



# General Assembly

Sixty-sixth session

## First Committee

**14**<sup>th</sup> meeting

Monday, 17 October 2011, 3 p.m.  
New York

Official Records

*Chair:* Mr. Viinanen ..... (Finland)

*In the absence of the Chair, Ms. Borland (Belize),  
Vice-Chair, took the Chair.*

*The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.*

### Agenda items 87 to 106 (continued)

#### **Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items**

**The Acting Chair:** Before we proceed with statements under the conventional weapons cluster, I shall call on those speakers remaining on our list for the morning meeting under the clusters “Other weapons of mass destruction” and “Outer space (disarmament aspects)”.

**Mr. Danon (France)** (*spoke in French*): The segment of our debates devoted to other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is of critical importance for my delegation. Weapons of mass destruction pose a threat that we cannot afford to treat as a secondary issue.

In order to address the threat, the international community has available to it a number of specialized instruments tailored to the specifics of the main types of weapons that we are discussing. All those instruments are essential; they must all be universalized and scrupulously respected to ensure that they provide the best possible prevention that the international community can implement against this multifaceted threat.

As a depositary State of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in war of chemical and bacteriological chemical weapons, France reaffirms its attachment to that instrument, which, as far as possible, helps to fill the gaps in the universalization of the major regimes concerning such weapons. France urges all Member States that have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol without delay, and urges those with reservations to withdraw them.

No one should think that the use of such weapons of mass destruction can be justified or go unpunished. In that regard, France maintains its full support for the investigative mechanism that the Secretary-General may initiate with regard to alleged use. We reaffirm that we will contribute, to the extent of our capacity, to a specific request for assistance in implementing the instrument.

This year will be marked by the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) Review Conference. The Convention establishes a key principle for international peace and security: biological weapons must not be developed, produced or held for any reason whatsoever. The universalization of the Convention is therefore a crucial goal. France appeals to all Member States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention, and reaffirms that its provisions must be effectively implemented.

We support the strengthening of all existing instruments and mechanisms to ensure the Convention’s effective functioning, namely, confidence-building measures, assistance for affected States, an intersessional work programme and regular follow-up

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to take into account scientific and technological developments.

We extend our full support to the President-designate of the BTWC Review Conference and the approach that the Ambassador of the Netherlands set out this morning.

The Convention is the cornerstone of the international system to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It must remain an effective instrument. States parties must therefore aim to make the Convention a central component of a more comprehensive architecture to combat the biological threat, whether deliberately provoked or not. Biosafety and biosecurity will be at the heart of France's concerns at the Review Conference in December.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is the other key pillar of the regime prohibiting other weapons of mass destruction. We believe that this essential treaty, whose robustness, seriousness and suitability do not need to be emphasized, must be fully implemented in order to maintain its relevance. It is a unique text in the annals of disarmament; indeed, it is the only international convention governing both the total eradication of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction and providing for a binding verification system — statements, inspections and so on — with robust action with regard to non-proliferation.

The Convention regime covers 98 per cent of the global chemical weapons industry, and provides for the destruction — completed and ongoing — of the most significant global stockpiles. I take this opportunity to welcome the participation in our debates, in the panel organized on 11 October, of Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and to assure him of my country's full support.

The issue of WMD delivery systems is equally central to our debate. Several Security Council resolutions describe ballistic proliferation, along with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as a threat to international peace and security. At this stage the international community does not have a mandate on the issue, but we all know that the Iranian and North Korean programmes, in particular, are moving forward. This is a matter of collective concern, requiring to be dealt with urgently.

We must therefore step up our efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of multilateral arrangements, notably

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the Missile Technology Control Regime. We support the efforts to universalize The Hague Code of Conduct and express our desire to make it more effective. We are determined to continue making the international community aware of this threat and to encourage transparency with regard to ballistic missiles.

**Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): Under this cluster, I would like to comment first on the Chemical Weapons Convention and then on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is the main victim of the use of chemical weapons in contemporary history. As a result of more than 400 attacks with chemical warfare agents during the eight-year war imposed by Saddam against Iran, from 1980 to 1988, more than 100,000 Iranian citizens were either martyred or injured. That figure includes more than 7,000 civilians injured as a result of nearly 30 attacks on Iranian cities and villages.

For instance, on 28 June 1987 Saddam's warplanes, in two separate bombing runs, unleashed sulphur mustard gas bombs on four residential areas of Sardasht, a town in north-western Iran. As a result, more than 130 unprotected civilians were martyred, and almost 5,000 were injured and still suffer from long-term complications.

Recently, an unexploded chemical bomb dropped in that attack was discovered in the city, and it is now in the process of destruction under monitoring by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). It is noteworthy that the anniversary of this tragedy is commemorated in Iran as the National Day to Call for a Ban on Chemical Weapons.

Despite that painful experience, Iran not only did not resort to using chemical weapons in retaliation for such chemical weapon attacks during the imposed war, but also promulgated a very public stance against the use of chemical weapons, and afterwards actively participated in the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Iran was among the first countries to sign and ratify that legally binding instrument.

There is well-documented evidence that almost 455 companies, mostly from Western countries, including the United Kingdom, France and the United States, were involved in the development of Saddam's

chemical weapons programme. Nearly 30 United States companies were among those that supplied more than two thirds of the equipment and material required for such a programme. Given that all of those companies were under the scrutiny of their Governments, they could not transfer chemical weapons precursors to Saddam without their Governments' blessing.

France also provided the dictator Saddam with other weapons, including more than 60 Mirage F-1 warplanes and Exocet missiles to strengthen the dictator's ability to deliver weapons. Although French assistance to Saddam could not help him win the war, it had other consequences. In one case, a French Mirage F-1 was used by Saddam's army to launch two Exocet missiles that struck the *USS Stark*, killing more than 40 Americans.

The use of chemical warfare agents, in particular against civilians, mostly women and children, is a clear war crime and a crime of genocide. While Saddam and some of his partners, as the major perpetrators of such crimes, have been properly punished, those who contributed to the development of Saddam's chemical weapons programme have yet to be punished.

The total destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and their production facilities remains the key objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention. As the mere existence of chemical weapons threatens international peace and security and undermines the Convention's integrity and credibility, ensuring compliance by major possessor States with the final extended deadline of 29 April 2012 is vital.

Accordingly, possessor States parties should start sustained and accelerated efforts — as required by the eleventh session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, and within the framework of the Convention and its verification regime — to fully comply with their obligations under the Convention. Otherwise, its *raison d'être* will be seriously challenged, and its credibility will be significantly tarnished. In our view, this important issue should be accurately reflected in the draft resolution on the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The other important issue with regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention is the measures adopted by the United States and the United Kingdom in the destruction of chemical-weapons-related materials in Iraq prior to that country's accession to the Convention. Since such measures were taken without full observance

of the provisions of the Convention, and numerous questions about the issue are still unanswered, it is imperative that the requisite information be circulated to States parties openly, so as to provide the grounds for a consideration of the issues within the OPCW.

Secondly, nearly four decades since the Biological Weapons Convention entered into force, its universality has not yet, regrettably, been realized. We call upon States parties to remain committed to their obligations not to transfer to non-parties equipment and material, including biological agents and toxins, or scientific and technological information. Needless to say, that action with regard to non-parties, and ceasing cooperation with them, would facilitate realization of the Convention's universality.

To ensure the universality of the Convention, the upcoming Review Conference should seriously address the issue and develop an action plan, comprising concrete measures, including the prohibition of transfers to non-parties of any material or technology that could be used in the development of biological weapons.

We strongly support the position of the Non-Aligned Movement on the importance of strengthening the Convention through multilateral negotiations for a legally binding protocol, which unfortunately could not be concluded, because of the adversarial position of a single country in 2001, after years of negotiation. There should be ample opportunity at the Review Conference to discuss this very important issue in order to explore ways and means to respond to the wish of the international community for the early conclusion of such an instrument.

Furthermore, we emphasize that promoting international cooperation, as provided for in article X, and overcoming the arbitrary and politically motivated denial should be adequately dealt with at the next Review Conference. An action plan consisting of practical and concrete measures to strengthen the implementation of that article as the best way to reinforce the Convention should be worked up.

In conclusion, we reiterate our belief in a total ban on the use of biological weapons, and express our concern that the Convention does not explicitly prohibit their use. In that connection, we strongly support the Non-Aligned Movement position in calling on those States that continue to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw them. We appreciate the withdrawal of reservations by a number of States

parties, and call upon all those that still maintain reservations to follow suit.

**The Acting Chair:** We have exhausted the list of speakers on other weapons of mass destruction and now move to disarmament aspects of outer space.

**Ms. Elias (Australia):** The world is increasingly dependent on space for communications, navigation, climate monitoring, electronic commerce and a myriad of other services now necessary for our daily lives. All Member States are in some way dependent on space-related systems. The use of space is important for the sustainable development of all nations. As the number, national diversity and range of satellite applications grow, so does international concern about space security.

The Australian Government is currently preparing a comprehensive national space policy to chart our way forward in this increasingly important domain. But Australia has a long history of involvement with space, becoming the fourth nation to successfully launch its own satellite, from its own territory, in 1967. Our geographic position allows Australia to be an important partner for most major spacefaring nations. For example, we are working with the United States to improve space situational awareness, thereby contributing to a service that warns other States of threats to their satellites from orbital debris, and thus enabling timely evasive action.

Australia strongly supports the development of a rules-based approach to managing the space domain, and is committed to contributing to the development of appropriate international norms for behaviour in outer space.

Australia is seriously concerned about the problem of long-lived orbiting space debris. We consider that the most pressing task for the international community is to prevent actions that increase the already serious levels of debris threatening the safety of satellites and human space travel. The inappropriate use of weapons to destroy satellites can create enormous volumes of long-lived orbiting space debris. Unless we find effective means to prevent such actions, we risk losing the benefits of space for all.

Australia welcomes the decision of the General Assembly, in resolution 65/68, to establish in 2012 a group of governmental experts on space transparency and confidence-building measures. Australia stands

ready to actively contribute to the important work of that group.

Australia is disappointed that there has been no substantive progress on space security issues in the Conference on Disarmament, and believes that there is a need for fresh thinking in the Conference on space security, aimed at identifying practical and achievable ways forward.

Australia is increasingly active in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. We welcome the establishment of the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities. We are also honoured to serve as a co-Chair of the expert group on regulatory regimes and as a member of the expert group on space debris, space operations and tools to support collaborative space situational awareness. Complementarity of effort in the Outer Space Committee, the First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament remains vital.

Australia also welcomes constructive contributions to space security being made outside the United Nations context, specifically the proposal put forward by the European Union to develop an international code of conduct for outer space activities. That kind of initiative offers a valuable pathway to developing further international norms on space behaviour.

As space-based systems increasingly become critical infrastructure for nations and critical enablers for the international economy and for development, the security of space becomes even more important. Australia is committed to playing its part in developing practical and appropriate measures to protect space for all.

**Mr. Prunariu (Romania):** When it was released, in June 1989, “Star Trek V: The Final Frontier” was considered pure science fiction. As we speak, space has become the final frontier in reality. Not only for our globalized life, but also for individual nations, outer space itself and the growing activities undertaken there are of crucial importance.

With some significant milestones behind it, Romania has the status of a spacefaring nation. This year my country celebrated a twofold anniversary, as it is 50 years since the first human ventured beyond the Earth’s atmosphere and 30 years since the first experience of a Romanian in outer space. Coming to

the present day, let me point out just a few events that have taken place in 2011.

In January, in Bucharest, the Government of Romania and the European Space Agency (ESA) signed the agreement for my country's accession to the ESA Convention. As the nineteenth fully fledged member, Romania will benefit from all the Agency's programmes, including the transfer of technology and know-how. Direct access to ESA space systems will contribute to development at a higher level of space applications in the fields of agriculture, the environment, transportation, disaster management and medicine.

From 8 to 13 May, Bucharest hosted the second International Academy of Astronautics Planetary Defence Conference, which considered all aspects of the asteroid impact threat, including observations and orbital determination, impact physics, spacecraft missions to asteroids, mitigation/deflection techniques and even disaster management and the political aspects of the near-Earth object threat.

The Global Earth Observation System of Systems Summer School was organized in Constanța from 29 August to 4 September, with the main goal being to acquire knowledge on current use of Earth observation data and image information mining techniques, contributing to the prevention, monitoring and assessment of the impact of natural and man-made disasters and crisis situations.

I must not neglect to mention a first for my country, namely, the fact that the Romanian Space Agency and the Măgurele Space Sciences Institute will take part in the planning and preparation for the Euclid space mission. On 5 October, ESA selected that mission to be part of the Cosmic Vision Programme, to be launched in 2019.

Romania holds the chairmanship of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for the period 2010 to 2012. On 1 June, as Chair of the Committee, I had the privilege to preside over the meeting dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary of the first manned space flight and of the Committee's first session.

Romania was among the founders of the Committee, in 1959, and for many years it held the position of Vice-Chair, being involved from the very beginning in the elaboration of the main legal framework concerning States' activity in outer space. Between 2004 and 2006, Romania also held the position of Chair of the Scientific

and Technical Subcommittee. Taking into account all those activities, Romania believes that it is crucial to work towards preserving a peaceful, safe and secure outer space environment, and to use it on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis.

We all recognize and abide by the existing international legal framework regulating the peaceful uses of outer space. In that context, Romania follows with great interest the multilateral debates on the necessity and opportunity to further elaborate and strengthen it.

As a member State of the European Union, Romania took part in the elaboration of the draft international code of conduct for outer space activities. We reiterate that the draft code is intended to be applicable on a voluntary basis to all outer space activities conducted by States, as well as by non-governmental entities. The new multilateral instrument will lay down the main rules to be observed by spacefaring nations in both civil and military activities. Conceived as a transparency and confidence-building measure, the code has as its core aim to provide measures to prevent space from becoming an area of conflict.

In the same vein, Romania reaffirms its interest in engaging in real debate in the Conference on Disarmament on the agenda item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". In that respect, we again call for the resumption of the Conference's substantive activities, with negotiation of the fissile material cut-off treaty in parallel with discussions on all remaining subjects.

Finally, Romania has been a sponsor of the draft resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities traditionally submitted by the Russian Federation and China. We look forward to the setting up next year of the group of governmental experts to conduct a study of those issues.

**Ms. Kennedy** (United States of America): Today space systems touch nearly all aspects of our daily lives, and are vital to enhancing our national security, foreign policy and global economic interests, as well as expanding scientific knowledge.

Space exploration was characterized for years as a race between two super-Powers, but today virtually all Governments, their citizens and commercial sectors rely on space systems. Those systems provide global

benefits as well as national benefits, and contribute to enhancing stability in space.

The interconnected nature of space capabilities and the world's growing dependence on them mean that irresponsible acts in space can have damaging consequences for all. All nations have the right to use space and explore space, but with that right also comes responsibility.

The United States is committed to addressing the challenges of today's contested space environment. Indeed, all nations must work together to adopt approaches for responsible activity in space in order to preserve that right for the benefit of future generations. It is in the shared interest of all nations to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions and mistrust.

The United States is committed to strengthening international collaboration to enhance safety, sustainability, stability and security in space. The United States National Space Policy affirms that we are open to considering space-related arms control concepts and proposals, provided they meet the rigorous criteria of equitability and effective verifiability, and of course enhance the national security of our country and its allies. The United States cannot support proposals for arms control that do not meet those criteria, nor can we support attempts to establish artificial linkages between such proposals and pragmatic and voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures.

Measures that promote transparency and confidence-building — such as providing prior notifications of launches of space launch vehicles, establishing best practices guidelines and warning of risks of collisions between space objects — enhance stability, safety and sustainability, and thus strengthen our mutual security interests.

Our bilateral space-related efforts at transparency and confidence-building measures include close-approach notifications, discussions on mechanisms for information exchanges on natural and debris hazards, expert visits to military satellite flight control centres, and regular space security dialogues with both established and emerging spacefaring nations. The experience of the 2009 collision between a commercial Iridium Communications satellite and an inoperable Russian Cosmos military satellite was a great impetus in the establishment of those dialogues, including our ongoing dialogue with Russia.

In the realm of multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures, the United States believes that efforts to adopt space transparency and confidence-building measures should be built from top-down negotiations, as well as upon bottom-up initiatives developed by Government and private sector satellite operators. The United States is taking a leadership role in the working group of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on long-term sustainability, which is a key forum for the international development of best practices guidelines for orbital debris mitigation and space situational awareness, which are foundational to efforts to pursue transparency and confidence-building measures to enhance stability and security.

Additionally, the United States is considering the European Union's proposal for a politically binding international code of conduct for outer space activities. A politically binding international code of conduct signed by established and emerging space Powers can help to enumerate best practices, reduce the chance of collisions or other harmful interference with other nations' activities and strengthen stability in space.

I would highlight that the United States is already following many of the practices laid out in the current draft of the code, such as warning of potential orbital collisions, notifying of high-risk re-entry hazards, publishing our national security space policies and strategies and providing pre-launch notification of civil and national security launches.

The United States also looks forward to working with our colleagues in the international community next year in the group of governmental experts on outer space transparency and confidence-building measures established under resolution 65/68. It is our hope that the group will serve as a constructive mechanism to examine voluntary and pragmatic transparency and confidence-building measures in space that remedy today's concrete problems and promote both safe and responsible operations in space.

The United States supports the full consideration of all relevant proposals for bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures, including measures aimed at enhancing the transparency of national security space policies, strategies, activities and experiments; notifications regarding actual or potential environmental or unintentional man-made hazards to space flight safety; and enhanced procedures

for international consultations regarding outer space operations in order to prevent incidents in outer space and to prevent or minimize the risks of potentially harmful interference.

The United States again reaffirms our commitment to strengthening the stability of the space environment through international cooperation. That is in everyone's interest, and can be achieved through pursuing transparency and confidence-building measures that promote responsible behaviour and the peaceful use of space. Such cooperation among established and emerging members of the spacefaring community will enhance our common security.

Let me conclude by saying what a pleasure it was to speak just after our Romanian colleague, a former cosmonaut and, of course, Chair of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and also to say how much we enjoyed sponsoring, together with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and other colleagues, the annual UNIDIR Space Seminar, which we look forward to again next spring.

**Mr. Tilegen** (Kazakhstan): I am grateful for the opportunity to present my delegation's stance in this thematic debate on outer space.

The importance, and robust expansion of, the space domain as a resource environment is increasing, compelling us to review security and disarmament issues related to outer space.

With a larger number of space actors and stakeholders, and their diverse ways of using and relying upon outer space and space assets, there are increased benefits and risks. Our space environment is extremely fragile and vulnerable to being used in an unsustainable fashion. That reality makes space security an urgent issue, and it is encouraging to note that the international community is beginning to address it.

Kazakhstan endorses the initiatives of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, which have put forward a draft treaty on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space, and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects. However, due to gridlock within the Conference on Disarmament and a number of other political difficulties, the push towards a binding international agreement has not made much headway.

Although there seems to be widespread agreement among delegations about the importance of space

security, they lay different emphasis on non-binding transparency and confidence-building measures relative to formal treaties. Kazakhstan calls for a combination of both: a strong unequivocal treaty reinforced by transparency and confidence-building measures, as proposed in the draft resolution of the Russian Federation and China that became resolution 65/68, under which a group of governmental experts on the subject is to convene its first meeting in July 2012.

We can look forward to a road map for the future, building on the work of the first Group of Governmental Experts, set up 20 years ago, and its report (A/48/305) on confidence-building measures in outer space, including the different technologies available and possibilities for defining appropriate mechanisms of international cooperation in specific areas of interest.

It is absolutely essential that the international community commit its best efforts to this group of governmental experts initiative, which establishes norms of responsible behaviour in space, perhaps even addressing some of the national security concerns of spacefaring nations, so that they no longer feel the need to explore the possibility of weaponizing this fragile environment.

In addition, Kazakhstan is convinced that placing weapons in outer space would result in an advantage for the few, thus generating walls of distrust and suspicion, which we are only now beginning to break down with regard to nuclear and other weapons. What is more dangerous is that action by some countries with advanced space warfare technology can result in non-proliferation by other countries that also want to acquire it, as in the nuclear field.

Past experience has proved that such a theatre of military action can be concealed, thus becoming a major breach of international security. Presently, more than 130 countries possess sophisticated space programmes, or are developing them, using information from space assets for their own defence. Member States need to ensure that such dangerous weapons systems do not undermine the existing structure of agreements on arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear missile sphere.

Kazakhstan has no intention of pursuing the development of space weapons, or of deploying them in outer space, now or in the future. On the other hand, my country, which hosts on its territory the first and largest cosmodrome, the Baikonur, is actively developing

a national civilian space programme, including the creation of a space rocket complex, Baiterek. That set-up will facilitate the country's becoming part of the world space services market, with access to the latest technologies within the norms of international collective security.

In July 2005, Kazakhstan acceded to the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and it is actively working to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Although not a formal member of the MTCR, Kazakhstan has strictly followed the Regime's regulations in its export policy for the past several years, and hopes to gain the support and confidence of member States to make possible its bid for membership at the next session of the MTCR.

My country stands ready to cooperate in a collective collaboration with others to guarantee the full realization of our goal of an international community based on fairness and equality, without any exception. Our past and current lessons regarding difficulties in abolishing accumulated weapons of mass destruction, both nuclear and chemical, prove the need to prevent similar obstacles to eliminating space weapons and space debris in the future. Any short-sightedness would only reduce our limited global financial resources for sustainable development, which the United Nations is striving to accomplish.

In conclusion, Kazakhstan emphasizes that our common goal is to ensure that space remains a sphere of cooperation, free from weapons, for humankind to use for its peaceful development and advancement.

**Mr. Wang Qun** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): Humankind has marched into the sixth decade of outer space exploration, and manned space flight has a 50-year history. Recently, China successfully launched the Tiangong-1 — Heavenly Palace-1 — as a target spacecraft for rendezvous and docking experiments, thus ushering in a new era of China's manned space flights, and also reflecting the fact that China is committed to the noble goal of promoting the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, maintaining peace and bringing benefits to humankind.

As a global public space, outer space is the common wealth of humankind. Enduring peace in outer space has a bearing on every nation's security, development and prosperity. Meanwhile, with humankind's growing reliance on outer space, the risks of its weaponization

and an arms race in it are on the rise, and the uncertainties concerning outer space security are growing as well. Safeguarding outer space for peaceful uses and preventing its weaponization and an arms race there are the common interests and obligations of all countries.

What is gratifying is that, in responding to that growing security challenge in outer space, the international community has found more common ground with regard to opposing the weaponization of outer space and preventing an arms race there. The General Assembly has in consecutive years adopted by an overwhelming majority a resolution on preventing an arms race in outer space, and has called for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a legally binding international instrument on the issue.

The Chinese Government always firmly opposes the weaponization of outer space and an arms race in outer space, and dedicates itself to efforts to maintain peace and security in outer space. China has been the co-sponsor of the resolution entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", and actively promotes its implementation at the Conference on Disarmament.

China and Russia jointly submitted to the Conference, in 2008, a draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects. In 2009, focusing on the comments and proposals made by many other members of the Conference, China and Russia submitted a working paper further clarifying and explaining the draft treaty. We hope that the Conference on Disarmament will start substantive discussions on the draft treaty as soon as possible. We are ready to work with all other parties to enrich and improve the draft treaty by discussing effective ways to deal with a series of related issues, including verification.

China attaches great importance to outer space transparency and confidence-building measures, and is open to relevant initiatives and discussions. We believe that appropriate and viable transparency and confidence-building measures are of positive significance, as they enhance mutual trust, reduce misjudgements, regulate outer space activities and maintain outer space security. They are useful supplements to the international legally binding instrument on the prevention of the weaponization of outer space and of an arms race in outer space.

At the same time, transparency and confidence-building measures and the prevention of an arms race in outer space are two parallel processes. China is of the view that, on the one hand, a set of transparency and confidence-building measures arrangements can eventually be reached on the basis of consensus through extensive, open and equal international deliberations. On the other hand, as they are voluntary, transparency and confidence-building measures are not legally binding, and they cannot substitute for the negotiation of a new legally binding instrument on outer space. In that respect, the Russian Federation and the European Union have been making useful and unremitting efforts over many years.

Resolution 65/68 requests the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts on transparency and confidence-building measures to provide a highly authoritative platform for the relevant international discussions. China looks forward to a comprehensive, in-depth exchange of views with relevant parties in that framework.

*The Chair took the Chair.*

The Chinese Government takes note of the efforts made by the European Union on a draft code of conduct for outer space activities. China believes that the draft code, which focuses on the peaceful uses of outer space, would by no means dilute the process of discussing within the Conference on Disarmament the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We hope that the European Union can deal with the concerns of all the relevant parties appropriately, so as to conclude a code of conduct acceptable to all.

Peace, development and cooperation are the irreversible trends of the times. The early conclusion of a new international legally binding instrument to prevent the weaponization of outer space is of fundamental importance to lasting peace and tranquillity in outer space. China is willing to join hands with all countries to contribute to maintaining peace and security in outer space.

**Mr. Manfredi (Italy):** The prevention of an arms race in outer space and the need to prevent outer space from becoming an area of conflict are essential conditions for the strengthening of strategic stability. Italy is fully committed, together with its European Union (EU) partners, to strengthening the security of activities in outer space that contribute to the development and security of States. Both bilaterally and

as an active member of the European Space Agency, and as one of its chief contributors, my country therefore promotes international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

We supported last year's draft resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space, submitted by the Russian Federation and sponsored by my country. We encourage the establishment of effective transparency and confidence-building measures among the most active spacefaring nations. We are committed to the implementation of last year's resolution (resolution 65/68) and look forward to the role to be played by the group of governmental experts in that regard.

Together with its EU partners, Italy supports the elaboration of an international voluntary set of guidelines that would strengthen the safety, security and predictability of all space activities. Such guidelines should, among other things, limit or minimize harmful interference, collisions or accidents in outer space, as well as the creation of debris.

To that end, the EU has proposed an international code of conduct for outer space activities. A draft code has been prepared and is currently being discussed by the EU with a number of key partners. The code is based on three principles, namely, the freedom for all to use outer space for peaceful purposes; the preservation of the security and integrity of space objects in orbit; and due consideration for the legitimate security and defence needs of nations. Italy has been supportive of the initiative from the very beginning.

The purpose of the draft code is not to duplicate, or compete with, initiatives already dealing with this specific issue, including those presented at the Conference on Disarmament. On the contrary, as a transparency and confidence-building measure, the international draft code does insist on the importance of taking all measures in order to prevent space from becoming an area of conflict, and calls on nations to resolve any conflict in outer space by peaceful means.

We hope that the discussion during this session will help to clarify issues related to the EU proposal for an international code of conduct. Italy stands ready to share information on the matter.

**The Chair:** I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.14.

**Ms. Muthukumarana** (Sri Lanka): Sri Lanka's long-standing position is that outer space is part of the world heritage and must be explored and utilized for peaceful purposes and for the benefit and in the interest of all humankind, in a spirit of cooperation.

For many years, Sri Lanka and Egypt have alternately presented the draft resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This year's draft resolution (A/C.1/66/L.14), which my delegation is introducing, recognizes the long-held general understanding regarding this issue, and therefore closely follows last year's resolution, with only technical updates.

The human race has long engaged in arms races on land, at sea and in the air. Outer space must not become another arena for an arms race. A series of grave consequences could arise from the deployment of any weapon in outer space. In addition, the deployment of weapons in outer space could seriously threaten the security of outer space assets, and has the potential to harm the Earth's biosphere and to give rise to space debris. It is much easier to prevent an arms race from taking place than to control it or roll it back once it has begun.

Technologies associated with outer space are nowadays used extensively for peaceful purposes. It is the duty and responsibility of all States to ensure that the rapid advances in space technologies are exploited for peaceful purposes beneficial to human life.

The text of this year's draft resolution, like resolutions on this topic in previous years, recalls and affirms several international agreements on this subject, as well as understandings reached in several forums. The draft resolution emphasizes the complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral efforts and stresses the importance of greater transparency in sharing information on all bilateral efforts in this field. It also recognizes that the Conference on Disarmament — the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum — has the primary role in addressing this issue.

My delegation hopes that the draft resolution will enjoy the widest possible support, reflecting the collective will of the international community. We encourage all members of the Committee to support the draft resolution as a manifestation of the general desire of humankind to prevent an arms race in outer space.

**Mr. Park Chul-min** (Republic of Korea): This year marks a significant milestone in the history of space

activities and international cooperation, namely, the fiftieth anniversary of the first human space flight. That accomplishment opened a new frontier of science, with advances and applications in a wide variety of fields, such as weather forecasting, disaster management and telecommunications.

Over the past five decades, our ventures into space have made unprecedented contributions to the well-being of humankind by facilitating progress towards sustainable development. In view of the advantageous impact of space science on humankind as a whole, maintaining space for peaceful purposes and preserving it as a useable domain will be a key challenge as we consider the future of humankind in outer space.

Given the importance of the peaceful and cooperative use of outer space, and the active discussions simultaneously taking place in various international forums, we will be able to achieve maximum synergy by sharing expertise and experience. In that regard, my delegation emphasizes the importance of close cooperation and enhanced dialogue among forums such as the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the Conference on Disarmament, the First Committee and the Fourth Committee, and the International Telecommunication Union.

As the number of satellites increases, so does the amount of space debris in outer space, with an increased likelihood of collisions. In that regard, there is an urgent need to enhance the multilateral framework concerning the preservation of a peaceful, safe and secure environment in outer space.

There seems to be a growing consensus in the international community that the existing outer space framework remains desirable. The major spacefaring countries can make constructive proposals, such as the new United States Space Policy in this regard.

That is why the Republic of Korea considers the discussion of the prevention of an arms race in outer space to be of great importance. My Government believes that there needs to be balanced consideration of improved implementation and universalization of the existing international regime; the development of transparency and confidence-building measures; and the introduction of a new legally binding instrument that is not mutually exclusive.

As a party to the Outer Space Treaty, the Space Liability Convention, the Rescue Agreement and the Registration Convention, the Republic of Korea actively supports efforts to promote the understanding, acceptance and implementation of the existing international regime. Over the past 50 years, we have sought ways to promote universal adherence to, and ensure full compliance with, existing agreements and arrangements made by spacefaring nations. Progress is evidenced by the increased number of States parties to those agreements, such as the Registration Convention and The Hague Code of Conduct, as well as the increased awareness among States of their obligations regarding outer space activities.

Transparency and confidence-building measures are highly important elements in ensuring multilateral cooperation with regard to the peaceful uses of outer space. Transparency and confidence-building measures have enhanced stability and security in outer space by reducing tensions and preventing conflicts.

Because of the huge impact on long-term human activities in space, the need for international coordination remains high. In that regard, we support resolution 65/68 and look forward to actively participating in 2012 and 2013 in the work of the group of governmental experts that the Secretary-General will establish under the resolution.

In addition, we note the endorsement of space debris mitigation guidelines by the General Assembly, and also appreciate the European Union's endeavours to elaborate a draft code of conduct on outer space activities as a concrete effort to enhance transparency and confidence-building measures.

With regard to efforts to create a new legally binding instrument, my Government notes the submission by the Russian Federation and China of a draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat to use force against outer space objects. The prevention of an arms race in outer space has been one of the core issues in the Conference on Disarmament, and the draft treaty may be used as a meaningful reference in substantive discussions when the Conference on Disarmament adopts a programme of work.

The Republic of Korea has been actively pursuing and sharing the benefits of space technology and scientific cooperation. Since April, Korea's first geosynchronous satellite, the first satellite in the world to carry both an ocean colour imager and a meteorological

imager, has been providing meteorological and marine environment monitoring services. Moreover, the Korea Multi-purpose Satellite-5, which is scheduled to be launched in mid-November, will carry Korea's first synthetic aperture radar, capable of executing all-weather and all-day observations.

Korea also attaches great importance to sharing information and technology at the regional and international levels by providing satellite imagery to help restore regions after natural disasters and by holding training programmes for developing countries.

As we look forward to the next half century of space exploration, Korea remains firmly committed to cooperation in the scientific and legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space. We anticipate that human activities and international interaction in outer space will only increase as space-related technologies continue to advance and become more widespread. In the light of those expected developments, my delegation reiterates its support for multilateral efforts to ensure the sustainable, long-term use of space for the benefit of all humankind.

**Ms. Milot (Canada)** (*spoke in French*): The importance of space is growing every year, and with it the urgency of the need to ensure secure and sustainable access for all. Services that depend upon space-based assets, such as communications, navigation and disaster response, to name just a few, have become indispensable utilities of many societies and, indeed, for international commerce and cooperation.

Although still prohibitive to many, the technical and economic barriers that impede many States' access to the space domain are steadily falling away, and today more than 60 nations and commercial enterprises have deployed their own assets in space. Canada welcomes that development. A growing number of nations, including Canada, consider such space assets to form part of their critical national infrastructure. Our discussion here will contribute to a shared understanding of the risks, rights and obligations associated with our use of space.

While it is true that a rapid expansion in the numbers of deployed spacecraft will increase congestion and competition for suitable orbits and frequencies, Canada believes that international awareness of the related space security issues is also expanding apace. We welcome that. Canada has long advocated transparency and confidence-building measures among spacefaring nations as key steps towards mitigating the risks that

we all face, including the significant dangers posed by navigational hazards such as space debris.

Space debris represents a significant hazard that affects both manned and unmanned spacecraft in orbit, and it is a worsening problem. Although we are pleased to note that there have been no major debris-causing events in the past year, the inventory of dangerous objects in orbit created by past events continues to grow. Canada believes that it is the responsibility of all spacefaring nations to make good-faith efforts to minimize the production of space debris and other navigational hazards resulting from their activities. Prevention alone, however, is not enough. It is also time for the international community to examine practical methods for removing space debris from useable orbits.

*(spoke in English)*

Canada welcomes and encourages both the development and the implementation of debris mitigation standards, as some spacefaring nations have done, as well as efforts to share information regarding existing hazards, which enhance the situational awareness of all nations operating in the space domain. In that regard, we welcome the establishment of the Working Group on the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. We look forward to its work, particularly its study of workable methods for dealing with space debris.

We also note the efforts of the United States to issue conjunction warnings, which have permitted other operators to protect their spacecraft from collisions with space debris, as well as the work of the Space Data Association, which encourages the sharing of positional information among commercial satellite operators in order to prevent electromagnetic interference. Those are practical examples of international technical cooperation that benefit us all.

Canada has consistently opposed the weaponization of space, and continues to do so. In the past, we have proposed measures that call for a ban on the placement of weapons in outer space; the prohibition of the use of satellites themselves as weapons; and the prohibition of the testing and use of weapons on satellites so as to damage or destroy them.

We believe that momentum is building for the development of international norms for the responsible use of space by all actors.

**Mr. Vasiliev** (Russian Federation) *(spoke in Russian)*: The Russian delegation, together with the People's Republic of China, has submitted a draft decision (A/C.1/66/L.11) on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities. The draft decision contains a reference to resolution 65/68, of the same title, adopted on 8 December 2010, which inter alia calls on the Secretary-General to create a group of governmental experts on transparency and confidence-building measures, to start its work in 2012, and to submit a report on the outcome to the General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session.

After a hiatus of 20 years, therefore, there will again be a group of governmental experts on this extremely important issue. In those 20 years, space exploration and the use of space have attained truly global proportions. As has already been noted in a number of statements, more than 60 States have their own satellites in orbit, while 130 States Members have their own space programmes. It is difficult to imagine the lives of people in all corners of the world without satellite television or satellite communication.

The sharp rise in space assets in recent years has significantly increased risks in space activities, too. Space debris, satellites colliding and the danger of the weaponization of outer space are just a few examples of the challenges in that area.

Moreover, discussions, including those during the previous session, show that the international community has virtually reached consensus on the need for additional measures to ensure outer space security, with a first step to that end being the enhancement of transparency and confidence-building measures in space.

Among other things, in the past few years, more than 30 countries have submitted to the Secretary-General their views on transparency and confidence-building measures in space, in response to a General Assembly resolution. Documents containing specific proposals in this area have been submitted by the countries of the European Union, the Non-Aligned Movement, the United States, Canada, China, Russia and a number of others. All that should serve as a good basis for the upcoming work of the group of governmental experts.

It is also important to note the interaction with specialized bodies — the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the International Telecommunication Union and the World Meteorological

Organization — and with national and regional outer space agencies.

In supporting the adoption of additional transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, as an overdue step towards ensuring outer space security, we of course do not rule out the continuation of work to tackle other important issues in that area. Russia is a sponsor of the draft resolution (A/C.1/66/L.14) on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which was introduced this year by the delegation of Sri Lanka. It is well known that, together with China, we brought before the Conference on Disarmament in 2008 a draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space. We trust that, as part of a balanced programme of work at the Conference on Disarmament, we will be able to continue work on promoting and advancing the treaty.

**Mrs. Dunlop (Brazil):** Never before has the world depended so much on space-based technologies, especially in areas such as information, communication, banking and transport, among many others. An estimated 3,000 satellites are operational, providing vital service in an intricate web of information communications. The interruption of satellite services as a result of weapons in space would cause a major global collapse.

There is widespread recognition of the impending danger resulting from the insufficiency of the legal coverage to deal with the problem of weapons in space. Brazil believes, therefore, that it is in the best interests of the international community to start negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prevent the placement of any kind of weapon in outer space.

Apart from the evidence that there is enough technology today to create and launch space weapons, the need for such an instrument has been recognized in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament as one of the Conference's four core issues. More than 30 years ago, the Conference was called upon by the General Assembly, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, to consider the question of preventing an arms race in outer space.

In addition, in paragraph 5 of resolution 65/44, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, there is the following observation: "the Conference on Disarmament ... has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement ... on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects".

The lack of consensus to move forward this item on the Conference on Disarmament agenda has prompted delegations to submit proposals. One is on transparency and confidence-building measures. Brazil takes note of resolution 65/68, on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, which requests the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts to conduct a study, commencing in 2012, on outer space transparency and confidence-building measures.

While stressing the priority of negotiating a legally binding instrument on strengthening the international outer space regime, Brazil recognizes that global and inclusive transparency and confidence-building measures could be important complementary measures. However, although such measures can be relevant in certain circumstances, they are not legally binding.

Brazil understands that not having an agreement on a treaty concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space may lead States to explore intermediate alternatives. However, there should be efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to push forward towards negotiations focused on a legal instrument.

The proposal of a draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects, submitted in 2008 by Russia and China, is a contribution to starting discussion of a legally binding instrument to regulate the matter. In its present wording it is still an outline, with some elements that could be useful in a treaty. But further substance and more precise language are needed. An encouraging aspect of this initiative is that the document has already been the object of fruitful interactions among member States of the Conference on Disarmament.

Having coordinated the four informal meetings held by the Conference on Disarmament, both during the 2010 session as well as at the meeting in 2011, on the agenda item concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space, Brazil believes that there is a clear need for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference to allow direct discussions in order to advance the issue.

Brazil expects the Conference on Disarmament to adopt its programme of work early next year, with the inclusion of a working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. That could be the first concrete step towards bringing together all perspectives and proposals

with a view to the negotiation of an instrument. Many substantive contributions to those debates have been made. The Conference on Disarmament must give due priority to direct those efforts, and focus on adopting a programme of work in order to advance, among other issues, negotiations on a legal text that will ensure that outer space is free of any weapons, and that activities and objects in outer space are exempt from any threat and from any use of force.

Forward movement in the Conference on Disarmament implies political will to engage in discussions. Some Member States blame the Conference on Disarmament, affirming that it is a dysfunctional institution because of, among other things, its consensus rule, which prevents negotiations in certain areas. Surprisingly, concerning other items, such as the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the use of consensus is deemed perfectly legitimate. The criticism of this rule as a factor jeopardizing the Conference on Disarmament, according to those States, applies only to difficulties surrounding agenda items that they deem ripe for negotiation, which is the same as stating that they are not willing to limit their military power. Therefore, if we wish to advance the programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament, there must be coherence and commitment on the part of its members to engage in all the issues on the agenda for disarmament.

**Mr. Kim Yong Jo** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Outer space is a common property of humankind, and its peaceful exploration and use are directly interlinked with global peace and security, together with sustainable development worldwide. It is regrettable to have to say that negative attempts by specific States to militarize space have been daily emerging as serious challenges threatening the world's peace and security.

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, one of those countries with the capacity to manufacture and launch satellites, takes this opportunity to express its views on the challenges in outer space.

It is the reality of today that outer space is being used by certain countries for their strategic policies, and huge amounts of financial resources are invested and directed to that end. One of the clearest and most representative examples of that is the missile defence system pursued by the United States.

As the world well knows, in 2002 the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile

Treaty in order to escape the legal constraints on missile defence systems. Since then, the United States has pursued a missile defence system.

In 2008, Japan abrogated its domestic law on the prevention of the militarization of space, which had existed for more than 40 years. Japan adopted a new basic space law in order to pave the way for the militarization of space. It now actively collaborates with the United States in developing a missile defence system.

The missile defence system is aimed at securing primacy by means of outer space, thereby inciting another arms race in outer space. There is now a need for the establishment, as soon as possible, of new multilateral legal systems that are more effective in preventing the militarization of space.

In that context, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea warmly welcomes and strongly supports international initiatives such as the draft treaty for the prevention of the placement of arms in outer space, presented jointly by China and Russia at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in 2008. We call on the First Committee to give due attention to negative elements that can give rise to a new arms race in space, and to redouble its efforts to prohibit the militarization of space at an early date.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as a State party to the Outer Space Treaty, will continue to participate actively in the peaceful exploration of outer space and will extend its full cooperation to international initiatives to prevent the militarization of space.

**Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly believes that outer space is the common heritage of humankind and must be explored and utilized exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit and interests of humankind and future generations.

We also share the view that space science and technology and their applications, such as satellite communications, Earth observation systems and satellite navigation technologies, provide indispensable tools for long-term solutions for sustainable development, and can contribute more effectively to efforts to promote the development of all countries and regions of the world to improve people's lives, conserve natural resources and

enhance preparedness for disasters and mitigation of their consequences.

My delegation emphasizes the need for the full observance of the principles of non-ownership of outer space and the freedom of States and their sovereign equality to make discoveries and carry out research in outer space. While stressing that access to outer space through space science and technology should be available to all countries, we underscore the importance of the promotion of non-discriminatory cooperation and mutual assistance in making discoveries and carrying out research in outer space.

Iran is strongly opposed to measures aimed at turning space and space technology into the monopoly of a few countries, and believes that the monopolization of outer space is neither an option nor achievable.

Moreover, non-intervention in other States' programmes for exploring and utilizing outer space for peaceful purposes, as well as non-interference in their activities using space-related technology, are principles that all States should fully observe.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, being under restriction and deprived of any assistance in sending its satellites into space, was forced to develop its indigenous space technology by its young scientists, and consequently has made a remarkable advance in space science and technology in recent years. After the launch, in February 2009, of the second indigenously made satellite launch vehicle, Safir-2, carrying our first-ever home-built telecommunications satellite, Omid, and its successful placement in low Earth orbit, Iran is now among the countries with the capability to launch satellites into orbit.

Iran has gained considerable experience in the build-up of outer space science and related technology, which constitute a solid foundation for further advance in implementing its long-term plan to explore and utilize space for peaceful purposes.

Countries like France that consider advanced science, such as space technology, as their monopoly are wrong. Developing nations, including Iran, will advance their space technology. Unfounded allegations of proliferation will never prevent them from doing so.

Iran gives high priority to international cooperation in developing its space programme, particularly in the framework of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. As one of its first members, we

have constantly made a positive contribution to the Committee's activities.

Iran is also an active partner of the United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response, famous as the UN-SPIDER, which was established to ensure that all countries have access to, and develop the capacity to use, all types of space-based information to support the full disaster management cycle.

As a disaster-prone country that faces a particularly hazardous situation resulting from the various types of natural disasters, Iran has been supportive of UN-SPIDER since its establishment, and, as the host to its regional support office, is now an active regional partner of the programme.

The Islamic Republic of Iran was also among the countries that actively contributed to the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization. In a new development, recognizing Iran's wide experience in dealing with a full range of disaster management, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the regional development arm of the United Nations for the Asia-Pacific region, decided in May to establish its regional centre for information, communication and space-technology-enabled disaster management in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In line with our support for measures to engage in the common efforts to use space science and technology and apply them for the benefit of humankind, the Islamic Republic of Iran will host in Tehran this month a regional workshop on the use of space technology for human health improvement. The workshop is being co-organized by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs and the Iranian Space Agency.

My delegation underlines the significance of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are deeply concerned over the negative implications of the weaponization of space, the development of a project under the pretext of a missile defence system and the pursuit of advanced military technology capable of being deployed in outer space, which contribute to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to strengthening disarmament and international security.

Given the inadequacy of existing legal instruments to deter an arms race in outer space, and taking into account the attempts to weaponize outer space in order to seek military and strategic superiority, which could

endanger international peace and security, Iran shares the view that the prevention of an arms race in outer space requires greater urgency.

The development of an anti-missile system by nuclear-weapon States under the pretext of the so-called missile threat aims only at superiority over other nuclear-weapon States in the neighbourhood of Europe and the Far East. It is extremely difficult for the international disarmament expert to be convinced that the main reason to spend billions of dollars to develop an anti-missile system, whose origin is the so-called Star Wars of the 1980s, is to defend against the purely defensive missile programmes of a couple of other countries. Hosting this missile system will definitely not add to the security of the host countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, or the security of the country operating such a system. It would only be a trigger for a new arms race.

I conclude by hoping that we all succeed in demonstrating that space is an asset of humankind with great potential to benefit all human beings, regardless of their technical capabilities. There is no reason why it should not be so, if we all use outer space for peaceful purposes.

**The Chair:** We have heard the last speaker in the segment on outer space disarmament matters.

I shall now call on those delegations that wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply on the clusters concerning other weapons of mass destruction and outer space.

**Ms. Kennedy** (United States of America): Earlier this morning, in discussing weapons of mass destruction, the representative of Iran raised questions about the manner in which the United States recovered and destroyed pre-1991-era chemical weapons in Iraq. I would like to reiterate, as my Government has done repeatedly at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at The Hague, that our immediate destruction of those weapons did not violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and indeed was necessary to support the Convention's object and purpose. It was also necessary to protect military forces, the people of Iraq, the environment and the stability of that country. Our actions were fully consistent with article I obligations under the Convention, and we reject as totally unfounded any allegation that they violated the CWC in those very unusual and unforeseen circumstances.

With regard to the comments about the United States destruction of the chemical-weapon stockpiles, I previously addressed the topic and also circulated the 3 October statement of the Secretary of State, so I will not further detail all of the extraordinary efforts that the United States has made and the transparency with which we have been destroying those stockpiles. Let me note, however, that I find these allegations against the United States in terms of its compliance with weapons of mass destruction treaty obligations not only unfounded, but also, frankly, surreal, coming from a State whose own non-compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been the subject of — let me count — maybe 10 meetings of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and has been referred to the Security Council and been the subject of, I think, six Security Council resolutions. Most recently, in terms of space and the so-called missile threat, Iran might wish to discuss its own nuclear and missile development programme.

**Ms. Adamson** (United Kingdom): I also wish to refer to the questions raised by the representative of Iran about behaviour in Iraq by coalition forces post-2003, and to make the same point, which is that the issue has been discussed repeatedly at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at The Hague, at several Executive Council meetings, to make it clear that our destruction of those weapons did not violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). I also wish to add that we have been in correspondence with many parties to the CWC to clarify the issue a number of times. Therefore, it is an issue on which the United Kingdom has given a number of responses.

I underline the point that the actions we took in Iraq did not violate the treaty, and we explained at The Hague why we took those actions.

**Mr. Amano** (Japan): The delegation of Japan has the pleasure of exercising its right of reply to respond to the statement of the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

As is widely known, Japan is conducting a variety of space activities, but they are all strictly confined to peaceful purposes, in accordance with basic space law. Therefore, the allegation by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea about the nature of Japan's space programme is groundless, and we totally reject it.

**Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I wish to speak in reaction to the comments on the destruction of chemical-weapons-related material in Iraq before that country's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The excuse of protecting the people or troops in Iraq is not in accordance with the Convention, whose provisions are very clear: any chemical weapons found by States parties should be destroyed under strict observation by inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We still await, within the framework of the OPCW, receipt of information in order to assess the situation.

With regard to the reference to the politically motivated Security Council resolution, I refer the Committee to the letter, 20 pages long, that my Minister sent and registered as a United Nations document. In it we gave details elaborating the illegal basis of referring the issue of Iran to the Security Council and the Council's unfounded and illegal resolution.

Iran's nuclear programme, which has always been peaceful and under the International Atomic Energy Agency, has never been a threat to international peace and security — the reason used to find a way to send the issue to the Security Council. We are all aware that this is purely for the narrow political considerations of a few countries, including the United States.

**Mr. Ri Tong II** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I would like to make some observations about the remarks of the representative of Japan concerning Japan's peaceful uses of outer space. What the representative of Japan said is far from the reality. Japan started conducting space activities in 1970, when its first launch took place. Japan was one of the first countries in the Asia-Pacific region to launch a satellite.

Now Japan has gone so far as to launch espionage satellites. There are four military satellites, covering the whole Asia-Pacific region. That means that it has an eye over the territories of the Asia-Pacific countries, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In addition, Japan has a missile defence system. In 1999 Japan started underground joint research with the United States. In this area also Japan went as far as to develop and deploy, successfully undertaking the experimental stages. Japan has an eye in the sky and it has a missile defence system on the ground. That has a great negative impact on the region's strategic balance. Naturally, it gives rise to an arms race in the region.

**The Chair:** We have now finished the clusters concerning other weapons of mass destruction and outer space disarmament matters.

As indicated in our programme of work, we will now take up the conventional weapons cluster, and begin by hearing introductions by the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Continuing Operation and Further Development of the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, Ambassador Klaus Wunderlich, and by the Chair of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán.

I warmly welcome our guests, and I first give the floor to Ambassador Wunderlich.

**Mr. Wunderlich,** Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Continuing Operation and Further Development of the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures: It is an honour to be here today and to present the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Continuing Operation and Further Development of the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, which I had the privilege to chair. I am very grateful for the invitation and this opportunity.

For many years, Germany has taken an interest in the issue of military expenditures. Together with Romania, we have introduced the biennial draft resolution on the matter.

In 2007, under resolution 62/13, the Group of Governmental Experts was tasked with reviewing the operation and further development of the Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures. The Group had 15 members and it held three sessions, one in Geneva in November 2010 and two in New York in February and May 2011. The Group's consensus report was presented to the Secretary-General and submitted to the General Assembly in document A/66/89, of 14 June 2011.

Allow me to briefly outline the course of the Group's deliberations.

This has been the first review exercise since the introduction of the Standardized Instrument, three decades ago. Our mandate was clear: "to review the operation and further development of the Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures"

(*resolution 62/13, para 5 (c)*). We started out to review the operation and had very intensive discussions on all elements of the Instrument.

In the course of our three week-long meetings, we gradually focused on how to further develop the Instrument. My goal was to have a consensus report at the end of our meetings, and we managed to achieve that. Although the report is before the Committee, allow me just to mention a few elements of our discussions, which are also reflected in the report's recommendations.

First, there was agreement among the experts on the continuing importance of the Standardized Instrument.

Furthermore, the Group discussed the low reporting rate and inconsistent participation, and there was an exchange of views on possible reasons.

The Group considered the existing standardized form and its simplified version, and agreed to preserve the Instrument's basic structure. At the same time, experts found that certain modifications to both forms were needed to better accommodate differences in national accounting systems for military expenditures. The standardized and simplified forms should include the same basic elements, to make sure that the same total amounts of military expenditures are arrived at.

In addition, to encourage broader participation by States that do not possess armed or military forces, a "Nil" report form was proposed. Experts also suggested that it might be useful to allow for explanatory remarks and additional factual and documentary information to be submitted by Member States in their reporting. The share of military spending in gross domestic product might be an illustrative example.

When discussing the comparability, reliability and comprehensiveness of data provided by Member States, experts raised the question of a common definition of military expenditures. That was not an easy issue. I am all the more pleased to report that the Group agreed upon the common understanding that, for the purpose of the Instrument, military expenditures would refer to all financial resources that a State spends on the uses and functions of its military forces. It is expected that this common understanding will allow States to better specify the nature of their military expenditures and facilitate more accurate reporting, which would provide for greater comparability of the data. I think that this is an important achievement.

The Group also noted the important role that some regional and subregional organizations have played in the exchange of information on military expenditures, and the fact that reporting to both the United Nations and regional instruments is mutually reinforcing. The Group believed that increased cooperation between the Secretariat and relevant regional organizations, such as the African Union, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Union of South American Nations, could be a good way to promote the Instrument. I encourage delegations to raise this important matter whenever appropriate in the relevant forums and organizations. I myself, together with the Secretary of the Group from the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, had the privilege to do so at the OSCE in Vienna last July.

Furthermore, the Group noted the importance of leveraging existing resources of the United Nations disarmament machinery for promoting the Standardized Instrument and of having high-level officials of the Secretariat actively disseminate information on the Instrument by highlighting its role and importance.

In that context, the Group commended the efforts of the Secretariat, but also reflected upon the challenges for the Office for Disarmament Affairs regarding the transition from the basic provision of information to a user-friendly web-based platform with its particular maintenance and capacity-building needs.

The Group acknowledged that the enhanced management of the Instrument depended on Member States providing adequate extrabudgetary resources for the Secretariat to execute such tasks. My Government stands ready to contribute to that end.

Finally, the Group agreed that in order to ensure the continued relevance and effective operation of the Instrument it would be helpful to periodically review its operation with a view to better adapting it to new security challenges and developments. Experts suggested that, as a first step, a follow-up group of governmental experts could be convened in five years to assess the implementation of the recommendations made in 2011.

The Group believes that its key recommendations — the modifications to the reporting system under the new name United Nations Report on Military Expenditures, the common understanding of military expenditures, and the establishment of a

process for periodic review — will facilitate broader participation in, and the increased effectiveness of, the Instrument. That will ensure its relevance and operation in years to come.

I encourage all delegations to join efforts to strengthen the implementation of this vital and renewed instrument of global transparency.

In conclusion, I thank the members of the Group for their very constructive approach and their individual contributions to the work process, which allowed the Group to arrive at substantive conclusions and recommendations. I have seen some of the national experts attending this Committee. It was a real pleasure and honour to chair the Group and to work constructively with experts from many different Member States and different backgrounds.

I also wish to express the Group's appreciation for the support received from the United Nations Secretariat. I would first like to mention Mr. Sergio Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, who also addressed the Group during its May session here in New York. In addition, I acknowledge the support of Daniel Prins and the members of his branch.

In particular, it is my special pleasure to thank the two persons who supported me most throughout this whole process in an excellent manner. The first is Yuriy Kryvonos, who served as Secretary of the Group. It is fair to say, on behalf of all members of the Group of Governmental Experts, that without him the Group would not have been able to work through such a vast amount of material in only three weeks. The second is Bengt-Göran Bergstrand of Sweden who, as the consultant of the Group, provided excellent analytical and statistical papers. His grasp of the issue is really impressive, and he always had immediate and comprehensive answers to many questions of the experts during our discussions.

**The Chair:** I now give the floor to Ambassador García Moritán.

**Mr. García Moritán,** Chair of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (*spoke in Spanish*): Speaking in my personal capacity as well as on behalf of my delegation, I wish to convey to you, Sir, our satisfaction at the fact that you are chairing our deliberations. Not only are you a distinguished representative, with diplomatic prestige, but you represent a country that has made significant

contributions to disarmament and international security, as Ambassador Sergio Duarte stated clearly here on Friday, when he spoke of Finland's role in the negotiations on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

I am grateful for the invitation to speak here.

I have the honour to brief the First Committee on the work of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, carried out in accordance with its mandate contained in resolution 64/48, and, as I did last year, to present a synthesis of the substantive issues that the Preparatory Committee considered during the year — in this case at two sessions, held from 28 February to 4 March and from 11 to 15 July.

In accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 64/48, the Preparatory Committee was to dedicate its 2010 and 2011 sessions to a substantive exchange of views in order to make recommendations on the elements of an arms trade treaty, and by so doing to facilitate the negotiation process that will take place during the United Nations Conference in July 2012.

The two sessions held this year followed the methodology that I proposed in 2010 and, from a substantive point of view, continued work on the basis of the preliminary list of elements identified then. In that regard, the Committee continued its consideration of the specific elements of the Treaty.

At the February session, the exchange of views focused mainly on the treaty's scope, international cooperation and the criteria and parameters to be taken into account. During the July session, delegations focused on issues related to the implementation and applicability of the treaty, as well as those included in what can be described as the final provisions of the instrument. Both sessions reflected an environment of high-quality diplomacy and an intense exchange of views that I deeply appreciated and that I believe allowed for a comprehensive debate on all the issues that were considered.

The positions of delegations and their suggestions ranged from comprehensive views, emphasizing the need for the treaty to include all kinds of conventional weapons, components, dual-use goods, future technological developments, munitions and ammunitions and explosives, to more selective views, including, for example, those of delegations that

believed that small arms and light weapons should not be incorporated and those that still had doubts about the inclusion of munitions and ammunition. As can be seen, a wide range of issues was addressed in our consideration of the Instrument's scope.

With regard to criteria or parameters, there was also a rich variety of suggestions and alternative positions. On this issue, too, there were differences in what delegations wanted. Nevertheless, the exchange of views allowed for a greater awareness of the position of each delegation and the importance attached to the different criteria outlined.

Delegations also emphasized — I give this by way of example — that it was important to ensure that, among other things, the criteria or parameters finally identified and agreed during the negotiations were not written in such a way as to leave room for subjective interpretations. That will avoid, *inter alia*, their being used for political or self-interested use.

With regard to international cooperation, there was a general readiness to give cooperation and assistance to States requiring it for the adoption of, for example, the appropriate national legislation and technical provisions to comply with the treaty.

On issues related to the implementation and application of the future treaty, each delegation also put forward a significant number of suggestions and perspectives. Nevertheless, I recognized a shared view that the treaty's implementation should be national. I identified no differences on this point.

The different points of view reflected the different degrees of ambition. For some delegations, the treaty must be simple to apply and contain the necessary provisions for common application, while others suggested further details to strengthen — as I interpret it — the objectives and purposes of the Instrument and make it more effective.

On final provisions, as with previous elements, there were also plenty of suggestions, including, for example, on the number of ratifications required for the treaty's entry into force. The same can be said about the mechanism for its revision and other issues related to follow-up on compliance by States parties. Nevertheless, on the latter issue I recognized a shared belief in the need to pay particular attention to bilateral consultations about disputes related to interpretation of the treaty, or other disputes.

The intense exchange of views during both sessions, in February and in July, made it clear that there was a wide variety of perspectives and priorities among delegations. Some highlighted the importance of a treaty that was robust, comprehensive and effective with regard to its purposes and provisions; others still considered it unnecessary to adopt a legally binding instrument. Nevertheless, I believe that the detailed consideration of all the elements that have been identified has allowed for a better understanding of all the problems involved in the negotiation of the treaty.

As I said at the beginning of my statement, I deeply appreciate the generosity of all delegations in allowing me to use a methodology that was at times a little unconventional in order to make progress in the consideration of the issues. On that basis, I took the liberty to present during each session several papers, which were not binding and were not meant to prejudge, with the sole aim of guiding discussions and provoking an active debate.

I did the same at the end of each session. Each paper was my personal interpretation of the discussion, and was not binding on any delegation. The last paper, dated 13 July 2011, is my interpretation of the debate within the Preparatory Committee on all the elements: preamble, principles, objectives, scope, criteria, international cooperation, implementation and final provisions. When that paper was discussed, delegations submitted many suggestions, which consequently are not yet reflected.

In general, I believe that my paper dated 13 July had the merit of generating dissatisfaction among all the participants. I believe that there was consensus on that. Nevertheless, I still think that the paper, which does not bind any delegation and was submitted under my own responsibility, and which did not seek to prejudge the negotiations nor to affect the position of any delegation on the substance, could serve as a reference guide for the elements that should be considered, discarded or negotiated during the Conference.

In my opinion, the Preparatory Committee is doing a good job that will serve constructively to shorten distances when initiating the process of negotiating an instrument during the 2012 Conference. That was made possible by the particular spirit of flexibility demonstrated by all delegations, which allowed me to promote debate and present papers. I extend to all delegations my gratitude and deep appreciation for that

generosity, and also my apologies for having incorrectly interpreted or having discarded issues of relevance to them.

The Preparatory Committee has one session remaining — in February 2012 — in order to conclude our deliberations. I am certain that we shall enjoy the same spirit of cooperation and flexibility demonstrated by all members as has been the case since the beginning of our work.

**The Chair:** I shall now open the floor to those delegations wishing to make comments or ask questions. To that end, I shall suspend the meeting to enable us to continue our discussion in an informal mode.

*The meeting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and resumed at 5.50 p.m.*

**The Chair:** We shall now start our debate on the conventional weapons cluster.

**Mr. Charles** (Trinidad and Tobago): I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the 14 member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons continues to pose an intolerable threat to the maintenance of peace and security in our region. The control, prevention and eradication of the illicit trade in those armaments therefore remain a top regional priority.

The interlinkages between the accessibility to illegal small arms and light weapons and the consequent increase in organized crime, the illicit drug trade and money-laundering activities, as well as armed violence, are indisputable. Consequently, CARICOM States continue to expend a significant amount of financial and other resources to effectively tackle those problems. Those resources could be employed in areas of our economic and social development that require more attention as we seek to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

We recognize that coordinated and concerted action is important if we are to win the fight against that illicit trade, which is cross-border in character. With that in mind, CARICOM member States have made security the fourth pillar of our Community's overall objectives. In keeping with that emphasis, we have created mechanisms geared towards confronting the challenges posed to regional peace and security by the illegal

arms flow. Those include the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) and the Council for National Security and Law Enforcement.

IMPACS has put in place several measures to address the impact of the negative effects of the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons in our States. One such initiative, which, once fully implemented, will provide critical support to authorities in addressing the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, is the development of the regional ballistics information network. That framework will enable law enforcement authorities across the region to share information on identifying and tracing guns used in crime through ballistic identification.

We also welcome the ongoing, direct engagement between IMPACS and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and their joint determination to tackle issues of priority for the region, as expressed following the joint meeting between representatives of the two entities held last month in Trinidad and Tobago. The priority areas of focus identified include the proliferation of illegal guns and related transnational organized crime issues. We value UNODC as an integral partner in our efforts, and look forward to its increased coordination with IMPACS.

CARICOM States are of the view that effective laws and regulations are critical ingredients in our armoury to confront the menace posed by the illegal arms trade. Nevertheless, our leaders also recognize the importance of political commitment to the success of any scheme devised to deal with the issue. In keeping with that objective, at the thirty-second meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, held in July in Saint Kitts and Nevis, heads of Government adopted the CARICOM Declaration on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

That landmark instrument commits heads of Government, among other things, to take all necessary measures to ensure full compliance with the 2001 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, including through the development and implementation of national action plans to combat the illicit trade in such weapons; empower national and regional security entities with the necessary capacities to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, as well as other elements of transnational

organized crime, including in the areas of border control, intelligence-gathering and forensic analysis; and continue to accord the highest national and regional priority to matters related to combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and their ammunition.

Notwithstanding our efforts at the regional level, we remain firm advocates of action at the hemispheric and global levels to assist in combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. We are neither major importers nor producers of small arms and light weapons. However, the combination of our geostrategic location and the porosity of our borders have left us at the mercy of that illicit cross-border trade. The continued solidarity of the international community in addressing this criminal activity is therefore essential.

In that regard, we wish to underscore the importance of the full implementation of the Programme of Action and its International Tracing Instrument. Those non-binding instruments, as well as the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, are vital in assisting Member States in dealing with the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons.

We recognize that cooperation and capacity-building are key pillars of any strategy to successfully address the multifaceted threat posed by the proliferation and accessibility of small arms and light weapons in our societies. We therefore welcomed the convening of the Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts on the Implementation of the Programme of Action, held from 9 to 13 May, which allowed States to exchange best practices in the field of marking, record-keeping and tracing, and to explore further opportunities for enhanced international cooperation and assistance in these areas. CARICOM supports the convening of future open-ended meetings of governmental experts within the context of the Programme of Action.

CARICOM looks forward to the convening of the Programme's second Review Conference, next August and September, and pledges its support to the Chair-designate, Ambassador Ogwu of Nigeria, in ensuring a successful meeting. It is our view that the Review Conference should not be limited to a mere examination of the implementation of the Programme since the last Review Conference, in 2006. Rather, it should aim to strengthen the Programme's implementation, including through discussion of issues related to enhanced cross-border controls.

At this time of global financial and economic uncertainty, many Member States are finding it difficult to mobilize adequate resources to address many issues, including the illegal trade in conventional weapons of all types. CARICOM therefore applauds the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) for the increased assistance rendered to our countries, through the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, aimed at curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them, as described in the Secretary-General's report (A/66/177).

The Regional Centre has assisted CARICOM member States in enhancing the capacity of our law enforcement and judicial personnel; improving our stockpile management capabilities; and aligning our national legislation with global and regional instruments. As we meet, the Centre is engaged in the destruction of surplus and obsolete firearms, an event that commenced in Trinidad and Tobago on 10 October and is scheduled to end on 21 October. That activity is also supported by contributions from Canada and the United States. We commend the Regional Centre for its work in the region, and call on Member States to continue to support the work of UNODA and its regional centres.

We are at a critical juncture in the coordination of the international community's response to the illicit trade in conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons. In 2012, here at the United Nations, we will witness the convening of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, to be followed by the second Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

While we look forward to an enhanced and revised Programme of Action, CARICOM remains fully aware of the potential of a comprehensive, robust and legally binding arms trade treaty in tackling issues related to diversion, brokering and all other measures which could reduce, if not eliminate, the illegal trade in conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons and ammunition.

A legally binding arms trade treaty, with provisions for capacity-building and an effective implementation regime at both the national and international levels, would help reduce armed violence, armed conflict and other crimes that violate international human rights law

and international humanitarian law. It would also make a meaningful contribution to international peace and security.

CARICOM strongly believes that, through continued negotiations in good faith, and with willingness to compromise, those goals will be achieved.

**Mr. Ulibarri** (Costa Rica) (*spoke in Spanish*): The breadth and complexity of the challenges posed by the unfettered flow of conventional weapons, in particular of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, mean that we must find visionary, comprehensive solutions. My country believes that an arms trade treaty can provide such a solution, by establishing shared international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, in order to close the existing gaps in arms control policies that facilitate the diversion of such weapons to the illicit market. Those loopholes all too often allow weapons to fall into the hands of those who would use them to violate international humanitarian and human rights laws.

My country recognizes, as do others, the significant progress achieved in the treaty negotiations under the effective, visionary leadership of Ambassador García Moritán, who has facilitated open and comprehensive discussions to address the many challenges implicit in creating a rigorous, legally binding and verifiable arms trade treaty. We recognize his papers as a solid starting point for the final negotiation of an arms trade treaty and reiterate our willingness to continue to participate fully and constructively in that process. We welcome the fact that hurdles have been overcome in order to reach this crucial juncture in our discussions on the treaty, but it is most important to remember the common objective that has brought us to this point.

As my country noted at the closing of the Preparatory Committee meeting in July, the treaty that we seek to create is not only a goal in and of itself, but also a means to an important end, namely, rectifying the reality recognized in the ninth preambular paragraph of resolution 61/89 that

“the absence of common international standards on the import, export and transfer of conventional arms is a contributory factor to conflict, the displacement of people, crime and terrorism,

thereby undermining peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable development”.

Those fundamental human security concerns require a treaty that is comprehensive in scope and strong in its criteria, built upon respect for that human security.

Costa Rica does not consider those ambitious goals to be incompatible with the treaty’s practicability as an instrument to regulate the arms trade; nor do we believe them to be incompatible with the time set aside for negotiations. On the contrary, the human security objectives of the arms trade treaty are proportionate to its implementation and verifiability, as long as the cooperation, assistance and technical support needed to facilitate universal compliance are present, thereby preventing countries with less rigorous controls from becoming loopholes through which irresponsible transfers pass unchecked.

Costa Rica believes that those should be guiding principles as we continue to negotiate on a non-discriminatory, transparent and multilateral basis. We also recognize and appreciate the participation of civil society organizations, whose experience and expertise have enriched our dialogue throughout the arms trade treaty process.

In conclusion, Costa Rica recognizes that many regional and international regimes, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, have made laudable progress towards confidence-building and strengthening global peace and security.

However, as the human and developmental costs of armed violence continue to rise in Latin America and around the world, it is clear that further steps are needed to block the source of an unrestricted flow of devastating conventional arms. We believe that the time has come to muster the political will in support of an arms trade treaty, in keeping with the criteria to which I have referred.

**The Chair:** I thank all delegations for their hard work today and during the rest of the week. I also thank the interpreters for their flexibility.

*The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.*