



# General Assembly

Fifty-ninth session

First Committee

**20**<sup>th</sup> meeting

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New York

Official Records

*Chairman:* Mr. De Alba . . . . . (Mexico)

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Rowe (Sierra Leone), took the Chair.*

*The meeting was called to order at 9.55 a.m.*

## Action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items 57 to 72

**The Acting Chairman:** The Committee will continue to take action on those draft resolutions that appear in informal working paper No. 4, which was previously circulated, starting with cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons".

After completing action on the draft resolutions contained in cluster 1, the Committee will proceed to take action on draft resolutions contained in cluster 4, "Conventional weapons", followed by the rest of the draft resolutions.

I should like to take this opportunity to remind all delegations that sponsors of draft resolutions may make general statements at the beginning of the meeting, so that, when we deal with cluster 1 this morning, we will hear general statements, followed by explanations of vote before and after the vote.

I give the floor to those delegations wishing to make general statements.

**Mr. Sanders** (Netherlands): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.25, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".

The candidate countries Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Croatia, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries Iceland and Norway members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this general statement.

Under the nuclear cluster, I had the opportunity, on behalf of the European Union, to express the views of the EU regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), reiterating the EU's belief that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an essential part of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We hope to move closer to the early entry into force of the Treaty and work towards its universality, because global adherence to it will contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the process of nuclear disarmament, and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security - also taking into account the fact that the ultimate objective of the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The EU attaches utmost importance to the early entry into force of the Treaty and will continue to call on those States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay and without conditions. In particular, we call for early ratification by the so-called annex II States, whose ratification is necessary

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for the Treaty to enter into force. In that context, the EU also strongly supports the work of the Special Representative of the ratifying States, who will visit several of those annex II countries this autumn to promote universal adherence to the CTBT. In that context, the EU notes the proposal in operative paragraph 8 on the preparation of a report, which we believe should be prepared using the expertise of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

The EU believes that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear-weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as well as a credible verification regime, are vital. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the EU urges all States to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any actions which are contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT. That is the reason why the EU fully supports draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.25/Rev.1, which has been co-sponsored by all EU member States.

**Mr. Gala López** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Under cluster on nuclear weapons, we shall take action today on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.26/Rev.1, entitled "Nuclear disarmament". My delegation supports the contents of the draft resolution, since we believe that it appropriately reflects the priority given to nuclear disarmament. In particular, we fully support the call in the operative part of the text upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in 2005 and to commence negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The elimination of nuclear weapons must continue to be the international community's highest priority in the sphere of disarmament. My country has always supported initiatives to that end.

**The Acting Chairman:** I call on the representative of Israel, who wishes to speak in explanation of vote before the voting on draft resolutions under cluster 1.

**Mr. Bar** (Israel): I wish to speak in explanation of vote on the draft resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), contained in document A/C.1/59/L.25/Rev.1

Israel signed the CTBT in September 1996. That decision reflected our longstanding policy on arms control and support for international non-proliferation

efforts, with due consideration for the specific characteristics of the Middle East and our national security requirements. Furthermore, Israel played an active role throughout the negotiation of the Treaty in Geneva and contributed conceptually, technically and politically to its drafting.

Since the establishment of the Preparatory Commission in November 1996, Israel has played a major part in the endeavours to develop the elements of the CTBT verification regime, including the practical procedures to be adopted in the operational manuals by which the Treaty will be implemented. Israel has decided to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.25/Rev.1 because of the importance it attaches to the objectives of the CTBT, notwithstanding our reservations regarding some of the wording in operative paragraph 1.

Israel remains committed to the objectives of the CTBT. We would like to emphasize, however, that progress has still to be made on several important issues.

First, with respect to the development and readiness of the verification regime, in our view its completion constitutes a prerequisite to entry into force, as required by the first paragraph of article IV of the Treaty. Moreover it is our belief that the verification regime should provide for a robust system that is as effective as possible in detecting non-compliance with the basic obligations of the Treaty. At the same time, it should be immune to abuse and allow every State signatory to protect its national security interests. Those principles guide Israel in the development of the CTBT verification regime.

Secondly, several salient political issues, in particular those related to the geographical region of the Middle East and South Asia, need to be resolved.

Lastly, we must reverse the negative dynamics evolving in our region, where certain States signatories are not fully cooperative with the efforts to complete and test the international monitoring element of the verification regime, thus impeding the pace of development of that element in the verification regime.

Recognizing that the entry into force of the Treaty is still pending and does not look to be imminent, we believe that the advancement of the objectives of the CTBT calls for the following commitments and activities to be diligently pursued.

First and foremost, the commitment not to carry out any nuclear test explosion in line with the Treaty's basic obligations must be sustained. Sufficient funds must be provided to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization in order to complete as soon as possible the essential elements of the CTBT verification regime. The International Monitoring System stations and the International Data Centre must be operated, maintained and tested as appropriate to gain experience in order to provide detection capabilities prior to entry into force, as must a smoothly-operating monitoring system by the time of entry into force. In addition, seismic cooperation must be expanded among all member States. The on-site inspection element of the CTBT verification regime must be built.

**The Acting Chairman:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.25/Rev.1, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".

A recorded vote has been requested.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

**Ms. Stoute** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/59/L.25/Rev.1, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".

The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of New Zealand at the 11th meeting, on 19 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/59/L.25/Rev.1 and also in documents A/C.1/59/INF/2 and addenda 1\*, 2, 3\* and 6. In addition, Canada, France, Malaysia, Peru and Senegal have now become sponsors of the draft resolution.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican

Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

*Against:*

United States of America

*Abstaining:*

Colombia, India, Mauritius, Syrian Arab Republic

*Draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.25/Rev.1 was adopted by 147 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions.*

[Subsequently, the delegations of Jordan, Kuwait and Papua New Guinea informed the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.]

**The Acting Chairman:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.26/Rev.1, entitled "Nuclear disarmament".

A recorded vote has been requested.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

**Ms. Stoute** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/59/L.26/Rev.1, entitled “Nuclear disarmament”.

The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Myanmar at the 11th meeting, on 19 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/59/L.26/Rev.1 and also in documents A/C.1/59/INF/2 and addenda 1, 2 and 3.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

*Against:*

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

*Abstaining:*

Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Honduras, India, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Sweden, Ukraine

*Draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.26/Rev.1 was adopted by 93 votes to 42, with 18 abstentions.*

[Subsequently, the delegations of Jordan, Kuwait and Papua New Guinea informed the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.]

**The Acting Chairman:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.41, entitled “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas”.

A recorded vote has been requested. Separate, recorded votes have also been requested on the last three words of operative paragraph 5 and on operative paragraph 5 as a whole.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

**Ms. Stoute** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take a separate vote on the last three words of operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.41, which read as follows: “and South Asia”.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy,

Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

*Against:*

India, Pakistan

*Abstaining:*

Bhutan, Bulgaria, France, Israel, Myanmar, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

*The last three words of operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.41 were retained by 139 votes to 2, with 9 abstentions.*

[Subsequently, the delegation of Papua New Guinea advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

**The Acting Chairman:** The Committee will now proceed to take a separate vote on operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.41.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

**Ms. Stoute** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take a separate vote on operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.41, which reads as follows:

“Welcomes the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the

States of the region concerned, and calls upon all States to consider all relevant proposals, including those reflected in its resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia;”

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

*Against:*

India

*Abstaining:*

Bhutan, France, Israel, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

*Operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.41 was retained by 144 votes to 1, with 8 abstentions.*

[Subsequently, the delegation of Papua New Guinea advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

**The Acting Chairman:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.41 as a whole.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

**Ms. Stoute** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/59/L.41, entitled “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas”, as a whole.

The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Brazil at the 11th meeting, on 19 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/59/L.41 and also in documents A/C.1/59/INF/2 and Add.4\*. In addition, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Liberia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Zambia and Zimbabwe have now become co-sponsors of the draft resolution.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark,

Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

*Against:*

France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

*Abstaining:*

Bhutan, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Spain

*Draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.41 was adopted by 149 votes to 3, with 6 abstentions.*

[Subsequently, the delegation of Papua New Guinea advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

**The Acting Chairman:** The Committee has thus concluded action on cluster 1 for today.

I now call on those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote on the draft resolutions just adopted.

**Mr. Rivas** (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation has found itself once again obliged, as it

was at the fifty-eighth session, to abstain in the voting in the First Committee on the draft resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is contained this year in document A/C.1/59/L.25/Rev.1.

We were obliged to do so despite Colombia's traditional commitment to nuclear disarmament, monitoring and inspection systems. The Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is familiar with Colombia's constitutional difficulties in ratifying the CTBT. We have declared our reservations publicly and transparently over the past four years.

Colombia continues to reaffirm its commitment to the Treaty and to finding ways to overcome its constitutional impediments in an effort to contribute to the Preparatory Commission prior to its ratification of the Treaty. We are grateful for the interest that many States have demonstrated in helping us to find a solution to the obstacles to our ratification of the Treaty as soon as possible, as we wish to do.

In connection with those proposals, the participating States have suggested that more discussion be held within the Preparatory Commission and its subsidiary bodies, with the assistance of the Provisional Technical Secretariat. We hope that those discussions will yield an early solution to the problem that Colombia has described, allowing us thus to ratify the Treaty.

**Mr. Alhariri** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation wishes to explain its vote on the draft resolution entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", contained in document A/C.1/59/L.25/Rev.1.

My delegation abstained in the voting on the draft resolution on the basis of our well-known position, which we reiterate today. We remain of the view that the Treaty ignores the legitimate concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States, provides them with no safeguards against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and prevents them from acquiring advanced technology that would accelerate the march of progress.

We reiterate our reservations concerning the text of the Treaty, which does not oblige the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals

within a time-bound framework, does not refer explicitly to the illegitimacy of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and does not emphasize the need to ensure the universality of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in order to put an end to nuclear proliferation in all its aspects. The text is confined to banning nuclear test explosions and ignores laboratory testing of such weapons and the qualitative improvement or production of new types of nuclear weapons.

The on-site inspection system may open the way to misuse of national systems for political motives and benefits. We have stressed the strange fact that the Treaty allows signatories to take steps against non-signatories, including measures to be taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, in contravention of the sovereign right of States to choose to accede or not to accede to the Treaty.

Syria continues to consider those essential loopholes with grave concern and categorically rejects the inclusion of Israel on the list of Middle East and South Asian countries. Despite the explosive situation in the Middle East, Israel continues singly to acquire nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction and to develop them qualitatively and quantitatively. It refuses to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to place all its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. All of that impedes the efforts under way to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and subjects the region and the world to Israeli nuclear threat, with no firm international response.

**Mr. Rivasseau** (France) (*spoke in French*): I am speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and France to explain once again our position on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.41, entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas".

As in previous years, our three delegations have voted against the draft resolution. Last year, we noted the reference in the preamble that recalled the applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the rights of passage through maritime space, including those of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. We welcome the preambular acknowledgement of that

important point and do not want those principles and rules to be affected.

If it does not affect the freedom of the high seas and the rights of passage through maritime space, however, we remain uncertain as to what value, over and above that of existing zones, would be added by a nuclear-weapon-free area in the southern hemisphere. In essence, it would seem contradictory simultaneously to propose a zone that is composed largely of high seas and to assert that it would not apply to the high seas. We wonder whether the real goal of the draft resolution might be the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that covers the high seas. We do not believe that this ambiguity has been sufficiently taken into account and our three countries have therefore voted against the draft resolution again this year.

We stress that we have no objection in principle to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones that would make an important contribution to regional and global security, provided that they are supported by all States of the region concerned and would be the subject of appropriate treaties, including assurances from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

**Mr. Pardeshi** (India): My delegation has requested the floor to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.26/Rev.1, entitled "Nuclear disarmament".

India has an unwavering commitment to nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. India was supportive of the draft resolution until the year 2000, after which it incorporated references to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on which my delegation's position is well known. While we have abstained in the voting, our vote does not detract in any manner from India's strong support for the longstanding position of the Non-Aligned Movement and G-21 positions on nuclear disarmament, which we share with Myanmar and other sponsors of the draft resolution.

I also take the floor to explain our vote on operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas", contained in document A/C.1/59/L.41. The draft resolution recognizes in operative paragraph 5 the well-established principle for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones that zones must be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. However,

that is immediately contradicted by the pointed call upon all States to consider establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, inter alia, in South Asia. A proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia logically has no more validity than nuclear-weapon-free zones in East Asia, Western Europe or North America. We therefore voted against the paragraph and abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole.

**Ms. Sanders** (United States of America): The United States delegation has voted against draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.25/Rev.1 because, as we have repeatedly made clear, the United States does not support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and will not become a party to that Treaty. The United States also intends to maintain its moratorium on nuclear testing, in effect since 1992, and urges all States to maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear testing.

**Mr. Mine** (Japan): I should like to explain Japan's abstention in the voting on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/59/L.26/Rev.1, entitled "Nuclear disarmament".

Japan shares the same ultimate goal with the draft resolution: the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In that regard, my delegation takes note of positive elements concerning nuclear disarmament in the draft resolution. My delegation appreciates the fact that it contains a reference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and that it incorporates some of the steps towards nuclear disarmament agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

However, the draft resolution does not contain elements that are necessary for the international community, including nuclear-weapon States, to form an agreement towards nuclear disarmament. My delegation firmly believes that steps towards nuclear disarmament should be realistic and progressive, with the involvement of nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, my delegation would prefer to see a different approach from that proposed in the draft resolution towards the shared goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

**Mr. Elahi** (Pakistan): My delegation has asked for the floor to explain Pakistan's vote on the draft resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty (CTBT), as contained in document A/C.1/59/L.25/Rev.1.

In keeping with our longstanding and consistent record of support for the objectives of the CTBT, my delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution. As regards the draft resolution's call for promoting signatures and ratifications of the Treaty, leading eventually to its entry into force, we believe that this goal will, of course, be facilitated when major erstwhile supporters of the CTBT decide to restore their support for the Treaty. Acceptance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty's obligations at the regional level in South Asia will also facilitate its entry into force.

**Mr. Rodríguez-Pantoja** (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): I wish to speak in explanation of Spain's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.41, entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas".

Spain fully supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. We therefore believe that the draft resolution just adopted is important to the consolidation of such zones and to cooperation among them. Indeed, Spain has supported the contents of the draft resolution in the past and has voted in favour of its predecessors, resolutions 53/77 Q and 54/54 L.

This time, however, the Spanish delegation decided to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution, as it did at the fifty-fifth, fifty-sixth, fifty-seventh and fifty-eighth sessions. For us, a concept has crystallized concerning which my country has always had and continues to have reservations — that is, the organization of an international conference of States parties signatories to the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties to support the common goals envisaged in those treaties, as reflected formerly in operative paragraph 8 and now in the eighth preambular paragraph.

The draft resolution also contains in its seventh preambular paragraph a reference to the possibility of convening, among other types of exchanges, joint meetings of States parties and signatories to those treaties for the purpose of enhancing cooperation among treaty members. Spain has no objection to such a concept, but, as I have already noted, the draft just adopted maintains in its eighth preambular paragraph what my delegation has always considered to be a new

concept, that of an international conference, which is qualitatively different and implies a distancing from the consensus achieved in the matter of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Indeed, the concept of a possible international conference, as reflected in the eighth preambular paragraph, is nowhere mentioned either in the Disarmament Commission's April 1999 report regarding the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, or in the paragraphs on nuclear-weapon-free zones of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Spain participated actively in both negotiations and welcomes the fact that they led to a consensus that was satisfactory, though difficult to achieve. Spain believes that the groundwork laid in both documents is adequate and in no need of additional juridical or political elements that could justify the organization of an international conference.

For all those reasons, my delegation is unable to endorse the proposal and therefore was unable to support the draft resolution.

**Mr. Kim Kwang Il** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.26/Rev.1, entitled "Nuclear disarmament", proceeding from the consistent position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to contribute to ensuring peace and security throughout the world.

My delegation is of the view that the primary task before the international community in the preservation of peace and security is the general and complete dismantling of nuclear weapons, the main source of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This task requires the States Members of the United Nations to pay due attention to any attempt by certain countries to control the legitimate activities of Member States on the pretext of so-called non-proliferation.

**The Acting Chairman:** We have thus concluded action on cluster 1.

We turn now to cluster 4 on conventional weapons.

I call on the representative of the Republic of Korea, who wishes to speak in explanation of vote or position before action is taken.

**Mr. Lew** (Republic of Korea): As it has done previously, my delegation will abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1 regarding the Ottawa Convention.

Although we fully understand and support the cause of the Convention, we are currently not in a position to adhere to it for well-known reasons relating to our own security. Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea has been supporting and will continue to support all humanitarian activities to eliminate and minimize the horrible consequences of the reckless use of anti-personnel mines. This year alone, my Government has donated \$100,000, through the United Nations Development Programme, to two African countries in support of mine-action programmes and we will consider further contributions in the future.

On the other hand, my Government, as an acceding country to amended Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, will continue constructively to participate in the relevant discussions.

**The Acting Chairman:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.21/Rev.1.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

**Ms. Stoute** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/59/L.21/Rev.1, entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them".

The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Mali at the 14th meeting, on 22 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/59/L.21/Rev.1, A/C.1/59/INF/2 and addenda 1\*, 2, 3\*, 4\*, 5 and 6. In addition, Portugal has now become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

**The Acting Chairman:** The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.21/Rev.1 was adopted.*

**The Acting Chairman:** We will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

A recorded vote has been requested.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

**Ms. Stoute** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Thailand at the 14th meeting, on 22 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1 and A/C.1/59/INF/2. In addition, Antigua and Barbuda, Belarus, Botswana, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Fiji, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Madagascar, Mauritania, Nauru, Norway, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, the Seychelles, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Tonga, Tuvalu and the United Republic of Tanzania have now become sponsors of the draft resolution.

In connection with draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction", I wish to put on record the following statement of financial implications on behalf of the Secretary-General.

By operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would request

"the Secretary-General to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the next Meeting of States Parties, pending a decision to be taken at the First Review Conference, and to invite States not parties to the Convention, as

well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations to attend the Meeting as observers”.

The Secretary-General wishes to draw the attention of Member States to the fact that the costs of the next Meeting of States Parties, in accordance with article 14 of the Convention, would be borne by the States parties and States not parties to the Convention participating in that Meeting, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments, adjusted appropriately. The Secretariat will prepare preliminary cost estimates of the next Meeting for the approval of the States parties, following a planning mission to assess the requirements for conference facilities and services.

In that regard, it is noted that, following established practice, the United Nations would levy a charge at the rate of 13 per cent of expenditures to defray the administrative and other support costs incurred in connection with such preparations. That charge would also be borne by the States parties and States not parties to the Convention participating in the next Meeting of States Parties.

It is recalled that all activities related to international conventions or treaties that, under their respective legal arrangements, are to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations may be undertaken by the Secretariat only when sufficient funding is received, in advance, from States parties and States not parties to the Convention participating at meetings.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia,

Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia

*Against:*

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

*Abstaining:*

Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, United States of America, Viet Nam

*Draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1 was adopted by 140 votes to 1, with 18 abstentions.*

[Subsequently, the delegations of Papua New Guinea and Somalia informed the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour; the delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.]

**The Acting Chairman:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.54, entitled “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

**Ms. Stoute** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/59/L.54, entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Sweden at the 14th meeting, on 22 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/59/L.54, A/C.1/59/INF/2 and addenda 2, 3\* and 5.

In connection with draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.54, entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects", I wish to put on record the following statement of financial implications on behalf of the Secretary-General.

By operative paragraphs 9 and 10 of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would request

"the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Meeting of the States Parties on 18 and 19 November 2004, as well as for any possible continuation of work after the Meeting, should the States parties deem it appropriate;"

and also request

"the Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, to continue to inform the General Assembly periodically, by electronic means, of ratifications and acceptances of and accessions to the Convention and the Protocols thereto".

The Secretary-General wishes to draw the attention of member States to the fact that cost estimates for servicing the Meeting of the States Parties to be held on 18 and 19 November 2004 have been prepared by the Secretariat and were approved by the States parties at the Meeting of the States Parties held at Geneva on 27 and 28 November 2003, as reflected in document CCW/MSP/2003/3.

It is recalled that all activities related to international conventions or treaties that, under their respective legal arrangements, are to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations may be undertaken by the Secretariat only when sufficient funding is received, in advance, from States parties.

**The Acting Chairman:** The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.54 was adopted.*

**The Acting Chairman:** I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes on the draft resolutions just adopted.

**Ms. Ng** (Singapore): I would like to give Singapore's explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

Singapore's position on anti-personnel landmines has been clear and open. Singapore supports and will continue to support all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines, especially when they are directed at innocent and defenceless civilians.

With that in mind, Singapore declared a two-year moratorium in May 1996 on the export of anti-personnel landmines without self-neutralizing mechanisms. In February 1998, Singapore expanded the moratorium to include all kinds of anti-personnel landmines, not just those without self-neutralizing mechanisms, and extended the moratorium indefinitely.

At the same time, like several other countries, Singapore firmly believes that the legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defence of any State cannot be disregarded. A blanket ban on all types of anti-personnel landmines might therefore be counterproductive. Singapore supports international efforts to resolve humanitarian concerns over anti-personnel landmines. We will continue to work with members of the international community towards finding a durable and truly global solution.

**Mr. Hu Xiaodi** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The Chinese delegation wishes to explain its abstention in

the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

China understands and appreciates the humanitarian concerns of the international community over anti-personnel landmines. At the same time, we believe that the landmine issue involves not only humanitarian concerns, but also the legitimate requirements of self-defence of sovereign States. Those two aspects should be addressed in a balanced manner.

Because of its self-defence needs, China is not currently in a position to accede to the Ottawa Convention. However, it endorses the purposes and objectives of the Convention and has made its own efforts to address the humanitarian concerns over anti-personnel landmines. China has ratified and implemented the amended Protocol II on landmines of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. In recent years, China has been an active participant in international demining cooperation and assistance. In April, China and the Australian Network's International Campaign to Ban Landmines sponsored a workshop in China on humanitarian mine and unexploded ordinance clearance technology and cooperation. The workshop promoted exchanges and cooperation between donor States and mine-affected countries.

We will continue, within our capacities, to contribute to international demining efforts in the future. We are also ready to step up exchanges and cooperation with all interested countries and international organizations in that regard. The Chinese Government will participate as an observer in the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention, to be held in Nairobi, Kenya. We wish the Conference every success.

**Mr. Gala López** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): I should like to explain our position on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1, just adopted. As in past years, the delegation of Cuba has abstained on a draft resolution on the implementation of the Ottawa Convention on the total prohibition of anti-personnel mines. My country, a State party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), has always

paid due heed to — and has endorsed — the legitimate humanitarian concerns associated with the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines.

As a country that for over four decades has been subjected to a policy of constant hostility and aggression by the country with the greatest military and economic power on Earth, Cuba finds it impossible to renounce the use of this kind of weaponry to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity in accordance with the right to legitimate self-defence recognized in the United Nations Charter. We will continue to lend our full backing to all efforts which, while continuing to strike the necessary balance between humanitarian and national security issues, aim to eliminate the terrible effects, on civilians of many countries, of the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel landmines.

**Ms. Sanders** (United States of America): The United States continues to strongly support the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), including ongoing meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts. We look forward to actively participating in that forum when it resumes in November, as well as in the annual meetings of the States parties to the Convention and in the annual conferences of States parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention.

However, we have some concerns with respect to the wording in paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.54 that compel us to offer this explanation of vote. The Constitution of the United States provides that when the President sends a treaty to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, two thirds of the senators present must concur on the resolution authorizing ratification of the treaty. The United States is in the process of reviewing Protocol V for submission to the Senate. To assist the Senate in its consideration of treaties, the State Department prepares an extensive analysis of the text, including recommendations, which is subject to approval by all interested agencies in the executive branch. Once approved, the analysis is provided to the President, who may provide additional comments or recommendations and who then transmits the package to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

Because the United States is still in the initial stages of this process, and because the Senate has an

essential role in determining whether the Protocol should be ratified, we are precluded from agreeing to language that would appear to prejudge, circumvent or undermine the constitutional processes that are fundamental to our system. We believe that this concern may be shared by others with similar constitutional or governmental systems that require consent by more than one branch of Government to ratify a treaty.

With the understanding that agreement on language that calls for ratification of the Protocol should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with the fundamental principle that ratification is subject to the respective constitutional processes of States, we are pleased to join consensus on this draft resolution.

**Mr. Milad** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*spoke in Arabic*): Libya is among those States that have suffered from the presence of mines on its territory. In the Second World War, Libya was the scene of fighting between parties to the conflict, which resulted in the planting of thousands of mines on Libyan territory. When those mines exploded, they claimed large numbers of victims. Their presence was also an obstacle to our country's development in many areas.

Despite its noble objectives, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction does not take into account the security situation of countries, such as Libya, that have vast territories and can protect them only through such means as mines. Nor does the Convention address the issue of mines that were previously placed. It does not place responsibility on the countries which placed such mines on Libyan territory; mine victims have therefore received no compensation.

My country has taken part in most of the meetings held under the Convention, including last year's Geneva meeting of States parties. Libya stated its position at that time and called for the adoption of measures that would meet all the concerns we expressed. We hope this will soon be achieved.

For all those reasons, my delegation abstained on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

**Mr. Bouchaara** (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): The delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco wishes to speak in explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

Morocco is not a signatory to the Ottawa Convention, for imperative security reasons linked to the defence of its territorial integrity and to its legitimate natural security interests. In the past, the Moroccan delegation had always abstained in the First Committee during the adoption of the draft resolutions on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction.

This year, Morocco decided to vote in favour of the draft resolution. Through its positive vote, the Kingdom of Morocco has reaffirmed its support for and its attachment to the objectives and humanitarian principles of the Ottawa Convention. In addition, this vote takes place on the eve of the First Review Conference of the Convention, to be held in Nairobi, Kenya. Here, Morocco would like also to state its commitment to supporting the review process.

It should also be recalled that, although it has not acceded to the Ottawa Convention, Morocco has always implemented de facto many of its provisions. Thus, the Kingdom of Morocco has never produced or exported anti-personnel mines. Furthermore, well before the Convention entered into force, Morocco no longer imported anti-personnel mines.

Finally, the Moroccan delegation wishes to recall that, in 2002, my country ratified Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices, which the international community considers to be an essential instrument in the field of international humanitarian law. My country's ratification of Amended Protocol II is additional evidence of our determination to contribute to the fight against the scourge of anti-personnel mines.

**U Aye** (Myanmar): I would like to explain the position of my delegation on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

Although Myanmar is not a State party to the Ottawa Convention, my delegation respects the position of all States parties to the Convention. In principle, Myanmar is in favour of banning the export, transfer and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines. However, all States have the right to self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. When it becomes a matter of national security and sovereign interests, all States must necessarily possess the right of self-defence.

At the same time, we oppose the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines, which cause death and injury to innocent parties all over the world. Such tragedies occur because of the easy availability of landmines. Hence the urgent necessity of preventing the illicit trafficking and indiscriminate use of mines by States not parties. That is a reality, and a sweeping, total ban at this time will not prove to be a practical or effective solution.

Given the circumstances, we reaffirm our belief that the Conference on Disarmament is the most appropriate forum for dealing with the problem of the illicit trafficking and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines. Hence, my delegation abstained in the voting on the draft resolution.

**Mr. Pardeshi** (India): Although India abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction", we remain committed to a non-discriminatory, universal and global ban on anti-personnel landmines that addresses the legitimate defence requirements of States, while ameliorating the particular humanitarian crisis that has resulted from the indiscriminate transfer and use of landmines.

India believes that a phased approach commends itself as a confidence-building measure that enables States — especially those that have long and difficult borders — to safeguard their legitimate security needs. The process of the complete elimination of anti-personnel mines will be facilitated by the availability of appropriate, militarily effective and non-lethal alternative technologies that can perform cost-effectively the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines.

India has played an active role in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons process and has

ratified all its Protocols, including Amended Protocol II on landmines; in 1997 we discontinued the production of non-detectable anti-personnel landmines. India will support negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a ban on the transfer of anti-personnel landmines on the basis of a mandate that reflects the interests of all delegations.

**Mr. Kone** (Mali) (*spoke in French*): My delegation welcomes the Committee's adoption by consensus of draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.21/Rev.1, which bolsters our conviction that the issue of small arms and light weapons remains an important component of general and complete disarmament.

A subject that is of interest not only to West Africa or to Africa in general, the problem of small arms continues to be at the centre of the international community's concerns. That is why my delegation would like to take this opportunity to thank, on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States, all those countries that were kind enough to sponsor the draft resolution or that simply supported it.

Finally, I would like to thank the Secretariat for its cooperation and its assistance.

**Mr. Pant** (Nepal): I have requested the floor to explain my delegation's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1, on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, which has just been adopted. We voted in favour of the text as an expression of our unwavering commitment to the elimination of the scourge of anti-personnel landmines. We feel concerned at their growing proliferation and indiscriminate use, which cause serious human casualties. At the same time, we are of the view that this issue also relates to the legitimate security concerns of sovereign States. It is for that reason that my country is currently not in a position to sign the Convention.

**Mr. Vasiliev** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We would like to speak in explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.40/Rev.1, on implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.

The Russian Federation agrees with the overall humanitarian concerns of the Ottawa Convention but is

not a party to the Convention. Russia is prepared to accede to the Ottawa Convention when the necessary conditions are created. As in the case of similar texts in the past, the Russian Federation has abstained in the vote on the draft resolution.

**The Acting Chairman:** We have thus concluded action on draft resolutions in cluster 4, conventional weapons, and will now proceed to cluster 5, confidence-building measures including transparency in armaments. Here we shall take action on one draft resolution, "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification", contained in document A/C.1/59/L.33.

I call first on the representative of the Republic of Korea, who wishes to make a general statement on this cluster.

**Mr. Lew** (Republic of Korea): My delegation would like to make a general statement on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/59/L.33, entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification". Verification is one of the key issues of disarmament and non-proliferation. It needs to be carefully reviewed in the light of technical developments and other relevant factors.

It has been 10 years since the establishment of the previous Group of Governmental Experts on verification. My delegation believes that it is the right time to set up another panel to review this matter. My delegation does not share the view that the work of such a panel would undermine or be inconsistent with the relevant treaty body's unique verification functions. We do not need to prejudge the outcome of the panel's work at this stage.

It is my delegation's hope that the timely establishment of the panel will provide a valuable opportunity for an overview of the issue of verification in all its aspects and that it might lead to consensus recommendations. The Republic of Korea would like to do its best to contribute in this endeavour.

**The Acting Chairman:** I shall now call on delegations wishing to speak in explanation of position on the draft resolution.

**Mr. Elahi** (Pakistan): It is our view that verification is essential to promoting confidence among States in compliance with disarmament treaties and agreements to which they are parties. Verification

ensures the effectiveness and integrity of such agreements. However, the concept and the practice of verification are integral to arms limitation and disarmament agreements. They have no independent existence. That is affirmed in 16 principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission and endorsed unanimously by the General Assembly in its resolution 43/81 B of 1988.

While, in a spirit of cooperation, we intend to go along with draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.33, we are not convinced that another panel of experts can make a significant contribution to the philosophy of verification at this stage.

Major disarmament initiatives since the verification principles were agreed upon have suffered setbacks. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention's Compliance Protocol provide examples of that. It is not for want of knowledge in the field of verification that those initiatives have been sidelined, but for political reasons. It seems that the fissile material cut-off treaty will suffer a similar fate since some now want what used to be termed a toothless arms control treaty.

The principles and the practice of verification cannot be promoted in a vacuum. We therefore doubt very much that this is a good time to set up another expert panel for what may end up being essentially an academic exercise. On the other hand, any moves to revise or negate already agreed parameters and principles in the field of verification or to propagate certain fringe experiences such as the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission as a new verification paradigm will negatively impact existing achievements and consensus on this critical issue. The expert group would be well advised to avoid such creative but misplaced impulses.

**Mr. Baiedi-Nejad** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I have taken the floor to explain my delegation's position on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.33, entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification".

The question of verification is regarded as being among the most important issues in the post-cold-war era. In recent years, multilaterally negotiated disarmament treaties, in particular the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, have been accompanied by very detailed verification systems.

In that spirit, the Disarmament Commission started to deliberate on this important issue and, following intensive deliberations, adopted 16 principles of verification, which are referred to in the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. The Commission also put forward the outcome of its deliberations on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, including the establishment of a standing body within the United Nations with the capacity to enforce on-site and off-site inspections.

Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution contained in A/C.1/59/L.33 requests the Secretary-General to establish a panel of governmental experts to explore the question of verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in that field. While we share the sentiment of the sponsor States in favour of further exploration of the issue, we believe that the most appropriate body for continuing to explore this issue, in the light of the Disarmament Commission's verification principles, would be the Commission itself. The Disarmament Commission has deliberated extensively on the issue and should be given the opportunity to review the outcome of its discussions and deliberations. That is all the more relevant at a time when the Disarmament Commission is suffering from the lack of agreement among Member States on its agenda. Interestingly, a large group of States has proposed the issue of verification in all its aspects as a possible agenda item of the Disarmament Commission. The lack of agreement on the Commission's agenda has placed that important deliberative body of the United Nations on the verge of complete deadlock. Thus, we feel that, with respect to both substantive and procedural aspects, the Disarmament Commission is still the best body for further exploring the issue, including the role of the United Nations in that regard.

However, we hope that the panel of governmental experts can make positive contributions to the process, fully taking into account the Commission's work and the different views of Member States. Otherwise, the panel of governmental experts will produce more division and divergence than convergence.

Nevertheless, in the interest of cooperation with the sponsors of the draft resolution, my delegation will join the consensus.

**Mr. Shamaa** (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation would like to explain its position on draft

resolution A/C.1/59/L.33, on verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. Egypt has always supported the revitalization of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. The delegation of Egypt was involved in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts that examined the issue in 1995, as well as in that of the First Committee since then.

The present draft resolution raises two major issues. The first involves the report and the recommendations submitted by the Group of Governmental Experts in 1995. The recommended measures continue to be of relevance and interest, yet none have been implemented. That situation prompts us to ask why we should undertake a new study; the earlier recommendations should have first been implemented. Have they have been overtaken by events? No, developments have not overtaken that study.

The draft resolution also raises the issue of the First Committee recommending numerous studies in spite of the call for the rationalization of its own work.

Perhaps we have a more positive outlook than the sponsors of the draft resolution, but we feel that they could have taken up the recommendations of the expert group and had the First Committee examine them before urging the creation of a new panel.

**The Acting Chairman:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.33. I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Stoute** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.33, entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Canada at the Committee's 15th meeting, held on 22 October 2004. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/59/L.33 and A/C.1/59/INF/2 and Addenda 1, 3, 4 and 6. In addition, Belgium, Finland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Slovenia have become sponsors of the draft resolution.

There is an oral statement to this resolution, which, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall now read out.

In connection with draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.33, on verification in all its aspects, I wish to put on record the following statement on financial implications on behalf of the Secretary-General.

“By operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts to be established in 2006 on the basis of equitable geographic distribution, to explore the question of verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, and to submit the report of the panel of experts to the General Assembly for consideration at its sixty-first session.

“Pursuant to the provision of the draft resolution, it is envisaged that the panel of experts will hold three sessions in 2006, one in New York and two in Geneva. The conference servicing requirements, at full cost, for the three sessions, are estimated to be \$224,160. Further non-conference-servicing requirements would be required for substantive servicing of the sessions of the proposed panel of governmental experts in 2006, and these are estimated at \$385,000. The requirements arising in 2006 would be considered in the context of the preparation of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007. Accordingly, should the General Assembly adopt draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.33, no additional requirements would arise from the programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005.”

**The Acting Chairman:** The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.33 have expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.33 was adopted.*

**The Acting Chairman:** The Committee will now proceed to hear explanations of position on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.33, in cluster 6.

**Mr. Freeman** (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom's decision to support draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.33 reflects our continued commitment to the principle of the effective verification of international arms control agreements.

However, with regard to the draft resolution's operative paragraph 3, we would like to place on record our concerns about the proposed panel of governmental experts. While we are ready to approach this issue constructively, we remain to be fully convinced that a panel of governmental experts is the most appropriate or effective means of taking forward work on verification.

We believe that verification is best addressed within the context of existing treaties and regimes and in the negotiation of future such instruments. It is important that the work of the panel not cut across that of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons or other multilateral bodies. Nor should the panel's work be used as a pretext for delaying ongoing efforts to enhance verification in existing regimes in the United Nations system.

**Mr. Mine** (Japan): I would like to explain Japan's position on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/59/L.33, on verification in all its aspects. Japan attaches great importance to verification and has joined in the adoption by consensus of the draft resolution.

It should be noted, however, that paragraph 3 of the draft resolution contains a proposal for establishing a panel of governmental experts in 2006 through open-ended consultations. Not a few questions have been raised with regard to the panel. What is the scope of its work? Does it target only weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons as well?

We already have verification regimes, including those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for nuclear weapons and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for chemical weapons. There is also an ongoing programme for strengthening measures on biological and chemical warfare. An international legal mechanism banning the use and possession of missiles does not exist, and the kind of missiles that could be placed under verification is not identified.

What will be the relationship between the future role of the United Nations in verification and existing verification regimes? Is it necessary to establish a panel? We may have alternatives elsewhere — for example, in the Disarmament Commission.

I must say, these questions remain unanswered; they should be carefully examined in the future,

especially considering the fact that the work of the panel would be technical in nature. The scope and objectives of the panel should be identified and clarified before its establishment in 2006.

Bearing those questions in mind, Japan has carefully considered the establishment of a panel of governmental experts from the viewpoint of enhancing overall international verification capability. I would like to stress that the work undertaken as a result of this draft resolution must neither undermine nor overlap with the functions of existing verification regimes such as those of the IAEA and the OPCW, but must rather enhance them. Nor should the work of the panel undermine ongoing procedures related to biological and chemical warfare. Furthermore, to ensure sound United Nations budgetary management, efforts should be made to operate the panel in a reasonable and cost-effective manner.

We look forward to working towards the productive goal of the panel being established in 2006.

**Ms. Sanders** (United States of America): The United States places a high value on genuine verification, a verification that contributes to our ability to detect compliance in a timely fashion and which includes consideration of the need for effective responses to detected non-compliance. We believe that, in the appropriate context, internationally agreed cooperative measures, including on-site inspections and data declarations, can make important contributions to our collective security by enhancing confidence in the implementation of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament agreements and enabling States to detect violations in time for appropriate responses to be undertaken.

The United States is therefore not opposed to studying when and under what circumstances verification measures can make such contributions. However, as we made clear to the sponsors, the United States believes that the mandate for the study outlined in draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.33 omits critical factors that determine the extent to which an agreement with verification measures can actually contribute to international security. Those factors were discussed before this body at the 15th meeting, held on Friday, 22 October, by the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance. As the Assistant Secretary stated, verification capabilities alone are not enough. Without strict compliance and the willingness

of all parties to enforce strict compliance, agreements will not achieve the goal of strengthening international security and stability.

It behoves us, therefore, to study those two factors in any United Nations study that addresses verification. The United States made proposals to the sponsors for amendments to draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.33 that we believe would have corrected this deficiency. Regrettably, the sponsors have not incorporated these proposals in the text before us. The United States will work to ensure that the experts group called for in the draft resolution adequately addresses the issues that we sought to include, that is, compliance and enforcement of compliance.

**Mr. Pardeshi** (India): I take the floor to explain India's position on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.33, on verification in all its aspects. India has consistently supported effective verification as an essential element of all disarmament and arms control agreements. India has proposed a single, integrated multilateral verification system under the aegis of the United Nations as an integral part of the strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during the process of general and complete disarmament, including the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This was conceived as part of a new system of comprehensive global security.

Augmenting the United Nations verification capacity is thus intrinsically linked to progress on a phased but time-bound revamp of disarmament. A verification mechanism cannot exist in the abstract and should be linked to specific legal instruments on arms control and disarmament. Major disarmament and non-proliferation instruments such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty provide for verification mechanisms and institutions to implement their provisions in order to verify compliance by States parties to those instruments. India is in favour of also including the provision of an adequate and effective verification mechanism in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Moreover, the Disarmament Commission has considered the issue of verification in all its aspects thoroughly and, following its deliberations, enunciated 16 principles of verification. The Commission underlined that verification is not an aim in itself, but

an essential element in the process of achieving arms limitation and disarmament agreements. In view of the Commission's work and the 1995 report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Verification in All its Aspects, it may be premature to recommend the establishment of a panel of governmental experts to explore the same issue. However, in view of the sponsors' call to adopt the draft resolution without a vote, our delegation has joined the consensus.

**The Acting Chairman:** We have thus concluded action on the draft resolution in cluster 6.

The Committee will now move on to consider cluster 7, "Disarmament machinery". We have one draft resolution in this cluster, contained in document A/C.1/59/L.4/Rev.1.

The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.4/Rev.1, under cluster 7, "Disarmament machinery". I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Stoute** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.4/Rev.1, entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Nigeria at the 16th meeting of the Committee, held on 25 October 2004. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/59/L.4/Rev.1 and A/C.1/59/INF/2 and Addenda 2 to 6. In addition, Belarus, El Salvador, Eritrea, Grenada, Iceland, Micronesia, Somalia, Spain and Swaziland have become sponsors of the draft resolution.

**The Acting Chairman:** The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.4/Rev.1 have expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.4/Rev.1 was adopted.*

**The Acting Chairman:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.38, under cluster 9, "Related matters of disarmament and international security".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

**Ms. Stoute** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft

resolution A/C.1/59/L.38, entitled "Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Germany at the 14th meeting of the Committee, held on 22 October 2004. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/59/L.38 and A/C.1/59/INF/2 and Addenda 1, 2, 3 and 6. In addition, Algeria, Burundi and Grenada have become sponsors of the draft resolution.

**The Acting Chairman:** The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.38 have expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

*Draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.38 was adopted.*

**The Acting Chairman:** We have concluded action on the draft resolution under cluster 9.

#### **Other matters**

**The Acting Chairman:** It appears that we have only four draft resolutions scheduled for tomorrow's meeting, so, if the Committee agrees, we shall cancel that meeting. But, as the Chairman said last Friday, it is not a holiday. It will give delegations the opportunity to conduct necessary consultations on outstanding draft resolutions. My assumption is that we shall take every advantage of that opportunity.

The next formal meeting of the Committee will be announced in the *Journal*. Here, I wish also to announce that the Chair of the Fourth Committee and the Chair of the First Committee have decided, in principle, to swap meeting times for next Thursday, 4 November. Thus, the Fourth Committee would meet in the morning and the First Committee in the afternoon.

Are there any comments on these matters?

**Mr. Sanders** (Netherlands): I am a little surprised by all the last-minute changes to our programme. We have now received informal paper 5, listing a number of important draft resolutions, which apparently cannot be taken up on Wednesday, but only on Thursday — and then only on Thursday afternoon. Is it unthinkable that we could take up draft resolutions on Wednesday?

It is now fairly late in the game; many of us have made travel arrangements, assuming that we would have completed our work by Thursday morning. It

would be highly inconvenient for us to have a meeting on Thursday afternoon and to wait until then to take action on these important draft resolutions. I would appeal to you, Sir, to make it possible for us to complete our work as early as possible.

**The Acting Chairman:** The announcements I made were based on the exigencies of the service. I know it will be inconvenient for delegations to find out what will happen only on Wednesday, and I apologize. But we will do our best to ensure that the necessary information is communicated.

**Mr. Sanders** (Netherlands): My question was basically whether the draft resolutions listed in informal paper 5 could not be handled on Wednesday — and if not, why not?

**The Acting Chairman:** The assumption is that if there is a meeting on Wednesday, we will take care of the clusters listed in informal paper 5.

**Mr. Freeman** (United Kingdom): I am sorry to join on this point, but I very much agree with my Netherlands colleague. Furthermore, I do not quite understand what the Chair is telling us. Is there a meeting on Wednesday, or not? And if there is, what will it cover? It is a very simple question. I do not understand why it is being left up in the air with this lack of clarity. I would have thought it was very easy to sort out.

**Mr. Trezza** (Italy): I would like to add our concern to that just expressed by the representatives of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. We believe that discussion and action on the draft resolutions listed in informal paper 5 could take place on Wednesday.

**Mr. Mine** (Japan): I have one simple question. If we complete all the items listed in informal paper 5, will we have finished taking action on all draft resolutions?

**Mr. Heinsberg** (Germany): Could the Chair clarify what was meant by the “exigencies of the service” that have brought us to this timetable? I am one of those who have made plans; as you know, Sir, there is a Geneva contingent in the First Committee. We are therefore very sensitive to questions both of organization and of substance, and we all think that all such questions can and should be resolved. Organizational questions, in particular, have a time frame.

Moreover, I have a problem understanding informal paper 5. Looking at cluster 7, I see that there is an ongoing effort, which I am following actively, to conclude our work on draft resolutions A/C.1/59/L.1 and L.13. We are looking forward to that. My question is why both draft resolutions now appear in informal paper 5, which I understand lists texts intended for action?

On a technical question, if these are the outstanding draft resolutions, then where is draft resolution A/C.1/59/L.45, on which we should have taken action today, but which apparently was postponed?

Another question is organizational. If we have meetings scheduled for today, tomorrow and Wednesday, then why not follow the programme and take action on draft resolutions which present no problem? On Wednesday we will already have resolved them and will thus have fewer outstanding issues. We could use the meeting time for them.

**Mr. Andreades** (Greece): I would like to put on record that I support the suggestion made by the representative of the Netherlands, namely, that we hold a meeting on Wednesday.

**Mr. Sanders** (Netherlands): I apologize for taking the floor for the third time, Sir, but you said initially that we were in a position to take action on four draft resolutions tomorrow, and that that was too few to justify having a meeting. Are those four draft resolutions listed in informal paper 5? If they are, then why does the paper mention Thursday? We might as well take action on them tomorrow, perhaps along with a number of other draft resolutions which are ripe for action, which we will know in the course of today.

My request would be that we take action on those draft resolutions which are ready, and not have a large number scheduled for Thursday, for no apparent reason.

**Mr. Shaw** (Australia): I would like to echo the view expressed by the representatives of the Netherlands and of Germany, that if we have draft resolutions ready for action tomorrow, then let us take action on them.

**The Acting Chairman:** I think we have a problem here. I understand the sentiments and views expressed by many delegations concerning our programme of work. I am sure that everyone here

would like to use available services judiciously. The recommendation we made was based on the fact there are few draft resolutions, and we do not want to waste the services of the Secretariat. We are concerned about that.

Secondly, in my view there are a number of consultations still under way on draft resolutions. I think the representative of the Netherlands, for example, mentioned draft resolutions A/C.1/59/L.1 and A/C.1/59/L.13; those are still on the table and have not been withdrawn. I assume that is why the Secretariat, in preparing informal paper 5, included A/C.1/59/L.1 and A/C.1/59/L.13. Last week, I believe, we adjusted the informal paper, and I assumed that such adjustments would be made, and that the paper would be adjusted or amended based on the availability of services and the status of the consultations on all the draft resolutions.

Given that negotiations are still taking place, informal paper 5 is not written on stone and can be adjusted accordingly. I would therefore appeal to delegations to understand. The Chairman is working with the Secretariat and with delegations that need time. As the Chairman said last week, the fact that there is no formal meeting scheduled for a given day does not necessarily mean that we have a holiday.

With regard to the discussions we have been having about the revitalization of the work of the Committee, many delegations have expressed the view that we should have more time to consult on draft resolutions that are to be adopted. I know that consultations are still going on and are scheduled for today and tomorrow. We therefore appeal for the patience of members.

**Mr. Mine** (Japan): I am sorry to have asked for the floor again. Despite the Acting Chairman's appeal, I must make a few remarks; I may perhaps be a bit confused. I understand the necessity of having informal consultations. But I wonder about the word "waste". If we have a few draft resolutions ready for adoption, and if we were to have a meeting to adopt those draft resolutions tomorrow morning, would that be a waste?

**Mr. Hu Xiaodi** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): Like delegations that have spoken before me, my delegation would like to say that the Committee should make full use of the remaining time in the final week to complete its work in an orderly and efficient manner.

Having heard the comments made a while ago about the consultations and the Acting Chairman's explanations, I think it necessary to remind the Acting Chairman and the Secretariat that, whatever decision we take on when to hold another meeting, it is our wish, as well as the wish of many other delegations, that all delegations receive the agenda for that meeting in advance. In other words, everyone should be able to come to the meeting knowing exactly which draft resolutions action is to be taken on.

**Mr. Sanders** (Netherlands): It is certainly not my intention to deprive delegations of sufficient time to have substantive consultations on any draft resolution. At no time was I trying to imply that.

To clarify a remark made by the Acting Chairman, it was my German colleague who asked a question with regard to draft resolutions A/C.1/59/L.1 and A/C.1/59/L.13. If more time is needed for consultations on those particular draft resolutions, then of course that time should be provided. I fully agree with that. But I cannot see why it is necessary to link the consultations on those draft resolutions with a delay in taking action on other draft resolutions.

My final point concerns the swap in meeting times between the First and Fourth Committees on Thursday. I was never consulted on that. The Acting Chairman said that there had been consultations. Bureau members did not consult, at least not with me. This is highly inconvenient, at least for my delegation. Had I been consulted, I would have opposed the swap.

**The Acting Chairman**: I am sorry that the question regarding draft resolutions A/C.1/59/L.1 and A/C.1/59/L.13 was attributed to the representative of the Netherlands instead of to the representative of Germany.

**Mr. Freeman** (United Kingdom): I am sorry to take the floor, but it seems to me that it is implicit in what the Acting Chairman has said that it is his view, or the Bureau's view, that there are only four draft resolutions up for consideration tomorrow, Tuesday, and that therefore there should not be a meeting. That seems to me to imply that it is the Acting Chairman's view that, if there are no more than four draft resolutions to be considered on Wednesday, then there should not be a meeting on Wednesday either.

I do not think that quite follows, if that is the thesis. While I think it is reasonable to forgo a meeting

tomorrow because we may only have four draft resolutions to consider, I do not think it makes sense to forgo two meetings on two successive days because there are only four texts for consideration. I think that, when it comes to the second day, even though there may be only a smaller number of draft resolutions ready than we would ideally wish, we should just proceed and have the meeting. I think that this is what the Acting Chairman should do: he should agree that we should have a meeting on Wednesday to that end. I think that then, at the very least, we should ensure that as much as possible is done on Wednesday. That should make the conduct of Thursday's meeting more efficient.

**Mr. Luaces** (United States of America): We have had about enough of this discussion. Let us be clear about what we are talking about here. Again, I do not want to put words in the mouths of the Acting Chairman or the Secretariat.

My guess is that the reason why there is not to be a meeting tomorrow is because we need to have separate three-hour meetings to try to finalize track 1 and to continue to discuss track 2, on draft resolutions A/C.1/59/L.1 and A/C.1/59/L.13. Here we speak only for our delegation, but I suspect that the others who are very heavily involved in this would appreciate this. We associate ourselves with the remark made by our friend and colleague from the United Kingdom, namely, that we might be able to bring some draft resolutions up for decision at a formal meeting of the Committee on Wednesday, specifically those draft resolutions that seem to be ready to go. It would be our hope that one of the two tracks could be resolved, perhaps tomorrow. Although we have said that on several occasions, perhaps some delegations have not been listening.

We want to be clear that, since we have two meetings reserved, the delegation of the United States is prepared to pursue the ongoing consultations that are being chaired by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. We are prepared to do so all the way to the end of this week, so long as there is an opportunity for the draft resolutions under the two tracks to be adopted by consensus. Of course, as our other friend and colleague, from Germany, has pointed out, that does not mean that we must declare an end to the exercise at some point if it seems that it is going to go on. Obviously, the sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/59/L.1 and A/C.1/59/L.13 would presumably need some time if we had to go all the way to Friday to

make a call as to whether the consultations were going somewhere or not. We believe that they are. Regrettably, we have to ask for the indulgence of the Genevois — which is much more polite than saying “mafia” — to give us a chance to try to resolve this issue in a manner that is satisfactory to all delegations.

**Mr. Heinsberg** (Germany): I apologize for taking the floor, but, as my delegation has been mentioned, I would like to clarify one point.

My remarks related to the procedure of informal working paper 5, which refers to draft resolutions and decisions for action. I understood that to mean action on draft resolutions A/C.1/59/L.1 and A/C.1/59/L.13, as my friend and colleague from the United States has mentioned. My confusion had to do with the fact that the two draft resolutions were being put up for action on Thursday while they were in fact still under discussion.

**The Acting Chairman:** Having heard the comments of delegations, I wish to say that, if it is the wish of the Committee to meet on Wednesday we shall do so. If we have only three draft resolutions ready for action, we will meet to take action on those three draft resolutions — if that is the wish of the Committee.

**Mr. Shamaa** (Egypt): With regard to whether the Committee wishes to have a meeting on Wednesday even if there are only three draft resolutions ready to be acted upon, I would just like to ask what the financial implications would be in terms of unutilized resources.

**The Acting Chairman:** I call on the Secretary to enlighten the Committee on the matter of the question raised by Egypt.

**Ms. Stoute:** (Secretary of the Committee): I thought the Acting Chairman did a good job enlightening the Committee. But let me see if I can answer some of the questions, because it sounds as though the Secretariat has a vested interest in holding the meeting on Thursday.

The Secretariat is very much aware that there are negotiations taking place on various draft resolutions that, as the Acting Chairman has said, are important ones. The Secretariat also thought that it would be wasteful to try to have only three draft resolutions dealt with — wasting, as the representative of Egypt suggested, two hours — two hours not of the Committee secretariat's time, but of the time of

interpreters and verbatim reporters. That has financial implications. That is why the Secretariat thought to move the meeting to Wednesday. We then realized that we might even have to put the meeting off until Thursday. That is why we said that we would announce it in the *Journal*. The meeting may very well take place on Wednesday, but the fact is that we thought that delegations would prefer to know that they could look in the *Journal* to know exactly when we would be meeting.

With regard to informal paper 5, such informal papers are just indications, and informal paper 5 simply listed all outstanding draft resolutions. Maybe we were being optimistic, but that is the heart of why we listed all remaining draft resolutions in informal paper 5.

**Mr. Sanders** (Netherlands): At the beginning of this debate, the Acting Chairman said that, in principle, there were four draft resolutions ready for action tomorrow, Tuesday. Now we hear that there are three draft resolutions ready for action on Wednesday. Does that mean that there are seven ready for Wednesday, or has one been dropped in the meantime? Is my understanding correct that the draft resolutions listed in informal paper 5 are all the draft resolutions remaining, or are there more?

**The Acting Chairman:** Let us look at informal paper 5. As I said, it is not set in stone. We can make adjustments. I would remind the Committee that last week we skipped a number of draft resolutions in at least one cluster. They were postponed because they were not ready for adoption. We therefore have to make some adjustments as we go along. That is part of the efficiency that we are concerned about in the Committee. Thus, as the Secretary said, there is no hidden agenda or any attempt to upset our programme of work. We are trying as best we can to ensure that we complete our work in a transparent manner.

Based on the discussions thus far, my proposal was that we not meet tomorrow, Tuesday. I think that there is general agreement that tomorrow's meeting has been cancelled, to give us time for informal consultations.

As to Wednesday, I was suggesting that, if it is the wish of the Committee, we meet on Wednesday to consider any number of draft resolutions.

As far as the swapping of meeting times with the Fourth Committee is concerned, I said earlier that that

was just a matter of consultation between the Chairmen of the First and the Fourth Committees. If the Committee does not approve that proposal, we shall take it back to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee to consult to determine whether we can abandon the swap or decide otherwise.

I suggest that we concentrate on Wednesday. My proposal, based on the discussion so far, is that we meet on Wednesday to consider the draft resolutions that may be available, some of which are listed in informal paper 5.

**Mr. Shamaa** (Egypt): Do I understand correctly that the Acting Chairman is now proposing that we meet on Wednesday to consider whatever number of draft resolutions has been cleared? Would that represent a waste of the financial resources allocated to the Committee?

Secondly, does the time allocated for the meetings of the Committee run through Friday?

**The Acting Chairman:** As of now, at any rate, it is assumed that the work schedule will end on Friday.

I believe that the representative of Egypt has asked whether there will be a waste of resources if we meet on Wednesday. The Secretariat has told me that the answer is yes, based on the number of draft resolutions that could be considered on Wednesday.

**Mr. Oubida** (Burkina Faso) (*spoke in French*): I would like, if I may, to come to the aid of the Acting Chairman.

My delegation, for one, fully understood the concerns of the Acting Chairman from the outset. But I also have the impression that many of us are questioning the determination of the Bureau or the Secretariat to hold a meeting on Wednesday. As we understand it, regardless of the number of draft resolutions that are ready for action, delegations are prepared to work on Wednesday. If that is the case, I wonder why we could not work on those draft resolutions tomorrow, Tuesday.

Instead of forgoing a meeting tomorrow in order to hold consultations, let us meet on Tuesday and adopt the draft resolutions that are ready. If there are other draft resolutions ready on Wednesday, we should adopt them then. If by Thursday it turns out that we need time for additional consultations, that may even resolve the issue of swapping meeting times with the Fourth

Committee. The Acting Chairman may wish to leave Thursday open for final consultations, and then we could take action on the remaining draft resolutions on Friday. That way, those who have to travel can do so without any problem.

I would like to ask the Acting Chairman to provide a list of the three or four draft resolutions that he believes may be ready for adoption on Wednesday or Thursday.

**The Acting Chairman:** The hour is late. My suggestion is that we cancel tomorrow's meeting and meet on Wednesday. Unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the Committee agrees to that proposal.

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.*