetorical boasts of progress even though nuclear weapons continue to exist in exorbitant numbers and their range continues to expand.

We are convinced that if these agreements are to produce the best possible results, we need to bear continuously in mind that, while progress needs to be made on nuclear disarmament, it also needs to be made in non-proliferation. In this connection, the non-nuclear-weapon States are also obliged to fulfil their own responsibilities under the NPT and reaffirm their commitment not to become nuclear-weapon States, while exercising their inalienable right to acquire, develop and use nuclear technology exclusively for peaceful purposes.

All of these measures towards disarmament and non-proliferation must be carried out in an atmosphere conducive to verification and transparency with the purpose of strengthening confidence among the parties

to the Treaty. Likewise, we believe it fundamental for all States to fully implement the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, and we stress the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the verification of the exclusive use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Guatemala is proud of its recent ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and takes this opportunity to congratulate Indonesia on having taken the same step. This action is a significant contribution to the entry into force of the Treaty. We consider it essential to maintain the moratorium on nuclear testing until the Treaty comes into force. We believe it important that all States that have not yet ratified the CTBT, especially the nuclear-weapon and annex 2 States, do so as soon as possible.

Mrs. Ledesma Hernández (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, States Members of the Organization agreed that nuclear disarmament is the highest priority in this field. Nonetheless, 66 years after the General Assembly sought in its very first resolution (resolution 1 (I)) to eliminate nuclear and all other weapons capable of significant collective destruction, and more than 40 years after the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), there are still more than 20,000 nuclear weapons in existence, 5,000 of which are ready to be used immediately. That is a threat to international peace and security.

It is unacceptable that certain nuclear-weapon States do not give up their use as part of their security doctrines based on so-called nuclear deterrence. Worse still, they allocate billions to the modernization of their nuclear arsenals. Cuba believes that the only guarantee that nuclear weapons cannot be used by States or any other party is through their elimination and absolute prohibition under strict international control.

We are against the selective approach promoted by some States in order to prioritize measures against horizontal proliferation to the detriment of issues arising by vertical proliferation, disregarding the fact that the prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons are the real objective. We support the inalienable right of States to research, produce and use, without discrimination, nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

We further believe that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is an important contribution of States to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. That is why our country joined the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which is celebrating its forty-fifth anniversary. In this connection, we champion the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East, and the adoption on an urgent basis of universal, unconditional, legally binding security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

The entry into force of an agreement among the main nuclear Powers for the reduction of their strategic offensive nuclear weapons is a positive but insufficient sign. The nuclear Powers have not fulfilled their commitment under article VI of the NPT to negotiate an international treaty for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Cuba believes that the lack of political will on the part of some States to make real progress, mainly with respect to nuclear disarmament, is the reason of the ongoing paralysis in the United Nations disarmament machinery.

As members of the Conference on Disarmament, we support the adoption as soon as possible of a broad and well-balanced programme of work that takes the real priorities for disarmament into account. The Conference must urgently begin negotiations on a convention preventing the development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons; providing for their destruction; and leading to the total, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons under a concrete timetable.

While we advocate the launch of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty that prohibits the production of fissile material for the production of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and that also covers the question of stockpiles, we believe that the negotiation of a treaty on fissile material would be a positive but insufficient measure if no follow-up steps are designed for nuclear disarmament. In this regard, Cuba reiterates its firm commitment to working towards the convening of a high-level international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear weapons as soon as possible, as agreed in the Special Communiqué on the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons adopted by the Heads of State and Government of Latin America and the Caribbean in the framework of the Summit of the

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in December 2011.

We are pleased to note the successful conclusion of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, which took place in May in Vienna. In this regard, we urge a renewal of the commitment of the Preparatory Committee to convening the second session in 2013. In the context of the NPT process, the Non-Aligned Movement has submitted a proposal that deserves attention and contains a plan of action establishing a concrete timetable for the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons until their total elimination and prohibition at the latest in 2025.

In conclusion, I emphasize that, in accordance with the long-standing position of the Non-Aligned Movement in favour of nuclear disarmament, the members of the Movement will submit for consideration by the Committee a new draft resolution on the convening of a high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament in September 2013. It is our hope that this initiative will enjoy the support of the States members of the General Assembly because such a meeting could be an opportunity to promote the efforts of the international community to achieve the objective of nuclear disarmament.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.40.

Mr. Od Och (Mongolia): As it has in previous years, my delegation has the honour to introduce to the Committee a draft resolution entitled “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status” (A/C.1/67/L.40).

My delegation wishes to express its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report on this subject (A/67/166). We would also like to express our gratitude to the sponsors of the draft resolution for their support. The draft text goes back to 1998, when the General Assembly, in its resolution 53/77 D, welcomed Mongolia’s declaration of its nuclear-weapon-free status. Ever since, the Committee has adopted draft resolutions on the item every second year without a vote.

My delegation shares the revived hope, expressed by the Committee, that our endeavours will be sustained in the months and years to come, thereby

lending momentum to further efforts towards a world without nuclear weapons. As part of these efforts and looking forward, my delegation expresses its trust that the widely recognized uniqueness of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status — which this year marks its twentieth anniversary — is an important contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

On 17 September, Mongolia signed a declaration, in parallel with the joint declaration of the five nuclear-weapon States on Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status. By their joint declaration, the five have recognized Mongolia’s unique status and declared that they would respect that status and not contribute to any act that would violate it. These documents are the result of careful consultations that duly reflect the interests of all six parties in promoting nuclear non-proliferation.

The two new preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution welcome the 17 September 2012 declarations by Mongolia and the five nuclear-weapon States on Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status as a concrete contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of confidence and predictability in the region.

The draft resolution also contains one update. The eleventh preambular paragraph reflects the support expressed for Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status by the Sixteenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Tehran on 30 and 31 August. Mongolia highly values the dialogue and interaction we have had with, and support extended by, member States for our efforts. My delegation expresses the hope that, as with similar resolutions in previous years, the Committee will adopt the draft resolution without a vote.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Austria to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.46.

Mr. Strohal (Austria): Austria aligns itself with the European Union statement on nuclear weapons delivered on Wednesday (A/C.1/67/PV.9). Austria is fully committed to all measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, however, we have always been convinced by the compelling logic that the only credible and sustainable way to deal with the danger posed by nuclear weapons is through their total elimination.

Allow me therefore to add a few specific Austrian considerations with respect to nuclear disarmament, which also provide the background and motivation for the draft resolution entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations” (A/C.1/67/L.46), on which we have been working with a number of States. I will come back to that text in a moment.

Let me first recall the reference we made in our general statement to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction often risk being sidelined in our general discussions. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Code this year, in my capacity as representative of the Austrian Executive Secretariat, I joined its current Chairman, Ambassador Cho Hyun of Korea, in transmitting a joint ministerial statement in support of the Code to the Secretary-General, calling for the further universalization of this important confidence- and transparency-building instrument.

Let me also refer to the joint statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear weapons that the representative of Switzerland shall deliver on behalf of a group of States, including my own. As that statement will reflect, there is today a greater awareness among States and in civil society that the nuclear-weapons debate should go beyond military security concepts. Due to the catastrophic global effects resulting from the potential use of nuclear weapons, more emphasis should be put on the humanitarian, health and ecological consequences, as well as on aspects of international humanitarian law. We look forward to such an intensified discourse, which in our view will further strengthen the case for nuclear disarmament.

Looking closely at the effects that any use of nuclear weapons would have also explains why nuclear disarmament is, on the one hand, the primary responsibility of the nuclear-weapon and nuclear-armed States but, on the other, cannot be considered as their sole prerogative, let alone a purely national rather than a global security issue. In other words, nuclear disarmament concerns us all. All States have a right to demand nuclear disarmament. All States have a stake in nuclear disarmament and a responsibility to work towards that goal.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a key instrument in this regard. It is being challenged on several fronts, and progress on nuclear disarmament — or lack thereof — may be the

most serious challenge. The forward-looking action plan that was agreed in 2010 may not be perfect; if implemented credibly, however, it would put us on the right track towards a world without nuclear weapons. All States need to be on board in implementing the necessary steps on the way towards achieving that objective. It also seems important to achieve clarity within the NPT, and specifically within the current NPT review cycle, on the framework to carry nuclear disarmament forward. The Middle Powers Initiative is attempting to assist this process with the support of a number of countries, including my own.

Moving forward on nuclear disarmament is not only imperative for the security and survival of us all; it is also an obligation under article VI of the NPT and has been reconfirmed over and over again, most recently in the 2010 action plan (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). We would like to reiterate that the successful implementation of actions 6, 7 and 15 will require credible and flexible efforts on the substance of the issues. Our current and well-known problems in getting a particular forum to work cannot exempt us from trying to make substantive progress. The First Committee is now called upon to try to provide the impetus for breaking the deadlock in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.

A number of complementary initiatives have been launched. Austria welcomes these initiatives. As already pointed out in the European Union statement, we particularly value the initiative aimed at making progress on negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Furthermore, we have worked with Mexico, Norway and a number of other countries on a proposal for taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations that we hope delegations will acknowledge to be constructive, serious and complementary to other initiatives.

As we have already pointed out, the purpose of the draft resolution proposed by us is to facilitate substantive multilateral progress in the area of nuclear disarmament through the establishment of an open-ended working group that would convene in Geneva for up to three weeks next year. It would be tasked with developing concrete proposals to take forward multilateral negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.

We have listened carefully to the reactions and comments made by delegations on the draft text that we have put forward. In the light of these discussions, it seems important to stress that this initiative is intended to provide a forum for constructive, substantive work without prejudice to any outcome. This proposal is not about creating a new disarmament institution, and is in no way intended to undermine existing ones. On the contrary, this initiative aims at bringing impetus to disarmament negotiations within the established United Nations framework, notably the General Assembly, in accordance with Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations.

We also stress that the open-ended working group constitutes a format that is well-established and inclusive and has been widely used within the United Nations. The draft resolution text has been amended in order to clarify these points and to accommodate further concerns raised by partners. A revised version of the draft resolution was submitted yesterday. We hope that this initiative will be perceived as an opportunity for the United Nations disarmament community to overcome the prevailing inertia and to move towards substantive disarmament negotiations.

The challenges the international community has to face with regard to the continued existence of nuclear weapons are enormous. We have been complacent for too long by not pressing to create a nuclear-weapon-free world quickly and effectively, as my Minister appealed to the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency earlier this year. In this spirit, Austria is supporting a number of initiatives and resolutions that will not only make us more alert and aware, but ultimately help the entire United Nations membership to turn words into action.

Mr. Momen (Bangladesh): Bangladesh aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/67/PV.9).

As we noted in our statement in the general debate (see A/C.1/67/PV.5), Bangladesh reiterates its strong support for the global agenda of nuclear disarmament achieved within the framework of the three clearly defined pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Over the years, while significant progress has been made in the area of nuclear non-proliferation towards limiting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, thousands of nuclear weapons continue to threaten the very existence of humankind. Billions of dollars are being spent to modernize them, despite pressing social needs and growing global expectations for progress in disarmament. We therefore call upon the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals in fulfilment of their relevant multilateral legal obligations, and to immediately to cease all plans to further modernize, upgrade, refurbish, or extend the lives of their nuclear weapons and related arsenals.

We welcome the positive outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and call for the full implementation of the action plans adopted at the Conference on nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We also recognize the successful conclusion of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, and look forward to the adoption of additional concrete steps, including a binding time frame, for complete nuclear disarmament at the next Review Conference in 2015.

Pending the achievement of the ultimate goal of complete, irreversible, verifiable and transparent nuclear disarmament, non-nuclear-weapon States have the legitimate right to receive security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. However, commitments of negative security assurances made by nuclear-weapon States have not been adequate enough to dispel the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States, mainly due to the non-binding nature of such commitments. We therefore underscore the need for the conclusion of a universal, legally binding instrument on unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States as a matter of high priority.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and accession to their protocols may be useful interim steps towards securing negative security assurances and achieving global nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Nuclear-weapon-free zones may be established in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2) and the principles and

guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1999.

Bangladesh was the first annex 2 South Asian nation to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). To us, it is a matter of great disappointment that, 16 years after its adoption by the General Assembly, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force. We therefore urge all States that are yet to ratify the CTBT, especially all nuclear-weapon States and those listed in annex 2, to sign and ratify the CTBT on an urgent and unconditional basis. Pending the Treaty's entry into force, we call on all States to maintain a moratorium on nuclear tests or any other form of nuclear explosions, and to refrain from activities that undermine the provisions of the CTBT.

Since the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has remained deadlocked for the past decade and a half, it is imperative to revitalize the work of the CD and take forward multilateral disarmament negotiations. We call on all members of the CD to begin negotiations immediately on a fissile material cut-off treaty and to engage in substantive discussions on all the core issues on the agenda of the CD. If the current stalemate in the CD continues, we urge the General Assembly to exercise its primary responsibility in carrying forward the disarmament process.

In our view, the continued existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use, either by design or by accident, or the threat of their use, poses the greatest threat to human beings. We therefore believe that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee of a peaceful and secure world. Although we all believe that disarmament is the best protection against the dangers of nuclear weapons, achieving that goal has been a tremendously difficult challenge. With a view to overcoming this challenge, Bangladesh has been co-sponsoring a number of draft resolutions seeking nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, regional disarmament and confidence-building measures. We call upon all States to support these draft resolutions.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Australia to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.43.

Ms. Elias (Australia): Australia is committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and has a history of practical and determined activism in support and promotion of this goal.

Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard reaffirmed Australia's commitment to that goal in her address to the General Assembly last month (see A/67/PV.9), as did the Australian Parliament when it passed a bipartisan motion on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in March. Australia attaches great importance to the First Committee as a forum where together we can build support for practical, concrete steps to achieve our shared goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

In this regard, Australia is pleased to be presenting, with New Zealand and Mexico, the annual draft resolution entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty" (A/C.1/67/L.43). The draft resolution stresses the vital importance and urgency of the Treaty's entry into force and, pending that entry into force, urges all States not to carry out nuclear-weapon test explosions. It has already enjoyed strong support and we are very grateful to the 75 other member States that have to date sponsored this draft resolution, including several member States that are sponsoring for the first time this year.

It is of course an issue of serious concern that, 16 years after it was opened for signature, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet entered into force. We call on those States that have yet to ratify the CTBT, particularly annex 2 States, to do so as soon as possible. In the meantime, we encourage and invite all member States to support and sponsor this year's draft resolution.

Australia is under no illusion about the complexity and difficulty of achieving our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. All of us — States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as those States still outside the NPT — have an opportunity and an obligation to keep moving towards that goal. This is an opportunity we must seize. But there are no easy solutions. Australia is encouraged by the ongoing discussions of the five nuclear-weapon States on their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitments. We look forward to seeing positive and concrete results from their individual and collective efforts in implementing their obligations under the consensus action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

Australia also welcomes the continuing efforts of the Finnish facilitator, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, and the NPT depositary States — the United States, the

United Kingdom and Russia — in consultation with the States of the Middle East region, for the convening of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. We urge all States of the region to continue to cooperate constructively in this endeavour.

But of course, implementing the action plan is the work and responsibility not of a limited number of NPT States parties, but of all NPT States parties. True, the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility under the NPT, but Australia also encourages all NPT States parties to carry a collective notion of responsibility for action plan implementation through the Preparatory Committee process into the 2015 Review Conference. For its part, Australia continues to work hard to take forward the consensus outcomes of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and in this regard we presented to the first session of the Preparatory Committee in Vienna earlier this year a detailed report of our efforts to date to implement the 2010 NPT Review Conference action plan.

In addition to our national efforts, Australia is working with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). NPDI ministers met in New York on 26 September and in their declaration outlined the NPDI's ongoing activities, including specific actions in support of the implementation of the action plan. Australia is pleased to associate itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Turkey on behalf of the NPDI on Wednesday (see A/C.1/67/PV.9).

One of Australia's key interests is to see States act on the international community's long-standing calls for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We consider the negotiation and early conclusion of such a treaty to be long overdue.

Banning the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapons purposes is not an end in itself but a vital step towards irreversible nuclear disarmament. It is lamentable that, 17 years after the Shannon report (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) still has not begun negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Mr. Špokauskas (Lithuania), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.

Over the past two years Australia, Japan, Germany and the Netherlands have made practical steps to inform the CD's work, such as through experts' side events on the issue. In the First Committee, Australia strongly supports Canada's efforts through its annual resolution to move substantive work forward on this issue, and we strongly encourage others to support Canada's efforts and initiative.

We will continue to support the negotiation and early conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is part of the deal from 2010 and part of the picture mapped out in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2). In the meantime, we call on all relevant States to maintain moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, or else to stop production and implement moratoriums.

Australia remains gravely concerned about the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's continuing nuclear weapon and ballistic missile activities, including the launch in April of a long-range missile. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's pursuit of these capabilities poses a significant threat to the stability of our own region, the Asia-Pacific, and to the non-proliferation efforts of the international community.

Australia also shares serious concerns about the mounting evidence of the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme. There is no ambiguity about what the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran each need to do to resolve these matters and to restore the international community's confidence. They must comply with these obligations.

It is important that we harness positive developments in disarmament and non-proliferation and build on these to achieve the shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The current NPT review cycle is nearing its mid-point, so this is not a time for complacency. There remains much work to be done within the context of the NPT and also — let us never forget — by those States outside the NPT that possess nuclear weapons. We should all focus on practical and positive efforts which keep us moving forward.

The Acting Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.55.

Mr. Laro (Nigeria): The Nigerian delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) by the representative of Indonesia (see A/C.1/67/PV.9), as well as the statement delivered by the representative of Switzerland on behalf of the de-alerting group (see A/C.1/67/PV.9). Nigeria sees continued relevance and importance in calling on the nuclear-weapon States to decrease the operational readiness of their nuclear weapons. We also align ourselves with the joint statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament delivered by the representative of Switzerland (see A/C.1/67/PV.10).

On behalf of the Group of African States, the Nigerian delegation would like to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.55, on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Pelindaba. The draft resolution has already been circulated to delegations. We note with satisfaction the overwhelming support for this text in past sessions of the General Assembly, and we call on all delegations to continue to support it. The presentation of the draft resolution is to re-emphasize Africa's strong commitment to maintaining the continent as a zone free of nuclear weapons. With a view to ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaty, we urge nuclear-weapon States that have not yet ratified its relevant Protocols to do so without further delay.

Nigeria sees nuclear-weapon-free zones as a credible means of promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Their significance lies in the fact that they ban not only the production and possession of nuclear weapons within their member States, but also the stationing of such weapons within the zones. We note again with satisfaction that today 113 States belong to the five nuclear-weapon-free zones that have been created across the world.

We recall that during the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) held in New York in May 2010, the member States called for the convening in 2012 of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. We welcome Finland's commitment to hosting the conference, and we call on all stakeholders to work towards its success. The Nigerian delegation believes that, with the demonstration of the necessary political will and a determination to succeed by all concerned, the important and essential goal of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction can be attained.

While nuclear-weapon States have continued to hold on to their stockpiles, a new phase in the nuclear arms race is evolving as more States acquire the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. And although there have been some reductions in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States, we consider these to be merely cosmetic measures, as the remaining stockpiles continue to pose a danger to mankind. It is for this reason that Nigeria welcomes the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and urges those countries that are yet to sign it to do so without delay in order to facilitate its entry into force. We join other delegations in welcoming the ratification of the CTBT this year by Indonesia and Guatemala.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons creates the problem of the security of these instruments of destruction, especially given the threat of global terrorism. The risk of nuclear materials falling into the hands of non-State actors, including the risk of the transfer of nuclear technology to terrorist groups, remains a matter of great concern to Nigeria. We therefore welcome the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in monitoring and inspecting nuclear facilities, and urge concerned countries to ensure their observance of IAEA safeguards at all times.

In addition, we welcome the Secretary-General's initiative in hosting the high-level meeting on countering nuclear terrorism in September. We consider it to be a timely effort to focus global attention on the dangers of nuclear terrorism and the urgent need for counter measures to promote international cooperation to fight it.

My delegation considers the obligations of States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and respect for the three pillars contained in its preamble and 11 articles as ultimate to our goal of nuclear disarmament. We are convinced that broader compliance with the NPT would serve a useful purpose in addressing the challenges associated with nuclear disarmament, including the clandestine development of broad systems and the phenomena associated with its acquisition and ownership. We welcome the basic NPT philosophy, which emphasizes that nuclear-weapon States commit themselves to nuclear disarmament while non-nuclear-weapon States adhere to the principles of the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we call on all States parties to demonstrate a practical commitment to article VI of the NPT.

My delegation welcomes the outcome of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, which provided an opportunity to assess the implementation of the Treaty. We remain hopeful that the remaining two sessions scheduled to be held before the 2015 Review Conference will contribute to the overall strategy for the full implementation of the action plans adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

As a State party to the NPT, Nigeria will continue to promote a multilateral process, and we join other member States, including those of NAM and the African Group, in expressing support for the NPT as the cornerstone for deepening the global non-proliferation regime. The next Review Conference is two years away, but we could assist its agenda by demonstrating commitment to ensuring transparency in the process.

In December 1993, the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/75 L, calling for the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The resolution stated that the General Assembly was convinced that such a treaty would be a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects. That was true then and remains true now.

Regrettably, almost two decades after that resolution was adopted, there has been no progress in negotiating a treaty to ban the production of fissile material. Nigeria considers it urgent and necessary that negotiations be commenced within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). In this regard, we all on all States members of the CD to show the necessary flexibility and political will that would allow the process of negotiating an FMCT to proceed without further delay.

Mr. Berbash (Libya) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, my delegation aligns itself with the statements made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and by the representative of Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group (A/C.1/67/PV.9). We are in full agreement with the concerns, requirements and aspirations for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

I should like only to emphasize the importance of convening the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. It would be the

first conference on which hopes are pinned for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and the promotion of security and stability. We would also like to express our deep thanks to friendly Finland for hosting the proposed conference and for the efforts of Mr. Jaakko Laajava, the special facilitator of the conference, and his team to ensure the convening and success of the conference.

Libya is very keen to work and fully coordinate with the Arab Group in order to ensure the success of all efforts aimed at freeing the Middle East region from all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. My country will spare no effort in order to achieve that goal. We look forward to all concerned States of the region acting in the same spirit to ensure the convening of the 2012 conference to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, as scheduled for December this year, and to achieving its goals according to specific time lines and a concrete plan of action.

In that context, my country calls on all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to work to fully implement the 1995 resolution and action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, as well as other relevant resolutions, so as to achieve this overarching goal. My country also calls on the Secretary-General and the depositary States, as well as the sponsoring States, to scale up their efforts and enhance coordination at this point in time with all countries of the region in a bid to urge and encourage them to participate meaningfully so as to ensure the success of the conference and the achievement of its objectives. That would strengthen the NPT and contribute towards achieving its noble goals.

Mr. Vasiliev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Russia favours a comprehensive approach to limiting nuclear arsenals for the security of all participants in international relations, taking into account all the factors that influence strategic stability. The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) between the United States and Russia demonstrates our strong adherence to this course. The New START agreement strengthens international stability and the regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The main thing now is unswervingly to implement the obligations under the Treaty and its underlying principles and understandings.

We are open to dialogue on future steps towards nuclear disarmament, and we are convinced that this can be achieved only by taking due account of all factors of international security. These factors include plans to strengthen the global anti-ballistic missile systems and attempts to undertake similar measures with respect to strategic weapons in non-nuclear configurations; lack of progress on the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); the threat of nuclear weapons in outer space; and the presence of qualitative and quantitative imbalances in conventional weapons.

We note that there are still serious differences in the approaches of Russia, the United States and NATO on retaining anti-ballistic missiles in Europe. In our opinion, the steps taken by the Alliance could disrupt the strategic balance of forces and do great damage to the regime, not only at the regional level but also at the global level of security. Russia's concerns are well known to all.

We need strong assurances that the anti-ballistic missile system of the United States and NATO in Europe will not undermine the Russian strategic potential. Similar concerns are shared by other States in various regions of the world. Such guarantees cannot be in word only. They must be based on objective military and technical criteria allowing each country to be sure that the anti-ballistic missiles deployed in each region truly correspond to what has been declared, including defensive missiles that could be used to target States outside Europe. We must say honestly and openly that progress in this field will to a significant extent determine the prospects for the development of relations at the regional level, and also the evolution of the entire international situation.

At the same time, I note that the steps taken by the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals require all countries with nuclear potential, without exception, to take the same steps. We must take into account the presence of nuclear programmes in those countries that have refused to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear States. Significant progress on disarmament cannot be made without a positive dynamic in all these areas.

I should also like to recall Russia's initiative to universalize the obligations taken under the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their

Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles to reduce their range from 1,000 to 500 kilometres.

We welcome the follow-on process for the next NPT review cycle, which should be concluded at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties. We believe that the first session of the Preparatory Committee was quite successful, and we congratulate Chairman Walcott on that success.

We are convinced that the current risks and threats to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime can and should be resolved on the basis of the NPT. We must now focus our efforts on the gradual development of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system and on increasing the number of States joining the additional protocol to the safeguards agreement. We believe that the IAEA safeguards should be applied on the basis of clear criteria that are acceptable to all NPT States parties.

The Russian Federation fully supports the idea of creating a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East, in accordance with the decisions of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2010 Review Conference. We are convinced that the timely establishment of such a zone would facilitate the resolution of many issues of non-proliferation and the effective maintenance of peace and stability in the region. As a depositary country, we shall earnestly strive to ensure the success of the conference in 2012.

Just a year ago, Finland was named host country, and Mr. Jaakko Laajava as special coordinator of the Conference. With the other co-convenors, we have regularly looked into the organizational modalities and substance of this event. We support all key decisions on the creation of the Middle East zone being made on a consensus basis, particularly among the countries of the region, which must first and foremost show their political resolve for the creation of such a zone. In this context, one of the most important tasks before is to ensure that the conference is convened in 2012 and that all countries of the Middle East countries participate in it.

The Russian Federation views the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia as an important instrument for increasing regional and international security and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We are convinced that the formalization of the status of these zones has moved our work in this area

forward, and we hope for the successful conclusion of this process in the near future.

Mr. Aquino (Peru), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.

We also support the efforts of Mongolia aimed at strengthening its non-nuclear status. The Russian Federation has made a significant contribution to that end by signing the joint declaration of the five nuclear-weapon States on Mongolia's non-nuclear status at the margins of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly. We are convinced that the next logical step should be the signing by all nuclear States of the protocol for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. Russia is prepared to do so.

Ensuring the rapid entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is of course a priority task and an imperative of our times. We therefore urge all countries, and especially those on whose participation and ratification the entry into force of the CTBT depends, to sign it as quickly as possible.

Mr. Kellerman (South Africa): At the outset, my delegation wishes to associate itself with the statements that have already been made under this particular cluster on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition (see A/C.1/67/PV.9).

With regard to the entire debate surrounding the issue of nuclear disarmament, at the very outset my delegation wishes to reaffirm its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the foundation of the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. We believe that the NPT is the only legally binding international instrument that establishes a universal norm against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and also contains a legally binding commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States towards the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. While recognizing the inalienable right of States to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, we remain fully committed to promoting full compliance with all its provisions and their universal application.

For many years, my country has warned of the tendency of some States to emphasize certain preferred provisions of the Treaty to the detriment of other equally important, inextricably linked provisions. We have warned that such selective approaches may well lead to others doing the same, and that this could disturb the delicate balance between the three Treaty

pillars, thereby undermining the original bargain and the credibility of the NPT.

While we welcome the significant progress that has been made towards realizing the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty, we continue to be concerned at the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament in fulfilment of article VI of the Treaty, particularly following the unequivocal undertaking made by the nuclear-weapon States in 2000 towards nuclear disarmament.

For South Africa, the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT was therefore of particular importance. Significantly, the 2010 Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) reconfirms the validity of the agreements reached in 1995 and 2000, including the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. In this context, it also contains a number of important measures aimed at achieving our common goal of a world free from the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

The challenge now is to ensure that these undertakings are turned into concrete actions that would restore confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which, I think we can all agree, has been subjected to significant tensions during the past decade. Such actions cannot be confined to reductions in the number of strategically deployed nuclear weapons aimed at removing the excessive destructive capabilities developed during the Cold War, irrespective of the necessity and importance of such measures. What is required is a fundamental shift in the security postures of those States and groups of States that continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their security, whether through direct or extended deterrence policies.

It remains South Africa's firm conviction that nuclear weapons do not guarantee security, but rather detract from it. The continued retention of nuclear weapons, including by States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities outside the NPT, remains of ongoing concern. As we have argued since joining the Treaty, any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons not only contradicts the provisions of the Treaty and the commitments made, but also contributes to increasing insecurity and a continuing arms race.

Continuous and irreversible progress in nuclear disarmament and other related nuclear arms control measures therefore remains fundamental to the

promotion of nuclear non-proliferation. For as long as these weapons exist, there may be others that will seek to acquire them. What is consequently required is a fundamental review of security doctrines, as well as other transparent, irreversible and verifiable measures aimed at realizing a world free from the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

South Africa appreciates the information that has already been provided by some of the nuclear-weapon States about their nuclear-weapon arsenals and the implementation of their nuclear disarmament objectives. Beyond the reporting obligations agreed to in 2010, we would encourage all five nuclear-weapon States to further increase their efforts to enhance transparency and to build confidence among States parties.

While we welcome the progress that is being made towards the implementation of the New START agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States, we also regret that the commitments towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty have not yet been realized. We therefore call on all States that have yet to ratify the Treaty, particularly the annex 2 States, to do so without further delay.

Pending the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, South Africa believes that those States that have forsworn the nuclear weapons option have the right to demand security assurances. Another matter of concern is the lack of progress towards the conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Such a treaty would serve both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives.

While some may wish to blame the lack of progress on one or even a few members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the debate on this matter seems to indicate reluctance on behalf of a larger number of CD members to commit to an instrument that would truly contribute to nuclear disarmament. This is particularly evident in the debate on the scope of such a treaty. While various technical and security complications are being used as arguments against including stocks within the scope of such a treaty, it is evident that all these could be overcome if there were indeed a commitment to nuclear disarmament and the political will to secure progress on the requisite steps towards that goal.

South Africa continues to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the

world, including in the Middle East. In this regard, we underline the importance of the decision taken at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT aimed at the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, and in particular the convening of a conference in 2012. We welcome the work undertaken by the facilitator towards this end, and call upon all States to lend their full support to his continued efforts.

The first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, which took place earlier this year in Vienna, ensured a smooth start to the review cycle. We believe it imperative that we build on the success of that meeting, which laid the groundwork for monitoring the fulfilment by all States parties of their commitments in the 2010 Review Conference action plan, including those of the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

In conclusion, let me reiterate that nuclear weapons are a source of insecurity, not security. They have no place in today's security environment, and the humanitarian imperatives that underpin the need for their complete elimination demand the renewed determination of all States and members of civil society to permanently rid our world of the threat of annihilation.

Mr. Najafi (Islamic Republic of Iran): The Islamic Republic of Iran associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement on this cluster (see A/C.1/67/PV.9).

The persistent lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and the continued existence of thousands of deployed and non-deployed strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons throughout the world remain a serious source of threat to international peace and security and the very survival of human civilization. While nuclear-weapon States have a legal obligation for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in our view the continued non-compliance of such States with this obligation has no doubt not only jeopardized international peace and security, but has also undermined the objective and purpose, as well as the relevance, integrity and credibility of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

The Islamic Republic of Iran fully endorses the position of the non-aligned States parties to the NPT

not only that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, in particular international humanitarian law, but also that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law.

My delegation is of the view that the nuclear posture review of certain nuclear-weapon States, as well as the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept, which justify the use or threat of use of such inhumane weapons, are clear cases of non-compliance with relevant legal obligations and a setback to nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the decision to modernize nuclear weapons under any pretext, such as reliability, and to spend billions of dollars to construct new nuclear facilities runs counter to the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States on nuclear disarmament and represents obvious non-compliance with article VI of the NPT.

We strongly call upon the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the United States, to honour their obligations under the NPT and immediately cease any kind of development of or research on nuclear weapons and any modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities, refrain from making any threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, withdraw their nuclear weapons from the territories of other countries, and stop maintaining their nuclear warheads in the trigger-alert status.

It is ironic that instead of committing to their legal obligations, certain nuclear-weapon States such as France, which are motivated by the Cold War mentality, have made irrational statements threatening non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, French officials have announced that they will develop new nuclear plans to modernize nuclear arsenals and spend billions of euros on this plan until 2020. That policy clearly disregards the obligations of France to respect the practical steps agreed to at the Review Conferences of the Parties to the NPT, as well as the object and purpose of the Treaty.

Countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, as well as the representatives of the European Union and the Canadian regime, having nuclear weapons or being under the nuclear umbrella, and having been deadly silent at this meeting on the danger of Israel's clandestine nuclear-weapon programme, are not eligible to make

judgements about the peaceful, safeguarded nuclear programmes of the others. This hypocrisy and double standard shows that operating outside the NPT is rewarded, but acting within it and having all nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards may be punishable.

It is a source of grave concern that in violation of obligations under article I of the NPT, not only have hundreds of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery been and remain deployed in the territories of the European Union, but the air forces of certain non-nuclear-weapon States, European Union members, have been trained to deliver these weapons under the cover of military alliances. By transferring hundreds of nuclear weapons to certain non-nuclear-weapon States under the NATO umbrella, the United States has long been in non-compliance with its obligations under the NPT, which provides in its article I "not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons".

Nuclear-weapon States, especially the United States, the United Kingdom and France, instead of threatening others and crying wolf about other countries' peaceful activities, should fully comply with their obligations under article I of the NPT by refraining from nuclear sharing under any pretext, including security arrangements, bilateral agreements or military alliances. Likewise, those members of the European Union, such as the Netherlands, that are hosting tens of nuclear warheads in violation of the NPT, must end their non-compliance with the Treaty and decide immediately to remove such nuclear weapons from their territories. The European Union also should first begin addressing compliance issues from its members, in particular the non-compliance of France with articles I and VI of the NPT.

France, which has tried to create a smoke-screen about its non-compliance, has resorted to disseminating wrong and deceptive information about others. As an example, contrary to France's misleading claims, Iran's 20 per cent enrichment activities are under IAEA full monitoring and aimed at providing needed fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor to enable it to continue producing medical isotopes for more than 1 million patients with serious diseases like cancer. Therefore, this activity is purely for humanitarian purposes and is plausible.

Certain nuclear-weapon States, by transferring nuclear technologies and weapons-grade materials to

non-NPT parties, in clear violation of their obligations under the NPT, have also contributed to the emergence of new possessors of nuclear weapons, in particular in the volatile region of the Middle East, where the nuclear arsenals and clandestine nuclear facilities of the Zionist regime, which has occupied the territories of several countries, invaded all its neighbours without exception, and committed aggression against other countries, is the most serious threat to the region and beyond.

There is no source of insecurity and instability in the Middle East other than the Israeli regime, which, sitting on hundreds of nuclear warheads, has audaciously tried to identify red lines, in the form of a childish cartoon, for the peaceful nuclear activities of others. This regime, created on the basis of terrorism, and confident in its big patron and its other Western supporters, has crossed all red lines during its brief lifetime and committed all crimes, from the crime of aggression to war crimes and crimes against humanity, and continues to threaten other countries. Therefore, any transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, or extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to nuclear-weapons capability of the Zionist regime is a violation of NPT obligations and therefore must be stopped immediately.

As a fundamental part of the package agreed within the framework of the NPT in 1968, nuclear disarmament is the highest priority on the disarmament agenda, and the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to fully support the Non-Aligned Movement's position on the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeline, including for the start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, based on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work, for the conclusion of a legally binding instrument on nuclear weapons to prohibit once and for all the possession, development, stockpiling and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by any country under any circumstances, and to provide for the total destruction of such inhumane weapons by 2025.

In the past few years, certain nuclear-weapon States, through false and misleading propaganda, have tried to equate nuclear energy with nuclear weapons. This false misinformation has been highlighted, while all nuclear activities of the non-nuclear-weapon States

parties to the NPT are under the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA. Those States have already foregone the nuclear options and therefore pose no threat to others.

In conclusion, let me reiterate once again that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a victim of weapons of mass destruction, will pursue vigorously the goal of a world free from weapons of mass destruction, but will never submit to intimidation and pressure.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of India to introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/67/L.25 and A/C.1/67/L.27.

Ms. Mehta (India): Nuclear disarmament has been a priority for the United Nations since the very first General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946 (resolution 1 (I)), and India has been consistent in articulating support for the achievement of this priority objective. India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was among the first world leaders to champion the cause of nuclear disarmament in the 1950s when the nuclear arms race was starting to rear its head.

Addressing the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1988 (see A/S-15/PV.14), our late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed an action plan for a nuclear-weapons-free and non-violent world order to attain the goal of nuclear disarmament in a time-bound, universal, non-discriminatory, phased and verifiable manner. We remain committed to the objective of that plan and to the realization of its vision of ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order.

As a nuclear-weapon State, we in India are cognizant of our responsibility, and our support for global, non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament has not diminished. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated in the Indian Parliament in 2007, "the possession of nuclear weapons only increases our sense of global responsibility and does not diminish it".

We believe that nuclear disarmament can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework. There is need for a meaningful dialogue among all States possessing nuclear weapons to build trust and confidence and for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines. Steps for the progressive delegitimization of nuclear

weapons are essential to the goal of their complete elimination.

Measures to reduce nuclear dangers arising from the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, increasing restraints on the use of nuclear weapons, the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, and measures to prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons are all pertinent in this regard. In a working paper submitted to the General Assembly in 2006, India suggested a number of such measures, including reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear-weapon States to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and specific legal measures, such as a global no-first-use agreement. India's working paper retains the spirit and substance of the Rajiv Gandhi action plan and aims to stimulate debate and discussion on what could be done today to implement the abiding vision of that plan. With this objective in view, a national conference was held on 21 August in New Delhi, with the participation of more than 1,000 students and researchers to raise awareness of and promote research on global nuclear disarmament.

Without prejudice to the priority we give to nuclear disarmament, we support the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a non-discriminatory and internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices that meets India's national security interests. We remain committed to maintaining a unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing.

India is committed to working with the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, including through strong national export controls and membership of the multilateral export control regimes. All States should implement fully and effectively the obligations arising from the agreements or treaties to which they are parties. India's position on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is well known and needs no reiteration.

Nuclear energy remains an essential source of clean and sustainable energy, especially for developing countries. Its expansion must be accompanied by enhanced international standards for nuclear safety, nuclear security and reduced proliferation risk. These international standards should be implemented through effective national action. The International Atomic

Energy Agency has an irreplaceable role in this respect. India has contributed actively to the Nuclear Security Summit process launched by President Obama in 2010, and participated in the recent high-level meeting on countering nuclear terrorism. Our resolution on weapons-of-mass-destruction terrorism in the General Assembly has received consensus support since it was first introduced in 2002. We shall introduce it on behalf of the sponsors at this session as well.

India's draft resolutions in the First Committee give expression to its desire to work with other States Members of the United Nations to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament. We are introducing, on behalf of the sponsors, draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.27 entitled "Reducing nuclear danger". The draft resolution highlights the need for a review of nuclear doctrines and immediate steps to reduce the risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through the de-alerting and de-targeting of nuclear weapons. Since 1998, the text has advocated modest yet critical objectives for the safety and security of humankind. It is a matter of satisfaction that the issues raised by this long-standing text are finding greater resonance and recognition in the international community, including through another resolution on the subject in this Committee.

Further, we have the honour to present on behalf of the sponsors draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.25 entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons". This traditional text reflects our belief that a multilateral, universal and legally binding instrument prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons will contribute to the process of delegitimization of nuclear weapons and create a favourable climate for negotiations on an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Mrs. Habweza (Zambia): I thank you, Sir, for giving me the opportunity to contribute to the debate on this very important agenda item. As this is the first time my delegation is taking the floor in this Committee, allow me to congratulate Mr. Percaya and other members of the Bureau on their election to preside over the proceedings of the Committee. My delegation is confident that through the able leadership of Mr. Percaya, the Committee will achieve its desired outcome.

Zambia, as a State party to both the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and

the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is committed to their respective universalization and pledges to continue supporting regional and global efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In this regard, Zambia welcomes the success of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, and calls for the full implementation of the action plan on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

In the same vein, we commend the five nuclear-weapon States for their meeting in Washington, D.C., and hope that this initiative will contribute to tangible outcomes for regional and global efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and in particular the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

Despite these positive developments, Zambia is concerned over the ongoing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Since the CD is not only part of the United Nations disarmament machinery, but is also the main forum for multilateral negotiations concerning the NPT, the CTBT and other related issues, the need to find an amicable solution to this ongoing stalemate cannot be overemphasized. In this connection, Zambia supports international efforts aimed at revitalizing the work of the CD, and calls on the First Committee to play a leading role in this respect.

Zambia is concerned over the continued absence of an internationally binding instrument that would guarantee unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear armed States against a nuclear attack or use of threats by a nuclear-armed State. Our concern is heightened by the current environment, which is characterized by non-compliance on the part of Member States with both their NPT and their CTBT obligations. Zambia therefore supports international efforts aimed towards the negotiation of a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Zambia recognizes the important contribution that the CTBT will make to the global nuclear disarmament effort and reaffirms its support. In this regard, Zambia wishes to take this opportunity to welcome the ratification of the CTBT by the Central African Republic, Indonesia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea and Trinidad and Tobago, and urges the remaining States,

especially annex 2 States — whose signatures and ratifications are necessary for the early entry into force of the Treaty — to take it upon themselves to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay in order to achieve its earliest possible entry into force.

The early entry into force of the CTBT as the core instrument whose purpose is to prohibit all nuclear testing on Earth, the modernization of existing nuclear weapons, and the prevention of the development of new ones and their delivery systems, will not only be a practical and systematic way of strengthening the NPT regime, but will also curtail the development and manufacture of a new generation of nuclear weapons.

Zambia remains strongly committed to the notion of general and complete disarmament, and reaffirms its support for a world free of nuclear weapons. In this regard, Zambia appreciates the contribution that the five regional nuclear-weapon-free zones continue to make towards the strengthening of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and the consolidation of international efforts towards peace and security. Since nuclear-weapon-free zones contribute to regional peace and security, Zambia reaffirms its support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones wherever they do not exist, and welcomes the conference on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to be held in Helsinki in December.

Zambia, as a State party to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, reaffirms its commitment to the Treaty and commends Ghana, Cameroon, Guinea Bissau, Chad and Namibia for ratifying the Treaty. In this regard, Zambia reiterates its support and welcomes the efforts of the African Union in establishing the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), whose responsibilities among others will include monitoring compliance by member States of obligations under the Pelindaba Treaty.

Zambia further commends AFCONE for holding its second ordinary session on 27 July in Addis Ababa, where key documents were finalized and adopted for its early and full operationalization. We equally commend South Africa for finalizing the hosting agreement with the African Union, under which the former will provide AFCONE with the required office space and equipment in Pretoria.

Zambia further reaffirms its support for the work of the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa

(FNRBA), which seeks to enhance, strengthen and harmonize radiation protection, nuclear safety and security regulatory infrastructure and frameworks among member States, as well as to provide the mechanisms for it to be an effective and efficient internationally recognized forum for the exchange of regulatory experiences and best practices among nuclear regulatory bodies of Africa. Since the purpose of FNRBA is complementary to that of AFCONE, Zambia urges African countries to become parties to the Forum if they have not yet done so.

Zambia is alive to the destructive power of nuclear energy and its implications for global safety and security. Recent nuclear disasters, such as that at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, and the potential for terrorist elements to acquire nuclear and radioactive substances and technology attest to the urgent need for an internationally agreed solution. In this regard, Zambia supports the third International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Safety Action Plan, which covers the period 2010-2013 and promotes the provision of long-term sustained improvements in nuclear security, as opposed to ad hoc interventions.

Zambia to this end reiterates the need for all IAEA member States to become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism if they have not yet done so. Despite the Fukushima Daiichi accident, nuclear power remains an important viable alternative for most countries. In this regard, Zambia calls upon the IAEA to continue the strengthening of regulatory mechanisms and the development of standards for the enhancement of nuclear safety and security.

Zambia acknowledges the measures that the IAEA continues to undertake in strengthening technical cooperation with member States, in particular developing countries. In this regard, Zambia welcomes the assistance of the IAEA in installing a radiation portal monitor in the northern part of the country, while a second monitor, to be installed in the southern part, awaits the identification of a suitable site. Once the project is completed, the portals will go a long way in assisting Zambia to monitor and detect the movement of any radioactive materials.

Zambia would also like to reiterate its appreciation of the offer by the IAEA to assist the country in the area of nuclear security during the General Assembly

of the World Tourism Organization, to be held in 2013 in conjunction with Zimbabwe.

In conclusion, the continued possession of nuclear weapons by some member States, the failure of the CTBT to enter into force, and the continued stalemate in the CD are challenges that the First Committee must take seriously during the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly if meaningful progress is to be made in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Zambia therefore remains committed to the ideals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and hopes that the First Committee will make tangible progress during this sixty-seventh session.

Mr. Ponomarev (Belarus) (*spoke in Russian*): Our delegation associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/67/PV.9).

Belarus, as the first State voluntarily and without precondition to have renounced the nuclear weapons that remained on its territory after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, not only reaffirms its attachment to its non-nuclear status under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but also actively calls on other countries to take tangible steps in the area of nuclear disarmament. We welcome the achievement of the 2010 New START agreement between Russia and the United States of America, and we are certain that it is necessary to take further measures to reduce strategic nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Moreover, such measures should not only include the destruction of outdated nuclear warheads and their means of delivery, but should also envisage obligations to prevent the further improvement of nuclear weapons. We are concerned at the reverse trend we have been seeing in nuclear disarmament and the many factors facilitating it, and we view that as a unilateral plan to deploy a global air defence system on the European continent.

We believe that the multilateral disarmament mechanism has long needed a reboot. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is still awaiting settlement of the most pressing issues connected with nuclear disarmament. We believe that it is only at the Conference on Disarmament that it will be possible to carry out inclusive and equitable negotiations on such issues as banning fissile materials and negative security assurances. In our view, it is specifically the CD that has the necessary capacity and the proper toolbox to

adopt treaties in the area of nuclear disarmament aimed at promoting the fulfilment of obligations under article VI of the NPT.

There are problems in other forums related to nuclear disarmament. The NPT review cycle, in our view, does not yet meet the expectations of non-nuclear-weapon States, including progress towards nuclear disarmament, in particular concerning nuclear disarmament. The noticeable progress towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be immediately bolstered by further accessions to the Treaty by annex 2 countries, particularly States with nuclear arsenals.

Belarus takes the principled position in support of the process of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. As the terrorist threat persists in the modern world, the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the materials and technologies intended to be used to create them, is one of the most serious challenges to international security and stability. Such challenges require the consolidation of the international community's efforts, including consistent and broad cooperation to counteract nuclear terrorism and safeguard nuclear materials.

We highly value the contribution of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and we attach great importance to the development and improvement of the IAEA safeguards system based on the provisions of the NPT. Belarus views the IAEA as the central international body for ensuring the necessary balance of the global physical and nuclear security regime and the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The reduction of proliferation risks would promote the further universalization of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. We are in favour of increasing the role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in the non-proliferation system. I should like to underscore that if the legal institutes to counteract nuclear terrorism are to function effectively, it is important to increase the potential of States to implement their international obligations.

The issue of security assurances is of particular importance in the context of nuclear disarmament. The receipt by NPT non-nuclear-weapon States of legally binding assurances is the key to confidence and predictability in relations between States and will further strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and promote the universalization of the Treaty. The lack of progress in this area gives rise to a whole set of problems in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and blurs the bases and principles of the NPT. In this regard, we are in favour of using the specialized committees or working groups of the Conference on Disarmament to discuss and further develop international agreements on security assurances to non-nuclear States.

We must not forget that one of the most important goals of the non-proliferation regime is to ensure that nuclear technologies will be used only for peaceful purposes. Currently, heightened attention in the world is being paid to the further development of peaceful nuclear technologies in various areas: energy, health, agriculture and environmental protection. Increasing numbers of States are becoming interested in the creation and development of national nuclear energy programmes. Belarus is certain that the IAEA mechanisms should promote the provision of equal and non-discriminatory access for all interested countries to the benefits of nuclear energy. Many such instruments already exist and should be given maximum access to all countries. At the same time, when carrying out peaceful nuclear programmes each member State should act in with maximum transparency, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the obligations under the NPT.

In our view, an important element in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime is the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons. We regret that the idea of creating such a zone in Eastern and Central Europe has not been fully implemented in practical terms. In this regard, we call on other States of other regions to follow the example of those that have created nuclear-weapon-free zones. We hope that all directly affected parties, particularly in the Middle East region, will take practical steps to create in the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.