



General Assembly

Fifty-eighth session

First Committee

21st meeting

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Official Records

Chairman: Mr. Sareva (Finland)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Agenda items 62 to 80 (*continued*)

Action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman: This afternoon, the First Committee, in accordance with its programme of work and timetable, will continue with the third phase of its work, namely, action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items 62 to 80. The Committee will continue today to take decision on draft resolutions that appeared in informal working paper No. 6, which was distributed yesterday, starting again with cluster 1, namely, nuclear weapons.

After completing action on the draft resolutions A/C.1/58/L.11 and an amendment to it in A/C.1/58/L.58 as well as with A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1 and A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1, in cluster 1, the Committee will then proceed to take a decision on draft resolutions A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1 and A/C.1/58/L.54/Rev.1, in cluster 6.

I would like to inform the Committee that, at the request of the sponsors, action on the following draft resolutions has been postponed to Wednesday, 5 November. The resolutions are A/C.1/58/L.1/Rev.1, L.25/Rev.1 and L.26, contained in clusters 4, 7 and 10, respectively. We will also, at our meeting tomorrow, be taking action on draft resolution L.15/Rev.1.

Delegates, before the Committee proceeds to take decision on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.11 contained in cluster 1, "Nuclear Weapons," I shall give the floor to those delegations wishing to make a general statement other than explanations of vote or to introduce revised draft resolutions.

Mr. Rodriguez-Pantoja (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): The object of my statement is to present the arguments that have led my delegation to present a written amendment to operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution sponsored by Nigeria, in its capacity as president of the African Union, on the "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)" (A/C.1/58/L.11).

Spain has always considered nuclear-weapon-free zones, created through arrangements freely arrived at by consensus among the States of a region, as an important contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and to efforts conducive to nuclear disarmament. More specifically, Spain has always stated its unequivocal support for the goals set out in the Pelindaba Treaty as a way to eliminate the presence and prevent the emplacement of nuclear weapons in a continent that is so close to Spain, and its genuine wish that the Treaty enter into force as soon as possible.

As stated in the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in its 1999 substantive session on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned,

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every zone is the outcome of specific circumstances and must reflect the diversity of situations existing within it. Every nuclear-weapon-free zone must be a well-defined geographical entity.

In this connection, after a very careful consideration of the invitation to join Protocol III of the Treaty of Pelindaba, Spain decided that it was not convenient to sign the Protocol, since such a signature and subsequent ratification would create a redundant nuclear control regime over certain parts of Spanish territory that, according to the Treaty, could fall within the area to which the Treaty is applied. These parts of Spanish territory are already subject to the comprehensive nuclear control established for all Spanish territory by the European Union, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Indeed, those parts of Spanish territory included in the so-called geographical scope of the Treaty are, in their entirety, an integral part of the European Union and therefore part of the process of political integration that it represents. As regards the field of security, they are also a part of NATO's North Atlantic Treaty (Treaty of Washington), the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the 1994 Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Therefore, the aforementioned parts of Spanish territory fall within European Union, NATO and OSCE boundaries and, consequently, should not be included within the area contemplated in the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.

All Spanish territory was denuclearized by means of the Treaty of Friendship, Defence and Cooperation, signed with the United States in 1976. Such denuclearization has been reiterated in the successive revisions of the said Treaty in 1982, 1988 and 2002. Furthermore, non-acceptance of the introduction, installation or storage of nuclear weapons by NATO in Spanish territory was included in the parliamentary authorization to the Spanish Government to join the North Atlantic Treaty in October 1981. An identical provision, prohibiting the introduction, installation or storage of nuclear weapons in Spanish territory appeared in the consultative referendum held to decide Spain's accession to NATO. There is no intention at all of changing this policy, as proved on the occasion of Spain's full integration into NATO's military structure on 1 January 1999.

All Spanish nuclear facilities, which of course are exclusively devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, are subject to double controls by the IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), in the framework of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between the non-nuclear weapon European Union member States and the IAEA. Furthermore, Spain, together with such European Union member States, has ratified the Additional Protocol to the IAEA's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

In addition to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Spain has also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and it implements IAEA recommendations on nuclear matters.

To sum up, Spain has engaged itself in and abides by obligations that go well beyond those contained in the Pelindaba Treaty.

Spain is also pleased to contribute to IAEA's African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology, which finances projects for peaceful applications of nuclear energy in Africa.

It is worth restating that my country has always considered nuclear-weapon-free zones as important contributions to strengthening international peace and security and that it therefore fully shares the goals set out in the Pelindaba Treaty. That is why Spain has always joined the consensus on the First Committee's resolution on the Treaty since it was first tabled in 1997.

Nevertheless, Spain, as it stated after this resolution's adoption by consensus in 1997, 1999 and 2001, does not consider itself bound by the consensus as it relates to operative paragraph 3, on which it still has serious reservations.

Since 1997, we have tried to persuade the successive sponsors of this resolution of the need to reach a more balanced wording of operative paragraphs 2 and 3. This wording is utterly and clearly discriminatory since it singles out only Spain, out of the six States concerned by the Protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba — the remaining five countries enjoying the "shield" of operative paragraph 2's broader

formula. In fact, the draft resolution as it stands now — and this year's draft remains unchanged — only targets Spain, in operative paragraph 3, since it does not confer individual responsibility upon each nuclear-weapon State concerned by the Protocols, but only joint responsibility, as in operative paragraph 2.

All the good faith and transparent efforts carried out by Spain since 1997 aimed at a more balanced wording of operative paragraphs 2 and 3 have been in vain. Each are repeated — every two years — unchanged. Such a stalemate is unacceptable.

Notwithstanding the validity of all the above-mentioned arguments, my delegation requests the withdrawal of the amendment that it has presented in order to preserve consensus on such an important issue for my country. We are confident that we can find a solution to the problem that will satisfy our legitimate interests, although the fact that the African Group does not intend to make the promised gesture of a conciliatory statement is not exactly an encouraging sign.

Finally, I would like to reiterate that Spain does not consider itself bound by the above-mentioned consensus as far as operative paragraph 3, on which it has serious reservations, is concerned, and that it will make a statement to this effect after the Committee adopts the draft resolution.

Furthermore, unless an acceptable solution is reached before the First Committee considers the draft resolution in 2005, Spain will not be in a position to join the consensus again.

The Chairman: If no other delegations wish to make general statements, the Committee will proceed to take action on the draft resolutions in cluster I.

Before we take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/58/L.11, I give the floor to the representative of Germany, who wishes to speak in explanation of vote before the voting.

Mr. Heinsberg (Germany): I would like to explain our vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1, "Towards a nuclear-free world: a new agenda" and A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1, "Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons".

My delegation has been conducting intense discussions with the sponsors of those two draft resolutions. We have done so with a view to being able

this year to vote in favour of both draft resolutions. We submitted specific drafting suggestions — suggestions that did not require the sponsors of this year's draft resolutions to walk the extra mile, but only the extra few yards. However, the sponsors did not consider themselves to be in a position to accept the few key amendments that we suggested. That is why it is with a sense of great disappointment that Germany today is not in a position to vote in favour of the two draft resolutions; again, we see no alternative but to abstain.

This is particularly regrettable, because Germany fully shares the commitment to the cause of nuclear disarmament which lies at the heart of the two draft resolutions. We understand the impatience with the pace of progress which pervades the language in, especially, the draft resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda". Indeed, all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) must live up to their responsibility to pursue, with determination and continued vigour, the full and effective implementation of the substantial agreement reached at the 2000 Review Conference, and we need renewed efforts to this end.

The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference spells out 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of article VI of the NPT. This action programme remains a performance benchmark for the disarmament process. It is of paramount importance that the credibility of this process is maintained at all times, that the process progresses along the lines of the pre-charted course and that it remain irreversible.

The other draft resolution, on non-strategic nuclear weapons, raises an issue which is of particular interest to my country. In order to further the debate in the NPT process, during the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, in 2002, we presented a discussion paper which was specifically devoted to that issue, and we initiated fruitful discussions during the second session of the Preparatory Committee in April this year. As part of the overall process leading to the common goal of the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, non-strategic nuclear weapons must also be reduced in a verifiable and irreversible manner. However, this goal cannot be achieved in one leap. A gradual, step-by-step approach, starting with ensuring the safety and security

of existing stockpiles and transparency measures, is the only realistic way forward at this juncture.

Let me underline once more the commitment of Germany to an incremental approach leading gradually and inexorably towards the achievement of the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We should devote all our efforts to continued and steady progress in this direction. There is reason for either complacency or undue pessimism.

Mr. Jon Yong Ryong (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I would like to clarify the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Towards a nuclear-free world: a new agenda". In previous years, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea voted in favour of the New Agenda Coalition draft resolution, entitled "Towards a nuclear-free world: the need for a new agenda", from the position that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea hopes that the nuclear disarmament issue will be resolved and our planet denuclearized. However, regrettably, the paragraphs on the Korean Peninsula, which were added to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1, do not accurately reflect the status of the nuclear issue between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States.

Furthermore, the draft resolution does not contain a single word about the nuclear threat posed by the United States to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but instead highlights the unilateral and one-sided demand calling for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea — which is subjected to constant nuclear threat from the United States — to give up its own right to self-defence. Such an approach will never contribute to the settlement of the issue.

Accordingly, it has become difficult for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to support the draft resolution as a whole, as we have done in the past. The nuclear issue is, in essence, the result of the hostile policy pursued by the United States aimed at isolating and stifling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It originates in deep-rooted hostility, which denies the validity of our system, and is a refusal to coexist with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the general call of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

was our initiative. It is our consistent position, and all Koreans desire its realization.

The United States, however, is standing in its way. It is entirely as a result of the hostile policy of the United States towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that we were compelled to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and opt for strengthening our nuclear deterrence capability. If the nuclear issue between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States is to be peacefully settled through dialogue, the United States should make a radical switch in its policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That is the key to, and a precondition for, the settlement of the nuclear issue.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea abides by the principle that the nuclear issue between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States should be settled by means of simultaneous actions. Such actions would provide a realistic way of bringing about the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. My delegation expresses its concern over the reality that it is becoming customary to put pressure on weak and small countries, which are subjected to threats from the super-Power while hesitating to accuse it of its own nuclear threats and acts in violation of international law.

We regret to state that the twentieth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 24 of the draft resolution do not correctly reflect the essence of the issue, ways and means for its settlement or the situation on the Korean Peninsula. For those reasons, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has decided to abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1.

The Chairman: Are there other delegations wishing to take the floor in explanation of vote or position before a decision is taken? I see none.

The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.11, entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Sattar (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will proceed to take a decision on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/58/L.11, entitled "African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty

(Treaty of Pelindaba)". This draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Nigeria, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States, at the Committee's 14th meeting, on 23 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/58/L.11 and A/C.1/58/INF/2.

The Chairman: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.11 was adopted.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1.

A recorded vote has been requested.

I now give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Sattar (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolution contained in A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1, entitled "Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons". This draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Brazil at the Committee's 11th meeting, on 20 October 2003. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/58/L.39 and in documents A/C.1/58/INF/2 and Add.3.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar,

Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia (Federated States of), Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey

Draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1 was adopted by 118 votes to 4, with 41 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1. We shall vote first on the twentieth preambular paragraph and then on the draft resolution as a whole.

A recorded vote has been requested.

I give the floor to the representative of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea on a point of order.

Mr. Jon Yong Ryong (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): My delegation did not request a vote on the twentieth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution on the Korean Peninsula.

The Chairman: The representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is correct; the delegation of that country did not request a recorded vote on the twentieth preambular paragraph.

Mr. Jon Yong Ryong (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): We should like to know which delegation requested this vote.

The Chairman: A recorded vote was requested by another delegation. However, in conformity with established practice, the Chair is not in a position to divulge information as to which delegation it was.

I give the floor to the representative of China on a point of order.

Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): We should like to know the content of the twentieth preambular paragraph. There is a certain amount of confusion in that regard.

The Chairman: I give the floor to the representative of Pakistan on a point of order.

Mr. Umer (Pakistan): I think the representative of China made a very valid point. If I am correct — and I hope I am — the twentieth preambular paragraph begins “Expressing concern that the development of defences” and ends “to the weaponization of outer space”. Has someone requested a vote on this paragraph?

The Chairman: The representative of Pakistan is correct. The twentieth preambular paragraph is the one from which he just quoted:

“Expressing concern that the development of missile defences could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on earth and in outer space.”

The Chairman: I now give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Sattar (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will proceed to take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda”. This draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Brazil at the Committee's 11th meeting, on 20 October 2003. The sponsors of the draft resolution are contained in documents A/C.1/58/L.40 and A/C.1/58/INF/2, Add.3 and Add.5.

The Committee will first proceed to take action on the twentieth preambular paragraph. I shall read out the paragraph:

“Expressing concern that the development of missile defences could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on earth and in outer space.”

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Australia, Israel, Japan, Micronesia (Federated States of), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Albania, Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus,

Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey

The twentieth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1 was retained by 117 votes to 6, with 39 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1 as a whole.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania,

Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

France, India, Israel, Pakistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Albania, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia (Federated States of), Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey

Draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1 was adopted by 121 votes to 6, with 38 abstentions.

The Chairman: I now call on those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote on the draft resolutions just adopted.

Mr. Meyer (Canada): I have asked for the floor to explain the position of the Government of Canada on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1, "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda".

Canada is pleased to have again supported the draft resolution, and shares strongly the attachment of the New Agenda Coalition to the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament agreed by all States parties at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In Canada's view, taking the 13 practical steps remains an urgent matter for the international community in order to implement article VI of the NPT. Canada did, however, call for a vote on the twentieth preambular paragraph, and abstained in that vote, because my Government is of the view that current developments in missile defences do not presume a negative impact on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Given the new threat of the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction that the international community faces, we believe that cooperation in this area could complement non-proliferation efforts.

As was the case last year, our vote of support for the draft resolution reflects Canada's longstanding nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policies and practices, and is consistent with our commitment to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, whose cornerstone is the near-universal norm established under the NPT.

Mr. Rodríguez-Pantoja (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): As we made clear in our statements of 1997, 1999 and 2001, Spain does not consider itself bound by the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.11 as far as operative paragraph 3 is concerned, with regard to which it has serious reservations, for the reasons given earlier — which we need not repeat — during consideration of the amendments put forward by my country to operative paragraphs 2 and 3 and which were later withdrawn in order to preserve the consensus.

Mr. Trezza (Italy): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.11, entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)". The acceding countries Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia align themselves with this statement in explanation of vote. The associated countries Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey and the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, also align themselves with the statement.

The EU attaches great importance to the development and strengthening, wherever possible, of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, based on arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region. The nuclear-weapon-free zones enhance regional and global peace and security and are a means to promote nuclear disarmament, stability and confidence.

We welcome and support the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free zones and look forward to the entry into force of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty at an early date. The European Union therefore welcomes the efforts undertaken this year in the First Committee to preserve consensus on the draft resolution, and is satisfied that this has been the case.

Nevertheless, as contemplated in the guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, every zone is the outcome of specific circumstances and must reflect the diversity of situations existing within it. Every nuclear-weapon-free zone must be a well-defined geographical entity. The EU shares Spain's legitimate concern not to be singled out in the draft resolution. The EU calls upon the parties concerned to resume their efforts to find a solution acceptable to all that takes into account the specific circumstances and the diversity of the situation existing within the area of application of the Treaty.

Mr. McGinnis (United States of America): The United States would like to support the statement made earlier by Spain, as well as that just made on behalf of the European Union, concerning draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.11, entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba)".

The United States believes that Spain has a legitimate objection to being singled out in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution. Furthermore, the United States believes that Spain has a legitimate concern about the status of its national territory that the Pelindaba Treaty defines as falling within its area of application.

These issues must be addressed. The United States therefore strongly urges the concerned parties to establish quickly an effective process for resolving their differences with a view to finding a solution to these long-standing problems that takes into account the specific circumstances and the diversity of the existing situation within the area of application of the Treaty before the Pelindaba draft resolution is again considered by the First Committee. The effects of doing so can only be beneficial for the Treaty of Pelindaba and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone that it seeks to establish.

Mr. Varma (India): My delegation has requested the floor to explain its vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda". India believes that the only consensus document of the international community as a whole on this issue is the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament. It contains

a Programme of Action which remains only partially implemented. India believes that any agenda for the future would have to take into account, as the starting premise, the implementation of the Programme of Action adopted at that special session. It is evident that that the international community has achieved little progress on the most important element, which is nuclear disarmament. This raises the question of whether there is a need for a new agenda at all. The most important element in the existing agenda remains valid, but is yet to be accomplished.

The draft resolution, cast in the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), includes extraneous elements and formulations that have been adopted in other forums. We reject prescriptive approaches to security, such as those set out in the eighteenth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 20, 22 and 23, as they are not relevant to the draft resolution and do not reflect the realities on the ground.

India has already exercised its nuclear option, and is a nuclear-weapon State with a minimum credible nuclear deterrent. It is not a conferment of status that we seek — nor is such status something for others to grant. This is a reality that cannot be denied, a reality that has to be factored into any agenda that seeks to be realistic.

The reference in paragraph 22 to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia not only borders on the unreal, but also calls into question one of the fundamental guiding principles for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, namely, that arrangements for such zones should be freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. That principle was again endorsed by consensus in the Disarmament Commission guidelines. As we have stated on other occasions, given current realities, the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia is no more valid than a proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in East Asia, Western Europe or North America would be.

My delegation's views on the Non-Proliferation Treaty are well known. We sympathize with those States parties that have been striving in vain over the years to get the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT to accept concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution is silent on the

multifarious sources of proliferation, which the NPT has failed to stem.

We believe that all such efforts, however energetic, would be limited by the intrinsic inequality and the discriminatory framework of the obligations enshrined in the NPT. As we have stated before, a new agenda cannot succeed in the old framework of the NPT. There is a need to move beyond the old framework towards a durable system of international security based on the principle of equal and legitimate security for all.

My delegation also shares the objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and endorses the need to work for a nuclear-weapon-free world. However, we remain unconvinced about the utility of an exercise bound by the flawed and discriminatory approaches of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We therefore cast a negative vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1 and A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1, China has always advocated the complete prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons, including, naturally, nuclear weapons of all kinds. However, both the concept and the definition of non-strategic nuclear weapons, as referred to in the draft resolution, are unclear. The Chinese delegation did not, therefore, participate in the voting on the draft resolution.

With regard to A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1, the Chinese delegation voted in favour, because we support its main thrust, objectives and content with regard to promoting nuclear disarmament and bringing about a nuclear-weapon-free world at an early date. At the same time, we are of the view that all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons — that is essential to the realization of total nuclear disarmament. Transparency on nuclear weapons should be considered in the context of an international environment of peace, stability and trust, and should be discussed and resolved in the process of nuclear disarmament negotiations. The definition of non-strategic nuclear weapons lacks clarity. We therefore have reservations about that part of the draft resolution.

Mr. McGinnis (United States of America): I would like to provide an explanation of my delegation's negative vote on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1, "Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons". Although France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland do not have non-strategic nuclear weapons in their arsenals, their delegations wish to be associated with this statement. Our three countries cannot support this draft resolution because it still fails to take into account efforts already under way to address the concerns underlying the draft resolution. Nor does it recognize that alternative approaches have already borne fruit. By bringing this issue into the United Nations arena and by continuing to insist on a formalized approach to it, draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1 risks complicating and interfering with efforts that we believe will be more productive.

As we have pointed out many times before, the types and number of NATO sub-strategic nuclear forces have been reduced since 1991 by approximately 85 per cent, including through the elimination of entire categories of weapons. The United States has also completed its implementation of the pledges, which included non-strategic nuclear weapons, that it made in the 1991 presidential nuclear initiative undertaken in parallel with the Russian Federation. All this was accomplished without a formal arms control agreement. A formal arms control approach to non-strategic nuclear weapons, as called for in draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1, would present problems of definition and fundamental verification, issues of access to sensitive facilities, vast force-level asymmetries and other major obstacles.

NATO has proposed nuclear confidence-building measures in the NATO-Russia Council, including measures to enhance non-strategic nuclear weapon transparency. The United States is also pressing, in the context of the bilateral United States-Russian Consultative Group for Strategic Security, for transparency aimed at increasing openness and predictability and reducing uncertainty. We believe that such approaches, rather than those called for in draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1, will prove most effective in dealing with non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Mr. Vasiliev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We would like, in fairly great detail, to explain the reasons for the vote of the Russian

Federation on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.39 and A/C.1/58/L.40.

The Russian Federation is faithful to its commitments in the area of the reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons, and it is reaffirming this through practical steps. Over recent decades, as a result of the implementation of an entire series of treaties, the Russian Federation is conducting deep and irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons. An entire class of non-strategic nuclear weapons has been eliminated — medium and short-range missiles.

In accordance with the treaty included on our initiative, which has entered into force, namely, the Moscow Treaty, Russia will continue reductions of strategic offensive weapons, having reduced on a reciprocal basis with the United States the number of its strategic nuclear warheads by a factor of three. Russia has presented detailed information on the course of the continuing successful implementation of unilateral initiatives in 1991 to 1992, regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons at the first and second sessions of the preparatory committee of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference of 2005.

The process of the reduction of nuclear arsenals, inter alia non-strategic nuclear weapons, is being conducted in Russia systematically and consistently, in accordance with the federal programme targeted for the elimination and disposal of nuclear warheads.

Tactical nuclear weapons, as any other types of nuclear weapons, form a complex system, protected in numerous ways from accidental or unintentional use. Throughout Russia's entire history, there have never been any breakdowns in the reliable storage of nuclear weapons. In recent years, the Russian Federation has undertaken additional important measures to ensure highly reliable and secure storage and treatment of nuclear weapons. Everything possible has been done to prevent the unauthorized access to these weapons.

All of this attests, in fact, to the readiness of Russia to implement the commitments it had undertaken — inter alia, under article 6 of the NPT — and to respond adequately to new dangers and challenges, and has a direct bearing on those reasons for which the Russian delegation voted against draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1. Last year, we abstained from voting on the draft of this resolution since, in our view, it was insufficiently precise and did

not reflect realistically enough the true picture in the area under consideration. This referred both to an underestimation of measures and steps undertaken in the area of the reduction of this type of nuclear weapons and to the objective difficulties that are complicating the achievement of such rapid and radical results as those at which the draft resolution is aimed.

Unfortunately, the present draft not only fails to take into account the views that we expressed earlier, but a number of additional provisions have emerged which also call forth questions. As we have already noted, the draft once again fails to take into account divergences in the views of States regarding the fact as to how, in principle, we should treat non-strategic nuclear weapons. Such divergences exist even in the texts of the presidential initiatives of 1991 and 1992 of the USSR, Russia and the United States. For example, there are nuclear weapons that could be categorized both as strategic and as non-strategic. Therefore, the very subject of what is being proposed for agreement is not clear. And this is a key and fundamental point. We cannot fail to mention as well the differences in the roles that different States are assigning to non-strategic nuclear weapons and their policies in the area of national security.

I note in this connection that, as regards all of its nuclear weapons, Russia has concentrated solely on its own territory and that it is under reliable control. The President of the Russian Federation has called upon other nuclear States to do the same thing. The significance of such a step for the reduction of many risks, including those of security and non-proliferation, are obvious.

The draft, unfortunately, passes over this subject in silence. It is also not clear as to whether it is in fact possible at all to consider non-strategic nuclear weapons in isolation from other steps in the area of disarmament. I will recall here that measures regarding tactical nuclear weapons in the presidential initiative of 1991 to 1992 form an integral part of a broad plan of action covering strategic offensive weapons, chemical and biological weapons and conventional and other weapons. There are also other basic questions, and without answers to them, the inclusion in the draft resolution of such categorical and far-ranging wording as is in this draft seems to us unjustified.

We understand the wish of the sponsors of the present draft to accelerate progress towards reduction

and limitation of nuclear weapons. It is difficult, however, to agree with the ways in which proposals are being made to achieve this goal. The draft proposes the adoption of a number of new and specific commitments that are not mentioned either in the unilateral initiatives of 1991-1992 or in the recommendations of the final document of the NPT Review Conference of 2000. We would not like to be responsible for commitments that have not been undertaken, and even less for specific timetables and dates to which the adoption of such commitments could be tied in advance. Resolutions that we adopt must open the way to the achievement of practical results. Unfortunately, the draft resolution, in our view, is not fully in keeping with this objective.

We would also like to clarify the reasons for our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.40, "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world: a new agenda". The Russian Federation shares many of the views and the specific provisions contained in this document and considers them important. Such is the case, for example, with the provisions that take note of the close link between strategic, offensive and defensive weapons. In these provisions, there is an expression of support for the NPT and mention is made of the concerns regarding the situation surrounding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and of the importance of preventing the weaponization of outer space.

We welcome the call for the speedy commencement of negotiations for the ban on the production of fissile materials, for nuclear weapons and for other nuclear explosive devices and we believe that the future treaty for a ban on the production of fissile material will become an important measure for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

At the same time, the draft contains provisions that we consider as untimely and incapable of leading to practical results. We are speaking here primarily of the selective reproduction in it of part of the provisions from the draft of another draft resolution, "Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons" (A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1). In fact, it is hard to explain the need to repeat the text of one draft resolution within another. This does not enhance arguments in favour of the importance of the subject and may be counter-productive. On this issue, we have just had an opportunity to state in detail some of our concerns and, in that respect, Russia has found it possible to abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1.

Allow me once again to assure you that the Russian Federation is already in accordance with the commitments it has undertaken to follow the path of nuclear disarmament and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Russian Federation supports and will continue to support realistic and balanced decisions in this area.

Mr. Broucher (United Kingdom): I am taking the floor on behalf of the United Kingdom, the United States and France to explain our vote against draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.40, "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world: a new agenda".

As we stated in our explanation of vote on this draft resolution last year, the United Kingdom, the United States and France remain fully committed to meeting our obligations under article 6 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We support nuclear weapons reductions. But, unfortunately, this draft resolution contains elements not included in the 1995 and 2000 NPT final documents, and does not take sufficient account of the progress that has been made in nuclear weapons reductions since 2000.

Although it now acknowledges the Moscow Treaty, it goes on to imply that this is not yet an effective nuclear disarmament measure, this despite the fact that the treaty commits the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals by several thousand warheads over the next decade. We have many other concerns about this draft resolution and would have been prepared to address them with the sponsors, had they approached us in a receptive spirit.

Our nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitments remain steadfast and rooted in the NPT. The present NPT review process is making progress. As we turn our attention to the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference, here in New York in the spring, we hope that ongoing dialogue among States parties will help ensure that the process will lead to the further strengthening of this cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

Mr. Rivas (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1, "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world: a new agenda", which we have just voted on, and, specifically, the twelfth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 5 and 7 concerning the complete reduction of nuclear weapons, Colombia reiterates

what was said in its explanation of vote concerning draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.52.

In conformity with international law and with Colombia's political constitution, the obligations contracted in these treaties and signed by our countries can only enter into force from the time that they are ratified. Colombia has presented these arguments publicly and transparently for three years before the technical secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization as well as the preparatory committee of review of the Treaty and its subsidiary organs.

During the last conference on measures to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty in Vienna last September, Colombia reaffirmed once more its commitment to the Treaty and proposed to overcome its constitutional obstacles in order to make contributions to the preparatory committee before ratifying the Treaty. We are thankful for the interest of the various participating States in finding a solution to these obstacles. Such a solution would permit us to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, as we wish to do.

With regard to our concrete proposal, the States participating proposed that we should continue our discussions in the context of the preparatory committee of the Treaty and its subsidiary organs. We hope that these discussions, along with the provisional technical secretariat, will produce a prompt solution to the problem that Colombia has in being able to ratify the Treaty.

Mr. Ogawa (Japan): I would like to explain Japan's abstention in the voting on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/58/L.40, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world: a new agenda".

It is Japan's fervent desire that nuclear devastation should not be repeated and that continuous efforts should be made towards achieving a peaceful and safe world, free of nuclear weapons. In this regard, Japan shares the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons with the sponsors of this draft resolution. We are also of the view that draft contains many elements that we believe are useful and agreeable.

At the same time, Japan firmly believes that steps for nuclear disarmament should be realistic and progressive. In this context, it is imperative to take into consideration the different interests and concerns of a

wide range of countries in the international community. In addition, Japan is of the view that there are some elements in the draft resolution of which it is not completely convinced, such as the description on missile difference.

More careful examinations are required on these issues and therefore we abstained in the vote on this draft resolution.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): I am taking the floor to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.40. We have voted against this draft resolution, and we have done so with a certain degree of diffidence, because the text of this draft includes a number of very important and valuable concepts.

The title of the draft resolution itself is a very appropriate one. It calls for a world without nuclear weapons, an objective with which we, like the rest of the international community, support entirely. Similarly, in the preamble and the operative parts of this draft resolution, there are some extremely important ideas, for example, the conviction that the retention of nuclear weapons carries the risk of proliferation and the possibility of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists or non-State actors. We fully subscribe to this view. In our explanation of vote on the draft resolution pertaining to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, this is exactly the point that we made — that we want to ensure that these weapons are not acquired by non-State actors. The best assurance for that is to eliminate them all — total and complete disarmament. Again, this is the concept that non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing processes and that, for the promotion of non-proliferation, progress in the reduction of nuclear arms is essential to this very important concept, to which Pakistan subscribes fully.

We are also very impressed by the declaration in this draft resolution that the participation of the international community as a whole, and I underline the term “as a whole”, is central to the maintenance and enhancement of international peace and stability, I think, in this day and age. This is an extremely valuable concept. The maintenance of international peace and security is a global responsibility, not that of limited group of countries, but an undiluted and total international responsibility. So this is a concept, I think, which needs full and total endorsement.

But despite these extremely useful ideas in this draft resolution, we were obliged to vote against it for reasons that should be familiar to everyone and which are, of course, reflected in the eighteenth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 20, 22 and 23. Now, our problem with this is that there is, of course, a certain reality in our part of the world in which Pakistan has acquired nuclear weapons. We have nuclear capability. This particular aspect of the resolution, these three or four paragraphs, do not recognize that reality. But worse than that, they do not recognize the factors that prompted Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons. They make a general equation of two or three countries, which, to our mind, is absolutely incorrect. We were not the first ones to acquire nuclear weapons. For 20 years, we had advocated a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. We had called for a number of measures that would have ensured the non-nuclearization of our region. But that did not happen. The Committee knows the circumstances under which Pakistan was forced, literally, to acquire an overt nuclear capability for self-defence and strategic balance. These three paragraphs do not take this reality, which is known to everyone, into account.

So it was for these reasons and despite, as I said, the fact that we are very strongly attached to a number of concepts in this draft resolution that Pakistan regretfully had to vote against it.

Mr. Shaw (Australia): I take the floor to provide an explanation of vote on the two draft resolutions, “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world: a new agenda” (A/C.1/58/L.40) and “Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons” (A/C.1/58/L.39).

The proliferation of nuclear weapons remains one of the most serious challenges to global peace and security. Australia, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, is therefore strongly committed to efforts to curb the spread of such weapons and to advance the goal of nuclear disarmament. In working to achieve nuclear disarmament, Australia supports practical, realistic proposals capable of winning wide support, including, in particular, the support of the nuclear-weapon States. It is our view that, through this type of inclusive approach, further progress will be made in ridding the world of all types of nuclear weapons. Therefore, while there are many elements in the new draft resolutions that Australia could support, we have significant reservations on others.

We are also concerned that the draft resolution on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, document A/C.1/58/L.39, does not acknowledge either the substantive progress that has been made over the last decade in reducing these types of weapons nor the ongoing efforts. For these reasons, Australia had, unfortunately, to abstain in the vote on the two draft resolutions.

The Chairman: That concludes the list of speakers in explanation of vote after the vote. Are there any others? I see none.

We have now concluded our consideration of cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons", not only for today's meeting, but for this session as a whole. We have also previously completed our consideration of clusters 2 and 3 as well as cluster 5.

We will now proceed to the two drafts that we have under cluster 6, "Confidence-building measures, including transparency in armaments", contained in documents A/C.1/58/L.18 and A/C.1/58/L.54.

Before proceeding to take action, I give the floor to those delegations wishing to make general statements other than explanations of vote or to introduce revised draft resolutions.

I have one speaker on my list, the representative of the Central African Republic.

Mr. Poukré-Kono (Central African Republic) (*spoke in French*): As the Assembly must take a decision on A/C.1/58/L.54/Rev.1, it is useful to mention that the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa has made some significant progress in modifying the text. This is in regards to the organization, in Franceville, Gabon, from 21 to 28 July 2003 of the peacekeeping military exercise called "Biyongo 2003" and the recent holding, in Malabo in Equatorial Guinea, of the twentieth ministerial meeting of the Committee, which took place from 27 to 31 October 2003.

These relevant events, indicated in operative paragraph 4, will assist the work of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, which should be recognized and supported.

Moreover, I would like to draw the attention of the committee to the spelling of the name "Biyongo", which should be written and pronounced "Biyongo".

The wrong spelling is to be found in section (d) of operative paragraph 4.

The Chairman: Due note will be taken of the correct spelling just indicated.

Are there other delegations wishing to make general statements before we proceed to take action?

If not, I now give the floor to those delegations wishing to express themselves in explanation of vote or position before a decision is taken.

Mr. Varma (India): The Indian delegation has requested the floor to explain its vote before the vote on the draft resolution entitled "Confidence-building measures in the regional and sub-regional context" (A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1).

This draft resolution has gone through some revision. In informal consultations, we had conveyed several concerns that we had with draft resolution L.18 as well as with L.18/Rev.1. Though the sponsor of the draft resolution has gone through the motions of taking on board suggestions made by delegations, including ours, the core objective of the draft remains unchanged. This consists of using confidence-building measures as a vehicle for introducing vague notions of the regions of tension and military balance and for dragging the United Nations Secretary-General into an ambiguous role under questionable motivations. It is indeed a pity that the very important subject of confidence-building measures, which enjoys broad support, including that of India, is being brought to the First Committee under dubious conditions in this draft resolution.

There is a distortion of the accepted use of confidence-building measures, as commonly agreed in consensus documents of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In fact, this draft resolution is silent on the invaluable contributions made by the Commission. It betrays a lack of understanding of all the systematic labour and sincerity of the real practitioners of confidence-building measures that have made a difference on the ground.

Confidence-building measures need sustained dialogue and application in order to be useful and productive. They comprise a gradual process to create a positive atmosphere in difficult conditions. Engaging into confidence-building measures presupposes the good faith of the parties concerned for increasing space for peace, which is inconceivable when dialogue and confidence-building measures are treated as a cloak to

hide the intent to change the status quo. Similarly, confidence-building measures cannot be a subterfuge to get a whole host of non-parties to a dispute involved in the process.

The draft resolution suffers from these drawbacks and effects only a travesty of confidence-building measures. The draft resolution tries to fuse selective quotes from the Charter with concepts and notions that have no place in any consensus document that would bring us all together in the First Committee. An entirely artificial construct of regions of tension is advanced in paragraph 7 to assign a role to the Secretary-General beyond what is ascribed to him in the Charter or by established practice. Moreover, involving non-parties to a dispute may be a recipe for wrecking, rather than building, confidence in particular situations. Paragraph 7 would create a bad precedent in our deliberations, exacerbate contentious issues and knock the bottom out of the confidence-building-measure option being implemented in practice.

By prescribing military balance between States in the regions of tension, the draft resolution unrealistic demands on diverse States of various sizes and security requirements. Such balance is intended to justify a quest for the sterile concept of parity derived from the cold war. In fact, the total absence of any reference to threats posed by international terrorism or by terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction typifies the anachronistic approach of the draft resolution.

The draft resolution is unacceptable to India both in its objectives and in its content. We will therefore cast a negative vote to reject its premise and its intended outcome, and the use of its content, piecemeal or as a whole, with regard to other areas of interest in the First Committee.

Mrs. Martinic (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation has asked for the floor to explain its abstention in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1 on confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context. In our opinion, the draft resolution contains valuable elements that we believe are of interest in the context of the General Assembly debate on the prevention of armed conflict. As is well known, Argentina, on the basis of its own experience, is an enthusiastic advocate of confidence-building measures. Unfortunately, the draft resolution under consideration does not fully reflect the consensus on these measures attained in the Disarmament

Commission in the past and reflected in document A/51/182/Rev.1.

Furthermore, the draft resolution does not do justice to the work done by the Disarmament Commission on this issue during its most recent three sessions. It is worth recalling that the vast majority of Member States have agreed that those measures can make a positive contribution to international peace and security and to the prevention of armed conflict. That is why, regrettably, we are obliged to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.

Mr. McGinnis (United States of America): It is with regret that my delegation is compelled to vote against a draft resolution dealing with confidence-building measures. I am referring to draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1, entitled "Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context".

The United States places particular value on the role that confidence-building measures can play in establishing an atmosphere of trust, cooperation and renewed optimism among States long distrustful of one another. We would have been pleased to support a well-crafted draft resolution on the issue in this Committee. Unfortunately, the draft before us, although revised, remains seriously flawed. It asserts principles which have little to do with confidence-building measures and with which we do not agree. The text fails to take account of the considerable body of established principles on confidence-building measures and the broad convergence of views on how they are best employed, as reflected most recently in the Disarmament Commission's work on this issue. Most important, the draft resolution seems to run counter to the very spirit of mutual and voluntary accommodation that gives confidence-building measures their power.

Allow me to be absolutely clear: my delegation does not believe that our vote on this draft resolution should be mistaken to signal a choosing of sides on the various disputes between India and Pakistan. Our negative vote will represent our rejection of an approach that distorts a principle: that is, the confidence-building measures that we hold dear.

Many delegates will recall that it was just such an approach that helped produce a failure by the Disarmament Commission to produce an agreed document on conventional confidence-building measures after three years of what seemed up to that time to be productive effort.

My delegation has expressed, throughout this session of the First Committee, our deep concern that multilateral disarmament institutions will become ever-more irrelevant if we cannot find ways to refocus our efforts to address the urgent security challenges before us. If the Committee endorses this draft resolution, we shall be voting to burden ourselves with yet another perennial resolution whose underlying purpose is to bring a bilateral dispute into this body. We urge delegations to consider whether this represents the best use of our time and energy in this Committee, and then to join with us in opposing the draft resolution.

The Chairman: If no other delegation wishes to speak in explanation of vote before the voting, the Committee will proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Benin, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Fiji, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, South Africa, Swaziland, Turkey, Uruguay, Vanuatu

Draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1 was adopted by 68 votes to 47, with 34 abstentions.

The Chairman: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.54/Rev.1. I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Sattar (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take a decision on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/58/L.54/Rev.1, entitled "Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa", under agenda item 74, "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly".

The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of the Central African Republic at the 13th meeting, on 22 October 2003. A list of the sponsors is contained in document A/C.1/58/L.54/Rev.1.

In connection with the draft resolution, I wish to put on record the following statement on the financial implications. Under the terms of operative paragraphs 6 to 11, 15 and 16 of draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.54/Rev.1, the General Assembly would welcome the creation of a mechanism for the promotion, maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa, to be known as the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa, by the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the Economic Community of Central African States, held at Yaoundé on 25 February 1999, and would request the Secretary-General to give his full support to the effective realization of that important mechanism.

The draft resolution emphasizes the need to make the early-warning mechanism in Central Africa operational so that will serve, on the one hand, as an instrument for analysing and monitoring the political situation in the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with a view to preventing the outbreak of future armed conflict and, on the other hand, as a technical body through which the member States will carry out the programme of work of the Committee, adopted at its organizational meeting held at Yaoundé in 1992, and requests the Secretary-General to provide it with the assistance necessary for it to function properly.

It requests the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to continue to provide their full assistance for the proper functioning of the Subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa. It requests the Secretary-General, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1197 (1998), to provide the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with the necessary support for the implementation and smooth functioning of the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa and the early-warning mechanism.

It also requests the Secretary-General to support the establishment of a network of parliamentarians with a view to the creation of a subregional parliament in Central Africa. It requests the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to continue to provide increased assistance to the countries of Central Africa for coping with the problems of refugees and displaced persons in their territories.

The draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with assistance to ensure that they are able to carry on their efforts. It also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session a report on the implementation of the resolution.

The activities of the Standing Advisory Committee, including those related to the implementation and functioning of the early-warning mechanism and the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa referred to in paragraph 6, 7 and 9, and those related to the establishment of a network of parliamentarians, referred to in paragraph 10 of the draft resolution, are expected to be funded by voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for the United Nations

Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.

Provision for the implementation of activities relating to the request contained in paragraph 8 of the draft resolution regarding assistance for the proper functioning of the Subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa has been made in the programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005, under section 24, Human rights.

Provision for the implementation of activities relating to the request contained in paragraph 11 of the draft resolution regarding increased assistance to the countries of Central Africa for coping with the problems of refugees and displaced persons in their territories would be subject to the availability of voluntary contributions to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Implementation of the requests contained in paragraphs 15 and 16 regarding the provision of assistance to States members of the Committee and the submission of a report to the General Assembly would be carried out within the resources provided for under section 4, Disarmament, of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005. Therefore, should the General Assembly adopt draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.54/Rev.1, no additional requirements would arise in the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005.

The Chairman: The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.54/Rev.1 have expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted without a vote. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.54/Rev.1 was adopted.

The Chairman: I shall now call on those representatives wishing to speak in explanation of vote or position on the draft resolutions just adopted.

Mr. Trezza (Italy): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1, entitled "Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context". The acceding countries Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia align themselves with this explanation of vote. The associated countries Bulgaria and Romania and the European Free Trade Association countries members of the European Economic Area

Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway also align themselves with this explanation of vote.

The EU strongly supports the establishment of confidence- and security-building measures as an instrument to overcome mistrust, misunderstanding and miscalculation, especially in situations and areas of tension. European countries have greatly benefited from the confidence-building measures and the confidence- and security-building measures which were introduced in Europe, in particular through the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe process. The EU therefore favours the principle of introducing similar concepts into other areas of the world, especially areas of tension, and of adapting them to specific local or regional situations.

The EU therefore could accept some elements of draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1, on confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context, but it cannot ignore the outcome of the debate which took place on this same subject in the Disarmament Commission just a few months ago.

Moreover, in our view, some provisions of the draft resolution seem to reflect national views with regard to a specific area of tension which are not in line with an overall and balanced approach. The concept of military balance between States in regions of tension, which is not in itself a confidence-building measure, and the request for the involvement of the Secretary-General with the States of the regions concerned, acquire special meaning if applied to the context of specific geographic areas. Some EU member States brought these concerns to the attention of the sponsors, but they were not adequately taken into account.

The EU believes that the text of draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1 is not balanced and therefore expressed a negative vote. That vote does not in any way imply taking a political position on any particular regional issue.

Mr. Duarte (Brazil): Brazil voted in favour of the draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.18 concerning confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context. We support the general thrust of the draft resolution because we consider that confidence-building measures are a powerful instrument for generating trust among countries in all regions. Their implementation has a positive impact on the consolidation of a more cooperative environment, essential to the full development of national and

regional potential. Confidence-building measures should imposed or monitored in no way by any actor other than the countries that voluntarily engage in the exercise.

That is confirmed by Brazilian bilateral, regional and multilateral experiences in this field. In our hemisphere, Brazil is the country that has consistently registered the largest number of confidence-building measures in the appropriate mechanism within the Organization of American States.

My delegation supported the draft in spite the fact that we are not comfortable with some of the language included in the text, although we recognize the effort made by the Pakistani delegation to accommodate some of the concerns raised by several delegations, including ours. We still consider that the text might have been refined in order to attain the consensus that the initiative deserved.

We hope we can work further with the Pakistani delegation to reach consensus on this important initiative. To our strong disappointment, at this year's session of the Disarmament Commission, consensus inexplicably eluded us at the very last minute of the three-year exercise we embarked on in the Commission to deal with confidence-building measures.

Mr. Udedibia (Nigeria): I have asked for the floor to explain Nigeria's vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1, entitled "Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context".

Nigeria attaches great importance to confidence-building measures in the maintenance of international peace and security. However, to my delegation the core of paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, concerning the maintenance of military balance between States in the regions of tension and conflict in the acquisition, development and deployment of conventional and strategic weapons systems, is not possible to realize. Nigeria does not believe that such a measure will promote confidence-building among States.

For that reason, my delegation abstained in the voting on the draft resolution.

Mr. Shaimerdenov (Kazakhstan): I have taken the floor to explain our position on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1, entitled "Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context".

First, I would like to thank the delegation of Pakistan for presenting the draft resolution on this

important issue and for its flexibility during the consultations on the initial draft.

More than 10 years ago, Kazakhstan launched the initiative on the creation of a comprehensive security structure in Asia, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). The first CICA summit was held in Kazakhstan in June last year. Today, the countries participants in the process continue to work on practical implementation of the documents adopted at the Almaty summit: the Almaty Act and the CICA Declaration on eliminating terrorism and promoting dialogue among civilizations.

Confidence-building measures are an important aspect of global stability. At the same time, we strongly believe that confidence-building measure processes can be successful only through complete consensus among member States, which today, unfortunately, has not been reached.

It is for that reason that my delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1. My delegation expresses its readiness to continue its work with other delegations in order to reach a comprehensive agreement on this important issue.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of Pakistan to make a general statement.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): It is with some regret that I have asked for the floor. I have asked for the floor to respond in particular to two statements which I have heard this afternoon and with which I must express strong disagreement. The two statements related to the draft resolution just adopted on confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context.

That initiative was taken by Pakistan with the best of intentions and the desire to promote a process of peace and security in South Asia. The contents of the draft resolution, contrary to what has been stated here by some of my colleagues, are completely aligned with the decisions and positions adopted by the General Assembly and other international organizations at various stages.

Let me ask my colleagues to look at the text of the draft resolution, rather than at the sponsor of the draft resolution. The draft resolution calls for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. It recalls Security Council resolutions. It underlines the importance of confidence-building measures. It asks that resources released through disarmament be

devoted to economic and social development. It recognizes the need for —

The Chairman: I call on the representative of India on a point of order.

Mr. Varma (India): Of course, I do not wish to stand in the way of a statement being made from the floor by the Ambassador of Pakistan, but I do wish to seek a clarification from you, Sir, in terms of a point of order concerning the purpose for which this particular segment has been allotted.

We have given time for delegations to make known their general positions and here we have the Ambassador of Pakistan referring to his own draft resolution, which has just been adopted. He has the status of the sponsor of the draft resolution. Is it your ruling, Sir, that he has the right to make direct references to the draft resolution that has been adopted?

If that is so, it would be the first occasion at this session of the First Committee that this segment and allotment of time for delegations to make statements has been put to that use. It is, in our view, a modification of our understanding of how this segment and the time allotted should be made use of. However, we will abide by your decision, Sir.

The Chairman: Indeed, the procedure that we follow is that those delegations wishing to make general statements other than explanations of vote or to introduce revised draft resolutions will speak first. I have given the floor on previous occasions to delegations wishing to make a general statement afterwards when that has been necessary.

As members well know, sponsors of draft resolutions are not supposed to give an explanation of vote either before or after the vote, but they may make general statements. The representative of Pakistan requested the floor in order to make a general statement, which request I granted to the Pakistani delegation. I hope that the representative of Pakistan, when he now continues, will proceed along the lines of a general statement.

I give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): We are used to Indian domination, we are used to Indian bullying, but we are not used to being muzzled by India in the United Nations and we shall not be muzzled, neither by India nor by anybody else. We shall not be muzzled and I will make a general statement as I see fit, because it is

my statement, it is a statement of my delegation, it is a general statement and I will express the views that I wish to.

The Chairman: May I ask the representative of Pakistan if he is going to make a general statement or use the right of reply?

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): My general statement will clarify the position of Pakistan and if I wish to respond to some remarks that have been made in this Committee, I think I have a right to do that, do I not?

The Chairman: Yes, rights of reply can be made after action has been taken.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): I wish to make a general statement of my position.

When criticism is made of a draft resolution that is put forward, I think it is quite clear that one should understand the motivations for such criticism. We have been told that there is an abstract confidence-building-measures concept, which was not reflected in our draft resolution. There was talk about a sterile concept of parity. When India goes shopping for arms, does it not talk about seeking balance with some other country? Does Pakistan not have the right of self-defence to arm and to acquire weapons when India is acquiring \$100-billion-worth of weapons from other countries, and to talk about the need for military balance at the lowest level of armaments so that we do not waste our resources and may devote them to disarmament? Is that a sterile concept of parity?

Do those of our friends who have voted with India against this draft resolution look at the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe? Does it not speak of military balance? Does it not speak of equilibrium? Did it not negotiate levels of arms for both sides? That was a concept of military balance and military equilibrium which we have sought to reflect in the draft resolution that was sponsored by my delegation.

My friend from India earlier spoke about artificial regions of tension. Let me say that South Asia is not an artificial region of tension. It is an actual region of tension, a region where an Indian occupation army of 700,000 troops is brutally suppressing the rights of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, killing 80,000 of them over the last 10 years. It is a region where India deployed its armies on Pakistan's borders last year in what it described as an exercise in coercive diplomacy. We are glad that they admitted failure. It is a region

where arms are being acquired at the rate of \$10-\$15 billion a year and threats of use of force are held out.

It is certainly a region which requires peace-building and confidence-building. That is the purpose of the Pakistani initiative — to promote peace in such regions of tension. We are puzzled at the negative vote of some of our friends who themselves talk about regions of tension and confidence-building. But perhaps these are abstract concepts to them. When these are applied to specific regions, such as South Asia, or to other regions of tension, they cast a negative vote.

Yes, we construe this vote as a partisan vote on behalf of a State or States, perhaps, which are in occupation of foreign lands, which seek to impose their domination over their neighbours, and which seek military domination and the suppression of peoples.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of India.

Mr. Varma (India): We seek to address you, Sir, as the Chairman and as one entrusted with the responsibility of guiding our deliberations.

We are indeed disappointed that a segment of our time has been put to the use that it has been put to by one delegation. It queers the pace of the First Committee, it obstructs constructive debate and it tends to distort the views of other delegations. It is neither our intention to speak in the right of reply, nor is it our understanding that time allotted for constructive debate may be used to score propaganda points. We leave it to the entire body of the First Committee to draw its own conclusions.

Reference was made to the statement that was made by India earlier on. We did not refer to any country, we did not refer to any region and, if words and regions and countries are being read into our statement, we would seek the indulgence of the delegation concerned to read the text — or, before reading the text, to at least listen to us a little more carefully.

The Chairman: There are no further requests for the floor, and we have thus concluded our consideration of cluster VI.

Turning now to cluster VII, I now give the floor to the representative of Malaysia, to introduce a draft decision under agenda item 73 (e).

Mr. Syed Hasrin (Malaysia): The purpose of my statement is to introduce a draft decision on the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which will be issued as document A/C.1/58/L.61.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) believes in the necessity of convening a fourth special session on disarmament (SSOD IV). That was reiterated by our heads of State or Government at the Kuala Lumpur summit in February this year. We believe the special session would provide an opportunity for all States to discuss and review the current international disarmament situation. We are convinced that SSOD IV will set the future course of action in the field of disarmament, arms control and related security matters. It would also allow all of us an opportunity to discuss the issue of revitalizing disarmament machinery, including the First Committee, in a comprehensive manner. The Committee may recall that this issue was underscored by many delegations at this session.

The Committee will recall that the Open-ended Working Group on SSOD IV held a number of meetings this year to consider the objectives and agenda, including the possibility of establishing a preparatory committee for the special session. To follow up on the work of the Working Group, NAM introduced draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.25 on 23 October 2003.

A number of informal consultations have been held with some delegations, and based on those consultations, NAM has agreed instead to submit a draft decision, and will not insist that the Committee take action on draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.25/Rev.1 at this session. Copies of the draft decision have been circulated by the Secretariat.

The draft decision is straightforward and basically requests Member States to continue consultation on the subject and to include the item in the provisional agenda of the fifty-ninth session.

Having said that, NAM underscores the importance of reactivating the Open-ended Working Group in 2006. In that connection, our submission of the draft decision should not be construed as prejudging our position at the next session with regard to the reactivation of the Working Group.

The Non-Aligned Movement believes that adopting this draft decision at this session would enable Member States and all political groupings to utilize the cooling-off period to engage with one another constructively with a view to finding common ground to facilitate the work of the Open-ended Working Group in 2006. The working papers submitted at the substantive session of the Working Group this year, including the paper presented by the Chairman of Working Group II at the 1999 substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, will be crucial to this consultation process.

While I have the floor, I shall also turn to draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.26, on the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. Based on our consultations with a number of delegations, NAM has decided to revise three paragraphs, as follows.

In the sixth preambular paragraph, we would like to add the words “and transparent” after the word “non-discriminatory”.

In the seventh preambular paragraph, as well, we would like to add the words “and transparent” after the word “non-discriminatory”.

And lastly, in operative paragraph 3, similarly, we would like to add the words “and transparent” after the word “non-discriminatory”.

We have submitted those amendments to the Secretariat for printing so that we can take action tomorrow.

The Chairman: I thank the representative of Malaysia for his statement, in which he introduced draft decision A/C.1/58/L.61 and orally amended draft resolution A/C.1/58/L.26.

There are no further requests for the floor under either cluster VII or cluster X. I would note that we have previously concluded our consideration of both cluster VIII and cluster IX.

Before adjourning the meeting, I would like to note that the Committee should conclude its work tomorrow, Wednesday, 5 November. I therefore plead with all delegations to contribute towards that goal.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.