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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. **RANA** (Nepal)

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General debate on all disarmament agenda items

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The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 66 AND 155 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL ~~DISARMAMENT~~ AGENDA ITEMS

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): We are gratified to see you, Sir, presiding over the First Committee, **which** deals with items of vital importance to all peoples. We shall draw on your diplomatic ability and tact, and we offer **you our** full support in the discharge of **your** duties. Our congratulations also go to the other officers of the Committee.

Last fall, there emerged a new tone in the general debate in plenary. This year, despite **new crises**, that encouraging trend has been confirmed. **Moreover**, after several years of reticence, **some** countries are turning **more** often today towards the **mechanisms** provided in the Charter of the United Nations **for the maintenance** of international peace and security. **We** hope that this renewed enthusiasm **for** the United Nations will translate into concrete results, both in the First Committee **and** in the **Conference** on Disarmament. We should therefore strive **to** concentrate on the two **or** three items on our heavy agenda that **are** of especial importance.

**What** are those priority questions? One is the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and, above all, a comprehensive nuclear-test **ban, as** well as **nuclear** disarmament. The prompt conclusion **of a** convention on elimination **of** chemical **weapons** is another priority. Those are the items on which we should intensify our **work**.

**Before** reviewing certain developments in those fields, I should like to recall parenthetically **how** the agenda of the **First** Committee evolved.

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In 1960, when the Organisation had fewer than 100 Member States, there were 95 items on the General Assembly's agenda. Of the 11 **items** assigned to this Committee which dealt with political and security questions, including the regulation of armaments, only 4 dealt with disarmament **matters** and 4 resolutions were adopted. Today, we are 160 Members and there are **more** than 150 items on the General Assembly's agenda. **Some** 22 are assigned to this Committee and, of those, 19 are related to disarmament. Last year we adopted **some** 57 resolutions on disarmament questions. This number is too high and represents 14 times the number of resolutions adopted in 1960. All of us have contribute:: to this inflation which, we should note in passing, has begun to decrease after reaching almost 30 items and 70 resolutions in the middle of the past decade. All of us, I repeat, have contributed to this inflation and it is up to all of us to reduce it.

At the beginning of the 1960s we concentrated on the "urgent necessity" to suspend nuclear testing, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a treaty on **general** and **complete** disarmament, as well as **on** the establishment of what became the predecessor of the Conference on Disarmament. Perhaps it is impossible to return to an agenda as small as that one, but we should certainly try to refine the list of items assigned to us **now**.

The question of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty has been **on** the General **Assembly's** agenda since 1954, and today ~~we~~ continue to assign to it the highest priority. This year, 1990, there were several important developments in this field.

First, from 29 May to 8 June a meeting was held here in New York for the **organization** of the amendment Conference on the partial test-ban Treaty. The Conference will take place from 7 to 18 January 1991 to consider an amendment aimed

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at converting it into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. This initiative has gained broad support among the States Parties to the 1963 Moscow Treaty and is evidence of the international community's growing impatience with regard to this item. We appeal to all members of the First Committee, and therefore to all Members of the United Nations, to contribute to the success of the Conference.

A second development was that, after five years of fruitless efforts, the Conference on Disarmament managed to establish - or rather re-establish - the Ad Hoc Committee that is to consider item 1 of its agenda, regarding the nuclear-test ban. That step, however, was neither easy nor very satisfactory. We know - and we know this because this is what the General Assembly votes indicate - that except for a small group of States, the international community wishes to put an end, once and for all, to all testing. But, since that group includes two nuclear-weapon States, which today have another approach, the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate had to be very modest. It was requested merely:

"to initiate, as a first step towards achieving a nuclear test ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues, including structure and scope, as well as verification and compliance." (A/45/27, para. 29, cruetina CD/1035, para. 1)

Twenty-seven years after the Moscow Treaty, and 20 years since the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body, has re-established its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban and requested it "to initiate . . . substantive work on specific issues". That occurred towards the middle of last July, that is to say a few weeks before the end of the Conference. We hope that in January of 1991 the Ad Hoc Committee will start work immediately, and with a

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mandate more in line with the priority which the international community attaches to this item.

Ten years ago, the Secretary-General, in his report of 24 March 1980 on a comprehensive test ban, prepared by the Secretariat with the assistance of consultant experts, stated:

**"No** other question in the field of disarmament has been the subject of so much international concern, discussion, study and negotiation as that of stopping nuclear-weapon tests." (CD/86, para. 1)

In **the** report the Secretary-General reached the following conclusion:

'A main objective of all efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament has been to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race, to stop the production of nuclear weapons and to achieve their eventual elimination.

"In this connexion, a comprehensive test ban is regarded as the first and most urgent step towards a cessation of the nuclear-arms race, in particular, as regards its qualitative aspects.'" (CD/86, paras. 151-152)

In the report, the Secretary-General recalled that the question of a comprehensive test ban

"was one of the issues raised in connexion with the negotiations for the non-proliferation Treaty". (CD/86, para. 52)

And he stated that the question arose:

"because of the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States that the nuclear Powers must provide some binding undertakings to make rapid substantial progress towards nuclear disarmament, A resolution of that question was regarded as one of the necessary elements of an acceptable balance of the mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear-weapon **and** non-nuclear-weapon States". (ibid.)

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What is **more**, the history of the non-proliferation Treaty **negotiations** demonstrates that **there** is a close link between the provisions of its article VI - cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the achievement of a comprehensive test ban - and those **of** article X, which deals with the limited duration of **the** Treaty. Hence, the importance of beginning at once the preparation of the 1995 Conference regarding **the** extension **of** the non-proliferation Treaty. And this brings us to the third **important** development in **1990** regarding the comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

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The Fourth Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was held in Geneva from 20 August to 14 September this year. The Government of Mexico believes that the Conference held the **most** in-depth debate and thorough review of the Treaty's operation that has ever taken place. This, in itself, is an indication of the Conference's success. Many important questions were clarified, and **some** understandings were reached which will find their place in other forums, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the First Committee. **I** have in **mind** full-scope safeguards and security guarantees. Moreover, we identified those areas of the Treaty's operation with which States parties are satisfied and others where there is growing non-compliance. The latter is especially true with regard to the question of the fulfilment of the obligations under **article** VI of the Treaty, including a comprehensive test ban.

This year we have before us a "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons", in document A/45/373, whose conclusions were adopted unanimously by the Group of qualified experts appointed by the Secretary-General. This document updates the 1980 study, in document A/35/392. Our **appreciation** goes to Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin of Sweden, who chaired the *Group*. In the report it is stated inter alia that

"Most countries in the world consider that an early end to nuclear testing by all States in all environments would be an essential step towards preventing the qualitative improvement and the development of new nuclear weapons and would also **contribute** to the goal of non-proliferation. *Most* nuclear-weapon States consider that their reliance **on** nuclear weapons for their security requires their continued testing and do not agree that a comprehensive test ban is an urgent necessity." (A/45/373, para. 523)

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Unfortunately, the experts **were** unable to agree on a series of conclusions stressing more categorically the urgent necessity of putting an end to the nuclear-arms race. Moreover, a reading of the study in its entirety leaves us with the impression that there is too much emphasis on the dangers of a horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, a rather hypothetical proliferation, and much confusion regarding the dangers **of** vertical proliferation, **which** is not hypothetical at all.

Ten years ago, in the first "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons", in document A/35/392, which the qualified experts appointed by the Secretary-General submitted unanimously to the General Assembly, stress was placed on a comprehensive test ban's fundamental importance for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race. In that study we also read:

"Moreover, there is also the undeniable role of the so-called military industrial complex, which obviously stands to benefit from the continuation and escalation of the arms race. It is imperative that the political leaders of the world control these forces rather than be controlled by them and thereby assume their responsibility for seeking increased international security at lower levels of armaments and through the eventual establishment of a security system that does not rely on the use or threat of the use of force." **(A/35/392, para.503)**

The report concluded as follows:

"Even if the road to nuclear disarmament is a long and difficult one, there is no alternative. Peace requires the prevention of the danger of a nuclear war. If nuclear disarmament is **to** become a reality, the commitment to mutual deterrence through **a balance of terror** must **be discarded**. The concept of the maintenance **of** world peace, stability and balance through the process of deterrence is **perhaps** the most **dangerous collective fallacy that exists ...**

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"So long as reliance continues to be placed upon the concept of the balance of nuclear deterrence as a method for maintaining peace, **the** prospects for the future will always remain dark, menacing and as uncertain as the fragile assumptions upon which they are based. Fortunately this is not the only alternative that is available to mankind. We have, in the United Nations, an institution which should be utilized for all the purposes and stages that are relevant to the process of disarmament - negotiation, **agreement**, implementation, verification and ratification where necessary'. (ibid, paras. 519 and 520)

That is precisely the role we should like the United Nations to be playing, a more and more central one in the sphere of disarmament.

This year the Secretary-General has submitted another report - in document A/45/372 - which deals with the role of the United Nations in the field of verification and was prepared with the assistance of a group of experts appointed by him. The group carried out an analysis of the fundamental aspects of the verification of disarmament agreements and of United Nations activities in this area, as well as possible improvements in these activities. It also identified some possible additional activities. Though its conclusions and recommendations are very modest, the report is useful as a point of departure for placing the United Nations in a position to enhance - in quantity and in quality - its role in this field.

The rapid changes **registered** in Europe over the past year have transformed the political and military structure of the **post-war period**. We hope that these changes will soon have an impact also on the European military situation, in the conventional as well as in the nuclear arms field, **A few days ago the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on measures for a** substantial reduction of conventional **armaments** in Europe, Let **us hope that this important**

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step will be followed by others of similar significance in the field of nuclear disarmament and in other priority disarmament questions.

The changes in Europe will also affect the way in which we have been working at the United Nations - in the so-called regional groups - and, in particular, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. For 30 years we have been organizing our work on the basis of five regional groups. We shall certainly have to adjust the membership of those groupings to the new political and military realities. For example, the Group of 21 in the Conference on Disarmament is made up of non-aligned and neutral countries; but in 1990 one should ask non-aligned and neutral vis-à-vis whom?

For several years the question of the enlargement of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament has been considered. At present it has 40 members, and it is proposed that there be an increase in the number to 44 and that such an increase be made so as to maintain "the balance in the membership of the Conference". Mention is made of two States of the Group of 21, one for the Group of Western European and Other States, and another for the Group of Eastern European States. The unification of Germany on 3 October last presents us with an additional variant: the need to fill a vacancy. The delegation of Mexico considers that this should be examined independently of the question of the enlargement of the membership of the Conference. Therefore we are willing to consider this matter with the other members of the Conference and members of the First Committee in order to reach agreement on how that vacancy should be filled.

During 1990 the Conference on Disarmament held a series of informal consultations on the way to improve its functioning and make it more effective. Aably conducted by Ambassador Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan, they produced a first and

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very **modest** result regarding the calendar of the Conference's annual sessions **and** the simplification of its programme of work. We hope **that** in 1991, when this question is again taken up, the members of the Conference will give clear proof of political will in **dealing** with the substantive items on its **agenda**. That will be the **best** way to enhance the Conference's **effectiveness**.

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The report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly (A/45/27) is, as in past years, a voluminous document. There are some 370 single-spaced pages in its Spanish version. Its size is in inverse **proportion** to the Conference's results in 1990. With the exception of chemical weapons there is in fact nothing to report to the General Assembly. Once again the section on chemical weapons accounts for 70 per cent of the report of the Conference on Disarmament. That is an accurate reflection of the intensity of the work on this important question. Under the tenacious guidance of Ambassador Carl **Magnus** Hyltenius of Sveden, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, with a negotiating mandate, and its several subsidiary bodies, were in session almost continuously from February to August. In November the Committee **will** continue its open consultations to prepare for the brief session it will hold from 8 to 18 January 1991.

The way in which **work** is proceeding in Geneva on a convention regarding the elimination of chemical weapons exemplifies both the virtues and the shortcomings of the multilateral negotiating process on disarmament agreements.

**On** the one hand, there is a collective and detailed examination of the different questions relating to the future convention. Obstacles are identified and adequate solutions are sought. Besides diplomats and experts from member and non-member countries of the Conference on Disarmament, representatives of the chemical industry participate and contributions are received from a wide range of non-governmental organisations.

On the other, the negotiating process has its ups and downs. This is normal in any multilateral exercise, and unfortunately this year **has** been no exception. With an important change in its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee began its work in February with signs that augured well, but it concluded its **work** in August under a cloud of disagreements, as reflected in the **last** pages of **its report**. In part this

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was because it is difficult for **some** to gauge adequately the true meaning of a multilateral negotiation.

As is known, the United States and the Soviet Union - the only States that have declared they possess chemical arsenals - have been negotiating agreements bilaterally on this **matter**, independently of the Conference on Disarmament negotiations. Last June, during the Washington summit, they signed an agreement on destruction and non-production of their chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the multilateral convention banning them. We expect its early entry into force so as to implement the undertaking to cease the production of chemical weapons and to begin the process of their destruction.

**They** also agreed to submit joint **proposals** in Geneva with a view to modifying the draft multilateral convention that has been under negotiation for several years. Those proposals resulted in an impasse in the Ad Hoc Committee which was *only* resolved on the last day of its session through resort to the not very satisfactory method of negotiating extensive footnotes and the status of the documents to be annexed to the report.

Those proposals refer to the provisions on the destruction of chemical weapons. They are aimed at placing conditions on and postponing a decision on the total elimination of chemical weapons, and would give greater rights to States that possess **them**. If these proposals were accepted there could **emerge** a sort of juridical limbo with regard to the **scope** and implementation of the multilateral convention.

The statement made by the Group of 21 on those proposals, which is appended to the Committee's report, notes, among other things, that the multilateral negotiations on a total ban **of** chemical weapons should not deviate **from** the principal undertakings in the present draft convention. Moreover, **it** points out that their destruction should be unconditional and should be decided from the very

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conclusion of the convention so that by the **end** of the 10-year destruction period all such weapons and their production facilities would be totally eliminated. The **statement concludes** as follows:

"**The** Group of 21 opposes any **measures** which are aimed at establishing a non-proliferation **régime** in the field of chemical weapons. In its view, non-proliferation in all its aspects can only be achieved through a total and comprehensive ban of chemical weapons." (A/45/27, p. 299.)

My delegation, like all other participants in the Conference on Disarmament negotiations, desires the achievement of universal adherence to the convention **on** the total ban of chemical weapons. However, one should consider carefully the means to achieve that universality. The objective of universality would best be promoted by the unconditional commitment to destroy all chemical weapons and their means of production, as already provided for in Article I of the draft convention, and unambiguous agreement to provide assistance to States Parties that **may** be exposed to the use or threat of the use of chemical weapons. In this respect, attempts to transfer the reservations attached by **some** Governments to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Convention under negotiation would defeat this purpose. Moreover, the introduction at this stage in the negotiations of new verification concepts - the scope, the **means** of implementation and the costs of which are unclear - can only further delay and complicate our task.

**The** future convention will establish the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to achieve the objectives of the convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a multilateral forum **for** consultation and co-operation among States Parties. It is thus important to ensure the establishment of a close link **between** that **organization** and the United Nations.

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Before concluding we should like to refer to the item on outer space which, as will be seen, is a natural candidate for inclusion in the list of subjects whose consideration by the General Assembly should be rationalized. On the basis of the report of the Conference on Disarmament, the First Committee will examine the "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". This item has been on our agenda since **1981**. The Special Political Committee will in parallel consider on the basis of the **report** of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of **Outer** Space, the item entitled "International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space", which has been on the General Assembly's agenda since 1958.

No one can or should deny that these items complement each other. It would be unthinkable to seek greater co-operation in the exclusive use of outer space for peaceful purposes while there continued to be initiatives aimed at ensuring military supremacy in that environment.

The duplication in the treatment of this item for over 10 years has given rise to a **sort** of schizophrenia. On the one hand, the Conference on Disarmament, as **one** can see in its report on the subject, has again ignored the repeated appeals of the General Assembly to undertake negotiations with the aim of concluding an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Ad Hoc Committee on this question, established five years ago, is still in the process **of** "examining and identifying relevant issues" though as yet it has been impossible to give it a negotiating mandate.

On the other hand, the Committee on **the** Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which has negotiated all the existing multilateral **agreements** on the subject, has not been capable of considering fully the question of the **militarization** of **outer** space since **some** of its members argue that it can Only deal with the promotion of international co-operation in this field,

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**In the meantime** the international community looks on as **two** multilateral bodies of limited membership shirk the responsibility of undertaking the urgent task of stopping the arms race in outer space, *Ten years from a new millennium, and five from the* fiftieth anniversary of the **creation** of the United Nations, **we must** all of us redouble our efforts to consolidate **a more just and equitable and, above all, a less armed world.**

Mr. PIREK (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, allow me to congratulate you on your election to the office of Chairman **of** the First **Committee** and to assure you of the readiness of the delegation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to work together with you and with all delegations for the achievement of positive results at this session.

I agree with the evaluation made by many previous speakers that the current session of the First Committee, and that of the General Assembly as a whole, is taking place under very special historic conditions. As in the case of the aggressive policy of divide et impera, an end has been put to the balance of terror. The sense of responsibility conceded to the zoon politicon by Aristotle could, therefore, begin to permeate the new, increasingly humanised legal space of the world. The strength of the pervasiveness of this process of recovery is demonstrated by the resolute reaction of the United Nations to the crisis in the Persian Gulf. For the first time in its history, the Security Council has, by its decision, demonstrated the higher principle of the collective responsibility of the international community for the preservation of peace and security in the world. The doctrine based on fear and terror and on the military approach to the security of nations has been outweighed by new all-human certainties - certainties imbued with legality, with humanistic essence and with the noble will of States to prevent armed conflicts by effective measures. Confrontation is being replaced by co-operation and partnership. Security ceases to be the domain of only the strong of the world and former moralizing monologues are taking the shape of partner-like, open and needed useful dialogue.

**As** the representative **of** a country located in the heart of Europe, I am proud that it is precisely the nations of Central Europe that have emerged as the effective catalyst **of** the democratic transformations and of peaceful co-operation. They have renounced military blocs and are merging into an alliance of new eternal

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values. In this context one cannot but **emphasize** yet another important circumstance.

The consequences of the cold war can be eliminated only through collective efforts and within the framework of a community of democratic States that will guarantee non-militaristic approaches to the preservation of peace. In other words: the emergence of global problems of disarmament makes it inevitable that the historically established **system** of nation States be supplemented by a new system of broader regional groupings of States fully engaged in mutual peaceful co-operation. The formation **of** such a system is highly topical, especially in Europe. In fact, the moral and material insecurity arising temporarily in some States could increase into a resurrection of militant "**isms**" - ethnic feuds and racism, long surpassed by history.

The brutality and arrogance **of** those who instigated the Gulf crisis have again urgently reminded us that disarmament has now become a categorical imperative of the conduct of all States. Therefore, we place such efforts in the forefront of our foreign policy orientation, which is aimed at the establishment of a *new* international order. One such effort is based on a relocation of the functions of military blocs to new all-European structures based **on** a common determination on the part of States even to **enforce** peace. We are convinced that peace will be like a big river into which **more** and *more* rich tributaries are streaming - if mankind is able to make such a provision. And the greater the input, the more powerful and unstoppable will be the peace resolve of States.

In our new foreign policy we attach fundamental importance to conventional **disarmament** and, as a European country, primarily to its European dimension. We regard the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe (**CFE**) and on confidence-building **measures (CBM) in** Vienna as being among the keystones of the

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new European structure. We are paying particular attention to them and expect **them** to produce tangible results.

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic supports the efforts aimed at completing a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe by the time the summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in **Europe (CSCE)** meets in Paris in November. We are doing our utmost to find a mutually acceptable compromise. **At** a meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Special Commission on Disarmament we prepared specific suggestions for all of the matters still outstanding in the **CFE** negotiations. At issue are the national levels and ceilings of combat equipment for the individual Warsaw Treaty countries. That is a prerequisite for the adoption of an overall treaty that is to set collective ceilings for the two alliances.

The ministerial meeting, here in New York, of representatives of the 35 CSCE States as well as the outcome of the talks between the United States Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister have given a new impetus to the negotiations. We are in favour of the convening of one more meeting of ministers for foreign affairs: at it the CFE Treaty should be initialled and a final agreement reached on the modalities for the **summit**.

My **country** considers the final document of the Paris summit, entitled "Democratic, Peaceful and united Europe", which is currently under preparation, as a paper of crucial significance in that it not only classifies the changes in Europe but also profiles the role, further development and institutionalisation of the CSCE process.

**Let me now** mention some issues of arms **control** and disarmament, and of international arms transfers, to all **of** which we are devoting constant attention. **We** regard them as integral components of the confidence-building **process**. The Group of **Experts** studying the role **of** the United Nations in the field of verification, **which** included a **representative** of my country, **successfully** completed

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its work this year. The Czechoslovak delegation considered the outcome of the Group's work to be good and therefore recommends the study to the First Committee for its approval.

The discontinuation of arms supplies, especially to areas of tension and conflicts, is a new and important part of my country's foreign policy. In the long run, this will be conducive to greater openness and confidence. The result of the work of the Secretary-General's group dealing with this subject - a study to be presented to the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session - is, in our opinion, much needed, both in the international context and as a useful point of reference for internal consideration of this topic.

In the recent past, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic has been unilaterally reducing the manpower strength of its armed forces, and also its' combat equipment. Far-reaching organisational changes are being carried out in the Czechoslovak army. Defence spending is also being gradually scaled down. In 1989 this amounted to 35.62 Czechoslovak crowns; the sum envisaged for this year is 31.18 billion, which represents a cut of 12.5 per cent. Last April the Federal Government decided to terminate military production in a number of major plants. That simultaneously triggered off some concrete measures in the sphere of conversion from military to civilian industries.

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This process, which involves structural changes in the Czechoslovak economy and affects the field of social welfare, is not an easy one. All this is taking place against the background of a fundamental transition to the principles of a market economy, which is imposing tremendous demands on the country's population and economy. Yet the conversion is necessary and cannot be avoided. The results achieved and the experience gained, whether good or bad, may then serve as a source of knowledge for other **countries**.

In the newly existing situation, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic has taken a principled stance on the issue of military expenditures. Pursuant to a relevant General Assembly resolution, we have submitted a report on our military expenditures, compiled in accordance with the United Nations standardised system of reporting. Those data were presented also at the negotiations of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Vienna. They reflect in detail the situation in the 1989 fiscal year. Czechoslovakia intends to continue to submit **these** data and calls upon all other Member **States** that have **not** yet done so to subscribe to a similar practice.

As a country situated in Central Europe, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic underscores the importance of regional and subregional initiatives. At the same time, the fact that we are paying attention to regional affairs does not mean we underestimate global problems or the role played by the United Nations in efforts **to solve** them. In fact, the results of a regional approach to disarmament issues in Europe may have a favourable effect on other multilateral negotiations **or show a path** to be **followed** by other regions of the world as well.

As to the **global** questions of disarmament, we deem it to be necessary to concentrate efforts, first and foremost, on the speedy **finalization of** the Convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, The relevant

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resolution of the First Committee should therefore include an appeal to conclude **the work on** the convention next year, and an appeal for the adoption by as **many** countries as possible of a commitment to become the original parties to the convention. We regard the successful **finalization** of the convention as proof of countries' readiness to embark upon the road of strengthening world stability.

With a view to helping enhance the atmosphere of trust and to speeding up those negotiations, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic made public this year detailed data on its own peacetime chemical potential and tested, experimentally, **the** usefulness and feasibility of the proposed challenge inspections. A few days ago my country withdrew its reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, thus **committing** itself to abide by it unconditionally.

We are convinced that conditions have grown ripe also for accelerating the process **of** nuclear disarmament, which was set in motion by the Soviet-United States Treaty on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The pronouncements made at the Soviet-United States **summit** in Washington, the proposals contained in the London Declaration of the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (**NATO**), and, last but not least, the deliberations at the recently concluded **Fourth** Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty **on** the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons confirm this fact. **Even** the absence **of** a **final** document does not detract from the significance of the Conference. It thoroughly reviewed the implementation **of** all articles and provisions of the Treaty. It helped to clarify the positions in the field or, possibly, **some aspects**, of nuclear disarmament. The discussion there indicated **a** very close convergence **of** views on co-operation in **the** peaceful uses **of** nuclear **energy**, on the evaluation of the **work of** the International **Atomic Energy Agency** and the Agency's safeguards system, and on the **need for** consistent verification **of** compliance with the non-proliferation **régime**.

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The Conference reaffirmed the necessity speedily to open serious negotiations, at both the bilateral and the multilateral levels, on a complete and universal ban on nuclear-weapon tests. To this end, bilateral Soviet-United States talks are of decisive importance as is, from the multilateral point of view, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. As far as the latter is concerned, we appreciate the setting **up this** year, on the basis of a compromise mandate originally proposed by the Czechoslovak delegation, of a working committee on the issue of a nuclear-weapon-test ban. It is **our** view that under the relevant resolution of the First Committee the general Assembly should decide that the working committee should continue its activities in 1991. In view of the progress in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, to which I have already referred, we shall support efforts to reduce the number of resolutions on this topic. Pressure to reach a comprehensive solution to the whole question will be brought to bear, too, by the amendment conference on the partial test-ban Treaty in January 1991, which a **Czechoslovak** delegation will also attend.

The **subject** of prevention of a nuclear war is closely related to the issue of **military** doctrines. This is another area we are following very carefully. We **welcome the outcome of the NATO** summit in London, in particular the **development** of the alliance's positions on short-range missiles **and on** the use of nuclear weapons.

**In** regard to the issue **of** preventing the spread **of** the **arms race to outer space**, the **Czechoslovak** delegation at the Conference on **Disarmament in Geneva** wishes to *rely* on a **committee** there which would have a clearly defined mandate. That would **make it possible** to start discussing specific items, **such** as confidence-building measures in outer space.

The **demands** for **safeguards** to prevent **the use or threat** of use of nuclear weapons **against** non-nuclear-weapon **States** were urgently **reflected** at the **Fourth Review Conference** of the Parties to the **Treaty** on the Non-Proliferation

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of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference on Disarmament should continue intensive discussion of this topic in the spirit of the suggestions that emerged at that forum. Within the framework of the First Committee, we advocate combining the two traditional yet parallel resolutions.

It is encouraging to note an increasing United Nations role in dealing with questions concerning **arms** control and disarmament - and not only here. Because it is a global organisation, the United Nations fully reflects the current broad understanding of international security. The delegation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is participating in the endeavours to enhance the comprehensive role of **the** United Nations and of its system in the field of disarmament. At **the** same time, **however**, our eyes are not closed to the need to rationalize many a **component** of **this** large machinery.

**The** general debate in **the** First Committee should be shorter, more subject-related and more specific. Thus, more time would be spared for an exchange of views on **the major** outstanding problems of the day. The Czechoslovak delegation is in favour of **the** adoption of a fewer number of resolutions, given that their content is **often** very similar, if not identical. We shall seek primarily to **achieve** resolutions **with** a practical effect.

The **activization** of efforts to **reorganise** the Conference on Disarmament in **Geneva has come** at an opportune time. It is the result not only of sound dialogue, but also of **the** needs of the present time. However, the approach to the **Conference's** work **should** also be changed so that not all but, rather, only some agenda **items are** considered in one **single** negotiating round. That would make it **possible** to concentrate all the potential needed to achieve long-overdue results.

In thin **context, we** welcome the **already** accomplished rationalisation of the

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work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in which we have actively participated. This will constitute a basis for next year's work, in accordance with agreed rules. We see it as an example, also, for other forums - with, naturally, due regard being paid to the purpose, meaning and possibilities of each of them.

(Mr. Pirek, Czechoslovakia)

The great philosopher Immanuel Kant **has** already been quoted **numerous times** in **United Nations forums** as a **wise man** who **revealed to** the world not only the rationality of peace but also **its indispensability**. But allow me in **conclusion** to restate his convictions as a practical humanistic thinker, **As** early as 200 years **ago he was able to understand that a community of democratic States** would be able to avoid **war** if it were **able to** enforce peace, If only for that reason, we **support** the setting **up** of a **security** structure that would rest on such reasonable guarantees **as** could be reached gradually in a process **of** real disarmament.

Mr. AWOONOR (Ghana) : **Since** this is **my** first statement in the First Committee, let me congratulate you, Sir, and the other Committee officers, on your election **to** the posts in which you will guide our deliberations. The Ghana delegation will co-operate with you in the discharge *of your responsibilities,*'

The **First** Committee has begun its work **against the** background **of** the encouraging trends **in** international relations **that** were already apparent during last year's **session of the Committee**. That **is true** despite the regrettable **events in the** Gulf and pockets **of** tension in **some** regions. Changed East-West relations have transformed Europe from a long-standing scene of ideological rivalry and incipient military **confrontation** into an area **of** constructive co-operation and the **promotion of mutual trust**, Our fervent hope is that this laudable detente will be used to serve the interests of all nations big and small,

Two years ago the international focus was on the Treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range **missiles** - the INF Treaty. Today the aspirations are much **greater**, **In** Malta at the beginning of the year and in Washington last June the super-Powers held out the promise of a whole range of disarmament agreements in 1990. Equally **encouraging** was the significant progress announced a fortnight ago on the

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conventional-arms-reduction talks going **on** in Vienna, indicating that **arms control** has caught up with **the** important political changes sweeping Europe.

In other regions we have **seen** manifest the will of the international **community** **to** settle conflicts through peaceful dialogue. These encouraging developments **are** beginning to have a significant **impact** on **arms** control and disarmament.

However reassuring these developments are, they have not changed the **sombre** realities facing us all. The world is still threatened by the massive stocks contained in **nuclear** arsenals. Even after **a treaty** under the strategic arms reduction talks (START), there will be over 35,000 operational nuclear warheads in the world.

This is therefore not a time **for** complacency. It is rather a time for redoubled efforts which would take advantage **of** the ongoing developments. This Committee, therefore, has no choice but to improve upon its performance **of last** year. The conclusions **of** its deliberations, in our view, should be seen to **move** the disarmament process forward, even **if** only by a modest step. The Ghana delegation will, as in the past, co-operate with like-minded delegations in the achievement **of** this objective.

A nuclear-test ban remains an intractable problem. Ghana attaches great importance to the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We believe that is the **most** practical way **of** halting and de-escalating the nuclear-arms race because testing constitutes the further development **of** nuclear arms. We therefore welcome the re-establishment by the Conference on Disarmament, during its July 1990 session, **of** the Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear testing. The re-establishment **of** that Committee offers a long awaited opportunity to focus attention on the important item of nuclear-weapon testing. **We** note that the

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Committee has agreed to resume substantive work during the 1991 session. My delegation would like to hope that the resumed work will focus on central issues and will proceed to a meaningful exchange of views on a test ban,

We cannot help but register profound regret over the **failure** of the review Conference of parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty last month to reach consensus on a final document, primarily because of differences over nuclear-weapon testing. Although we welcome the progress on the important issues of full-scope safeguards, security assurances and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, the failure to agree on the crucial issue of a test ban clearly shows that much still remains to be done. We urge the depositary States which claim they support general and complete disarmament to demonstrate their sincerity by changing their position on the issue of nuclear testing.

To be effective, a test ban, in **our** view, must be comprehensive and should cover all environments and systems including so-called peaceful nuclear **explosions**. The increasing waves of weapons testing - a total of 27 instances as estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for the year 1989 alone - are incompatible with claims to a sincere commitment to general and complete disarmament, even if the number of nuclear explosions in 1969 was significantly lower than the total of 40 recorded in 1988. **The** ongoing bilateral initiatives by the super-Powers do not preclude **the** modernization of their **weapon systems** and therefore cannot, in our view, contribute to the cessation of the qualitative development of their nuclear capabilities and systems. With Germany united, with the new thinking on **the future of the** North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, and with Eastern European States edging into a more Western orbit, **how much relevance can one attach** to the theory of so-called deterrence?

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Nor is verification any longer an issue, as some have always **claimed it to** be. There **is** a consensus within the scientific **community** that nuclear explosions can be detected through the available **network of high-performance seismic stations**, space observatories and satellite detecting stations. Besides, the United States-USSR joint verification experiment provides ample examples **of** the willingness of the **two** super-Powers to allow highly intrusive on-site inspections to **verify agreements** on nuclear testing.

The credible scientific view also **has** it that **a** test ban would not render existing nuclear weapons unreliable. According to **an** article published by the Washington-based **Center** for **Defense** Information in the April 1989 issue **of** **The Defense Monitor**, eight renowned nuclear-weapon experts, including Morris Bradbury, **former** Director of the Los **Alamos** National Laboratories, told the United States **Congress** in **1985** that continued nuclear testing was not **necessary** to ensure the reliability of existing nuclear-weapons stockpiles. The best way **way** to confirm reliability, **Bradbury** stated, was to disassemble sample weapons and subject the components to non-nuclear tests.

**We** urge those who have been using the argument of verification capabilities and stockpile reliability to block **progress** on **a** nuclear-test **ban to initiate** appropriate action to end nuclear testing, thereby creating conditions for final, credible and real nuclear disarmament.

It is the view of **my** delegation that the issue of conventional disarmament and the international transfer of **arms** should receive no less attention in this debate. In this connection, the Ghana delegation welcomed the report **a fortnight** ago that an accord had been reached in principle on conventional **arms in Europe**.

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**It is our hope that the emerging accord will serve to strengthen the new political order in Europe through the elimination of excess weapons and will thus put an end to over four decades of division and mistrust in that part of the world. We also hope the accord will be ready for signature at the planned Paris summit next month.**

(Mr. Awoonor, Ghana)

Arms transfer has become a disturbing phenomenon which **must** be addressed. The tragic events in the Gulf with their destabilising global effects are partly the result of unrestricted transfer of arms to an already volatile region. In their anxiety to exploit the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, **some** Member States, regrettably, became reckless in the effort to help their national businesses **make money**. The events in the Gulf should therefore offer sobering reflections on the unbridled transfer of arms, particularly to regions of conflict.

It is also our view that the benefit of the emerging accord on conventional arms **reduction** in Europe would be neutralized if the surplus **arms** made available by the proposed legal limits **were either** sold or transferred to so-called allies in the developing countries. We **therefore** appeal to those planning to dispose of **their** surplus weapons **in this manner** to reconsider their position in the interest of strengthening the disarmament process. The tendency to **make maximum profits, even** from **those** disposable weapons, under this laudable accord should be scrupulously avoided if already sensitive regional issues are not to explode into ugly armed conflicts.

**The** Ghana delegation will again support **any** draft resolution intended to curb the emerging phenomenon of arms transfer. It remains our view, however, that a realistic approach to the problem lies in greater attention **to** conflict-resolution, strict adherence to the principle of **non-interference** in the internal affairs of others, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the promotion of mutual trust.

**My** delegation has noted in the report by the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical-weapons **convention** that a **number** of differences still **remain to be bridged before** the elaboration of the draft **convention**. We had thought the conclusion of the draft was within our reach, given the enormous interest expressed in the treaty negotiations. **We would** urge greater flexibility and **compromise** to bridge the existing differences on the draft **text**.

(Mr. Awoonor, Ghana)

In his statement on 25 September in the General Assembly, the leader of our delegation welcomed the Nash-Gorbachev agreement at their recent Washington Summit on the non-production of chemical weapons, and the destruction of the bulk of their chemical-weapons stockpiles before the conclusion of the chemical-weapons convention. However, the **decision** to keep residual stockpiles until all **chemical-weapon-capable** States adhere to the convention would not, in our view, help the course of the negotiations.

Among the major issues that deserve urgent attention, now that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is entering the final stages of the negotiations, is a convention that is universal and comprehensive. Universality would demand that all States cease the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons; it **would** include the termination of all modernization programmes and of the **residual** retention of existing stocks. Anything short of this approach would, in our view, **undermine** what could otherwise be a major accomplishment in **arms control** and disarmament. Our objective should be to improve upon the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Ghana continues to support the peaceful **use** of outer space, and therefore **remains** opposed to the extension of any military competition or activity into outer **space**. Our stand has always been in conformity with United Nations resolutions which have affirmed that outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is the common heritage of mankind and **must** therefore be preserved exclusively *for* **peaceful purposes in the interest of all nations**. My delegation will therefore, as in the past, support all measures that would halt the **development** of space **weapons**, including anti-satellite weapons, as well as a workable **and** effective mutually agreed programme that will ban space weapons.

Ghana has supported and continues to support the **concept**: of **nuclear-free zones**, because such **zones** have **the potential for strengthening nuclear**

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non-proliferation. It is therefore **a matter of** deep **regret** that Africa's desire to remain nuclear-free continues to be thwarted by the racist **régime** of South Africa. The continued nuclear activities **of** South Africa and its allies on the continent, including the testing of nuclear **arms**, has seriously undermined the wishes of Africa. It is regretted that the Secretary-General's final report under resolution **44/113** B of 15 December 1989 is not ready for our study as we take the floor. We hope that what finally **comes** out will clarify the position on the allegations that collaboration between a **member** State and South Africa has resulted in the development by South Africa of a nuclear-tipped missile.

In order further to strengthen the ongoing talks on the future **of** South Africa, we urge the South African Government to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty without any pre-conditions. We also call upon other countries which have **not** yet done so to accede to the Treaty. Universal accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is vital for the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

We are happy that the Disarmament Commission succeeded during its session last spring in reaching consensus agreement on a number of its old agenda items. We **look** forward to the adoption of shorter agenda items, which should include **items on** which agreement could be reached. Long and over-ambitious agenda items, in **mar** view, can and should be avoided.

We also welcome the practical proposals **made by you**, Mr. Chairman, during the informal exchange of views last week, **on further rationalization of the work of** the First Committee. My delegation will co-operate with you *and* with **other** like-minded delegations to ensure a more business-like approach to our work. **We** need to avoid repetitive and, at times, counterproductive approaches which **make** the work of **the** Committee unnecessarily long and **cumbersome**.

(Mr. Awoonor, Ghana)

**Finally**, arms control and disarmament continue to be among the **major** concerns of the international **community**. This is demonstrated by the large number of resolutions **the** general Assembly adopts every year on disarmament issues alone. **With** the improved international climate, an opportunity now exists for addressing with positive hope disarmament issues which a **few years** ago would have appeared intractable. For the attainment of the General Assembly's objective of general and complete disarmament, however, tangible progress needs to be made on all aspects of **disarmament**. **This implies greater** flexibility and commitment, particularly *with* regard to the resolution of conflicts through peaceful negotiations.

**We** also hope that the developing climate ushered in by disarmament will enable all of us, small and big nations, to avoid the temptation of clandestinely **acquiring arms**. This will defeat the entire international **effort**.

The different positions **expressed already** in the current debate point to the **challenging tasks** before this **Committee**. The Ghana delegation hopes the First **Committee** will *again* prove **equal** to its daunting task by increasing the number of consensus resolutions **it** submits to the General Assembly.

**The CHAIRMAN** has just heard the last speaker on the list of **speakers** for this **afternoon's** meeting.

I shall now call on **those** representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of **reply**. Before doing so I should like to remind representatives that the **Committee** will follow the procedure outlined at the previous meeting.

**Mr. LEDOGAR** (United States of America): I wish to speak in exercise of our right of **reply**, in order to **answer** remarks made here yesterday by the representative of **Iraq**.

The First Committee is not the proper place for the detailed consideration of the Gulf crisis initiated by **Iraq's** brutal invasion of Kuwait. **However**, it is

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certainly appropriate to take note of Iraq's unwarranted use of military force against its smaller neighbour. Such aggression is a reminder of the vital importance of our work, In this regard, Iraq's abuses of its international obligations have been pointed out repeatedly since the beginning of the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly. Virtually every speaker here in the First Committee has noted these violations. It is clear that Iraq stands isolated.

I shall not comment on the specific remarks made by the representative of Iraq yesterday afternoon. I would simply point out that we in this Committee are working to build a safer and more secure world, a world in which *differences* will not be addressed by force. As Ambassador Pickering said in the general debate in the General Assembly, actions such as those carried out since 2 August by Iraq in the Gulf represent a relic from a violent past, a past we hope to leave behind us. Those actions profoundly threaten the kind of world order we are working to achieve.

**Mr. MALIK (Iraq)** (interpretation from **Arabic**): The representative of the United States should **be the** last person to speak **of international** order, **international** law or international security, His country **has the** worst track **record** in the world **when** it **cornea** to violating international law and order and trampling upon international norms, Has the representative **of** the United States forgotten **his** country's **invasions** of Grenada and Panama? Or is he **naive** enough to believe **that he can** deceive this **gathering** of representatives with his **claims**?

That is all I **have to say**.

**The CHAIRMAN:** I *now* call on Mr, Kheradi, Secretary of the Committee, who *has* **some** announcements to make pertaining to documentation,

**Mr. KHERADI** (Secretary of the Committee); o d r a w t h e Committee's attention to document **A/C.1/45/INF/1**, which lists the documents before the First Committee at the current session,

It should be noted that that document includes references **only** to documents that **were** issued **as of 12 October**. Accordingly, the updated version to be issued shortly will **list** additional **documents**, including certain reports of the Secretary-General that have been issued **since** that **date**.

**In** that **context**, I **would** also wish to assure delegations that, despite various constraints related to the processing **of** documentation as it **moves** from the **stage** of substantive preparation **to** the stage of technical production and issuance, every **possible effort** is being **made** by the Secretariat to bring out the remaining documents, including the one referred to by the representative of Ghsna, as **expeditiously** as possible.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.