



# General Assembly

Forty-ninth Session

## First Committee

6<sup>th</sup> Meeting

Wednesday, 19 October 1994, 3 p.m.  
New York

Official Records

Chairman: Mr. Valencia Rodriguez . . . . . (Ecuador)

*The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.*

### Agenda items 53 to 66, 68 to 72 and 153 (continued)

#### General debate on all disarmament and international security items

**Mr. Londoño** (Colombia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): At the outset, as Ambassador of Colombia and particularly as a colleague and friend of long standing, I should like to express my great pleasure and that of my country at seeing you, Sir, preside over the work of the First Committee. You can count on our support in carrying out the tasks of this important Committee in an atmosphere of cooperation, joint effort and trust. The important challenges ahead compel us to commit ourselves decisively to general and complete disarmament.

The item on nuclear weapons must be based on a new approach to global security arising from the premise of the legal and moral unacceptableness of the use of these weapons. The claim of security put forward by a group of countries as an excuse for holding on to their nuclear weapons, as well as the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is by any standard contrary to the spirit that should prevail at these negotiations and could even serve to encourage the spread of these weapons. We therefore hope that new and definitive measures will be taken to avert such a complex situation.

While we view with concern the deadlock in the negotiations taking place in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, we believe that both the nuclear-test and the

nuclear non-proliferation regimes should be made universal, complete, multilateral and verifiable in that context. We therefore support the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. We continue to hope that we will eventually attain the goal of banning nuclear weapons and seeing nuclear energy used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Colombia has devoted much attention to conventional disarmament, especially as it relates to illicit arms trafficking. The illicit traffic in weapons and its devastating effects are not isolated phenomena peculiar to a few regions of the world. On the contrary, that traffic is growing ever more nearly universal, diversified and dangerous to the well-being of the international community.

Arms manufacturers, who viewed with ill-concealed concern the shrinking of their profits with the end of the cold war and the achievement of important agreements between traditional rivals at the domestic and international levels, are determined to anticipate any financial crisis by offering attractive rebates and "merchandise" at sale prices. The situation has reached the point where it is easier to obtain a pistol, machine-gun or rocket-launcher than it is to get a kilo of flour or medicine to treat pneumonia, malaria or dysentery.

It would seem to matter little to some people that these explosives and anti-personnel mines are used to kill men, women and children in the backstreets of major cities or in remote rural areas in the four corners of the world. Very often, this is the result of the indifference, sometimes even of the complicity, of governmental authorities. Terrorism, banditry, drug trafficking and other kinds of criminality all benefit from the situation.

If we do not take speedy, effective action at the global and national levels against the traffic in arms, then very soon all countries will fall victim. Here, as with other phenomena, very few will be able to escape the devastating effects of these activities.

It seems surprising that disarmament agreements should become nothing more than political triumphs, military guarantees or economic necessities for the Governments of certain countries. At the same time, hundreds of men and women across the world who have never even heard of nuclear disarmament are suffering anguish and desperation in the face of a treacherous and inexorable barrage of weapons, mines and explosives that are sold and bartered as if they were items at a village fair.

Maybe the best solution to this will be to close our eyes and discreetly overlook this every-day problem and confine ourselves exclusively to sophisticated theories on nuclear weapons.

Only cooperation, confidence and determination on the part of each and every one of us will create a world free from the scourge of war and the threat of destruction, a world in which the welfare of peoples prevails over commercial considerations. We must of course continue to work for an effective treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on general and complete disarmament, but we must not overlook other aspects of the problem, because disarmament must, above all, really guarantee peace and progress for peoples, and not be just an academic exercise, sprinkled with theories discussed in university halls, associations and bodies.

**Mr. Al-Sahlawi** (Qatar) (*interpretation from Arabic*): On behalf of my delegation, I should like to congratulate the Chairman on his election to this post and assure him of our full cooperation in carrying out the tasks entrusted to him. I should like also to congratulate the other members of the Bureau.

At the outset, I should like to declare my country's full support for all measures taken at the international, regional and other levels to reduce and control nuclear weapons in particular, and other weapons of mass destruction in general. My delegation urges all countries, large and small, to accede to all international treaties which prohibit weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons that are excessively injurious and have indiscriminate effects. I should like to refer, in this context, to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling

and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, of which Qatar was among the first signatories.

Since 1974, the question of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East has been on the General Assembly's agenda. The General Assembly has adopted many resolutions on that item at session after session in which the Assembly urged all the parties concerned to take the necessary steps towards the achievement of that objective and set out a number of principles that should be followed until such a zone was created. And yet here we are on the threshold of the twenty-first century and, for reasons that are well known to all, that goal has not been achieved.

There is a set of fundamental principles upon which efforts that aim at ensuring international peace and security and disarmament in the Middle East and throughout the world should be based. Peace and peaceful coexistence amongst nations and peoples of various ethnicities cannot prevail without the commitment by all nations of the world to the principles of peace and coexistence. Those principles are: non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State; settlement of disputes and conflicts by peaceful means such as dialogue, arbitration and resort to the International Court of Justice; rejection of occupation and expansion at the expense of others and reaffirmation of the right of every State to sovereignty and independence; recognition of international borders of States and of the right of every State to economic and social development in keeping with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law.

Proceeding from its commitment to these principles, Qatar has consistently sought to entrench such concepts in our region as peace, security, good-neighbourliness and coexistence amongst all the States of the region. My country has always believed and continues to believe that all countries in the Middle East, without exception, should accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We also support all initiatives that aim at making the Middle East a nuclear-free zone and a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, especially now that we are on the eve of a new era during which we hope to see peace and security prevail in the world.

The creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East would benefit the countries of the region at the economic and social levels, as a large part of the budgets of those countries is now being wasted on armaments and the maintenance of large defensive forces.

If the current peace process leads to results that will reassure all parties, the general climate in the region will change from one of mistrust and the continuous gearing up for conflict to one of equanimity and coexistence. Thus it will be possible to channel those vast resources that are now tied up in the military budgets to socio-economic development. That is sorely needed by the peoples of the region to improve their standards of living and ensure a better future for their coming generations.

With respect to the objective of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, we reiterate the hope that comprehensive peace will be achieved and will generate a climate favouring the attainment of that objective so that the disarmament process may be promoted and peace and security may prevail, not only in the region, but also in the world at large.

**Mr. Wisnumurti** (Indonesia): On behalf of the Indonesian delegation, Sir, I should like first of all to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee. We have unreserved confidence that your able leadership will bring the work of the Committee at this session to a productive conclusion. We pledge to you our full support and active cooperation in the discharge of your task. Let me also avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate the other members of the Bureau on their unanimous election.

This session of the First Committee is convened against a backdrop of some encouraging developments in arms limitation and disarmament. The hopes these developments engender, however, continue to be tempered by the aura of indecision, ambivalence and uncertainty that has marked multilateral efforts in this field during the past year.

The end of the cold war has not totally eliminated the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, and the resulting reduction of the threat of nuclear war should not be perceived as diminishing the need for nuclear disarmament, which remains an imperative. On the other hand, we can draw on many positive trends that have taken place in the crucial area of arms limitation. We hope that the quantitative growth of nuclear weapons will soon be arrested. The total number of nuclear warheads has declined. The successful conclusion of the second strategic arms reduction Treaty (START II) has significantly reduced the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. Further deep cuts that are significantly beyond the commitments undertaken in START, along with concurrent negotiations with the other nuclear Powers, would lead to an irreversible process

of nuclear disarmament. The new cuts in arsenals announced by the United States, together with the placing of enriched uranium under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the closure of some weapons-development and testing facilities, are other positive developments.

We also welcome the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Georgia to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and hope that Ukraine too will accede.

The goal of a denuclearized African continent is now within reach, as is full implementation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean — the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Taken together, these constitute a significant step towards the globalization of the nuclear-disarmament process. The declared moratorium on nuclear tests has continued to be observed by most of the nuclear-weapon States.

However, on the negative side, new uncertainties and new risks have emerged on the horizon. We cannot fail to note the existence of vast quantities of unsafeguarded fissile materials, enriched uranium and plutonium, which pose a serious threat to international peace and security. We are also concerned at the lack of progress in the negotiations with a view to the establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in particular with respect to article 11 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, which relates to economic and technological cooperation. This has implications for the future of the Convention, especially with regard to its timely entry into force, to universal adherence and to effective implementation.

Nor can we be oblivious of the fact that some nuclear Powers continue to oppose or at least to be ambivalent about a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. For many if not all of us, the importance of a comprehensive test ban as an effective instrument against horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a major step towards nuclear disarmament, not to mention as an urgent measure to protect our environment, is self-evident. It is also an objective set out in the preamble of the NPT. Hence, continued testing and the failure to maintain the moratorium may well place the NPT in jeopardy and call into question its integrity. In the absence of the establishment of a comprehensive test ban within a specific time-frame, many non-nuclear States have gone on record as saying that they will not acquiesce in an indefinite

extension of the NPT. There is also a growing realization that the grave consequences of continued testing far outweigh any perceived benefits, and indeed would seriously undermine the ongoing endeavours to limit and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. In sum, testing is a dangerous anachronism in the post-cold-war era.

The Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban now has a rolling text, which marks the beginning of earnest efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban. We are gratified to note that the ongoing endeavours have covered the whole range of pertinent questions, while substantive work on specific interrelated issues has continued in parallel. They have also rightly taken into account all existing proposals and have drawn on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years. Yet it is regrettable that, despite imperative urgency and treaty obligations, negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament have bogged down and that those who hoped for significant progress should have little grounds for optimism.

What is now called for is a demonstration of political will to complement the seriousness of the technical negotiations, in order to ensure the conclusion of a comprehensive, non-discriminatory, universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable test ban within a specific time-frame that would make it a truly credible component of a balanced nuclear-non-proliferation regime. It is therefore incumbent upon the negotiating parties to redouble their efforts to find common ground on the text now before the Conference on Disarmament. The deliberations at the coming inter-sessional meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee must be resumed with a greater sense of urgency against the backdrop of the 1995 NPT review Conference.

We realize that the goal of a comprehensive test ban can be realized only through multilateral endeavours. Hence, serious concerted efforts should be undertaken by the Conference on Disarmament in conjunction with broader multilateral endeavours in the Amendment Conference on the partial test-ban Treaty. There should be no diminution of our efforts towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban as our common goal. On the contrary, we should intensify our efforts to that end. In this context, it might perhaps be useful to see what the Amendment Conference can do to advance the cause of our objective, especially in the context of the lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament, and to determine the appropriate time for the resumption of the Amendment Conference.

In that event, close contacts should none the less be maintained with the Conference on Disarmament, and appropriate steps should be taken to avoid duplication of work. The two forums can be mutually supportive, but it is critical that talks should proceed rapidly towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. And in this, the vast majority of Member States should not be marginalized. Rather, those States should be allowed to make their contributions to the achievement of the long-sought goal of a comprehensive test ban.

The NPT review and extension Conference scheduled to be held next year will be an event of major importance for the international community. It will provide a unique opportunity to make a sober assessment of the implementation of the Treaty. As the primary legal and political guardian against proliferation, the Treaty has made an important contribution to the limitation of nuclear armaments. Yet, for many Member States, the overall record of the NPT is less than encouraging. Divergences among the parties have persisted on issues of critical importance. Hence, the issues we face next year should not be oversimplified to a mere choice between limited and unlimited duration or between conditional and unconditional extension.

Beyond doubt, the question of the extension of the NPT is linked to such critical issues as nuclear disarmament, the dissemination of nuclear know-how for peaceful purposes, security assurances to non-nuclear States and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and progress in these areas. All these issues dominated the negotiations that led to the NPT and its successive review Conferences. Consequently, the conclusion of agreements on those issues will ensure a non-proliferation regime that is genuinely acceptable to the vast majority of non-nuclear States.

Earlier I expressed concern over the lack of progress in the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban in the Conference on Disarmament. The early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban will undoubtedly have a favourable impact on a decision to extend the NPT. Equally important is the question of security assurances, which needs our urgent attention and serious consideration, particularly since it is bound to influence both the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the NPT-review exercises. It is worth recalling, in this regard, the importance that the tenth summit meeting of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement attached to a multilateral and legally binding convention. This position was recently

reiterated by the non-aligned Foreign Ministers in Cairo when they stated that,

“... security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons could contribute positively to addressing some of the dangers inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons. They ... called on the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an international legally binding convention.” (A/49/287, para. 54)

Another relevant issue is the removal of restraints on access to technology through the imposition of ad hoc export-control regimes which have impeded the economic and social development of developing countries. Genuine non-proliferation can also be bolstered by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in appropriately defined regions and based on a consensus among the States concerned. It bears repeating that in South-East Asia the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has for some years endeavoured to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone and is now seeking to realize such a zone in consultations with other countries involved. This, we believe, will make a significant contribution to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Having reviewed a number of relevant issues which are closely linked to the question of the extension of the NPT, my delegation feels that it is unrealistic to contemplate an indefinite extension of the Treaty. Rather, it would be prudent to consider its extension for a fixed period, which would ensure its continued effectiveness in stemming proliferation. At the same time, in order to strengthen the NPT, there has to be a solemn commitment from the parties, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to implement all the provisions of the NPT so as not to perpetuate the status quo.

Of no less importance is the question of fissile materials for military purposes. While there is already a clear recognition of the significant contribution that the banning of their production will make to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, we should like to stress that the issue of existing stockpiles should be addressed at the same time. We are concerned at the accumulation of vast quantities of weapons-grade plutonium from civilian reactors, even by some non-nuclear States. To date, no satisfactory solution to this problem has been devised, and the appropriateness of civilian processing of spent fuel has become yet another source of disagreement.

Regional and subregional organizations continue to make substantial contributions to the cause of disarmament and security. In the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN Regional Forum, which was launched at a historic inaugural meeting in Bangkok last July, reflects the desire of the countries of the region to ensure a peaceful and stable political and security environment for their peoples. That Forum affords an opportunity for the States of the region and external Powers to regularly exchange views and consult on security issues of common concern. Such regional action for peace and security could contribute to a deeper sense of participation and to the democratization of international affairs. The Forum is unique because it was established, not in response to any crisis, but as an exercise in preventive diplomacy to manage strategic change so that a stable relationship would emerge among the States concerned.

As to the question of transparency in armaments, we share the widely held view that the present Register of Conventional Arms is but a step towards a more comprehensive instrument covering all types and categories of arms, stockpiles, indigenous production and weapons undergoing research, development, testing and evaluation. All these aspects are closely linked to perceptions of security which cannot be ignored. It is therefore appropriate to address this question from a wider perspective. Unfortunately, the group of experts studying such an expansion has been deadlocked, which has cast the matter into ominous doubt, as many States have set as a condition of their acceptance of the Register that it should be more comprehensive.

Finally, my delegation has long endorsed proposals for the rationalization of the First Committee's work and reform of its agenda. We are encouraged to note that such endeavours are currently under way. We have noted the indicative list of key questions that may be included in each of the major areas. My delegation welcomes the new approach as part of the efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the First Committee, with the understanding that it is to be on an interim basis. If this approach facilitates a more rational and focused decision, it can be formalized in a resolution or other decision. Alternatively, the Committee can carry on further discussions on providing a new impetus to our continuing endeavours.

**Mr. Fostervoll** (Norway): First, on behalf of the Norwegian delegation, may I congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members of the Bureau on your election. We look forward to cooperating with you, under your able leadership, in the weeks ahead.

Developments during the past year confirm the emergence of new challenges to peace and security in the aftermath of the cold war. There is growing recognition of the fact that the concept of security must be broadened. We should continue to search for more effective measures to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We are faced with new risks, including environmental hazards, stemming from the drastic reduction of nuclear and chemical arms. We have not yet found efficient instruments to deal with the growing number of regional and internal conflicts. Ethnic rivalry and minority strife threaten the stability and security of many parts of the world.

A new role for regional organizations in conflict-solving and securing peace is emerging, not only in Europe but also in other parts of the world. The European Union is, in a significant manner, shaping the future of Europe and also making important contributions from a global perspective. These are two major reasons why Norway is seeking membership in the European Union, and I would like to take this opportunity to associate myself with the statement made by Ambassador Hoffmann of the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of the European Union.

In the field of arms control and disarmament there are clearly encouraging developments. Drastic reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons have occurred in countries formerly engulfed by the East-West conflict. There is slow but steady progress towards the entry into force of the global regime banning chemical weapons. Our task is to see to it that all commitments are carried out in good faith and in compliance with the treaties.

The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) is rightly hailed as a landmark in the history of conventional disarmament. It contains elements that could serve as a model for other regions. Despite the radical changes that have taken place since the CFE Treaty was signed in Paris in 1990 it remains a cornerstone of the European security structure. The Budapest Summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) should reaffirm the need for the Treaty's full implementation. On that basis, we should make further progress towards a European security order based on cooperation rather than on conflict. The decision of 22 European nations to join the Partnership for Peace programme of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an important contribution towards fulfilling that objective.

We welcome the encouraging news from the recent summit meeting between the United States of America and Russia with regard to expediting the destruction process

under the START II Treaty. This agreement is a concrete contribution towards making the disarmament process irreversible, and it brings us one step closer to a world free of nuclear weapons.

The process of dismantling and destroying nuclear weapons brings with it new hazards. In areas where weapons of mass destruction were produced, tested and stored the environment has been damaged, often beyond repair. The prevention of further environmental degradation as a consequence of an accelerated disarmament process represents a major additional challenge. We should recognize that problems of this magnitude can be resolved only in a wider multilateral context and that their resolution will require international assistance and cooperation. Norway is ready to play its part in such a joint effort. The question of coordination and resource allocation to deal with these new challenges should be addressed in all relevant forums as a matter of urgency.

In the light of this situation the increased focus, at the recent summit meeting between the United States and Russia, on the environmental dimension is particularly welcome to us, as is the agreement to cooperate in handling Arctic radioactive waste. The invitation addressed to other interested States deserves a positive reply, and I should like to take this opportunity to express my Government's willingness to be an active partner in this endeavour.

Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the indefinite and unconditional extension of its provisions are a long-standing Norwegian policy objective. It is essential that our recognition of the need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction be translated into concrete action. A common priority should be to strengthen the regime that provides the basic instrument against nuclear proliferation. The International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should be further strengthened — *inter alia* by on-site and random inspections — to prevent the diversion of fissile material, as well as of sensitive technology and equipment, for weapons purposes.

We welcome the recent advances towards universal adherence to the NPT represented by the accession of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia and the announcement by Argentina and Algeria of their intention to accede to the Treaty before the 1995 Conference. We should like to express our appreciation of Ukraine's efforts to implement the trilateral statement, and we look forward to Ukraine's early accession, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, to the NPT.

The momentum that has built up in the field of nuclear disarmament must be maintained. We should therefore seek rapid progress on a number of related issues.

The first of these issues is the need for a firm commitment on the part of the nuclear Powers to abstain from the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against States that do not possess such weapons. The provision of such assurances is a political precondition for a balanced non-proliferation regime.

The second issue is the need for the perspective of and the commitment to a nuclear-free world to be reconfirmed by all nuclear Powers.

Third, we are pleased that progress is being made in negotiations on a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing. We have a unique opportunity to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty within the next year. Such a treaty would constitute a reasonable *quid pro quo* on the part of the nuclear-weapon States for a firm commitment to a strong NPT regime of indefinite duration. As it is desirable that there be a clear demonstration of substantial and credible progress before the convening of the NPT Conference, the negotiations should be speeded up.

Fourth, we are pleased that the unilateral moratoriums on testing remain in force for the majority of the nuclear-weapon States. The recent nuclear-test explosion in China is highly regrettable. It has rightly produced strong and negative reactions from the international community. Once again we urge China to refrain from further testing and to join other nuclear-weapon States in declaring a moratorium.

Fifth, a ban on the further production of fissile material for nuclear-weapon purposes should be considered as a matter of urgency. Negotiations on such a ban should commence without further delay.

Sixth, huge quantities of weapons-grade plutonium will be removed from dismantled warheads as a result of the implementation of the START agreements, along with hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium. Concrete steps must be taken to establish a regime that would include the declaration of stockpiles of all weapons-grade materials, accompanied by appropriate transparency measures.

Seventh, the illegal transfer and smuggling of nuclear material of weapons-grade quality are cause for growing concern. This problem appears to arise from, *inter alia*, an inadequate system of physical protection, deficient systems of accounting and control, and insufficient border controls

on such material. All relevant legal and administrative measures should be applied and, if necessary, strengthened. More effective measures to register, manage and monitor existing stocks of plutonium should be agreed upon. International assistance should be encouraged in cases where national systems of accounting and control, as well as physical protection, are inadequate. In addition, the safe and secure storage of fissile material is a matter of urgency if further environmental degradation in consequence of a comprehensive disarmament process is to be prevented.

Land-mines are among the most insidious weapons commonly used in war. Their effects are indiscriminate. They cause widespread suffering among civilian populations. For years — even decades — after hostilities have ended land-mines continue to spread terror. Norway has for years been involved in United Nations peace-keeping operations and mine-clearing missions, and it has had an opportunity to gain first-hand experience of the consequences of the widespread and irresponsible use of land-mines. We regard with approval the proposal to establish a voluntary international trust, administered by the United Nations, to promote and finance information and training programmes related to mine clearance and to facilitate the launching of mine-clearance operations.

New measures are needed to strengthen the legal basis and authority of the United Nations Convention on inhumane weapons, of 1980, which, *inter alia*, seeks to regulate the use of anti-personnel mines. We call for a total ban on the export of land-mines that constitute the greatest danger to civilians. We believe that it is high time to reach agreement to restrict the production and use of such land-mines, as well as to develop an efficient verification regime for the enforcement of its provisions.

The time has come to expand the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. This issue is a test case for the adaptability of the Conference to new international realities. We believe that bringing in new members will provide the Conference on Disarmament with greater legitimacy and credibility. The present stalemate will not come to an end unless fresh political will is forthcoming. A firm resolution by the General Assembly calling for the expansion, in the near future, of the membership of the Conference would, in our view, be a very appropriate reaction to the present unsatisfactory situation.

**Mr. Dimitrov** (Bulgaria): Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee. The delegation of Bulgaria is confident that under your able guidance the Committee will achieve tangible results. Our words of respect are addressed also to the other officers of the Committee, as well as to the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Kheradi. I would also like to pay tribute to the excellent work done by your predecessor, Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner of Germany.

We have recently witnessed a number of positive developments in the field of disarmament and international security that have paved the way to a better and more stable world. At the same time, however, the international community is facing serious challenges and the risk of instability as a result of the disintegration of States, militant nationalism, and ethnic and religious rivalries. Poverty, underdevelopment, violations of human rights and environmental degradation have the potential of seriously undermining international security and stability, not only on a regional but on a global basis as well. Thus a well-functioning collective security system remains a goal to be achieved.

The important shift to wider utilization of peacemaking and peace-keeping should, in our view, be accompanied by further efforts in the sphere of disarmament and arms control.

The Republic of Bulgaria welcomes the approach and initiatives in the field of disarmament and arms control presented in the plenary General Assembly by the President of the United States, Mr. William Clinton, and the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Yeltsin. These initiatives emphasize the importance of a continuation of the process of reduction of strategic arsenals, as well as of the efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to safeguard nuclear materials and to prevent them from being smuggled.

Non-proliferation remains high on the agenda of the international community. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the major building block of the international arms control regime, and an essential foundation both for nuclear non-proliferation and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Continued and strict implementation of the NPT and of the respective safeguards agreements of the International Atomic Energy Agency is a basic prerequisite for ensuring the viability and the stabilizing role of the nuclear

non-proliferation regime. Our world urgently needs very effective international action to safeguard nuclear materials and to detect in time and prevent transfers or clandestine production. The indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT beyond 1995, which Bulgaria resolutely supports, should, in our view, be put at the top of the disarmament and arms control agenda.

The negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty represent a timely response to proliferation concerns. The treaty in question should be verifiable, universally adhered to, and of indefinite duration. It should contribute substantially to the halting of the qualitative arms build-up by leading to the complete cessation of all nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all time.

This ambitious goal presupposes an elaborate verification regime, of which an international monitoring system should constitute a central component. Bulgaria has participated in the exchange of seismic data and is in the process of establishing a temporary national data centre with upgraded capabilities as part of the future international monitoring system. Non-seismic verification involving radionuclide, infrasound, hydroacoustic and satellite technologies, on which there are still divergent views at the Conference on Disarmament, should, in our view, complete the verification regime.

We also favour the holding of negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. In our view, the conclusion of an early agreement on this issue will contribute substantially to the halting of the qualitative build-up of nuclear weapons.

The viability of the non-proliferation regime and of the NPT as its cornerstone would be enhanced considerably by the extension of credible and legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Bulgaria calls for a more forthcoming attitude on this matter, with a view to striking a balance between the interests of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States and to reaching an early agreement.

That being said, however, the delegation of Bulgaria is of the view that linking the issues of the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty and the negotiations on negative security assurances, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty or any other disarmament problems would not be favourable to the cause of common security.

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery has another topical aspect — that of preventing the development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition of biological or chemical weapons. Bulgaria was among the first 10 States to ratify the chemical weapons Convention. The process of ratification and universal adherence to that Convention, however, is at a very early stage and my delegation considers it appropriate to appeal for speedier ratification by all States parties to the Convention.

Regardless of recent achievements, the issue of the biological weapons Convention continues to necessitate additional measures. Although the Special Conference of the States parties to that Convention has come to a successful conclusion in Geneva, the elaboration of a legally binding verification protocol is expected to take more time. National export controls on dual use and on commodities related to chemical and biological weapons, as well as international efforts under the aegis of the Australia Group, are also needed.

Bulgaria has adopted these and other measures in its national legislation, which now covers the whole range of non-proliferation policies with regard to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, and also the prevention of unauthorized transfers of conventional arms. At the same time, we continue to seek formal membership in all international non-proliferation regimes and in the forum of the former Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).

The disarmament and arms control agenda is now increasingly focused on conventional weapons and related matters. Bulgaria believes that increased openness and transparency in armaments, when subject to strict rules and practised reciprocally, could strengthen peace and stability. An excessive and destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons, particularly in areas of tension and conflict, threatens security and stability. In practical terms, observance of this principle calls for a collective effort.

Bulgaria has contributed to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms every year since its establishment, and has provided additional data as well. We favour the inclusion of data on military holdings and on procurement through national production. The interpretation by competent international institutions of the data submitted by Member States and not just the recording of such data would be another step towards upgrading the Register and making it a more useful instrument of confidence-building.

The failure of the group of governmental experts appointed to study the expansion of the scope of the Register to reach consensus in its final report on this issue should not discourage the international community. It should rather stimulate it to seek more complex methods — involving regional security considerations — in attempting to structure the national data on conventional arms.

Bulgaria favours a transparency-in-armaments agenda, which would involve not only the issue of the United Nations Register, but also information on the size and organization of the armed forces, regional approaches to transparency, and procedures for clarification and consultation between States on a United-Nations-Register-related definition of data.

The work of the group of governmental experts to prepare the review conference of the “inhumane” weapons Convention in 1995 merits special attention. It is now clear that, while a possible revision of Protocol II of the Convention is the focus of the preparatory consultations, other types of “inhumane” weapons requiring innovative thinking and considerable compromise have to be addressed. The conduct of consultations under this item among Member States with a more liberal scheduling and resource planning for 1995 would be quite appropriate.

The Republic of Bulgaria is among the initiators of the regional disarmament process in Europe in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Bulgarian delegations participated actively in the elaboration of the instrument which led to unprecedented regional conventional disarmament and to the introduction of comprehensive confidence- and security-building measures, thus contributing to increased stability in Europe.

In the meantime, Bulgaria is of the view that the immense quantities of treaty-limited equipment and other weapons that remain in Europe, even after the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), exceed the needs of security and stability. The interest in further specific confidence-building and arms-control measures in the Balkans aimed at harmonizing the obligations assumed under various international instruments in this area is well founded.

Such additional measures in the Balkans could, in our opinion, include the expanded exchange of information and additional confidence- and security-building measures, as well as further reductions of conventional armaments and forces in the area, in particular where military imbalances persist.

In this context, I should like to mention the positive experience with our neighbours Greece and Turkey. Bulgaria signed agreements with these two countries on confidence- and security-building measures complementary to the 1992 Vienna document.

We hold the view that the regimes established by various regional agreements in Europe, as well as additional measures in the Balkans in the field of arms control and confidence-building, should include the territory of the former Yugoslavia as well. The timely and just solution of the crisis in that area is a major prerequisite for the achievement of this goal.

In conclusion, we share the hope expressed by the Chairman of the First Committee at the forty-eighth session that the Committee will truly modernize its work by eliminating those items that are no longer relevant and by addressing those which are relevant. Bulgaria would like to welcome further collective efforts with regard to a more structured role for the First Committee.

**Mr. Lamamra** (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): It is a great pleasure for me to address to you, Sir, my warmest congratulations on your well-deserved election to the chairmanship of this important Committee. My congratulations are also addressed to the other members of the Bureau and to your eminent predecessor.

The new prospects opened up by the end of the cold war in the fields of disarmament and of international security are major elements of a new vision of peace and stability in the world. The objective of general and complete disarmament, which has been looked at in terms of equal sovereign rights and shared responsibilities among all States, has thereby been rehabilitated. The emergence of strategic thinking downgrading the military factors in the national security of States, and in international security, is becoming more pertinent and necessary.

The major challenges of tomorrow call for a security that is global in its concept, universal in its basis and scope, and non-discriminatory in its effects and benefits. A doctrine of collective security that is inspired by the Charter of the United Nations naturally calls for transcending competition among the nuclear military Powers and recognizing the irrelevance of policies based on a balance of terror. In the final analysis, such a doctrine would promote the advent and spreading of a culture that would give security to peoples and individuals and would mobilize energies and resources that had long been gobbled up by the arms race, thereby serving to protect and promote the rights

of every person, including the fundamental right to life and to living in conditions compatible with the value and dignity of the individual.

Algeria has always considered that questions of disarmament, of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of international security cannot be dissociated from economic and social development, which is now rightly recognized to be the foundation of peace and harmony among nations. My country's commitment to a collective security capable of bringing about a qualitatively new era in the history of mankind has led my Government, which devotes only a very small percentage of its income to national defence, to adopt significant measures or to associate itself, in full responsibility, with the following measures:

Voluntary submission of its two reactors for research and the production of radioisotopes to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);

Adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), despite the observations with regard to the limits and imperfections of this international legal instrument that Algeria shares with the other members of the Non-Aligned Movement;

The signing and starting of the process of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction;

Participation in the work of governmental experts of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to draft a treaty on a nuclear-free zone in Africa;

Participation in the multilateral working group on the control of armaments and on disarmament which arose from the process of the Madrid Conference on peace in the Middle East;

Contribution to all the efforts deployed in various forums with a view to the strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean; and

Contribution within the framework of the Arab Maghreb Union and the Sahelo-Saharan group to development and subregional cooperation for peace, stability and security in these two geopolitical areas.

A clear analysis of the developments in matters of disarmament since last year makes it possible to note that,

whereas there has been no loss of impetus and no damaging slippage, unfortunately there has also been no marked advance of a nature that would be welcomed by the international community today.

Thus, the negotiations that have been taking place in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, in a bid to be serious and constructive, is now facing difficulties that are damaging, and the recommendation relating to the drafting of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes has not yet been implemented. The establishment of a binding and effective legal regime of safeguards against the threat of the use or the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States has unfortunately met with unjustifiable and counter-productive delaying tactics that run counter to the legitimate expectation of the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations and of their peoples, and also of public opinion in the nuclear military Powers themselves. The preparatory work of the fourth review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty is also encountering delay, and there has as yet been no convergence of positions towards a dynamic balance of obligations between the States parties of differing status and towards the promotion of the transfer of nuclear technology for development.

Against this background, it is a matter of concern that the new political climate in the sensitive region of the Middle East has not yet had a positive impact on nuclear disarmament and that considerable nuclear stocks held by one single State in the region still remain outside any international control at a time when the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction should be supported by everyone.

The initiatives of the non-aligned countries in the Conference on Disarmament, and those announced by the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation at the current session of the General Assembly, have in common the will to maintain and develop the dynamic of disarmament, with a view to covering all the interlinked compartments of the ultimate aim of disarmament — that is, real and undiminished security. The dynamic should also cover the question that has particular importance for a growing number of States, namely, the illicit transfer of conventional weapons, which feeds and exacerbates violent phenomena such as terrorism and drug trafficking. This is not a minor or a side issue from the point of view of the national security and stability of many countries. The international community must

therefore deal with it effectively and with the urgency it demands.

Like other fields of international life, the field of disarmament and security must be the object, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, of a critical analysis. It is to be hoped that people of good will will join together to ensure that next year will be a time of significant breakthroughs in the process of disarmament that can have concrete and broad-ranging prospects.

**Mr. Chong-Ha Yoo** (Republic of Korea): I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee. Your vast experience and able leadership will greatly contribute to the success of our discussion. At the same time, I wish to acknowledge the excellent work of your predecessor, Ambassador Von Wagner of Germany, whose ardent endeavours to rationalize the work of this Committee deserve our praise.

We are now at a critical moment in the area of disarmament and international security, particularly regarding weapons of mass destruction. Not only are we in the final stages of preparing for next year's Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but we are also getting ready for the full implementation of the chemical weapons Convention and have just successfully concluded a special conference on the biological weapons Convention.

Ensuring an effective nuclear non-proliferation regime is one of the most critical tasks facing us today. We will have a rare opportunity to address crucial issues in the field of disarmament during the 1995 NPT review and extension Conference.

The NPT has been the key international instrument for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons for the past 24 years. By providing a solid and dependable foundation for containing nuclear proliferation, it has served as the primary legal and political deterrent for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fact that 165 countries are now States parties to the NPT reflects the global appeal of the objectives and rationale of the regime.

My Government supports the indefinite extension of the NPT. Notwithstanding concerns about its shortcomings, the NPT will constitute a leading component in the development of an effective international non-proliferation regime. We must do our utmost not only to maintain this regime, but to strengthen and improve it. Garnering

increased confidence in the NPT and diminishing the inequitable elements in it will lead to the greater effectiveness of the regime.

In this regard, we welcome the negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament towards an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT), and a treaty on a cut-off in the production of fissile material for weapons use. My delegation hopes that during the scheduled inter-sessional meetings the Conference on Disarmament will achieve substantial progress on the CTBT, which will have a positive influence on the efforts to extend the NPT indefinitely.

For the purpose of securing effective and complete nuclear non-proliferation, the NPT should be comprehensively reviewed. This review should be conducted with the goal of strengthening the present safeguards system through the reinforcement of its verification measures and its inspection system.

More efforts are needed to foster full-scale cooperation between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly in guaranteeing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We should also seek to facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology and information for peaceful purposes.

All nuclear-weapon States should make concerted efforts to achieve greater reductions in their nuclear arsenals through the implementation of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and to guarantee the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to it.

My delegation acknowledges the cooperation of the nuclear-weapon States with the international community. We are satisfied to see that the nuclear-arsenal-reduction programme of two major nuclear-weapon States was provided for more positively in the joint statement of the United States-Russian summit last month. We also welcome the de facto moratorium on nuclear testing — although we regret the one exception.

Despite these developments, the progress in nuclear disarmament has actually increased the sources of nuclear proliferation. One of the most disturbing phenomena is the emerging threat of the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. This is a challenge which can be surmounted only through the collective and determined efforts of the international community. The First Committee should pay due attention to this.

A major challenge to the NPT regime is the North Korean nuclear programme. Unless it is resolved thoroughly, it will set a disturbing precedent, causing irreparable damage to the NPT regime and also threatening the stability of the whole North-East Asian region. It is my Government's firm position that for the settlement of this issue the full transparency of North Korea's past, present and future nuclear programmes should be ensured. We urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to comply fully with its obligations under the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to uphold its commitment under the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

My delegation would like to note the positive outcomes of the United States-DPRK high-level talks in Geneva. My Government regards the United States-DPRK agreement as providing an important basis for the solution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the maintenance of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula. However, the ultimate resolution of the nuclear issue will depend on how faithfully North Korea implements the Geneva agreement.

I wish to take this opportunity to reiterate my Government's position that if North Korea fulfils its obligations in good faith, we are fully prepared to make our technological and capital resources available for North Korea's overall economic and social development in the spirit of mutual prosperity, and to assist it in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In addition to its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, the Republic of Korea is equally dedicated to the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. The conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention (CWC) in January 1993 and the ongoing preparations in The Hague represent a major step towards our goal. To achieve an effective non-proliferation regime in this area, it is important to ensure universal adherence to the CWC. The Republic of Korea plans to ratify the Convention in the near future and strongly urges those countries that have not yet adhered to the Convention to do so as soon as possible.

My delegation notes with satisfaction that the Special Conference on the biological weapons Convention in September this year has successfully laid a firm foundation for establishing needed verification measures that will lead to the Convention's effective implementation. We sincerely hope that the Ad Hoc Group scheduled to start its work in

January next year will be able to present its report to the international community soon.

In the post-cold-war era we can see that conventional weapons are becoming no less important than weapons of mass destruction, and that security arrangements at the regional and subregional levels are gaining more significance than ever before.

In this regard, the Republic of Korea welcomes the productive discussions at the Regional Forum of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) last July in Bangkok. Composed of countries with diverse political, economic, social and cultural backgrounds, the Asia-Pacific region has a vital need for intraregional dialogue to reduce possible tension and build mutual confidence. A security dialogue for the North-East Asian subregion will clearly complement this region-wide framework. The Republic of Korea is ready to extend its efforts to pursue the dialogue.

Our two-year experience of the registration with the United Nations of conventional arms transfers has turned out to be quite positive. Given that universal participation in the Register is the key to its success, we urge all Member States to participate in the United Nations endeavour as actively as possible. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the ASEAN Regional Forum recently agreed to promote the participation of its member States in the United Nations Register.

We must bear in mind that we are in the midst of a historic transition, in which the shape of international relations is increasingly based on peaceful accord, cooperation and interdependence. In this regard, my delegation would like to take this opportunity to suggest the following points as possible objectives of our discussion during this session of the First Committee.

First, the disarmament mechanisms of the United Nations should be adapted to the new reality. The First Committee has already launched, quite successfully, a programme for rationalizing its working methods and agenda items. This exercise should be continued, and the pending issue of expanding membership of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament should be resolved soon. My delegation hopes that the countries that have reservations on this matter will reconsider their position to accommodate the new international reality.

Next, this session of the First Committee should do its utmost to encourage and facilitate the exchange of views among Member States in order to prepare for next year's

NPT Conference. My delegation appeals to all Member States to participate to their fullest and most productive extent in the discussions so that we may avert further confrontation and move forward with our preparations.

Lastly, at this session we should explore the possibility of expanding our considerations beyond disarmament matters and into broader and more urgent international security issues.

**Mr. Kohout** (Czech Republic): Let me first congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the important post of Chairman of the First Committee. We have full confidence in your skilful guidance of our joint work. I should also like to congratulate the other elected officers of the Committee.

Following the end of the cold war we seem to be living, from a global point of view, in a more stable and secure world. Yet the disarmament agenda seems to be as heavy as it was in the past, if not heavier. Recently, important results have been achieved, such as the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention. At the same time, we are trying to strengthen or render verifiable some treaties concluded in the past. New threats have also emerged, especially with regard to the risk of the proliferation of various types of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles.

Concerned about its security, my country, while seeking new alliances, is trying to contribute to all the efforts aimed at reducing the level of armaments and increasing confidence.

Within a couple of months we shall be meeting here again to take a step of crucial importance — to confirm the validity of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to extend its functioning beyond 1995. The view of the Czech Republic is that that extension should be of indefinite duration and unconditional. The effectiveness of the Treaty can be further increased by the adherence of those States that have for the past 25 years chosen not to adhere to it.

Obviously, further steps are necessary in the field of nuclear disarmament. In this connection, it was encouraging to hear that the United States and Russia will, as soon as START I takes effect and START II is ratified by both countries, immediately begin removing the nuclear warheads to be scrapped under START II.

The cause of nuclear disarmament can best be served by an indefinite, unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, thus giving it a permanent status. Attempts to revise the Treaty or to extend it for a limited period of time could mean risking the weakening of the basis for further efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament.

The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is finally engaged in negotiating what is clearly its top priority item: the comprehensive test-ban treaty. A propitious atmosphere for the negotiations has undoubtedly been created by the fact that four nuclear-weapon States are observing moratoriums on nuclear testing. We welcome the progress achieved so far in both relevant Working Groups and under the guidance of the Friends of the Chair. The contribution by the group of scientific experts was also valuable this year, being focused more directly on the drafting needs of the future comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The Czech Republic would prefer that that treaty cover all nuclear explosions, including so called peaceful ones, with no thresholds. The treaty should be universal, transparently negotiated and non-discriminatory in character, with equal rights and obligations for all States parties to it. It needs a reliable verification system based on an exchange of seismic data. The selection of complementary non-seismic methods is still under way. In our opinion, this selection should be very careful, based on a price-performance ratio. From a purely technical point of view there are good reasons for advocating the evolutionary approach — that is, starting with a very limited set of complementary non-seismic methods and extending that set only when it is proved beyond doubt that the new method is indeed indispensable. We should avoid investing too many resources in exotic technologies for monitoring oceans, atmosphere and outer space. The cost of the verification system must be kept reasonably low.

The central role in the verification system will be played by the future comprehensive test-ban treaty organization, and particularly by its key element, the international data centre. We would prefer the organization to be in a position to act independently and be responsible not only for data collection and data exchange, but also for data interpretation. This should assure the full access of States parties to the relevant information. At the same time, the transparency and openness of the organization's activities should make it possible for any State to apply its own processing to the raw data if it is willing to do so. The organization should also have the power to impose sanctions if the interests of compliance with the Treaty so require.

It would undoubtedly be gratifying if the comprehensive test-ban treaty could be agreed to at the review and extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty next spring. However, there is no need to despair even if the draft treaty text is not completed by then. What is important is the seriousness with which negotiators in Geneva continue to work on the issue and the dynamics of the current negotiating process, extended beyond the regular session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Czech Republic intends to participate next year in the third major technical test of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSETT-3). This test will have especial importance since it can offer negotiators of the comprehensive test-ban treaty in Geneva valuable information and experience on a continuing basis. The experimental system could also put in place an infrastructure that might eventually be useful in establishing an ultimate verification system. In 1990 we established an experimental seismic station in Southern Moravia. In view of its location, this site is particularly suitable to monitoring underground nuclear explosions. This was proved during the GSETT-2 test when three nuclear tests were carried out at a Pacific test site and our experimental seismic station was among the few that detected all of them. The station also registered the regrettable recent nuclear explosion in China with great precision. My delegation would be very satisfied if the General Assembly could unanimously adopt a strong resolution in support of the CTBT, as it did last year.

It goes without saying that efforts with regard to non-proliferation would benefit only if the Conference on Disarmament were in a position to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is encouraging that it has finally agreed that the Conference in Geneva is the appropriate body for the negotiation of such a treaty. We therefore support the establishment of a relevant ad hoc committee in Geneva with a simple mandate allowing for substantive negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. One of the first issues to be addressed by such a committee should be that of the scope and verification of a future "cut-off" treaty. Any positive steps the Geneva Conference could achieve towards the ban on the production of fissile materials would carry a good message to the forthcoming Conference for the review and extension of the non-proliferation Treaty.

States that abide by their non-proliferation commitments are entitled to receive assurances by nuclear-

weapon States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons. We support a two-track approach in the Conference on Disarmament: the search for a common formula for negative security assurances and parallel efforts by the five nuclear-weapon States to harmonize their respective negative security assurances. Recent changes in the international situation should be taken into account, as well as the interest of minimizing the risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. A formula for common negative security assurances, if found, could most naturally be applied to the States parties to the Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear explosive devices.

A new problem, the illegal transfer of fissile material, emerged recently in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. The Czech Republic is fully aware of the seriousness of the issue and is prepared to join international efforts aimed at curbing this dangerous activity. The illegal transfer of fissile material does not have its source on our territory. However, we cannot exclude attempts at transfer through the Czech Republic. We are ready to take our share of responsibility in border control and the exchange of relevant information, and we are prepared to make these activities as efficient as possible. This is one of the most urgent security challenges the world faces, in the light of the attempts to smuggle weapons material to terrorists.

The attention of the international community should be drawn to the grave dangers posed by land-mines, especially to civilian populations. We welcome the efforts of the group of experts to strengthen Protocol II of the inhumane-weapons Convention and make it more easily verifiable. Interesting proposals have been advanced regarding the detectability of land-mines and the limitation of their functioning after the end of conflicts. We subscribe to most of these suggestions. We listened with interest to the additional proposals of the United States in this regard and we shall study them carefully.

My country supports the idea of a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines. On 5 October, the Government of the Czech Republic declared a three-year moratorium on the export of such land-mines. We also fully support the call for a comprehensive programme of assistance in mine clearance.

The risk of uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles needs to be addressed constantly. For this reason, the Czech Republic was keenly interested in the activities of the Australia Group and of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and

we are watching attentively to see what kind of arrangement will replace the abolished Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM).

Another matter of concern is the fact that the threat of biological warfare did not perish with the cold war. The international community duly recognized the need to strengthen the biological weapons Convention, since it lacked legally binding verification methods to ensure compliance with its provisions. We welcome the decision by the Special Conference in Geneva, just a couple of days ago, to continue this work on an expert level and to prepare specific proposals for the Fourth Review Conference of the Convention in 1996. We support the creation of a legally binding instrument that would apply to all activities and facilities relevant to the Convention.

It is important that the instrument not hamper the economic or technological development of States parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities. We share the view that the future verification arrangements should consist of mandatory declarations on biological facilities and of on-site verification, mainly in the case of allegations of use. Whatever verification regime is agreed upon, it should be as efficient as feasible, but also as cost-effective as possible.

Another urgent task of today is that of the early entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention. My country is working towards the ratification of the Convention, and we hope to achieve it soon. The necessary legislation is now being prepared as well as relevant administrative arrangements for the implementation of the Convention, including the establishment of a permanent national authority.

With a view to sharing experience in preparing for the entry of the Convention into force, the Czech Republic, jointly with the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, last June organized a regional seminar on an exchange of practical experience in the process of national implementation of the Convention. A presentation of equipment and of the methods of protection for inspectors was organized during the seminar in the city of Brno.

The security of all States would undoubtedly benefit from increased transparency in armaments. For the last two years quite a number of States, albeit still fewer than half of the United Nations membership, have already contributed data to the United Nations Register of Conventional

Weapons. The Czech Republic contributed its data last year just a couple of weeks after it came into being. This year we also submitted our data on military holdings and procurement through national production. This demonstrates our support for the further expansion of the Register.

A number of interesting proposals for confidence-building measures are being discussed at the Conference on Disarmament. As they are further developed, the Conference on Disarmament could draw on the experience gained within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which has been engaged for years in extensive confidence-building measures and recently also in the destruction of heavy weaponry and in on-site inspections.

We appreciate the efforts by Ambassador von Wagner with a view to the restructuring of the work of the First Committee. Some of the proposals discussed seem to be of a technical nature; some suggest deeper structural changes in our work. My country supports most of the proposals advanced and hopes that the First Committee will have a chance to focus on the essential problems on its agenda and act on them in a more efficient way.

The Czech Republic is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. However, as one of the successor States to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, we have a fair amount of expertise in a number of issues on the agenda of the Conference, and our expert actively participates in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. To put it briefly, we think we are entitled to become a full member of the Conference on Disarmament.

All countries that are prepared to, and can, contribute to the work of the Conference should be given a chance to do so. There are not at this time so many applications that the Conference should hesitate too much to take the desirable step of increasing its membership for the first time in 16 years. For instance, it is not natural that countries wishing to contribute to the negotiation and future implementation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be permanently denied membership in the Conference on Disarmament. We note that a number of the States members of the Conference seem to understand that and have supported the early admission of all States which wish to join that body. We thank all those who spoke in favour of the requests of non-member States. Unfortunately, for the time being we can only regret that the decision on expanding the Conference on Disarmament seems to have been postponed again, until the 1995 session.

**Mr. Čalovski** (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia): At the outset, Sir, I should like to express my delegation's satisfaction at your election as Chairman of the First Committee. I am sure that the Committee will be most pleased with the results achieved under your chairmanship, and you can count on my delegation's full support and cooperation. I should also like to take this opportunity to congratulate other members of the Bureau on their election to their high posts.

The disarmament process should be looked upon as an integral and important part of the efforts to promote international security, to avert threats to peace and to prevent the occurrence of conflicts. If seen in that perspective, it would gain much greater importance and would make a very necessary contribution to international security and to the search for a lasting global peace. The delegation of the Republic of Macedonia will work in that spirit and direction.

In that regard, I would like to echo the statement of the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali:

"Progress in international security and disarmament depends upon the continuation of this integrated approach". (*A/49/C.1/PV.3, p. 2*)

The credibility of international efforts on arms control and disarmament will very much depend upon the ability and the readiness of the international community to engage in those efforts all States — large or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, developed or developing. This is particularly true since we know all too well that future wars, realistically speaking, will involve smaller States that do not feel threatened by global nuclear war but are very much concerned for their security because of negative developments in their immediate vicinity. Democratization and transparency in international efforts in the field of disarmament are essential for future progress on arms control and for the prevention of conflicts.

My delegation attaches the greatest importance to the development of good-neighbourly relations and considers them the most important factor in generating peace, security, cooperation and disarmament in our region. While we would stress the importance of these good relations as a deterrent against all kinds of non-peaceful activities, we do not mean to minimize the importance of other factors that favour peace, security and development. To put an end to the current unhealthy developments in our region, the international community, and the United Nations in particular, should insist on full observance of international

law; it should take action against any breach thereof; and it should not allow any unilateral actions that run counter to the Charter of the United Nations. Of course, the first goal should be to stop the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Last year, the General Assembly, at its forty-eighth session, adopted without a vote resolution 48/84 B, on the development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States. Affirming its determination that all nations should live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, the General Assembly emphasized the urgency of the consolidation of the Balkans as a region of peace, security, stability and good-neighbourliness, thus contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security and so enhancing the prospects for sustainable development and prosperity for its peoples. The report of the Secretary-General requested by this resolution will be discussed next year by the General Assembly, at its fiftieth session.

It goes without saying that very serious preparations will be required for the forthcoming discussions. The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of the Member States, particularly those from the Balkan region, and of international organizations, as well as of competent organs of the United Nations, on the development of good-neighbourly relations in the region and on measures and preventive activities aimed at creation of a stable zone of peace and cooperation in the Balkans by the year 2000.

The outcome of next year's deliberations should be the adoption of a political platform and a commitment that will make it possible for all Balkan nations to live together in peace as good neighbours. It should also generate practical measures and policies for inter-Balkan relations and cooperation. The timely and professional preparation of future discussions of this politically very delicate matter — a priority issue for all Balkan States — requires a special approach and efforts by the Secretary-General, which we are sure will be forthcoming.

This year, the First Committee will discuss many arms-control and disarmament issues, but in a slightly different atmosphere from that of last year. Last year, we were under the impression that the most important achievement in the field of disarmament — the conclusion of the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention — was imminent and that concentrating on preventive diplomacy would substantially improve the international security situation. This year, we have to face the fact that it has not been possible to conclude, as hoped, the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

and that many conflicts have continued to jeopardize international security.

Regrettably, the number of countries that feel threatened has not decreased. Next year, our priority efforts should be concentrated on the successful outcome of the Conference on the review and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on an early conclusion of the negotiations on a test-ban treaty and on the entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention. The non-proliferation Treaty should be extended indefinitely and unconditionally.

My delegation belongs to a group of delegations that have advocated higher priority being given to conventional arms control. We are very much in favour of strengthening endeavours towards transparency in conventional arms and we are sure that activities in this field can help immensely in furthering confidence-building processes among many States. This is particularly important for our region, the Balkans, which, as is very well known, is bristling with all kinds of conventional armaments. We should always bear in mind that the conventional arms race can provoke local crises which can quickly develop into international armed conflicts.

It is obvious that we need much more than a United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. We therefore hope that this year the Committee will be able to recommend to the General Assembly the adoption of a more resolute position on this issue. The deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament should be of assistance in this endeavour. My delegation is particularly interested because of the impact of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of conventional arms in our region. We are convinced, therefore, that practical measures to increase openness and transparency in this field are a necessity.

The prevention of disputes or crises that can easily evolve into armed conflicts is a very important aspect of current United Nations efforts to increase international security and free additional economic, scientific and technological resources for development. We are pleased that the Secretary-General is sparing no effort in this endeavour.

In this regard, I should like to note the very important deliberations organized by the San Remo International Institute on Humanitarian Law. All participants were strongly in favour of preventive measures and policies — political, economic and social at the global, regional and

national levels. My delegation is of the opinion that the current activities of the United Nations in this field are significant; however, we also feel that more could be done. There are many conflict situations caused by unresolved national or territorial problems from the past that no longer have any *raison d'être* and could be easily solved if the political will could be mustered.

My delegation shares the view that the present session should do everything possible to bring to a successful conclusion our deliberations on the land-mines issue, for we see no reason for delay.

My delegation will lend its support to the necessary efforts to ban the further production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and also to the non-nuclear-weapon States' demand for stronger international and legally binding security assurances. Of course, we are in favour of positive policies and measures concerning the regional dimensions of arms control and disarmament. There are many activities within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which, we hope, will be successful.

This year, like last year, we shall adopt many draft resolutions on various aspects of arms control, disarmament and the international security situation. We hope that every one of them will be aimed at improving the international security situation and advancing the cause of development so that all States can feel secure and not threatened.

**Mr. Dzvairo** (Zimbabwe): My delegation congratulates you, Sir, and your country, Ecuador, on being elected to the chairmanship of this important Committee at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly. We are confident that your leadership will result in the successful conduct of our work. We also express our thanks to Ambassador von Wagner of Germany for his stewardship of the Committee last year.

Zimbabwe welcomes the steps taken in recent years in the field of disarmament. The conclusion of a chemical weapons Convention, the establishment of a United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and recent advances in bilateral nuclear disarmament between the United States and the Russian Federation are all steps in the right direction, that of achieving general and complete disarmament. Yet my delegation cannot but express concern at how much remains to be done. It is a sad fact that even when the START I and START II Treaties have been fully implemented there will still be enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world several times over.

We should like to reiterate that nuclear disarmament is a multilateral issue and not a bilateral one. In this regard, the unanimous decision taken by the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Movement in Cairo in June this year — and reaffirmed unanimously by the Meeting, only two weeks ago, on 5 October 1994, of Foreign Ministers and Heads of Delegation of the Non-Aligned Movement to the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly — to resubmit and bring to the vote the draft resolution asking the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under international law is both appropriate and timely.

Let me refer to the March 1995 review and extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Zimbabwe believes that the Treaty is an important international instrument in the field of disarmament. However, the discriminatory nature of the Treaty cannot be denied. It is a fact that the nuclear-weapon States have not met their obligations under the Treaty's provisions to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals and to assist non-nuclear-weapon States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We are also disappointed that some of the nuclear-weapon States have impeded the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which, in our view, would have constituted a demonstration of their good faith. In the light of the foregoing, Zimbabwe will not be able to support the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty unless the nuclear-weapon States formally undertake to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals within a given timetable.

We agree with our Secretary-General that disarmament must be considered in all its aspects without excluding any category of weapons. We also recognize that it is conventional arms that have fuelled conflicts in developing countries, especially in Africa. In this regard, while we recognize that the proliferation of conventional arms is partly a residue of the cold war, we believe that supplier States must shoulder much of the blame for this continuing proliferation. We therefore call for international instruments that will regulate and monitor the manufacture, sale or transfer of all conventional weapons. Weapon-manufacturing States should not be guided solely by the profit motive. They should exercise international social responsibility and ensure that such weapons are not made available to areas of conflict around the globe.

Efforts to promote general and complete disarmament must include both conventional arms disarmament and nuclear disarmament. Like many other delegations,

Zimbabwe was disappointed that the decision of the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session urging the Conference on Disarmament to reach an early consensus on the expansion of its membership has not borne fruit. The efforts of Ambassador Sullivan of Australia provided a good basis for progress in this urgent matter. Clearly, the current membership of the Conference is not suitable to the arms control and disarmament needs of today. It is therefore our hope that those impeding this long-overdue expansion will relent and enable the Conference to acquire much-needed representativity that will give it more moral and political authority.

Finally, Zimbabwe welcomes the steady progress that has been achieved towards the conclusion of the treaty establishing Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which we hope will be adopted early in 1995.

**Mr. Taapopi** (Namibia): On behalf of the delegation of Namibia I should like to begin by congratulating the Chairman on his election. I congratulate also the other officers of the Committee. In the same vein, I should like to congratulate the Chairman's eminent predecessor, the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany. Let me voice our conviction that under the Chairman's able guidance, this Committee will successfully accomplish its task. On our part, I assure him of my delegation's cooperation in the discharge of his tasks.

Arms control, disarmament issues and nuclear weapons and their proliferation continue to be a cause of concern to the international community. With the end of the East-West confrontation and the profound changes that took place, hopes were raised that we could now build a more secure world out of the anguish of the prevalent threat of insecurity. However, the uncertainties that now engulf many regions, characterized by political, religious and ethnic rivalries, prove that our hopes were premature.

We live in a period of uncertainty that has the potential to create global instability at an enormous cost in terms of human anguish. Uncertainties with regard to nuclear proliferation and the proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction continue to exist. Furthermore, there is the broader and inherently complex question of the proliferation of conventional weapons.

It is precisely because of these developments that the Government of Namibia welcomes the new initiatives on disarmament issues and on control over the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, Namibia commends the ongoing deactivation and dismantling of the strategic

nuclear system by the parties to the START I Treaty. Indeed, the entire international community has a moral obligation to strive for sustainable progress in the fields of disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation, transparency in arms transfers, and confidence-building measures, which can make a crucial contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

We have demonstrated our commitment to disarmament issues by hosting seminars and meetings in our region on confidence-building measures. In fact, from 16 to 25 March 1994 Namibia hosted the fourth meeting of the Group of Experts to prepare a draft treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. An African nuclear-weapon-free zone would significantly confirm the bone fides of all African States as ardent opponents of the spread of nuclear weapons on the continent and worldwide. It should also be mentioned that Namibia, as an active member of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic, is committed not only to promoting trade, including the development of fisheries and marine resources in the zone, but also to keeping the zone nuclear-free.

Namibia has noted the key role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in ensuring global stability. We believe that the forthcoming review and extension Conference will provide a golden opportunity to review, assess and remove the existing loopholes in the Treaty and to make it an instrument for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Other critical issues such as complete and general disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy also need to be discussed and resolved. Once there is a consensus on these and other, related concerns, the extension of the NPT, limited or unlimited, can be resolved to the satisfaction of both nuclear and non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty.

Namibia supports the extension of the NPT, as Namibia has already acceded to it. However, it is legitimate to ask why those possessing a nuclear-weapon capacity today should be allowed to retain it if it is deemed undesirable and harmful. It follows from this that the exclusivity of the club of nuclear-weapon States and their status as a "holy cow" cannot be defended forever.

While the non-nuclear-weapon States are making commitments to the NPT and other agreements, it is vital that they should receive binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, Namibia calls not only for the universal application of the NPT but also for giving a sense of urgency to negotiations on the destruction of nuclear weapons by all those possessing them.

In conclusion, Namibia fully supports the proposal on the table on seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. We feel this would have greater implications for the possession, development and deployment of such weapons, and, hopefully, would speed up their elimination.

**Mr. Bivero** (Venezuela) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wish to congratulate the Chairman on his election, as well as the other officers of the Committee. My delegation is very happy to be working under the Chairman's commendable leadership. We pledge our full cooperation and support and our desire to contribute to the success of his work.

Over the years, Venezuela has constantly supported the various United Nations mechanisms dealing with disarmament, because of our conviction that our Organization has a very important role to play in the quest for solutions to the many problems related to international peace and security.

There is probably no more important contribution to international peace and security than the efforts being made by the United Nations to achieve general and complete disarmament. Part and parcel of these efforts is the attempt to free resources for use in the promotion of economic and social development, in general, and the solution of the problems of developing countries, in particular. However, we cannot be satisfied with the results achieved from several decades of work. We believe that conditions are now right to take decisive steps towards general and complete disarmament, which would put an end to the uncertainty created by the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction and the development of new military technologies.

We are convinced that a more solid peace must be built. Venezuela again expresses its belief that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including, as a matter of priority, nuclear weapons, is one of the most serious threats to international security. For this reason, we stress the importance, indeed the urgency, of negotiations to achieve agreement on a treaty that completely prohibits nuclear tests and that can be verified effectively and is universally applicable. We recognize that very important steps have been taken in this area, steps which are historic milestones on the path to peace, but we can find no justification whatever for the nuclear tests that are still being carried out.

Venezuela joins other delegations in hoping for the success of the 1995 Conference on extending the non-proliferation Treaty. We consider it essential that in the time remaining before the Conference existing differences regarding the future of the Treaty be resolved.

My delegation wishes to make a modest contribution towards finding formulas that could help reconcile the divergent positions expressed here today. As is well known, my country favours an intermediate option, according to which the 1995 Conference would decide to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) under the same conditions as those originally adopted: we do not want an indefinite or unconditional extension, or an extension for an indeterminate period of time subject to conditions. We simply want the Treaty to continue under the same regime, with a review conference every five years and an extension conference after 30 years, in the year 2025.

At the same time, the nuclear Powers must commit themselves to making every possible effort to abide by their obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty, especially its articles 4 and 6. We are convinced that it is to the extent that all Treaty provisions are implemented that confidence will be strengthened and progress made towards definitive approval of a non-proliferation agreement.

Also on our security and disarmament agenda is the question of negative security assurances. We consider that progress in the implementation of such assurances will create the most propitious conditions for the 1995 NPT review and extension Conference. We trust that the coming months before the Conference will see determined progress towards the negotiation of an international instrument providing non-nuclear-weapon States with the assurances they need regarding the use or threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction.

We are concerned about the destabilizing effect of the excessive accumulation of conventional weapons, which foment distrust between States and between regions. Here, we need to make greater efforts to promote confidence-building measures, including transparency in information on military matters. We believe that the United Nations should make new and renewed efforts to strengthen mutual trust, thus helping to reduce the probability of conflicts between States. Among other measures that should be fostered, we would attribute priority to having systematic exchanges of military information, making the Register of Conventional Weapons more effective, increasing available data through frequent military missions and developing regional and

subregional centres for confidence building. There must be greater efforts to address these issues in their full magnitude and to focus our work on them, identifying the means and the form in which the information should be channelled, without prejudice to the right of self-defence and security of States and in the context of the increased transparency that would result from a more effective Register of Conventional Weapons.

We attach great importance to the agenda item on disarmament and development. My delegation believes that we should review our treatment of the item, especially with a view to reallocation of the financial, human and scientific resources that have hitherto been used to military ends. There is a close link between disarmament and development. We attach special importance to the new international system that is emerging, which gives us a historic opportunity to make meaningful progress in both areas. In practical terms, we believe that the programme of action adopted in 1987 at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development should be fully implemented. There, Member States committed themselves to reallocating a substantial portion of the resources now used in weapons production to the economic and social progress of developing countries.

We join other delegations in saying that we must rationalize the work of the Committee in order to make it more efficient and to restructure and reorganize its annual programme with a view to promoting more substantive debates on the subjects of highest interest to the international community. Yet we must recognize the dramatic and positive changes in the international system, which call for an objective evaluation of disarmament issues. Any changes we adopt must not work against efforts that are being made in other priority areas in spite of newly emerging problems in the sphere of disarmament.

At the last session of the General Assembly, significant progress was made towards rationalizing the agenda of the First Committee. We hope we will continue to move in that direction at the present session. We believe that the First Committee should continue to play an important role in the consideration of items on arms limitation and disarmament.

In our view, the Committee's debates must meet two specific objectives: we must continue to review our priorities under the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, and we must contribute to identifying and promoting broad principles on new items. This will preserve

the Committee's function as a principal United Nations body in the disarmament sphere. Moreover, we agree with the view of many developing countries that disarmament matters must be considered in universal, representative forums.

**The Chairman** (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before calling on representatives who have asked to speak in the exercise of the right of reply, I remind members that

“Delegations should exercise their right of reply at the end of the day whenever two meetings have been scheduled for that day and whenever such meetings are devoted to the consideration of the same item.

“The number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation at a given meeting should be limited to two per item.

“The first intervention in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation on any item at a given meeting should be limited to 10 minutes and the second intervention should be limited to five minutes.” (*Decision 34/401, paras. 8-10*)

I shall now call on representatives wishing to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

**Mr. Kim Chang Guk** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I wish to reply to what the South Korean representative said about my country. South Korea has no say in the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. They never utter so much as a word about United States nuclear weapons in South Korea. We, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the United States are responsible for that issue. South Korea would do better to sit and look at what is going on between the DPRK and the United States. It should not put obstacles on the road of the DPRK-United States talks.

The South Korean representative showed nervousness and uneasiness, for South Korea has been elbowed out of the DPRK-United States talks. We have a powerful, independent, self-supporting economy. We have no intention to seek help from South Korea. I advise the South Korean authorities to stop boasting; they should think rather of the empty pockets of a colonial economy that is under the burden of several tens of billions of dollars of debt.

**Mr. Rhee** (Republic of Korea): My delegation truly regrets asking to speak in response to the representative of

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's statement in right of reply, as that statement seems not to deserve a response. However, I will make a brief statement for the records of this Committee.

Regarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's allegations that my country has been obstructing the dialogue between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, I would like to refer to what my Ambassador has already said this afternoon about this recent development.

**Mr. Kim Chang Guk** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I think all the representatives at this meeting have seen the television interview with the President of South Korea, Mr. Kim Young Sam. He begged the United States not to concede to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the talks, so I once again advise the South Korean representatives that the more South Korean authorities try to smear our country, the more it will expose their nervousness and unease at having been elbowed out of the talks between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

**Mr. Stephanou** (Greece): I chose not to speak on a point of order this afternoon in order not to interrupt the statement made by the representative of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. That is why I am now using my delegation's right of reply.

In connection with the incorrect denomination of the State in question used in that statement, I would like to recall Security Council resolution 817 (1993), according to which that State was admitted to the United Nations,

“being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State.” (*Security Council resolution 817 (1993), para. 2*)

That difference has not yet been settled.

**Mr. Čalovski** (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia): I regret speaking at this late hour.

Regrettably, the representative of Greece has made an incorrect interpretation of Security Council resolution 817 (1993). Unfortunately, he confused the issue, and this is not the first time.

The name of my country is the Republic of Macedonia; it is not what is written on the name-plate in front of me. The language on the name-plate is not the name of my country. If somebody would like to use this language — the provisional reference for our country — he or she can do so, but only if he or she wishes to do so. It is not obligatory to use it, and nobody is obliged to use it, not even the representative of Greece, which I hope will be the case in the not-too-distant future. I repeat once again that the name of my country is the Republic of Macedonia, and anyone who would like to use our constitutional name in addressing us is free to do so. This is fully in accordance with Security Council resolution 817 (1993).

**Mr. Stephanou** (Greece): I shall be brief.

I would like to mention that there is no question of interpretation of Security Council resolution 817 (1993), as its text is self-explanatory. If it were interpreted to imply that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia could be referred to otherwise, the resolution would be devoid of any meaning.

**Mr. Čalovski** (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia): Again I repeat that the representative of Greece is confusing the issue. He is confusing the reference with the name. The name of my country is the Republic of Macedonia, and the Security Council resolution uses the reference for our name.

**The Chairman** (interpretation from Spanish): I wish to remind all Member States that have not yet submitted a list of members of their delegations in the First Committee to please do so as soon as possible. This will make it possible for the Secretariat to circulate officially the list of members of the Committee at the earliest possible date.

*The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.*