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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 27th MEETING

Chairman:

Mr. EE ARABY

(Egypt)

later:

Mr. SUH (Vice-Chairman)

(Republic of Korea)

later:

Mr. ELARABY (Chairman)

(Egypt)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 49 TO 65, 68 AND 142; 67 AND 69 (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS UNDER ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of the United Kingdom, who will speak on behalf of the European Community and its member States.

Sir MICHAEL WESTON (United Kingdom): The European Community and its member States welcome the successful conclusion of the long-running negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 3 September this year. The Convention bears testimony to the hard, intensive and thorough work carried out by the Conference on Disarmament and represents a historic achievement in the field of arms control and disarmament. The participation of over 80 countries in the elaboration of the Convention has resulted in an agreement which is balanced and equitable and represents a truly global perspective.

The chemical weapons Convention will not only ban chemical weapons and ensure the destruction of declared stocks, but will explore new ground in global arms control through the introduction of an unprecedented verification regime allowing on-site inspections by a new international organization of any facility suspected of non-compliance. The regime has been carefully constructed to deter potential evaders of the Convention's provisions, while allowing States to protect their legitimate interests.

It will be backed up by monitoring of those chemicals and chemical facilities considered to be a potential threat to the Convention. These provisions will strengthen the Convention by enhancing confidence in its observance and will foster greater regional and global cooperation for mutual security. The rights of all States parties to benefit from international advances in chemical technology can only be enhanced in such an environment.

We welcome the clear and unequivocal global ban contained in the Convention on all forms of chemical weapons and the unconditional prohibition of their use against anyone. This should ensure that the Convention will be an effective defence not only against existing types of weapons, but also against any chemical weapon which technological changes of the future may make possible. The Convention also provides for assistance and protection to be given to any State party threatened by chemical weapons. This will be a further deterrent against the use of chemical weapons against a State party and is another illustration of the equitable nature of the Treaty.

The Community and its member States believe that the chemical weapons

Convention, which represents the broad-based consensus of the Conference on

Disarmament, will make a sub- initial contribution to international peace and

security. It has to be considered on its own merits and its signature should

not be dependent on preconditions, in particular because the Convention

constitutes a meaningful contribution to the establishment of zones free of

weapons of mass destruction. It represents a welcome step in addressing

regional security concerns. We hope that it will encourage Governments to

move towards further and more far-reaching disarmament measures by creating

conditions in which all States may feel more secure. We hope also that the

unprecedented system of verification contained in the Convention could become a reference for other multilateral disarmament agreements or for the strengthening of existing verification regimes.

We would like to pay a tribute to the many active participants in the negotiations from all regions. Community members have played their part in our common endeavour. We are particularly honoured that the task of chairing the final negotiating session at the Conference on Disarmament should have fallen to a representative of a Community member State.

We look forward to the Convention receiving a clear endorsement in the Committee and urge all States who have not already done so to join in sponsoring and supporting draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.1/Rev.1. We reaffirm our intention to be original signatories to the Convention next January, and to promote actively its early entry into force, and we urge all nations to do likewise. The Community and its member States are committed to ensuring the efficient and cost-effective implementation of the Convention, thereby enhancing cooperative multilateralism as a basis for international peace and security.

To introduce the views of the European Community and its member States on the subject of regional disarmament, I can do no better than to repeat again what we have said before: we believe that the adoption of regional arms control and disarmament measures is one of the most effective ways for States to contribute to the general arms control and disarmament process.

The changes which have taken place in the international situation over the last year have highlighted the importance of the role that regional agreements can and should play in the promotion of international peace and

security. In my general statement to the Committee on behalf of the Community and its member States, I referred to the hatreds and fears which have resurfaced in the former Yugoslavia, and confirmed our full support for the efforts being made in partnership between the United Nations and the European Community to bring peace to that region. I mentioned also the emergence of 15 new States where a year ago there was one, the Soviet Union. The new problems and challenges that entails might also benefit from regional efforts.

We do, of course, welcome the moves towards greater political and military stability and cooperation in our own region. We believe that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which limits holdings of major items of land and air equipment and contains sweeping provisions for verification measures, together with the recent extension to the Treaty, commonly knowns as CFE 1A, which limits the number of military personnel deployed by each State, will be a key element in European security. While the CFE Treaty was negotiated among States belonging to two military alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the then Warsaw Pact, the CFE 1A agreement was reached in a radically new political situation in Europe. So, whilst complementary in nature, these agreements also reflect the changing political landscape of the region.

The Vienna Document of 1992, which came into force on 1 May, marks a significant step forward in the field of confidence- and security-building measures in the region, developing earlier measures including visits and also notification and observation of exercises, and introducing additional restrictions on military activity together with new provisions for information exchange.

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(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) remains an essential element in the new European security architecture, providing inter alia a valuable forum for dialogue on arms control and confidence-building measures. The Helsinki summit meeting, which took place in July this year, took this a stage further, with the decision to establish a CSCE forum for security cocoperation to start a new negotiation on arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building, with the participation of all CSCE States, to enhance regular consultation and to intensify cooperation among the participating States on matters related to security and to further the process of reducing the risk of conflict.

We also believe that the Treaty on Open Skies, which was signed in March, will make a major contribution to confidence-building and stability throughout the CSCE area and beyond.

We hope that such achievements in the European context might offer some guidance and even possible model instruments for the solution of similar problems in other regions.

In putting forward draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.29, "Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe", the member States of the Community welcome these practical achievements in the European arena over the past year and invite all States to consider ways of reducing the risk of confrontation and of strengthening security, taking due account of their specific regional conditions. We hope that this draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

As we have said before, the European model is not necessarily one that can be applied to other regions. We are conscious of the fact that the various regions in the world have their own particular characteristics.

Individual States have security interests of their own, often reflecting the prevailing circumstances in their respective regions. It was for this reason that, in the Working Paper the Community submitted to the United Nations

Disarmament Commission in 1991, we stressed the importance of taking into account regional characteristics and stability, as well as highlighting the principles of sovereign equality for States, and of the peaceful settlement of disputes. As we stated in our paper,

"Initiatives should take into account particular characteristics of each region and should lead to stability and security for all the participating States. The States in the region should themselves define appropriate and specific conditions for the security of their region, as well as conditions for ensuring their security in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and generally recognized principles of international law." (A/CN.10/154, para. 2.2)

We are pleased to note that discussions at the United Nations Disarmament Commission have developed in such a way that commonly agreed guidelines and

principles on regional disarmament may now be within reach. These could then be drawn on freely by States anywhere when they wish to embark on a process towards enhanced security and stability in their region.

We highlighted last year how the events in the Gulf region had underlined the importance of regional arms control and disarmament and justified the search for a balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region, notably through a dialogue among the States of that region. We have, of course, not forgotten the Gulf crisis and its consequences, which can still be felt, not least through the continuing suffering of the Iraqi people under a brutal dictatorship. We congratulate the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency for their work in implementing Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which has gone a long way towards reassuring the international community that Iraq will never again threaten its neighbours. However, there is more work to be done, and we welcome the provision in resolution 687 (1991) on the objective of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles capable of delivering them.

We continue to consider the Middle East to be an area where regional arms control and disarmament measures must be instituted as a matter of priority. We welcome the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East. We believe that a successful outcome to the peace process is a vital element in the establishment of regional stability and confidence, and that it will pave the way for the realization of the goal of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction. We reiterate our support for the process. The Community and its member States will continue to contribute fully to the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security.

The Middle East peace process is an example of the interaction of global and regional efforts to ensure security in a particular region. We hope that the Convention on chemical weapons, the text of which was agreed at the Conference on Disarmament this year, will also represent a welcome step in addressing regional security concerns and thus contribute to the conclusion of regional arms control and disarmament measures.

In my general statement to this Committee, I have already mentioned various regional initiatives, which we welcome. Among these are the North-South Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which we believe should be fully implemented as soon as possible; the moves towards implementing the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa; and the steps taken by Argentina, Brazil and Chile towards bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force for themselves. We welcome also major and positive initiatives in Latin America, such as the Mendoza Accord and the Cartagena Declaration. Other welcome steps not specifically concerned with disarmament, but taken with the same aim of improving regional stability and security, include the accords designed to bring peace and democracy to Mozambique and the multi-party elections in Angola. However, we deplore the outbreak of violence since those elections. We call on all parties to abide by Security Council resolution 785 (1992) adopted on 30 October. The only hope for peace in Angola is for both sides to refrain from violence and to continue to implement the peace agreements embodied in the Bicesse Accords.

The Community and its member States share the view that armed aggression is not an appropriate means to solve disputes between and within States.

Regional arms control and disarmament is a vital part of solutions to regional conflicts and is essential if progress towards global security is to be

achieved. Solutions should be sought in a cooperative approach, preferably within a region, although sometimes the necessary steps may be stimulated from outside the region, if appropriate. But no one from either ouside or inside a region should try to impose a solution on others. Security perceptions are usually felt much more keenly at a regional level, but regional arms control and disarmament efforts cannot stand on their own. There must also be a serious political engagement to address the issues that produce tension and dispute. Furthermore, global and regional arms control and disarmament efforts should reinforce each other.

The adoption by consensus of resolution 46/36 F on regional disarmament during the forty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly illustrated the general resolve to stress the importance and to expand international awareness of regional disarmament. By co-sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.25, being put forward this year by Peru, the member States of the Community wish to reaffirm their commitment to this cause. The draft resolution encourages all States to envisage the creation of regional mechanisms or institutions designed for the prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes, with the assistance, if requested, of the United Nations.

Whenever possible, the Community and its member States will continue to stimulate and support initiatives that lead to increased security in a region. We are convinced that the search for regional stability must be pursued in order to enhance security at the lowest possible level of military forces, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and promoting economic and social progress.

On behalf of the European Community and its member States, I should like also to make some comments on the issue of conventional disarmament.

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(Sir Michael Weston, United Kingdom)

In recent times the process of nuclear disarmament has gathered momentum, not only with the Treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF) and the Treaty on the Reduction and Limititation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), but also by the subsequent agreements between the United States and Russia, including the far-reaching reductions in strategic arms announced by President Bush and President Yeltsin in June 1992.

Conventional disarmament too has seen major progress through the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe - the CFE Treaty - in Paris in November 1990. This Treaty has been provisionally applied since 17 July 1992 and formally enters into force today. The process of conventional-arms control and disarmament in Europe is continuing. A further agreement, commonly known as CFE-1A, on limits to manpower levels was signed on 10 July. A CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation has now been established in Vienna. This Forum has been tasked with starting new negotiations on arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building, with the participation of all CSCE States; enhancing regular consultation and intensifying cooperation between the participating States on matters related to security; and furthering the process of reducing the risk of conflict.

The increasing attention being given to conventional-arms control and disarmament is to be welcomed. Since the Second World War conventional weapons have caused an enormous number of casualties. But it is not simply the high number of casualties that should induce States to embark on a process of conventional disarmament. The Galf War showed that the international community does not accept the use of armed aggression to solve disputes.

Acquiring vast arsenals of conventional weapons in quantities that clearly go beyond the needs of defence and exerting efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction simply do not pay and will eventually lead to disaster.

States should base their defence policies on military capability sufficient for individual or collective self-defence. They should strive to reduce the risks of conflict. They should not resort to the threat or use of force to settle differences. The principle of the peaceful settlement of

disputes should be fully respected and implemented in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

The Community and its member States have always attached great importance to the issue of conventional disarmament, as did the General Assembly in the Final Document of its tenth special session. We have, on a number of occasions in the past, elaborated on the necessity to embark on arms-control and disarmament measures in the conventional field. The European model may not be one for all regions to follow in all its aspects, but it is precisely because we are only too aware of the difficulties of engaging in a process of conventional-arms control and disarmament that we cannot but urge others to begin without delay.

The European example shows that conventional disarmament cannot be seen in isolation. Breakthroughs and progress occur when political circumstances allow for such potential developments. The political will to develop and adopt confidence-building measures can pave the way for arms-control and disarmament measures. Openness and transparency are an essential step in the creation of a climate of confidence and should therefore be the first priority. States should concentrate their efforts first on establishing stability by eliminating, in particular, the capability to launch surprise attacks and large-scale offensive operations. The objective of conventional-disarmament measures should be increased security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces consistent with the legitimate requirements of conflict prevention and management and of defence.

Increasing transparency in international arms transfers is an important complement to conventional disarmament. A clearer insight into each other's

military capabilities will help States to embark on disarmament efforts focused on systems that are perceived to be particularly threatening and, by that nature, destabilizing. The establishment this year of an international Register of Conventional Arms under the auspices of the United Nations was a significant step forward. We now look forward to all the participation of all Member States in the Register.

We welcome the inclusion of the item "Transparency in armaments" on the 1992 agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the work already started there following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, which aims at the further improvement of transparency in military matters beyond the scope of the United Nations Register. We hope and expect that the Conference will play a substantial role in that field in the future – in particular, by elaborating practical means of increasing transparency in armaments.

It should, of course, be clear that weapons and equipment to be reduced as a result of the numerical limitations set forth in an agreement on reductions in conventional forces should not be transferred, directly or indirectly, to States not parties to the agreement in question.

Disarmament measures in one region should not lead to increased arms transfers to other regions. The Community and its member States believe that the subject of conventional-arms control and disarmament should be kept at the forefront of the multilateral debate on disarmament, and we stand ready to provide any assistance and expertise that we have gained in this field.

I should like now, on behalf of the European Community and its member States, to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.29, "Confidence- and

security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe", which is sponsored by most of the 52 States participating in the CSCE.

This draft resolution aims, <u>inter alia</u>, at welcoming the positive developments that have occurred since last year in the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe, as well as other related developments, in the framework of the CSCE. Let me mention these.

On 4 March 1992 the participating States of the CSCE adopted the Vienna
1992 Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures, which expanded the
scope of previously agreed measures, including those providing for exchanges
of information on military forces, and introduced additional measures.

On 24 March 1992, in Helsinki, 25 States signed the Open Skies Treaty, and a Declaration on the Open Skies Treaty was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the CSCE. This unprecedented agreement allows for States parties to carry out overflights, with specially equipped aircraft, of the entire territories of the participating States - an area ranging from Vancouver to Vladivostock. The Treaty is an important measure of transparency and confidence building. Six months after entry into force the Treaty will be open to the accession of other States.

On 10 July 1992, in Helsinki, the States signatories of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) decided to put the Treaty provisionally into force as from 17 July. Formal entry into force takes place today. On 10 July the same States also adopted the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe - commonly known as CFE-lA. This agreement contains detailed provisions not

only on the limitation of manpower levels in the conventional armed forces of the participants but also on exchanges of information on such forces.

Last, but not least, on 9 and 10 July 1992, at the Helsinki Summit meeting, the Heads of State or Government of the 52 participating States of the CSCE adopted the "Helsinki Document 1992 - The Challenges of Change", which has now been distributed in United Nations document A/47/361. They decided, inter alia, to establish a new CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, with a strengthened conflict-prevention centre, as an integral part of the CSCE. This new framework will serve to carry out the following tasks: to start new negotiations on arms control, disarmament and confidence and security building, with the participation of all CSCE States; to enhance regular consultation and to intensify cooperation between the participating States on matters related to security; and to further the process of reducing the risk of conflict.*

^{*} Mr. Suh (Republic of Korea), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

The participating States will, <u>inter alia</u>, strengthen security and stability through the negotiation of concrete measures aimed at keeping or achieving the levels of armed forces to a minimum commensurate with common or individual legitimate security needs within Europe and beyond. These new measures may entail reductions of and limitations on conventional armed forces, and may, as appropriate, include measures of a regional character.

Those achievements are the result of a process initiated nearly 20 years ago, a process which has accelerated with the end of the cold war and the appearance of a radically new political situation in Europe.

Along with the emergence of a new community of democratic States based on common values and increased security and confidence, we are also, regrettably, witnessing in Europe new armed conflicts and massive use of force to achieve hegemony and territorial expansion. Individually and jointly, within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations, we are working towards long-lasting solutions to the crises which have arisen. In this respect, the Helsinki decisions constitute a comprehensive programme of coordinated action which will provide additional tools for the CSCE to address tensions before violence erupts and to manage crises which may develop.

As in previous resolutions on the same subject, we propose in draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.29 that the General Assembly not only welcome these efforts and the positive developments in the field of confidence- and security-building and disarmament in Europe, but also invite all Member States to consider the possibility of taking appropriate measures with a view to

reducing the risk of confrontation and strengthening security, taking due account of their specific regional conditions.

We express the hope that this draft resolution, like previous ones on the same subject, will be adopted by consensus.

I should like finally to speak on agenda item 63 (g) and introduce, on behalf of all member States of the European Community and of the delegations of Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Togo, Turkey and the United States of America, draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.22, entitled "Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures".

Four years ago, in its resolution 43/78 H, the General Assembly adopted the guidelines for confidence-building measures which had been worked out by the Disarmament Commission. These guidelines are a standing invitation to all States to implement such measures on a global, regional or bilateral level. The first review of the implementation of the guidelines, two years ago, in the context of resolution 45/62 F, revealed that this invitation had been widely accepted and that the guidelines had been implemented by a great number of States. Reviewing developments over the last two years, it is justified to state that this process has been further strengthened.

On a global level, four developments over the past two years deserve our particular attention. The first is the conclusion of negotiations on a Convention on chemical weapons. The concept of confidence-building is the

underlying rationale of a number of provisions of the Convention. The universal implementation of the Convention will enhance confidence amongst States parties.

Secondly, the launching of a universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms, the finalization of the work of the panel of governmental experts on that matter, and the beginning of work in the Conference on Disarmament on the item "Transparency in armaments" are encouraging. An enhanced level of transparency in armaments resulting from these endeavours will represent a major contribution to confidence-building and security among States.

Thirdly, the expansion of the confidence-building-measures regime of the Convention on biological weapons, which was agreed at the third Review Conference of the Convention last year, will provide increased transparency, particularly in the area of biological defence.

Fourthly, the finalization of work on the agenda item "Objective information on military matters" at this year's session of the Disarmament Commission should be mentioned.

In his "Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General laid particular emphasis on the importance of confidence-building measures on a regional scale in the context of preventive diplomacy, stating that:

"Mutual confidence and good faith are essential to reducing the likelihood of conflict between States. Many such measures are available to Governments that have the will to employ them. Systematic exchange of military missions, formation of regional or subregional risk reduction centres, arrangements for the free flow of information, including the

monitoring of regional arms agreements, are examples. I ask all regional organizations to consider what further confidence-building measures might be applied in their areas and to inform the United Nations of the results". ($\lambda/47/277$, para, 24)

It is indeed on the regional, subregional and bilateral levels that implementation of existing confidence-building measures has made good progress, and a considerable number of new confidence-building measures have been agreed upon. Confidence-building measures have been widely succepted as an important step towards prevention of conflict and, in times of political tension and crisis, as an instrument for the peaceful settlement of conflicts. This is underlined by the fact that the First Committee is considering at this year's session three draft resolutions on confidence-building measures agreed upon in different regions of the world, namely draft resolutions A/C.1/47/L.2, L.24 and L.29.

Permit me to highlight some of the developments that have occurred during the last two years in various regions. In Africa, major efforts have recently been undertaken by States members of the Economic Community of Central African States to promote confidence-building measures in that particular region, as elaborated in detail in draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.2, entitled "Regional confidence-building measures".

Among Asian nations, confidence-building measures seem to have become a well-established element of bilateral and regional stability, conflict prevention and increased cooperation. On a subregional scale, the increased cooperation among States parties to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia, whose purposes and principles the First Committee is called

upon to endorse in draft solution A/C.1/47/L.24, bears witness to this development. We trust that all States parties to that Treaty will meet the commitments they have subscribed to in accordance with the principles stated therein.

We have also learned of the most recent agreements between India and paving the way for dialogue and cooperation.

In Latin America, the value of confidence-building measures has long been recognized. Suffice it to point to the Mendoza Declaration and the Cartagena Declaration, to the measures undertaken in the implementation of the Esquipulas II Agreement among Central American States, and to the Galapagos Declaration of 1989 among the members of the Andean Pact, as well as to the process of expanding economic integration and peaceful nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil.

In the Middle East, the peace process initiated among the States of the region with the participation of other States includes multilateral efforts to agree on confidence— and security-building measures, in particular in the military field.

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In the European region, as elaborated in draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.29, historic developments have taken place since the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly - developments that brought about and were accelerated by speedy progress in building confidence and laying the foundations of cooperative security structures in that region. At the same time, new conflicts have arisen in some parts of the region, including acts of aggression and use of military force, which cause deep concern. These conflicts highlight the necessity of applying confidence-building measures as a concrete, continuous and sustained process that must never stop if it is to attain its objective: to defuse conflicts, to tackle their underlying causes, and thus to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes.

As laid down in the 1988 guidelines (resolution 43/78 A), confidence-building measures are conceived of as a broad concept. Confidence reflects a set of related factors of a military as well as of a non-military character. A plurality of approaches is needed to overcome fear, tension and mistrust between States and to replace them by confidence.

Confidence-building measures in the military field can play a key role in this process of overcoming distrust and confrontation and laying the foundation for new understanding, cooperation and stability. Especially when applied in a comprehensive manner, they can be conducive to achieving structures of security based on cooperation and openness and thus contribute to the wider objective of the renunciation of the threat or use of force. They can also pave the way for disarmament measures.

It is against the background of this experience that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.22 recommend the guidelines for confidence-building measures to all States for implementation and appeal to

all States to consider the widest use of confidence-building measures in their international relations. We hope that draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.29 will be adopted by consensus.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Indonesia to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.35.

Mr. WISNUMURTI (Indonesia): I have the honour and privilege to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/47/L.36, entitled "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament", on behalf of the Russian Federation, the United States of America, the non-aligned countries and a large number of other countries that are sponsoring the draft.

The draft resolution reflects the profound change and transition that have occurred in the international landscape and the resultant shifts in perception and attitude towards nuclear disarmament. A significant change has been particularly evident in the conclusion of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States and the former Soviet Union, the unilateral decisions of their leaders to reduce significantly the size and nature of nuclear deployments world wide, to eliminate certain nuclear weapons, and to enhance stability. We welcome these developments as constituting substantive contributions to disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. We welcome also the determination to seek deep reductions as well as cooperative efforts with the former Soviet Republics to ensure the safety, security and environmentally sound destruction of nuclear weapons. In this context, we look forward to a continued and constructive dialogue among them.

All Member States have a vital interest in the success of negotiations on armament limitations and a duty to contribute to efforts in the field of

(Mr. Wisnumurti, Indonesia)

disarmament. Bilateral and regional initiatives with regard to specific issues are useful and should be intensified. Major questions of disarmament have bilateral, regional and global implications, and negotiations at these levels can complement and reinforce one another.

The draft resolution we are submitting is the outcome of concerted efforts by the Russian Federation, the United States, the non-aligned and other interested countries, and for the first time in many years our endeavours have drawn the broad support of this Committee. It is our firm conviction that the international community should speak with one voice through the General Assembly and thereby further encourage the two major Powers to sustain the momentum of their efforts with the objective of achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is in this spirit that we recommend the draft resolution for unanimous adoption.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Mexico to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.40.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): At the beginning of the general debate in the First Committee, on 12 October, my delegation stated that Latin America and the Caribbean were most pleased by the concrete steps that had been taken in 1992 to consolidate the denuclearization regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We were particularly gratified by the deposition by France, on 24 August, of its instruments of ratification to Additional Protocol I.

Today we are honoured, as representative of the depositary Government of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to introduce in the First Committee the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/47/L.40, under agenda item 142, "Consclidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The title of the item is new and this change is due to a very simple reason. For years, emphasis was placed on the two Additional Protocols open for signature, respectively, to the States which de jure or de facto are internationally responsibile for territories located within the zone of application of the Treaty and the nuclear-weapon States. Since 1974, Additional Protocol II has been in force for the five nuclear-weapon States. On this twenty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty, Additional Protocol I has come fully into force, thus ending the long first phase.

Draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.40 is sponsored by Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and the United States of America.

The first seven preambular paragraphs give a brief summary of the background of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and of the way in which the General Assembly encouraged the adoption of that instrument. The Treaty was the outcome of the collective efforts of the countries of the region and of many individuals. However, the decisive contribution that ensured the success of this endeavour came from Ambassador Alfonso García Robles.

The eighth to the fourteenth preambular paragraphs summarize major events that have taken place in the past few months in respect of the Treaty of Tlatelclco. First of all, we should mention that, with the 1992 accession of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Treaty is now in force for 24 of the 33 sovereign States of the region. Reference is also made to the coming into force of the two Additional Protocols, and it is stated that international conditions are more propitious for the consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The fourth meeting of the Treaty signatories and the Seventh Special Session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) was held on 26 August 1992 in the capital of my country. OPANAL approved and opened for signature a set of amendments to the Treaty aimed at ensuring its full implementation. This will enable full effect to be given to it in the very near future by Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

Moreover, the Government of Cuba has expressed its support for both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty and has stated that even though there are still circumstances preventing it from acceding to the Treaty, it would be prepared to do so once all the States in the region had assumed the Treaty commitments.

Under the operative part of draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.40 the General Assembly would welcome these concrete steps, as it would ratification by France of Additional Protocol I. It would also urge

"all Latin American and Caribbean States to take speedily the necessary measures to attain the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and, in particular, the States in respect of which the Treaty is open for signature and ratification immediately to carry out the corresponding formalities so that they may become parties to that international instrument, thus contributing to the consolidation of the regime established by that Treaty". (A/C.1/47/L.40, para. 4)

Finally, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.40 express the hope that the members of the First Committee will adopt it unanimously.

Mr. VIEGAS (Brazil) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Brazil is pleased to have the opportunity to express its satisfaction with draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.40 on consolidation of the regime established by

(Mr. Viegas, Brazil)

the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Brazil fully supports the text introduced by the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

In our opinion, the draft resolution adequately reflects the substantial advances achieved recently to ensure that the Treaty of Tlatelolco comes fully into force, advances as a result of which the Treaty has now been updated and strengthened.

The various amendments to the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco proposed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, and adopted by acclamation at the Seventh Special Session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, are basically technical and in no way affect the Treaty's principles and purposes. Together with the ratification of Additional Protocol I by France, which we welcome, it opens up concrete prospects of the early complete entry into force of the Treaty throughout the region.

These measures are a significant step in the consolidation of an international legal instrument which can in many ways be considered a model: binding in nature, designed to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and characterized by equal rights and duties for all the States Parties to it.

I would like to repeat here the declaration of the Government of Brazil, and the Governments of Argentina and Chile, to the effect that as soon as the internal ratification process of the amended text of the Treaty is completed we will waive all the requirements set forth in paragraph 1 of article 28 of the Treaty that still remain to be met.

In this connection, we attach particular importance to the provision in paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/47/L.40, which urges:

(Mr. Viegas, Brazil)

"all Latin American and Caribbean States to take speedily the necessary measures to attain the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco", as amended.

Mr. FUENTES IBANEZ (Bolivia) (interpretation from Spanish): I would like my first words in the Committee to be words of congratulation to Ambassador Elaraby and the other officers of the Committee.

Ambassador Elaraby's election as Chairman is not only recognition of his outstanding attributes as a lawyer and diplomat, but an implicit tribute to his country, which 13 years ago set an example of maturity, determination to ensure peace, and pragmatism in adopting the path of negotiation, thus avoiding greater sacrifices for its people. I should also like, albeit perhaps belatedly, to extend my delegation's feelings of solidarity to the people of the capital of Egypt and other cities in that country that suffered such destruction in last month's earthquake. I also wish to pay tribute to the Chairman's predecessor, Mr. Robert Mrozievicz, who so wisely and authoritatively chaired this Committee during the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly, with the invaluable cooperation of its secretariat, and particularly Mr. Kheradi, whom I greet and to whom I pledge our cooperation.

The historic process of international relations since the 1940s has in my view had two turning points in bringing to fruition the international community's constant desire for a new order, now known as the new world order. Two options put hope on the horizon after the devastation and suffering of war. The first came about at the end of the Second World War. Its birth, in the United Nations Charter, would seem from this distance in

time to be an act of contrition following the numerous holocausts that the war created on all battlefronts.*

Looking back across the years, we see that we should have put behind us the invasions, violating all the norms of law, the concentration and extermination camps, the implacable bombardments of London, Coventry and Dunkirk and the subsequent reprisals that left Berlin in ruins. Shortly afterwards Hiroshima and Nagasaki were devastated in the first experiments on civilian targets. Thus nuclear energy made its diabolical entry onto the scene as an apocalyptic weapon. And thus began the cycle of cold war, just two months after the signing of the Charter in San Francisco.

While the majority of the founding Members of the Organization tried to implement and strengthen the principles enshrined in our Charter, some, sceptical about the weakness of human nature, tried to subordinate those noble ideals to their own desire to dominate, interpreting them as a tacit concession of privilege as the fruits of victory. As a result, they enlarged their arsenals and developed their military potential, with no other justification than protection of their security interests, wherever they deemed it necessary. They deliberately overlooked the fact that, as the representative of Togo said in the Committee:

"Military deterrence does not guarantee peace or security."
(A/C.1/47/PV.14, p. 16)

^{*} The Chairman returned to the Chair.

A/C.1/47/PV.27

(Mr. Fuentes Ibáñez, Bolivia)

That is a maxim that we developing countries fully support, as a genuine programme to avoid wars requires the creation of conditions for dignified coexistence. And this can be achieved only by eliminating all forms of oppression and subjugation, whether due to poverty, through lack of access to health care and education, or a lack of fairly paid work.

Thus, a feudal regime that seemed to be behind us for ever began to re-emerge. Such an anachronism can be maintained only through the depressing and deceptive persuasive action of nuclear warheads or supersonic aircraft, tanks and guns, for the ravages wreaked by conventional weapons during the recent Gulf war, as was confirmed in this forum, were said to be the equivalent of seven atomic bombs used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which, according to recent reports in The New York Times, killed 60,000 and 80,000 persons, respectively. This demonstrates not only that has progress been made in applying atomic energy to surface-to-air or air-to-air internally or remote-controlled missiles, which are now patrolling the world from land, sea or in the air, but also that there has been an ongoing refinement in conventional weapons, which are freely traded, thus increasingly impoverishing peoples when used against one another in pursuit of Utopian hegemonies in disregard of the fact that peace itself will always be ephemeral as long as we fail to work together to overcome the problems that are hindering the harmonious and sustained development of humanity on our planet. In this spirit we join the sponsors of the draft resolutions concerning all aspects of general and complete disarmament, in particular, those concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and its logical complement, the draft resolution on agenda item 54: "Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

It is no secret to anyone that the cold war encouraged an arms build-up and contributed greatly to an increase in social problems. The producers of such weapons find a favourable market in the developing countries for ridding themselves of surpluses. Encouraged by the possibility of acquiring expensive weapons, which they can pay off over the long term, the developing countries do not hesitate to increase their defence budgets to the detriment of such

urgent items as health, education and housing. What is even more disturbing is that they also yield to the temptation of security based on military power. If those countries had spent on such items even a fraction of the amount used to arm themselves, they could have avoided the moral and economic collapse that dashed the hopes created by the ideological panaceas endorsed by their Governments. For all these reasons, my delegation joins in supporting the useful views that we have heard on arms build-up, and reconfirms its conviction that our goal must be general and complete disarmament and good faith among States.

We believe that a historic step is being taken through the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/47/L.1, on prohibition of the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, to which the Ambassador of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Adolf Ritter von Wagner, has devoted so much effort, and of which my delegation has the honour of being one of the sponsors. While achievement of the goal - that is, the signing of the Convention, which will take place in Paris in 1993 - has taken 20 years, we must, with equal determination and encouraged by this achievement, face undaunted the difficult task that is before us, the task of ensuring a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons. We hope that this action will not take such a long time and that we can count on the cooperation of that select minority whose security is based on a privilege that is in every way discriminatory vis-à-vis the other members of the international community.

Our commitment to peace has been, and will continue to be, unswerving, and we welcome any move towards the objective of disarmament. We welcome the decisions taken by some Powers to refrain from nuclear tests for a specified time - a moratorium that we hope will lead to the complete elimination of this odious practice.

Need we say how much we welcome the broad acceptance of the pioneer institution in the field of disarmament, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Acceptance of the amendments proposed by Argentina, Brazil and Chile opened the way for its prompt entry into force. The Treaty of Rarotonga also covers a broad geographical area, which should be supplemented by similar agreements in the countries scattered in the Pacific Ocean archipelagos, as their insular isolation exposes them to the risks of nuclear tests or of deposits of atomic wastes in their adjacent waters. The draft resolution submitted by Mauritania in document A/C.1/47/L.13 is relevant in that regard. This environmental protection movement, which seeks a legal barrier to protect the signatories from such risks, deserves our full support.

In the course of our deliberations we have listened to several distressing statements on the vast increase in weapons production. Certain countries that are still in the developing world none the less have factories for the manufacture of high-technology conventional weapons. Reliable sources have stated that once peace has been achieved or through demobilized forces or deserters, countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, particularly those in which there have been civil wars, have many options for obtaining the latest models of firearms at bargain prices, because once these weapons have been used or are no longer in the immediate control of those who acquired them, they lose their real value and become instruments used in crimes or they are auctioned off to the highest bidder. Here again, regional disarmament can be most useful.

Fortunately, there are indications that the changes that we so much desire are well under way. We are particularly pleased about the strategic arms limitation agreements signed between the United States and the former

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. With regard to the verification system, we should mention the outstanding contribution made by the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose cooperation is always effective in the clarification of situations relating to the possession of nuclear facilities or precursors for the use of atomic energy for military purposes or illicit trade, as is clear from the sudden increase in countries with such factories.

Another historic landmark that I had in mind at the beginning of my statement is the possibility that we might be on the threshold of a new cycle - a new era that seemed to be heralded by a rainbow of peace following the end of the Persian Gulf war, a ray of peace of which, to some extent, we caught a glimpse. This conflict was not as widespread as the two previous wars, but given the vast resources deployed and the loss of human life and material property involved, there were grounds for a meeting unprecedented in the history of the United Nations, the Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the members of the Security Council held on 31 January 1992.

The January Summit Meeting sounded a warning note with regard to failure to comply with some of the principles proclaimed in the Charter, witness the conflicts in various regions of the world in the half century since the San Francisco Conference. The Declaration of Heads of State and Government at that Summit Meeting was duly followed up by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his "Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277) and expanded on in the report given in his statement on 27 October on the occasion of Disarmament Week. In that report the Secretary-General called on the international community "to integrate disarmament" (A/C.1/47/PV.18, p. 12), that is, to take part in any initiatives that could contribute to the strengthening of peace in response to the destructive violence of war as the antithesis of peace.

The doctrine has been laid down. The instruments that we have can be improved. Much can be done through the proper use of preventive diplomacy at the regional and international levels. There is a phased process involved, leading to a single goal, that is, peace-building, restoration of peace where peace has been breached and consolidation of peace, which should not correspond to a subjective ideal but rather to a deep conviction based on balance, reflecting the rights and duties that are a prerequisite for peace. For peace cannot be imposed by force; xather, it should come from a sovereign agreement, without preferences or paternalism, that is, through the optimal implementation of confidence-building measures as a basis for dialogue leading to spiritual disarmament and negotiation.

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Nothing is more instructive than history. Recent events that we have observed and witnessed from a distance that has been miraculously overcome by modern technology have allowed us to observe just how far the obstinate blindness of those who have opted for violence can go. We have just seen this in the collapse of one of the protagonists in the bipolar confrontation of the cold war.

The alienation resulting from the possession of weapons is a vicious circle. First, the lion's share of financial resources is allocated to enhancing the creative capacity of scientists and technologists so that they can apply their theories and tur them into instruments of the mass destruction on which their diabolical effectiveness depends, and then we get the State and business interests that instead of making tractors, ploughs and the communications and transport equipment to bind people together in a crusade for peace, divert those resources into the production of armoured cars, tanks and weapons of every calibre needed to do their job of extermination with the greatest precision. Thus there has been a conjunction of interests involving all social classes engaged in a business that is annihilating the conscience of the human race inasmuch as it has to do with highly profitable industries which, paradoxically, are seen as factors of development and social stability.

Another measure that is useful by anyone's standards is the verification and registration, by the United Nations, of arms transfers; I would make just one further point about this, which is that the arms Register should come with additional lists giving the area of each country, its population, its economic resources and the ratio of its military budget to its expenditures on social security. Of course, the effectiveness of this proposal is based not so much

on the transparency of the system as on the honesty of the Governments responsible for providing the information and on what opportunities they afford for carrying out the effective monitoring that, without adversely affecting the sovereignty of the country providing information for the Register, can give the truest picture possible of reality. This is conducive to confidence-building.

These are the general outlines within which we shall give our fullest support to the draft resolutions that are to be considered by our Committee and that we hope it will adopt.

The CHAIRMAN: As I stated at an earlier meeting, an informal paper setting out the list of all the draft resolutions on all disarmament agenda items in six different clusters has been prepared, after careful consideration, by the officers of the Committee.

In this connection, I should like to indicate that I have tried to distribute the paper containing the clusters as early as possible in order to enable delegations to undertake the necessary consultations and to seek instructions, as appropriate, from their capitals, with a view to facilitating the smooth conduct of the work of the Committee during the voting procedure.

These clusters, as members are well aware, were devised by the officers of the Committee on the basis of the pattern that has evolved during the past several years, with, I may add, some changes in accordance with the circumstances of this year. In the process of grouping the various draft resolutions, the officers of the Committee took into account the most logical and practical criteria available, and made every effort to group them according to related subject-matter, to the extent possible.

Furthermore, I should like to stress that no other significance should be attached to this endeavour than the desire to facilitate and expedite the work

(The Chairman)

of the Committee with a view to utilizing fully and in the most effective and efficient manner possible the time and conference facilities available for this phase of the Committee's work.

With regard to the programme of work and timetable for action on draft resolutions, on the basis of precedent it is my intention to move, in so far as possible, from one cluster to another sequentially upon the conclusion of action on each cluster. Nevertheless, in following this procedure I should stress that we shall of course maintain the desired degree of flexibility. Whenever I am in a position to give a precise indication of the days on which any particular cluster will be taken up, I shall advise the Committee accordingly.

The procedure during the decision-taking stage on each cluster will be that delegations will first have the opportunity to make any introduction, or statements other than in explanation of vote, that they regard as necessary with respect to the draft resolutions listed in that cluster. Subsequently, delegations wishing to explain their positions or votes on any or all of the draft resolutions in a particular cluster before a decision is taken will be able to do so. Then, after the Committee has taken a decision on the draft resolutions contained in a given cluster, delegations will be able to explain their positions or votes if they wish to do so.

In order that the Committee's work may proceed in a systematic and efficient manner, delegations are urged to make, as far as possible, only one statement in explanation of position or vote on the draft resolutions in a given cluster.

I do hope that the Committee is in agreement with the programme of work and the procedures that I have just outlined. If I hear no objection, I shall

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(The Chairman)

take it that the Committee approves the suggested programme and the procedure that I have outlined, and that it will accordingly proceed to the stage of taking action on disarmament draft resolutions beginning on Thursday,

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the Secretary of the Committee to make some announcements.

Mr. KHERADI (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to inform the Committee that the following countries have become co-sponsors of the following draft resolutions:

A/C.1/47/L.1/Rev.1: Burkina Faso;

A/C.1/47/L.8: Czechoslovakia;

A/C.1/47/L.15: Australia, Austria, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Peru, Poland and Russian Federation;

A/C.1/47/L.18: Albania;

A/C.1/47/L.20: Albania and Hungary;

A/C.1/47/L.24: Albania, Estonia and Malta;

A/C.1/47/L.25: Albania, Czechoslovakia and Poland;

A/C.1/47/L.26: Viet Nam;

A/C.1/47/L.30: Albania, Algeria, Canada and Singapore;

A/C.1/47/L.35: Albania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary;

A/C.1/47/L.36: Kazakhstan;

A/C.1/47/L.37: Bulgaria, Egypt, Italy and Kazakhstan;

A/C.1/47/L.42/Rev.1: Denmark, Russian Federation, Singapore and Thailand.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.