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First Committee

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Official Records

President: Mr. Choi (Republic of Korea)

The meeting was called to order at 3:05 p.m.

Agenda items 85 to 100 (continued)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman: In accordance with the programme of work and timetable, the Committee will continue with the second phase of its work — the thematic discussion on item subjects as well as the introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items.

Once again, for this stage of our work there will be no formal list of speakers. Therefore, please inform the Secretariat of your plans to speak prior to the meeting, or request to speak directly from the floor.

Before continuing with our thematic discussion on the issue of nuclear weapons, I would like to give the floor to Mr. Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), whom I officially invited to be our guest speaker for today.

Mr. Tóth: As the new Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) it is a great honour for me to address the First Committee.

Over the next few weeks, issues will be debated that are essential to the future of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Preparatory Commission. I hope that my brief report will support the positive outcome of your important deliberations.

When the Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1996, we were aware that its success would depend upon two crucial factors: its universality and its verifiability. On both points we have made substantial progress since then. As of today, 176 States have signed the CTBT and 125 have ratified it. These impressive numbers demonstrate the ever-growing commitment of the international community to the Treaty. Of the 44 States whose ratification is necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty, 33 have already ratified. The vote of confidence expressed in the large number of signatures and ratifications is a major source of motivation for all of us who are working on the verification system.

The most recent Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was held here in New York from 21 to 23 September 2005, reconfirmed the commitment of the international community to the Treaty and developed an action plan to promote its entry into force. The large number of delegations and the high level of participation was proof of the undiminished relevance of a legally binding, universal, verifiable and total ban on nuclear test explosions to the security interests of the overwhelming majority of nations.

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.

I would like to thank the Chairman of the Conference, Mr. Alexander Downer, the Foreign Minister of Australia, for successfully guiding the work of the Conference. I would also like to thank the Special Representative, my old friend Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, whose work is crucial for the article XIV process. Last but not least, the good cooperation between the Department for Disarmament Affairs and the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) allowed for a smooth conference. I thank Ambassador Abe for that.

Since 1997 the Preparatory Commission has been working on ensuring that the verification system of the CTBT is credible, functional and cost-effective. We are now entering a crucial transition phase where close to two thirds of the system has been built. In the coming years the task of provisionally operating and maintaining the system will become more dominant. Continuous testing and evaluation of the verification system will prove to the remaining sceptics that the CTBT is equipped with a robust verification system capable of detecting nuclear test explosions and all other nuclear explosions everywhere, as mandated in the Treaty.

So far, 217 of the 321 monitoring stations provided for in the Treaty have been installed and substantially meet the Commission's specifications. Over the last two years alone 115 new stations were installed. The building programme is continuing at a sustained pace. Data from the established stations are flowing to the International Data Centre via our global communication infrastructure. In this nerve centre of the verification system the incoming data are collected, processed, analysed and transmitted to States for final analysis. Over three million data segments and products have been distributed to authorized users since 2000.

Over the last two years alone the data traffic between the monitoring stations, the International Data Centre and the 89 national data centres currently in operation has almost tripled from 5 to 14 gigabytes per day. This massive increase documents the improving capacity and growing interest of the national data centres to receive and use our data.

It is the unique feature of the CTBT verification system that it empowers each signatory State to make their own judgment about events based on the data and products provided by the organization. In this respect the Treaty enables States, regardless of their size and

wealth, to fully participate in the verification work and benefit from the wealth of data provided by the system. This includes civil and scientific applications whose potential has only begun to be explored.

In the wake of the tsunami catastrophe of 26 December 2004, the Preparatory Commission decided to test the usefulness of International Monitoring System data in the context of a tsunami warning.

The PTS is working closely with international and national tsunami warning centres through the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in order to ascertain the potential contribution of our data for that humanitarian purpose.

I would like to take this opportunity to underline that the strengthening of the verification regime would be unthinkable without the political and financial commitment of States signatories and the expertise, talent and dedication of the experts working as delegates or staff members in the Provisional Technical Secretariat and in the national data centres.

Those activities are important accessories — but only accessories — to the political will of the international community to bring about the entry into force of the CTBT. The comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions has been a dream for many decades. The political and strategic choices of States, together with scientific and technological advances, have brought us very close to a universal and verifiable regime. I hope that the work of the Committee will further strengthen that political will and create a new dynamism in pursuing our common objective.

The Chairman: I thank Mr. Tóth for his statement. I am certain that it will add value to our discussions today.

As agreed, the Committee will now have an interactive discussion with our guest speaker through an informal question-and-answer session. I intend to suspend the meeting now so that we can continue our discussion in an informal mode.

The meeting was suspended at 3.15 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The Chairman: I shall now give the floor to delegations wishing to comment on the subject of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Loedel (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): I am taking the floor on behalf of the States members of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) — Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay — and the associated States Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

As States that have given up the nuclear option and as parties to the world's first nuclear-weapons-free zone, we continue to forge a determined path towards maintaining the delicate balance between rights and obligations upon which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) rests. Although those rights and obligations are well defined in the Treaty, currently it is evident that efforts are being made to reinterpret them. The countries of the expanded MERCOSUR cannot accept ideas or proposals that contradict both the spirit and the letter of the NPT. As the expanded MERCOSUR sees it, without a multilateral process moving towards transparent, verifiable, irreversible and complete nuclear disarmament, it will be impossible to avoid the dangers posed by nuclear proliferation.

Total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons is the only way to guarantee that such weapons will not fall into the hands of terrorists. Strict observance of all obligations under the Treaty and of the commitments agreed upon at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences are of crucial importance. In particular, we wish to reiterate the need to fully comply with the 13 practical steps agreed upon in the year 2000.

Along with nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, the third pillar upon which the NPT rests is the inalienable right of all States, envisaged in article IV, to conduct research in, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and to receive transfers of material, equipment and scientific and technological information for such purposes. Such cooperation must be accomplished under the terms of the Treaty and in respect for the balance between rights and obligations.

MERCOSUR and its associated States deeply regret the absence of results at the seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT. We call upon all Member States to take the indispensable political decisions to prepare, as of 2007 and with substantive debates, the next review conference. With solid credentials in the field of non-proliferation, our

countries reaffirm that only a systemic concept that includes the components of disarmament, verification, assistance and cooperation will guarantee the elimination of the nuclear threat.

Our subregion is the first whose members have become formal parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). That signals the historic commitment of our countries to perfecting the mechanisms and instruments of the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

As is already known, the CTBT is an instrument of particular relevance in the field of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. As an integral part of the commitments that allowed the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, the entry into force of the CTBT would free the world from nuclear tests, thus contributing to a systematic and progressive reduction in and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, as well as to the prevention of and fight against nuclear proliferation.

We have achieved important steps in that direction. Today, the CTBT enjoys almost universal support, with 175 signatories, of which 125 have already ratified. We welcome efforts to identify measures to promote the entry into force of the Treaty, of which the article XIV conferences have represented important steps. In a year in which we have found ourselves particularly frustrated with the absence of results in the NPT Review Conference and with the silence of the recent High-level Plenary Meeting with regard to disarmament and non-proliferation, the final declaration of the recent Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty reaffirmed our resolve in that regard and highlighted the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation to the international community.

We call upon all States included in annex 2 of the Treaty, in particular the two nuclear States and other States that remain outside the non-proliferation regime, urgently to take the necessary political decisions to join the international community in its efforts to eliminate nuclear testing once and for all. We invite the Provisional Technical Secretariat to continue searching, with the support of interested parties, for solutions to the technical difficulties that some countries face despite their political will to ratify the Treaty.

The respect in which MERCOSUR and its associated States hold the Treaty leads us to think it paradoxical that the International Monitoring System (IMS) may be implemented with no clear prospects for the entry into force of the Treaty. The IMS cannot function if the legal obligations to be monitored are not in force. The functioning of the IMS must not be accelerated on the basis of simple technical considerations, while the universal and non-discriminatory character of the Treaty that created it are not taken into account.

MERCOSUR and its associated States reaffirm their ongoing commitment to the objectives of the CTBT and express their strongest support for maintaining the moratorium on nuclear testing until the Treaty enters into force.

Mr. Park (Republic of Korea): This year will go down as one of the poorest harvests in the field of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation. In addition to the already ailing Conference on Disarmament and Disarmament Commission, the successive failures of the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May and the world summit in September to produce a meaningful outcome attest to the gaping differences in positions and perceptions, particularly surrounding issues related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, among key players and a group of countries. The First Committee this year is convened at that juncture, and thus far we find no grounds for hope that the issues relating to nuclear weapons will be handled with less controversy than before. However, controversy does not necessarily lead to pessimism; rather, my delegation is of the view that the international community is already saturated with a prevailing and common sense that we will emerge from the quagmire sooner rather than later.

First of all, the Republic of Korea welcomes the significant progress made thus far in reducing nuclear arsenals and the commitments to further reductions under the Moscow Treaty. Nevertheless, we expect further progress towards deeper cuts, taking note of the fact that the number of nuclear warheads in existing arsenals is roughly the same as when the NPT entered into force in 1970. Further agreements should be pursued to bring the largest arsenals down to much lower levels and limit research and development intended to add new nuclear weapons to existing arsenals.

At the heart of the turmoil on nuclear disarmament lies the gap between the record of nuclear-weapon States and the expectations of non-nuclear-weapon States. The fact is that disarmament progress has not matched the rapidly rising expectations of the post-cold-war era. In that regard, we believe that efforts to reduce the gap will enhance the moral authority and political legitimacy of nuclear-weapon States in strengthening non-proliferation norms.

Reaffirming the urgency of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), we call upon all States that have not yet ratified the Treaty, particularly those 11 States whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force, to do so without further delay. Meanwhile, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, it is imperative to maintain the moratorium on nuclear test explosions. Moreover, all States are strongly encouraged to continue their contributions to the early completion of the monitoring system of the CTBT.

As the next logical step in the wake of the adoption of the CTBT, we cannot overemphasize the importance of a fissile material cut-off treaty, not only as a guarantor of nuclear non-proliferation, but also as a precursor to nuclear disarmament. In light of the urgency of commencing substantive discussions on such a treaty, my delegation is willing to start negotiations based on any reasonable formula that can garner the widespread support of States members of the Conference on Disarmament. There should be no further delay in opening negotiations.

In the meantime, considering the pressing need to curb the production of fissile materials, we encourage all States with nuclear-weapons capabilities to voluntarily declare moratoriums on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. Ideally, those States are also encouraged to place all fissile materials no longer needed for military purposes under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification regime.

Furthermore, my delegation would welcome any reasonable initiative that would get the Conference on Disarmament back to work. In that regard, we appreciate the new initiatives by some of this year's Conference presidencies to introduce more serious and interactive discussions. That would be an interim measure that, I believe, could galvanize the

Conference, creating an atmosphere conducive to its original mandate for active negotiation. I believe that the First Committee should support the continuation next year of those constructive initiatives of the Conference presidencies in order not to leave the only negotiating body for multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation in perpetual disarray. As the Republic of Korea is to assume the second presidency next year, it will spare no effort to revitalize the Conference on Disarmament, in tandem with the close affiliation of other presidency States.

I would like briefly to draw the Committee's attention to the outcome of the fourth round of the six-party talks, held in Beijing last month, at which the six parties succeeded in adopting a joint statement setting out the principles and guidelines for the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.

First and foremost, we welcome the commitment by North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to return at an early date to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards. The six parties also reaffirmed that the goal of the six-party talks is the verifiable and peaceful denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and agreed that the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula should be observed and implemented.

My delegation earnestly hopes that the joint statement will lead to substantial progress not only on the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, but also towards the realization of enduring peace on the Korean peninsula and the consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

My Government highly appreciates the endeavours of all the other parties, particularly China, the host country of the talks. The Korean Government will continue to engage in diplomatic efforts for the ultimate settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue and for achieving permanent peace on the peninsula.

The pursuit of non-proliferation will work best when the causes of proliferation are adequately addressed. We should not overlook the fact that insecurity, real or perceived, is in many cases a key motive for the development of nuclear-weapons capabilities. The international community must redouble its efforts to alleviate those security concerns that have prevented certain States from joining the NPT and caused others to pursue nuclear-weapons capabilities clandestinely.

At the same time, we believe that nuclear-weapon States should provide strong and credible security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that faithfully meet their NPT and other safeguards obligations. We also recognize the value of providing enhanced security assurances and other incentives to those States that voluntarily accept additional non-proliferation commitments beyond the parameters of the NPT.

Mr. Ri Jang Gon (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): As we gather here to discuss the problems arising from nuclear weapons, my delegation wishes to share some thoughts.

There is no denying the fact that the existence and possible use of nuclear weapons pose the most serious threat to the survival of humankind. Sixty years have passed since the nuclear holocaust, yet there are no legally binding international arrangements to contain any possible use of nuclear weapons. Instead, nuclear arsenals continue to increase, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Let me ask representatives here to consider with a fair mind the nuclear-weapons programmes pursued by certain States. Who on Earth has large quantities of nuclear weapons and has even stationed them abroad? How many nuclear-weapon States continue to stick to nuclear doctrines based on the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons, and how many have made commitments not to resort to first use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances? Nevertheless, some countries are raising their voices on behalf of non-proliferation only, glossing over the real danger looming over our heads due to the facts that I have just mentioned.

My delegation is of the view that we in this house have to look at the main purpose and objectives of non-proliferation pursued by certain States. We have to see the real objective of certain States, led by the super-Power, in pointing their fingers selectively at those small countries for their peaceful nuclear activities. How can the international community achieve non-proliferation while at the same time allowing some selected countries to keep large numbers of nuclear weapons ready to attack others at any given time?

It is now time to take practical measures to make the whole world free of nuclear weapons. The argument for non-proliferation should not be used as camouflage to keep nuclear weapons permanently. Before saying anything about non-proliferation, one

should talk about its root cause: nuclear weapons, the topic under discussion today. For the peace and security of the world, as well as for non-proliferation, the international community should continue to gear its efforts at concluding, as soon as possible, an internationally binding instrument to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, leading to their ultimate destruction.

My delegation urges all nuclear-weapon States to make their political decisions for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and, as a first step towards that, to commit themselves unconditionally, through internationally binding instruments, not to resort to first use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Before concluding my remarks, let me talk about the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula from that perspective. As we have mentioned over and over again, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a small country under constant threat from the super-Power, the United States. Our nuclear weapons are not intended to threaten or to strike others. We have no intention of keeping them permanently. There will be no need for us to keep a single nuclear weapon once relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States are normalized, bilateral confidence is built, and my country is no longer exposed to nuclear threat from the United States.

The most urgent requirement for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is to put an immediate end to the United States nuclear threat and hostile policies towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, aimed at overthrowing the regime.

Mr. Anton V. Vasiliev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): First of all, we would like to express our deep condolences to the Government and the people of Pakistan in connection with the catastrophic earthquake, which resulted in many casualties. The Russian Federation immediately declared its readiness to provide humanitarian assistance in this connection.

The Russian Federation is committed to its obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). At the same time, we believe that the full and complete elimination of nuclear weapons is possible only by gradual, step by step movement towards the final goal, without undue haste, on the basis of a comprehensive approach, with the participation of all nuclear States and, of course, at

the same time maintaining strategic stability and compliance with the principle of equal security for all.

We are meeting all the obligations we have assumed regarding nuclear weapons reduction. The process of reduction, a labour-intensive, technically complex and very costly activity, is moving forward successfully, consistently and without any delays. Overall, the stockpiles of nuclear weapons in Russia have been reduced by a factor of five since 1991. As of now, non-strategic nuclear weapons have been reduced by a factor of four. We have eliminated 1,328 launch pads for intercontinental ballistic missiles and for ballistic missiles on submarines; 2,670 missiles; 45 strategic nuclear submarines; and 66 heavy bombers.

In just the last five years, the Russian Federation has removed 357 delivery vehicles and 1,740 nuclear warheads from its strategic nuclear forces. In accordance with the provisions of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, by the end of 2012 Russia and the United States of America will further reduce their strategic warheads by approximately a factor of three, as compared with the limits set for late 2001 under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. As Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated, Russia is ready to continue reducing its strategic nuclear arsenal to a level lower than that stipulated in the Moscow Treaty.

We attach particular importance to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We welcome the work just described by Ambassador Tóth. The CTBT can serve to reliably block any qualitative improvement in nuclear weapons. The Treaty is also one of the most important components of the system of international security and prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We note with satisfaction that 176 States have now signed the CTBT and that, of those, 125 have ratified it. We welcome this weighty decision taken by those States. At the same time, we cannot but be concerned with regard to the prospects for the entry into force of this highly important treaty. We hope that the remaining 11 States on the so-called list of 44 will take the necessary steps to accede to the Treaty with all possible speed.

Our contribution to the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament also includes the implementation of a Russian-United States programme to process fuel for electric power stations. Thus far, 500 tons of highly

enriched uranium have been extracted from Russian nuclear weapons.

In September 2005, there was an important landmark in the implementation of the Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement, an 18 February 1993 agreement between the Governments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the use of highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons: 250 tons of highly enriched uranium, which is equivalent to tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, were processed into low-enriched uranium. This means that the halfway mark toward the final goal of the agreement, the elimination of 500 tons of highly enriched uranium by the year 2013, has now been reached.

Our steps in the field of nuclear disarmament are accompanied by structural changes in the nuclear weapons sector in Russia. Production capacity in the sector has been halved, as the previous capacity has been deemed excessive for defence purposes. Together with the United States of America, we are working to shut down Russian uranium graphite reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium; the materials produced there are not used for military purposes. Moreover, the production of uranium in our country for nuclear weapons purposes was halted long ago.

The Russian Federation supports the beginning of talks at the Conference on Disarmament on the preparation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Nor would we object to a consensus on the programme of work of the Conference, on the basis of the so-called five ambassadors proposal, which, among other things, provides for consideration of nuclear disarmament issues.

Russia is appropriately ensuring the technical security and the reliable storage of nuclear weapons. I recall that our nuclear weaponry in its entirety is contained at centralized storage sites, all of which are located within Russia. Russia has introduced a number of measures to prevent terrorist acts. There are regular, integrated safety tests of all nuclear and hazardous radiation sites, which also serve to ensure that those sites are ready to respond to any terrorist act.

In this way, the Russian Federation is demonstrating its will to move ahead decisively in terms of nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and most important, is putting that decisiveness into action.

We call upon all other nuclear States to join in this process.

Those are only some of the fundamental aspects of Russia's position with regard to nuclear disarmament. I should like to recall that detailed information about the fulfilment of our obligations in reducing nuclear weapons was presented at the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Now I should like to say one or two words about the results of that Conference. Despite the absence of any substantive recommendations to strengthen the NPT for the future, there is no reason to call the Conference a failure. We believe that very useful work was done. Clearly, a very wide range of opinions emerged during the Conference as to the fulfilment of obligations under the NPT. That is natural, as significant changes have occurred in recent years in the area of international security.

At the same time, some fundamental elements that unite all the parties to the Treaty were confirmed. No one said that the Treaty was out of date. Nobody raised the question of preparing any sort of document to supersede the NPT. Everyone underscored the viability of the Treaty and its value as a basis for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The parties carried out an objective and balanced analysis of the Treaty in all its aspects. All participants confirmed their dedication to the strict implementation of their obligations and their support for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime was unambiguously endorsed as an important component of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and of respect for the non-proliferation regime. We welcome the granting of the Nobel Prize to IAEA Director General ElBaradei and express the hope that it will further strengthen the Agency's authority.

We believe that the new challenges to nuclear non-proliferation that have arisen in recent years will and must be eliminated as a result of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the course of general discussion, we have discussed our approach with respect to the success of our six-party talks in Beijing and the adoption on 24 September by the IAEA Board of Governors of a resolution on the nuclear programme in Iran.

New challenges call for new solutions. We welcome the broad support offered to the Russian proposal on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. All States must now work together to ensure the full implementation of those documents.

We welcome the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world. We therefore support the decision taken by the States of Central Asia to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone there. We believe that the establishment of such a zone, on the basis of the Tashkent draft text on negotiations for a nuclear-weapon-free zone, drawn up in February, will be a significant step towards the strengthening of peace and stability in the region.

With regard to this session's draft resolutions on nuclear disarmament to be considered by the First Committee, Russia will base its decisions on the aforementioned positions. Our priorities are to make a due assessment of progress achieved in that field, the existing obligations of States and their implementation. We are prepared to support realistic and balanced proposals in that respect.

Mr. Løvold (Norway): The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Norway regrets that the 2005 Review Conference of the States Parties failed to produce a substantive outcome. An important opportunity to further strengthen the NPT was lost.

It is also highly regrettable that the United Nations summit outcome document did not reflect the challenges posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Yet another opportunity was missed to enhance our common security. We were, however, encouraged by the broad support for our cross-regional initiative on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in preparation for the high-level summit. Seven countries from different regions of the world submitted a ministerial declaration and specific text proposals for the summit outcome document. The initiative was well received and a large number of countries expressed support. Regrettably, the proposal did not command the required consensus.

Norway will take up the challenge laid out by the Secretary-General and will continue to seek consensus

and concrete results. We will do that together with Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Romania, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and all the other countries that have supported our efforts. It is now more important than ever to consolidate and strengthen our global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

We must overcome our disappointment over the setbacks in multilateral negotiations so far this year. We must continue to seek and to foster a new global consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. There are a number of concrete steps that should be taken on an urgent basis.

We believe that an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would be crucial in that regard. It is alarming that we now seem further away from the Treaty's entry into force than we have in a very long time.

Countries that have not ratified that vital Treaty should do so without delay. We urge the nuclear-weapon States in particular to commit themselves to the CTBT in a legally binding way. Pending entry into force, we must do our utmost to further consolidate the existing test moratoriums. Those moratoriums have set a norm against all nuclear testing. In order to ensure credible verification, we must accelerate current efforts to complete the International Monitoring System.

It is high time that the Conference on Disarmament emerge from its long-standing impasse. We urgently need agreement on a programme of work for the Conference. A fissile material cut-off treaty should be our first priority. A cut-off treaty banning the future production of fissile materials for weapons purposes will be vital to our non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. It must also address the question of existing stocks, taking into account the Shannon compromise. Meanwhile, we urge all nuclear-weapons States to place their fissile material no longer required for military needs under the verification regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

All States should increase the transparency and security of their fissile material holdings. We need to see more substantial reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. Norway encourages the Russian Federation and the United States to undertake nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for by the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. In that respect, we underline the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability.

Norway would like to congratulate the International Atomic Energy Agency and its Director General, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, on having received this year's Nobel Peace Prize.

There is a growing fear that nuclear weapons might be given a more prominent and additional role in security policies. It is therefore more important than ever to strengthen mechanisms of multilateral arms control diplomacy. The IAEA has a clear mandate to deal with cases of non-compliance and to verify that NPT States honour their NPT obligations. The IAEA therefore plays a vital role in our global security regime.

The IAEA verification programme is essential for maintaining the confidence needed for the NPT to be credible. The Additional Protocol will give the IAEA a broader basis on which to draw conclusions as regards safeguards. Norway appreciates that an increasing number of countries are implementing the IAEA Additional Protocol. We believe that the Protocol, together with the IAEA comprehensive safeguards, should be considered the verification standard. All States should therefore sign, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol without delay. Further steps to enhance the effectiveness of the IAEA verification regime should also be supported.

Further, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) must be implemented in full, assisted by the appropriate multilateral bodies. That is crucial in order to prevent nuclear material and technology from falling into the wrong hands. We call upon all States to adopt and enforce effective laws that prohibit non-State actors from pursuing weapons of mass destruction-related activities. Norway is ready to consider assisting States in fulfilling the obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004).

Norway has signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which was adopted earlier this year. The Convention should enter into force as soon as possible.

A proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle is in the interest of all States. It will facilitate our right to benefit from nuclear energy and technology as stipulated by the NPT. Norway welcomes the recommendations by the IAEA Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Those recommendations should inspire our efforts to achieve a mechanism under clear IAEA control,

whereby States are assured supplies of nuclear fuel, provided they refrain from developing the capacity to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium. The IAEA must be given the legal, technical and political capacity to play such a role. It is also vital that such arrangements be of a voluntary nature and that they not exclude technical assistance and transfers. It may take time to achieve that. In the meantime, we call for a moratorium on the construction of facilities for sensitive technologies.

Curbing the use of highly enriched uranium is another measure to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. We should therefore set ourselves the long-term target of reaching agreement on a prohibition of civilian uses. In the meantime, Member States should commit themselves to converting civilian nuclear installations from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium as soon as technically feasible.

In conclusion, we believe that general and complete disarmament is a global responsibility. We must continue practical, systematic and progressive efforts to advance nuclear disarmament globally towards our ultimate objective: a world free of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Al-Zaabi (United Arab Emirates) (*spoke in Arabic*): Permit me at the outset to express, on behalf of the delegation of the United Arab Emirates, my deepest condolences and sympathy to the countries stricken by the South Asian earthquake, which have suffered heavy losses in terms of both human lives and material damage.

Despite the major progress made over the past 60 years in the establishment of international disarmament arrangements, the arms race — in particular the nuclear arms race — continues to threaten international peace, security and stability. It must be stressed that, by clinging to their strategies weapons, the nuclear-weapon States encourage non-nuclear-weapon States to want to acquire or develop formal or informal nuclear programmes of their own. It also encourages the emergence of other threats and challenges involving these dangerous weapons and related prohibited materials and the possibility that they will fall into reckless and irresponsible hands.

We are deeply concerned and disappointed at the lack of adequate confidence-building measures among countries. That has blocked consensus on an agenda for the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, has

prevented the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has precluded progress in implementing the outcomes of the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The United Arab Emirates believes that maintaining regional and international peace, security and stability is a universal endeavour that must be shared by everyone, with the primary responsibility lying with the nuclear-weapon States. We therefore call on the nuclear-weapon States to enter into flexible and serious multilateral negotiations, motivated by the political resolve gradually to achieve the systematic, and total elimination of their nuclear arsenals within the specific timetable set forth in Article VI of the NPT.

In accordance with the commitments undertaken under the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and the various arrangements and international treaties already established concerning the destruction of weapons of mass destruction, we must consider strengthening the work of the First Committee, and of the General Assembly in general, with a view to attaining the objectives agreed upon at the 1978 special session devoted to disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva must break the impasse in which it finds itself, and all nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States must show the political will and flexibility to agree on an agenda for that body so that the goals of the NPT can be achieved. Moreover, the international community must respond to the calls for the establishment of an international, universal and unconditional instrument that would provide non-nuclear-weapon States with the security and non-threat guarantees that they need.

Beyond that, we must reaffirm the need for universality and comprehensiveness in disarmament treaties, particularly those covering nuclear weapons, such as the NPT. We call upon the three countries that are not yet parties to the Treaty to join it unconditionally and as soon as possible. We call upon States concerned to consistently fulfil their legal obligations and to respect and strengthen the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to meet their obligations in a transparent, fair and non-discriminatory manner. We must eliminate double standards in all national policies and bear in mind the principles of the Charter and international law and existing treaties.

In addition, we must prevent the non-nuclear-weapon States from trying to acquire nuclear weapons and arsenals. We must strive to create more nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Arabian Gulf and Middle East regions, in order to support efforts to achieve non-proliferation goals. Moreover, we must support the right of developing countries to acquire nuclear technology for exclusively peaceful civilian purposes and activities.

Ms. Mourabit (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): Permit me at the outset to express, on behalf of my delegation, our sincere condolences to the friendly countries of South-East Asia that were hard hit by the recent earthquake and to the delegation of Guatemala, whose country has had to deal with tragic floods. All of those friendly delegations have our deepest sympathy and our fullest solidarity.

The importance of the role of the United Nations in the area of maintaining international peace and security is increasingly obvious and essential in a difficult international context characterized by the emergence of new threats and challenges to which the world Organization must respond. It is clear that strengthening the rule of law — particularly by honouring international commitments and implementing disarmament and non-proliferation treaties — is especially urgent today.

Ongoing difficulties are blocking the multilateral disarmament process. To be sure, the end of the bipolar world order made it possible to put an end to the balance of terror, but it could not create the hoped-for climate of peace and trust. Indeed, the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, linked in particular to the threat of their acquisition by terrorist groups, weighs heavily on international security. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) was a response to that challenge.

The impasse in the Conference on Disarmament, the sole forum for negotiation and multilateral disarmament instruments, is disappointing. For the eighth consecutive year, the Conference was unable to commence substantive work because of a lack of consensus on its programme of work. But that deadlock must not deter us from continuing to explore ways and means — consensual, of course — to put it back on track.

It is regrettable that no progress has been made in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,

particularly with the failure to effect the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the failure to conclude an agreement on a fissile material cut-off treaty, the failure to adopt a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention and the failure of the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

My country, Morocco, remains concerned about the situation in the Middle East and regrets that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region is running into the opposition of a single country that has yet to become a party to the NPT and that refuses to submit its nuclear facilities to the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

My country's commitment to general and complete disarmament and to nuclear non-proliferation stems from its firm conviction that international security heavily depends on giving pride of place to economic and social development for the benefit of the world's peoples.

Finally, we wish to recall the importance of the rapid entry into force of the CTBT and reiterate our support for the commencement of negotiations towards conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

Mrs. Gayatri (Indonesia): In 2000, all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed to a package of practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. But what has happened five years later? The nuclear-weapon States have back-pedalled on that agreement. Even worse, one of them has said that nuclear disarmament no longer exists and is part of history.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing. Commitments and obligations to these issues should be implemented in a balanced manner, without harming either one. In this context, with regard to the obligations, undertakings and commitments of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, basically, in our view, the international community has done more to implement the nuclear non-proliferation provisions than those of nuclear disarmament.

There are some positive developments with regard to the implementation of non-proliferation provisions. The International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), as the competent authority, has continued to carry out its responsibility under its Statute to verify and ensure compliance with Safeguards Agreements by States parties to the NPT undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III.

The effectiveness of IAEA safeguards has been assessed and evaluated; this has led to the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and of the Model Additional Protocol. There are only 37 States parties to the NPT that have not yet brought into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA; 102 States parties have signed additional protocols.

Regardless of its status, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not been brought into compliance with its treaty obligations. Libya announced that it had given up its nuclear weapons aspiration and has since come into compliance. Over the past three years, the IAEA has been engaged with Iran to ensure its full compliance following the discovery of its undeclared enrichment facility.

In order to enhance cooperation and to seek solutions acceptable to all concerned in the field of non-proliferation issues, a number of initiatives have been taken, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

Meanwhile, however, there are some negative developments related to nuclear disarmament. About 30,000 nuclear weapons have been retained, many of which are on alert status, with the attendant risk of accidental or unauthorized use — which is undeniably a frightening possibility. Unilateral declarations of national security interests, based on the legitimization of nuclear weapons, in the security strategies or doctrines of some nuclear-weapon States will create another nuclear arms race and perpetuate the policy of nuclear deterrence.

There have been systematic attempts to de-link non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, which the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference held to be “mutually reinforcing” (*NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), p. 18*), with an exclusive focus on the former, thereby exacerbating discrimination and unsustainable double standards.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was opened for signature and

ratification in 1996, has not yet entered into force. The longer this is delayed, the more likely it is that testing will resume and become a major setback in efforts to constrain the qualitative improvement of weapons and the development of new types of weapons.

The resumption of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty is yet to get off the ground, although it constitutes the next vital step in the multilateral disarmament agenda. Its conclusion has been frustrated by the imposition of untenable preconditions relating to verification.

The Moscow Treaty of 2002 contains no commitment either to destroy or to render unusable weapons that are no longer operationally deployed. Unfortunately, reductions in deployment and in operational status cannot be a substitute for irreversible cuts in and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty have had negative implications in terms of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the pursuit of advanced military technology capable of deployment in outer space.

The question of non-strategic nuclear weapons continues to be of concern, due to their portability and to the fact that they can be stationed in close proximity to areas of conflict. This means that they can readily be used in combat, and that there is a high probability of pre-delegation of authority to use them in the event of conflict or of their early pre-emptive unauthorized or accidental use.

In conclusion, although not legally binding, the 13 practical steps should be reaffirmed and be used as the best tool for measuring the efforts of nuclear-weapon States to make progress in the fulfilment of their article-VI obligations.

Mr. De Alba (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): The delegation of Mexico had an opportunity to address the issue of nuclear disarmament at some length during the general debate. That is why I now wish to take advantage of our interactive format to highlight just two or three aspects.

First of all, I reiterate the Mexican delegation's frustration at the lack of negotiating progress made at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Without question, we missed a valuable opportunity to make progress on issues that to our understanding are

priorities for all Member States. We also missed opportunities in negotiations in the context of the Disarmament Commission. As if that were not enough, the biggest chance was lost when our heads of State or Government could not agree on substantive language at the recent General Assembly summit.

These failures are compounded by a misinterpretation or a poor interpretation of the meaning of the political will of Member States and of consensus. I would like now to address that issue. I think political will is articulated by the majority, not the minority, of States. It is therefore difficult for me to listen to statements that talk about a lack of political will. I think that political will exists in this room: the majority has the political will to move forward. I also find it hard to understand the idea that consensus is a desirable objective, when we have seen how that concept is abused. The rules of procedure of the General Assembly do not include the word consensus. Consensus is a process that Member States have been developing with the intention of summoning collective will and forging commitments on basic issues. We must not lose sight of that fact. The idea of consensus was not to reach agreements based on the lowest common denominator. The intention was to use it to achieve the greatest possible backing for any particular initiative, always for the benefit of the majority. I do not think that that is what is happening. The idea of consensus is being abused, and that is hindering our work. The Conference on Disarmament is a case in point.

This year had witnessed a number of exercises in negotiation, including the Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in Tlatelolco, Mexico. That gathering showed that we are capable of going beyond lowest-common-denominator agreements, of making progress for the benefit of all of humankind and of negotiating substantive instruments and agreements, not just at the governmental level, but face-to-face and in cooperation with civil society. I believe that anybody who was involved in the Mexico Conference would have found that to be the case. It resulted in a solid document that will move the agenda forward and promote a level of cooperation and understanding among all States that have rejected the nuclear option.

Eliminating nuclear weapons is the political will of the majority, and we must not allow ourselves to be manipulated by some to believe that that goal is

unrealistic or impractical. Some countries have already begun to mobilize. We have already begun discussing a number of options during this First Committee session, because we believe that the status quo is unacceptable. We believe that we have options. We believe that, under the best of circumstances, we are open to considering options that could enable us to break with the status quo. The only thing that is unacceptable is the status quo. We must move forward with an agenda to eliminate these weapons, and, of course, to tackle other equally important disarmament tasks, in particular non-proliferation. We must not close off any option.

In convening the Tlatelolco Conference on nuclear-weapon-free zones, Mexico was provided with invaluable support. During this First Committee session, we must pick up on the contributions made in that context by Member States, by non-governmental organizations and, indeed, by Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, now a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, who honoured us with his presence in Tlatelolco. Delegations should be mindful of those contributions.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that as we work to develop alternative ways and means to advance our agenda we must be inclusive, transparent and democratic; we are not calling for confrontation. We will be engaging in an exercise of reflection that is essentially political — one clearly reflected in the addresses made by each of our heads of State or Government a few weeks ago in the General Assembly.

The Chairman: We will now proceed to the introduction of draft resolutions and decisions.

Mr. Hamidon (Malaysia): My delegation has the honour to introduce to the Committee a draft resolution entitled “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*”, which will be issued as document A/C.1/60/L.46.

The draft resolution has been sponsored by the following delegations: Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Qatar, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Singapore, the Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. My delegation

expresses its gratitude to all the sponsors and to other delegations that will join in sponsoring the text.

My delegation and the other sponsors of the draft resolution would like to express their appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report relating to agenda item 97 (q), contained in document A/60/122. We have noted the observations contained therein. We thank the Member States that have submitted information pursuant to resolution 59/83.

The advisory opinion on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, rendered by the International Court of Justice on 8 July 1996, remains a historic and resolute decision in the field of nuclear disarmament. The decision of the Court constitutes, and remains, an authoritative legal call to rid the world of nuclear weapons. The Court's unanimous conclusion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective control, is again reaffirmed in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. The unanimous decision of the International Court of Justice, while being consistent with the solemn obligation of States parties under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is not confined only to States parties to the NPT. Rather, it is, significantly, a universal declaration.

Operative paragraph 2 underlines the obligation of all States to conduct and successfully conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. The sponsors of the draft resolution consider that the decision by the International Court of Justice must be followed up by concrete actions by all States Members of the United Nations. Aside from retaining those important pronouncements, the text has the modifications necessary for technical updating and includes a new preambular paragraph, the thirteenth, which reads

“Expressing its regret over the failure of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to reach agreement on any substantive issues”.

This year has been a disappointing one in the field of nuclear disarmament. Last May the States parties to the NPT failed to reach agreement on any substantive issues at the NPT Review Conference. Another major setback was the failure to reach any

agreement on disarmament and non-proliferation for the 2005 world summit. The Conference on Disarmament remains deadlocked, while the Disarmament Commission has again been unable to agree on an agenda this year. The global disarmament and non-proliferation framework is in flux. Nuclear-weapon States are continuing to modernize existing nuclear weapons, and large stockpiles of nuclear weapons remain in their arsenals. Sadly, several nuclear-weapon States have chosen disengagement, retrogression and unilateral measures, rather than multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions.

Those are some of the fundamental challenges, which, if left unchecked, could destabilize international peace and security, as well as increase the risk of new instances of the unilateral or pre-emptive use of force.

The sponsors feel compelled to recapitulate the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD I), which underscores the primacy of nuclear disarmament that remains valid today. That goal is far from being achieved. Member States agreed at SSOD I that nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of human civilization. In that connection, we call on all Member States to commence negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament and to an unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. We urge all States to work closely and constructively towards the convening of SSOD IV. It is crucial that the international community create that opportunity to renew, revitalize and create a new milieu for the further advancement of the global nuclear disarmament process.

The challenge facing the international community in trying to realize a nuclear-weapon-free world has become more formidable than ever, requiring our full and unqualified commitment to the goals we set ourselves. The world has promulgated legal treaties banning the use, threat of use and production of other weapons of mass destruction. We have seen significant developments and steady progress in the past year relating to the Biological Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Yet, the final goal of eliminating nuclear weapons remains elusive. We must remain committed to achieving that goal. We agree with the Secretary-General that “We must revitalize our multilateral frameworks ... to address the growing risk

of a cascade of proliferation” (*A/59/2005, para. 85*). We cannot allow the indefinite perpetuation of the possession of such weapons; nor can we allow the possessive obsession with such weapons to further undermine our goals. We cannot allow the remnants of the cold war to continue to haunt us.

Nuclear disarmament must remain a high-priority issue on the global agenda and must not be sidelined or marginalized. We must address the issues confronting disarmament in a comprehensive, constructive and balanced manner. Practical steps as well as systematic and progressive efforts need to be implemented. The test before us is to find the consensus and political will to move forward, despite our diverging views and positions based on individual interests. Governments must support multilateral efforts that seek to bring all countries together to create a nuclear-free world — a multilateral effort to save mankind and the future of human civilization. The vitality of multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions in addressing disarmament and international security issues must be preserved and strengthened.

In submitting a draft resolution on this item for the consideration of Member States for the tenth consecutive year, my delegation and the other sponsors are confident that it will continue to receive the support of a large majority. We are confident that States that support multilateral negotiations will heed the views of the overwhelming majority inside and outside the General Assembly and seek to join us in our collective endeavour to attain the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kurup (India): I have taken the floor to introduce two draft resolutions submitted by India under cluster 1.

I have the honour, first, to introduce the draft resolution entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons”, on behalf of its sponsors. The draft resolution, which will be issued as document A/C.1/60/L.54, underlines that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to the survival of mankind.

The last Non-Aligned Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur in 2003, underscored the danger to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use. The threat of use of nuclear weapons by States and non-State actors will remain so long as certain States claim an exclusive

right to possess such weapons in perpetuity until they feel justified in using them, or threatening to do so. We believe that States should reorient their nuclear doctrines through a commitment to no-first-use and non-use of nuclear weapons, backed by a legally binding agreement to that effect. That should be more feasible today — when the major Powers are participating in more cooperative exchanges among themselves — than in 1982, when the idea was first mooted.

In its historic advisory opinion of 1996, the International Court of Justice made international humanitarian law applicable to the use of nuclear weapons. The Court expressed the conviction that a multilateral agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would strengthen international security and create a climate for negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

We must take decisive steps, collectively, to support a legally binding instrument prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons — as an interim measure until we reach agreement on a step-by-step process for the elimination of nuclear weapons. That will serve to diminish the salience of nuclear weapons in maintaining security and contribute to the changes in doctrines, policies, attitudes and institutions that are required to usher in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world.

The operative part of the draft resolution reiterates the request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention on prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. A positive vote on the draft resolution will be a vote by the international community in favour of a decisive step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Now, I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution on “Reducing nuclear danger” on behalf of India and the other sponsors. The draft resolution, which will be issued as document A/C.1/60/L.52, offers modest and pragmatic proposals for the safety and security of mankind. It calls for a review of nuclear doctrines, as well as immediate steps to reduce the risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons. The very real possibility of systems and components falling into the hands of non-State actors has aggravated current dangers. Several strategic experts have identified measures proposed in this draft

resolution as feasible in the present circumstances, including lowering the alert status of nuclear forces from their current hair-trigger posture.

In 1978 the entire membership of the United Nations agreed by consensus that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. The international community also agreed that effective measures for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war were of the highest priority. Now, more than a decade and a half since the end of the cold war, the concept of mutually assured destruction is universally considered untenable. The dictum that a nuclear war can never be won — and must never be fought — is now accepted as conventional wisdom. Measures for reducing nuclear dangers are therefore an essential prerequisite for safeguarding our collective security interests, pending nuclear disarmament. The draft resolution refers to the seven recommendations of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters of 2001 that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war, including promotion of dialogue on cooperative security, de-alerting nuclear weapons, review of nuclear doctrines, further reductions in tactical nuclear weapons, increased transparency, creation of a conducive climate for disarmament through educational and training programmes, and preparations for a major international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear danger.

A positive vote on the draft resolution will be a reaffirmation by the international community of the need to take decisive steps to reduce nuclear danger.

Ms. Darlow (New Zealand): I take the floor today to introduce our draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, which is being put forward jointly by Brazil and New Zealand and which will be issued as document A/C.1/60/L.12.

A powerful symbol of the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction by the international community is the reach and potential reach of nuclear-weapon-free zones over the landmasses of the globe. Nuclear-weapon-free zones can act as disarmament measures, providing an incentive for nuclear-armed or aspiring States to pull back from the nuclear option, as well as contributing to non-proliferation efforts. We welcomed Mexico’s initiative to hold the First Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties

that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in April. That provided a valuable opportunity to explore ways of strengthening communication and collaboration within and between zones. A nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere would facilitate coordination and cooperation among the respective nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas such as verification, compliance and disarmament.

Draft resolutions on this item have been adopted by overwhelming majorities in past years, and we hope that that will once again be the case. We understand that States in opposition to the text are concerned that their freedom of navigation on the high seas would be undermined by the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone encompassing the entire southern hemisphere. Let me take this opportunity to reiterate that the draft resolution specifically recognizes the relevant rights and obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Mr. Najafi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am taking the floor today to introduce a draft decision and a new draft resolution.

First is draft decision A/C.1/60/L.5, entitled "Missiles". Egypt, Indonesia and Iran are the sponsors of the draft decision. Since the introduction of this item into the agenda of the General Assembly in 1999, increasing support has been given to addressing the issue of missiles in all its aspects within the framework of the United Nations.

The first Panel of Governmental Experts was able to adopt a report (A/57/229) — the very first such report in the history of the United Nations — in which the issue of missiles in all its aspects was addressed comprehensively. The success of the first Panel opened up the prospects for exploring further ways and means regarding this issue within the United Nations.

Unfortunately, the second Panel of Governmental Experts ended its work having fallen short of the success of the first Panel. The Secretary-General, in his report to the General Assembly (A/59/278), stated that, given the complexity of the issue at hand, no consensus was reached by the Panel on the preparation of a final report. That situation showed once again that dealing with the complex issue of missiles requires further preparation, with extensive organization, proper timing and intensified effort on the part of all of us.

Therefore, last year's resolution, resolution 59/67, which was supported by 119 countries and adopted by the General Assembly on 3 December 2004, concentrated on defining future steps aimed at addressing the issue of missiles at the United Nations. The resolution, in its operative paragraph 3, requested the establishment of a third panel of governmental experts in 2007 with a more specific mandate "to further explore further ways and means to address within the United Nations the issue of missiles in all its aspects, including identifying areas where consensus can be reached".

Paragraph 2 of the same resolution requested that in the meantime, a report be prepared by the Secretary-General, with the support of qualified consultants and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, for submission in 2006. The report would focus on identifying areas where consensus could be reached. We are of the belief that such a United Nations report will be an important in-depth study on the issue and, without committing States with regard to its findings, could be helpful to Member States. In particular, it could serve as useful input for a third panel of governmental experts.

On the basis of resolution 59/67, the Secretariat has been taking preparatory measures and the necessary budget has been allocated for the activities mandated in the resolution. Because no specific developments have occurred since the resolution's adoption last year, and in keeping with the General Assembly's recommendations on improving methods of work, the resolution's sponsors decided this year to present a draft decision instead of a draft resolution and only to request the inclusion of an item entitled "Missiles" in the provisional agenda of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly. We hope that delegations will be able to support the draft decision, as they have supported the relevant draft resolutions in previous years.

I would now like to introduce to the Committee, for the first time, a draft resolution entitled "Follow-up to the nuclear disarmament obligations agreed at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", which will be issued as document A/C.1/60/L.38.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the cornerstone of nuclear

disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, was originally intended to be in force for 25 years. The 1995 NPT Conference extended the Treaty in a package of agreements and commitments, in particular the nuclear-weapon States' obligation of "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons" (*NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), p. 11*), and adopted a resolution on the Middle East.

As a follow-up to disarmament obligations, the 2000 NPT Review Conference agreed by consensus on 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear proliferation and disarmament. However, 10 years after the indefinite extension of the Treaty and 35 years after the Treaty entered into force, the nuclear disarmament obligations have yet to be implemented. The international community has expressed on many occasions its concern about the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States in accomplishing the elimination of their nuclear arsenals with a view to nuclear disarmament. Serious concerns are also being expressed over the development of new types of nuclear weapons, in contravention of the undertakings provided by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.

The 2005 NPT Review Conference, which was supposed to review nuclear disarmament obligations, failed, owing mostly to attempts to undermine the

NPT's disarmament obligations, particularly the practical steps adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Traditionally, the General Assembly, after each NPT Review Conference, adopts a resolution in which it reacts to the results of the Conference. Given the grave concerns expressed during the General Assembly summit and the general debate by many delegations over the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the Islamic Republic of Iran is convinced that there is a need for the United Nations to pursue the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations. As suggested by the President of Iran, one possible way is to "mandate an ad hoc committee to compile and submit a comprehensive report on possible practical mechanisms and strategies for complete [nuclear] disarmament" (*A/60/PV.10, p. 7*).

The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in line with the proposal of its President, thus has the honour to introduce a new draft resolution entitled, "Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". The text of the new draft resolution is self-explanatory and has mostly been taken from the consensus documents of the NPT Review Conferences. We plan to organize open-ended consultations on the draft resolution, and proposals for improving its text are welcome.

The Chairman: Allow me to remind all delegations once again that the deadline for submission of all draft resolutions is tomorrow, 12 October, at 6 p.m. Tomorrow afternoon we shall proceed with our thematic discussion on the subject of other weapons of mass destruction and outer space.

The meeting was adjourned at 5.10 p.m.